WRITTEN SOMEWHERE: THE SOCIAL SPACE OF TEXT
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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the space of text, with the composition of that space, its form and substance, and also with the perception and experience of that space. The argument takes in existing theoretical attempts to explain the spatiality of texts, particularly Joseph Frank's 1945 essay "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," and tests their ideas against literary texts which, it will be argued, make a vital contribution to our comprehension of textual space. The keys texts studied are John Banville's *Kepler*, Paul Auster's *City of Glass*, Kazuo Ishiguro's *The Unconsoled*, and the works of Thomas Pynchon.

As an understanding of the space of text develops, the work of Henri Lefebvre, and especially his 1974 text *The Production of Space*, comes increasingly to the fore. Criticising traditional philosophical concepts of space, which tend to view space in either purely physical or mental terms, Lefebvre's work enables us to place the discussion on textual space within a wider context. Textual space is seen to emerge as a social space, and thus a social product, capable of being employed in different ways within society, as a representation of space, aligned with mental space, or as a representational space, allied to lived spaces. The final sections of the thesis explore the reader's experience of this lived textual space, and question the role and place of textual space in the social realm.
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Then what hope do I have of attaining the thing I push away? My hope lies in the materiality of language, in the fact that words are things, too, are a kind of nature - this is given to me and gives me more than I can understand. Just now the reality of words was an obstacle. Now, it is my only chance. . . . Everything physical takes precedence: rhythm, weight, mass, shape, and then the paper on which one writes, the trail of the ink, the book.

Maurice Blanchot, "Literature and the Right to Death"
INTRODUCTION
In Henri Lefebvre's short essay "A Vision," he describes his experience of a swim out to sea, perhaps going further than was wise for he "was out alone and the water was rather choppy" (127).1 Because Lefebvre's work informs much of what will follow, this essay on a vision, though brief, provides an excellent overview of the concerns of the coming argument. In this thesis, the discussion is always on the space of the text, dealing firstly with the composition of this space, its substance and structure, but later analysing how the space is perceived, asking how, indeed, we can ever achieve a vision of the space of the text. The final question concerns the location of textual space, where it lies, and what happens there.

The first part of this discussion, looking at the form of the space of text, takes in the first two chapters, and deals with the physical, mental, and social aspects of textual spatiality. This tripartite division is a Lefebvrean strategy, for the undisturbed binarism is a rarity in Lefebvre's work, as seen in "A Vision" where the first few lines place Lefebvre in a space of three elements, water, wind, and earth. The last of these, seen in the distance as "the pebbled slope of the beach . . . the yellow strip of sand," extending "up steeply" and back from the shoreline as land, solid ground, and yet also sloping down, below the water, as the sea-bed, is a suitable image for the physicality of the text, its material existence, which underlies all textual space (127, 130). The first chapter begins with this physical dimension, with the book as an object to be held in the hand, with the printed word on the page, but the space of the text soon emerges as something less familiarly solid, produced by disturbances in the line of the text which curl the pages back upon themselves, marking the printed line with points which intersect, coincide, and repeat. As Lefebvre says:

This becoming is not a commonplace flux, an ever-flowing river, a shapeless mobility, a never-ending fluidity, a linear movement in which ephemeral happenings appear and disappear. It is a remorseless repetition of sameness which is never quite the same, of otherness which is never quite other than what it is, since the repetitions grow larger or smaller, reach a crashing, convulsive climax or fade peacefully away.

(129)

The space of the text becomes now a product of "this mixture of the real and the imaginary: repetition" where to read a text is to swim in the sea where "wave follows

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1All quotations in the Introduction are from Lefebvre's "A Vision."
wave, each wave like the other, and yet the waves which have passed are completely
different from the waves which are to come" (129, 127-28). Suddenly, the aim of the
swim is not simply to return to the distant shore, but to take in the surface of the sea
itself, where "in fascinating simultaneity, present, past and future are juxtaposed" (128).

In the second chapter, this seemingly natural space, the vast sea, assumes a
social aspect. The reader, wading through the text page by page, is seen in the context
of a sea which, ridged with waves "like an incalculable number of backbones," is
oriented towards the body at its heart, the rhythms of the water seen to support or
oppose this "minute organism caught up in these undulating movements which is
fiercely defending its precarious frontiers - teeth clenched, eyes closed, lips sealed tight"
(127, 129). The "multiple, polyrhythmic" movement of the water, of the text, plays out
"before my eyes and my lips," so that "at the centre of this chaos of repetition, within
this gigantic being, I maintain an order, my order" (129, 128). Though the reader may
strive to comprehend the text as an existing whole, this vision of the text in its entirety is
incomplete without recognising the place of the reader in the text also, without
identifying the part that the reader plays. This discovery may, for the reader, ultimately
prove the most significant one: "through this vision of simultaneity reality becomes
restructured, a shifting totality, roaring, buffeting, overwhelming: the sea. The vision is
of something intangible, something elusive, a strange and liberating truth. This
simultaneity exists for me and because of me" (128).

The third chapter, recognising the importance of the vision of the space of the
text, confronts the difficulties in gaining this vision, for, as a reader, "I am surrounded . .
. by a fluidity which I can touch, which I can control; yet I cannot grasp it in my hands"
(128). In particular, the discussion revolves around those points where "a wave lifted
me up," where the reader seems granted some special insight into the space of the text,
but always with the awareness that "not everything is visible to me. There is always
something else, always something unexpected, always something which seems to be a
fragment but is suddenly a whole" (127, 129). The contradictory or seemingly divergent
effects of the textual space are analysed, where the text "enfolds me like a mother,
gently stroking the back of my neck, but still trying to smother me;" "if I cannot
overcome it, I shall die" (129, 128). If, "from anxiety, the vision was born," then this
chapter takes a suitably psychoanalytical approach, its argument converging at the end
on two extremes, life and death, and suggesting that it is in the tension between the two
that we find the unique experience of textual space: "never before have I experienced my own strength and willpower so clearly. And the hesitant emergence of consciousness" (127, 131).

The fourth and final chapter attempts to analyse the place of textual space in the world, finding that the text is not something easily contained on the shelf, but something indeed fluid and extensive. "On all sides there are boundaries, limits, and deepness, that other deepness, the deepness of sky and water," so that the text is hardly a thing of two dimensions, spread thin across a page bordered by margins to the edge of the paper, but multi-dimensional, reaching down and out and up, connecting itself to new places, different contexts, for "the fearful turbulence of the waves happens only in the space shared by the air, the wind, the light, the sea, the marches of sky and ocean, their common limits. There are three. Not two. And myself" (130). The end of the chapter, and of the thesis, discusses what might happen in this open, intersecting, playful, and social space of text.
I

WRITING THE SPACE OF TEXT: PHYSICAL AND MENTAL SPACE
Place a book on its bottom edge, where the extreme edges of the spine and of the front and back covers frame, on three sides, a plainly solid surface (which is yet formed by the accumulation and compression of, of course, paper-thin slivers of material), and it tends to stand rather unstably, toppling easily, and falling over onto its front or back where it might, briefly, slide on a cushion of trapped air before settling in a new, prone position. To prevent this from happening, you might try opening the book up, so that its footprint changes from its rectangular configuration to something more fan-shaped, the pages sweeping out a sector of that circle whose radius they determine by their width, and the greater rigidity of the covers strengthening the standing structure. Alternatively, you might find that a book with a higher page count, and so a larger surface area on its lower end, is more stable than a thinner book. You could even mimic this effect, to a certain extent, by standing the slimmer books together so that they support each other, each pushing equally against the other and still standing, though usually only so long as the end books, too, are given some support. You might find that the best way to achieve this is to set the last book at an angle against the second-last, and so, with this small sacrifice in the vertical order, you succeed at last in keeping your books upright (the greater sacrifice is to use a bookend, an alien object when placed on a shelf of books alone). Surely the best solution is to fill a shelf of a purpose-built bookcase, made to store your books in perfect order. Invariably, you find that, soon, another shelf is filled, and, before long, you have a veritable library of books, maybe thirty-five books on each shelf, five shelves to each wall, their spines laying bare their titles to the eyes which run along the rows, scanning the lines.2

Looking over at my own bookshelves, the lines read, first, Paul Auster's *The Art of Hunger*, followed by *Ground Work*, by the same author, *In the Country of Last Things*, *The Invention of Solitude*, *The New York Trilogy*. Then there's *Kepler* by John Banville, and *The Newton Letter*. Further along the line I read the names of Jorge Luis Borges, Don DeLillo, Umberto Eco, but I have to look to my left, to the other shelves at the end of the room, to see *The Remains of the Day* by Kazuo Ishiguro, *The Unconsoled*, *When We Were Orphans*, and, on the shelf above these actually, George Perec's *Life A User's Manual*, and six books by Thomas Pynchon. The end support is

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2The familiar custom of shelving books with their spines facing out did not always hold. When, due to the rarity of books, they were chained to their lecterns for security, they were also shelved with their spines facing in, partly because the spines did not yet bear any identifying marks, but also because "the
provided by the thick volume of the poems of W. B. Yeats, and a hardback copy of the 1969 reprint of his *A Vision*. This work, as well as some of those by Auster, disrupt, I suppose, my categorising of these shelves as shelves of fiction. My non-fiction shelves, fewer in number, I see from here also. I can read the names of Roland Barthes, Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault (there's quite a French feel to these shelves), Sigmund Freud, Gérard Genette, J. Hillis Miller, Edmond Jabès, Henri Lefebvre. This non-fiction section, my theory, begins on the lowest shelf across from me, and works its way up towards fiction, which fills a shelf before continuing on those other shelves to the left, beginning again now on the lowest, moving on up. Except at the level of the individual line, it seems I must read my shelves backwards, up and to the left instead of down the page and to the right, but this couldn't really be avoided, the space of the room required it.  

If our purpose here is to explore the concept of a textual spatiality, surely we can say that this, at least, is the space of books, their natural habitat, ranged out along the shelves for consumption or storage, tightly pressed into lines of vertical contact. The aim of this chapter will be to move from this tangible, bookish space, to an understanding of what it is that we might mean, or not mean, by a textual spatiality. In truth, this chapter will be as much concerned with identifying what should not be described as textual space as what should, for, as we review the work of those we can term spatial theorists, we shall discover that no matter what common ground they share, the terms of their discussions never entirely overlap. Ultimately, it will be argued that those very characteristics which most clearly distinguish textual space have not yet been fully accounted for in the theories which purport to describe it. This chapter, then, paves the way for the introduction, in the second chapter, of the work of Lefebvre, whose analyses of the production of space highlight the inadequacy of other approaches, and better enable us to place textual space.

This question of placing, the question of where we find and encounter textual space, the question of how it is formed or forms itself, and of how we recognise it, will be the focus of this chapter. These questions ask us what it is we see when we look at

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3If spaces can determine the order of books, the opposite is also true. For example, "A chained book cannot be read unless there is some kind of desk or table on which to rest it within the length of the chain; that fact conditioned the structure of the bookcase. Again, since a chained book cannot be moved to the..." (Petroski 78).
books on shelves: bound paper objects, pages of printed text, or rectangular windows on other worlds (the streets of New York city, Central Europe four hundred years ago, a Parisian apartment building). Perec, for example, who writes of that Parisian building, sees his words project a virtual space, "a long goods train drawn by a steam locomotive passes over a viaduct; barges laden with gravel ply the canals," but the final image is of writing, "sitting deep in thought at their table, writers are forming lines of words," for the route to these worlds is through the text, "this is how space begins, with words only, signs traced on the blank page" (Species of Spaces, 14, 15, 13). This relation between the virtual world of the text and the printed words of the text, placed by Perec at the beginning and at the end of the spatial experience, will concern us throughout our discussion, but an indication of where our investigation might lead us is illustrated by Perec's own text, Life A User's Manual. Here, Perec "imagines a Parisian apartment building whose façade has been removed . . . so that all the rooms in the front, from the ground floor up to the attics, are instantly and simultaneously visible" (Species of Spaces 40). The revealed space of the apartment building, "adapted, what's more, to a board of 10 squares by 10," can act for us as an illustration of the books on our shelves, ten books to each of ten shelves, each book a window onto a virtual world and the "activities unfolding in them" (Perec, Species of Spaces 40). Now, my books are arranged alphabetically, so I would move from world to world in alphabetical order, going shelf by shelf. Perec does not move through the world of the apartment building row by row, but his route is strictly regulated nonetheless, determined by the "moves made by a chess knight," and requiring that he visit all but one of the squares just once (there are only ninety-nine chapters as the bottom left-hand square is not described) (Perec, Species of Spaces 40). If the rooms of the apartment building are like the sections of a jigsaw puzzle, then the line of the text is presented as the solution to the puzzle, recording in proper order our movement through the world of the building, and only then allowing us to perceive its story, for "the pieces are readable, take on a sense, only when assembled" (Perec, Life 189).

The line of the text, however, takes its place on the page where, as Perec says, "I write: I inhabit my sheet of paper, I invest it, I travel across it. I incite blanks, spaces (jumps in the meaning: discontinuities, transitions, changes of key" (Species of Spaces window, the window must be near the book; that determined the plan of the building" (Streeter, qtd. in Petroski 60).
Here, movement at the level of the page is seen to occur independently of that movement through the world described by the page, the written word producing spaces of its own, discontinuities in the line. For example, *Life A User's Manual* begins with the Preamble, "To begin with, the art of jigsaw puzzles seems of little substance," so imagine our surprise when we encounter, again, at the beginning of chapter forty-four, "To begin with, the art of jigsaw puzzles seems of little substance" (189), the preamble, a preamble no longer, repeated, begun again. Now, suddenly, a connection exists between two parts of the text aside from their link as parts of the chain, the line of chapters which form the text. The possibility emerges that there is more than one route through the text, more than one solution to the puzzle of how to tell this story. This is hinted at in the description of Winckler sorting his labels from around the world. "He wanted," writes Perec, "to sort the labels into order, but it was very difficult: of course, there was chronological order, but he found it poor, even poorer than alphabetical order. . . . What he would have liked would be to link each label to the next, but each time in respect of something else . . . or a relationship based not on similarity but on opposition or a fragile, almost arbitrary association" (*Life* 31-32). No matter what order is settled upon, the other relations remain, disturbing the assumed proper order of the line and diverting our attention elsewhere.

If this is a clue to the nature of textual space, and this chapter will argue that it is, then, strangely, another difficulty in defining the nature of the space of text is the fact that we are actually so very familiar with it, for an implicit recognition of the text as a space produced by the interaction of repeating and linked elements affecting the path of the line is already evident in a number of long-employed textual elements. The sense that there are "further trajectories" available to the reader, apart from the direct line of the text, occurs whenever we encounter a note, for example, for as Butor observes, "The reader is manifestly invited to read the text twice: once by continuing straight through the sentence, the second time via the detour of the note" ("Object" 56, 50). Genette also argues that the note helps to "reduce the famous and sometimes regrettable linearity of discourse," acting as "a local detour or a momentary fork in the text" (*Paratexts* 328). Butor also observes that "in the most sequential works, a table of contents can help me recapture the volume's simultaneity" ("Object" 56), but it is the index which more truly

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4Perec remarks that "I am very fond of footnotes at the bottom of the page, even if I don't have anything in particular to clarify there" (*Species of Spaces* 11n).
indicates the interwoven nature of the printed line, providing, as it does, a cross-section of the many lines which extend the length of the text, often running unseen alongside the printed line, but capable, at any moment, of re-inserting themselves into the textual line, of entering again into the flow of print. Moreover, the entries in the index reveal to us the various paths which we may take through the text. The index enables us to "look up a certain word or subject without obliging us to reread the work from beginning to end" (Butor, "Object" 56), so freeing us from the printed line, and granting us access to a single, intersecting line as it winds its way through the text. We may move through Life A User's Manual like a chess knight but, if we so wish, and by referring to the index provided by Perec, we may also follow Winckler's story on page four, five, six, sixteen, twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-five to thirty-three, and so on, or Valene's on sixteen, seventeen, twenty-three, and so on.

When Perec writes, therefore, that "a wooden jigsaw puzzle ... is not a sum of elements to be distinguished from each other and analysed discretely, but a pattern, that is to say a form, a structure" (Preamble and 189), we should ask if it is the structure of the jigsaw or the form of the picture painted on it which should be the focus of our attention, and whether it is not sometimes better to restructure the jigsaw, even at the expense of the picture, in order to signify new relations. This chapter will argue that the space of the text is to be found in the relations between the parts of the puzzle, in the ordering and re-ordering of the line of the text, and not in the picture, suggesting that a distinction has to be made between the space of the text and the world of the text, the virtual picture it projects (this distinction will be further illustrated in the discussion on Kepler, a slim volume whose world centres on the life of the astronomer from Weilderstadt, but whose space charts for us an entire cosmos). This space is placed somewhere between the physical and the mental, between the wood of the jigsaw pieces and the objects in the picture painted on them, between the paper pages and the world they project. Looking now at the books on their shelves, we should see neither physical spaces nor mental spaces alone, but both, and also something more which, in chapter two, and referring always to the work of Lefebvre, we will come to term social. If this seems something of a leap ahead, we need, for the moment, just to imagine again each book on the shelf as a room in an apartment building. As Perec writes:

As Genette points out, "Our modern table of contents is in reality a table of chapters, and its name is a little misappropriated," while an actual table of contents is "a sort of detailed index" (Paratexts 317n).
The inhabitants of a single building live a few inches from each other, they are separated by a mere partition wall, they share the same spaces repeated along each corridor, they perform the same movements at the same times, turning on a tap, flushing the water closet, switching on a light, laying the table, a few dozen simultaneous existences repeated from storey to storey, from building to building, from street to street. (Life 3)

Before we find our way to this place, we will begin again in the most obvious way, with the book on the shelf, working, from here, from this physical space, towards a fuller understanding of the space of text.

Volumes and area: physical spacings

Take a book from the shelf, Banville's Kepler for example, heft it in your hand, feel its weight, and you might recall that a book can be called a volume. When we call a book a volume, we aren't necessarily thinking that the book is also simply an object occupying a volume of space, but this is certainly our first, tactile encounter with the space of the text. As W. J. T. Mitchell states, "the physical existence of the text itself, is unquestionably a spatial form" (550). In fact, the very word volume can seem better suited to the larger objects, the more substantial books, the weightier tomes. We contrast them with the 'slim volume'. By all accounts, we haven't yet encountered the text, haven't yet cast our eye over the printed word, and yet it seems we are already passing judgement on it. From the very moment we took the book from the shelf, we were aware of such material details as the texture of the cover, cloth, or leather, or board, or whether the book was a hardback or paperback, and, if a hardback, whether or not it had a dust-jacket, and if this was worn or still in good condition (my copy of Ground Work is in hardback, but the paper jacket is sadly torn). 6 We will notice the very feel of the paper chosen for the pages of the book, and, at every stage, an opinion is forming of words which have yet to be read, for these tangible qualities are assumed to be the result of, or informed by, judgements already passed on the text (my copy of Kepler is just ten years old, but the paper has yellowed badly).

6 Though we are forever warned not to judge a book by its cover, Gérard Genette informs us that even "the color of the paper chosen for the cover can strongly indicate a type of book. At the beginning of the twentieth century, yellow covers were synonymous with licentious French books" (Paratexts 24).
It is not unreasonable to think that the size of a book might lend its subject a certain gravity, the weightier volume implying a weightier subject also, a more profound thesis. As Genette points out, "in the classical period, 'large formats' (quarto) were reserved for serious works . . . or for prestige editions that enshrined a literary work," although, in contrast, it seems now that "the pocket edition will long be synonymous with canonization" (Paratexts 17, 21). With publishers so intent on targeting particular sections of the reading public, and obviously aware of the fact that different formats sell to different audiences, the very size of the book becomes an indication of the publisher's expectations both regarding the nature of the text's readership, and the reaction of that readership to the text. Genette speaks, for example, of "supposed best-sellers, those famed 'beach books'," intended for holidaymakers, and made "heavy enough for the book itself to prevent a beach towel from being gone with the wind" (Paratexts 19). These are sometimes also known as 'airport novels', this second appellation drawing attention to the significance the site of purchase has in our approach to the text, and our initial reaction to it. The simple act of reaching up and removing a book from a shelf can assume a different aspect as it is repeated in an airport lounge, a highstreet bookshop, a one-pound bookshop in Greenwich, a second-hand bookstall on London's Southbank, a comic-shop, an English-language bookshop in Paris, an American chain, a public library, a college library, and so on. This distribution in space, the very positioning of the book in the world becomes, then, a part of the interpretive context. Moreover, it adds another dimension to our term the "space of text," for now it is not just that the text as a physical object occupies a volume of space, but the text is also spatialised, positioned in space, as it is copied and distributed.

The process of distribution assumes another dimension when the text involved is not a single unit but a multi-volume work, the text achieving, in its self-dispersal, a form of self-distribution also, attaining the power of multilocation. But the question of whether or not a work is contained within one or more volumes affects, of course, the internal organisation of the text also. The partitioning of the text, spreading it across the volumes, affects the construction and form of the text in its entirety, signalling for us, therefore, a first point of potential conflict between the concerns of the author and the concerns of the publisher. Genette presents us with an excellent example of the issues involved when discussing Marcel Proust's A la recherche du Temps perdu, for, as he says, "we know that Proust originally hoped to publish this work in a single thick
volume," with the initial tripartite division and the final division of the work into seven named volumes agreed to as a concession "to custom and to publishing requirements" (the conventions and habits of the publishing house were taken into consideration, as were printing costs no doubt, but we should not forget either that there are basic physical requirements also to be taken into consideration, such as what size print would be required, and whether a single volume would be convenient or simply cumbersome to handle, too awkward to hold in the hand)? (Paratexts 62). Different editions have treated the volumes and their titular presentations in differing ways, however, and Genette points out that, as a result, "since 1913 two or three generations of readers will have had different perceptions of Proust's work and accordingly will doubtless have read it differently, depending on whether they were receiving it as a set of autonomous works or as a unitary whole, with a single title, in three volumes" (Paratexts 63). Holding Kepler in my hand, I am aware that it is seen as one in a trilogy of books by Banville on men of science, astronomers and mathematicians, The Newton Letter and Dr Copernicus being the other two. Yet, nowhere is this stated on the books themselves, the only clue given being perhaps certain similarities in the design of the covers of Kepler and The Newton Letter, the shared images of books and manuscripts and fruit. Dr Copernicus is missing from my library, leading me to wonder if my text of Kepler is truly complete.

If we think of Dr Copernicus, Kepler, and The Newton Letter as three volumes in an ongoing work, then their dates of publication, 1976, 1981, and 1982 respectively, show how access to a work can be affected not only by its distribution in space, but, of course, its distribution in time also. A key example of how periodic publication can affect not only the consumption, but also the production of the text, is seen in the instance of serial publication, a system which "often ended up presenting the public first with a disfigured text pending publication in book form" (Genette, Paratexts 406). Some disfigurements appear only retrospectively, revealed through comparison with the unspoiled, if not untouched, form of the book version, although writers have also, at times, tried to recover what was included in the serial but excluded from the book (see James Joyce's concern with the Homeric chapter headings which accompanied the original, serialised publication of Ulysses). Most often this disfigurement took the form

7Jorges Luis Borges, of course, has written of the possibility of an infinite book, "a volume of ordinary format, printed in nine or ten point type, containing an infinite number of infinitely thin leaves," but has
of editing or amendment with or without the author's approval, but, of course, the
simple fact of the physical division of the text, and the delayed distribution of its parts,
ecessarily means the deformation of the text.

Thomas Hardy, for example, whose Jude the Obscure appeared as a serial in a
very much bowdlerised form in Harper's magazine, wrote that "the form in which it is
appearing there is a conventionalized one, in several points," and that it "will be restored
to its original shape in the volume" (Hardy xxxix). We can take this to mean that the
return to an original shape will involve the restoration of the sexual material which had
been excised for serialisation, or the toning down of some of the anti-religious elements,
but, for a critic such as Joseph Kestner, Hardy's language suggests also that the volume
will be physically reformed, purposefully reconstructed. Kestner, whose text The
Spatiality of the Novel is an interesting though, it will later be argued, ultimately flawed
addition to spatial theory, wishes to suggest that an author can communicate meaning
through the simple division of the text into units, and through the relation between these
units, arguing that "the written text is a graphic product with clear visual and
architectural properties" "of rhythm and sequence, of proportion and scale," (Kestner
126, 125). 8 It is exactly this harmonious relation of parts which is distorted by the
process of serialisation, so any reader following the text in serial form would be denied
the possibility of apprehending the text as an "architectural" whole. It was only when it
came to preparing the version of the manuscript meant for book form, for example, that
Hardy divided the book into six parts, which divisions Kestner relates to the six
subdivisions of the parts of an architectural Gothic structure.

Furthermore, Kestner also argues that the sites named in relation to the six parts
each represent one of Ruskin's six elements of Gothic, so that, for example, "Marygreen
is savageness or rudeness," while "'At Christminster Again,' reflects beyond question
redundance" (Kestner 130). In contrast, Kestner argues that the individualism of Jude
and Sue, their strong independence, shows that Hardy associates them "with classical
sculpture and sculptors," jarring with the overarching nature of their world, so that
Hardy has "deliberately ill-fitted them to the Gothic form of his novel, a form symbolic

to admit that the "handling of this silky vade mecum would not be convenient" ("Library of Babel" 86)
8Interestingly, Genette argues, in his discussion on the use of intertitles, that Proust, having abandoned
"the initial plan of a long textual flow without breaks or markers," later felt that he could better
demonstrate by titular presentation the underlying structure of "the architectural unity of his work - which
we know he valued so highly (and in fact more and more highly as it was breaking up under the influence
of his own additions)" (Paratexts 305, my emphasis).
both of oppression and of failed faith" (Kestner 131, 132). Sue's final capitulation to society's pressures is, then, in the true sense of the word, a conformation: "[Phillotson] is going to marry me again," she says. "That is for form's sake, and to satisfy the world, which does not see things as they are" (Hardy 360). Earlier, Sue had expressed her sense of not fitting in by exclaiming, "I have been thinking . . . that the social moulds civilisation fits us into have no more relation to our actual shapes than the conventional shapes of the constellations have to the real star-patterns" (Hardy 205).

It is probably no coincidence that this last quotation brings us back again to Banville's Kepler, his tale of Johannes Kepler, the astronomer, reluctant astrologer, and imperial mathematician, whose purpose in life was to describe through geometry the true design of the solar system, and not to be content to "save the phenomena, to set up a model which need not be empirically true, but only plausible according to the observations" (Banville 25). Kepler could easily be classified as an historical biography, but it qualifies also as historiographic metafiction, to use Linda Hutcheon's term, due to its self-conscious regard for its fictional construction (McHale 152). It is, as Rüdiger Imhof says, "a novel that acknowledges fully the necessity of an interdependence and inter-relationship of form and content" ("Supreme Fiction" 73), and, significantly, its form most obviously foregrounds exactly that process of internal division and inter-relation to which Kestner draws attention. For this reason, it presents itself as a specimen for further analysis.

Gaps and repetitions: internal distribution

In his lifetime, Kepler published three main works, Mysterium Cosmographicum (1596), Astronomia Nova (1609) and Harmonice Mundi (1619), in which he detailed his discoveries of what were the first three fundamental laws of planetary motion. Kepler's first cosmological theory, originally proposed in Mysterium Cosmographicum, was later "dealt a blow" by his own discoveries as described in Astronomia Nova, but he never abandoned the hope it held out of the "possibility of order" in "this familiar - O familiar! - disorder" of his world (Banville 181, 7, 6). This first theory was prompted by a single question, "Why are there just six planets?" and, since Kepler believed he was dealing with a perfectly structured system, designed by a perfect God ("nothing in the world was

9Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Banville are taken from Kepler.
created by God without a plan the basis of which is to be found in geometrical quantities"), he decided that there were six planets so that their orbits would correspond to the "five regular perfect solids, also called the Platonic forms," which are perfect because their sides are identical (Banville 25, 35). He therefore proceeded to place the five regular solids of the cube, tetrahedron, dodecahedron, icosahedron and octahedron between the orbits of Saturn and Jupiter, Jupiter and Mars, Mars and earth, earth and Venus, and Venus and Mercury respectively. Kepler later structured his book Harmonice Mundi on this very model, foreseeing "a work divided into five parts, to correspond to the five planetary intervals, while the number of chapters in each part will be based upon the signifying quantities of each of the five regular or Platonic solids" (Banville 148). Also, "as a form of decoration, and to pay my due respects, the initials of the chapters shall spell out acrostically the names of certain famous men" (Banville 148).

This is the very model and method which Banville adopts to structure his text, though he does not simply copy it but expand upon it, adapting it and introducing nuances of design. The most obvious difference is in the names he chooses for the acrostic which runs through his book, spelling out the names Johannes Kepler, Tycho Brahe (the astronomer with whom Kepler worked from 1600 until Brahe's death in 1601), Galileo Galileus and Isaac Newton. Banville continues then to divide the book into the required five parts, naming the parts after five of Kepler's books. Part I, "Mysterium Cosmographicum," is divided into six chapters to represent the six sides of a cube; Part II, "Astronomia Nova," has four chapters for the four sides of a tetrahedron; Part III, "Dioptrice," contains twelve chapters, even as a dodecahedron has twelve sides; Part IV, "Harmonice Mundi," has a chapter for each of the twenty sides of an icosahedron and Part V, "Somnium," has eight chapters to represent an octahedron. In each case the chapters are of approximately the same length, and cover the same number of pages, just as the sides of each of the polygons would be identical in area.

Kepler, therefore, is given a spatial form, but, for the moment, we are talking only of the space of stars and planets, of orbits and vacuums, a cosmic form suggested by the physical division of the words on the page. We should, however, consider how much of this form would be evident on a physical level, if, say, all the pages of Kepler were to be displayed together on a single surface as if it were an example of visual art. Certainly, the five parts would be discernible, and the equal areas of the sub-divisions
within them, but we could not say that the form of the cube, or of the tetrahedron, would be directly perceptible. In the same way, the six parts of Hardy's *Jude the Obscure* which Kestner finds so significant, correspond in number only to the Gothic style, and cannot replicate the figure, which he uses to illustrate his argument, of a rectangle divided by two diagonals and by a line bisecting it along its length (129). In order to draw attention to the potential significance of the physical construction of the texts, both of them must employ a form of internal prompting, highlighting the importance of spatial constructions in general to alert the reader to similar possibilities in the form of the text. So it is that *Jude the Obscure*, aided by Jude's occupation as a stone-mason, can address itself regularly to the issue of the architecture of the day: Jude reads the buildings at Christminster as "architectural pages" (Hardy 84. See also 12, 134-5, 136, 306). Banville, of course, can include Kepler's plan for his *Harmonice Mundi* to signal the existence of elaborately structured texts, but he also describes Kepler's plans for a drinking cup "which shall be a model of the world according to my system, cast in silver," but, to convince the Duke that it is worth financing, must first be made with "scissors and paste and strips of coloured paper," this paper model described within and contained by the mirroring form of Banville's text (Banville 32, 34).

Banville, however, is not content to simply fulfil all the requirements of Kepler's stated structure, but goes on to introduce more subtle features. It is possible, in fact, to claim that, not only does he impose the structures of the Platonic solids upon his work, but he also evokes the form of those orbits within which the solids were to be placed, the five parts becoming the five orbital divisions. The main device he uses to accomplish this is chronological reordering, returning at the end of each of the sections to the same time frame with which he started so that, as he says, "time in each of the sections moves backward or forward to or from a point at the centre, to form a kind of temporal orbit" (qtd. in Imhof, Banville 134). Thus, Part I begins with Kepler's arrival at Benatek in 1600, moves back to 1593, and eventually returns to 1600; Part II moves from 1600 to November 1601 and back to 1600; Part III, telling of a visit to Kepler's mother's house in 1609, beginning with him entering it and ending with him leaving it, moves in time through subjective retrospection and anticipation, largely focalised through Kepler, rather than through retroversions externally narrated, and takes in the extremes of his life, "even a notion of regressing into the womb, and last envisaged moments of his life before death" (Imhof, Banville 136); Part IV, a part of epistles,
moves from 1605 to 1612 and back again, while Part V circles between the years of his childhood and 1630.

Nor is this cyclical nature confined to the five sections, for the novel as a whole suggests the form of a circle, as if to represent the crystal sphere which was thought to surround the planetary system, and onto which the stars were fixed. Imhof argues that it is possible to provide this sphere with a centre point, acting as the sun does within our own solar system, as he says that the focal point of the book as a whole lies in chapter six of "Dioptrice," that chapter where Banville places a suggestion of both the ultimate death and the forgotten birth of Kepler, describing him with "his hands folded on his breast," and telling of how "the years were falling away, like loops of rope into a well" until "deeper he sank. The water was warm. Then in the incarnadine darkness a great slow pulse began to beat" (98). It is also notable that here Kepler drifts between waking and sleeping, even as he does at the beginning and at the end of the text.\footnote{In fact, Imhof reveals that, if we deemed it necessary, there are even greater elaborations of form to be found in the text. He argues, for example, that in Parts I and IV "there is reason to regard the narrative movement as elliptical rather than as circular" (John Banville 133), and he also sees the four chapters of Part II as representing an exploration of the pyramid that is the tetrahedron, each chapter as side appearing to anticipate the next, with the flashback of the final chapter representing a move downwards to the base of the pyramid.}

Of course, given the context of Kepler's life, and his life's work, it is natural to speak of the form of the text in terms of orbits or revolutions. Thinking of the text without regard for its subject-matter, it seems, however, that we can still conceive of it as possessing a circular form, as somehow tracing out a purposefully shaped path. It is in recognising this that we finally move away from any discussion of space in terms of stars and planets, and seem instead to be describing a textual space, a space not set by physical dimensions, by the purely material organisation of the printed line, but formed by the line of textual signifiers. To illustrate, we can see that, again and again, \textit{Kepler} presents us with spatial orbits (textual circles) evoked through temporal shifts, the various time-frames themselves indicated by simply stating the date, or by references to particular people, events, and places. At times, however, as with the circular movement of the text as a whole, the orbits are achieved, not by returning to a particular time, but only through the reiteration of themes and motifs, such as "a reference to dreaming," "the theme of financial destitution," and "the theme of Kepler's religious persecution" (Imhof, Banville 132). It is, then, the text which draws the circle, not the plot, and, indeed, Imhof betrays his sense of the disjunction between the story and the language.
which tells it when he describes how "the whole narrative is contained in a circular, global frame" (Banville 132), this frame being the textual frame which bears the narrative, and yet, as Imhof suggests, seems external to it, containing it. Yet, this is not to say that the text is removed from its narrative, untouched by it, for the orbital reflects the life of a man, who, in some respects, made little progress in life, who wandered far but got nowhere. Still, we can say that what Kepler teaches us is that, if the text has a space, it is a product of signifiers and signifieds, and not of their referents. As Philippe Sollers would say, "It is with the meaning . . . of words that we are concerned, not with the things in the words" (qtd. in Barthes, Sollers 58, his emphasis), so that our focus must be on the space of the text, not the world of the text.  

Kepler structures its space by employing the same devices we first encountered briefly in our discussion of Life A User's Manual, where the text was seen to disrupt its linear order through the repetition of its opening lines. Looking, for example, at Part I of Kepler, we can see the circularity of the text manifest itself in the repetition of particular images, the "borrowed hat" which reappears with mention that Baron Hoffmann had "lent Kepler a hat;" Mistress Barbara, who "shook him by his ill-shod foot," and "would shake him, looming down like a form out of his dreams;" "And 0.00429," "and 0.00 something something 9" (Banville 3, 52). The evocation of the sphere which contains the solar system requires similar repetitions, so that the first line, "Johannes Kepler, asleep in his ruff, has dreamed the solution to the cosmic mystery" is twinned with "I must have been asleep. . . . Such a dream I had . . . such a dream. . . . Ah my friend, such dreams;" the second line, "He holds it cupped in his mind," is recalled by "Anna Billig came and filled his cup with punch;" and, we might argue, the third and fourth lines, "O do not wake! But he will," speak for "Never die, never die," the last line (Banville 3, 191, 192). It is these repetitions in the line which signal the return to that point of the circle which we had first encountered, for the repetitions signal not just the recurrence of like parts, but the spatial coincidence of parts. We are not experiencing the re-appearance of an element of the line, but returning to that original point on the line where we first encountered it. And yet, this is perhaps not

11Following on from this discussion, and in line with our analysis of Perec's Life A User's Manual, I will use from here on the phrases "the space of the text" and "the world of the text" to distinguish between the spatiality of the text and the spaces in the text (in the sense of places, locations, geography, and so on). In the same way, Jean Ricardou, in Problèmes du Nouveau Roman, distinguishes between "'the space of the fiction' and 'the space of the narration'" (Kestner 148). The former is what I call the world and the latter
really the same point for, as Hillis Miller points out, "even an exact repetition is never the same, if only because it is the second and not the first." Even if the first and second are one and the same thing, there is a first-time experience of it, and a second. Banville seems to suggest just this sense of difference in his repetitions which repeat without repeating exactly, giving us "0.00429" and "0.00 something something 9" (3, 52), while his talk of 'temporal orbits' implies not just the chronological reorderings they employ, but also the time required to travel their path. So it is that the line of text, turning back upon itself, deviating from its line, produces the form which leads us to speak of a recognisably multi-dimensional textual space. 

The complexity and purposefulness of Kepler's form make it an excellent test case against which we can measure the analyses of those we would call spatial theorists. In truth, however, the group of those who might be classed as spatial theorists could almost be made as large or as small as we wish. For example, though we have already included Genette in our discussion, he could only be termed a spatial theorist in the sense that, like so many others, Butor, Derrida, or Barthes for example, his work at one time or another refers to, or makes use of, space and spatial concepts. Though we have previously introduced Kestner as a spatial theorist, there is perhaps only one critic whose work is defined almost solely by its contribution to the theory of text and space, namely Joseph Frank, and he will be the focus of our discussion at a later stage. However, in a 1964 article by Paul de Man on those he called 'spacecritics', Hillis Miller, who was briefly mentioned in the last paragraph, was included with Frank as one of the practitioners of a new, spatial approach to text. 

Ronald Foust, too, sees in the analyses of Hillis Miller "examples not only of the necessity of spatialization for the critic, but also of the influence of the spatial form hypothesis on their work" (190). The difficulty, however, in defining what it is that makes a spatial critic can be seen when we find Mitchell, whose own work builds explicitly on Frank's, describing the Hillis Miller of The Form of Victorian Fiction, from 1968, as a "resolutely 'temporal' critic," is what I call the space. Mitchell, following Northrop Frye, describes as descriptive spatiality "the world which is represented, imitated, or signified in a work" (551). 

Edward Soja, too, opens up the spatiality of his text by disrupting its line, bringing the end together with the beginning in a combined Preface and Postscript which gives the text a circular movement and shakes "up the normal flow of the linear text to allow other, more 'lateral' connections to be made," encouraging the reader "to see the text as a map, a geography of simultaneous relations and meanings that are tied together by a spatial rather than a temporal logic" (Geographies 1).

De Man's article reviews Hillis Miller's The Disappearance of God and Frank's The Widening Gyre, both of which appeared in 1963. Frank's article "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," which was reprinted in The Widening Gyre, originally appeared, however, in 1945.
only to concede that his later work marks "an apparent departure from his earlier hostility to spatial criticism" (545, 562).

With regard to the development of an understanding of textual space as it is emerging in this discussion, however, Hillis Miller's work makes an important contribution. For example, in speaking of the construction of his Topographies, he recalls exactly our discussion of how the index in Life A User's Manual presents it as a space through which we may travel by many, alternative routes. He suggests that, though Topographies as a whole may cover particular ground, the "landscape 'as such' is never given, only one or another of the ways to map it," so that the chapters are "like the transparencies superimposed in palimpsest on a map, each transparency charting some different feature of the landscape beneath" (Topographies 6). The linear presentation of these chapters is seen as an inadequate way of presenting these overlapping, interrelating maps for "the order of the chapters in the printed version is a somewhat arbitrary sequence that signals certain relations but hides others" (Topographies 6).

Writing in Ariadne's Thread, he describes how "each chapter's sequence could better be thought of as a set of examples that might be ordered in any sequence" so that the book as a whole is marked by "a desire for assemblage that goes against the grain of sequential logic or story-telling" (xiii). In both cases, and in a move which reflects our description of textual space as a space between spaces, he suggests that, in order for the text to achieve its full potential, pure physicality, the printed line, must be transcended. As he says:

A final figure for the organization of this book would see it as a virtual hypertext, presented in a somewhat arbitrary sequence through the necessity of the printed book. All but the first of the chapters were written on the computer, and that one has been transferred there and revised. All were written with a certain set of topographical questions in mind. The chapters when called up into the RAM or 'random access memory' of a computer do not exist as a linear sequence. They exist rather as a strange spatial array in which the chapters can easily be arranged in different orders and through which various lines of exploration, in a different way in each case, are possible by following different paths of relation. Each chapter can be related to the others by a multitude of different conceptual and figurative links. (Topographies 6)
When it comes to understanding the space of Kepler, Hillis Miller's work on the nature of the line is most relevant. When we speak of the line of text, we speak, says Hillis Miller, of the way "the reader follows, or is supposed to follow, the text . . . reading word by word and line by line from the beginning to the end" (Ariadne's Line 5). The circularity discovered in Kepler, however, disrupts this immediate notion of a beginning and an end, the repetition undermining the direct line of the text. Recognising the significance of this disruption, Hillis Miller argues that "this linearity is broken . . . by anything in the words on the page which in one way or another says, see page so and so. An example of this," as we have seen, "is the repetition from one place to another of the same word, phrase, or image" (Ariadne's Thread 5). Visualising this break in the line can be difficult, however. We could think of the physical extremes of the circle, the first and last pages of the book, as connected by some virtual line we draw between them, this line, then, rather unsatisfactorily completing the circle. Imhof's accounts of the elliptical form of Kepler's orbits, however, depend always on the text to shape them, and not on projected lines. Alternatively, we could manipulate the physical structure of the book so that it better imitates its text, curling the pages back so that the corresponding parts of the text touch, as if we were scientists trying to illustrate how wormholes aid travel between the stars by bending, again, cosmic space. The book is barely malleable enough to manage a single roll, however, and the line of Kepler's text is so complex, so continuously turning back upon itself, that, to mimic it, we would need to destroy the book as book, cutting, splicing and sticking, folding it to destruction. The result, in fact, when we think about it, should be Kepler's model for his "cosmic cup," a copy of the one he made with "scissors and paste and strips of coloured paper" (Banville 34), but it is not necessarily so. Kepler's orbits, for example, should circle around each other, yet we, as readers, encounter the orbits in order, so that it is as if we complete a circle, then move on to the next, to circle, continue, and so on, the five circles forming loops along the line. It is only by referring to Kepler's own model that we know we should place one circle inside the other. Reading Part I, we sweep out the area between the orbits of Saturn and Jupiter, circling the other parts in the process, until we are brought back to the same point on the circle to continue in, towards the sun, and on to the line which traces the orbit between Jupiter and Mars. The line towards the centre is thus interrupted five times by an orbit intersecting it at a right angle, and around which we must travel. The final orbit, between Venus and Mercury, is evoked
through repetitions such as "A fine rain drifted slantwise" and "The rain beat upon the world without" (Banville 155, 192), but this last page, part of the innermost orbit, is, of course, also supposed to be part of the cosmic sphere which contains all the orbits; it occupies, or contains, the two extremes of the cosmic space. It is at points like this that the knot of the textual line seems to pull so tightly that it must break free from its place on the page, transcending, like Hillis Miller's virtual hypertext, any form we could grant it through our manipulation of the physical form of the book, and emerging into a truly textual space.

The full form of Kepler's cosmic space gives us a true insight into the form of textual space. We can see how it employs the flexibility of the sign to create forms which seem to abstract themselves from a concrete reality and yet this is not the space's sole aspect. We could argue, perhaps, that Banville could produce, if he so wished, a textual space unmistakeably structured according to Kepler's cosmic model, with each orbit clearly positioned in relation to all others, but achieving this might mean the destruction, in turn, of any narrative line, the world of the text so distorted, through the extreme use of anachronies for example, that it can no longer be interpreted as an effective biography of Kepler (we touched on such possibilities briefly in our discussion of how a restructuring of the form of Perec's jigsaw puzzle might be at the expense of the picture painted on it). Also, we have seen the textual line twist and slip from the printed page, and yet it remains grounded on that page, for the physical organisation of the text, the division into five parts, and the number of chapters in each part, remains a structural element in the formation of the cosmic space, the construction of the five regular polygons essentially taking place in physical space. The situation of the forms of repetition at the beginnings and ends of these divisions also aids in the identification of the circular patterns, while, moreover, we can see a form of interaction between the space of signs and the physical spaces in Part II, where the movement of the textual line relates the four chapters together in such a way as to evoke the form of the pyramid.

The importance of the interaction of the various aspects of this emerging textual space is seen in Hillis Miller's distinction between the manipulation of the printed and textual lines. His argument is rooted in a brief discussion of Victorian novels, bringing us back to a consideration of serial publication and the effect of this delayed distribution on the form of the text, and our appreciation of that form, while also providing us with
an interesting comparison with Kestner's analysis of chapters as bearers of meaning. To quote Hillis Miller:

> The physical, social, and economic conditions of the printing and distribution of Victorian books, that is, the breaking of the text into numbered or titled parts, books, or chapters, and publication in parts either separately or with other material in a periodical, interrupts this linearity but does not transform it into something else. (Ariadne's Thread 5)

Whatever the extent of its distribution in space and time, the line of the text is not in this way complicated by the form of repetition which would lead us to speak of it producing a textual space. To that extent, we would describe the text as relatively formless and, indeed, as Kestner admits, "Many writers have criticized the architecture of," for example, "Dickens's novels: Flaubert complained of the 'faulty construction' of Pickwick Papers; Poe, as Eichenbaum observes, felt that the serial publication of Barnaby Rudge prevented the author from having a detailed plan" (116). Without being required to fit itself to any plan, the trajectory of the line remains unperturbed:

> The text of a Victorian novel, to remain with that as prime example for the moment, with its divisions into chapters and parts, is like bits of string laid end to end in series. Its publication in parts over a period of time that, in the case of Dickens's big novels, was almost two years in length, only emphasizes this linearity. Publication in parts gives that linearity an explicitly temporal dimension. (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Line 5)

Kestner, however, sees Dickens working around the timetable which so stretched out his text, arguing that "although published from 1 December 1860 to 3 August 1861 in weekly installments in All the Year Round, Great Expectations nevertheless reveals startling properties of architectural rhythm, scale, proportion, and sequence" (117). Leaving aside the question of whether Kestner's architecturality automatically implies a spatiality also, here we at least find Kestner appealing to John Hagan's description of "three methods of repetition which unify the work: first, of words and phrases; second, of characters . . . ; and third, of incidents and locations" (117). For Kestner, "a recurrence of scenes and characters, however, has meaning only if it is structured in a certain way vis-à-vis all the other architecture of the novel" (117), and he therefore
develops a structure based on the chapter divisions within the text, wherein the three parts of the text are themselves composed of three parts formed of two halves of three chapters each. The tripartite division in Part I, for example, is signalled by the repetition of elements (statements involving inscription) at the beginning of the first, seventh, and thirteenth chapters, and again by repetition (intruders into the forge) in the sixth, twelfth, and eighteenth chapters. Furthermore, Kestner sees this structure fortified by a series of relations between the parts, so that "as the openings of sextets are parallel, the openings of the triads are contrasting" (120). The result is "a controlling unity operating not only at the end of each part but also collectively for the novel" (Kestner 121). This unity, however, might not necessarily be evident to all:

Victorian readers had to read one part of Bleak House and then, after an interval, the next part, and so on. The spurious instantaneous unity or simultaneity of the single volume held in one's hand was further broken by the fact that Victorian novels, even when their scattered parts were gathered in volume form, were often printed in two, three, or even four volumes. The linearity of a novel is always temporal. (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Thread 5)

The divergence in these opinions illustrates a tension between temporality and spatiality which has long been a contentious part of any discussion on textual spatiality. Hillis Miller presents the Victorian reader encountering a text defined by its linearity, by the sequential order of its parts. Kestner, on the other, describes a text designed as a tightly structured whole, its part related through repetition and juxtaposition. Yet, it is not insignificant that the architectural form Kestner finds in Hardy's Jude the Obscure materialised only when the manuscript was being readied for publication as a single volume.14 It would be interesting to know what effect it would have had on Hardy's structuring of the text, as well as Kestner's reading of it, if the book had been published, as many of Hardy's earlier works had, in three volumes, (the single volume was adopted in consideration of the cost only). In fact, Kestner does speak of how "the three volumes of Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice or Emma were required by the demands of circulating libraries, but frequently one may see the form of the syllogism in such tripartite arrangements. The novels present a major premise, minor premise, and

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14Genette's comment on the architectural unity of Proust's work refers also to a text initially conceived as a single volume.
conclusion" (121). Such an appeal to the forms of logical reasoning hardly seems to offer support to a spatial reading, but instead invokes what is, for many, one of the most attractive aspects of the unbroken line. As Barthes says of narrative, "Logic immediately pervades the notion of time: that which follows next is at the same time the result" ("Action Sequences" 10), the sequentiality of the line tempting us into believing that it is driven by a logic of causality which drives it irreversibly forward. To argue that a text is a structure whose third part must, by logical necessity, follow from the first two, is to present a text whose momentum carries it unerringly forward, unmoved by repetition. That this line can span three volumes without difficulty, supports Hillis Miller's initial assertion that physical distribution alone does not necessarily construct a textual space:

One must distinguish sharply, however, between effects of discontinuity, spaces or hiatuses between segments of a narrative line, and true disturbances of the line that make it curve back on itself, recross itself, tie itself in knots. Those spaces may have a powerful effect, in one way or another, on the meaning, but they are not in themselves forms of repetition breaking linearity. (Ariadne's Thread 6)

Kestner's analysis of the structure of Dickens's Great Expectations, however, does appeal to forms of repetition as a structural element, and doesn't present an overall form based on logical construction. Instead, though, Kestner draws a relation between the three parts of the text and, in turn, between the three sections within each of those three parts, where the first section is "preparatory," the second "revelatory," and the third "climactic," Dickens thus attempting to control how the reader may "enter, pass through, and exit" the text, and always focussed on propelling the reader through one part of the text and on to the next (Kestner 119, 116). Kestner's assertion that Dickens's intention was "that the observer be guided through the edifice, and particularly that he be advised when one section has been left" (120), suggests that Dickens was not so much concerned with the reader developing an awareness of the text as a spatial construct, a simultaneously existing whole whose parts lay in meaningful relation to each other, but rather that the reader was to immerse him/herself in the line, and not to look back, but

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15Nor, it can be argued, does the 'serialisation' of Hillis Miller's argument here, as quotations interspersed throughout the main body of the text, lessen the logical progression of his own line of thought. As he admits, he cannot resist at times "the desire . . . to write an orderly, logical, rational, logocentric book, a
leave behind the line already covered and looking ahead instead to the anticipated climactic ending. The repetitions, in this sense, are simply the reproductions, on a smaller scale, of structures designed to guide us along the line of the text, but these structures, though reflecting each other in form, are not meant to be read in relation to each other. They are, indeed, temporally self-contained, "like bits of string laid end to end in series" (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Thread 5), and we can no more talk of their architectural unity than we would speak of the complex spatiality of certain popular television programmes which employ the same linear forms ("Holy episodic climaxes, Batman!").

What Kestner's approach does reveal, however, is one way of perceiving the possible existence of larger textual structures. For Kestner's analysis of Great Expectations, "The basic clue is the opening unit of six chapters . . . . . Within each division of six, there are subdivisions of three that reflect in miniature the relationship of parts I, II, and III to each other" (117), so smaller structures, more easily apprehended in their entirety, provide us with a glimpse of potentially grander spaces. Something similar occurs in Kepler where the third chapter of the first part performs a perfect circle, moving from "the 19th of July, 1595, at 27 minutes precisely past 11 in the morning: that was the moment" (Banville 19), back to 1593, before returning to that very moment, this minor orbit reflecting the presence of the wider textual orbits. This idea that divisions in physical space grant us access to discrete parts of the textual space is akin to that of Philip Stevick in "The Theory of Fictional Chapters," where he argues that chapter divisions play a vital role in our understanding of the work as a whole. As with Hillis Miller, he does not suggest that it is the simple fact that the novel "this very temporal continuity should be so frequently interrupted" (172) which produces disturbances in the line, but he does see these interruptions delimiting an area within which we are more likely perceive non-linear patterns. He bases his view on the idea of gestalt perception, that tendency of humans to perceive patterns between parts, so that if
three dots are seen, so is the possibility of those three dots forming a triangle. He feels that this gestalt impulse is equally applicable to narratives, that "the impulse to shape narratives into patterns is simply the ineluctable result of the human perceptions that lie at its basis" (Stevick 173). The gestalt perception falters, however, when faced with an entire narrative and "the sheer bulk of its detail" (Stevick 173). Encountering the length of a novel, we find that parts evade our memory, and so the pattern of the whole is lost to us. It is through the use of chapters, "partly discrete, partly enclosed units," each of which has a form in itself, that the pattern of the whole is conveyed; "one responds to the form of a novel by responding to its chapters" (Stevick 172, 174).

Stevick's theory is at times confounded by the often rather arbitrary nature of the divisions of prose into volume, chapter, or section. The history of the chapter shows that though Cervantes's Don Quixote has them, Cervantes using divisions as he was parodying the poetical form of the romance, Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe and Moll Flanders do not, despite appearing over a century later. Stevick admits that "in Moll Flanders, Defoe makes no apparent chapters; the novel is typographically continuous. Nevertheless, it does contain narrative units" (177). This illustrates, however, that when Stevick speaks of narrative patterns, he seems not to mean formal patterns but rather fabular patterns alone, so that the pattern of a work might encompass "the moral education of the hero, say, or the vicissitudes of a love affair" (Stevick 174). In this sense, his interpretation of chapters is close to Joseph Conrad's, who suggests that the quality of the chapter is in "carrying the action a step further or embodying a whole episode," much as paragraphs in turn structure a chapter or essay, carrying the argument on, or expressing a single point (qtd. in Vidan 136).

Ironically, though, Conrad makes this comment when considering the form of Lord Jim, whose chapters he feels deviate from this norm and serve simply to allow "the reader's attention to rest," in the manner of Henry Fielding (Vidan 136). Fielding, writing in the eighteenth century, always used chapters as he thought of the novel as "a comic Epic-Poem in Prose," and epic poetry was divided into sections (Fielding, Preface 4). In Joseph Andrews, Fielding describes how these divisions are for "the Advantage of our Reader," suggesting that the "little Spaces between our Chapters may be looked upon as an Inn or Resting-Place," while the breaks between the books can be seen as "those Stages, where, in long Journeys, the Traveller stays some time to repose himself, and consider of what he hath seen in the Parts he hath already past through" (70-71).
His sister, Sarah Fielding, in History of Charlotte Summers, lauds his use of divisions, "the main design of which must be to give time for shifting the scenes and conveying the audience without hurry or apparent absurdity to and from the several places and apartments where the poet had laid his action" (qtd. in Watson 67), suggesting that the chapter break can also act as a welcome elision of text to link episodes. Stevick compares this idea of the chapter break providing an opportunity for consideration of what has gone before, to his assertion of "the need for limiting the size of the fictional unit to the capacity of the reader's gestalt-making facility," but the fact that Fielding's chapters "are often more or less arbitrarily ended units" means he has to admit they make "only the most fragile of gestalts" (Stevick 180, 181).

Though the focus of Stevick's theory leads him away from a consideration of textual space as we are beginning to understand it, nevertheless his approach highlights two significant factors. Firstly, there is the possibility that the scope of the textual space might surpass our comprehension, that "the whole exceeds the limits of the esthetic understanding" (Stevick 176). Secondly, there is difficulty in correctly identifying and interpreting formal patterns. Stevick cites four possible options for the writer: s/he "can present the data of his book, or chapter, or episode along with their enclosure," so that not only are we given the three dots, but the lines are drawn between them to form a triangle; the writer can give us the three dots but "enclose these materials in a way different from our expectations," perhaps drawing a circle through them instead of a triangle; the writer "can provide us with materials suggesting the means for their enclosure yet withholding from us the enclosure itself," so that though the dots are observable, the responsibility for making the connections between them is left with the reader; or, finally, the writer may give us "an irregular sprinkling of dots; we may experiment, if we wish, with lines and curves and figures, but any enclosure which we make is uncertain, subjective, and arbitrary, like interpretations of Rorschach ink-blots" (174, 175).

One of Stevick's first illustrations of the impulse to perceive patterns is a description of the way in which "an observer of the sky separates figure from ground and perceives that one group of stars resembles a 'W' and another resembles a crab"
In his description of the reader who connects the dots with "lines and curves and figures" he seems to recall those astronomers who would attempt to "save the phenomena" (Banville 25), and tend to fit their theories to the observable evidence rather than pursue the theoretical source which produced those observations. Thinking in these terms, we see a strange symmetry in Kepler, for the space which we, as readers, encounter in the text, is a model of that very space which Kepler himself seeks to provide evidence for. Even as we trace the movement of the textual line, place the parts in relation to each other, and try to observe the whole, so Kepler maps the movements of the stars and planets, traces their orbits, and tries to understand the forces which organise this cosmic unity. In turn, Kepler encounters similar difficulties to the reader of Kepler, challenged to correctly identify and interpret the passage of the orbits, and to gain an insight into the nature of the space in its entirety. As such, Banville's account of Kepler's quest might give some indication of how he might expect us to produce our own spatial reading. In this, Kepler performs for us the sort of role that Stevick assigns to chapters, allowing us to see on a smaller scale the knot of questions posed by the space of text, and the possible answers to those questions which this very discussion might arrive at.

**Telling things in John Banville's Kepler**

Kepler's life's work is marked firstly by a trusting faith in the Author of his cosmic space, his God. If he held "the world to be a manifestation of the possibility of order," it was because the world was created by a perfect God, a God who could have created only a perfect world; "his God was above all a god of order" (Banville 7, 25). If the suggestion would seem to be that we, too, should have faith in our author, and trust Banville's purpose, it is problematised by the fact that, in contrast with Kepler's desired order, his own life seemed one of absolute disorder. Driven by nature and circumstance from his home town of Weilderstadt to Tubingen, Graz, Prague, Linz and, finally, to Sagan, and through occupations varying from teacher to courtier to astrologer and mathematician, he was a victim of the religious and political upheavals of his time, of the religious persecutions of Archduke Ferdinand against those of the Protestant faith, and of the national financial constrictions which condemned him eventually to a state of
near-poverty. He must ruefully agree with Tycho Brahe's observation that "one has always to contend with disturbance" (Banville 7).

This contrast between divine order and earthly chaos is encapsulated by Banville in the image of Kepler's wife, Babara Muller, who, on their arrival at the castle of Benatek, "had been unpacking, and now with the glowing fruit," an orange, "cupped in her hands she sat down suddenly amidst the strewn wreckage of their belongings and began to weep," the image of this unnatural fruit recalling the "solution to the cosmic mystery" which Kepler had held in his dreams "cupped in his mind" (11, 3). Later, when Kepler attempts to interest the Duke in his "cosmic cup," the perfect geometry of the design he describes contrasts again with the chaotic scene he finds himself in, "jostled . . . and pushed" by those around him, and yet this disorder seems too neat, too conveniently discordant (34, 35). "The room was crowded," writes Banville, "the milling courtiers at once aimless and intent, as if performing an intricate dance the pattern of which could be perceived only from above," perhaps by the "angels" or "angry bearded god" painted on the ceiling (34-35). Order, and of course this means for us a spatial order, becomes a matter of perspective, of knowing from where the object must be viewed, indicating that we must know how best to approach a text, but suggesting also that the truest reading will result from an adoption of the author's position, attempting to occupy the seat of god.

There are moments when Kepler does seem accorded some special vision, some privileged insight on the world around him. Fittingly for an astronomer, accustomed to use of a telescope, and author of two works on lenses and optics, Astronomia pars Optica (1604) and Dioptrice, these moments tend to involve the refraction or passage of light, but not through some instrument aimed at the sky, but through more mundane and earth-bound elements such as windows and tears. It begins at Benatek which, for Kepler, represents at first a possibility to work without distraction, to find a peace away from disorder; when he first speaks with Tycho Brahe, "the wall by which they sat was almost all a vast arched window of many leaded panes (Banville 7). When, in his classroom, he first perceives the relation of the orbits to the Platonic forms, the discovery which ensures he "shall live forever," he is brought to tears, "the diagram, the easel, the very walls of the room dissolved to a shimmering liquid" (Banville 27). Elsewhere, "he walked slowly to the window, as if stalking some rare prize . . . . The mystery of simple things assailed him . . . . was it the music of the spheres?" (Banville
Yet these visions, moments framed and filtered by the refracting surface, do not grant him access to a total knowledge. They tend, instead, towards an intensification of feeling, a greater empathy with the world around him, the "simple things," "the mysteriousness of the commonplace," "a snail crawling up the window outside . . . [whose] economy, the heedless beauty of it, baffled him" (Banville 61, 86, 99). They thus recall the epigraph to Banville's text, "Preise dem Engel die Welt," Rilke's words from the Ninth Elegy of his Duino Elegies, which are translated in the text itself as "Give this world's praise to the angel!" (86), and would continue with "not the untellable: you can't impress him with the splendour you've felt; in the cosmos where he more feelingly feels you're only a novice. So show him some simple thing. . . . Tell him things" (Rilke 245).

Yet Kepler's focus is still directed towards the stars, and not towards things on earth, and still he would seek the view from the angel's place on high, with the heavens themselves in his sights and not just worldly things. Unsurprisingly, then, Kepler suggests that only in death will we be granted that totalising vision; "death is the perfecting medium" (134). In textual terms, death is the end, and "the End is a figure for [our] own deaths" (Kermode, Sense of an Ending 7), where, if we were to understand the text in traditionally linear terms, we too might expect to arrive at a full understanding of what has gone before, for the end is the point of logical conclusion, or the result of a causal series. Two things, however, undermine the possibility of this final revelation, for Kepler and for the reader. Firstly, Kepler's discoveries are greeted by him as those lasting truths which grant immortality (he "shall live forever," "Never die, never die" (Banville 27, 192)), and, indeed, death does not arrive for him in the course of the text (the fact of his death in "Regensburg on November the 15th, 1630" is instead given in a Note following the main body of the text). Also, as Kermode remarks, "The physician Alkemon observed . . . that men die because they cannot join the beginning and the end" (Sense of an Ending 4), so of course Kepler eludes a true end, for, as we have seen, the text itself circles back upon itself, repeating.

Secondly, as we return to that part of the text which we first encountered, those first few lines on that first page, we realise that all that the author had, has, and will have to say is already evident. The very first lines reveal a whole which is always and everywhere already formed, self-aware, and nothing can be added to it at its end that has not already been inscribed in its parts. As Imhof relates, "Kepler's idiosyncratic notion
regarding the epistemological and astronomical discoveries; his ideas about the shape of
the cosmos; the many wrong turns he took on his way towards arriving at his
momentous laws; his marital difficulties and the family disharmony - these are some of
the themes sounded at the start" (Banville 104). Even elements of the form of the novel
are implied in the first paragraph, for the use of different tenses, "asleep . . . has dreamed
. . . he holds . . . he would . . . do not . . . he will . . . shook . . . leaving" (Banville 3),
anticipates the anachronies which will inform the orbital structure of the parts. As if
were the Big Bang of textual space, all the matter of the text, all that matters in the text,
is evident at the beginning, but quickly outstrips us. It is as Kepler's friend
Wincklemann suggests, that "at the beginning God told his chosen people everything,
everything, so now we know it all - and understand nothing," or, "Everything is told us
but nothing explained" (Banville 47, 191). No point in the text, therefore, is privileged
above any other, and no place, particularly the end, suggests itself as a site of revelation.
The text is not oriented, as if along some horizontal line, towards an end point which
gives meaning to its beginning, but occupies instead a transversal plane on which all
points are equally significant.

The lack of an Apocalyptic ending implies that, though we encounter that whole
in its entirety, traverse it as we read, we are not guaranteed an apprehension of its unity.
Again, Kepler's search for an explanation here mirrors the reader's own, and, faced with
the complexity of structure which Banville creates for Kepler, we can legitimately put to
him the question the Duke asks Kepler when shown the plans for his cosmic cup, "'That
is clear, yes,' he said, 'what you have done, and how; but, forgive me, may we ask
why?'" (Banville 36). Imhof praises Banville for his "admirable portrait of the man
Kepler" (Banville 124), but it is hardly intended as an historical biography, a true and
accurate representation of a man and his times. If Kepler is usually described as an
historiographic metafiction, attention tends to focus on the second part of this
categorisation rather than the first. In this interpretation, Kepler emerges as an author in
his own right, not a reader. Where Tycho Brahe was "the assiduous gatherer of
information," Kepler was the creative thinker, never more so than when he produced his
models of the cosmos, "both supreme fictions, creations of the mind that have no
counterpart in reality" (Imhof, Banville 114, 129). His model of his universe, his paper
toy, is as false and fictitious a representation of his own world as Banville's is, and so he
comes to be seen as a supreme artist, as well as an accomplished scientist. By adopting
his harmonious structure Banville can be seen as both paying homage to Kepler for constructing such an artistically perfect form, while perhaps also gently mocking a search for a harmony that cannot exist, which can remain only a fiction, a work of art.

Yet by presenting Kepler's world-view as an artistically perfect form, Banville may not be treating Kepler's theories ironically, but may offer them some fond support. If Kepler believed that death would reveal that his life had gone to plan all along, that "At the final moment, we shall at last perceive the secret & essential form of all we have been, of all our actions & thoughts" (Banville 134), then Banville grants this final wish by fitting the parts of his life to that essential form Kepler had always sought, so allowing perfect order to emerge from the apparent chaos of Kepler's life. We have seen already how Banville manipulates the passage of Kepler's life to create this form, but Kepler would perhaps hope that even the disorder of his world might result in some harmony, for, as he observed, "Even random phenomena may make a pattern which, out of the tension of its mere existing, will generate effects and influences" (175). In fact, Kepler himself perceives in the confusion of his life some emerging patterns, some uncanny coincidences: "Three times the name Susanna had occurred in his life" (158). He feels this most clearly at the time of his mother's trial. Declared innocent of witchcraft, her acquittal nevertheless coincides with the disappearance of Kepler's friend Wincklemann: "Kepler could not rid himself of the conviction that somewhere, in some invisible workshop of the world, the Jew's fate and the trial verdict had been spatchcocked together" (Banville 174). These chance occurrences, then, the apparent connection of unrelated events, speak to Kepler of some controlling force, so that it is as if "someone had been trying to tell him something," "as if it had all been slyly arranged" (Banville 158, 101. See also 50, 164). These points of coincidence become new windows on the controlling order of his life, evidential fragments which might yield a more profound insight given further study. The incident of Wincklemann's disappearance becomes "a pin-hole in the surface of a familiar world, through which, if only he could find the right way to apply his eye, he might glimpse enormities" (Banville 174). In the same way, it is the points of repetition, of spatial coincidence, which become meaningful for us, and alert us to reorderings in the textual line and the production of the textual space, prompting us to search, in the apparent connection of unrelated points on the textual line, for a clue to the significance of the textual space as a whole.
A tension remains, however, between the sense that all is ordered, that the events of the world are engineered for significance, and the sense that everything occurs by chance, without intended meaning. It is in deciding between what is meaningful and what not that Kepler moves from being a reader, interpreting raw data, to assuming the position of writer which is granted to him by the metafictional interpretation of the text. Something similar occurs in the course or our own reading of the text, for the possibility remains that we "might be overdoing it," that the repetitions in the line which we read so much into, these linear deviations, are merely coincidences, in the sense of chance events (Imhof, Banville 133). By interpreting such moments as significant, by creating new connections and relations between parts of the text, we too seem to move from being just readers of the text to something more, co-creators of the textual space we move through; "he who discovers them creates them; the perceiver creates form and structure just as an artist creates texture and form," (Banville 129) writes Imhof, referring to Kepler's adherence to a Platonic epistemology which leads him to argue that the proportions which "everywhere abound . . . are all relation merely, and inexistent without the perceiving soul" (Banville 180). The possibility that any shapes found in a text are actually the result of interpretation alone, that the reader does not find those shapes but create them, leads some critics, such as Ivo Vidan, to suggest that "spatial form is a subjective category the application of which depends on individual appreciation" (140), and will obviously form an important part of the remaining discussion.

As with Kepler, and to add to our confusion, we are denied the chance to confirm the accuracy or completeness, the legitimacy, of our reading, for, as described, our view remains a partial one, each knot in the line just one part of the overall pattern, each loop just a "pin-hole" to look in on the whole. Like Kepler, we may aspire to the position of the angel, but the book Kepler itself suggests our perspective will be limited. The cover illustration is of another book, a manuscript perhaps, whose front cover is pictured on the front cover of Kepler, its back on the back, with the two spines overlapping. The title Kepler, unlike Banville's name, is printed in such a way that, while we naturally assume it is the title of the book we hold, it may also be the title, the pictured title, of the manuscript. But the manuscript is larger than the book, so the covers cannot coincide completely. Instead, we can see only the top left-hand corner of the front, with its detailed headband, the top half of the spine, and the top right-hand
corner of the back. The book *Kepler* is just a window onto a larger text, framed by its physical limits.

This curtailed image of the manuscript may also indicate Banville's intention to avoid writing a full biography of Kepler, but to shape his life to a certain extent. We might now also suggest an explanation for Banville's design, for when we consider the apparent emergence of form from the chaos of Kepler's life through repetition and coincidence, we begin to understand that Banville's imposing of geometric forms on Kepler's biography is not a violent act. Paradoxically, Banville introduces order through literally disordering Kepler's life, through the anachronies which disrupt chronological order to produce spatial harmony. The devices described, the orbits and repetitions, mirror Kepler's circular wanderings ("there was something, an eerie sense of being given a second chance at life, as if it were Graz and the Stiftsschule all over again"), and the repetitions which turn his life's path back on itself ("three times the name Susanna had occurred," "all this had happened before somewhere") (Banville 165, 158, 97). The textual spatiality Kepler moves in, therefore, may not represent accurately the chronological path of his life, but it may produce a truer representation of the space through which Kepler believed he moved, an harmonious and perfect cosmic space not simply containing or contrasting with the chaos, coincidences and repetitions of Kepler's life, but resulting from them. The textual space does not record the reality of the solar system or the true movements of the planets, but instead gives form to the ordered world which Kepler felt he existed within but simply could not fully apprehend. In contrast with the ill-fitting Gothic space of Hardy's *Jude the Obscure*, which confines his independent characters, Banville's text accords with the experience of his subject, a man who came to some of his greatest discoveries "quite by accident" (Imhof, Banville 131). The textual space becomes, then, a lived space, a social space, with Kepler as its source and centre; "our lives contain us," "the soul and the circle are one" (Banville 134, 180).

**Placing signs and sound: visual forms**

Place a book on some surface, on the table before you perhaps, open it up and leaf through it, curling the pages over and flicking them towards the back board or front, it hardly seems to matter which, and, blurring past you, you can expect to see a procession of fairly uniform, rectangular, dark shapes. Slow the speed of these turning pages and
the shaded areas suddenly resolve themselves into lines of figures, areas of ink, or paint, or pencil, spread upon, or injected into, or absorbed by a surface contrasting in its colour or texture, and, focus, and the figures are letters and marks of punctuation, grouped into words and sentences, paragraphs and chapters, an entire book of them. If the focus in the previous sections was on the larger divisions, the volumes and chapters, our concern here will be with the significance of the placement and arrangement of the text on the page.

This section, therefore, is again concerned with the distribution of the text, and yet there might be some unease expressed at the suggestion that we can move from the book as object, and the commercial production and consumption of that object, to mention of the form and layout of the text on the page, as if this represented a graded spectrum of similar elements. Yet, as Mitchell argues, "What is not usually observed is that this sort of inquiry into the physical spatiality of texts may be related to a host of other spatial dimensions in literature" (551), while other critics have also, in their suggested terminology, embraced wide extremes of scale. Genette, for example, defines the paratext (which will be discussed in more detail at a later stage) simply as that which "enables a text to become a book" (Paratexts 1), whether this be the distribution of ink on a page to create the form of an individual letter, the format of the book, or even something beyond the book, such as the circulation of the author's image to advertise the text. Similarly, John Lennard's understanding of 'punctuation', as detailed in his entry in Literary Terms and Literary Theory, bears close resemblance to the pattern of distribution described, developing, as it does, a range of spatialities, or "spatial levels" (Lennard 712). For Lennard, punctuation consists of:

(1) letter-forms, punctuating the blank page; *scripta continua* . . . ; (2) interword spaces, including paragraph-, verse line- and stanza-breaks; (3) the marks of punctuation with their associated spaces; (4) words or other units distinguished by fount, face, case, colour, siglum, or position; the detail of the *mise-en-page*; (5) the organization of the page and opening; the principles of the *mise-en-page*; (6) pagination or foliation, punctuating reading; (7) the structure of grouped pages; sections, chapters, prolegomena and appendices, and apparatus; and (8) the book itself, as a complete object punctuating space or constituent volume. (712)
So far, our focus has been on levels (7) and (8), but at every level both Genette's paratext and Lennard's punctuation draw attention to the presentation of the text, and to the significatory content of that which is apparently non-text but only the appearance of the text. In each case, they argue for an increased awareness of the active role that these substantialising elements play in the act of interpretation. Lennard, for example, argues that "punctuation is a tool of authority, limiting as well as generating and inflecting meaning, and has long been of interest to church and state," so that "the art of punctuating is influenced by religion, utility, philosophy and aesthetics at least as much by logic or theoretical coherence" (712). The purity and plainness of the black text on a white background is immediately coloured in its production by its emergence into a social context. We have already seen how cultural and commercial factors can influence the form of the book, but, in attending to the word as printed on the page, we might have naively expected that we were in the domain of the writer, experiencing the text as they experienced it also. Yet, even for a writer such as Banville, so concerned to determine volume, part, and chapter breaks, the overall appearance of the text might be quite outside his control, depending as it does on page width, margins, typeface, and so on. Genette says that "typesetting - the choice of typeface and its arrangement on the page - is obviously the act that shapes a text into a book" (Paratexts 34), yet it is often the publisher who decides the sizes and shapes of the letters, the spacing between lines, as well as between sections, and the width of the margins, so that, ultimately, the publisher's influence extends across every page.

The text may be further affected by historical and cultural methods for presenting certain textual elements, such as dialogue, which can also alter the form of the text. George Watson argues that, "In libraries and bookshops, aspiring readers may be seen turning the pages, confident they can tell at a glance whether dialogue predominates. . . . It now represents the most important fact one can easily discover about a novel without actually reading it" (41), yet the form that dialogue takes on the page was not always as it is now.18 That this comment is made with regard to novels,

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18 As Watson says, "Its very punctuation and arrangement on the page were for long uncertain, with numerous variations between individual printers, including italics for the spoken words, and even a dramatic arrangement with the speaker's name at the start of each speech. . . . It was only as late as the 1780's that French and English settled into something approaching their present conventions . . . [while] the convention of starting each speech with a new line was not regularly established before 1800" (46). Genette points out that Proust initially wanted his volumes "printed without paragraph indentations, even for the dialogue" (Genette, Paratexts 62) so that it would "enter more into the continuity of the text" (Proust, Correspondance, qtd. in Genette, Paratexts 62).
however, rather than books of poems, or the texts of plays, shows the extent to which
the pages of novels especially tend to adhere to our expectations of them, with
deliberate deviations from the basic structures relatively rare in prose fictions.
Inevitably, though, there are exceptions, affecting the appearance of the text on the page
by indenting passages, sentences, and individual words, skipping lines, placing words in
particular positions, printing words in bold, or italic, or underlined.

Poetry, by comparison, seems a far more malleable form, and, aside from the
more mundane changes in layout required by the normally shorter, often varying, line
lengths (as compared to prose), as well as by the spaces between stanzas and poems,
poets also seem more inclined towards typographical experimentation. Still, we should
not accept either that a poem as it appears on the page is exactly as envisaged by its
author. Even a well-known, and celebrated, poem such as Ezra Pound's "In a Station of
the Metro," which appeared in 1916 in what has become its recognised form,

The apparition of these faces in the crowd;
Petals on a wet, black bough.

first appeared in 1913, in Poetry, taking a different form:

The apparition of these faces in the crowd:
Petals on a wet, black bough.

At this level, where we would perhaps expect the author's voice to speak the loudest,
where we would surely feel we are as close to the text as is possible, at the very face of
the text, still external factors intervene, affecting our interpretation of what we read
through its manipulation of the textual environment we read within.

Certain writers, however, distinguish themselves by their concern for
maintaining control over the form of the text on the page. Genette, for example, argues
that "there are cases in which the graphic realization is inseparable from the literary
intention: it is hard to imagine certain texts by Mallarmé, Apollinaire, or Butor deprived
of this dimension," and elsewhere says of Butor, notably the one writer of the three most
associated with prose forms, that in his "Mobile, for example, the white spaces on the
page - their relations to the printed words - play a major role in the effect created and in
the expression of theme" (Paratexts 34, 19n). Butor's own views on the use and purpose of textual forms are very much worth attending to. In "The Book as Object," Butor describes the book simply as "one of the ways in which language can be preserved," but he introduces a more specific requirement later on when he describes it as "preserving speech" (39). Within this context, he then laments the largely arbitrary nature by which the prose text is usually formed, depending, as we have seen, on page width, typeface and so on, so that line breaks occur independently of any syntactical divisions, such as sentences and clauses, and also without regard for what we might term performative indicators, such as commas and periods, which are used to organise and structure the text. "Ideally, of course," Butor says, "the line breaks would correspond to something in the text, the text would be already articulated into measures. Each line of writing, hence each continuous movement of the eye, would correspond to a unit of meaning, of hearing; the time the eye takes to skip from one line to the next would represent a pause in the speaking voice" ("Object" 41). In fact, it is exactly this form of motivated lineation, when the division of "the thread of speech into lines . . . is justified by something more than editorial accident" ("Object" 41), which Butor posits as one of, if not the defining characteristic of verse as opposed to prose. It is only when Butor moves from discussing the length of the line to the length of the column, formed by the lines as they run down the page, that he can speak of a comparable justified division for prose, the division of the column into strophes or paragraphs. "Strophe, perfect page, as 'verse, or perfect line" ("Object" 41), he says, deliberately incorporating the words of Stéphane Mallarmé.

Mallarmé, of course, is notable for his use of what Butor terms his "expressive typography," where the selection of font, as well as its layout and presentation, were intended to inform the delivery of the poetry ("Object" 51). Thus it is that the "differences of intensity in the utterance of words are translated by differences in body type," "the blanks denote the silence," and "roman and italic . . . correspond to the transcription of a timbre or tone of voice," while it "is certain that Mallarmé was also trying to find equivalents for the pitch of sounds" ("Object" 52). The stated intention of all of these forms of typographical intervention, as well Butor's stated desire that, even in prose, line length fulfil some role in structuring the delivery of the material, refer back to Butor's conception of the written word as primarily the preserver of speech, the
spoken word. As such, the written word comes to be seen as secondary to orality, and, in poetry in particular, to the oral performance.  

Some of the implications of conceiving the written word simply as a record of the spoken word are apparent in the work of Gotthold Lessing, who, in *Laocoon: An Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry*, famously placed the qualities of the spoken and written words together in opposition with those of the plastic arts. Lessing, in discussing the nature of the aesthetic and what subjects could best be represented by poetry and painting, suggests that the nature of the medium determines to a large extent the success with which either art may represent an object or action. The two arts employ different means of expression, "the one using forms and colours in space, the other articulate sounds in time" (Lessing 91), implying an immediate distinction between one, painting, as a spatial art, and the other, poetry, both spoken and written, as a temporal art. He continues to say, "if signs must unquestionably stand in convenient relation with the thing signified, then signs arranged side by side can represent only objects existing side by side, or whose parts so exist, while consecutive signs can express only objects which succeed each other, or whose parts succeed each other, in time" (91). The juxtapositional and visual nature of painting is suited to portraying objects while the sequential and, essentially, aural/oral nature of poetry equates with presenting actions. Since then, many proponents of a spatial form in literature have worked within these boundaries for, as Joseph Frank says, "Time and space were the two extremes defining the limits of literature and the plastic arts in their relation to sensuous perception" ("Spatial Form" 8).  

Of course, recalling Butor's description of poetry as a text incorporating justified line breaks, it is apparent that the traditional concept of poetry implies exactly a secondary relation of the written text to the spoken word. Richard Bradford makes this clear in his analysis of poetry's double pattern. The first part of this is "the pattern of comprehensibility" (Bradford 5), the grammatical and syntactical order of language which enables us to develop meaningful statements from a vast number of available

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19 Watson suggests that even the adoption of chapters may have its roots in an oral culture, for "in an age that read aloud as well as silently, there may have been practical considerations in favour of interrupting narrative in an intelligible way" (67). It is interesting to remember that Fielding's chapter lengths were determined, too, by quotidian rhythms rather than narrative imperatives, except that the focus was on the rhythms of the reader rather than the performer, as he "does seem often to divide his narrative according to the duration of attention which he can legitimately ask of his readers" (Stevick 180).  

20 Joseph Frank points out that Lessing "did not originate this formulation... but he was the first to use it systematically as an instrument of critical analysis" ("Spatial Form" 6).
words. Each of those words then has its own sound, its own phonetic quality independent of any referential function it might be serving, with the result that language tends to have a rhythmical quality, "surface patterns of rhythm and sound" (Bradford 5). The double pattern is evident when these surface patterns are purposely structured into regular and constant beats, so it is the double pattern which defines the traditional poetic line; "for the poetic line to become a verifiable phenomenon it must be possible to discern a pattern which is anterior to what can be regarded as the accidents of speech or prose rhythm" (Bradford 6). The poetic line, therefore, is determined by accepted metrical units, each line representing "the acoustic presence of a single unit of the double pattern" (Bradford 6).

As Bradford illustrates, it was in the debate over free verse that the significance of the relation between the poetic line and the double pattern came to the fore, for if a line did not structure itself according to recognised metrical patterns, but instead gave in to "the natural rhythmic imperatives of composition and expression" (Bradford 6), then it left itself open to the accusation of being no more than shaped prose. Amy Lowell, the self-appointed "spiritual chief" of the Imagists (as Ezra Pound laments ("Letter" 142)) felt the need to tackle this charge in her preface to the 1916 collection Some Imagist Poets, arguing that it arose from "the almost complete ignorance of the public in regard to the laws of cadenced verse," which was, for her, "the sense of perfect balance of flow and rhythm" (140, 138). F.S. Flint, an early advocate of vers libre, and one of the founding members of the society which would produce the Imagists, also spoke, in a letter to J.C. Squire, of the need to throw off "the strait jacket of regular metre and rhyme" (145), and to compose, as he writes in "Imagisme," "in sequence of the musical phrase, not in sequence of a metronome" (129). Other practitioners of free verse have reacted to criticism either by ignoring it or by arguing instead that the shape of the poem mapped "the essentially poetic movement of vocalisation" (Bradford 6), thereby returning shape to sound, or even more specifically, to the act of speaking.

Amy Lowell suggests something of this attitude when she writes "Poetry is a spoken and not a written art" (139), but this common approach to the poetic line is probably epitomised by the Projectivist or Black Mountain poets, including Robert Creeley, Ed Dorn, Hilda Morley, John Wieners, Robert Duncan, and, of course, Charles Olson. As Paul Hoover points out, "Attention to the line as a unit of breath is a major principle of Black Mountain composition" (Introduction xxxii), and so, in the essay
"Projective Verse" (1950), we find Olson rejecting the inherited, traditional, poetic line, and urging that "the line comes (I swear it) from the breath" (616). Allen Ginsberg too, a member of the Beat movement in the fifties and sixties, of course, rather than the Black Mountain poets, felt the breath was the source of the line. "My breath is long," he said, "that's the Measure, one physical-mental inspiration of thought contained in the elastic of a breath" (Ginsberg 635-36). Both Ginsberg and Olson "reconnected poetry with the body" (Hoover, Postmodern 3), but, moreover, and as with Mallarmé, through the use of the typewriter Olson strove to write the poem as a score for its own performance: "For the first time the poet has the stave and the bar a musician has had. For the first time he can, without the convention of rime and meter, record the listening he has done to his own speech and by that one act indicate how he would want any reader, silently or otherwise, to voice his work" (618). Notably, this dedication of the text to the vocal performance of the work is achieved only by wresting control of the text, its punctuation and its distribution, from the intervention of industrial of commercial producers; "What we have suffered from, is manuscript, press, the removal of verse from its producer and its reproducer, the voice" (618).

For the Beat movement, writing was "public, direct, performative, ecstatic, agonized, oral and incantatory" (Hoover, Introduction xxx), a view which reached its logical extreme in the seventies with the performance poetry of David Antin, Jerome Rothenberg and John Giorno. Improvising in the moment, drawing from and expanding on prepared texts, incorporating theatre, ritual and accompaniment, this poetry challenges "the preciousness of the page" (Hoover, Introduction xxxviii), affirming Olson's view that "the materiality of language is a regrettable condition of the medium, something that must be used and transcended as rapidly as possible" (Bradford 150). When the works of the performance poets are recorded as texts, they employ the same techniques of typographical arrangement to give an indication of the original performance, but the suggestion is that the written word is very much just the remains of the initial moment, and thereby the lesser art. The written word here, then, is seen as secondary to what is oral. Philippe Sollers, in fact, warns that, in "our obsession with time," we are "becoming more and more blind to the spatiality of signs," for "we habitually," though mistaken, "consider [writing] a simple fictitious image of the spoken word or of its imitative transcription" (Sollers, "The Novel" 69). Genette also observes that "One has long considered writing . . . as a simple means for the notation of
speech" (Figures III qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 242). If this is the case, then it hardly seems worthwhile to speak of the spatiality of the page, of textual layout or marginal influences, because these spatial elements are meant only to inform an oral performance, so that the written word and the form it takes, is seen as partaking only of the nature of the spoken word, that is, not spatial, but temporal, sequential, and linear.

The obvious question here, however, is why artists so concerned with the preservation of vocal nuances, of timbre, pitch and volume, should even persevere with this simple means of preserving speech when technology has made it so easy for us to capture precisely the spoken word. This is exactly the question which Butor poses at the beginning of his essay "The Book as Object," and his answer, perhaps surprisingly, ignores issues of effectiveness, ease, affordability, longevity, or reproducibility, but returns us immediately to the book as a volume, an object in space. "The sole, but significant, superiority," he says, "not only of books but of all writing over the means of direct recording, which is incomparably more accurate, is in the simultaneous exposure to our eyes of what our ears can grasp only sequentially" ("Object" 39-40), so that, again, the distinction is made between the spatial area of the page as viewed by the eye, and the temporal experience of following the line of conversation.

It is at this point, however, that Butor's reasoning comes into conflict with Lessing's argument. Lessing makes a number of assumptions in the above declarations, the first being that a text develops its meaning solely through a sequential presentation of its component parts, yet, as we have seen, Butor's highest recommendation of text is its simultaneous quality. In this, Butor seems to suggest, though doesn't properly distinguish between, two differing, though related, functions of the simultaneity of the text. The first emphasises the fact that the text acts as a container of the thread of speech which doesn't require that the thread be rolled up for convenient storage, as on a tape or film, and so unrolled for each replaying, with only the present instant audible. Instead, in a text all elements are co-existent, equally accessible, and the text as volume is apprehensible in its entirety, in all three dimensions, allowing us to better orient ourselves and navigate within the body of the text. Butor speaks of how, to achieve a similar ease of access on a recording, a record can "be divided into concentric zones, or

21Ginsberg's "Notes for Howl and Other Poems" first appeared, in fact, as the liner note to a recording of Howl and Other Poems in 1959.
bands" and only then can we "possess a certain freedom, a mobility with regard to the
text" ("Object" 40).

What the text also allows, however, which is denied to us by the aural recording
but results from the co-presence of all parts of the thread of speech in the pages of the
text, is the possibility of simultaneously apprehending different areas of that thread. In
fact, Butor argues that the evolution in methods for storing this permanent thread shows
that the concern lies with how "to make the largest possible section of [the text] legible
at one time" ("Object" 40). A single straight line would mean the beginning would
soon be too far removed from the viewer's eye to be discernible, but each alternative has
its own problems. We might employ boustrophedonic script ("alternating lines in
opposite directions . . . but this method has the disadvantage of making the series of
characters reversed from one line to the next almost unrecognizable"), or cylinders ("one
section of the line necessarily conceals the rest") ("Object" 40, 41), but now we simply
"cut the line of text into lengths which are then arranged one under the next, forming a
column" ("Object" 41). This arrangement of lines filling columns filling pages filling
volumes has "the advantage of allowing the reader a great freedom of movement in
relation to the 'unrolling' of the text, a great mobility which most nearly approximates a
simultaneous presentation of all parts of a work" ("Object" 42). The ease of navigation
permitted by the physical structure of the volume therefore permits the near
simultaneous apprehension of all parts of the work. This aspect of the text is equally
significant on a smaller scale, however, for the written word, as opposed to the spoken,
has the advantage of "leaving accessible to our eyes what our ears would already have
missed, permitting us to grasp a whole sequence at a single glance" ("Object" 40).

Butor's observations suggest that, despite being employed to record a series of
signs in sequence, the text's manner of permanent, spatialised presentation adds another
dimension to the line of speech, problematising Lessing's easy equation.22 Richard
Bradford, too, criticises Lessing for his essentially phonocentric attitude, insisting that it

[22] It is for aesthetic reasons that Lessing does not permit the written description of objects in space (it is
only for the writer of prose who "is satisfied with being intelligible, and making his representations plain
and clear" (101)), for descriptive language would lack the aesthetic harmony of coincidence with its
object. As Genette remarks, "description has to model in successiveness the representation of objects co­
existing and juxtaposed in space; narrative language would thus be distinguished by a sort of temporal
coincidence with its object, while descriptive language, on the contrary, would be irreparably deprived of
such coincidence" (Figures II qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 238). Genette, however, suggests that in
written, as opposed to oral, literature, there is little to hinder the harmony of the description as "nothing
prevents the reader from retracing his steps and considering the text, in its simultaneous spatiality, as an
analogon of the spectacle it describes" (qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 238).
is wrong to say simply that "language moves and visual representations are static" (Bradford 34). Bradford argues, of Lessing, but also of the Projectivist poets such as Olson, that what they "conveniently forget is that speech and typing must stop, that the kinetic of the poem will eventually become stasis, and the text will present itself as a network of silent graphemes" (151). It is the graphic nature of the poem on the page with which Bradford is concerned because he feels that the written word presents possibilities of meaning which are indiscernible in listening to the poem.

In order to develop his analysis of what he terms visual form, Bradford employs a "sliding scale," a means for gauging the extent to which poets exploit the possibilities of poetic form on the page. At one end of the scale, Bradford places the blank verse of Milton and Wordsworth. In the seventeenth century, the use of blank verse in poetry was quite unusual for if, as Bradford says, "Rhyme provided an aural signal for the existence of the double pattern" (11), then the absence of rhyme meant that the end of the poetic line might no longer be audible, the iambic beat might be lost among the natural surface patterns of the language, and poetry would be 'reduced' to prose. The end-of-line beat, however, which can disappear for the ear with the loss of rhyme, is a visible and concrete element of the poem when it is being read, an element which, moreover, Bradford argues, can often act as a counterpoint to the interpretation suggested by an oral reading. As an example, Bradford refers to that section in Milton's Paradise Lost (1667) where Eve relates to Adam how God told her to:

follow me
And I will bring thee where no shadow stays
Thy coming (4.470-1)

In the brief instant before the eye moves from "stays" to "Thy," an initial meaning of 'restrains' suggests itself before the reader adapts to the syntax of the next line and realises that here "stays" means 'awaits'. The problem for someone listening to the poem, and for Adam, to whom this is being related, is that without seeing the poem, and the positioning of the line break, this double signification, suggesting "a hesitant, unreliable dimension of Eve's character," remains unapparent (Bradford 58). Butor's

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23 As Perec writes, "Letter by letter, a text forms, affirms itself, is confirmed, is frozen, is fixed" (*Species of Spaces* 9).
praise for the written text's perpetual presentation of the words it records suggests that
this better enables us to grasp what is being said, that seeing a sentence in its syntactical
and grammatical wholeness aids us in comprehending the meaning of what is being
said, but Bradford's analysis of visual form suggests that the layout of the written text
can communicate to the eye what would never be accessible to the ear.

Significantly, this interpretation of visual form also seems to describe a
hesitation in the movement of the line, a disruption in the line akin to that introduced by
repetition, as discussed in the previous section. Indeed, we can see that, while the visual
line communicates one meaning, the syntactical line communicates another, requiring
us to double back upon the words we have just read, re-reading them in order to inscribe
the new meaning upon them. Complicating, therefore, Hillis Miller's assertion that such
"spaces . . . are not in themselves forms of repetition breaking linearity" (Ariadne's
Thread 6), the more authentically simultaneous presentation (as compared to the
Victorian novel) of the poetic lines does create a double reading of a single point.
Rather than being like "bits of string laid end to end" (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Thread 5),
the poetic line both ends and does not end, and so loops back upon itself, to be re-
written and re-read, before continuing.

Connections and relations: spatial form

It is Bradford's visual form which finally leads us to the work of Joseph Frank. His
seminal essay "Spatial Form in Modern Literature," appearing in 1945, arose in
response to two works. The second of these, giving us our first link to Bradford, was
Lessing's Laocoon, which provided Frank with the theoretical system around which, and
against which, he would base his argument. However, it was the unique style of
composition of the first, Djuna Barnes's Nightwood, which posed Frank the initial
problems, for it seemed as if a certain as yet undefined and unexpressed quality
distinguished it from much of the literature of its time. Nightwood would, then, remain
the focus of the resulting essay, whose purpose would not be to develop any kind of
theory of modern literature, but rather to cast some light on the workings of a difficult
text, though Frank later wrote that it was perhaps "out of a sense of gratitude to the book
that had started me on my way" (Preface xiii) that Nightwood remained so central to his
essay. What Frank then calls this "lopsided character of the essay as a whole" (Preface
may be one of the reasons that his essay retains a rather singular characteristic, as individual in its own way as Barnes's Nightwood. Highly quotable, and always thought-provoking, Frank's essay has attracted considerable attention and criticism, and been praised for its insights into the works of Joyce and Proust especially, as well as for drawing attention to, and for intelligently illuminating, Barnes's Nightwood, considered by many to be something of a neglected masterpiece.

The essay, described by Wellek and Warren as an "admirable study" does, however, have its weaknesses (303). Paul de Man, for one, reviewing Frank's collection of essays, The Widening Gyre, welcomes the "insight" shown in "Spatial Form in Modern Literature" but later condemns its "very sketchy intellectual history" and "rather useless excursion into eighteenth-century aesthetics" (111, 110, 114). Moreover, he goes on to point out that "the purely literary essays that conclude the work [The Widening Gyre] make little use of the methodological possibilities inherent in the concept of spatial form" (111), a remark which, strangely, also seems applicable to the essay itself in an analysis of Nightwood which tends to depend more on the assertion of its spatial form rather than on the rigorous application of the valuable concepts developed up to that point. Frank's essay emerges, then, as a stimulating piece of work, but lacking any detailed elaboration of its key concepts, and, in fact, it was to be another thirty years before Frank returned to the subject which, as he himself admits, he "had more or less lost contact" (Preface ix), having long since turned his attention to a study of the history of Russian literature and culture, and, especially, Dostoevsky.

Frank's original essay stands, then, as something of an oddity, and Frank himself is hard to classify. Some mark him down as a New Critic, with Patricia Tobin describing "Spatial Form in Modern Literature" as "that influential document of the formalist New Criticism" (3) and Richard Poirier suggesting the New Critics methods were "epitomized in such influential codifications as Joseph Frank's essay of 1945" (qtd. in Frank, Preface xi). Others state flatly that he is not (Tate vii, de Man 110). His association with the New Critics probably stems partly from the fact that his essays were published in their early forms in journals seen, as Tate puts it, as "strongholds of New Criticism" (vii). Tate, however, describes Frank as "his own man" (viii), and there is very much a sense of a personal vision at work in the essay, the writer motivated by a clear and compelling challenge, and neither swayed by, nor attached to, the fashionable
movements of the time. This might explain some of its attraction, but as Frank Kermode explains, it also happened that the essay "crystallised what had been for the most part vague notions, ideas that were in the air, and gave them a memorable name" ("A Reply" 579), a comment which at least partly explains the popularity of what remains a frustrating but fecund piece of work.

To begin with the work which provided the impetus for Frank's exploration, it is interesting to see some of T. S. Eliot's comments from the introduction to Barnes's Nightwood echo again the theme of a simultaneously present totality which has been developing throughout our discussion, for he speaks a number of times of the importance of coming to "an appreciation of its meaning as a whole" (1), and of the "whole pattern" (3, 5). Eliot himself is one of the writers, along with Barnes, and others such as Pound, Proust, and Joyce, who, Frank argues in this essay, require us to apprehend their works as a whole, in their entirety, and so "ideally intend the reader to apprehend their work spatially, in a moment of time, rather than as a sequence" (9). This sequence is, as we have been seeing, the spoken order of language where, as Butor puts it, "Every word follows one other, precedes one other" ("Object" 40), in single file. In order to make the reader read spatially, Frank argues, this familiar verbal line must be disrupted, and "it would be necessary to undermine the inherent consecutiveness of language, frustrating the reader's normal expectation of a sequence and forcing him to perceive the elements of the poem as juxtaposed in space rather than unrolling in time," spooling out as if off a tape or film. Now, the "syntactical sequence is given up for a structure depending on the perception of relationships between disconnected word-groups," with the end result that "the meaning-relationship is completed only by the

24Perhaps this is partly the result of the fact that Frank wasn't writing from within the academic circle, but was working as a journalist in Washington D.C. for at least part of the time he was writing the essay.

25To illustrate Kermode's observation that Frank's essay gave form to existing vague ideas, we should note the remarkable similarities between Frank's argument and G. Wilson Knight's comments on Shakespeare's tragedies: "One must be prepared to see the whole play in space as well as in time. It is natural in analysis to pursue the steps of the tale in sequence, noticing the logic that connects them. . . . And yet by giving supreme attention to this temporal nature of drama we omit what, in Shakespeare, is at least of equivalent importance. A Shakespearian tragedy is set spatially as well as temporally in the mind. By this I mean there are throughout the play a set of correspondences which relate to each other independently of the time sequence which is the story. . . . Now if we are prepared to see the whole play laid out, so to speak, as an area, being simultaneously aware of these thickly-scattered correspondences in a single view of the whole, we possess the unique quality of the play in a new sense" (3). Future echoes of Frank's spatial form appear also in the work of Northrop Frye: "the word meaning or dianoia conveys, or at least preserves, the sense of simultaneity caught by the eye. We listen to the poem as it moves from beginning to end, but as soon as the whole of it is in our minds at once we 'see' what it means. More exactly, this response is not simply to the whole of it, but to a whole in it: we have a vision of meaning or dianoia whenever any simultaneous apprehension is possible" (77-78).
simultaneous perception in space of word-groups that have no comprehensible relation to each other when read consecutively in time" ("Spatial Form" 10, 12, 13).

These are the key tenets of Frank's theory of spatial form, and they have proved relatively uncontroversial. Though de Man, for example, may find fault with the historical aspects of Frank's essay, he argues of Frank's method that "such a procedure is altogether sound from a hermeneutic point of view. There is nothing different here from what happens when, in an interpretation of a short poem, we feel entitled to progress not simply line by line but by establishing relationships backward and forward" (111). Similarly, Frank himself remarks on "how little specific objection has been taken to my actual arguments or analyses. Most of the discussion has turned on the larger cultural implications" ("Years After" 205-06). This is not to say, however, that there are no problems with Frank's development of his methods. To begin to assess Frank's spatial form, therefore, it might be helpful to first see how it compares to Bradford's visual form. Bradford, for example, includes an analysis of the work of e. e. cummings, whose work he places at the other end of his sliding scale to Milton, due to the extent to which he exploits the potentiality of the visual form in poems such as the following from his 95 Poems (1958):

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The reader is aware that a connection is being made between the experience of loneliness and the leaf falling, but, as Bradford says, "It is impossible to describe the order in which the reader is able to distinguish the formal materiality from the metaphoric resonance of the poem" (35). If we wished, we might project a world
around the poem (as Bradford says, "the end of summer evoking a sense of sadness and isolation" (35)), but the material form of the poem, and the way in which it works visually, seems to make this unnecessary. The path of the falling leaf is reflected in the path of the poem itself, while the fragmentation of the words, and the interrupted linearity, mean that the realisation of the word "loneliness" is deferred so that it exists both before and after, and therefore during, the leaf's fall, so that the two can be apprehended simultaneously. The sense of loneliness is entwined with the experience of the falling leaf, even as the words are entangled with each other. If, as Bradford says, "We feel the word 'loneliness' as we watch the leaf fall," we are also reading the experience of loneliness as we fall along the poem in "a blending of the material and the referential dimensions of language" (Bradford 35). Also, we see that the "one" of loneliness is isolated, like the individual, as are the two 'l's, each evoking the number "one," and the same sense of solitude. Bradford argues, then, that "Somewhere within the text there is the conventional temporal syntagm 'A leaf falls', but in the process of simply decoding what Lessing calls these 'consecutive symbols' we are also aware that the linguistic signs have come to operate like the 'parts . . . in juxtaposition' of a painting" (35-36).

Frank would certainly arrive at a similar interpretation, for this poem, in its fragmentation and interspersal of words and syntactic units, negates the readers' normal expectations of sequentiality and requires them to grapple with the relations between the spatially superimposed elements of "loneliness" and "a leaf falls." Where Frank might differ from Bradford is in Bradford's statement that "Our awareness of how temporal language can describe or signify a relation between an event and a feeling is fused simultaneously with a visual representation of that process" (35), for though we can obviously draw comprehensible relations between the separated parts of "loneliness" and between the fragmented sections of "a leaf falls," to form a word and a syntactic whole respectively, the poem relies for its effect on the simultaneous awareness of a connection between the two word-groups which is not grammatical but metaphorical. In other words, there does not appear to be an equivalent in "temporal language" ('Loneliness is like a leaf falling' or 'Loneliness is caused by a leaf falling') which adequately matches what cummings's poem achieves by its spatial arrangement.

Where Frank's approach differs from Bradford's is that it does not actually require the writer to affect the visual form of the poem. Despite this, the form of "l (a"
does serve as an excellent representation both of the subversion of sequentiality, and of the simultaneity of perception meant by Frank when he speaks of spatial form. It is almost as if the poem were intended as a concrete illustration of the experience of spatial form. Frank suggests only that, in order to prompt the reader to attempt a spatial reading, the writer must "undermine the inherent consecutiveness of language" ("Spatial Form" 10), but there are different ways to achieve this. Pound's "In a Station of the Metro," for example, would represent for Frank a poem which requires a spatial reading, for Pound himself defined an "Image" as "that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time" ("A Few Don'ts" 130). Just as cummings's "l(a" presents an emotional complex based on the simultaneous apprehension of its inter-woven parts, so Pound emphasises the need to respond to the two parts of his poem in an instant, as a complex, resonant whole. "Such a complex," says Frank, "does not proceed discursively, in unison with the laws of language, but strikes the reader's sensibility with an instantaneous impact" ("Spatial Form" 9). For some readers, however, the incompleteness of the syntactic units and the form of their punctuation, that is, the division of the parts by a semi-colon as well as the line-breaks, is not enough to undermine the sequentiality of the line. Harvey Gross, for example, accepts that "the two images have spatial and emotional relationships," but suggests that "grammar, however, is not missing; it is automatically supplied by the reader," and so he feels free to re-write the lines in the following form:

The apparition of these faces in the crowd
(Are like) Petals on a wet black bough (sic, Gross 162)

Bradford describes this re-integration of such lines into the apparently natural "successive pattern of language" as "phonic naturalisation" (87), but the inadequacy of this approach, and this reading, becomes apparent when we look back on the original form of the poem, as it appeared in 1913. Then, the four irregular interword spaces further emphasised the spatialised aspects of the poem, and encouraged not just the juxtapositional apprehension of the two, larger elements, but played with the possibilities of relations between smaller sections also, "The apparition" and "Petals," or "bough" and "in the crowd." On this smaller scale, then, the physical distribution in
space of the text again plays a key part in producing the spatiality of the text and our awareness of it.

Despite Gross's reluctance to read "In a Station of the Metro" in terms of its spatial relations, the rather one-dimensional nature of his imposed reading illustrates a feature of visual or spatial form which both Frank and Bradford remark on, namely the problems it presents for critical analysis or attempts at naturalisation. In Frank's view, "The one difficulty of these poems, which no amount of textual exegesis can wholly overcome, is the internal conflict between the time-logic of language and the space-logic implicit in the modern conception of the nature of poetry" ("Spatial Form" 13). Bradford says of visual structures that they "pre-empt and negate the analytic conventions of criticism by investing the printed text with an inbuilt tension between succession and simultaneity," so that visual form is "probably the final point of resistance to the process by which critical writing has catalogued and colonised the 'language of poetry'" (43, 181).26 A further point of contact between Bradford and Frank views is in the effect they see spatial and visual forms having on the nature of the work of art itself. There is a self-referential nature to the work as relations are built up between the constituent elements of the text, meaning that priority is no longer given to the concept of language as signifying an external referent or operating in reference only to a thing external to the linguistic system. As Frank says, "Since the primary reference of any word-group is to something inside the poem itself, language in modern poetry is really reflexive" ("Spatial Form" 13). In Bradford's understanding, this translates itself into a concern for the materiality of the poem rather than a focus on the ideational image which the poem conveys. He draws his examples of visual forms, therefore, from poets who see the function of the poem as being more than the conveyance of an image. Bradford says of Wordsworth that, "he wanted the poetic artefact to become part of the experience represented, rather than an ephemeral spoken event, which is all too easily replaced by the ability of the hearer to move beyond the words to the imagined experience that brought them into existence," while Williams "draws the reader into a

26W. J. T Mitchell, also, says "This familiar pattern in literary criticism - the claim that we do, at least for a moment, 'see the meaning' of a work, coupled with our inability to state it in a verbal paraphrase - seems to me a phenomenon that rises out of a spatial apprehension of the work as a system for generating meanings" (553).
double (twofold) encounter with the language itself and with the world both created and reflected by the language" (66, 76).  

At this point, however, what seems to be required is a more detailed analysis of the internal relations Frank speaks of, the basis of their relation, and the methods for signalling the existence of these relations. In fact, the necessary undermining of "the inherent consecutiveness of language" in order, as Frank describes, to assert the significance of "word-groups that have no comprehensible relation to each other when read consecutively in time" ("Spatial Form" 10, 13), is already evident both in Banville's *Kepler*, where we witnessed significant relations drawn between words through the successful undermining of the straight line by the repetition of words or word-groups, and in Bradford's visual form, where the disparity between what is seen and what is heard produces a disruption in the movement of the line. Comparable disruptions, however, can be produced on the level of what is heard alone, for repetitions are, of course, a common poetic feature, with Gerard Manley Hopkins actually defining verse as "speech wholly or partially repeating the same figure of sound" (qtd. in Jakobson, "Linguistics" 358-59), whether through rhythm, metre, alliteration, assonance, or rhyme.

Looking at rhyme, for example, which is "based on a regular recurrence of equivalent phonemes or phonemic groups" (Jakobson, "Linguistics" 367), we can easily see how the repetitions of sound patterns create between words connections which are independent of any grammatical connection, connections which cut across the sequence of the text. Roman Jakobson, however, repeatedly argues for an understanding of rhyme based not on sound alone; "it would be an unsound oversimplification," he says, "to treat rhyme merely from the standpoint of sound. Rhyme necessarily involves the semantic relationship between rhyming units;" "equivalence in sound . . . inevitably involves semantic equivalence;" "the metrical parallelism of lines, or the phonic equivalence of rhyming words prompts the question of semantic similarity and contrast" ("Linguistics" 368, *Language* 95-96). The phonetic equivalences foregrounded by an oral/aural conception of poetry, where similarity is created through the rhythm and metre of the lines, where "word stress is assumed to equal word stress, as unstress equals unstress," is also an indication of a semantic equivalence which includes

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27Both these qualities, the resistance to naturalisation and the self-awareness of the text, are cited in Jonathan Culler's description of the "essence of literature," which, he says, "is not representation, not a communicative transparency, but an opacity, a resistance to recuperation which exercises sensibility and intelligence" ("Towards" 258).
associations of "similarity and dissimilarity, synonymity and antonymity" (Jakobson, "Linguistics" 358).

Semantic equivalence, which, therefore, may be signalled through phonetic equivalence but is not confined to similar-sounding words, is the ground on which we build what Jakobson calls the axis of selection. Also known as the paradigmatic axis, and incorporating relations of similarity, substitution, encoding, and metaphor, this axis is twinned with the syntagmatic axis, involving combination, contextual integration, contiguity, decoding and metonymy (Gelley 476). Together, these two axes, now familiar concepts in linguistic theory, govern the construction of the line, the paradigmatic providing a list of similar words, one of which will be selected to be integrated into the linear sequence organised by the syntagmatic. As such, the paradigmatic axis stands as a virtual line vertical to the line of the text, while the syntagmatic axis is usually visualised as operating horizontal to the line of the text.

Analysis of Frank's examples shows that one of the devices structuring the significant "word-groups" is exactly this horizontal axis formed by "positional (namely, syntactic) contiguity" (Jakobson, Language 91), so that each word-group forms a single syntagm. This is clearly the case in Pound's "In a Station of the Metro," for example, where the two disconnected word-groups which must be perceived simultaneously are the two syntactic fragments embodied in the two printed lines. Perceived simultaneously, the one is effectively inscribed on the other, and they are to be read at the same time (some, however, as we have seen with Gross, would argue that the more natural tendency is to position them within a larger contiguous unit, that is, have them follow each other in time rather than juxtapose them in space).

The syntagmatic axis, however, is not one with the textual line, that is, it is not tied to it at every point. Barthes, writing only a few years after Jakobson's development of these concepts, wrote of the resulting means of analysing narrative, then "both in their infancy:"

The first is functional, or paradigmatic. It tries to bring out, over and above the mere sequence of words, the elements which are knotted together within the work. The second is sequential or syntagmatic. It tries to discover the path - or paths - followed by the words from the first to the last line of the text. ("Sollers" 42)
This reference to "paths" through the narrative suggests the way in which contiguous elements can remove themselves from the line of the text, give way to another syntagm and then return to the line, reappear along its course. In fact, a sense of fragmentation as the syntagmatic lines replace each other on the textual line, interwoven and overlapping, is one of the hallmarks of literature remarkable for its spatial form. Frank suggests that R. P. Blackmur, in his analysis of what he called Pound's anecdotal method in the Cantos, was one of the first to adequately describe it:

[The form] is that of the anecdote begun in one place, taken up in one or more other places, and finished, if at all, in still another. This deliberate disconnectedness, this art of a thing continually alluding to itself, continually breaking off short, is the method by which the Cantos tie themselves together. So soon as the reader's mind is concerted with the material of the poem, Mr. Pound deliberately disconcerts it, either by introducing fresh and disjunct material or by reverting to old and, apparently, equally disjunct material. (qtd. in Frank, "Spatial Form" 12)

This is seen in condensed form in cummings who, more clearly and materially than Pound, illustrates the spatial coincidence of the two syntagmatic parts of the poem, "loneliness" and "a leaf falls," the inscription of the one on the other, by compressing them into the thin, vertical line of the poem, resulting in the fragmentation of their parts, and the disruption of their contiguity which, nevertheless, cannot obliterate their connection. This process of switching from one "path" to the other and back again, from "loneliness" to "a leaf falls" and back, suggests a further complication in the apprehension of spatial form. The act of perceiving a connection between disconnected word-groups (such as "loneliness" and "a leaf falls") is made all the more difficult by the need to first adequately perceive each individual word-group, especially when we consider that a word-group may comprise a syntactic whole spread across a number of pages, perhaps throughout an entire book. Spatial form can require, then, a double apprehension. We must recognise the spatially distributed word-groups themselves, as well as the relation between them.

Frank's spatial form, however, does not employ the syntagmatic axis alone, as further analysis of the nature of the interaction between the two axes will show. Take, for example, "Sonnet in Search of an Author" (1962) by William Carlos Williams:
Nude bodies like peeled logs
sometimes give off a sweetest
odor, man and woman
under the trees in full excess
matching the cushion of
aromatic pine-drift fallen
threaded with trailing woodbine
a sonnet might be made of it

Might be made of it! odor of excess
odor of pine needles, odor of
peeled logs, odor of no odor
other than trailing woodbine that
has no odor, odor of a nude woman
sometimes, odor of a man.

Traditionally, semantic rhyme, bringing things into symbolic consonance or dissonance, most obviously occurs at line ends (for "'verse' draws its name from the point at which it is deployed" (Agamben, "Corn" 30)), but the absence of rhyme does not necessarily deprive the line end of a significatory aspect. As Bradford describes, "Just as rhyme operates not only as a marker of the line ending but as a device that thickens and intensifies meaning, so the visual structure that replaced it would come to represent an axis in the interplay between abstract form and signification" (17). In this case, Bradford takes the line-endings as the cue for the selection of syntactically disconnected words which nevertheless form a structure of inter-connections with a bearing on his interpretation of the poem. In other words, it is the line-endings which here alert us to the pattern of internal references which Frank sees producing spatial form. The result is the following:

sweetest
woman
excess
of
fallen
woodbine

excess
of
odor

woman
man (52)

Bradford feels that there is "clearly some sort of interplay between the conventional foregrounding of words at each line ending and the sequential, though very uncertain, movement of the syntax" (53). Indeed, though the line endings foreground words with no apparent semantic equivalence, their positional equivalence alone (meaning the plain similarities in their spatial siting), suggests that they are providing something akin to a visual listing of the paradigmatic dimension open to Williams in the composition of the poem, as if he perceives a further equivalence between them, but is unsure of its basis. These, to use Barthes's words, are "the elements which are knotted together" "over and above the mere sequence of words" (Sollers 42), but the tie between them is not plainly grammatical or logical. Williams's inability, or reluctance, to define the relations between these parts is mirrored in the hesitancy of the form of their combination, which, at times, maps exactly the axis of selection, "odor, man and woman" (line 3) mirroring the last three parts of Bradford's selection, "odor, woman, man." As Bradford argues, it may be possible to say that "the poem is 'about' the poet's attempts to confine and rationalise a sequence of phenomena drawn from the images of the natural world and their correspondence with humanity, male and female" (53), but, as with cummings's poem, the description cannot adequately explain the action of the poem. The interaction of the vertical and horizontal, and the process of mapping, is visible only through the perception of isolated words in their relation to each other as part of a static spatial array
or, as Bradford describes it, through the "formal dimension of the text [which] can only be perceived visually, in silence" (53).28

Another interesting illustration of the interaction of such horizontal and vertical lines is provided by Butor, though without any reference to Jakobson's work. In discussing the way that the text is presented on the page, Butor describes the Western tradition of writing from left to write as tending to privilege the horizontal line of the writing, that is the horizontal axis, over the axis which travels the length of the page or the depth of the book. He writes:

All the links usually studied by grammar are established along this dynamic horizontal, but when we encounter a certain number of words which have the same function in the sentence, a series of direct objects, for example, each one is attached in the same fashion; they have basically the same position in the sequence of links, and I perceive a kind of interruption in the line's movement; this enumeration is arranged, then, perpendicularly to the rest of the text. ("Object" 44-45)

Butor’s example is *Gargantua* (1535) wherein Rabelais lists for the reader the 218 games played by the giant. Butor provides a selection of these in the form of a vertical list. All the items in the list are marked by their similarity in that they are all proper names and all occupy the same grammatical point in the sentence; if only one game were to be listed, any of the 218 from the vertical axis could be used without affecting the meaning of the sentence. "Each of these games listed occurs at the same point in the horizontal development of the sentence," says Butor ("Object" 45), and yet, of course, each of these games is initially individually located on the horizontal line of the text, that is, the list is presented to us as a sequence of words, the axis of selection effectively occupying the axis of combination, as in Williams's sonnet.

Jakobson, also, famously allows coincidence between the two axes when he says, in "Linguistics and Poetics," *The poetic function projects the principle of equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination. Equivalence is promoted to the constitutive device of the sequence* (358, his emphasis). Both Butor and Jakobson, then, describe a horizontal line containing elements which, due to their

28Banville also uses a form of positional equivalence to create relations between certain elements, but with a different aim. Where Williams uses the line ends and the visual image of the poem's vertical printed form to reflect the paradigmatic dimension, Banville uses the first letters of the chapters for the
semantic equivalence, effectively occupy the "same position," for, as Jakobson says, "The capacity of two words to replace one another is an instance of positional similarity, and, in addition, all these responses are linked . . . by semantic similarity (or contrast)" (Language 91). This positional similarity would apply even to words separated along the line of the text: for example, if the 218 games listed in Gargantua appeared on 218 different pages. From repetition we move to rhyme to semantic equivalence to, now, positional similarity, a further repetition, for the equivalent words remain linked by that virtual vertical line of selection. The appearance and re-appearance of those words can be interpreted either as the repeated intersection of the 'vertical' line with the horizontal, the one cutting across the other as a wave-form, for example, or else can be seen as the repeated return of the line of the text to that point of intersection between the horizontal and vertical (a true knot), perhaps with a different word selected from the list with each encounter. It is not surprising that, at this point, Butor perceives "a kind of interruption in the line's movement" ("Object" 45), for such points are directed not only along the path of the narrative line, but are also connected by another, oblique line with another point (yet the same point) on the line. With the text emerging as a network of interconnecting verticals and horizontals, and with the relations between words no longer determined by sequentiality alone, we can agree with Frank's interpretation of Jakobson's poetic function, that, "In a poetic message . . . the customary order of combination is overlaid by an order based on equivalence - that is, by a space-logic running counter to the linear temporality of syntactical structure" ("Years After" 231-32). The image of a continuously unfolding textual line, determined by a logical progression, and driven unerringly towards its end, comes to be replaced by the image of a text whose body is the fragmented and interrupted manifestation of numerous lines, syntagmatic and paradigmatic, narrating and listing, arguing and citing, whose overlapping, intersecting and touching produces the single line of the text.29

29"A course in mathematics," says Carlos Williams, "would not be wasted on a poet or reader of poetry if he remember no more from it than the geometric principle of the intersection of loci: from all angles lines converging and crossing establish points" (qtd. in Jones, Introduction 42). And, says John Berger, "It is scarcely any longer possible to tell a straight story sequentially unfolding in time. And this is because we are too aware of what is continually traversing the storyline laterally. That is to say, instead of being aware of a point as an infinitely small part of a straight line, we are aware of it as an infinitely small part of an infinite number of lines, as the centre of a star of lines" (40).
Time and the world: the limits of spatial form

To return for a moment to the idea of semantic equivalence as a structuring device, an excellent example can be found in the opening pages of Sollers's The Park, where the narrative line seeks out and connects itself to, but is also directed towards and connected to, red objects. Redness is the base of the paradigmatic axis woven along the textual line, so that, as Jean Ricardou describes, "here the color red is a privileged thread. It appears four times in the opening lines," "images line up around it" ("Writing" 267-68). We have a "red dress," "lips," a "red, diamond-shaped sign," and "red light," and, later, a "red lamp," a "light reddened," "red Bangal flares," a "sky reddened," and, notably, "a vertical red line," for redness is itself here the vertical line connecting with the horizontal, marking these points as positionally similar. The book speaks of the possibility of other colours tracing a line through the text, "places just indicated by a colored detail, but by that very color related to each other; places connected by an invisible thread" (qtd. in Ricardou, "Writing" 267). The paradigm may present itself as a line of red, or a line of blue, perhaps, but a line might also be drawn on the basis of colour alone, to include black and white, or objects transparent and opaque.

This example from Sollers is interesting also in the extent to which the world of the text is involved in the construction of the space of the text. The language is patently aware of itself, reflexive in the way Frank describes, the line directed as much towards the other elements on the paradigmatic chain as towards the progression of the printed line, but, in Sollers, the sense of textual construction is so profound, that it is as if the world too is oriented towards the line of the text, attending to it, rather than, as we would normally expect, being simply conveyed by that text. As Ricardou explains:

The red light at the intersection is . . . selected not only by the street evoked by the descriptive trajectory . . . , but by analogy with the serial phenomenon itself. The cars, like the images, "regrouped in three lanes at the red light." Phonetically a relative of line, the word lane underscores this deliberately. . . . It is a case of the fiction providing an allegory of the function that is producing it. ("Writing" 268-69)

The site of this interaction between the space and the world of the text will be the focus of the next sections for, unfortunately, the sensitivity of Ricardou's approach to text is, understandably but unfortunately, lacking in the somewhat broad strokes through which
Frank defines spatial form. Though we might argue that our analysis of Frank's spatial form up to this point adds significantly to a furthering of our understanding of the textual space glimpsed also in the works of Hillis Miller, Butor, and Bradford, when we focus on the specifics of his theory, as evidenced in the examples he provides, the value of his contribution does tend to be compromised. Most problematically, Frank rarely distinguishes between textual levels, between the world of the text and a space of the text, and this is especially evident in the first non-poetic example of spatial form discussed by Frank, Gustave Flaubert's Madame Bovary (1857).

This is Frank's first analysis of a spatial form constructed of large-scale elements, so that "the unit of meaning is not, as in modern poetry, a word-group or a fragment of an anecdote; it is the totality of each level of action taken as an integer" ("Spatial Form" 15-16). In other words, and as previously suggested, the syntagms of larger works are not limited to a word or syntactic unit, but may comprise an account, an argument, a narrative, a speech, a monologue, a description, or a discourse. Moreover, though the same operations as we have seen in the poetic examples still apply, the alternating returns to different syntagmatic threads for example, such interruptions in the line tend to occur less often or with less rapidity, so that we find ourselves staying with the one line for longer periods. As Frank says, "the novel, with its larger unit of meaning, can preserve coherent sequence within the unit of meaning and break up only the time-flow of narrative," so that whereas the use of spatial form in poetry can result in the rapid breakdown of a coherent sequence, the larger units of the novel can maintain their internal coherence while instead the temporality of the narrative is interrupted ("Spatial Form" 16). The existence of coherent sequences in a spatial form is exactly what causes Frank problems, however.

In the county fair scene of Madame Bovary, Frank's interest lies in the way that "there is action going on simultaneously at three levels," with events occurring at street-level, on a raised platform, and at a window overlooking the scene ("Spatial Form" 14). Flaubert himself writes of this scene that "Everything should sound simultaneously" ("Correspondence" qtd. in Frank, "Spatial Form" 15), this simultaneity, as Frank describes, being achieved through the fragmentation of the temporal line, "by breaking up temporal sequence," as Flaubert splices the different levels together in his cutting back and forth between them ("Spatial Form" 15). Following on from Frank's initial descriptions of spatial form, and our subsequent discussions, it would not seem
contradictory to imagine that we can visualise the three levels of action in the country fair as running alongside each other, with the full significance of any one level becoming evident only when read in relation to the other two (Frank does speak at one stage of "the reflexive relations of the two actions" ("Spatial Form" 15). It would be as if we were watching three films at once (or as if we could view different parts of the same filmic world at the same time, as in Mike Figgis's Timecode, where the screen is divided into four frames), or, as Albert Thibaudet points out, like "the medieval mystery play, in which various related actions occur simultaneously on different levels" (Frank, "Spatial Form" 14-15). Frank, however, describes things differently, suggesting that "this scene illustrates, on a small scale, what we mean by the spatialization of form in a novel. For the duration of the scene, at least, the time-flow of the narrative is halted; attention is fixed on the interplay of relationships within the immobilized time-area" ("Spatial Form" 15). The significance of this comment lies in the way in which Frank's concern with simultaneity over sequentiality is expressed less in terms of a spatialisation of the text through the interruption of the line, but is instead described as the abolition of time within the world of the text. Frank is clearly suggesting that, in interrupting the line of the text, Flaubert is arresting the passage of time within the text, and that it is in this timelessness alone that spatial form can be apprehended. Unlike the manageable word-groups offered up by his poetic examples, Frank is seen to have difficulty in incorporating such larger, narrative syntagms into his vision of spatial form. He does not explain, for example, how we should visualise these frozen actions, how a character's passage through the world of the text might appear in a timeless moment. Perhaps it would be akin to viewing a film, not as a projection, but in its celluloid state, the characters present in every frame, but altered slightly by a time no longer allowed to pass at its regulation twenty-four frames per second. Frank's own hesitation in how to treat the text in this situation is evident from his language, for he variously describes the events of Flaubert's text as "action" producing a "slowly rising crescendo," and "scene," using the latter both in the sense of a sequence of events finally reaching a "climax," and also employing its implications of static, pictorial presentation, as in "Flaubert sets the scene" ("Spatial Form" 15, 14).

This close relation of spatial form to the near abolition of time is seen in Frank's repeated definitions; "a complex presented spatially in an instant of time," "these word-groups must be juxtaposed with one another and perceived simultaneously," "the
simultaneous perception in space," "units of meaning are apprehended reflexively in an instant of time," "spatially, in a moment of time" ("Spatial Form" 9, 12, 13, 16, 24). The difficulties arise from the fact that, as Alexander Gelley observes, "Joseph Frank's discussion of spatial form applies the same terms to both the phenomenal space or locales depicted in a fiction and to the way the linearity of a text is projected onto a mental space" (471). Frank's confusion of textual levels means that what we have been interpreting as apprehension in a moment of time, that is, an attempt to grasp the entirety of a work in an instant, becomes the apprehension of a moment of time, reading as if everything in the text occurred at the same time. The difference between the two is exactly the difference between an apprehension of Perec's text on 11 Rue Simon-Crubellier, and an apprehension of Valene's planned painting of the apartment building.

So insistent is Frank on this point that in Spatial Form in Narrative, an anthology which further defines and expands on Frank's concept, spatial form is equated exactly with this negation of time, "'spatial form' in its simplest sense designates the techniques by which novelists subvert the chronological sequence inherent in narrative" (Smitten and Dagherstany, Preface 13). Yet it is hard not to think that such a reductive view of spatial form is based on a misunderstanding. Perhaps Kant indicates the crux of the problem when he says:

We represent the time-sequence by a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series of one dimension only; and we reason from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with this one exception, that while the parts of the line are simultaneous the parts of time are always successive.31 (Critique of Pure Reason qtd. in Gelley 474)

The implication is that "a figure accessible to perception in a simultaneous act can never be adequate to the experience of succession" (Gelley 474), for, despite the importance of the stated exception, those advantages granted by a simultaneously perceptible figure too often erroneously become the limits placed upon the successive elements of that
In other words, Frank, writing in the forties, tends to suppose that a natural bond exists between the sign and the signified, whereas, as Bradford writes, "There is no natural connection between the phonemic and graphic structures of language and the substance of the experience and objects they seek to represent" (27).

Frank's mistake has its roots in his own source material, particularly in his concern for the limits on the arts set by Lessing. It has already been shown that Bradford, in his development of visual form, reacts against Lessing's assumption that a text develops its meaning solely through a sequential presentation of its component parts. It is also Frank's central point that avant-garde writing strains against the idea that "literary form, to harmonize with the essential quality of its medium, must be based primarily on some form of narrative sequence" ("Spatial Form" 6). Yet, Frank's view of what spatial form accomplishes, that is the negation of time, can now be seen almost as an acceptance of a second assumption made by Lessing, that there is a necessary relation between the signifier and the signified, that there is a link between what is written and what is being written about so that indeed "signs arranged side by side can represent only objects existing side by side" (Lessing 91). The limitations which this formula imposes on the plastic arts become now applicable to spatial form, requiring that it be used only to portray a static instant in the world of the text, a timeless moment.

Mitchell describes as "one of the major obstacles" the "notion that spatial form is properly defined as an antithesis or alternative to temporal form and that literary works achieve 'spatiality' only by denying temporality" (541-42), yet any attempt to see spatial form as a necessary effect of, or as necessarily resulting in, the negation of time will

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32 Conversely, Mitchell suggests that, since time can be mapped, since 'it is a time that one may always represent as a line' (Derrida, Grammatology 290), then 'far from being a unique phenomenon of some modern literature . . . spatial form is a crucial aspect of the experience and interpretation of literature in all ages and cultures' since 'continuity and sequentiality are spatial images based in the schema of the unbroken line or surface; the experience of simultaneity or discontinuity is simply based in different kinds of spatial images from those involved in continuous, sequential experiences of time' (Mitchell 541, 542).

33 Lessing's views, though, are not without qualification, and he admits that 'it may be urged, the signs employed in poetry not only follow each other, but are also arbitrary; and, as arbitrary signs, they are certainly capable of expressing things as they exist in space' (101). It follows that either Lessing recognises that language can be spatially organised, the linguistic signs necessarily sharing the objects' spatial nature, or else he recognises that there is not an inalterable link between a word and its object.

34 This is not to say that the exploitation of the spatiality of the text isn't particularly suited to the presentation of a single image or a static moment in time. See, for example, Bradford's discussion of William Carlos Williams' Pictures from Brueghel, where "he is showing us how poetry can overreach, without abandoning, its status as a temporal medium and actually become like a painting" (116). See also C. Philo's analysis of Michel Foucault's writings on Raymond Roussel's La Vue in Death and the Labyrinth (144-48).
encounter difficulties, as can be seen in Ivo Vidan's "Time Sequence in Spatial Fiction." Vidan wonders "can the plot itself, or simply the story, be considered a factor of spatiality, of simultaneous perceptibility?" exploring whether chronological reordering, "the very handling of the sequential character of a story," automatically produces spatial form (132, 133), particularly in those cases where the intention of the author is to present a timeless array rather than developing action, a "complex situation" rather than an "enfolding process" (140). Studying the complex chronological structure of Lord Jim, Vidan concludes that "the actual order in time has been suppressed through the actual juxtaposition of episodes, minor incidents, and analytical recallings: the effect is one of simultaneous relevance. Sequence is transposed into coexistence," "time has turned into space" (137, 138). Vidan's initial conclusion, therefore, considering plot structures alone, is that for a text to be considered as having spatial form "what is needed is a way in which the temporal sequentiality of the story is neutralized by an appropriate abandonment of chronological presentation" (140), but the erasure of time is not the actual aim of this chronological reordering. Vidan's final conclusion is that "the actual quantity of chronological looping is not decisive for the production of spatial form. . . . What is decisive is whether the order and relationship of time sequences functionally contribute to the impact of the novel's totality" (149). This is spatial form motivated by a "significance that informs the whole story," but the significance derives not only from the story itself, but from its arrangement also, so that, though it might be possible that the story could be told in chronological order, we would then have to ask "What would the story itself lose?" (140, 138). We have seen exactly this in our discussion of Kepler, whose specificity of form would be lost without its chronological reordering.

Such analysis further foregrounds the extent to which objects and actions in the world of the text tend to have a dual role, acting both as part of the narrative and as elements in the formal structure of the text, participating both in a temporal progression and in a spatial array. Anachronies become another device in what is, for some, the secondary mode of production of spatial form (though it has tended to be central to our discussion), namely spatial form created using "a word-group or a fragment of an

35Compare this to Edwin Muir's distinction between "the character novel, which represents action predominantly in space, and the dramatic novel, which represents action predominantly in time" (Fasel 230). In the character novel, "Time is assumed, and the action is a static pattern, continuously redistributed and reshuffled, in Space" (Gullón 20).
anecdote" (Frank, "Spatial Form" 16). Frank's insistence on the connection between spatial form and the negation of time, however, suggests a weakness in his formulation of the term which is apparent also in his discussion of Proust, whose method Frank describes in this way:

Hundreds of pages sometimes go by between the time [characters] are last seen and the time they reappear; and when they do turn up again, the passage of time has invariably changed them in some decisive way. Rather than being submerged in a stream of time and intuiting a character progressively, in a continuous line of development, the reader is confronted with various snapshots of the characters 'motionless in a moment of vision' taken at various stages in their lives; and in juxtaposing these images he experiences the effects of the passage of time exactly as the narrator had done. ("Spatial Form" 24)

We can easily imagine a character's lifeline acting as one of the lines woven through the text, but this is not a sufficient reason to describe this as spatial form. For example, we previously described the recognition of spatial form as comprising two stages, first perceiving the connection within the line itself, and then relating that line to another, but Frank is here treating two points on the same line as if they existed on separate strands. Moreover, a relation is usually drawn between points which have no comprehensible relation when encountered in time, yet these two points are obviously related as part of the same temporal sequence. There is no true interruption in the line, it is simply the case that part of the line is not narrated. Also, though the reappearance of a character may mean also the reintroduction of a textual element, through the reemergence of a particular discourse or style, Frank's concern here is with worldly aspects only, namely the changes which have taken place in the character, so the formal aspect of spatial form is absent. He is not comparing spatially isolated parts of the text, but the past and present of a character in the world of that text, a purely temporal aspect. Frank's argument is that "To experience the passage of time, Proust had learned, it was necessary to rise above it and to grasp both past and present simultaneously in a moment of what he called 'pure time.' But 'pure time,' obviously, is not time at all - it is perception in a moment of time, that is to say, space" ("Spatial Form 24). Again we find Frank asserting an unconvincing relation of inverse proportionality between time and space, the less time, the more space, leaving himself open to equally assertive
counter-arguments. "'Pure time'," says Ida Fasel, "obviously is not space" (229), while Frank Kermode says that "Frank's expression of juxtaposing images 'spatially, in a moment of time' seems to me to sum up the problem quite neatly. These adverbs are in apposition - they are held to mean roughly the same thing. But they do not" ("A Reply" 587).

Kermode more convincingly relates Proust's 'pure time' to Aquinas's concept of aevum, arguing "there is an historical link between the aevum and Proust; furthermore this durée réelle is, I think, the real sense of modern 'spatial form,' which is a figure for the aevum" (Sense of an Ending 72). Aevum, in turn, Kermode traces back to Augustine, for "when Augustine recited his psalm he found in it a figure for the integration of past, present, and future which defies successive time. He discovered what is now erroneously referred to as 'spatial form'" (for a discussion of Augustine on time see Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 5-30 especially) (Sense of an Ending 71). Even as Kermode was explaining spatial form in terms of time, however, Frank was trying to define Kermode's sense of the intemporal in terms of space. Kermode's argument is that, in the organisation of the plot, "that which was conceived of as simply successive becomes charged with past and future: what was chronos becomes kairos;" "mere successiveness . . . is purged by the establishment of a significant relation between the moment and a remote origin and end, a concord of past, present, and future" (Sense of an Ending 46, 50). Frank interprets this as meaning that "plots therefore seem to work against the flow of time . . . to create relations of meaning detached from pure succession" ("Years After" 220), when a truer interpretation would seem to be that the plot, by fixing a beginning and an end, makes meaningful or significant a moment's position in the timeline, without actually altering the order of the successive points on the line, or creating any relations which diverge from it. It is a move from succession to meaningful, linear order, whereas spatial form, as de Man rightly points out, means "we are no longer left with a chaotic succession, but with a figure, a trajectory, a network" (111). Frank is again confusing textual levels, and Kermode seems generous when he says, "If I was afraid of 'spatial form' it was doubtless because it would have short-circuited the thinking I was trying to do in The Sense of an Ending ("A Reply" 588).36

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36Kermode's comments in The Sense of an Ending initiated a debate with Frank which ran through Frank's "An Answer to Critics," Kermode's "A Reply to Joseph Frank," and Frank's "Spatial Form: Thirty Years After," where the final argument centred on whether there could ever be asserted a "relationship between modernist spatialising and political and cultural fascism" (Kermode, "A Reply" 586).
Even if we dispense with any idea that spatial form is meant to imply the immobilisation of time within the world of the text, some critics still see a difficulty in spatial form's claim to the events of the narrative. Fasel, for example, though she accepts Frank's spatial form as a "satisfactory" description of narrative structure, accepting that it "does indeed give us the method of modern art-writing," nevertheless finds it metaphysically "inadequate" (Fasel 225, 226). She prefers the Bergsonian temporal concepts of 'durée', "the constant creative flow of Becoming," and spatialised Time to explain such works as discussed by Frank, suggesting that "modern novelists apply spatial time to form, durée to content," preserving the sense of a dual aspect to the elements of the text (227, 228). She condemns spatial form if conceived purely as the negation of time, describing Joyce's Ulysses as "time emptied into itself without passion, the river become stagnant, become space" (227). In what is by now a familiar argument for us, she says that to reduce language to stasis is to strip it of its most natural qualities:

Language by its very nature moves. It creates an illusion of reality by its physical property, its progress across the line, across the page through the book, as much by what it says. Fiction also moves. It is temporal. Even when it reshuffles chronology into new patterns, chops time into non-sequences, new relationships, nervous juxtapositions, to give the sense of pictorial or perceptive simultaneity in space, the action moves. (229)

Yet, showing a greater awareness of Frank of the distinction between form and content, she appreciates the "metaphysical implications" of a spatial form which does not deny the energy of its parts, which explores "the impasse of inaction locked with action, of mobility made simultaneously immobile" (229, 228).

Other critics see any kind of claim by spatial form on narrative as a dangerous thing, however, because at the level of text, if not world, spatial form does require a co-existence of parts (we have seen both Butor and Bradford argue that the text, the printed word on the page, is ever static, immobilised, no matter what action it describes). William Spanos, for one, urges that the literary work "must . . . be projected temporally and apprehended or, to use Martin Buber's term, 'met' sequentially in time" ("Literary Criticism" 90). He agrees with Lessing in saying that language is suited to the presentation, not of objects, but "of human life or, to put [Lessing's] insight in another way, of Being characterized not by stasis but by mobility, by consciousness of a future
and, thus by Becoming; in short, of existential Being. . . . As such it must be encountered consecutively, within the matrix of the conditional, of temporal limits" ("Literary Criticism" 91). He rejects Frank's exhortation to "suspend the process" of reading ("Spatial Form" 13) when this risks "radically minimizing the sequential dimension and reducing the existential experience" (Spanos, "Literary Criticism" 89).

Eerily recalling our discussion of Kepler and his attempts to transcend the conditions of his own life, Spanos argues the reader has a moral obligation not to assume "the perspective of a god or an angel . . . but rather the perspective of a man discovering the world" ("Literary Criticism" 91).

Throughout these arguments, and seen again in Spanos's talk of stasis and mobility, time is opposed to space, and space portrayed as the poorer relation for, as Michel Foucault says, "Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the immobile. Time, on the contrary, was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic" ("Geography" 70). These positions do themselves no favour in replicating the stubborn dualism of Frank's argument, for, as Gelley says, "a position like Frank's that differentiates so sharply between the temporal and the spatial and tends to play off one mode against the other is beset with difficulties" (485n.). In the introductions to these arguments, however, before the real debate is embarked upon, we tend to see a greater degree of equivocation: Spanos says that "Lessing's distinction, needless to say, is problematic in its over-simplification. . . . He is clearly wrong in his insistence that a painting or a sculpture is perceived in an absolute instant of time" ("Literary Criticism" 90), and Kermode that "Forms in space, we should remember, have more temporality than Lessing supposed, since we have to read them in sequence before we know they are there, and the relations between them" (Sense of an Ending 178). For Mitchell, the connection of space and time, and the abolition of the assumption that they are necessary opposites, is exactly the basis for the development of a truer sense of spatial form. His starting point is similar to Butor's in that the space of the text is marked firstly by its physical co-presence. Using Leibniz's definition of space as "an order of coexistent data," "I know," he says, "before I open a book that all the words are already there and that the text is therefore a spatial form in Leibniz's sense" (543, 544).

Mitchell's key point, however, is that "nothing in the definition requires that this simultaneity be directly experienced," and he goes on to argue that it is in fact impossible to consider spatiality as non-temporal as "we never apprehend space apart
from time and movement," "we cannot experience a spatial form except in time" and he suggests instead that "we ought to treat their relationship as one of complex interaction, interdependence, and interpenetration" (544). As Samuel Alexander says, "there neither is Space without Time, nor Time without Space" (qtd. in Gullón 11).

**Treading the line between world and space**

If Frank's discussions of Flaubert and Proust raise questions around the issue of spatial form and time, his other example, Joyce's *Ulysses*, suggests a further complication. "Joyce," says Frank, "composed his novels of a vast number of references and cross references that relate to each other independently of the time sequence of the narrative. These references," which we can see as the fragmented parts of the intersecting lines as experienced by the reader, "must be connected by the reader and viewed as a whole before the book fits together into any meaningful pattern. Ultimately, if we are to believe Stuart Gilbert, these systems of reference form a complete picture of practically everything under the sun, from the stages of man's life and the organs of the human body to the colors of the spectrum," but Frank argues that these patterns are secondary to "Joyce's most obvious intention . . . to give the reader a picture of Dublin seen as a whole" ("Spatial Form" 16-17). The unfortunate use of the word "picture," which seems to replicate Frank's errors in relation to Flaubert, is tempered by later references to "a whole teeming city," "Dublin life" and "Dublin as a totality," but what is most interesting is the way in which the space of the text is seen here to correspond exactly with the world of the text, Frank equating linguistic structures with locales ("Spatial Form" 17, 18). In other words, this is a text which we can follow as a printed line, but it is also woven from a great number of lines, so numerous that every word in the text is accounted for by at least one of them. As we walk the streets of Joyce's city, at every step we encounter, and so momentarily inhabit, an intersecting line which will appear again later, and reappear again later still. Both the printed line and this network of intersecting lines cover the entire city, but the question is whether the line and the network produce the same city.

While it is hardly a mistake for Frank to deal with the world of the text in spatial terms (as Jacques Derrida says, "Is it not frequently said that every metaphoric enunciation spatializes as soon as it gives us something to imagine, to see, or to touch?"
("White Mythology" 227)), the concept of spatial form itself cannot explain the move from space to text. Frank's argument is that "all the factual background summarized for the reader in an ordinary novel must here be reconstructed from fragments, sometimes hundreds of pages apart, scattered throughout the book" ("Spatial Form" 18), and this "distributed exposition" is enough for him to describe this as spatial form (Smitten, Introduction 19). Yet, Frank's description of this form differs from the others. Firstly, Frank here includes the possibility of a temporal dimension, for "the reader is intended to acquire this sense [of Dublin as a totality] as he progresses through the novel, connecting allusions and references spatially and gradually becoming aware of the pattern of relationships" ("Spatial Form" 18-19). Though Frank later says that it is only once the reader has arrived at the end that "all the references are fitted into their proper places and grasped as a unity," he then does not explain what extra dimension of understanding, what "meaningful pattern," will be granted to the reader through this simultaneous apprehension. To say that this will "place all references in their proper context" is to suggest it is the world of Dublin alone which is to be apprehended, as a picture, map, or spatial complex, rather than the elements of the text as an intellectual complex (Frank, "Spatial Form" 19). In fact, as Kumar says, "The perceptual form of the novel can be disregarded, Frank seems to argue, if you have sufficient empirical information concerning Dublin" (61). As Frank nowhere argues that spatial form reproduces physically the spatial layout of the world it embodies, with fragments situated within the area of the text meant to correspond with sites in the city, there is nothing to be gained from the spatial apprehension of the world through "fragments" as compared to an apprehension of the world as normally "summarized." The line and the network cover the same ground.

Though Frank is wrong in describing the construction of this world in terms of spatial form, for the process of connecting and collecting fabular information seems different to the process of constructing meanings through the juxtaposition of word-groups, nevertheless the easy slippage from the space to the world of the text suggests that these processes are different facets of the same phenomenon. In his confusion of the world of the text with the structures of spatial form Frank, in fact, prompts a further possible aspect of textual spatiality. As Vidan says, "In order to understand later sections of any narrative, we must connect their content with that of the earlier sections, thereby establishing reflexive reference on the level of events, character features, etc.
But the reflexive reference here is in the mind that constructs the story out of verbal signals, not necessarily in the reiteration of verbal signals" (133). Vidan is concerned to distinguish this process of world building or reflexive understanding from a more specifically identifiable spatial form, the expanding concept of spatial form requiring further categorisation so that we may distinguish between a text such as Kepler which exploits the spatial possibilities of the text to create a very structured space, and a text which displays only what may now come to be seen as an inherent spatiality, the internal order of reflexive references through which we form an image of the world of the text. Mitchell here suggests the term "tectonic" "to suggest the global, symmetrical, gestalt-like image that is generally associated with so-called spatial effects" (560), while Sharon Spencer describes as "architectonic" the novel whose "goal is the evocation of the illusion of a spatial entity, either representational or abstract, constructed from prose fragments of diverse types and lengths and arranged by means of the principle of juxtaposition so as to include a comprehensive view of the book's subject" (xx-xxi).

The wider the application of the term spatial form, however, the greater the need to interrogate the form, as in type, of the spatialities being described. The word 'spatiality' itself suggests that the text is being talked about not as a space in itself but in terms of a relatedness to space, as if the text is space-like but not a space. Beyond the level of the physicality of the printed volume, critics will accept that, figuratively speaking, the text is a space, but that, as Mitchell says, "Neither linear nor spatial phenomena in literary forms are literally spatial; both are ways of organizing time in a coherent image" (560). Here, recalling Vidan's discussion, Mitchell is speaking of the organisation of time within the world of the text, and how "the reading experience may produce in us the sense that no real time is passing, that we are in an eternally timeless realm where everything occurs simultaneously. Or it may produce the illusion of temporal sequence, with distinct stages like beginning, middle, and end" (544). The flexibility of the spatial metaphor means Mitchell can suggest that "any time we sense a 'map' or outline of our temporal movement through the text, we are encountering . . . spatiality" (552), while the flexibility of the material means that Spanos seems to be able to claim with equal validity that we should speak of "the 'time-shape' of a literary work of art - linear (progressive or regressive), circular, spiral, discontinuous, etc." ("Literary Criticism" 100). The crux of the difficulty, or the heart of the temptation, is the ease with which spatial metaphors lend themselves to textual matters, and the extent
to which they have infiltrated our writing on text. Hillis Miller illustrates this when he points out that "the term narrative line, for example, is a catachresis. It is a violent, forced, or abusive importation of a term from another realm to name something which has no proper name" (Ariadne's Thread 21). Through a simple exploration of linear terminology, Hillis Miller develops nine areas which would, no doubt, be termed spatial:

First come the physical aspects of writing or of printing books. . . . A second region of linear terminology involves all the words for narrative line or diegesis: dénouement, curve of the action, turn of events . . . . Note that these lines are all figurative. They do not describe the actual physical linearity of lines of type or writing. . . . A third topic is the use of linear terms to describe character, as in the phrases 'life line,' or 'what's my line?' . . . A fourth place is all the terminology of interpersonal relations. . . . Another region is that of economic terminology. . . . Another area of narrative terminology involves topography: roads, crossroads, paths, frontiers, gates, windows, doors, turnings, journeys, narrative motifs like Oedipus murdering Laius at the place where three roads cross. . . . Another topic for investigation is illustrations for novels. . . . Another region for investigation is figurative language in the text of a novel. . . . A final topos in the criticism of fiction is the question of realistic representation. (20-21)

Without even a mention of 'plot' or 'passage,' the spatial metaphor emerges as a rich vein to mine, a wonderful insight on the nature of the text and our thinking about it, but a fertile vocabulary which must be treated knowingly or it will project only vacant spaces.

Such figurative wanderings through the text can result in a space within which it is difficult to orient oneself. Kestner, for example, in The Spatiality of the Novel, develops a concept of space as the secondary illusion of the novel, arguing that, though literature is essentially temporal, nevertheless it can convey the effects of simultaneity. "The secondary illusion of the novel is thus a spatial agent inherent in the temporal art of the novel by which the complete realization of the form is effected" (Kestner 19). He defines three kinds of spatiality, the geometric, the virtual, and the genidentic. The "geometric spatiality of the novel," he says, "involves Euclidean elements, such as the point, the line, and the plane," but here he tends not to mean that the novel occupies or
constructs a Euclidean space, but is instead suggesting that certain novels can be viewed, or understood, in terms of the point, line, plane, and so on. The "word virtual may be used to designate the form of spatial secondary illusion in the novel, which involves the literary text and its relation to the spatial arts of painting, sculpture, and architecture" (Kestner 33, 69) and, though his discussion on the text in terms of an architectural space has certainly been helpful, this virtual space seems largely concerned with how scenes within a novel can be thought of in pictorial terms, while characterisation can be related to sculpture. Genidentic spatiality is more complicated, dealing with the issue of textual interpretation, which involves "two factors, one 'in' and one 'out,' with a mediator between" (Kestner 135). Concentrating on the nature of this mediation, Kestner draws on Bergson's concept of the dynamic mode of assimilating the conscious states of others to suggest that, "One of the properties of a novel, therefore, is that it is a dynamic field through which the reader may atemporally be the characters, be the author of his own text, and be an interpreter. The dynamic field of the novel, common to the work, to its author, and to its interpreter, is language, by its nature dynamic" (Kestner 138-39). Interpretation thus becomes interpenetration. The dynamic field of language, Kestner argues, results in a genidentity between text and interpreter, between related texts, and between signifier and signified.

Truthfully, however, though Kestner's work is detailed and ambitious, many of his concepts, including the dynamic field of language, remain confusing and ill-defined, and it is difficult to precisely determine what he means even by "the spatiality of the novel." More specifically, the spatiality of the novel, which is presented as a definable characteristic, is immediately divided into the geometric, virtual, and genidentic without consideration of how these three relate to each other, or of how they cooperate in the formation or structuring of the spatiality of the text, or of whether they account for all forms of spatiality in the novel or if they are just three possible examples from many, and this is without questioning whether Kestner sees these as figurative or literal spaces. Mitchell, on the other hand, is very aware of the metaphorical aspects of spatial terminology in discussing texts, but appeals to Nelson Goodman to explain his approach: "Metaphorical possession is indeed not literal possession; but possession is actual whether metaphorical or literal" (qtd. in Mitchell, 540n). He develops four levels of spatiality, "the literal level, the physical existence of the text itself," "the world which is represented, imitated, or signified in a work," spatial form in the structural or formal
sense, and "that point where the interpretation of literature (presumably a rational, sequential activity) converges with the experience of it" (550, 551, 553), but again there is little sense of how these spatial levels interact. In particular, there is no attempt made to bridge the gap between the physical and figurative aspects of a text's spatiality, or to explain a space such as Banville's Kepler which so fully incorporates both.

Considering the constant risk of metaphorical fudging, Frank's own understanding of the spatiality of his spatial form is put under pressure, for his textual space seems only a product of frozen time, or is invoked through spatially loaded terminology: connections, relations, juxtapositions, oppositions, groups. This makes it all the more important to see how Frank, in a new account of spatial form which appeared in his article "Spatial Form: Thirty Years After," expands and defends the concept, especially when this is where Frank, who had always viewed spatial form "exclusively as a particular phenomenon of avant-garde writing" now admitted that "this no longer represents my own point of view" ("Years After" 203). To begin with, he is interested in the spatial awareness in the work of Roman Jakobson, just as we ourselves appealed to Jakobson's linguistic concepts to explore the formations and relations of the connected word-groups. He is encouraged by the Formalist distinction between story and plot, by Boris Tomashevsky's distinction between "bound motifs" ("essential to the causal-chronological sequence") and "free motifs" ("independent of such a sequence") ("Years After" 234), and in Todorov's "logical-temporal order" and "spatial order."37 Frank is most appreciative of Genette's work, but, even amid this expanding conception of spatial form, Frank still relates spatial form to an idea of time negation, as is evident when he speaks of Genette's distinction between "narration," which "attaches itself to actions and events," and "description," which "lingers on objects and things considered in their simultaneity, and . . . seems to suspend the course of time and contributes to spread the récit in space" (Genette, Figures II qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 237).

It is through the work of Genette that Frank also introduces what he sees as "the broader horizon against which the idea of narrative spatial form must now be seen," namely Structuralism (Foust, too, argues that "The fruition of spatial form can occur

37Formalist thought, however, seems to conceive of textual space purely in linear terms. Shklovsky's differentiation of plot and story meant that "the dominance of structure, of plot over material, was emphasized" (Eichenbaum 121), but the structural changes seem only to apply to the order of the presentation of the events, changed "by simply transposing parts" (Shklovsky 57), and understood as the swapping of one section of a linear narrative with another, or as operations taking place in a space of just two dimensions.
only in a hermeneutic Structuralism" (185)) ("Years After" 241). As Genette writes, "the manifest spatiality of writing may be taken as a symbol for the profound spatiality of language" for "it is undeniable that Saussure and his continuators have brought to the foreground a mode of being of language that one must call spatial" (Genette, Figures III qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 242, 241). It is Saussure who, in his analysis of language as a synchronic system, first places the signifier at the centre of a network of syntagmatic and paradigmatic axes, but it is a network which tends not to find its place on the page. The signifier, says Saussure, "being auditory, is unfolded solely in time," and writing, when "the spatial line of graphic marks is substituted for succession in time," returns to being just a record of the spoken word, denied the possibilities of "visual signifiers . . . which can offer simultaneous groupings in several dimensions" (70). "The elements are arranged in sequence on the chain of speaking" (Saussure 123), and it is these contiguous linear elements which are the syntagms. The paradigmatic lines, which we had described as cutting across the line of the text, intersecting and interweaving, are formed by associative relations which, for Saussure, are formed "in the memory," "in the brain" (123).

Saussure is, of course, describing a system of language, not of a text, but Frank's willingness to see spatial form absorbed into Saussure's linguistic spaces means a willingness to see the forms abstracted from the page, and placed in a relational space removed from the text. With the associative relations made in a mental space rather than between the physical elements of the printed text, the line of the text is left undisturbed, making it seem strange that Frank would want to describe this in terms of spatial form. And yet, this is the logical conclusion for Frank to arrive at, given his later views on how spatial form should be perceived, for the "spatiality of language" described by Saussure is the twin to the process of reflexive reference described by Vidan, the one occurring at the level of the space of the text, the other occurring at the level of the world of the text. Once the concept of spatial form is defined as including these spatialities also, it is no surprise to see Kermode lamenting that spatial form "seems to be only a weak figure for the process, compounded of memory and prediction, by which we understand utterances of whatever length," so that Frank's "new account of it seems to apply to any act of reading whatsoever" ("A Reply" 582, 581). For it does apply to any act of reading, Frank suggesting now that the emergence of spatial form should no longer be seen as "a radical break with tradition," but that "every
narrative work of art necessarily includes elements that may be called spatial" ("Years After" 235, 236). This would represent the view of critics such as Mitchell also, who, as we have seen previously, sees spatial form as "an essential feature of the interpretation and experience of literature" (546).

Frank is here distancing himself further from those critics with whom we had originally linked him, such as Butor and Bradford, though his continuing insistence on spatial form as the negation of time had already disrupted any connection to their analyses of the significance of the simultaneity of the words on the page, of the reader's exposure to the printed text, and of the tension between the temporal experience of that text and its static arrangement. With Frank spreading spatial form across all textual levels, his final development of spatial form may seem emptied of persuasive force. On the contrary, however, his broad and inclusive definition of the spatiality of the text actually produces very valuable observations. For example, if we say, as Saussure says, as Genette says, that all language is spatial, then even the most linear of texts is spatial. Indeed, Mitchell argues that "continuity and sequentiality are spatial images based in the schema of the unbroken line or surface; the experience of simultaneity or discontinuity is simply based in different kinds of spatial images from those involved in continuous, sequential experiences of time" (542). He says of the line and the figure that "neither of these forms is more spatial (or temporal) than the other but that each provides a distinct set of experiential and analytic images" (560-61). A distinction emerges again between texts which present themselves as purely linear, progressive and straight, and those, like Kepler, which emerge as purposefully constructed and defined spaces, formed through the manipulation of the physical, phonetic and semantic relations of the words of that text, and physically manifesting the potential spatiality of language.

The question now arises as to what might motivate the production of one form of spatiality over the other. Significantly, Hillis Miller observes that "a straight line conveys no information beyond the fact that the line is there" (Ariadne's Line 8), while Steven Connor says that "it is repetition more than any other trope which draws the attention of the reader to the medium of language" (15). The straight line of "'natural', non-literary language is characterized by its flowing irreversibility, moving too fast for us to be conscious of the process of signification" (Connor 15), while the spatialised line clearly positions itself between the reader and world, the knot of repetition meaning there is always the chance of an unnatural intervention on the part of the author. The
linear text, though recognising its place between spaces, and its potential for spatial form, acts as if attempting to minimise the distance between the reader and the world, emptying itself of significant volume or bulk in order not to obstruct a view of a world. It sides with the view that the written word "is supposed to be a passive expression on the surface of the world" (Blanchot 370). The spatialised text, in its material application of the inherent spatiality of language, becomes a significant place in itself.

Frank's error, therefore, is in trying to describe the space of text as if it were uniform or homogeneous. Yet, the sophistication which Frank's theory seems to be lacking can often be found instead in the works of those authors whose texts we might term spatial, for they are hardly unaware of the possible tensions in their texts between form and content, space and time, or of the process of the reader's exposure to that text. Writers for whom writing itself is a subject, who, like Sollers, wish to stress the "scriptive activity" (Ricardou, "Writing" 263), will often reveal their worlds as written spaces by including within them characters who are readers, who are exposed to text in the world of the book. Then, as if this were an exposure to text as contagion, a scriptural virus may infect every line, and the texts lay bare the textuality of their own worlds also. One such text, building for us, like Ulysses, a textualised city, is Paul Auster's City of Glass, the first story in his The New York Trilogy, and the focus of the next section.

**Wandering through Paul Auster's City of Glass**

Our reader in City of Glass is Daniel Quinn, a writer of detective stories who, by chance, has become involved in a real-life investigative case. He has assumed the identity of the detective Paul Auster, and is trailing a man, Peter Stillman, recently released from captivity, who had kept his young son imprisoned for nine years, and now, again, could pose a threat to his safety. Trailing Stillman involves monitoring his movements from the moment he first arrives by train at Grand Central Station and steps out into New York, described on the very first page as "an inexhaustible space, a labyrinth of endless steps" (Auster, City 3). Quinn's following of Stillman, however, seems pointless at first as Stillman does not attempt to approach his son, but instead walks through the city by seemingly random and arbitrary routes. Each day he simply emerges from his hotel, picks broken and useless items off the streets, and places them
in his bag, lunches in the Riverside Park, dines at the Apollo Coffee Shop on 97th Street and Broadway, and then returns to his hotel.

After five days of following Stillman's wandering figure, Quinn, to stave off the boredom, begins to take a careful note in his red notebook of everything that Stillman does and everywhere that he goes. He is fully immersed in following Stillman's path, is with him every step of the way as Stillman discovers New York, and yet the result is only incomprehension. "Quinn felt no closer to Stillman than when he first started following him. He had lived Stillman's life, walked at his pace, seen what he had seen, and the only thing he felt now was the man's impenetrability" (Auster, City 67).

Though this account raises questions about Auster's own existentialist position, nevertheless we can see that, in this case, Spanos' desired result, the direct experience of human life, means nothing. On the thirteenth day, however, Quinn looks over his notes and, "for no particular reason," maps out Stillman's journey for each day (Auster, City 67). The first resulting diagram resembles a rectangle, though "it might also have been a zero or the letter 'O'' (Auster, City 68). The second is "a bird of prey perhaps, with its wings spread," or it is the letter 'W' (Auster, City 68). It is followed by the letter 'E', then "a shape that resembled the letter 'R' . . . a lopsided 'O' . . . a tidy 'F' . . . a 'B' that looked like two boxes haphazardly placed on top of one another . . . a tottering 'A' . . . a second 'B': precariously tilted on a perverse single point" (Auster, City 70). From these nine letters, spelling out o-w-e-r-o-f-b-a-b, Quinn realises that the entire series will read THE TOWER OF BABEL, inferring from his knowledge that Stillman had previously written a book entitled The Garden and the Tower: Early Visions of the New World, dealing with the biblical Garden of Eden and Tower of Babel.

Stillman, then, has been writing his way across the surface of the city, his steps tracing a literal passage as he makes his way through the streets, but the close relation between the world and space of the text is seen in the way the world which embodies the message inevitably affects it. Stillman's "lopsided" letters scrawled on the grid of New York's network of streets suggest Sollers's description of learning to write, how the "hand shakes, as does the shadow of the pen on the white surface divided into squares

38Relate this to Barthes' claim that, "The reduction of reading to a consumption is clearly responsible for the 'boredom' experienced by many in the face of the modern ('unreadable') text, the avant-garde film or painting: to be bored means that one cannot produce the text, open it out, set it going" ("Text" 163).
39Words are related to steps on a number of occasions in the text. Quinn, for example, when telling the story to a character called Auster, "began at the beginning and went through the entire story, step by step"
by fine blue lines" (The Park, qtd. in Ricardou, "Writing" 264), but their lopsidedness is also an indication of the constraints that simply existing in a physical space places upon Stillman. He is not simply drawing his letters on a map, but is walking his message through the city, and the steps he takes are necessarily in some way determined by the landscape he traverses, by the 'actual' world of New York. He cannot, for instance, leap tall buildings in a single bound, though on a map he might conveniently skip them, with the result that that Quinn admits of the first letter that it "resembled a rectangle" but "given the quadrant structure of New York streets, it might also have been a zero or the letter 'O'" (Auster, City 68). In the same way, writers must attend to some extent to the world of their text for, as we saw with Kepler, a perfect textual space may require a text so fragmented and disconnected that it can no longer serve the writer's narrative purpose. Writers who wish to avoid surrealism or magic realism tend not to leap the tall buildings of their own narratives, do not have their characters lie in lamps and read by the light of a bed, for "it will not do to call the lamp a bed... or the bed a lamp" (Auster, Ghosts 148). If these are the constraints their written world puts upon them, then the paths by which they write this world can be equally restricting when they try to mould their textual spaces. Syntactic convention may place the step, the word "step," in slightly the wrong position in the line of printed text, and so the paradigmatic line, as visibly traced on the surface of the page, is deviated slightly from its perfect path, resulting in shaky and uneven forms, or, in Stillman's case, letters. Adherence to syntactic normality is, again, often motivated by a concern for the readability for the world of the text, since the naturalistic impulse is seen as better served by coherent sequences.41

(City 94), while in the second tale in the trilogy, Ghosts, the narrator speaks of "the way of the world: one step at a time, one word and then the next" (136).

40Perhaps it is not a coincidence that Auster writes, or has written, his books on gridded engineering paper (see Gurganus 11, 12). Nor, perhaps, is it a coincidence that the characters in his story Ghosts are named after colours, "Blue," "White," "Black," "Brown," "Redman," "Gray," "Green," "Gold," "Violet," "Rose," as are the mountains, "White," and the streets, "Orange" (where there's a "red-brick church" (137)).

41Udaya Kumar, for example, points out that spatial form in Joyce's Ulysses is particularly evident in the syntactically adventurous and often fragmentary monologues, where "connections are verbal and associational" (51). These monologues are marked also by their detachment from the timeline of the world of the text, so that "we cannot institute a unilinear time based on the narration and then locate the monologues within it... This causes a temporal indeterminateness" (Kumar 67). Timothy Clarke, meanwhile, discussing Blanchot's interpretations of Mallarmé's work, says that, because "the word no longer refers to an object in the concrete world," it is inscribed instead in a now-familiar space, "an open context where it plays or, in a loose sense, rhymes in many directions at once. Thus the Mallarméan poet will avoid linearity and accord novel importance to layout, spacing, punctuation" (82). "Once representation is eschewed, the order of the text need no longer submit to the sequentiality of mundane
Stillman writes, of course, on a page from the intricate spaces of New York itself, choosing a suitably rectangular area "bounded on the north by 110th Street, on the south by 72nd Street, on the west by Riverside Park, and on the east by Amsterdam Avenue" (Auster, City 58). This New York space, however, could hardly be described as a blank page, pure and white, and ready for the pen. Rather this page has already been written across, the streets themselves being the printed lines of text on the space of the page (and it is only through a spatial apprehension of this text that Stillman's meaning becomes evident, for if we were to read the page of the city line by line, from left to right (street by street, from West to East), going down its length (from North to South), we would encounter his message as a series of disordered and disconnected points with, as Frank says, "no comprehensible relation to each other" ("Spatial Form" 13). Stillman himself reveals for us the textuality of the city space in the message he writes across its surface. The Tower of Babel, for Stillman, relates back to the story of the Garden of Eden, where Adam, given the task of naming all the things of the world, had spoken words which had grasped the essential heart of their objects; "A thing and its name were interchangeable. After the fall, this was no longer true. Names became detached from things; words devolved into a collection of arbitrary signs; language had been severed from God" (Auster, City 43). The story of the garden of Eden, then, is not only the story of "the fall of man, but the fall of language" (Auster, City 43), but Stillman's project is to restore the language of man to a prelapsarian state, to undo the effects of the fall which saw the word divided from the thing it named. Collecting broken things, he creates a new language by renaming what has lost its original function, so that the word is again a part of the true thing, so that he can "make language answer our needs" (Auster, City 81). His writing across the city seems part of this same grand project, for it renames New York as the new Tower of Babel, the construction of which will herald the return of the language from before the fall,

Significantly, however, "language does not quite abandon the 'real word' (sic); representation is transposed into another space" (82). For Frank, though, Mallarmé's space is too extreme, risking "the self-negation of language" ("Spatial Form" 13).

Auster maps the city onto the page in The Invention of Solitude also, writing, "He has spent the greater part of his adult life walking through cities, many of them foreign. He has spent the greater part of his adult life hunched over a small rectangle of wood, concentrating on an even smaller rectangle of white paper" (98).

Stillman is attempting to return to a world of myth, which, as described by Blanchot "supposes no separation of sign and referent; meaning cannot be disembodied from the agents of the mythical narrative. It is as if the myth would ideally return the reader to a primitive state in which thought had not
meaning "it would again be possible for the whole earth to be of one language and one speech" (Auster, City 48). In this naming, the word seems again a part of the thing, for Stillman's writing is a language of the earth, or of the city; his steps have taken place in the streets of New York. Stillman's text, then, stands in relation to Auster's own, for both of them write on and about the New York streets, working within the same space, but interpreting the results of their actions in opposing ways. Though Auster's New York, true to Stillman's re-naming, is interchangeable with the words which produce it, revealed as a truly textual space, it is not, as Stillman believes, because the words are one with the city, 'The Tower of Babel' its essential name in this world, the mark of its true presence, but rather that, for Auster, there is no city outside the text, the world is produced by, not simply represented within, the textual spatiality. Stillman presents his text as if it were absolutely natural, the line adhering to its object, with no space between, but Auster's text is a space which fills our entire vision, obscuring everything else. We cannot access Auster's New York except through Auster's text, but there is nothing to that New York but its text.44

Frank's spatial form can, perhaps, take us this far in our analysis of the textual space that is City of Glass, but no further. Frank may, however, have pointed the way forward for us when, at the end, he read spatial form through the work of Saussure, for a further insight into the nature of this space does seem to emerge if we look to the way in which Saussure structures the relations between the elements of his linguistic space. His proclamation is that "in language there are only differences," "phonic and conceptual differences" (120, 127). Any element in the syntagmatic line differs from those elements on either side, "its environing sounds," while differing also from all associated elements "that may come to mind," a potentially limitless number since "terms in an associative family occur neither in fixed numbers nor in a definite order" (Saussure 131, 126). Difference lies at the root of all relations, whether syntagmatic or paradigmatic, the nature of this difference being illuminated further if we take into consideration the work of Jacques Ehrmann. He argues that "the poetic nature of language may be defined by two necessary and sufficient characteristics: displacement

learnt the trick of abstracting from physical things" (Clark 77). "Primitive man knows that the possession of words gives him mastery over things . . . the name has not emerged from the thing" (Blanchot 379). 44The City of Glass itself ends when the text finds its conclusion, when the "city was entirely white now," like an empty page (Auster, City 132). Meanwhile, Ghosts really begins only as "snow is falling on the quiet street, and everything has turned white" so that "Black's shoes have made a perfect set of tracks on the white pavement," like words on a new page (Auster, Ghosts 140).
and repetition," and, in a move which seems targeted at systems such as Jakobson's, which equates the syntagmatic and paradigmatic with the metonymical and metaphorical, goes on to suggest that "since this displacement is time in motion within language, it is no more satisfactory to explain it by the structures of metaphor and metonymy - which are obviously the elementary forms of displacement - because it is displacement itself which is at the basis of every structure" (245, 246). Ehrmann then goes on to say that "repetition and displacement are inversions of one another: repetition is a displacement of the same, and displacement is repetition of the other. But repetition is never exactly the same, nor displacement absolutely other" (246). To say that repetition is never exactly the same is to say, simultaneously, that the act of repeating is not the same and that the object repeated is not the same; repetition itself is unrepeatable. And this is just as we discovered previously, that even a repetition of that which is exactly the same is a repetition which is different, for there is a first experience of the thing and then its repetition (Derrida, too, speaks of "the logic which links repetition to alterity" ("Signature" 315)). Ehrmann's categories of repetition and displacement suggest a differential process of varying degrees of similarity and dissimilarity applied to both object and action, substance and practice. Difference is produced spatially, temporally, and substantially, by similar objects and actions in different places, by similar objects and actions at different times, by differing objects and actions at the same time and in the same place. And these differences are produced, made evident, "are themselves effects" of what it is that relates sign to sign, the difféance, Derrida's "neographism," which is "literally neither a word nor a concept," but, famously now, means both difference and deferral, differing and deferring, "difféance as temporization, difféance as spacing," so that "what is written as difféance, then, will be the playing movement that 'produces' - by means of something that is not simply an activity - these differences, these effects of difference" (Derrida, "Différence" 11, 3, 9, 11).

Returning now to the space of City of Glass, our focus again is on Stillman's message. We hadn't yet mentioned the true scale of Stillman's efforts, but they are most impressive, for it takes many steps to form even a single letter, and days to form a word. If, however, we are suggesting that the streets of New York are the printed lines of text then, at this level at least, we can say that each step is a word on the printed line. Each of the steps of Stillman's message, then, may be thought of as a textual fragment (say
"step" instead of Sollers's "red") occupying a point of intersection between the contiguous line of the text, the streets of the city, and the paradigmatic path which cuts across it. The steps represent textual fragments of, to use Jakobson's phrase, positional similarity, related to each other by a semantic equivalence which means that, within the terms of Auster's analogy, we can say that any of the steps would be equally as effective if they were to replace any of the other steps within the line of the passage. In Ehrmann's terms, Stillman's letters are formed by the repetition of the same action again and again, but each step is also absolutely different from all others, marked by a positional dissimilarity, occurring at a different set of spatial coordinates.\textsuperscript{45} Ultimately, the individual step itself hardly matters, it communicates nothing, but depends on that which precedes it and that which will follow a step later, assuming significance only within that space which differentiates it from its others, only on that detour along the line of steps that thread their way through the city as they spell out their message: "It is because of \textit{diff\'erance} that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called 'present' element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element" (Derrida, "Diff\'erance" 13).

But Quinn is unsure if we can even say that the steps spell out their message. None of the letters is, as Derrida says, "A written sign, in the usual sense of the word, . . . a mark which remains, which is not exhausted in the present of its inscription" ("Diff\'erance" 317). Instead, "Stillman had not left his message anywhere. True, he had created the letters by the movement of his steps, but they had not been written down. It was like drawing a picture in the air with your finger" (Auster, \textit{City} 71). Moreover, "a written sign carries with it a force of breaking with its context" (Derrida, "Diff\'erance" 317), while Stillman's message seems wholly of its context, one with the streets. Except, as Auster shows, "the pictures did exist - not in the streets where they had been drawn, but in Quinn's red notebook" (\textit{City} 71), and it is this recontextualisation, removing the line from their present, "inscribing or \textit{grafting} it into other chains" (Derrida, "Diff\'erance" 317, which draws out a meaning. An O that might be a rectangle or zero, a W that is first a bird of prey or "only two abstract shapes" (Auster, \textit{City} 68), a

\textsuperscript{45}It is etymologically tempting, but misleading, to link iterability with itinerary at this point. Also, that the same points can be both positionally similar and dissimilar recalls our original discussion of how best
doughnut, two boxes, a ladder, and an upside-down pyramid (the "mute mark" of differance, "the form of the letter ['a'] when it is printed as a capital" (Derrida, "Différence" 4) which become an O, a B, an A, and a B when seen in relation to other elements in possibly the same system, these are what come to form Stillman's message. But still Quinn is not sure, for there are four days missing, and "the mystery of those four days was irretrievable" (Auster, City 69-70), and, he predicts, there are two days yet to come, the meaning of the full communication delayed yet further, deferred, and that fullness impossible with days lost. It is iterability alone, which "structures the mark of writing itself" (Derrida, "Signature" 315), which communicates anything, allowing him to see similar forms in this differing context. And it is a final recontextualisation, placing the letters in relation to Stillman's other writings, which finally prompts Quinn to read the lines as THE TOWER OF BABEL.

That delayed 'EL', however, acts like a deferred rhyme, denying Quinn's reading the sense of completeness which rhyme, in its symmetrical displacement of the same, in its harmonious repetition of the other, would provide. As a point of positional similarity strangely removed, the missing rhyme, the corn, as Giorgio Agamben tells us, is "a point of rupture of the poetic body," and so opens the text to uncertainty ("Corn" 34).46 Left struggling with Stillman's message, facing an incompleteness which looks to him for completion, and the possibility that "the letters were not letters at all" (Auster, City 71), Quinn goes to bed, thinking of the coming E and L, finally telling "himself that El was the ancient Hebrew for God. In his dream, which he later forgot, he found himself in the town dump of his childhood, sifting through a mountain of rubbish" (Auster, City 72). This mountain of rubbish continues the theme of broken objects, broken homes, broken men, broken words, but Stillman's re-naming of New York is, of course, an attempt to fix words, to return language to its God, so that it fulfils its function, to reveal the thing it names, and is not debased by those broken things which no longer fulfil the function their name calls for, which no longer work. Work, as described by Blanchot, operates on teleological principles: "For example, my project might be to get warm. As long as this project is only a desire, I can turn it over every possible way and still it will

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46Interestingly, Agamben argues that, since the unrelated rhyme represents a rupture in the "correspondence between strophic division, which is marked by regular rhymes, and melodic division," the use of the corn as a structuring principle signalled "a radical crisis in the relation between the text and its oral performance" which meant the "emancipation of the poetic text not only from song but from all oral performance" and a movement towards "poetry as something essentially graphic" ("Corn" 33).
not make me warm. But now I build a stove... I had in front of me stones and cast iron; now I no longer have either stones or cast iron, but instead the product of the transformation of these elements - that is, their denial and destruction - by work" ("Literature" 370-71). The writer, such as Stillman, may seem to do a similar kind of work because the artistic work negates language in its present form and transforms it into something new. Auster characterises this attitude in the figure of, suitably, Max Work, Quinn's pseudonym, who "allows Quinn's texts to accomplish an end, to create order" so that "Work (as a character) allows Quinn's writing to perform work (as a concept)" (Nealon 94, 93). For Blanchot, however, writing is different, it "plays at working in the world" ("Literature" 395), for "words - writing's raw material - refuse to be negated within a higher unity; they are always there to attest to what should have been destroyed in the limiting negation that brings about the work of meaning" (Nealon 98). Words resist having limits placed upon them, won't allow the literary work to become a closed context, constructed for one purpose, for one function. Writing "manages to loosen the limits, to open the same field to a much greater range" (Derrida, "Signature" 311), and, in this way, words are uneconomic, wasteful, because they will not work for the writer alone. Stillman's writing, meant for one thing only, is nonetheless marked by its iterability, is opened to recontextualisation, removed from its author, and placed in a field that "is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is something missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions" (Derrida, "Structure" 289). There is no God in Babel (différence puts into question "precisely the quest for a rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure, a principal responsibility" (Derrida, "Différence" 6), and, in the "chaos of Stillman's movements," Quinn's fear is that he is left with what is only meaningless, rubbish (Auster, City 69).

The radical playfulness of the space of différence is daunting for, where previously our network of lines seemed to draw significance to particular points, focus our attention, now it seems they radiate outwards, leading us ever onwards and away. This city is, as Auster says, "a labyrinth of endless steps" (City 3), and any point of entry gives access to any number of paths, for infinite combinations of vertical and horizontal are possible, every point defers to and differs from the others. If we can still say that each word stands as a point of intersection, we can move from it in any
direction, follow it along whichever associative path we wish, move where our
imagination takes us, "any one thing is always, in some way, already another thing, a
multitude of other things" (Ricardou, "Writing" 274). Each forking path produces
further crossroads, further diversions. Ricardou's warning is that the starting points for
such flights of fancy, the "vectors of organization, gradually lose their directive power.
They themselves evolve, collide, and are finally lost in patterns so complex, so rapidly
overlapping, that the mind is soon no longer able to follow them" ("Writing" 266).
Losing sight of our point of entry, we rapidly become lost ourselves in the maze of
textuality, for each step leads to so many places. "'The sky is blue', for example," writes
Sollers, "would be metamorphosed into images, memories, journeys or sensations of
multiplied transversal presences" (qtd. in Ricardou, "Writing" 267). No wonder, then,
that Stillman's progress through the city is so slow, advancing on his journey
"sometimes by the merest of increments, pausing, moving on again, pausing once more,
as though each step had to be weighted and measured before it could take its place
among the sum total of steps" (Auster, City 58). Each step must indeed be carefully
considered, for there are an infinite number of steps to select, or reject.

Significantly now, the need to adhere to the world, as described above, is now
not a constraint, a deformation of the purity of the textual space, but a source of
guidance, a means of preventing the text from falling into chaos (the same attention to
the world is seen in Sollers when, describing a woman, "it is the female body (the face)
that selects from the series of possibilities of red" (Ricardou, "Writing" 268)). Sollers
employs another limiting device also, a temporal limit, the daily rhythm, night and day,
for "the Night selects all the images evoked in the first part, the Day in the second"
(Ricardou, "Writing" 271). Stillman, meanwhile, gives a day to each letter, thus
limiting the possible range of his meanderings. A further means of containing his
message is Stillman's decision to stay within the boundaries of 110th Street, 72nd Street,
Riverside Park, and Amsterdam Avenue, for "this strictly material measure metes out
the physical space allotted the writing for its development, and regulates the writing
itself," says Ricardou ("Writing" 270), though writing, of course, of how Sollers'
narrator "chose a notebook" and "divided it into two parts" (qtd. in Ricardou, "Writing" 270).47

47 Anna Blume, in Auster's In the Country of Last Things, experiences these temporal and physical limits
also, as her "handwriting has become smaller and smaller" so that she can "fit everything in" to her blue
potential can also be limited by the actual for, finally, Stillman's path is assured simply because he is writing it. The act of writing, as Ricardou shows, is very different to the act of imagination which can so quickly lose itself in its wanderings. "Exercising the imagination while at the same time apprehending its movement - such is the privilege that writing seems to enjoy," he writes, and again, as with Butor and Bradford, it is the written word's durability which is significant: "The written fragment is not flight, mobility, disappearance, but rather inscription, a stable reference" ("Writing" 266). Moreso even than the orbits of Kepler, Stillman's spatial form depends on its physicality to convey its message, for the forms of the letters must be legible, each of their parts occupying a suitable site, intersecting with the printed lines at the correct point. It is not enough that a "privileged thread" like Sollers's red be written through the text, but this thread, if drawn across the text, actually inscribed on the page, must signify something. Stillman's path is meaningful because he remains oriented within the space of the page, and the parts of his passage remain in proper relation with each other because his actions physically situate them, they cannot shift. When we remember that Stillman, as writer, can account for only four words scrawled across the surface of the city, and cannot claim to be the author of this space in its textual entirety, the stability of this writing achieves a further importance, for Stillman's steps assume, now, their positional similarity by their very inclusion in Stillman's work, marked out in their relation to each other by the work that Stillman does in his walking through the city. Outside of any other relation that may exist between the parts of this path, this act of writing itself gives them a common ground.

The space of text emerges, then, as a differential space, stepping back from chaos, yet subverting its own order, and delimited in time and space by physical placement and virtual projections. It is found in the printed word, projecting a mental world, but is reducible to neither, combining both, a space amid places. In describing it, we recall Derrida's observation that "between two opposites, the third can participate, it can touch the two edges" (Truth 34). The joining of the two edges was the problem facing Immanuel Kant, for, as Derrida says, his "first two critiques of pure (speculative and practical) reason had opened an apparently infinite gulf" (Truth 35). Kant was aware of the need to fill this gulf, this abyss. He writes:

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If thus an abyss stretching out of sight is established between the domain of the concept of nature, that is, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, that is, the suprasensible, such that no passage is possible from the one to the other (by means therefore, of the theoretical use of reason), as between worlds so different that the first can have no influence on the second, the second must yet have an influence on the former. . . . Consequently it must be that there is a foundation of unity. (qtd. in Derrida, Truth 35-36)

The domains Kant speaks of are physical and mental space. The expressed need to find a passage from one to the other is partially answered in his third Critique, "identifying in art (in general) one of the middle terms for resolving the 'opposition' between mind and nature, internal and external phenomena, the inside and the outside" (Derrida, Truth 35), but Derrida takes this further. Drawing on Kant's repeated use of the metaphor or analogy "of the immense 'abyss' which separates the two worlds and of the apparent impossibility of throwing a bridge from one shore to the other," Derrida argues that the "recourse to analogy, the concept and effect of analogy are or make the bridge itself" (Truth 36). He goes on to say, "The analogy of the abyss and of the bridge over the abyss is an analogy which says that there must surely be an analogy between two absolutely heterogeneous worlds, a third term to cross the abyss, to heal over the gaping wound and think the gap. In a word, a symbol. The bridge is a symbol, it passes from one bank to the other, and the symbol is a bridge" (Truth 36).

Following Ehrmann, we can see the symbol as only another form of displacement, a further manifestation of text's differing and deferring space. It seems we can rewrite Derrida, saying the bridge is the space of text, it passes from one bank to the other, and the space of text is a bridge. It touches the edges of physical and mental space, bridging the two, connecting them, and it does not side with one or the other, but remains attached to both while also remaining of itself. It is a bridge between places, which can be traversed, crossed over, allowing traffic to pass from one side to another. As such, it is a space which can be occupied, upon which (perhaps even under which) we can dwell if we so wish, but this then raises the question of what it might mean to linger in textual space, and where this would then place us. This is the question which the next chapter attempts to answer by asking whether, when we describe textual space as a third space, between the physical and the mental, we are describing a textual space.
only, or whether this describes also another space which we haven't as yet named or fully understood.
II

WRITING THE SPACE OF TEXT: SOCIAL SPACE
In the previous chapter, our aim was to arrive at an understanding of what might be meant by textual space, how we might recognise it, and what it encompassed. Beginning with the reassuring physicality of the book as an object, and the distribution of this object in a commercial domain, we continued on to the study of the distribution of print on the page, and how this affected our reading of the text. Arguing against the idea that the written word is only a record of the spoken word, we moved from a discussion of the significance of material divisions in the textual line to an understanding of the importance of repetition as a disruptive element in the seemingly smooth progression of the text. Gradually, textual space emerged as a network of connections and relations between elements of greater similarity or dissimilarity, held in tension between the pages which give it substance and the world which it constructs. What also became clear, however, as we began to distinguish between spaces, worlds, spatialities, and spatial forms, is that, as Rob Shields points out, "we are in desperate need of a vocabulary to conceptualise the varied production and consumption of varied spaces, places and landscapes" (154), especially as it became apparent also, even in the contrast between the linear and the non-linear, that textual space was a non-uniform space, but rather one which could be shaped and utilised according to one's purpose and intent. The question to be addressed in this chapter is whether textual space is itself unique, or whether it participates in a larger spatiality, one which, like textual space, is not easily classified as either physical or mental. If such a space can be identified, then an analysis of the nature of this space should give us a greater insight into the specific nature of textual space also.

Just such a space was the subject of a lecture given in July 1995 at a conference in the City University, London, where Edward Soja spoke of the re-emergence of the concept of space as an important element in social and cultural theory. In a discussion which reflected what spatial theorists were saying about literary theory, Soja had already argued, in *Postmodern Geographies*, that social theory was guilty of prioritising the temporal over the spatial, and his intent there was to readdress the imbalance, not placing geography, or the wider concept of space, in a temporally-minded critical consciousness, but placing it on a par with time in its importance for social theory. In his lecture, Soja argued that it was now possible to discern a move away from a dialectic towards a new trialectic where every object was seen as simultaneously historical, social, and spatial. Soja has traced this renewed interest in spatiality back to Michel
Foucault, John Berger, Ernest Mandel, and Fredric Jameson, but it is the work of another of his named theorists, Henri Lefebvre, which will be the focus of this chapter and what follows, even as it has implicitly informed all that has gone before. Although Lefebvre does not tend to portray space and time as fighting for dominance within social theory, his work is an example of the type of theory which Soja champions, concerning itself with the "ontological trialectic" (Soja, Thirdspace 70) of historicality, spatiality, and sociality. More than this, Lefebvre displays an extraordinary sensitivity towards the nature of space itself, and argues against what he would see as an inadequate understanding of the ways in which we inhabit the spaces of society. Whereas, traditionally, philosophy tends to view space either in material terms, as containing concretised forms which can be empirically described, or in ideal terms, as a construct of thoughts and representations, Lefebvre added to these physical and mental spaces a new space, a lived space, "actually lived and socially created spatiality, concrete and abstract at the same time, the habitus of social practices" (Soja, Geographies 18). Social space is not added as something separate, however, but instead "all 'space' is social space" (Shields 155) in the sense that all that Lefebvre includes in the word 'l'espace' is social space. This chapter will argue that it is within this lived, social space that we should understand textual space, the space of text, and, moreover, that, in discussing space in terms of spatial practice, representations of space, and spaces of representation, Lefebvre provides us with the key to identifying and analysing the varying forms of textual space.

**Henri Lefebvre and the production of space**

The key work in elaborating Lefebvre's theories of space, and the focus of our discussion, is The Production of Space, a continuation and summation of his thoughts on the nature of space, politics, urbanism, the city, and everyday life. It begins with a brief history and critique of the ways in which space has been conceived, moving from Aristotle's understanding of space (and time) as categories enabling humans to classify perceptions, to Descartes's understanding of space as that which contains all objects and perceptions of them, and returning to a categorical concept of space in the work of Kant. Though this is an issue which still occupies philosophy, Lefebvre claims that, in recent times, mathematicians have laid equal claim to space and, in their attempts to describe
it, have in fact "invented spaces - an 'indefinity', so to speak of space: non-Euclidean spaces, curved spaces, x-dimensional spaces (even spaces with an infinity of dimensions), spaces of configuration, abstract spaces, spaces defined by deformation or transformation, by a topology, and so on" (Lefebvre 2). These then are conceptual spaces, being either spaces within which the world can be mathematically represented, or spaces which have no worldly, in the sense of physical, reality, but can only be conceived of in mathematical terms by the mind. They exist then as what Lefebvre would call mental space. Moreover, they would also seem to exist within mental space, for Lefebvre appears to understand the term in two ways; it is not necessary that a particular space, Euclidean or other, be postulated, it is sufficient simply that something should happen which, though obviously abstracted from the physical world, is equally obviously situated in some theoretical space. Thus, when Roland Barthes says of Jacques Lacan, "His topology does not concern within and without, even less above and below; it concerns, rather, a reverse and an obverse in constant motion - a front and back forever changing places as they revolve around something" (Critique qtd. in Lefebvre 5n), he is placing Lacan's discourse within some space of clear orientations, an up and down, a frontward and backward, a left and right, an inside and outside, despite the fact that Barthes does not explicitly situate or describe this space. As Lefebvre says, "No limits at all have been set on the generalization of the concept of mental space: no clear account of it is ever given" (3). Indeed, this space is rarely recognised by those who use it, despite the fact that any space self-created by an author must, in some way, conform to the author's views and preconceptions, and so cannot be "extra-ideological" (Lefebvre 6).

In contrast with the idealism of mental space, and providing us with the second spatial category, there is seen to exist physical space, real space, the space of physical actuality. Within this space, Lefebvre says, objects are sensible by the human body, knowable by the five senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell, empirically describable. This space coincides with, or at least contains, the space of nature, where nature includes not simply natural objects such as trees and flowers, but all things which exist, and have existed, independently of human intervention, including the Earth, the solar system, and even the Universe or, as Lefebvre describes it, the Cosmos. Lefebvre says that physical space is "defined by practico-sensory activity and the perception of

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48Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Lefebvre are taken from The Production of Space.
'nature,' but he qualifies his use of "nature" for the same reason that it cannot truly be said that physical and natural space coincide, namely because "(physical) natural space is disappearing" (Lefebvre 27, 30). If 'natural' can be interpreted as 'untouched,' little remains that is natural, for social practices have progressively colonised the natural world.

For some, mental space is the only space of the text. For example, Edward Marcotte's question, and proffered answer, is:

But what space does a novel fill - the space occupied by the physical book, pages bound in cloth or paper? Or is it the dimensions of the printed page itself, so many lines of so many inches across, with so many letters per inch? But can we then say that the fiction is somehow constituted within these printed characters?

This has to be nonsense, of course. Fictional space exists in the mind alone. (267)

The space of the text is here denied a physical aspect, but removed to a mental space, which is a space given only the appearance of an existence as a result of mental processes for, as he says, "the space of the mind is no space" (268), for the mind has no dimensions. Marcotte's first question, "What space does a novel fill?" assumes a different aspect now, for, placed in a space without co-ordinates, it is left to the mind itself to delimit the space of the novel, to embody a thing of no substance. As Blanchot also remarks, though critically, "people create an opposition between action, which is a concrete initiative in the world, and the written word, which is supposed to be a passive expression on the surface of the world" ("Literature" 370).

The strict division of space into mental and physical spaces is, for Lefebvre, a problematic one. He contends that, while it is rare that a philosopher should even acknowledge the mental space within which s/he theorises, it is rarer still for a philosopher to detail the way in which that mental space relates to physical space, that space in which human beings, as physical creatures, exist. The result of this indistinct relation between the mental and physical spaces is the effective sidelining of the realm of social interaction, which takes place within physical space. Philosophical thinking, in Lefebvre's opinion, has failed to come to terms with the link between theory and practice, especially social practice, and has replaced the human collective in the mental space with "the abstract subject, the cogito of the philosophers" (Lefebvre 4). Man,
therefore, human beings, society, has fallen into the gap between mental and physical space. It is partly this imbalance which Lefebvre wishes to readdress in The Production of Space, repositioning humankind in a third space, a social space and, in so doing, developing a reconfiguration in our understanding of space which "aims both to reconnect elements that have been separated and to replace confusion by clear distinctions; to rejoin the severed and reanalyse the commingled" (Lefebvre 413). The duality of mental and physical, which Lefebvre sees as being as unnatural as any supposed division between mind and matter, or culture and nature, or even time and space, becomes then a triad of mental, physical, and social, where there is always a possibility of overlapping, shared, and similar qualities rather than two isolated spaces separated by a vacuum.

Lefebvre's introduction of a third space is simply one example of what Soja describes as "his insistent disordering or . . . deconstruction of binary logic" (Thirdspace 7). For Lefebvre, two terms were never enough, a position reflected even in the situation of his own life. Though he lived mostly in Paris, he always remained tied to his roots in the Pyrenees, so that he embraced both the urban and the rural, the centre and the periphery; "I enjoy my life between the centers and peripheries; I am at the same time peripheral and central, but I take sides with the periphery" (Lefebvre, Temps qtd. in Soja, Thirdspace 29). For Lefebvre, there "is always the Other, a third term that disrupts, disorders, and begins to reconstitute the conventional binary opposition into an-Other that comprehends but is more than just the sum of two parts" (Soja, Thirdspace 31). Lefebvre applies this strategy, which Soja describes as "thirding-as-Othering" (Thirdspace 5), not only to the duality of centre-periphery, but also to the dualities of subject-object, mental-material, natural-social, bourgeoisie-proletariat, local-global, and agency-structure, each time "transforming the categorical and closed logic of either/or to the dialectically open logic of both/and also" (Soja, Thirdspace 60). Lefebvre's use of dialectical logic was based on the belief that the dialectical materialism which Marx had applied to limited areas could be developed as an universal method. Lefebvre's focus, however, is always on the dialectical, though, "at the same time, knowledge and understanding and the opportunities for transformation are limited by material, historical conditions" (Shields 111).

As Shields points out, Lefebvre's 1939 work Matérialisme Dialectique, translated in 1968 as Dialectical Materialism, is his best-known and most widely translated work. The adoption by the Parti Communiste
The co-dependent nature of the triad of spaces means that social space is hard to define for, though it is contiguous with the mental and physical spaces, it is not limited by their status. Lefebvre himself asks, and answers, "Is this space an abstract one? Yes, but it is also 'real' in the sense in which concrete abstractions such as commodities and money are real. Is it then concrete? Yes, though not in the sense that an object or product is concrete" (27). Such 'yes and no' answers can be frustrating, but what Lefebvre does say for definite is, "(Social) space is a (social) product" (26). As a product, then, it is not a result of nature, for nature, in Lefebvre's view, does not produce but creates, for it brings forth all that it does spontaneously, without consciousness, and without labour. Neither can social spaces be generally considered as works of art if, as Lefebvre thinks, works can be defined as "unique, original, primordial" (Lefebvre 73), because, even if beautiful, such places are rarely planned as works of art but are the results of geographical, historical, economic, political, military, and other forces, and can be changed constantly by these forces. Moreover, these spaces are reproducible for "repetitious spaces are the outcome of repetitious gestures" (Lefebvre 75). The defining factor of social space, then, is that it is a social product.

Lefebvre contends that every society, and so every mode of production, produces its own space. In order for this society to survive, this space must contain the social relations of reproduction, "the bio-physiological relations between the sexes and between age groups, along with the specific organization of the family," and the relations of production, "the division of labour and its organization in the form of hierarchical social functions" (Lefebvre 32). In a capitalist system, a society must also contain the relations for reproduction of those elements which constitute capitalism. These actions and interactions of production and reproduction are included within what Lefebvre terms "spatial practice." Spatial practice is that which Barney Warf refers to as "the ontological reality of spatial existence" (111), and which Lefebvre says "consists in a projection onto a (spatial) field of all aspects, elements and moments of social practice" (8). Though spatial practice includes the social actions of the members of a society, and results in a social space, "secretes that society's space" (Lefebvre 38), social spaces can also restrict the members of that society, classifying actions as either permitted or prohibited. Spatial practices of today include those of everyday life, the

François (PCF) of Soviet theoretical orthodoxy one month after the book's initial publication, however, meant a large part of the first printing was seized and destroyed, while the book also suffered later when Althusserian interpretations of Marx came to the fore (Shields 109-10).
daily routine of the individual, and the construction and use of transport and information
networks which link places designated for "working, living, recreation, circulation"
(Jencks, Keynote address). These practices have their source, ultimately, in the human
body which performs the actions and, by doing so, defines the basic directions within
space of up and down, higher and lower, left and right, before and behind, while at the
same time, due to the bipedal nature of the body, introducing notions of symmetry and
asymmetry.

The spatial practices which contribute to the production of the space of the text,
include all that affects the physical reality of the text as book. These are the practices
which we earlier subsumed under the heading distribution, involving the act of writing,
including the longhand writing of words onto paper, the typing of the words on a
manual typewriter or on a computer, or any other method of production of the text; the
editing process, as well as any other actions which affect the layout and appearance of
the text; the reproduction of the original text, whether this is the initial printing from
computer, the copying of the text from one computer disc to another, or the
photocopying or printing of an original manuscript; preparations for the final
presentation of the text, including, for example, the binding of the book; the commercial
distribution and purchasing of the book which guarantees the geographical availability
of the text (this distribution is comparable to the transport and information networks
which are included within the wider set of social spatial practice, because it involves the
placement of objects throughout the world which are linked because they are identical
and so demand certain actions, reactions, and interactions from their users, even as
certain actions are performed within spaces designated for leisure, living, and work); the
practice of reading and interpreting the text.

These spatial practices are also social practices, social space being a social
product. Every stage in the production of a text, therefore, is affected by social
conditions which alter the text and our experience of it, for, as Derrida writes, "the place
of writing is linked . . . to the nature of social space, to the perceptive and dynamic
organization of the technical, religious, economic and other such spaces" (Of
Grammatology 290). Opening a book, for example, there are conventions at work of
which may be unaware, and yet still they affect our approach to the text, our tangible
and, as Lefebvre suggests, bodily experience of it. In the placement of the title and half-
title, we should notice how the right-hand page, or *recto*, is privileged over the left-hand
page, or *verso*, so that, as Butor explains, "The movement from left to right which carries our eye along constantly tends to make us leave the left page for the one on the right, which for this reason is called the 'good' side" ("Object" 55). The eye, then, moves automatically to the right, beginning its sweep through the pages of the book, an action which will be reflected on each and every page as the eye moves along the lines, echoing the movement of the hand, or the cursor, which first produced the text. This seems a natural action, but Butor, in his discussion, has already alerted us to former methods of record. Derrida, for example, discusses "writing by the *turning of the ox - boustrophedon* - writing by furrows [which] was a movement in linear and phonographic script," an economical form which proved "less suitable for writing than reading" (Of Grammatology 288, 289). As a social product, textual space is affected by changing spatial practices, which can mean the reconfiguration of the reading and writing processes. As Barthes writes, "Where should one start? Well, by the working instrument, the typewriter. . . . Everything begins not with the subject, but by the instrument of production" (Sollers 78). Thus, we should not think that even now textual space is static, for we have already seen how Hillis Miller sees in new technologies the means to liberate both writer and reader, visualising his text as "a virtual hypertext . . . [where] each chapter can be related to the others by a multitude of different conceptual and figurative links" (Topographies 6).

As well as these relations of production and reproduction, social space also contains symbolic representations of such social relations, and it is through these representations that a society is informed, or informs itself, of its own nature, so encouraging continuity and containment of that society. Since it is the body that is the root of social space, it is also the body which is often used to represent fundamental social concerns of sexuality, power, and death, either in an explicit (frontal) or implicit (coded) way (Lefebvre 33). Lefebvre divides this representation into two forms, representations of space, and representational spaces (or "spaces of representation" [Stewart 610]). The former, "which might equally be thought of as discourses on space" (Shields 161), is "tied to the relations of production" (Lefebvre 33) and is the dominant space in any society, being the conceptualised space of scientists, planners, engineers, and urbanists. The latter space, "which might best be thought of as the discourse of

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50Mireille Rosello argues that "the metaphorical system governing our conceptualization of reading is transparently dependent on the print medium" and that hypertextuality acts "to defamiliarize the reading
space" (Shields 161), is a space invested with symbolism and meaning. Lefebvre says of it, "This is the dominated - and hence passively experienced - space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate" (39). As a social space, it will be argued, textual space may contain both forms of representation. Moreover, in this identification of representations of space and representational spaces, it seems Lefebvre enables us to properly discern between those textual spaces which are marked by their spatial linearity, and those displaying spatial form. We had suggested that the linear text, in its attempt to minimise its volume, seemed to assert that it was in no way interfering with the information it conveyed, for "a straight line conveys no information beyond the fact that the line is there" (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Line 8). Therefore, where the spatialised text, it will be argued, becomes a representational space, the linear text would act like a window on reality, providing us with a true representation of space guaranteed by its natural relation with the objects it presents.

As representations of space, however, such texts do remain a part of a socially produced space, and must conceal this in order to convince us that they are really natural. Lefebvre, in discussing how it might be possible to conceal the fact that space is a product, suggests that this is achieved through "a double illusion," the illusion of transparency and the realistic illusion (27). Significantly, the effect of these interacting ideological illusions mirrors the desired effect of Stillman's project in City of Glass, for the end result is an apparently unproblematic relationship between language and a comprehensible world. The illusion of transparency means space is viewed "as innocent, as free of traps or secret places," for "anything hidden or dissimulated - and hence dangerous - is antagonistic to transparency," with the result that "comprehension is thus supposed, without meeting any insurmountable obstacles, to conduct what is perceived . . . from the shadows into the light" (Lefebvre 28). It is through speech and writing, Lefebvre argues, through "a total clarity of communication" and a "grasping of the 'object'," that we assume decipherment is possible, meaning "communication brings the non-communicated into the realm of the communicated - the incommunicable having no existence beyond that of an ever-pursued residue" (Lefebvre 28-29). Reality offers no resistance to its explication in speech and writing, and "a rough coincidence is assumed to exist between social space . . . and mental space," the world being as we imagine it (Lefebvre 28). Where the illusion of transparency is related to "philosophical process and the book as object" (123, 122).
idealism," the realistic illusion, on the other hand, "is closer to (naturalistic and mechanistic) materialism" (Lefebvre 30). In this view, which recalls Stillman's vision of a functional language, "language resembles a 'bag of words' from which the proper and adequate word for each thing or 'object' may be picked. In the course of any reading, the imaginary and the symbolic dimensions, the landscape and the horizon which line the reader's path, are all taken as 'real'" (Lefebvre 29). In contrast, in representational spaces the symbolic dimension remains a more insubstantial thing.

The production of space involves, therefore, a second triad of spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces. In order to clarify and expand on these terms, Lefebvre introduces a third triad to correspond with the second, basing it on the human body. In relation to spatial practice, he speaks of perception, as practice and action presuppose the use of limbs and the sensory organs. Representations of space, involving scientific and technical knowledge, are related to the mind and what is conceived therein. The final element of the three, representational spaces, because they are experienced through associated images and symbols, are spoken of as being lived. It will be noted that this last triad mirrors the very first, with physical space being linked to what is perceived, mental space with what is conceived, and social space with what is lived.

Again, none of the three elements in the production of space is easily explained or defined for, as with mental, physical and social space, they are both overlapping and separate, and can exist independently or dependently within the same space. Perhaps the best way to illustrate the nature of these elements, and especially to distinguish between the categories of spatial representation, is to note, as Lefebvre has, the ways in which the balance has shifted amongst them through history for, as already has been said, every society has its own social space. The history of any social space is not, however, necessarily the history of that society as we would usually know it, as a series of dated events or as "a sequence, whether teleological or not, of customs and laws, ideals and ideology, and socio-economic structures or institutions (superstructures)" (Lefebvre 46). The history of a social space is rooted in nature, in the situated, climatic conditions of an area which determine the productive capabilities of the society which grows there. An obvious example, pointed out by Lefebvre (73-77), is the city of Venice and the ways in which it has adapted to, and been formed by, the sea.

Considering the nature of this history, it can be seen that though Lefebvre might seek to
produce a unitary theory of physical, mental, and social space, he is not attempting to
develop a meta-theory with explicitly predictive or prescriptive conclusions. Instead,
Lefebvre's unitary theory is essentially a descriptive one, allowing for a detailed and
insightful analysis of societies without claiming to be able to fully explain why they are
as they are.51

Lefebvre's history essentially charts the transition from one form of space to
another, namely from absolute space to abstract space. Absolute space is to be found in
the earlier historical, as opposed to pre-historical, societies, though it could also be said
that it "refers primarily to spaces of pre-capitalist times" (Sayer 458). Absolute space
involved the 'appropriation' of natural sites, such as a cave, a mountain-top, a spring, or
a valley, which were chosen for their "intrinsic qualities" (Lefebvre 48) but were then
brought into the political and religious realms, usually through architectural structures
with symbolic significance. This symbolism was emphasised through rites and
ceremonies. Lefebvre uses as an example the Parthenon in Greek society, a sacred
place, as are all absolute spaces, with a clear perimeter and "aspects but no facade"
(Lefebvre 237), so that it cannot simply be 'read' but must be perceived in its entirety.
Its construction is at one with its appearance "so that the external appearance and the
composition (or structure) of Greek buildings are indistinguishable from each other:
each contains and reveals the other" (Lefebvre 238). Absolute spaces were often empty,
"a sanctified inwardness set itself up in opposition to the outwardness of nature"
(Lefebvre 48), but it was as if, due to the qualities of its location, the space could be a
part of, and so contain, all the space of nature around it. Though empty inside, this left
room for the forces of nature, for fertility and death, for the divinities, whose presence
might be symbolically indicated either through nature, "the peaks, the heavens; and
abysses or gaping holes," or through the architectural structure, through its columns,
planes, levels, and so on; "horizontal space symbolizes submission, vertical space
power, and subterranean space death" (Lefebvre 236). Again, the power represented in
the architecture is emphasised by religious, magical rites which protect the priestly

51 One effect also of Lefebvre's unitary theory, "is to reunite over-specialised areas of knowledge by
substituting or giving an overriding emphasis to the spatiality of action, objects, laws, semiotic codes,
economic processes and cultural practices rather than analysing them in terms of the priorities prescribed
by the specialised domains of knowledge" (Shields 151). Thus, Lefebvre, while directly influencing his
one-time assistant Jean Baudrillard, and engaging in philosophical debate with Jean-Paul Sartre, has also
found his work employed by geographers such as Soja, David Harvey and Dereck Gregory, though he
"never published in a geography journal in his life" (Shields 156n), and has been cited by feminist writers
such as Donna Haraway and Bell Hooks.
rulers of the space by permitting some acts and prohibiting others in their rituals, while also setting aside some areas of the space as public and others as private or sacrosanct. In this sense also, what surrounded the absolute was condensed within it. These magical spaces were true representations of space and representational spaces, for through the spatial practices performed within them, they echoed the social structures of the outside world, while in their structure and intent, they signified that society's comprehension of the cosmos.

In contrast with the absolute space of the pre-capitalist societies, the space produced by capitalist society is, Lefebvre argues, abstract space. Abstract space superseded historical space, which had originally overcome absolute space. The development of historical space included a shift in emphasis from country to town, with a corresponding shift in the nature of agricultural production. The increasingly important towns and cities excluded nature from their territories, resulting in the gradual disappearance of absolute spaces, which were founded in natural locations. By the twelfth century, a further element of historical space had developed, described by Erwin Panofsky as "visual logic" (Lefebvre 259), evident in works such as the great cathedrals. These differed from temples such as the Parthenon where construction and appearance were one and the same, because these new cathedrals employed load-bearing columns and pillars which meant walls could be lighter and more decorative. The use of statues and facades became widespread as medieval architects attempted "to have the exterior present the interior and render it visible" (Lefebvre 261). This was the beginning of the "trend towards visualisation" which was to entail, with the emergence of abstract space, space's "subordination to the written word" (Lefebvre 261).

The process of abstraction began with "the divorce of labour from direct association with the satisfaction of needs" (Sayer 458) when "productive activity (labour) became no longer one with the process of reproduction which perpetuated social life" (Lefebvre 49), so being abstracted from its original role, leading to abstract social labour and, inevitably, due to the connection between modes of production and space, to abstract space. As an attempted description of the sort of space created by this era's predominantly capitalist societies, abstract space is obviously a complex concept. Lefebvre says that as "a product of violence and war, it is political; instituted by the state, it is institutional," and that it "is buttressed by non-critical (positive) knowledge, backed up by a frightening capacity for violence, and maintained by a bureaucracy
which has laid hold of the gains of capitalism" (285, 52). If the three categories in the production of space are applied, "in spatial practice, the reproduction of social relations is predominant. The representation of space, in thrall to both knowledge and power, leaves only the narrowest leeway to representational spaces, which are limited to works, images and memories, whose content, whether sensory, sensual or sexual, is so far displaced that it barely achieves symbolic force" (Lefebvre 50). In so describing abstract space, Lefebvre is, of course, incorporating Marx's concept of alienation, which Lefebvre develops as a key element in his own thinking, and does not confine to the workplace alone, but extends throughout everyday life. Lefebvre's 'alienation' is a spatial concept "referring to displacement and distance" (Shields 40), resulting in "the estrangement of man from man and from his own individuality" (Lefebvre and Guterman qtd. in Shields 45), making us strangers to ourselves. Moreover, our own alienated state is hidden from us "or covered over with myths: people were actually convinced that they were living the 'good life'' (Shields 40). The members of society are effectively cut off from the space of nature or, indeed, any alternative space to that within which the relations of capitalism are reproduced. As this space is controlled by bureaucratic forces with a vested interest in the continuation of capitalism, there is a trend within abstract space towards homogeneity, towards the production of a uniform, manageable abstract space, though this homogenisation is counteracted to some extent by inherent contradictions in abstract space. In order to produce and reproduce this space, capitalist systems, which already determine most spatial practices, employ representations of space to ensure the continuation of these practices. Access to spaces of representation, then, are limited, with lived space being replaced with conceived space, and people encouraged simply to watch rather than to act. In fact, living becomes, for Lefebvre, "the practice of overcoming alienation to reach a deeper level of understanding, of engagement and of reconciliation" (Shields 43). But societies are alienated from life by the continuous representations of how they should live in a world where the "metaphorical qualities of objects are also ignored in a general reduction of the meaningfulness of the world to a set of predefined and commodified advertising images" (Shields 41). As Lefebvre says; "Perhaps it would be true to say that the place of social space as a whole has been usurped by a part of that space endowed with an illusory special status - namely, the part which is concerned with writing and imagery, underpinned by the written text (journalism, literature), and broadcast by the media; a
part, in short, that amounts to abstraction wielding awesome reductionistic force vis-à-vis 'lived' experience" (52).

The reductionist force of abstract space can be analysed according to Lefebvre, through three elements, or formants. The first of these is the phallic formant, for it is the phallus, Lefebvre claims, which is most often represented because "metaphorically, it symbolises force, male fertility, masculine violence" which "does not remain abstract, for it is the brutality of political power" (Lefebvre 287). The second element is the geometric formant, or the desire to reduce space to a utilisable space such as that of Euclidean geometry, "the reduction of three-dimensional realities to two dimensions (for example, a 'plan', a blank sheet of paper, something drawn on that paper, a map, or any kind of graphic representation or projection)" (Lefebvre 285). The third is the optical (or visual) formant, the blanket application of Panofsky's logic of visualisation, which involves "dependence on the written word . . . and the process of spectacularization" (Lefebvre 286). These last two are effected through metaphor and metonymy which privilege the visual over all other senses so that "finally, by assimilation, or perhaps by simulation, all of social life becomes the mere decipherment of messages by the eyes, the mere reading of texts" (Lefebvre 286).

**Approaching a Lefebvrean space of text**

It is very apparent that Lefebvre considers a textualisation of space (not to be confused with the spatialisation of text) to have played a large part in the abstraction of space. Textual space would thus be aligned with representations of space, "how space is portrayed" (Warf 111). The conceptual approaches to representation which inform the writing of the text, are often implied in the labels attached to them, Realist, Modernist, Postmodernist, Futurist, and so on, and the portrayal of spaces within these texts, the representation of the world, is affected by the conceptual apparatus of the writer(s) and of the genre. Thus Lefebvre speaks of how "Céline uses everyday language to great effect to evoke the space of Paris . . . Plato . . . offers marvellous descriptions of cosmic space, and of the space of the city as a reflection of the Cosmos. The inspired De Quincey . . . or Baudelaire in his Tableaux parisiens, offer us accounts of urban space rivalling those of Victor Hugo and Lautréamont" (14-15).
When it comes to the textualisation of space, however, the focus of Lefebvre's attack is semiology, leading Barney Warfto declare, "Few today would feel at home with his casual dismissal of symbols and epistemology, his hostility to language and abstraction" (112). For Lefebvre, the epistemology of linguistics projects a mental space within which linguists theorise, so that, in the triad of parts in the production of space, it aligns itself with representations of space. As an example, Lefebvre refers to the work of J. M. Rey, and Noam Chomsky in particular, who "has posited the existence of a linguistic level ... endowed with specific properties - with orientations and symmetries," speaking of "a finite set of levels ordered from high to low" (Lefebvre 4-5). This tendency towards abstraction we saw too in the theoretical precursors to these linguists, in the Structuralist space postulated by Saussure, and in the attempts at "constructing a poetics which stands to literature as linguistics stands to language" (Culler, Structuralist Poetics 257), seeking an underlying system of literary elements and combinations which would explain the readability of all texts. Such systems are inevitably open to questions concerning the ontological nature of the structures described. To use Lefebvre's terms, one can ask if these structures are present in the physical space of the text, or whether they exist purely as abstract constructs within mental space. Genette says of them that, "they are systems of latent relations, conceived rather than perceived, which analysis constructs as it uncovers them, and which it runs the risk of inventing while believing that it is discovering them" ("Structuralism" 68), suggesting that these structures exist more naturally in mental rather than physical space. Lefebvre understands a structure as abstracted from its context as that which "is conceived, and implies a representation of space" (Lefebvre 369). More importantly, Genette indicates the dangers of a pure structuralism when he describes it as "an ideology, the prejudice of which is precisely to value structures at the expense of substances, and which may therefore overestimate their explanatory value" ("Structuralism" 68), while Shields argues that Structuralism was an indication "of the extension of alienation ever deeper into the previously unregulated areas of everyday life" (122).

Operating within a mental space, linguists are open to the same criticisms that Lefebvre makes of all who do so. The first is that they ignore the created gap between their new mental spaces and the existing spaces of social reality, tending to "spring without the slightest hesitation from mental to social" (Lefebvre 6). The second charge
made against such an abstract approach is that social practice is excluded from the linguistic process as it becomes something of an entity in itself, self-creating and self-generating; "Epistemological thought, in concert with the linguists' theoretical efforts, has reached a curious conclusion. It has eliminated the 'collective subject', the people as creator of a particular language, as carrier of specific etymological sequences" (Lefebvre 4). Lefebvre is wary of a conception of language where comprehensibility is developed from within, for then "language, the vehicle of understanding, gives rise to an understanding of itself which is an absolute knowledge" (133). When "the methodological study of chains of signifiers is thus placed at the forefront of the search for knowledge," the result is "an extreme formalism, a fetishization of consistency in knowledge and of coherence in practice: a cult, in short, of words" (Lefebvre 133, 131). Relating the theory of the sign to set theory and so to logic, Lefebvre says, "Every mental and social relationship may thus be reduced to a formal relation of the type: A is to B as B is to C. Pure formalism becomes an (albeit empty) hub for the totalization of knowledge, of discourse, of philosophy and science, of perceptibility and intelligibility, of time and space, of 'theoretical practice' and social practice" (133), obviously related to the Modernist epistemological pursuit of "the standardisation of knowledge and production" (PRECIS 6 qtd. in Harvey 9).

The "coherence in practice" and the "totalization of knowledge" of which Lefebvre speaks, can be seen as part of the desire for homogenisation within capitalism, everything gradually being reduced to language; "everything - music, painting, architecture - is language. Space itself, reduced to signs and sets of signs, becomes part of knowledge so defined. As, little by little, do all objects in that space" (Lefebvre 133). Lefebvre's conviction is that not everything is reducible to language, "that signifying processes (a signifying practice) occur in a space which cannot be reduced either to an everyday discourse or to a literary language of texts," and so he is dismayed, for example, by any architectural attempt to make a building 'readable', where "the architect is supposed to construct a signifying space wherein form is to function as signifier is to signified" (Lefebvre 136, 144). Lefebvre would encourage the efforts of architects such as Robert Venturi who "sees space not as an empty and neutral milieu occupied by dead objects but rather as a force full of tensions and distortions" (Lefebvre 145).

Lefebvre's fears of an extreme formalism which would strive to reduce the three-dimensions of space to a two-dimensional readable surface, and which would encourage
architects to aim for this as a new conception of space, make an interesting comparison with those of Spanos, reacting against the spatialisation of time rather than the textualisation of space. The instinct which leads Lefebvre to condemn the readable space is the same as that which has Spanos decry a "formalist theoretical discussion" which considers an encounter with a text as "preeminently a matter of 'seeing'") ("Literary Criticism" 89). Indeed, the ultimate aim of literary Formalism was to arrive at "a general theory" of literature (Eichenbaum 104), purportedly through scientific principles, and it shares the reductive tendencies of any model which attempts to standardise knowledge. The development of such a theory inevitably results in the abstraction to some degree of the material being analysed, so that though a formal device is initially studied in the context of the work as a whole and what it achieves within that work, it is then related to some abstracted concept of that device so that its function can be delineated. Eichenbaum speaks of how "the Formalists quite naturally used literary works only as material for supporting and testing their theoretical hypotheses," demonstrating "that the same device may reappear in diverse materials," and attempting "to differentiate, to understand, the function of a device in each given case" (115, 117, 132). The salient devices are removed to a conceptual space, no longer situated within a physical context.

Now, many of the interpretations of spatial texts presented in the course of our discussion did involve formal elements such as "parallelism, comparison, repetition, symmetry" (Eichenbaum 113), all notably devices cited in (Russian) Formalist literary

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52 Lefebvre's textualisation and Spanos's spatialisation are both defined in terms of a lifeless space abstracted from the social world. Spanos links the formalist approach with the negation of time, and, with it, of change, progression, Becoming and, ultimately, of life. Therefore, for Spanos spatial literature expresses a "desire to escape from time and change or, in Worringer's term 'the flux of happening,' into a static sharp-edged eternity of geometric plastic form" ("Literary Criticism" 94). Spanos here is referring to Wilhelm Worringer who, in his work Abstraction and Empathy, suggests two catalysts for art, one the "aesthetic urge to abstraction (the rejection of material forms)," the other the "aesthetic urge to empathy (the affirmation of material forms)" (Spanos, "Literary Criticism" 94). The latter, which is expressed through naturalistic art-forms, is evident where there exists "a happy pantheistic relationship of confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world" (Worringer 15 qtd. in Spanos, "Literary Criticism" 92), while the former, which results in non-naturalistic, "dehumanised" (Spanos, "Literary Criticism" 92), "nonorganic, linear-geometric styles" exists when "the relationship between man and the cosmos is one of disharmony and disequilibrium" (Frank, "Spatial Form" 53). Frank originally sees the spatial emphasis in modern literature as an effect of the aesthetic urge to abstraction, a reaction to the "insecurity, instability, the feeling of loss of control over the meaning and purpose of life amidst the continuing triumphs of science and technics" ("Spatial Form" 55). Note, however, that Worringer's "urges" again illustrate a particular bipolarity, the urge to empathy tending towards the physical, or at least the natural, and the urge to abstraction tending towards the mental. It is interesting, therefore, to see Spanos introduce a third urge, the urge to engagement or the urge to "dialogic encounter with the
theory which did draw attention "to interrelationships among the linguistic signs" (Abrams 273). To any accusations that a spatial understanding of a text is simply a formal understanding, we can say that, obviously, if a Formalist approach aids in the identification of the specific structuring elements in a text, then there is no reason not to borrow such techniques, but this does not mean that a spatial analysis of a text should have the same aims as a Formalist analysis, to develop "a science of literature that would be both independent and factual," to differentiate between poetic and practical language, to identify the literariness that makes a work a work of literature, to examine the defamiliarising effects of formal devices, and to understand literary evolution "as the dialectical change of forms" (Eichenbaum 102, 136). Moreover, in our analysis of textual spatiality we have always insisted that the space is dependent on embodiment in the text, so that the emphasis is not on developing a system or account of the devices used but rather the significance of their employment within the text to produce a specific space of signification to guide the reading. As Vidan points out, "in a merely technical analysis, however exhaustive, no enumeration of recurrences and thematic collocation, of recognizable symmetries and contrasts, can ever reach the spatial effect of the whole" (150). No description of the structures of the space can equal the force of experiencing that space, or, as Shields says, "it is not possible to do what the Structuralists wanted; to separate out two 'levels of analysis' . . . without tending to forget and mystify the fact that language is an equally human invention" (123).

To illustrate the significance of attendance to the physicality of the text, and, especially, the physicality of the text as experienced in time, we need only recall Bradford's characterisation of his visual form, when "words and phrases will begin to resonate through the text not merely because of their position within the syntactic sequence but also . . . because of the spatial relationship," and a "tension or counterpoint . . . is created by a disjunction between the temporal movement of language and the movement of the eye across its static configurations on the page" (Bradford 28, 31). But Bradford's visual form is also instructive in other ways at this point. We might remember, for example, how Bradford placed cummings on the extreme end of his sliding scale, for in cummings "our awareness of how temporal language can describe or signify a relation between an event and a feeling is fused simultaneously with a visual
dreadful world of crisis generated by temporal flux" ("Literary Criticism" 95), which can perhaps be described as the social urge, the urge to connect with social space.
representation of that process. . . . Without actually transforming language into visual iconic images, cummings succeeds in fusing the conventions of interpretation that, for Lessing, separate poetry from the visual arts" (Bradford 35). Bradford does, however, include on his sliding scale certain forms of poems which employ iconic signification, namely picture, or pattern, poems, also known as the calligrammes. For Bradford, the work of Herbert and Herrick in particular, "in which the symbolic function of the language and the iconic function of visual art are both present," are important in the way that the visual and aural are combined to convey different facets of the same effect, though Bradford does feel that such poems are not as effective as the blank verse of Milton in exploring the tensions which can develop between what is seen and what is heard: "In the pattern poem the line is the stable building-block which, defined by metre and rhyme, represents a discrete component of sequential auditory structure, and it also operates as a graphic unit of the visual image. There is no conflict between the visual and auditory materiality of the line" (Bradford 106,109).

Superficially related to calligrammes, but beyond even cummings's end of the scale, are concrete poems. Although Edwin Morgan, writing for the catalogue of the 1965 exhibition "Between Poetry and Painting" at the ICA, describes concrete poetry as "only emphasising and developing an already existing component of visual effect" (qtd. in Bradford 130), Bradford rejects concrete poetry because it privileges the graphic impact of a language form at the expense of the syntactical and grammatical structures which make a linguistic discourse possible. They threaten to "move so far into the purely graphic or the mathematical that they are no longer making their appeal through language as such" (Morgan, qtd. in Bradford 130). Bradford takes as an example the following by Eugen Gomringer:

silencio silencio silencio
silencio silencio silencio
silencio silencio silencio
silencio silencio silencio

53The picture poem dates back to classical Greek poetry, where examples include the "Syrinx" (shaped so that it might be inscribed on a pan-pipe), generally attributed to Theocritus, though perhaps mistakenly so (see Gow 2: 554). Possibly the first English example is Stephen Hawes's The Convercyon of Swerers, while other writers to have used the form include George Herbert, Robert Herrick, Lewis Carroll, Dylan Thomas, Francois Rabelais, and Guillaume Apollinaire. More recent examples of pattern poems include
A poem such as this can be said to have achieved the "contrived depthlessness" that Jameson sees as the defining characteristic of postmodern architecture (qtd. in Harvey 58); it is simply depthless, and so, supposedly, "readable" (Jencks, Architecture qtd. in Lefebvre 144), its form "supposed to enunciate or proclaim the function" (Lefebvre 144). A "concrete poem communicates its own structure; structure-content" (A. de Campos, H. de Campos, and Pignatari qtd. in Bradford 133), so that the correspondence of form and function "or in other words," as Lefebvre puts it, "the application of the criterion of readability, makes for an instantaneousness of reading, act and gesture" (144). Compare this to Ricardo Gullón's remarks that "concrete poems seem to be written, or rather inscribed, without regard to temporality; rapidly visualized, they are related to the notion of simultaneity and not succession. The eye takes the composition in at a glance and captures, by its configuration, its meaning" (14). Of course, to do this successfully, the concrete poem must isolate itself as far as possible from the sequential and temporal characteristics of language, must reject "the combinative system through which the integers of linguistic communication are strung together to create meaning" (Bradford 131). The aim is to "create a specific linguistic area," allowing the meaning of the poem to be developed from within (A. de Campos, H. de Campos, and Pignatari qtd. in Bradford 134). The poem becomes a self-contained system, its own saturated context, depending on nothing external to it to complete it.

Bradford's interpretation of the poem is that "we might claim that the poem-picture is a meditation upon the paradox that in order to describe silence in language we need to use a linguistic symbol which transfers easily into sound, whereas true silence can only be communicated by the absence of the signifier" (Bradford 132). The "silencio" absent from the middle of the poem is the truest representation of silence, an unspoken silence. As an object which proclaims its function, as a dedicated work, this appears as the mirror image of Stillman's letters, intended as pure communication in contrast to the reticence of the poem. Silence and the Tower of Babel, the gaping mouth and the speaking tongue, zero and one, both imagine themselves to be whole. The one, knowingly, strips language of all that is worldly, identifying that which signals the absence of event, action, or object, and the other, in its innocence, thinks itself complete in the presence of that which it names, a mythical object. But Bradford's criticism of a

work such as Gomringer's is that "they invite the reader to relocate them within the kind of communicative circuit that they seek to transcend" (132), and that there is an inherent tension in the concrete poem being seen as "an object in and by itself, not an interpreter of exterior objects" and yet depending upon a (linguistic) system which is external to the poem and whose purpose is specifically to refer to objects and experiences exterior to that system (A. de Campos, H. de Campos, and Pignatari qtd. in Bradford 133). As with Stillman's letters, the impossibility of an absolute context opens the work to a wider field, draws them into the play of difféance.

This is of particular significance when we consider that Shields says of Derrida's description of the play of language that "Lefebvre would agree," though "he would deplore the alienated state of language, scoffing at those who concluded that signs ended up referring to nothing" (124), as misguided readings of Derrida tend to suggest. In fact, Lefebvre, discussing the gap between social and mental spaces, allows that, "by contrast, when Derrida gives precedence to the 'graphic' over the 'phonic', to writing over speech . . . clearly some search is being made for a transition or articulation between, on the one hand, the mental space previously posited (i.e. presupposed) by these authors, and, on the other hand, physical/social space" (Lefebvre 5n). This might surprise those who contrast Derrida with Lefebvre, because Lefebvre himself is often read as privileging the immediacy of the speech act over the written communication, his argument "blurred and oversimplified into a black-white contrast between authentic speech and language (structure)" (Shields 124). In truth, however, Lefebvre's focus is not on the speaking subject, but on the role of the body as it brings language into the world, manipulating its environment and cultural codes through actions which are not a guarantor of meaning but are "fundamentally unpredictable" (Shields 123). Lefebvre's desire, then, is for a study of language "in use not as an abstract system" (Shields 124). He makes mention of Georges Bataille's category of "social space (communication, speech)," and of "that social space wherein language becomes practice," and says that "perhaps what have to be uncovered are as-yet concealed relations between space and language" (19, 5, 17). Perhaps some of these relations are indicated in Derrida's reminder that communication may mean "the vehicle, transport, or site of passage of a meaning, and of a meaning that is one," Stillman's ideal, but that we may also, actively.

54Bradford's point is well taken when one realises that this translation of the poem, from Solt (91), is far more readable for someone who does not speak German than the original, which involves the repetition.
and physically, "communicate a movement, or that a tremor, a shock, a displacement of force can be communicated - that is, propagated, transmitted. It is also said that different or distant places can communicate between each other by means of a given passageway or opening" ("Signature" 309). Différance, of course, "is the name we might give to the 'active,' moving discord of different forces, and of differences of forces" (Derrida, "Différance" 18).

At this point, therefore, we can observe that Lefebvre might not be aggrieved so much by a textualisation of space but by "a literary language of texts" (Lefebvre 136), the way in which texts are spoken about, or, more pertinent, conceived. The conceptual spaces within which we theorise about signs, the spaces of Formalism and Structuralism which Lefebvre sees as reductive forces acting upon social space, are means of representing texts and textual space. In this sense, the aim of these representations is to make texts readable, constructing mental models of the text which are as abstracted a representation of the text's spatiality as they are of social space, reducing the space of the text to the terms of theoretical space. The formalist approach, in the broadest sense, cannot recognise the full extent of the spatiality of the text but can only apprehend its surface. Applying Lefebvre's concerns about the space of architecture to literature's space, it seems that the same concept of readability has deprived literary texts of a third dimension also, a third space, the lived space, social space. As Lefebvre describes it, social space is a space which "qualifies as a 'thing/not-thing', for it is neither a substantial reality nor a mental reality, it cannot be resolved into abstractions, and it consists neither in a collection of things in space nor in an aggregate of occupied places. Being neither space-as-sign nor an ensemble of signs related to space, it has an actuality other than that of the abstract signs and real things which it includes" (402). With the text reducible neither to its physical existence nor to ideal abstraction, both concrete and also abstract, not natural but reproducible, a social product, conceived of through representations of space, and sharing all this with social space, then the text must be considered spatially, as a social space, perceived and produced through spatial practice, and not simply viewed but experienced, lived, through reading.

That Lefebvre should lead us to such a reading of texts is not ultimately surprising, for his distaste for the alienation of the everyday which lies at the root of his
hostility towards an abstract textuality, also results in an optimism regarding the possibilities of literature, and especially "the creation of 'works' (likened to artworks) instead of products or commodities. These 'works' or oeuvres are an antidote to alienation" (Shields 100). As a member of a group of young philosophers calling themselves les Philosophes (including Pierre Morhange, Georges Politzer, Norbert Guterman, Georges Friedmann, Paul Nizan, and, on the fringe, Sartre), who published their own journal from 1924 to 1925, Lefebvre imagined "a new postwar world in which poetry and a new form of lived philosophy would come to the fore. . . . The central theme of this self-published journal was the idea that it is possible to create lucidly one's life as a work of art" (Shields 13). The idea embraced what might be termed youthful, certainly masculine, notions of adventure and desire, including a "hooligan style" and "absurdist gestures," but the sometimes crude actions of the group gained theoretical weight after their discovery of the work of the Dadaists and the Surrealists (Shields 30).

Les Philosophes were to become increasingly involved with the Surrealists, to the extent that they produced a joint manifesto, published in Clarté. Lefebvre himself had close relations with Tristan Tzara, one of the founders of Dadaism, and, later, would form one of the links between Surrealism and the Situationists, after Guy Debord attended his seminar group in Strasbourg. Lefebvre was drawn to Dadaism because it revealed "the potential of surprise, shock and humour for thinking of not only artistic images but of everyday life in new ways" (Shields 54). By blurring the divisions between high and low art, presenting everyday objects as works of art, and bleeding drama into life, it questioned the assumption that the function of art was as a representational tool serving society. Lefebvre also admired the Surrealists, though their aim was to transcend rather than remove alienation, in a process so individualistic as to leave little room for the social. Both movements, however, declared in some form the Philosophes' belief that "self-definition could only be found through action and self-expression" (Shields 32).

For Lefebvre, this process of self-definition was most fully realised in what he termed moments of presence, which we would "categorise as 'authentic' moments that break through the dulling monotony of the 'taken for granted'" (Shields 58). On a larger, societal level, such moments might express themselves in festive events, as

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55Lefebvre wrote only a few books on literature alone, Rabelais, Musset, Pignon, and Contribution à l'esthetique.
outbreakings of an adventurous and revolutionary spirit contributing to "the eternal Festival and the creation of situations" (Lefebvre qtd. in Shields 92). Though Lefebvre was never able to fully present his theory of moments, Shields suggests that he viewed them as "creating a link between the body and consciousness," and as "having a concrete existence . . . a certain tangible quality" (59). Moreover, these moments take form, for they are "themselves essential forms in which everyday contents are arranged in recognisable patterns" (Shields 60), but these patterns are always part of a larger design, and the moments just glimpses of a larger whole. "Partial totalities," says Lefebvre, "I see them as 'points of view' reflecting totality" (qtd. in Shields 60).

As such, Lefebvre's moments recall those points in Kepler where the astronomer is given a glimpse of greater truths through those coincidences which act as windows on the realities of his world, like "a pin-hole in the surface of a familiar world, through which, if only he could find the right way to apply his eye, he might glimpse enormities" (Banville 174). Moreover, these moments of presence act within our experience of the everyday just like points of repetition on the textual line, for they disturb and "puncture the 'everydayness' or banality of repetitive tasks like a ray of sunshine through clouds" (Shields 60-61). We would argue, of course, that the repetitiveness of the routine which numbs our experience of life should be mapped on to the uninterrupted line of the text, for the repetitions in the line which divert us from our preordained course are anything but routine, instead disrupting our placid progress through the text. As moments in the text, they draw our attention to our own presence and participation in the text in a way which, Lefebvre would insist, is not uniquely individual, but "may link us to others' experiences at other times and in other places" (Shields 62).

That we can make such a connection between textual repetitions and Lefebvre's spontaneous moments of renewal is supported by the similarities between the spatialising practices we have been describing, and those of the Dadaist poets who "fragmented the structures that perpetuated the trivialisation of the lives of the people" by, as Kermode would say, their disruption of a sense of an ending (Shields 57).

56The Situationists themselves, however, criticised Lefebvre's theory of moments, arguing that Festivals could too easily become State-sponsored spectacles, producing false moments. They also felt that his theory remained too abstract, mixing "existential experience with essentialist concepts of, for example, 'love'" (Shields 104).
Kermode is critical of a randomly determined fragmentation of the sort practised by
William Burroughs, whose aim was "to produce the accident of spontaneity" (Burroughs
qtd. in Kermode, Sense of an Ending 118) in order to not only undermine the narrative
line but, argues Kermode, "to defeat our codes of continuity, cultural and temporal"
(Sense of an Ending 117). For Kermode, pure disjunction or "the absolutely New is
simply unintelligible" and the noise of the randomly assembled text is only ever
welcome when we hear in it an echo of "our inherited notions of linguistic and narrative
structure" (Sense of an Ending 116, 118). This he finds in the work of the Dadaists, for,
though their call was for "abolition, spontaneity in a tottering world . . . Art, something
old, animated it" (Sense of an Ending 120). This accords with Lefebvre's
understanding of moments, for they do not represent a break from the everyday, but
rather emerge as part of it, for, "while everyday life is colonised . . . Lefebvre maintains
that everyday life is also the site of the authentic experience of self, of the body and of
engagement with others" (Shields 77). The everyday includes "the different rhythms of
the life-cycle, expressed in family life" which can free it from "the regulatory
framework of linear time," just as the textual line contains those very repetitions which
will disrupt and divert it (Shields 95). Moreover, there are also similarities to be found
between those oeuvres wherein there is always the potential for moments for presence,
and those spatial forms produced by the disorderings in the textual line (Shields 95). As
Shields argues, the oeuvre is "characterised by formal simultaneity where all the parts
refer to the whole and vice versa. The importance of the oeuvre is its character of being
a totality, an indivisible whole, from which something is always lost if it is separated
into component parts" (101). Each of these concepts, therefore, of the everyday, of the
oeuvre, and of the moment, which are central to Lefebvre's lived philosophy, and to
lived space, can be related to our own experience of textual space. The next section
looks more closely at these relations, focusing especially on how the text is a space
which is lived.

57 Agamben, too, compares those festivals which "interrupt the homogeneity of profane time" to the work
of art in which "the continuum of linear time is broken, and man recovers, between past and future, his
present space" ("Original Structure" 101, 102).
58 Barthes shows how Sollers, too, calls for a "genuine spontaneity" (Sollers qtd. in Barthes, Sollers 55)
which is "not linked to a disorder of the words" and "does not consist in paying no attention to language"
(these practices are "the height of convention") (Barthes, Sollers 55n, 56n). Instead, Barthes says,
Sollers's search for spontaneity is "an almost utopian . . . quest for an a-language, a fully corporeal one,
fully alive" (Sollers 55-56n).
"But what is a writer doing when he writes?" asks Blanchot. "Everything a man does when he works, but to an outstanding degree. The writer, too, produces something - a work in the highest sense of the word. He produces this work by transforming natural and human realities. When he writes, his starting point is a certain state of language, a certain form of culture, certain books, and also certain objective elements - ink, paper, printing presses" ("Literature" 371). Blanchot's vocabulary here, as he describes the production of his literary space, defined by Clark, echoing Soja, as a "third space" between mimetologism and "literarity' in the sense first isolated by the formalists" (76), reflects remarkably Lefebvre's as he speaks of that other element in the production of social space, "the 'mixed' space - still natural yet already produced - of . . . poetry and art. The space, in a word, of representations: representational space" (Lefebvre 203). Representational space is a dominated space, for our capitalist society privileges representations of space, conceived space, over this lived space. Yet, these representational spaces, also known as spaces of representation, are central to any development of a textual spatiality along Lefebvrean lines, for at the basis of representational space lies absolute space, that pre-capitalistic space which Lefebvre relates to the space of language, asking, "Is this perhaps the space of speech? Both imaginary and real" (251). Lefebvre says of representational space that it is the space of "'inhabitants' and 'users',' and it includes the space of "some artists and perhaps of those, such as a few writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than describe" (39). Later, Lefebvre speaks of societies, such as the Chavin of the Peruvian Andes, whose "representational space appears in their art works, writing-systems, fabrics and so on" (43). All this suggests that Lefebvre did not reject the possibility of textual representational space, "space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols" (Lefebvre 39).

For an impression of how this space might work, we can look to Lefebvre's discussion of the theatrical space, which, like the "imaginary and real" space of language (Lefebvre 251), involves an "interplay between fictitious and real

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59 Notably, it is one of Lefebvre's strongest convictions "that signifying processes (a signifying practice) occur in a space which cannot be reduced either to an everyday discourse or to a literary language of texts" (Lefebvre 136), recalling the resistance to naturalisation which Bradford and Frank see in their visual and spatial forms respectively.
counterparts" (Lefebvre 188). Lefebvre says that, as a result of this interplay, "bodies are able to pass from a 'real', immediately experienced space (the pit, the stage) to a perceived space - a third space which is no longer either scenic or public. At once fictitious and real, this third space is classical theatrical space" (188). This theatrical space which is both fictitious and also real, lying beyond the stage and yet not crossing into fantasy, parallels the textual space which is more than the physical book, though always grounded in it, the space of the text a staging area for all that might be possible, though, we should say, within limits. Of theatrical space, Lefebvre also says:

To the question of whether such a space is a representation of space or a representational space, the answer must be neither - and both. Theatrical space certainly implies a representation of space - scenic space - corresponding to a particular conception of space (that of the classical drama, say . . .). The representational space, mediated yet directly experienced, which infuses the work and the moment, is established as such through the dramatic action itself. (188)

For Lefebvre, theatrical space is a particularly social space, and he speaks of how a "Greek theatre presupposes tragedy and comedy, and by extension the presence of the city's people and their allegiance to their heroes and gods" (222).

We might ask if there is action, or an action, in the text which establishes it as a representational space. We must already know that we cannot mean the action recounted in the narrative alone, for this would return us to the world of the text, to the scenic space. We could reconsider the actions involved in reading; taking the book from the shelf, opening it, turning the pages, scanning the lines, the eyes skipping from one line to the next. Or we could imagine the actions of the writer, if we knew what it was to write, though sometimes, as Butor described, the writer at least guides us in our reading, in the judged line-ends of the poem, aiding comprehension and articulation. In prose, he spoke of the strophe, the perfect page, but this is a poetic division also. As Lowell writes, "The unit in vers libre is not the foot, the number of syllables, the quantity, or the line. The unit is the strophe, which may be the whole poem, or may be only a part. Each strophe is a complete circle," and, then, she reminds us, "In fact, the meaning of the Greek word 'strophe' is simply that part of the poem which was recited while the chorus were making a turn around the altar set up in the centre of the theatre. The simile of the circle is more than a circle, therefore; it is a fact" (Lowell 139).
Immediately we have the idea of the construction of the text rooted in the action of a body performing onstage. This seems to reverse the normal order. Dramatic works, obviously, inform the actor's movements onstage, their words and intonation, and there are examples, such as the aforementioned Beat movement and especially performance poets, where this sense of the text as a limiter of movements has a far more literal sense. For poets such as David Antin, who extends "the prepared text, through theater and ritual" (Hoover, Introduction xxxvii), poetry becomes something which requires a performance space, and though in Antin's case the text is secondary to the performance, it is the catalyst for what will ultimately be the poem. Others, however, use the text to form the performance space, and to guide the performer. Jackson Mac Low's series of poems *The Pronouns* involves a set of cards "on which there are groups of words and action phrases around which dancers build spontaneous improvisations.' Due to a 'correspondence of format to syntax, each verse line, *including its indented continuation*, if any, is to be read as one breath unit.' Thus the series of poems not only stands as script for the dance, but also provides its own instructions for oral performance" (Hoover, Introduction xxxiv).

As Lowell implies, however, just as the body can be shaped by a text, so text can be formed by the body. A close relationship between the body and the text is evident in the work of Charles Olson, for example, in the way he saw the length of the poet's breath determine the length of line, the natural rhythms of the body being reflected in the rhythms of the poetry. Olson did not see the text just as a score for its own performance but also as a record of its own production, "a graph of the process through which it was produced" (Baym et al. 2422), or, as Bradford puts it, "the line is a record, an indication of the perceptual, mental and spoken process that brought it into existence" (148). For Olson also, the text is a space, a field "where all the syllables and all the lines must be managed in their relations to each other," a field wherein these elements "(the syllable, the line, as well as the image, the sound, the sense) must be taken up as participants in the kinetic of the poem just as solidly as we are accustomed to take what we call the objects of reality; and that these elements are to be seen as creating the tensions of a poem just as totally as do those other objects create what we know as the world" (Olson 616-17). Rather than seeing the poem as a text requiring a performance space, it becomes possible to see the text as a performance space in itself,
where the writer has recorded the process of writing and where the reader now re-experiences this process by contact with the rhythms, tensions and relations of the text.  

Olson can be said to have "reconnected poetry with the body" so that "the line becomes an extension of the body itself" (Hoover, Postmodern 3, Introduction xxxii), but Ginsberg sees the same occurring in prose also: "There is a tradition of prose in America, including Thomas Wolfe and going through Kerouac, which is personal, in which the prose sentence is completely personal, comes from the writer's own person - his person defined as his body, his breathing rhythm, and his actual talk" (qtd. in Hoover, Postmodern 130). If textual space ever seemed like a purely static configuration, such an understanding of the basis of its production results in a far more vital space, related to lines of movement, voices in dialogue, the rhythm of bodies. Nor should we think that the body is present only in those texts which, like Olson's, make an effort to visually affect the text in accordance with the motions of the writer. An absence of line-ends, or of italics, or missing lines does not mean the breath is absent from the text for, as Derrida and Hillis Miller show, the very words we use to name writing can be traced back to the body which writes, for "writing is named by the involuntary sound in the throat caused by the bodily effort required to do it," the guh sound (Ariadne's Thread 10). Sollers, for example, recorded his unpunctuated text Paradis on tape, "restoring, by the way he read the stream-of-consciousness sentences, the punctuation so disconcertingly absent from the printed line" (Thody 13), and Barthes, quizzing himself on why Sollers should write without punctuation, says also that "you restore the punctuation, by the way you read it to yourself or by saying it out loud," with the lack of punctuation producing, perhaps, "a new rhythm, a new tempo" in the reader (Sollers 35).

That the word 'rhythm' should itself punctuate the descriptions of the production of these texts is significant, because rhythm implies again a sense of repetitive elements, now more explicitly placed on a temporal line, but resulting in the same interruptions and breaks. As Agamben writes, "rhythm . . . appears to introduce into this eternal flow [of time] a split and a stop. . . . We perceive a stop in time, as though we were

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60For Bradford, however, Olson's space is ultimately a disappointing one, "not designed to set up for the reader a complex interplay between metaphor and metonymy. Indeed it is not designed at all; it is, in the most literal sense, a sequential recording of the unresolved possibilities and indecisions that occur at the interface between impressions and language" (149). Perhaps Olson shared the opinion of the Beat poets, that writing "could no more be revised than the act / of walking across a room" (Hoover xxix-xxx).
suddenly thrown into a more original time" ("Original Structure" 99). Rhythm includes a more obviously spatial dimension too, however, which is perhaps less familiar. Mitchell points out that we "generally suppose that this term applies literally to temporal phenomena such as speech and music and is a mere metaphor when used in discussions of sculpture, painting, or architecture" (548). Recent studies into the etymology of the Greek *rhythmos*, however, show that it "was based . . . in the physical act of drawing, inscribing, and engraving and was used to mean something like 'form,' 'shape,' or 'pattern'" (Mitchell 548). J. J. Pollitt suggests of "rhythmoses" that:

[they] were originally the 'positions' that the human body was made to assume in the course of a dance, in other words the patterns or *schemata* that the body made. In the course of a dance certain patterns or positions, like the raising or lowering of a foot, were naturally repeated, thus marking intervals in the dance. Since music and singing were synchronized with dancing, the recurrent positions taken by the dancer in the course of his movements also marked distinct intervals in the music. . . . This explains why the basic component of music and poetry was called a 'foot.' (qtd. in Mitchell 548-49)

Dance, therefore, exhibits a rhythm which is both linear and cyclical with its continuous movement in space and time, and the repetition of patterns and positions. For Lefebvre, rhythm implies exactly this unity of the linear and cyclical, and "the way in which rhythms may be said to embrace both cyclical and linear is illustrated by music, where the measure and the beat are linear in character, while motifs, melody and particularly harmony are cyclical" (206).62 In the same way, a text combines the linearity of the narrative with the cyclical return to themes, motifs, images, symbols, characters, places, and words, reflecting as it does the rhythms of the body. Lefebvre always draws attention to the close connection between the body and rhythm, "for the body indeed

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61Kermode, for example, speaks of the "plot which depends on those subtle repetitions which E. M. Forster calls 'rhythms'" (Sense of an Ending 55).
62Lefebvre's *The Production of Space* has been referred to variably as "dense," "vital" (Dear 489, 494), "challenging," "rambling," "illuminating," "frustrating" (Sayer 459), "impenetrable," "intimidating" (Warf 112), "rich," and "suggestive" (Stewart 617), while, in his review, Molotch complains that, "Lefebvre wrote densely, with . . . disorganised development of content" (893), and though the book begins with the coherence and structure of the "Plan of the Present Work," the plan dissolves in the sections that follow. Soja's explanation is that "Lefebvre wrote *The Production of Space* in the form of a fugue, a polyphonic composition based on distinct themes which are harmonized through counterpoint and introduced over and over again in different ways through the use of various contrapuntal devices" (Thirdspace 58).
unites cyclical and linear, combining the cycles of time, need and desire with the linearities of gesture, perambulation, prehension and the manipulation of things" (203). Ultimately, it is "through the mediation of rhythms [that] ... an animated space comes into being which is an extension of the space of bodies" (Lefebvre 207). Though they are aligned more directly to the world of the text, it is no coincidence that natural rhythms play such a significant part in the texts we have discussed: the steps in City of Glass, night and day in both City of Glass and The Park, sleeping and waking in Kepler, and the beating heart at the centre of that book. For Agamben, rhythm becomes "the principle of presence that opens and maintains the work of art in its original space" ("Original Structure" 98).

Now, space itself becomes the record of rhythms, for "space is nothing but the inscription of time in the world, spaces are the realisations, inscriptions in the simultaneity of the external world of a series of times, the rhythms of the city, the rhythms of the urban population" (Lefebvre qtd. in Shields 156). We witnessed this in our analysis of Stillman's textual space, formed by a sequence of steps which inscribe his message in an urban world. This sense of the text as a space produced by the body, and as a record of the rhythms of the body, is always present in the work of Auster. Before any word, he writes, "finds its way to the page it must first have been part of the body, a physical presence that one has lived with in the same way one lives with one's heart, one's stomach, and one's brain" (Invention of Solitude 138). Of Beckett, he writes, "the prose of Mercier and Camier moves along at a walking pace ... buried deep within the words, a silent metronome is beating out the rhythms of Mercier and Camier's perambulations" ("From Cakes to Stones" 85). And in an earlier essay, "The Art of Hunger," writing of "an art that is indistinguishable from the life of the artist who makes it ... an art that is the direct expression of the effort to express it," he brings space, the textual network, and the body together in one brief phrase, "the city is a labyrinth of hunger" (9, 18). Here, it is a cycle of need which governs the text, for the man who would be a writer "must eat in order to write. But if he does not write, he will

63Imhof also argues that Part IV of Kepler, named for Kepler's Harmonice Mundi (where he describes that "harmony is form" (Banville 182)) is "suggestive of a compositional strategy known in music as retrograde canon ... / in which the imitating voice gives out the theme not as the first voice gave it but with the notes in reverse order" (Imhof 136-7).
64Edmond Jabès, whose work has influenced Derrida, and whom Auster has translated, speaks in an interview with Auster of how "a writer works with his body. You live with your body, and the book is above all the book of your body" (Auster, "Book of the Dead" 198). "The book," he says, "has become my true place ... practically my only place" (Auster, "Book of the Dead" 194).
not eat. And if he cannot eat, he cannot write. He cannot write" (Auster, "Art of Hunger" 9). The labyrinth, too, the textual network with its diversions and hesitations, has as its source the body. Auster writes:

But just as one step will inevitably lead to the next step, so it is that one thought inevitably follows from the previous thought, and in the event that a thought should engender more than a single thought . . . it will be necessary not only to follow the first thought to its conclusion, but also to backtrack to the original position of that thought in order to follow the second thought to its conclusion . . . and in this way, if we were to try to make an image of this process in our minds, a network of paths begins to be drawn, as in the image of the human bloodstream . . . or as in the image of a map . . . so that what we are really doing when we walk through a city is thinking. (Invention of Solitude 122)

The theme is taken up again in a short review, notably entitled "New York Babel," of Le Schizo et les Langues by Louis Wolfson, a schizophrenic who could not bear to hear or speak the English language, his hatred of his mother translating itself into an hatred of his mother tongue. In order to escape contact with English and "drawing on the several languages he has studied, he becomes able to transform English words into phonetic combinations of foreign letters, syllables, and words that form new linguistic entities, which not only resemble the English in meaning, but in sound as well" (Auster, "Babel" 121). In this way, the sentence "Don't trip over the wire!" becomes "Tu'ńicht tréb über eth hé zwirn," a combination of German, French, and Hebrew. This metamorphosis of the English language has an equally transformative effect on the world around him; "By looking out on his world through a different lens, by punning his world - which is immured in English - into a different language, he is able to see it with new eyes, in a way that is less oppressive to him, as if, to some slight degree, he were able to have an effect upon it" (Auster, "Babel" 122).

Auster later connects this phobia with Wolfson's fear of food, tracing this link between speaking and eating back to Adam, who named the creatures in the Garden of Eden but was then expelled for eating of the Tree of Knowledge. We have already seen how Stillman interprets this expulsion as meaning also "a fall of language" (City 47), that point of which language was severed from reality. It is to redeem this fall that he walks around New York, collecting items that are broken and shattered, renaming them
and, at the same time, writing the word THE TOWER OF BABEL across the city. This act of writing by walking and Wolfson's act of speaking by translation both strive to avoid speaking a broken English language. Moreover, it seems possible to expand this motif to include Quinn himself, whose fondness for his own Max Work character suggests that he would sympathise with the aims of Stillman's quest. If, as Norma Rowen suggests, "we remember that one school of thought adhered to the theory that the prelapsarian language was preverbal, a language of signs" (229. See also Malmgren192), then Quinn himself, perhaps unknowingly, partakes in Stillman's search by writing for the most part in his red notebook with a ballpoint pen bought from a deaf mute, a flag attached to the pen showing the hand positions for each of the twenty-six letters and urging the user to "LEARN TO SPEAK TO YOUR FRIENDS" (Auster, City 52).

When Quinn finally fails in his investigation, he recreates the circumstances of Stillman's first experiment to use his son to access the prelapsarian language, for Quinn "ensconces himself in a room in the now-deserted Stillman apartment and reproduces almost exactly the conditions of Peter's childhood incarceration" (Rowen 231). The room, as a contained space, contrasts, for Auster, with the city as a place of writing. We saw, in the previous chapter, in the hesitant and measured progress of Stillman's writing, the dangers posed by the labyrinthine paths of the city. There is always, as Ricardou warns, the chance of getting lost. Describing in The Invention of Solitude the difficulties he encounters in writing about his father, Auster admits that "I have a sense of trying to go somewhere, as if I knew what I wanted to say, but the farther I go the more certain I am that the path towards my object does not exist. I have to invent the road with each step, and this means that I can never be sure of where I am. A feeling of moving around in circles, of perpetual back-tracking, of going off in many directions at once" (32). Later, he says "his steps, by taking him nowhere, were taking him nowhere but into himself. He was wandering inside himself, and he was lost" (87). Rowen sees the same thing happening to Quinn, for "his wide divagations through the labyrinth of New York only bring him back to the inner world that he has been so assiduously avoiding" (227). Quinn's final destination, the room in the apartment in the city of New York, is the place "in which his inner reality might be expressed" (Rowen 226), the site of his truest writing. For Auster, too, the room, the physical location, becomes the place
He is "impossibly restless," then "he returns to his room. . . . He writes . . . then he goes out to eat his dinner" (35, 75). "It begins, therefore, with this room," because only in this room is the body directed towards writing, not tempted to wander (Auster, Invention of Solitude 80). Quinn also considers "getting up and going to another room, but then he realized that he was quite happy where he was" (Auster, City 127). There is no need for him to leave because, when he wakes up, there is always food for him in the room, and he has the red notebook to write in.

Once contained, the body becomes the site of writing, and, as a writing body, makes its site, the room that holds it, a place for writing. In the end, after writing in solitude for some time, Quinn "felt that his words had been severed from him, that now they were a part of the world at large, as real and specific as a stone, or a lake, or a flower. . . . He remembered the infinite kindness of the world and all the people he had ever loved" (130-31). "Here," says Rowen, "are words that turn into things, images of such force and clarity that they seem able to take their place in the world of objects, to become matter," and so, she asks, "Has Quinn found the prelapsarian tongue?" (232, 231).

In his room, however, writing, Auster is like the character S. in his room, where the "walls were like the skin of some second body around him, as if his own body had been transformed into a mind, a breathing instrument of pure thought" (Invention of Solitude 89). With the room centred on the body, and the body centred on its writing, the writing becomes all that there is in the room, it fills it, and expands beyond it, like "a skull that encloses the room in which a body sits," because this space is now a space of writing (Auster, Invention of Solitude 88). So it is that Auster remembers standing in Emily Dickinson's room and "thinking of the seventeen hundred poems that were written there, trying to see them as part of these four walls, and yet failing to do so. For if words are a way of being in the world, he thought, then even if there were no world to enter, the world was already there, in that room, which meant it was the room that was present in the poems and not the reverse" (Invention of Solitude 123).

Even before he has entered that room in Stillman's apartment, Quinn has become another link in a chain of characters for whom speech has become not simply "a

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65 Charles Tomlinson "reminds us that the word 'stanza' once meant literally 'a room', a space within which we can move, but with limitations" (Bradford 167). Agamben observes also that in courtly lyric poetry "the anatomy of the body of love has a strict correlate in the poem's metrical structure," as seen in the "anatomical metaphors that proliferate in metrical terminology (the stanza's 'feet,' 'face,' and 'tail')" ("Corn" 28). The room, here, as an extension of the body, comes to form a second skin, so that Agamben
strangeness, an anomaly, a biologically secondary function of the mouth" (Auster, "New York Babel" 124) but is instead something situated in the world, something achievable through walking or signing, through a manipulation of the physical body in reality which renames that reality, recasts it through its revealed textuality. As "a way of being in the world," words become now an extension of reality, reconnected to it or embedded in it, a second skin for the body. Each of the stories in The New York Trilogy presents a variation on this theme, where a written biography stands for a man, or to be written about is to be changed. In Ghosts a writer called Black hires a detective called Blue to observe, trail, and report on him "to prove he's alive" (Ghosts 181). In The Locked Room the narrator becomes the literary executor of his old friend Fanshawe, carrying the load of unpublished manuscripts away from the apartment Fanshawe shared with his wife in two large suitcases which "together . . . were as heavy as a man" (The Locked Room 208). Later, when the narrator attempts to write a biography of Fanshawe, he can inevitably see the book only as "a work of fiction" and yet Fanshawe's wife Sophie, now the narrator's wife, urges him to stop, saying "Your [sic] bringing him back to life" (The Locked Room 246, 285).66

For Quinn, therefore, his situation in the room may hold more meaning than he perhaps at first realises. When we look to his place in the text, we will find that it seems possible to isolate him from all that might be considered real, possible to separate him from everything around him. His wife and child are dead; through the pseudonym William Wilson, he presents himself to the world as a writer (he is tempted, but fails, to introduce himself as Wilson to a young woman at the train station when he sees her reading one of his novels, while, in the same way, the woman who has moved into his apartment knows only that a writer, William Wilson, lived there); he has a literary agent whom he never meets; increasingly withdrawn, he lives vicariously in the world through the character of the private eye Max Work; when he finally plays the part of the detective himself, the identity he must adopt is Paul Auster's; Virginia and Peter Stillman Jr. disappear, while Peter Stillman Sr. commits suicide, and the few others that Quinn encounters include a deaf mute and a counterman "whose name he did not know" (Auster, City 37). Even in The Locked Room, the man originally hired to find can describe the "capacious storehouse or receptacle" of the stanza (Dante qtd. in Agamben, "Corn" 35) as the "formal womb of the stanza" ("Corn" 36).
Fanshawe, a man named Quinn, is said to have disappeared. The only characters who encounter Quinn and remain are Paul Auster, his wife, and their son Daniel. It seems that the reader would do well to heed the initial recommendation that, "As for Quinn, there is little that need detain us. Who he was, where he came from, and what he did are of no great importance" (Auster, City 3). All that remains of him in the end, all his remains are, is the red notebook in which he keeps his notes on Stillman, and which, in conjunction with the character Paul Auster's witness, allows the unnamed narrator to tell Quinn's story.

The possibility arises, therefore, that the perceived author of the red notebook, the core of the story, is himself unreal. In fact, City of Glass contains at least three other embedded narratives with fictitious authors. The first of these is the collected Max Work novels, written by William Wilson. The second is Henry Dark's The New Babel which is summarised in Stillman's The Garden and the Tower: Early Visions of the New World, itself paraphrased in Quinn's notebook, though of course "there never was any such person as Henry Dark" (Auster, City 80). The third is, peculiarly, Cervantes' Don Quixote which Cervantes claims was written in Arabic by Cid Hamete Benengeli and which Paul Auster claims was translated back into Spanish by Don Quixote himself. Quinn's fictitiousness would explain a number of things; the detail of the narrative; the disparity between the content of the narrative and what is quoted directly from the red notebook, supposedly the narrative's source; the impossibility though actuality of the narrative reporting Quinn's dreams "which he later forgot" (Auster, City 9, 106). But this is not to say that Quinn does not exist. When he writes the initials DQ (for Daniel Quinn, but also for Don Quixote) on the first page of the red notebook, which "was the first time in more than five years that he had put his own name in one of his notebooks" (Auster, City 39), he inscribes within the text his own adherence to the text, and places himself in the textual network of Auster's New York.

If his words are "a way of being in the world," therefore, it is not because, as Stillman would have hoped, he had "come up with the correct text of reality" (Rowen 232), but because "materializing the signs, the notebook creates them" (Malmgren 197). The named notebook is a record of a reading of a text which remarks on the textuality of the world it produces, so that, reading and re-writing Stillman's message, Quinn reads

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60Barone points out also that Marco Stanley Fogg, from Auster's Moon Palace, "delights that his initials stand for manuscript," so that "Marco Stanley Fogg - MS - may be a life as work-in-progress"
the true nature of his textual existence, and writes himself into the world. "Language is not truth," writes Auster, "It is the way we exist in the world" (Invention of Solitude 161), so what Quinn achieves is not a true representation of space, but rather a space of representation, a directly lived textual space produced by the body of text. "In his heart," writes Auster, "he realized that Max Work was dead" (City 127), while Malmgren comments, "Quinn tried to pretend to be a Work, but he was condemned to be a Text" (197). Bound as he is to the text, Quinn's end coincides "with the dwindling of pages in the red notebook," but it is not as if he has accomplished nothing (Auster, City 130).67 "Quinn's contact with the pure prelapsarian word has been partial, momentary, and personal. He was granted only a series of glimpses," writes Rowan, but "in giving utterance to these glimpses, however, Quinn again laid hold on his vocation as a poet" (232). In the representational space of his text, therefore, Quinn achieves a Lefebvrean moment, an authentic experience of his place in the world.

If, at the end of the last chapter, we had wondered whether textual space could be related to any other form of spatiality, in this chapter that space has emerged as a lived space, an extension of our social reality. As a social product, formed by economical, technological, social, and spatial practices, we have seen how it can be employed as a representation of space or can emerge itself as a representational space, within which we might even gain an authentic experience of ourselves in a society where we are often alienated from all that we are. But this is not to say that textual space, as a representational space, is simply where we are free to be ourselves, or released from social constraints. Quinn, for example, though the author of the red notebook, is a reader also, of Stillman's words, and is also authored, inscribed in, and limited by, his text, asking, "What will happen when there are no more pages in the red notebook?" (Auster, City 131). The room enveloped by the text which is produced by the body, nevertheless remains the room which contains the body, holding it. Lefebvre reminds us that "Activity in space is restricted by that space; space 'decides' what activity may occur, but even this 'decision' has limits placed upon it. . . . Space commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes and distances to be covered. It is produced with this purpose in mind" (143). If this chapter, therefore, was

(Exposition 5. See also Kirkegaard 177).

67Quinn is not alone in experiencing this textual expiration. Stillman's own death was "all over the papers," and Quinn knew that Virginia Stillman was gone too when "the line went dead" (Auster, City 122, 123).
concerned with the production of the textual space, then the next chapter is about its consumption. Its focus throughout will be on the experience of the one who enters the space of the text to face its commands and demands, the experience of the reader.
III
READING THE SPACE OF LITERATURE
As we arrive in this third chapter, textual space has emerged as a social space brought to life by the rhythms of the body at its heart. Throughout, however, we have seen the playfulness of text and body held in tension with the limits imposed upon them by their very inclusion in society, and by the physical, temporal, and even biological realities of their being. Now, we will consider how the resulting space affects those who are invited to experience it, the readers who enter a text in the presumed hope that they will get something out of it. We will especially try to understand how the reader might respond to the particular difficulties posed by the space of textuality, the sort of difficulties implied by the arguments of those who resist any attempt to describe the text in terms of space at all.

Some pages ago, for example, in a discussion of Philip Stevick's theory of chapters, it was briefly noted that one of the implications of his analysis seemed to be that the scale of a textual space might far surpass our ability to comprehend that space, to take it in. Similar concerns seem to be at work in Bradford's visual form, which focuses on that part of the text immediately perceptible to the eye of the reader, and also emerge in the course of Butor's discussion of the book as object where he argues that the aim of the evolving forms of textual records was "to make the largest possible section of [the text] legible at one time" ("Object" 40). The suggestion is that what is out of sight is out of mind, and that a partial grasp of the text, in a sense that is almost purely physical, will result in a partial understanding also. As Percy Lubbock describes it, "Nothing, no power, will keep a book steady and motionless before us, so that we may have time to examine its shape and design. As quickly as we read, it melts and shifts in the memory; even at the moment when the last page is turned, a great part of the book, its finer detail, is already vague and doubtful" (qtd. in Stevick 174). These comments seem to recall the words of Quinn, the reader to Stillman's writer in Auster's City of Glass, who, in a passage immediately following his discovery of the letters, alerts us to one of the problems facing his reading: "Stillman had not left his message anywhere. True, he had created the letters by the movement of his steps, but they had not been written down. It was like drawing a picture in the air with your finger. The image vanishes as you are making it. There is no result, no trace to mark what you have done" (Auster, City 71).

These observations echo some of the strongest criticisms faced by Frank when he first proposed his concept of spatial form. Frank had always argued that spatial form
required the reader "to suspend the process of individual reference temporarily until the entire pattern of internal references can be apprehended as a unity" ("Spatial Form" 13), an apprehension which sees all parts of the text existing in their relation to one another simultaneously. Walter Sutton asks simply, "How can the idea of the image as an instantaneously-apprehended phenomenon be reconciled with the fact that the whole work, as an image, is read consecutively through the period of time?" (115) arguing that "since reading is a time-act, the spatialization of literature can never be entirely achieved" (Frank, "Years After" 207). It is for Frank to explain what happens to allow the reader "to perceive the elements of the poem as juxtaposed in space" (Frank, "Spatial Form" 10) but to Sutton's criticism that "since reading is a time-act, the achievement of spatial form is really a physical impossibility," Frank says, "I could not agree more. But this has not stopped modern writers from working out techniques to achieve the impossible - as much as possible" ("Spatial Form" 60). Frank, therefore, essentially recognises that the immediate apprehension of spatial form is impossible during the act of reading, if at all, but would say that this does not negate the form's existence. Though reading remains a linear act, tied to time, "the temporality of this act is no longer coordinated with the dominant structural elements of the text. Temporality becomes, as it were, a purely physical limit of apprehension" (Frank, "Years After" 207). It is as if, in reading spatial form, we must "measure what has ceased to exist" (Ricoeur 17).

It is hardly an insignificant admission to say that the space of the text, this social space, might be, in part, inaccessible, out of our reach. Yet, this chapter will argue that a spatial awareness is absolutely necessary in reading a text, but, perhaps more significantly, that an understanding of the spatiality of the text informs our understanding of reading itself. In this, we side with Foust's argument that "What criticism has not stressed is that spatial form is primarily a theory of perception that focuses on the reading process. Its prime rule - similar to both phenomenology's

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68 Cary Nelson says, "Pure spatiality is a condition toward which literature aspires, but which it never achieves" (3).
69 Mitchell says of Leibniz's definition of space as an order of coexistent data, that "nothing in the definition requires that this simultaneity be directly experienced" (Mitchell 544). Also Lessing's description of the way an object is viewed through language actually has many similarities with Frank's description of the way temporality limits the apprehension of spatial form: "The coexistence of the body comes into collision with the sequence of the words, and although while the former is getting resolved into the latter, the dismemberment of the whole into its parts is a help to us, yet the reunion of these parts into a whole is made extremely difficult, and not infrequently impossible" (106).
'empathy' and Structuralism's 'dissection/articulation' - is that the reader must engage the text on its own terms in a strenuously participatory reading that attempts to re-create the experience embodied in it" (199).

If this chapter has to do with the act of reading and how it relates to the nature of textual space, the first difficulty is that reading, that common and habitual act, is, as Tzvetan Todorov, notes, "hard to observe" (46). When he says this, we know that he does not mean that we cannot observe that part of the reading process which is physically manifested through the actions of the reader, through the reading aloud of the text itself, through the movement of the eyes over the text, or across and gradually down the page, through the turning of the pages, or the scrolling down of the screen, and perhaps even through the studious and attentive demeanour of the reader, seated or standing or lying down. Instead, we understand that the act of reading involves also an unseen, internal process involving the comprehension of the meaning of the signs being read, and the emergence of an understanding of the text in its entirety.

To observe even ourselves reading in this way is difficult, requiring some private inner eye to tail us through the text, always one step behind, paying more attention to the reading than to what is being read, as if the act of reading was an autonomous process applied equally to various passive objects. This is at least how we might imagine it happening but, as Todorov says, "introspection is uncertain" (46), leaving us to seek our subject elsewhere. One alternative is to look to the accounts of others of their reading, or else, more obliquely, we might look not to the act of reading itself, but to the evidence of that reading, to the essay, article, or other writings which come as a result of, or as a response to, that reading, as if we were detectives who might reconstruct the scene of the crime from the remaining traces of the passage of events. A better alternative, placing us contemporaneous to the act of reading itself, is to study a representation of the act of reading, the act of reading as it appears in text.

This is not a rare appearance, Todorov arguing that "reading . . . (inevitably) becomes one of the themes of the book," at least in those texts where reading can be understood as "the construction of an imaginary universe," that is, in those texts which might be described as representational (46, 39). The characters of such texts must comprehend their own universe, must come to an understanding of their place in the scheme of things, and perceive their relation to the elements of the world around them. This world is, as we saw in the first chapter, necessarily the effect of text, for "What
exists, first of all, is the text, and nothing else," so that the character's response to the
world as they see it might be said to mirror the reader's response to the text of this world
(Todorov 39). In this way, they must read their own environment even as we read to
understand them; they are "rigorously parallel to the reader who constructs the
imaginary universe on the basis of his own information" (Todorov 46).

It was exactly this close mirroring of construction in the world and space of the
text which led Frank to identify, in his discussion of Ulysses, that latent spatiality which
we have seen more fully realised in the more structured forms of, for example, Kepler.
But Kepler, too, provides us, in the figure of Kepler, with a model reader, but one who
is concerned not only with his relations to the world around him, but with the mysteries
surrounding the world itself. And it is in those who confront mysteries that we find
some of our greatest readers, as in detective fiction, for example, which, as Peter Hühn
writes, "seems to be unique among narrative genres in that it thematizes narrativity itself
as a problem, a procedure, and an achievement" (451). As a result, and as we have seen
with Quinn, "in the method he applies to the puzzling text that confronts him, the
detective is indeed a kind of exemplary reader, correctly interpreting ambiguous or
misleading signs" (Sorapure 71. See also Holquist and Spanos, "The
Detective").

Following Quinn's tale in City of Glass, following him as he follows Stillman, allows us
to become readers of his reading, perhaps not quite reading with him but keeping
abreast with him in his pursuit of Stillman, close enough to observe in detail the
methods of his reading, and to learn of the difficulties the role of reader holds. In the
next section, therefore, he will be our shadow and our guide as, in an attempt to read a
reading of a space, we enter another textual city with a reader at its heart, Kazuo
Ishiguro's The Unconsoled.

**Shifting spaces - Kazuo Ishiguro's The Unconsoled**

Inevitably, there are times when we encounter a text we don't fully comprehend. The
book itself may be lengthy, if not particularly difficult to read, with a detached and
patient style which might suit its bleached world and fragile characters. The plot is not
necessarily the source of any misunderstanding, and may, in fact, seem relatively
straightforward. A renowned pianist perhaps, called Ryder, arrives at a city in crisis
somewhere in Central Europe, where, in a few days time, he will give a recital upon
which the cultural and moral future of the whole city depends. What the members of
the audience hear on that Thursday night will either restore their faith in their aesthetic
judgement, and give new impetus to their self-belief in their society as a whole, or else
will reveal to them their lost and backward nature, and the extent to which their city no
longer deserves to be considered a place of importance. Ryder, having mislaid his
schedule for the vital days preceding the concert, will bluff and brazen his way through
engagements he arrives at unprepared for, or misses altogether, always afraid to lose
face before those who idolise him, forever being diverted from his course by private
matters and encounters with people from his past.

This is a story we can follow (even this brief re-telling suggests this), but, if we
are to compare our reading to Quinn's progress, we would say that we have got only as
far as the second stage in his reading. We have, admittedly, gone further than Quinn
had on those first five days when, simply following Stillman along the path of his
letters, he reflected in his movements the actions of Stillman as writer. At this stage, we
can no more say that Quinn is a reader than we can the person whose reading consists
only of the directly observable layer of reading, for Quinn may shadow Stillman with a
gaze which is no more than the inattentive eyes' movement across a page, automatic and
unseeing. It is only when Quinn begins to take note of Stillman's path that he becomes a
ture reader, and our own ability to paraphrase Ishiguro's text suggests we are at a similar
stage. Yet, this reading does not necessarily mean understanding, and Quinn says of his
own notes, "'Picks up pencil in middle of block. Examines, hesitates, puts in bag'," that
"these sentences seemed utterly worthless to him" (Auster, City 65). Frank, of course,
would argue that these words mean nothing to Quinn because his experience of
Stillman's text up to this point is at odds with the form of the text itself. Quinn may
follow Stillman every step of the way, watch him and note what he is doing, but, as a
reader, at any one moment he can be at only one point in the text as he travels it from
beginning to end. For both Quinn and the reader, and Quinn as reader, each instant of
experience during reading dominates the whole, and the passage is more likely to be
remembered as one continuous event happening over a definite period of time, rather
than as a journey covering set areas of space, so that it is the narrative, the sequential,
linear and temporal nature of any story, which narrows the reader's vision,
overshadowing Frank's asserted spatial aspect. In order to make sense of Stillman's text,
Quinn must work to fulfil Frank's exhortation to perceive the elements of the text as
juxtaposed in space, and so move beyond the limitations of a temporally bound perspective.

Quinn's object all along "was to understand Stillman" and, in order to achieve this, he had "started with a limited set of facts: Stillman's background and profession, . . . a book of bizarre scholarship" (Auster, City 65). In the same way, we have access to the facts of Ishiguro's life (born in Nagasaki, Japan, 1954, and so on), and can appeal to outside sources to give their opinion on his text, agreeing that it "offers a meditation on the nature of celebrity and relations between artists and their audiences" (Svoboda par. 1), that "It's about people who built their lives on top of things that have broken, wounds that won't heal, something that went wrong very early on. They are looking for consolation in relationships, art, or career. Consolation was not to be found" (Ishiguro qtd. in Ohno par. 17). It is only right that we agree with these last words, for these are the views of the author himself, and are all the more encouraging in that they allow us to believe that, as Quinn would say, "the steps were actually to some purpose" (Auster, City 61), that this is a text which its author intends should mean something. Yet, though Ishiguro speaks with absolute authority about his novel The Unconsoled, and guides us in our reading through his insight, still the feeling is that there are things which have been left unsaid, that there must be something more.

Quinn, too, feels the inadequacy of "facts of the past [which] seemed to have no bearing on the facts of the present" (Auster, City 67) and it is at this point that he "turned to a clean page of the red notebook and sketched a little map of the area Stillman had wandered in. Then, looking carefully through his notes, he began to trace with his pen the movements Stillman had made on a single day" (Auster, City 67). Up to this point, Quinn had been unable to recognise the letters as they emerged, for, as he said, these forms left "no trace," they were not "written down." When we imagine again how Stillman's texts would appear when printed on the average page, we can see that the same problem faces all readers, for, although the letters, the spatial forms, are contained within the writing of the text, just as each step takes its place on the street pavement, they leave no trace, and we cannot see the line of relation which would divert us from the printed line, the streets in parallel where we lose ourselves.

Quinn does have certain advantages though. The first is that Stillman's steps form a spatial unity with not a single one removed from the relations which link them, as if his steps formed a text wherein each word stood in a structured relation with all the
other words in the text. Most texts, however, structure themselves on the spatial form of the line, defined by contiguous relations, making only select use of deliberate spatialisations based on the oblique lines of selection and substitution. Though most readers are, in some sense, led by the writer along the path of these lines, even as Quinn has Stillman to guide him through the long text of the streets, the dominant linearity of the printed text, as we have seen, can easily obscure the spatiality of the text. It is only when he becomes aware of the existence of the letters that Quinn removes himself from an act of linear reading, no longer following in Stillman's footsteps, forced to travel at his pace, always right behind him. Instead, Quinn, in his mapping out of Stillman's movements for the preceding days, gains the perspective which Frank sees as vital for an apprehension of spatial form.  

As readers entering The Unconsoled, however, a text which, like Auster's New York, seems "a labyrinth of endless steps" (Auster, City 3), the difficulty lies exactly in identifying those steps which would form the 'Stillman's letters' of Ishiguro's text, in recognising the point at which we should diverge from the line of the text. Without knowing what we should take note of, we might not find even the entrance to the maze of steps, never mind its centre. Here, we can appeal only to what seems most remarkable in the text, which, in this case, is the bizarrely surreal nature of the world of The Unconsoled, which, above all other elements in the text, disorients the reader, and challenges us to make sense of what is happening. The world confronts us with three especially notable characteristics, all of which are evident even in the first chapter. The first is Ryder's selective amnesia, which has him entering a hotel on the book's first page knowing nothing of Thursday night, or of Mr Brodsky the conductor, or of his relationship to those around him. "When I tried to recall some basic details about the

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70 Whether or not we would still wish to call this part of the process 'reading', or whether it is better served by a term such as 'interpretation' is another question. Certainly, this sort of distinction between reading and interpreting has already been made by Richard Shusterman, who would say that, "reading (and, more generally, understanding) is not always interpreting" (114). If it is said that Quinn seems to comprehend Stillman's actions as he follows him and notes what he is doing, but only fully realises the significance of what he is seeing when he interprets the form of the letters, this seems to fit with Shusterman's view that "while understanding - even highly intelligent understanding - is often unreflective, unthinking, indeed unconscious (even if always purposive), interpretation proper involves conscious, deliberate thought: the clarification of something obscure or ambiguous, the deciphering of a symbol, the unraveling [sic] of a paradox, the articulation of previously unstated formal or semantic relations between elements" (133). Todorov, too, argues that "After constructing the events that make up a story, we then give ourselves over to the task of reinterpretation" (Genres in Discourse 44). Therefore, even though we might agree with Sutton that, limiting the act of reading to a temporal process, the immediate apprehension of spatial form is an impossibility, once a reading is supplemented by an act of interpretation, the apprehension of the text's spatiality again becomes possible.
present visit," he says, "I had little success" (Ishiguro 15), but his forgetfulness is not complete for, eventually, he has a faint recollection of once possessing a schedule for the days ahead, now misplaced and forgotten.71

The second remarkable feature of Ryder's world is the apparent distortion of time and space, and their relation to each other. People appear where previously there were none, and buildings many miles apart suddenly adjoin each other, are, in fact, the same building. Ryder may ride the elevator with Gustav, his hotel's porter, and talk with him at great length, for over six pages in fact while the lift still rises, and yet remain unaware, until well in to the ascent, that they were "not alone in the elevator. A small young woman in a neat business suit was standing pressed into the corner behind me" (Ishiguro 9).

Finally, there is the fact that, despite the first-person narration, Ryder often provides us with information he could not have access to, at times even seeing through disembodied eyes. Watching Gustav, he recognises that "a certain matter that had been preoccupying him throughout the day had again pushed its way to the front of his mind. He was, in other words, worrying once more about his daughter and her little boy" (Ishiguro 13). Later, while seated in a car, Ryder, impossibly, watches the hotel manager's son, Stephan, enter the front door of an apartment and be led by a Miss Collins through the front parlour and a second doorway, and then down a shadowy corridor to the drawing-room which, Ryder tells us, "looked expensively elegant in an old-fashioned way. On closer inspection, however, I could see much of the furniture was extremely worn" (Ishiguro 57, see also 319-27).

It is in these marks of the unknown that we seem to find our path into the text, our starting point. Yet, in identifying these three elements, we are like Quinn once he has traced out the shapes of Stillman's letters but not yet decided what they are. These three points may be unrelated, may be the equivalent of a rectangle, a bird, and a letter, or they may all be part of the same system, may all be letters, an 'O', a 'W' and an 'E'. We have to wonder whether we are discovering something meaningful here, or are simply "scribbling nonsense" (Auster, City 68). We are, like Quinn, "ransacking the chaos of Stillman's movements for some glimmer of cogency" (Auster, City 69). If the next step is to confirm that these elements are indeed all part of a larger system, like the alphabet, then we must try to gain some sense of what this system might be. Starting

71 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Ishiguro are taken from The Unconsoled.
out, we might assume that if we could lay our hands on some small clue, it could point the way to others, so, looking for other, more minor oddities, we begin to see that the strangeness of his world has some effect on Ryder, too: he is often being roused from his sleep, or poised at the edge of slumber, being "lulled by her words," so that he "found it difficult not to doze" (Ishiguro 44, 191). At times it seems as if the entirety of The Unconsoled takes place at that point between waking and sleeping, in a bout of fitful dozing. Here, a comment made by Sigmund Freud, that "dreams seem to be an intermediate state between sleeping and waking" (Introductory 116), suggests the possibility of drawing a parallel between Ryder's world and the worlds of dream, and, indeed, there does seem to be further evidence to encourage us in investigating this link. The most obvious point is that the breaks between the sections of the text, the blank pages of the book, coincide with the few periods of extended sleep that Ryder has. Each section, apart from the first, begins with Ryder waking up, but waking, of course, into this drowsy world which lies between waking and sleeping, so that the text seems a product of some dreaming process. In addition to this, the text contains factual deviations from our reality, such as a film version of 2001: A Space Odyssey starring Clint Eastwood and Yul Brynner, which finds Eastwood "preparing for the dismantling of HAL, carefully checking over his giant screwdriver" (Ishiguro 108), which might be taken as a form of dream wish fulfilment, the dreamer's dream cast. We can also see Ryder follow a woman through the narrow and steeply dropping streets of the city, and watch as she steadily draws away from him, along paths it takes him an unreasonable amount of time to cover. Finally, he loses her, and is left standing at the edge of a vast and darkened field. Then, towards the end of the first part of the book, late on the Tuesday night, Ryder is brought to a reception at which he will speak, but, when standing to address the audience, he finds "that my dressing gown was hanging open, displaying the entire naked front of my body" (Ishiguro 143). It seems a classic dream situation.

Our first supposition, therefore, might be that the The Unconsoled is obeying the laws of a dream world, operating by the perverse syntax of the dream. If we accept this notion, we can then explain the distortion of time and space, and the transmigration of Ryder's spirit, but we are still no closer to understanding why they do happen. In fact,

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72For a discussion of the "Sollersian wakening . . . a complex time, at one and the same time very long and very short" see Barthes, Sollers 56-57.
viewing the world of the text as a dream may not offer any help on this point at all, for Freud himself states that one of the peculiarities of the dream is that it "is on the one hand hard to grasp and on the other offers us no starting-point for further inquiry" (Introductory 125). Within a dream which has been purposefully constructed, however, as this one has, we might assume that there is an underlying sense to the selection and arrangement of its parts, and, if we could discover the idiom of this particular dream world, then it would enable us not only to see the true meaning in each event, but also to discern the correct relation between the various elements of the text. Admittedly, the interpretation of dreams might not be something with which we're particularly familiar, but by turning again to Freud, the most influential of dream analysts, and now seen to have been mentioned above with not complete innocence, we can immediately see the text transformed. The world of the text becomes everywhere sexualised, strewn with sexual symbols: from Ishiguro's description of the atrium "at the centre of which, dominating everything, was a fountain - a tangle of nymph-like figures in marble gushing water with some force" (23), we can go to Freud's assertion that "the male organ can be replaced by objects from which water flows" (Introductory 188), while "the flip-flopping of my slippers" (Ishiguro 148) brings the observation "slippers are female genitals" (Freud, Introductory 191). Elsewhere, the passage "I found myself looking at a tall cylinder of white brickwork, windowless apart from a single vertical slit near the top" (Ishiguro 182) suggests "the male organ, finds symbolic substitutes in the first instance in things that resemble it in shape" (Freud, Introductory 188); "the hill continued its descent down through a mass of tree-tops. . . . once I had built up my rhythm, he sighed" (Ishiguro 184), "The pubic hair of both sexes is depicted in dreams as woods and bushes" (Freud, Introductory 190); "we continued our descent in silence, Christoff's breathing becoming increasingly laboured behind me" (Ishiguro 185), "staircases, or, more precisely, walking on them, are clear symbols of sexual intercourse. . . . the common element here is the rhythm of walking up them" (Freud, Introductory 191); "my tie was fluttering stiffly out behind an ear" (Ishiguro 267), "Neckties . . . are a definitely male symbol" (Freud, Introductory 191).

Employing Freud's dream symbols to re-interpret the text so radically transforms the world of the text that it has to encourage further analysis. For Freud, of course, dreams are an expression of the unconscious, and dream elements are "substitutes for something the knowledge of which is present in the dreamer but which is inaccessible to
him" (Freud, *Introductory* 143). Moreover, the symbolism which is used by the manifest dream, the dream as it appears to us, is only one of the ways in which the elements of the latent dream, the genuine material behind the substitute dream, are distorted. Freud lists the other distorting relations as "the relation of a part to a whole, approximation or allusion . . . and the plastic representation of words" (*Introductory* 204). The dream-distortion itself is a function of the dream-work which, on the level of the dream as a whole, achieves condensation ("the fact that the manifest dream has a smaller content than the latent one" (*Introductory* 205)), displacement (meaning allusion, and also where "the psychical accent is shifted from an important element on to another which is unimportant" (*Introductory* 208), and the transformation of thoughts into visual images. Recognising the symbolism of the dream landscape, therefore, is only one step in the process of interpretation, one stage in the undoing of the dream-work, for we must still structure the relations between the parts of the dream. As Freud says, "In the course of the dream-work all the relations between the dream-thoughts drop out; these are resolved into their raw material and it is the task of the interpretation to re-insert the omitted relations" (*Introductory* 186).

When it comes to this part of the interpretive process, we are faced with a number of difficulties. First, there is the fact that our dream, *The Unconsoled*, is so long, and so demands many explanations, but a more intractable problem is Freud's belief that the analysis of any lengthy dream means including "much material in the way of associations and memories" (*Introductory* 220). In fact, Freud tells us "it is the dreamer himself who should tell us what his dream means" (*Introductory* 130), and we have no dreamer who is not also a part of the dream, or, rather, we have no access to a dreamer outside the dream. Though Ishiguro's text encourages our dream analysis by presenting us with a consciously created unconscious, so that we don't have to read the unconscious into an unwary text, or convince ourselves that a character is "vexed by unconscious impulses unfathomable even to the text itself" (Ellmann, *Introduction* 3), nevertheless, without access to the conscious life of the character, it is hard for us to come to any definite conclusion. Indeed, we can only assume that Ryder is in fact the dreamer of this dream.

Our hesitation at this point reflects Quinn's uncertainties also. Despite his discovery of the existence of the forms, despite recognising them as letter shapes, and despite reading in them a coherent message, still Quinn is beset by doubts, that "he had
imagined the whole thing. The letters were not letters at all. . . . Stillman had nothing to do with it. It was all an accident” (Auster, City 71). Quinn experiences these fears despite the great advantage he has over other readers, the ease with which he may plot the relations between the steps on a map of the city, reading their design on its surface. Each step finds its location within this wider textuality of the city and is oriented by it, so that the city provides the proper context within which the message must be understood, though, as we saw in chapter one, the message becomes evident only through a process of recontextualisation, transposed into Quinn's red notebook, a fact which of itself introduces doubt. Nevertheless, the map of the city provides Quinn with the key to understanding Stillman's passage because it reveals the organisation behind the apparently random wanderings, and also because it allows Quinn to transcend the limits imposed by a reading of the text at 'ground level', immersed in the temporal line of Stillman's steps through the city. As a representation of the space of Stillman's text, as a plan of the city, the map means Quinn may assume the position of Kepler's desired angel, able to comprehend now those letters "the pattern of which could be perceived only from above" (Banville 35).

Our own interpretations, our own mappings, similarly require us to situate Ishiguro's text within a wider textuality, orienting its elements according to recognised relations, and so demand a critical perspective, an intellectual stance from which we can hope to perceive between the parts of the text the correct semiotic relations, and so comprehend the meaning of the whole. So far, we have placed the text within a psychoanalytic context, but we have far greater reason than Quinn to be anxious about the validity of our reading, for our map is not a given. And if we were to find that first step into the maze, and follow its path to its conclusion, we would yet be faced with another difficulty, for we would still need a map upon which to plot our voyage, a way of seeing how all the points of our reading relate to each other. In effect, we are in the position of having to solve the labyrinth from within, of having to project a point from which we can view a space which surrounds us. Only then will we see how the simple line we experience is twisted and turned upon itself.73

73Kermode, approaching the text as an organised timeline, describes a similar situation, saying "We project ourselves - a small, humble elect perhaps - past the End, so as to see the structure whole, a thing we cannot do from our spot of time in the middle" (Sense of an Ending 8). Of course, in order to see the whole of a line (rather than simply a cross-section of it), you must view it from an angle, but Kermode would probably prefer not to suggest that we actually leave the line. Such a position is usually explained by recourse to an analogy of a climb up a mountain, the elevated point of view allowing the entire course
Assuming now that, in our reading, we have identified sensible forms, an 'O', a 'W', and an 'E' for example, and assuming also that we are convinced that we were meant to find these forms, still, like Quinn, we have to draw a relationship between these elements. At this point, when we are closest to revealing the author's intentions, we are more likely to discover instead what Harold Bloom might describe as 'anxieties when confronted with anterior powers' ("Freud" 183) as we prepare to face up to the vast accumulation of literature which may find some expression in the lines of *The Unconsoled*. We have already supposed that the work of Freud plays some part in the construction of the text, but we cannot know what else lies around it, what textual world Ishiguro sees it inhabiting, or what other texts it relates to. Nor can we tell if we know anything of this wider textual world to begin with, whether anything we have ever encountered overlaps with what Ishiguro has brought to *The Unconsoled*. It might emerge that our Stillman is "far more dangerous than previously imagined" (Auster, *City* 71). The result is an unstable mixture of self-doubt and arrogance as we try to match our own experience to Ishiguro's ingenuity, wondering if we will ever recognise in the text what we don't already know, yet trying to believe that we know enough to reveal all that the text has to show us.

Again, it is Quinn who suggests a way forward. In the end, he was able to interpret Stillman's writing only through a further recontextualisation, placing the discovered letters in the context of Stillman's previous works, and so arriving at the words *THE TOWER OF BABEL* by reference to the text *The Garden and the Tower*. If we are assuming that Ryder is the dreamer of our text, then it seems logical to proceed by focussing on his part in the story. Placing it in the context of Ishiguro's other works, the most striking comparisons emerge in connection with the book which followed *The Unconsoled*, *When We Were Orphans*. The title itself indicates that both Ryder and the protagonist of the later book, Christopher Banks, share, as Banks says, a "lack of parents" (Ishiguro, *Orphans* 6), while "My parents," says Ryder. "That's who we're talking about. There's no confusion here, I trust" (Ishiguro 255). Both of them also, as leading practitioners in their respective fields, display an acute awareness of the potency of their presence and actions. Banks speaks of how, "although this was still a good year of the climb to be seen. Interestingly, Kermode, in defending Frank against one of his critics, suggests that "Shattuck stresses the climb, Frank the view" ("A Reply" 580), but where Frank's view would be of the ground covered, the route in its entirety, Kermode's view would focus on placing moments of the journey in relation to its beginning and its end. 

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before my name acquired anything of the standing it has today, I was already beginning
to appreciate for the first time the scale of responsibility that befalls a detective with any
sort of renown," and even early in his career, when investigating the case of Charles
Emery's death, he is told that, if he can solve the mystery, it will revitalise not just the
family household but the whole town: "They'd be so grateful. Yes, they'll be talking
about you here for generations" (Ishiguro, Orphans 30, 33). We have already seen how
Ryder's performance is expected to save a city which "is at crisis point" (Ishiguro 200).
With these connections underlined, we can finally begin to see a structure linking the
elements we've noted on our psychoanalytic chart, for these parts of the story map
exactly onto the defining features of the work which produced Freud's most famous
complex, namely Oedipus the King. As with both Ryder and Banks, Oedipus arrives at
a city in turmoil to be hailed as the city's saviour, and, eventually and unexpectedly,
finds it is his relationship with his parents which is his greatest concern.

Our final answer, then, our THE TOWER OF BABEL and solution to the labyrinth of
The Unconsoled, is that the dream of the text is an expression of Ryder's unconscious
Oedipal desire, though Oedipus's twin crimes of patricide and incest necessarily take
less extreme forms in the censorious world of the dream. Though Ryder is an
internationally renowned pianist, his parents have never seen him play, but he believes
they will be there on the Thursday night to see him in concert for the first time. Then,
receiving the praise of his father, he can be seen to have bettered his father, dethroning
him, vanquishing him. Receiving the admiration of his mother, he will have gained her
esteem, and won her affections. In this way, he kills his father, and takes his place as
his mother's love.

Support for such an interpretation comes from the way this situation is re-
enacted between different sets of son and parents throughout the book. Ryder's own
step-child, Boris, clearly yearns for the respect of his surrogate father, somersaulting on
a playground climbing-frame, fantasising of protecting his parents from gangs of street
thugs, and displaying an earnest eagerness for DIY. Their relationship, however, is one
of unacknowledged efforts and unspoken disappointments, while all the time Boris
grows as his mother's source of support and strength. It is Stephan Hoffman, though,
the young son of the hotel's manager, who relates most closely to Ryder. He, too, is a
pianist, struck by how elegant his mother is, shunned by his own parents. Ryder's
advice to Stephan is "to try and enjoy your playing as much as you can, drawing
satisfaction and meaning from it regardless of them," but Stephan's father undermines his confidence, saying, "Your mother and I, we love you too much to be able to watch it" (Ishiguro 71, 480). Within the framework of Freudian dream analysis, however, this comment assumes a greater significance, for Freud sees piano-playing as a symbol of masturbation, for "Satisfaction obtained from a person's own genitals is indicated by all kinds of playing, including piano-playing" (Freud, Introductory 190). Stephan's parents, like most, "do not approve of this behaviour" (Freud, "Dissolution" 174), so naturally can't condone it by attending his performance. The masturbatory implications of piano-playing also put us in a position to better explain the awkward nature of some earlier scenes involving Ryder too, as when, needing to practice his playing, he is shown to the lavatory by Hoffman, who directs him inside with "a quick furtive gesture over his shoulder" (Ishiguro 338). When his practice is unsuccessful, Ryder has to admit that, "It's been the same since I was a child. I've never been able to practice unless I had complete, utter privacy" (Ishiguro 341).

Freud describes masturbation as an "incomplete sexual satisfaction," and says that "neurotic symptoms are substitutes for sexual satisfaction," which might explain why Ryder shares so many of the characteristics of neurotic people, with "their incomprehensible reactions to human intercourse and external influences, their irritability, their incalculable and inexpedient behaviour" (Introductory 434, 349, 426). Freud argues further that a child who masturbates is inevitably threatened with castration, and it is this threat which results in what he calls the dissolution of the Oedipus complex, when the complex is submerged, and "the libidinal trends belonging to the Oedipus complex are in part desexualised and sublimated . . . and in part inhibited in their aim and changed into impulses of affection" (Freud, "Dissolution" 177). The effect of this dissolution, when the consciousness represses, and sometimes even destroys, the Oedipus complex, can be seen in the form of Ryder's dream, for, even as the dream gives expression to the unconscious Oedipus complex, the repressed desire for parrincest is sublimated for Ryder into the creative musical act which will symbolically achieve for him what his conscious mind cannot admit to. Still, the masturbatory aspect of the piano-playing preserves the essentially Oedipal nature of the performance, for the act of masturbation is tied to his Oedipal desires, "his masturbation is only a genital discharge of the sexual excitation belonging to the complex" (Freud, "Dissolution" 176).
Yet, the nearer Ryder comes to achieving his desire, the harder it becomes for him to realise his aim, for, as Freud says, the dream-distortion "becomes greater the worse the wish that has to be censored" (Introductory 176). What Ryder is experiencing is essentially an anxiety-dream, more likely to produce unpleasurable feelings than any sense of gratifying wish-fulfilment, for "An anxiety-dream," says Freud "is often the undisguised fulfilment of a wish - not, of course, of an acceptable wish, but of a repudiated one" (Introductory 254). In Ryder's partly distorted anxiety-dream, the censoring agent recognises the emerging repressed wish, and so the introjected knowledge of the taboo against incest raises obstacle after obstacle to endanger his performance, including the lost schedule, the missed meetings, the lack of practice, and the strange wall which blocks his path to the concert hall, "built by some eccentric person at the end of the last century" (Ishiguro 388). Freud points out that we may often wake ourselves from such a dream before the repressed wish is finally fulfilled, but Ryder seems to wake himself into this dream, experiencing all of the anxiety which accompanies it as he is "woken . . . seized by a sudden concern," "seized by the panicky feeling," "with the panicky sense" (Ishiguro 155, 293, 413). As the end to the dream approaches, the dream-work seems to stubbornly resist producing anything which would yield to Ryder what he secretly desires, so that it becomes increasingly difficult to read in the dream the fulfilment of Oedipal desire, yet Freud urges us that the "wish-fulfilment cannot be obvious but must be looked for" (Introductory 251). What we must take into consideration as well, however, is that in an anxiety-dream wish-fulfilment may result in, not pleasure, but punishment, the fulfilment of the wish of the censor which cannot give the unconscious what it desires. If we cannot find the fulfilment of Ryder's Oedipal desire, then we should look instead for the punishment which is its opposite: his castration.

If our aim is to find the Oedipal in Ryder's dream, then we should look for those areas where their stories most closely parallel each other, especially as the dream nears its end. Encouragingly, on the night of the concert itself a number of incidents take place which seem to strengthen the links between Ryder and Oedipus. For example, the conductor, Brodsky, is making his way through the woods towards the domed concert hall, when he's involved in an accident, knocked from his bicycle by a passing car or truck. Ryder, arriving at the scene, has a sudden moment of doubt as the "thought vaguely crossed my mind if I had caused this wreck, that I had perhaps been involved in
some accident without knowing it" (Ishiguro 439-40). In the same way, Oedipus must think again of a long-forgotten incident, when he had met and killed a man at "the silent crossroad in the forest clearing" (Sophocles, Oedipus line 1398) while he was on the road to Thebes. Only the possibility that it may have been robbers, and not Oedipus, who killed Laius, and that a witness still survives who might testify to this, prevents Oedipus from immediately condemning himself. Soon after his encounter with Brodsky in the woods, Ryder rings Sophie and tells her she "hadn't aged at all. Not so anyone would notice" (Ishiguro 446) which, in this world of obscure and misremembered relations, seems to position her in Jocasta's role. Yet, if Sophie is indeed the one who has been cast as the mother, then we have to wonder why Ryder becomes increasingly alienated from her, not more attached, while it is Boris who stays always at her side, the stepson taking the place of the usurper who would "never love you like a real father" (Ishiguro 532). Even less apparent is the way in which Ryder might be said to have slain his father. Only one death occurs, Gustav's, but his takes place off-stage, when Ryder is not even present, and so recalls the death of Polybus, Oedipus's foster-father, rather than the murder of Laius.

These intransigencies present a real challenge to our ability to come to terms with this text. They question not only the possibility that any application of the Oedipus complex can hold here, but also the extent of our familiarity with the text, and of our knowledge of the complex itself, of the methods of dream interpretation, and of Freud's work as a whole. Whatever claim we might have made with regard to having some authority over the issues involved in this text has been undermined by the feeling that our answer doesn't hold, that something is yet missing, and that in some other, as yet unknown text lies the next key, the next terminological phrase needed to continue with the reading. The only alternative to capitulation, however, to the admission of the inadequacy of our reading, is to persevere. Like Oedipus, we, too, have further evidence to include, further paths to explore, for in the triangle of relations we have uncovered between The Unconsoled, Oedipus, and Freud, one side remains to be developed, namely the relation between Oedipus and Freud.

74It is interesting, however, that Freud suggests that the male genitalia can appear in a dream as a small son, especially when we think of Boris on the climbing frame, or his appreciation of Ryder's gift to him of a DIY manual, or how he fights off the street thugs in the apartment block where Ryder relives his fights with Sophie, for Freud shows how sexual intercourse can be symbolised within the dream world by "rhythmical activities such as ... riding and climbing ... ; so, too, certain manual crafts, and, of course, threatening with weapons" (Introductory 190).
The importance of the story of Oedipus, and of Sophocles's text of that story, derives from the fact that, as Cynthia Chase argues, "Freud reads Oedipus: the Oedipus complex draws its specificity from the Sophoclean tragedy, rather than just from the ostensible semantic content of the Oedipus legend" (57). The significance of the story lies not alone in the matter of Oedipus's parrincest, but also in the action of the drama where the reality of Oedipus's past acts comes to light. Freud famously described the action of the play as "a process of revealing, with cunning delays, and ever mounting excitement - a process that can be likened to psychoanalysis" (Dreams 269). The play, with its beginning in illness, with its recovered memories and misinformation, with its resistance to the emergence of the truth, and the final recovery of the past, dramatises the psychoanalytic process. More than this, however, Chase argues that Freud is drawn to Sophocles's text by an alternative Oedipus complex, by the "drive to interpretation and 'self-analysis'" (58), which, in both their cases, is motivated by a concern for the father, and ends in the discovery of the Oedipus complex. It is Oedipus's drive to interpretation which means his story is defined by, but not confined to, the acts of patricide and incest, for, around and alongside these acts, Oedipus engages in a search for answers to questions posed, on the cause of the plague on the city, on the identity of Laius's killer, and on the truth of his own identity (in the course of his investigations, of course, he also plays the part of the detective). It was with an answer that he first won fame in Thebes, when he solved the riddle of the Sphinx, and Freud sought to emulate him by seeking the solution to the riddle of dreams. In our case, it seems we should now follow Freud's lead and read Oedipus, allowing Oedipus the reader to guide even as Quinn did.

Oedipus made his mark, then, as an interpretor, as a reader of apparently remarkable ability. Faced with a riddle which had confounded every other, 'Which animal walks on four feet in the morning, two feet at noon, and three feet in the evening?' Oedipus saw in this truncated lifeline the story of man, and so produced the answer to defeat the Sphinx. This version of the riddle of the Sphinx, however, is only one of a number of alternatives. It also appears in only a very slightly altered form as "Which animal walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, and three legs in the evening?" (Burgess 14-15). Answering the riddle means understanding that the image of the day should be taken as the figurative representation of a lifetime, so that the line of the riddle projects itself onto the chronology of the lifeline, but it also involves
finding the reason behind the changing numbers. As such, the riddle demands a spatial comprehension, and an ability to perceive that term which stands in paradigmatic equivalence with each section of the riddle. Another version, "What goes on four feet, on two feet, and three, / But the more feet it goes on the weaker it be?" ("Sphinx") doesn't foreground the chronology, though the first line retains nevertheless the natural, temporal order, but the second line provides more of a clue to the relationship between the numbers of feet than either of the first two versions. As such, this line doesn't continue the story but writes across it, structuring the narratological relation between the parts as they tell of how man grows from weakness to strength, only to return to frailty again at the end of his life. A fourth version is more elaborate, asking Oedipus to identify "a thing with two feet and four feet, with a single voice, that has three feet as well. It changes shape, alone among the things that move on land or in air or down through the sea. Yet during the periods when it walks supported by the largest number of feet, then is the speed in its limbs the feeblest of all" (Gould 19 qtd. in Chase 67). In contrast with the chronological line of the first version, here even the order of numbers is confused, and an extra added through the single, one, voice, though the key to their relation remains. Yet it is perhaps this version which makes Oedipus's answer the most truthful when he answers 'man' and so names himself, for Oedipus fits even the confused and overlapping thing of the first line. As Chase points out, "Sophocles dramatizes the riddle by representing Oedipus as king, as exposed child, and as blind old man all in the single scene of the tragedy" (68), and so, simultaneously, as a man with two, four, and three feet. Oedipus is the three terms of the riddle's paradigmatic axis collapsed into an individual figure, and is described as such by both himself and Teiresias. Teiresias describes him as "brother, as it shall be shown, / And father at once, to the children he cherishes; son, / And husband, to the woman who bore him; father-killer, / And father-supplanter" (Sophocles, Oedipus line 454-57). Oedipus sees himself as "sinful in my begetting, / Sinful in marriage, sinful in shedding of blood!" (Sophocles, Oedipus line 1190-91).

By indirectly revealing Oedipus's fate as a blind, old man, the answer to the riddle of the Sphinx can be seen to prefigure the answer to the riddle of the Phocal crime also. All riddles converge then at the Oedipus complex. The line of the Sphinx's riddle leads there, as does the riddle of who killed Laius, as does the riddle of Oedipus's identity, as does Freud's solution to the riddle of the affect of Oedipus the King as
drama. Nonetheless, we had begun to doubt that the enigma of *The Unconsoled* also centred around the Oedipus complex, but these uncertainties might be dispelled by the parallels between the riddle of *The Unconsoled* and the riddle of the Sphinx which become apparent if, for our answer, we look for a tripartite being with a single voice. Then, we see that the text of *The Unconsoled* seems to present us with the same impossible thing as the riddle, a thing that has two feet, four feet, and three feet, a thing that, again, is Oedipus. If we need to find the child Oedipus, then we can look to Stephan, who is figuratively crippled by his parents' lack of confidence in him, but who nevertheless returns to the stage of the concert hall, to the stage of the drama, or Thebes, where the action takes place. There, he gives a performance which the audience sees as "a kind of omen" which suggests that the evening might "prove a turning point for the community after all" (Ishiguro 482). If this might be the young Oedipus come to maturity through his victory over the Sphinx, then Stephan's final "wistful, faintly ironic reading" (Ishiguro 482) reflects the bitter truth of Oedipus's answer. Ryder provides us with Oedipus as the king who has performed triumphantly in the past, but is now asked to save the city again. The peculiarly textual form of the dialogic drama by which the double-edged salvation is revealed is seen in the proposed format of the question and answer session in the concert hall where, Ryder is told "the words will be spelt out simultaneously on the electronic scoreboard fixed directly above your head" (Ishiguro 381). For Oedipus as he appears at the end of the play, it seems best to look to Brodsky who, after his fall from the bike, is found to have a wooden leg, and who must walk to the stage with the aid of an ironing-board propped under his arm.

The form of the riddle laid the three parts of the one thing along its single line, its one voice, and here *The Unconsoled* presents us with the three aspects of its Oedipal character spread intermingled throughout its length. Reading spatially allows us to link the dispersed, but of course already related, sections to each other, and in the juxtaposition of these three characters we perceive the figure of Oedipus, even as the three terms of the riddle reveal 'man' to be their answer. With this three-personed Oedipus, it becomes easier to read the answer to *The Unconsoled* as the Oedipus complex. It no longer seems necessary for Ryder's parents to appear, for anything may enter at those points where Ryder's story intersects with Stephan's and Brodsky's, and, indeed, they do seem to provide access to the required elements. In comparison with Stephan's success, his father Hoffman meets with utter failure. The evening was his
responsibility, but, like many others before, proved to be nothing but a disaster. Having long wondered why his cultured wife stayed with him, and having lived so long with the pressure to prove his worth to her while always failing, Hoffman now finally asks why she had ever married him. "What a mistake you made," he says, "A tragedy" (Ishiguro 507). He describes himself, in a way which recalls Oedipus's riveted feet, and marks him as Oedipus's precursor, as "the very ball and chain on your ankle" (Ishiguro 507), and can only beg her to leave him. With the son elevated to a position of respect within the community, and the father ruined, this seems an adequate version of the murder of Laius. If we need to speak of incest, then perhaps we can look to Brodsky, the elder Oedipus and the former lover of Mrs. Collins, the social queen of the city who "did my best to help the unhappy people here" (Ishiguro 499). Laying Stephan's story over Ryder's, and Ryder's in turn over Brodsky's, we arrive at last at an image of Oedipus.

Oedipus's incestuous crime, of course, does not bring an end to his story, which continues with the working out of its gruesome repercussions. Brodsky's desire is to reunite with Miss Collins, to make love to her once more, but he's bothered by "a wound. I got it many years ago" (308), which makes it painful for him. If, in Oedipal terms, Brodsky's relationship with Miss Collins represents the love of the mother, then it seems natural to think of this wound as a form of castration, which is the "resulting punishment" (Freud, "Dissolution" 176) of such intercourse. After Brodsky's performance in the concert, Miss Collins rejects him and his obsession with his wound, telling him that he is "going somewhere horrible now. Somewhere dark and lonely, and I won't come with you" (Ishiguro 499). So it is that Oedipus is sent into exile, with his blindness as his wound, his punishing castration. As Freud points out, "The self-blinding of the mythical criminal, Oedipus, was simply a mitigated form of the punishment of castration" ("Uncanny" 231). This wounding and exile should, then, be what finally provides us with the wish-fulfilment of the text, with the dream's censoring agent successfully punishing the dreamer for attempting to fulfil a forbidden desire. Our conclusion seems to be that The Unconsoled is an anxiety-dream which expresses an Oedipal desire, but is eventually overpowered by the censor.

Further evidence for this is to be found by turning from the riddle of the text to the one remaining riddle, namely the cause of the maladies afflicting the city of The Unconsoled. Perhaps the telling factor here is the audience reaction to Brodsky's performance. As conductor, Brodsky brings the orchestra with him in his interpretation
of his chosen musical piece, but Ryder becomes increasingly concerned by a reading which "was almost perversely ignoring the outer structure of the music - the composer's nods towards tonality and melody that decorated the surface of the work - to focus instead on the peculiar life-forms hiding just under the shell" (Ishiguro 492). Brodsky ignores the deceptive appearance of the manifest dream, to address the riddle posed now by the music, but when "the music veered dangerously towards the realms of perversity" (Ishiguro 494) it seems that the Oedipus complex is once again the answer. It seems the audience recognises this too, but is unwilling to accept it. They reject the interpretation given to them by Brodsky and, through an act of shared repression, convince themselves of their wellbeing by remembering "the splendid heritage of this city, all the things we've got to be proud of" (Ishiguro 516).

This final repression, this painless return by the people of the city to a placid state, is a telling point. Ryder is relatively unconcerned about the way in which the city solves its own problems, saying "After all, if a community could reach some sort of equilibrium without having to be guided by an outsider, then so much the better" (Ishiguro 524). Freud was drawn to Oedipus not only because of the insights to be gained from his parrincestual character, but also because of his status as a reader and interpreter, his ability to solve problems, but in the final analysis of The Unconsoled this side of the Oedipus complex is, at least on this level, absent. The process of psychoanalysis so vividly illustrated in Oedipus the King, the process of revealing what lies hidden, could never be reproduced in a text which must end with a successful repression instead of disclosure. The salvation that Oedipus offers Thebes is given at the expense of his own revelation, for, as Claude Lévi-Strauss explains, "myths of the Oedipal type . . . always assimilate the discovery of the incest to the solution of a living puzzle personified by the hero" (2: 24). Ryder cannot be permitted to save this city with a performance which will also reveal his Oedipus complex; the dream-censor cannot permit it, and so the city heals itself with the conviction that it knows itself, and has a past to be proud of.

There is one further question to be addressed to complete this reading. The interpretation of the text as a dream of punishment-fulfilment raises the issue of the death of the father, which seems not to have been repressed but successfully achieved. Against this, it might be argued that, though Stephan's father may fall from grace, Stephan experiences no sense of triumph, instead admitting to Ryder that "My parents
are right” (Ishiguro 520), an attitude which seems less the expression of a wish fulfilled than the acceptance into the super-ego of the law of the parent which accompanies the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. Furthermore, Brodsky may have loved Miss Collins, but this lies in the past of the text, while all we witness is the aftermath of his castration. In relation to this, it is interesting to note that Stephan embodies the Oedipus of the before of the text of Oedipus the King, that is, Stephan's story relates Oedipus's rejection by his parents, his maiming, the murder of his father, and his eventual return to Thebes, to the stage, where he wins the respect of the city by the skill of his interpretation. Brodsky, on the other hand, represents what occurs to Oedipus after Oedipus the King ends, when, already both wounded and rejected, he is asked to return by a city which believes that it is in him "that they must grow to greatness" (Sophocles, At Colonus 419). The crime of Oedipus, and the text which reveals it, is thus absent from The Unconsoled, but this absence is not "a hole" with either determinable or "with indeterminable borders" lying at the centre of the text, but is known only as a deferred and differing presence in these other texts which supplement the Oedipal with what precedes and follows it (Derrida, "Différance" 6). Stephan fails to recognise the father he kills, but instead asserts the authority of the father-figure, and the law of the father, in an act of self-banishment, even as Oedipus, in his self-imposed exile from Corinth, puts Polybus in the place of the father he cannot kill. As Pucci says, Oedipus "by running away from his home in Corinth . . . authenticates Polybus and Merope as his own legitimate parents and he obtains this authentification by inflicting on himself and on them a loss, his own absence" (Pucci 108-9, see also 123-44). Brodsky, meanwhile, reveals the mark of the crime through the punishment which results from it, and the censor has done its work on both fronts, declaring the nature of the law, which is the law of nature, the law against incest, and exacting its punishment, without ever revealing the specifics of the crime.

Ryder remains the only Oedipal persona inhabiting the actual text of Oedipus the King, but the necessity of our appealing to the supplementary tales of Stephan and Brodsky to find the elements required to fulfil the Oedipal formula, reveals the extent to which the text of Oedipus the King has been censored and written over throughout the course of The Unconsoled. Essentially, it is the deferral of the parents' return which negates the possibility of Ryder realising, and perhaps even expressing, those unconscious desires, and, indeed, the close of the book finds Ryder repeatedly
acknowledging his parents' absence. Beginning with his initial admission that he had
"so far been unable to find a single sign of my parents' presence anywhere in the
building," finally he "remembered all at once just how tenuous had been the possibility
of my parents' coming to the town. I could not understand at all how I had ever been so
confident about the matter" (Ishiguro 508, 512). While Freud's reading of Oedipus the
King reveals to him his own complex, both in terms of his own relationship with his
father, and his drive to self-analysis, our own reading of The Unconsoled reveals the
very impossibility of the fulfilment of the complex due to the unattainability of the
parents. The irony is, however, that Ryder's parents had once visited the city, in fact
"it's all been pretty well documented" (Ishiguro 513), but all that remains is the trace of
their passing, a vague memory of their being in the city.

We have to wonder how often Ryder has been let down by his parents, travelling
from city to city with the expectation that they will follow to hear him play, that this trip
will be "the very special one, the very important trip, the one that's very very important"
(Ishiguro 217), only to experience again such disappointment when they fail to show,
and perhaps to learn again that they have been there before him. This drive to see his
parents is the distorted echo of a similar series of actions in his childhood. Then, while
out playing in a lane outside his house, Ryder "had suddenly felt a sense of panic and a
need for the company of my parents" but, recognising this as an immature emotion, had
"forced myself to delay my departure" (Ishiguro 172). The child delays his return to the
house in an effort to train himself to master life without his parents, while the adult tries
to make his parents come to him in an effort to assert his independence, but in actuality
makes a delayed return to a place his parents have already been, repeating his childhood
actions. The striking matter is the way in which this behaviour mirrors the game of
"disappearance and return," or 'fort' ['gone'] and 'da' ['there'], which Freud observed
being played also by a young boy (Beyond 15). Freud's interpretation of this behaviour
was that in "their play children repeat everything that has made a great impression on
them in real life, and that in doing so they abreact the strength of the impression and, as
one might put it, make themselves master of the situation" (Beyond 17), even as the
child Ryder asserts his own sense of maturity by controlling his reactions to the enacted
loss of his parents.

The adult Ryder's same tendency to replay the loss and hoped-for regainment of
his parents, reveals that, like a neurotic patient, Ryder is experiencing what Freud calls
the "compulsion to repeat" (Beyond 19). Here, we see perhaps the one failure of the censoring agent of the dream to counter the desire of the unconscious repressed, for the compulsion to repeat comes from the repressed, as the patient "is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of . . . remembering it as something belonging to the past" (Beyond 18). Freud is interested, however, in the way that the re-experience of these repressed events seems to contravene what he calls the pleasure principle, whereby the mental life of the individual works to avoid unpleasure and produce pleasure. Freud points out that "It is clear that the greater part of what is re-experienced under the compulsion to repeat must cause the ego unpleasure, since it brings to light activities of repressed instinctual impulses" (Beyond 20), just as an anxiety dream creates its unpleasant effect through the fulfilment of a repressed wish.

More striking, though, is the way in which the compulsion to repeat will recreate circumstances which in no way could produce pleasure for the individual, so that "the compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences which include no possibility of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction even to instinctual impulses which have long since been repressed" (Beyond 20). The series of actions which tend to be repeated in these cases are "the activities of instincts intended to lead to satisfaction; but no lesson has been learnt from the old experience of these activities having led instead only to unpleasure" (Beyond 21). In Ryder's case, we might initially want to argue that Ryder is trying to relive the fulfilment of his Oedipal desire, that at some point his parents witnessed and appreciated his piano-playing, and that it is this sequence of events he wishes to re-enact, only for the censoring agent to react against this. Considering his childhood game, however, it seems that what he truly feels compelled to repeat is his traumatic abandonment by his parents, and his dream, like the young boy's game, is an attempt to control the traumatic situation. "These dreams," says Freud, "are endeavouring to master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis" (Beyond 32). 'Anxiety' here is being used in a clinical sense to describe "a particular state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown one" (Beyond 12). Just as Ryder prepared himself in his childhood for the loss of his parents by experiencing the "growing fear and panic of these occasions" when he kept himself from them (Ishiguro 172), developing an anxiety in an advanced reaction to
their absence, so the adult Ryder repeats his loss in dream, in the hope that the next time he might be prepared for it.

What we have to consider is why a loss for which the child Ryder had so thoroughly prepared, still resulted in such a traumatic shock to his system. Perhaps the answer lies not in the manner of his parents' desertion, but in their reasons for leaving. Speaking to his childhood friend, Fiona, of his parents' fights, she asks "Don't you know why they argue all the time?" and goes on to tell him that "They only argue like that when . . . when special things happen" (Ishiguro 172). But she is forbidden from telling him the truth, from telling him what "Everybody else knows" (Ishiguro 173). Surely the truth is that it is Ryder's Oedipal desire which lies at the heart of their fighting, and that what is so traumatic is that it was when he felt closest to them, when he felt on the verge of fulfilling his Oedipal wishes, that they abandoned him. Now, his compulsion drives him to repeat those actions which will see his Oedipal desire result only in unpleasure for, never learning his childhood lesson, he must experience again the loss of his parents by his own hands, his own desire to possess them.

For Freud, the compulsion to repeat revealed "the regressive character of instincts," the remarkable fact that "all instincts tend towards the restoration of an earlier state of things" (Beyond 59, 37). Ryder's urge to repeat means re-experiencing elements of his own childhood, and not just the separation from his parents for, as Freud points out, "The repressed instinct never ceases to strive for complete satisfaction, which would consist in the repetition of a primary experience of satisfaction" (Beyond 42), so that Ryder replays those childhood happinesses which promised utter fulfilment, but delivered desolation. Repeatedly, then, Ryder finds himself back in the world of his childhood. His hotel room becomes "the very room that had served as my bedroom during the two years my parents and I had lived at my aunt's house," a room in the flat where he, Sophie, and Boris once lived resembles "exactly the back part of the parlour in the house my parents and I had lived in for several months in Manchester," and, in the grounds outside the Karwinsky Gallery, he finds "the remains of the old family car my father had driven for many years" (Ishiguro 16, 214, 261). Ryder's emotional attachment to the time represented by that old car is apparent in Sophie's comment that he seems "to have fallen in love with that thing," as he holds the car in a "virtual embrace" (Ishiguro 262). A Freudian interpretation, however, gives these memories a greater resonance, for "whenever a man dreams of a place or a country and says to
himself, while he is still dreaming: 'this place is familiar to me, I've been here before', we may interpret the place as being his mother's genitals or her body" (Freud, "Uncanny" 245). These remembered places become the site of the mother's body, and so a replaying expression of the Oedipal desire to be at one with the mother's body, to be possessed by it to the exclusion of the father.

Ryder's desire to return to those times when he was closest to his parents may also restore him to an even earlier state of things, when he was yet in his mother's womb. Nor does the text itself contradict such a reading. The concert hall where Ryder is supposed to perform has a roof domed like a pregnant woman's swollen belly. Inside, Ryder views the performance from within a tall, narrow cupboard set high under the ceiling of the auditorium. Before entering, Ryder supposes the "cupboard contained a urinal or perhaps a drinking fountain" as he sees a man "bent right forward with his rear protruding, to all appearances rummaging busily through the cupboard's contents" (Ishiguro 476). Freud tells us that cupboards "have more connection with the uterus than with the female genitals" (Introductory 189), so that Ryder may be seen to witness his own conception by this rummaging man. When he enters, Ryder finds "a thin cord tied at waist height" (Ishiguro 477), like an umbilical cord. Ryder watches much of the concert from the cupboard, including Stephan's recital, and most of Brodsky's performance, but emerges to move to the side of the stage in time to see Brodsky collapse. Soon after this he learns of the absence of his parents, but, as we have seen, the compulsion to repeat which drives him to reexperience this loss, also never absolves him from the belief that he himself is responsible for this loss. The indirect admission of a guilty Oedipal desire requires a further punishment from the censoring agent, and Ryder, in a form of mitigated self-blinding, meets the news of his parents' loss by weeping uncontrollably, so that the "tears filled my eyes very steadily and ran down my face" (Ishiguro 516).

Despite this disappointment, Ryder is nevertheless determined to go ahead with his own performance, feeling that to do anything less "would be to open some strange door through which I would hurtle into a dark, unknown space" (Ishiguro 518). The auditorium, however, is empty, and Ryder is faced with "a vast, dark, empty space" (Ishiguro 519). This is perhaps the final repetition, the replaying of the earliest of all possible states, the return to what lies before the womb, the return to the inanimate, to death, for, of course, "the aim of all life is death" (Freud, Beyond 38). It is only natural
that Ryder's compulsion to repeat should end with death, with the negation of
animation, for Oedipus himself prefers death to an awareness of his parrincestual
crimes. "Cursed be the benefactor / That loosed my feet and gave me life / For death; a
poor exchange. / Death would have been a boon / To me and all of mine," says Oedipus
(Sophocles, Oedipus line 1356-1360). "Would you had never lived to read this riddle,"
says the Chorus, suggesting it would have been better had death greeted Oedipus at the
entrance to the city, rather than letting him find it at the end (Sophocles, Oedipus line
1355).

Uncanny parallels: an experience of the space of literature

In our final reading of The Unconsoled, informed by the interpretative procedures of
three other readers, Quinn, Freud, and Oedipus, we seem to have produced a relatively
satisfactory account of the text as one shaped by the psychoanalytical theories of Freud,
and particularly the theory of the Oedipus complex. Yet, though we saw in Ryder an
expression of all that was Oedipal, we failed to place him in that one
Oedipal
role
central to both our own and Freud's analysis, the role of reader. At this point, therefore,
it seems we should return now to an earlier part of this discussion to retrace the same
path along a different line.

That this brief repetition is necessary becomes clear when we look to one further
element in Oedipus's reading of the riddle which we haven't yet mentioned, namely the
advantage given to him by his own name. The name Oedipus means 'Swellfoot,' or
'Swollenfoot,' from oidos (swelling) and pous (foot), and was given to him on account
of his damaged ankles, which were riveted to ensure the child's death on the mountain-
side. Oedipus, then, is already familiar with the feet being used as a synecdochal
naming of the man, so in answering the riddle of the Sphinx, he need only see that it
repeats the same pattern. As Chase puts it, "sensitive to feet as part of a name for man,
Oedipus can provide the identification that destroys the Sphinx" (65). Pietro Pucci,
however, argues that Oedipus himself prefers to relate his name to the verb oida,
meaning 'I know,' though also related to the verb 'to see,' so that he may identify himself
by the name 'Knowfoot' instead (Pucci 66-78, see also Chase 65-66). Oedipus then
draws attention to his own heroic narrative rather than to the more telling marks on his
ankles, though Pucci comments that the ambiguities of expression in the text may "point
to a conscious refusal to read in his name the scars of his feet or an unconscious repression of the name's implications, or finally the possibility that Oedipus really was unaware of his scars" (Pucci 71).

Lévi-Strauss points out how not just Oedipus's name but the names also of his father Laius, 'left-sided,' and grandfather Labdacus, 'lame,' "refer to difficulties in walking straight and standing upright" (1: 215). It's tempting, though perhaps slightly unwarranted, to see a similar line of thinking emerge in the name Stephan Hoffman, 'step-and-hop man,' a further link to Oedipus with his pierced feet, but, accepting this, we could also include an interpretation of Hoffman as hoof-man ('hoof' coming from the Germanic hufo), the misrecognised father who rides on horseback. Ryder's obvious equivalent, 'rider,' would not be out of place for one whose parents are absent, who is un-fathered, and so given the place of privilege on horseback. In fact, we should notice that all the characters of The Unconsoled are the un-con-soled, are those without soles, are the lame, and are therefore necessarily bound by the Oedipus complex, following, as they do, in his line. Even as the marks on Oedipus's ankles forever recall his damaged past, so it is that the unconsoled are marked by "wounds that won't heal, something that went wrong very early on" (Ishiguro qtd. in Ohno par. 17)

Where the game of naming most clearly relates to the riddle posed by The Unconsoled is where, looking more closely at the name 'Ryder,' we can see that it is none other than a pun on both the word 'writer' and 'reader,' phonetically akin to 'writer,' visually akin to 'reader,' so that 'Ryder' is a combination of the two, is 'wri/der.' Even as Freud sees in Oedipus the model self-analyst, so Ryder allows Ishiguro to enact for us the reader's role, our own role, in the text. Our own reading of the text may be informed by Oedipus's understanding of the Sphinx's riddle, but Ryder's success or failure in helping the people of the city also lies, like Oedipus's, in his ability to read the situation and come to a conclusion. Ryder, therefore, goes about his task in much the same way that a reader might try to come to an understanding of a text, in a way easily comparable with our own approach to The Unconsoled, at times even replicating a reader's vacillation between self-doubt and self-confidence. On the one hand he is driven to attend to the issues at hand, to find out as much as he can about the local situation, to undertake some "background research," or, in other words, to read closely and attentively, for, as the city's original musical saviour, Christoff, argues, "even an expert of your calibre needs to apply his knowledge to a particular set of local conditions.
Each community has its own history, its own special needs" (Ishiguro 187). Ryder takes
offence at Christoff's "implication that I was more or less ignorant of the local
conditions, that I was the sort to draw conclusions without bothering with such factors,
was quite insulting" (Ishiguro 187). At times, however, he is absolutely convinced of
his own abilities, and believes that he need only bring the lessons of his prior
experiences to bear on the situation and all will be well: "I surveyed the scene around
me and saw how needless had been my worries concerning my ability to cope with the
various demands presented to me in this city. As ever, my experience and my instincts
had proved more than sufficient to see me through" (Ishiguro 115, 524). The text is
always there, though, to challenge such arrogance, to demand "why do you take it upon
yourself to pronounce like this, as though you're blessed with some extra sense the rest
of us lack?" (Ishiguro 133).

But as events unfold, Ryder more than adequately fulfils his role as reader, even
acting out its limitations. At times, he has a keen and insightful eye, inferring from the
state of those around him what has gone before: "Then as I continued to cast my gaze
about me, I began to realise just what had taken place before our arrival" (Ishiguro 126).
When required, he provides a mute witness to conversation, and an excuse for dialogue,
as Ryder as reader is provided with the information he needs to understand what's going
on: "But we were just discussing something else together. I really would appreciate
your advice" (Ishiguro 130). When there is no information to be given, he is generally
ignored, "no one seemed especially interested in me," and, if necessary, he is as
invisible as an external reader so that others may talk freely, "the two men continued
their discussion without looking up at me" (Ishiguro 125, 166). At other times, he
seems to be invisible against his will, unable to act, even as a reader may sometimes feel
impotent in the face of what they are reading, caught up in the action of the text but
unable to intervene: "I made another concerted effort to announce myself, but to my
dismay all I could manage was another grunt" (Ishiguro 239). The reverse of this is
when he is invited to take part but instead withdraws, unwilling to initiate action. Boris
asks him to play a board game with him, but Ryder, the writer, "pretended not to hear
and went on reading" (Ishiguro 285).

Seeing Ryder as reader, we realise that The Unconsoled contains not one but two
readers, and we are both encountering the world of the book as a textual construction.
Reading has become, as Todorov predicted, one of the major themes of the book. And
again this mirrors Oedipus's case also, for, as Chase points out, he is proven guilty of his crimes not by empirical evidence but by the accumulation of texts, by "a constricting network of texts: the Herdsman's word . . . , the Messenger's news . . . , his wife's confession . . . , and, above all, the words of the oracles" (64). Neither is shifting the perspective from seeing the world of The Unconsoled as one of dream to seeing it simply in its textual reality a radical move when we see that the riddle of dreaming itself was solved by Freud by a reading of a play which hinges on the correspondence of texts, and specifically in the reading of the text of this play of text. With the riddle of dreaming solved, Freud also suggests a particularly textual approach to the riddle of the individual dream, describing as the "work of interpretation" (Introductory 204) the process of undoing the dreamwork, and everywhere paying attention to the language of the dream, to the etymology of the words used, to their connotations, and symbolic meanings. Elsewhere, Freud describes psychoanalysis as a whole as "first and foremost an art of interpreting" (Beyond 18) and speaks of operating "with the scientific terms, that is to say with the figurative language, peculiar to psychology" (Beyond 60). The result is, in effect, a science of interpretation, which Trilling has described as "a science of tropes, of metaphor and its variants, synecdoche and metonymy" (qtd. in Bloom 176), and which Chase describes as having a "definitive and continuous dependency on writing" (70).

Whatever difficulties this might create for practitioners of psychoanalysis, for The Unconsoled this approach works extremely well, for all those elements which were explained as resulting from the logic of the dream can as easily be explained through narratological convention when we understand that the world of the text is purely text. Throughout The Unconsoled, Ishiguro confuses the world of the text with the space of the text, blurring the formal levels so that what is usually seen as taking place on the level of the story, now occurs on the level of fabula. For example, the inordinate amount of time which Ryder spends in the elevator, listening to Gustav relate a story for far longer than the elevator ride could possibly have lasted, can be explained by the fact that the story which Gustav tells is an example of a realised retrospection, or flash-back. Instead of pausing fictional time and externally narrating Gustav's story, or creating fictional time in which Gustav can tell his story, by having him relate it in Ryder's room perhaps, Ishiguro simply uses up fictional time, creates textual time, without regard for the worldly reality of the situation. As Barthes points out, "both narrative and language..."
know only a semiotic time, 'true' time being a 'realist', referential illusion"  
("Introduction" 99). The way in which Ryder appears to be able to project his spirit can also be explained by his unique status. As writer he is writer, reader, and character too, but it is with a writer's eye that he provides us with information which couldn't possibly be available to him as a first-person narrator. At times he seems to approach the status of the traditional omniscient narrator, able to access information both by focalising through other characters, seeing through their eyes, but also by using external focalisation.

There are times, though, when Ryder fails in the role ascribed to him by the people of the city, and yet the text still continues, carrying him along with it. It doesn't matter that he never gives that speech on the Tuesday night; the next day he is still being praised for "a marvellously witty address" (Ishiguro 155). Neither does Ryder's inattentiveness to what sometimes takes place around him impact negatively on the progress of the text. The townspeople proceed with a momentum of their own which is independent of this reluctant participant, but of course, even before his arrival, they had his trip planned out for him. The schedule which Ryder so vaguely remembers at the beginning of the text is a pre-record of the events that will take place over the days to come. Ryder's journey is already planned, his itinerary, his route, laid out for him. In this way too Ryder is the writer, because the reader knows that his/her future path through the text is already complete, mapped from beginning to end. The schedule which Ryder remembers so tangibly, recalling "the very texture of the thick grey paper on which the schedule had been typed" (Ishiguro 15), mirrors the physical volume which the reader holds in their hand, and which contains the line of text over which the reader will soon be travelling.

This realisation that what we will read is already there, before us, creates an awareness of the fact that the line of the text, and the text's space, is always already a whole in itself, a simultaneously existing design. But this is not to say that the world of the text can ever be considered as some complete and ethereal world where characters wander as we look on. Instead, when Ishiguro allows the textual world and space to coincide as he does, he foregrounds the constructed nature of textual space, and the way

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75The textuality of Auster's New York produces similar comparable phenomena. For example, "Quinn is amazed that his initial interview with Peter Stillman takes fourteen hours. He can't know that taking the case means entering text time, where experiential time equals writing time; the detective's interview in chapter two takes the amount of time it takes to write that chapter" (Malmgren 196).
in which, in our encounter with that space, the space itself tries to guide us in our reconstruction of its already-existing self. By denying us the usual orienting signposts, the techniques employed to create the illusion of a whole textual world, he reveals for us a world which is being created only as it is encountered in "the words which unfold it in time and inscribe it in space" (Blanchot 362). On that first day, for example, at the bequest of Gustav, Ryder goes to the Old Town to find Gustav's daughter and discuss his concerns with her. Initially, he cannot see anyone to match their descriptions but then "turning, I saw a woman sitting with a young boy waving to me from a nearby table. The pair clearly matched the porter's description and I could not understand how I had failed to notice them earlier" (Ishiguro 32). The fictional world is being manipulated for Ryder as easily as textual space is manipulated for the reader. Things are brought into being through the simple act of writing them, as are their relations to other objects. Ryder is "a little taken aback, moreover, that they should be expecting me" (Ishiguro 32), because he is in the same situation as the reader and doesn't yet know that the woman is his wife and the child her son. Ishiguro gives Ryder only the bare minimum to start with, and it is only over time that Ryder learns of the internal connections and links, the system of references, which form the reality around him. The text so also becomes an illustration of how the act of reading is required to substantiate the text and its space, to reveal its design. Ishiguro writes the fictional world of the text not as a pre-existing world of realism, but instead the world and the character relations within it are accounted for as textual time progresses. The further Ryder as writer travels into this world, the more complex and expansive it becomes, for the text looks to the act of reading to reveal its semantic space and uncover the relations between its parts.76

With Ryder experiencing the world as if he were a reader also, an understanding of Ryder's position illustrates the significance of our own role as readers, for Ishiguro shows us how the text is forever oriented towards the reader, requires the reader. Just as Ryder becomes increasingly concerned about the part he has to play in the city's future, so the reader too tends to experience the burden of presence, becoming increasingly

76Yet, though the textual space may, in this way, appear to change with the reading, this does not mean that we should agree with Sutton when he says, "the form of the work - its manifest structure at any time - is not absolutely fixed in a spatial revelation or epiphany, but is organically flexible and adaptable, accommodating itself to every altered perspective in time" (117). We would say instead that "it is only our vision which is being expanded & altered, not the thing itself. Curious, how easy it is for us little
aware of the demands the text places upon him/her, and beginning to question what it is that the text requires. Moreover, as readers standing at the threshold of a space of which we are the focal point, entering the textual city which will pose us so many questions, we know already where it all will end. The already-written conclusion lies before us in the volume of text to hand, and it is only a matter of time before the printed lines bring us to our inevitable destination.

Given this, our reading of Ryder as an Oedipal figure becomes more clearly not only an account of Ryder as a neurotic, but also of Ryder as reader. Oedipus stands with us before this already-written story in that his own future path had been laid out for him from a time before his birth. In a divination which mapped out not one life but two, Oedipus's father Laius heard from the ministers of Phoebus, also called Apollo, that he was to be slain by his own son. Oedipus, in turn, learnt from the oracle at Pytho, another representative of Apollo, that he would bear children by his own mother, and kill his father. The figure of the god Apollo, then, can be seen to stand over the line of Oedipus's life as a sign of its teleological necessity, for, determining Oedipus's ultimate end, he ensures also that the events of his life conform to the pattern predicted. The word of Apollo is the law which rules the progression of the story, and the fulfilment of Oedipus's destiny is a witness to the authority of the god. Within the world of the play, the god Apollo is the law-giver, and so he is also god the Father, for it is the father who presents the law to his child, and initiates his son into the social order. He is also the god as Author, for he is the author of Oedipus's destiny, yet, though his word is law, he speaks only through his representatives, through the medium of others, so that, though his words are known, his voice is never heard. Like a reader, Oedipus stands before an unspoken but already recorded future, so that as Pucci writes, "the reader perceives that he [Oedipus] is following an already written path unknowingly" (10). This is not to say, however, that Oedipus's actions are in themselves predestined, but the final revelation of the truth of the prophecy, Oedipus's arrival at that pre-destination, reveals the absolute inevitability of his fate.77 Fate is not that which determines the future, but that written past which is re-traced, even unwittingly.78

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77 Pucci cites a number of sources which show that the idea of fate as a form of predetermination is "false and ahistorical" (Pucci 10) when applied to Greek tragedy. Martin Mueller also argues that "Fate . . . is in the widest sense that which lies beyond human control. The assertion of the power of fate is simply a metaphorical transformation of human limitations into a counterforce actively resisting or oppressing creatures to confuse the opening of our eyes with the coming into being of a new creation: like children conceiving the world remade each morning when they wake" (Banville 141).
For readers entering the world of the text, it will be as if we have placed ourselves under the ordinance of our own Father figure, our own Apollo, exhibiting similar beliefs in an Author God whose prescribed path we must follow. Where we differ from Oedipus is in our intent to keep to this "already written path" (Pucci 10), for, while Oedipus tries to avoid the fate which awaits him, we adhere to the line of the text to ensure its proper fulfilment. Our movement along the line of the text is often propelled by our faith in this certain conclusion, just as this very reading of The Unconsoled has been motivated throughout by the belief that the narrative line is governed by a coherent logic, and that the aim of our reading is to come upon the key to its design. As Hillis Miller argues, "the linearity of the written or printed book is a puissant support of logocentrism" where "narrative event follows narrative event in a purely metonymic line, but the series tends to organize itself or be organized into a causal chain" (Ariadne's Thread 5, 18). The text is seen to spring from some knowing origin, and to move purposefully forward towards a revelatory end which will illuminate the structuring logos, the teleological primacy of the end determined by our presumption that the line of the narrative represents a series of causal relations which arrive at, or result in, this inevitable final position. Our belief in the existence of the text's logos means that only the end will provide us with all the answers, for, as Hillis Miller says, "The end of the story is the retrospective revelation of the law of the whole" (Ariadne's Thread 18). As such, the end is the locus of the Father, and it is there that he stands to oversee our progress and enforce his law.

Again, we see that Ryder truly occupies the position of reader too, for his own passage through the city is motivated by a belief that his Father waits for him at the end, ready to praise or condemn his musical interpretations. For us as readers, the possibility also remains that we will either have the answer we provide corroborated, or else we would be forced to retrace our steps. When Freud writes that some normal people feel that they are "being pursued by a malignant fate or possessed by some 'daemonic' power; but psychoanalysis has always taken the view that their fate is for the most part arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile influences" (Beyond 21), he supports this sense of a compelling and constricting force which, nevertheless, has an internal source, and is not something imposed on an individual from outside. Though Freud here speaks of a determined fate, he does so in the context of the compulsion to repeat, so that what is fated is that which must be repeated, the past which must be retracted.

78Writing about Jean Giraudoux's La guerre de Troie n'aura pas lieu (translated as Tiger at the Gates) Genette says, "Fate, as everyone knows, is what is written," meaning that, though Giraudoux's play "plays with its / prescribed end" it cannot avoid what has been foretold, cannot escape having to rewrite what has been written before (Palimpsests 380-81).
will have to have that answer provided for us. Now the end then assumes a double aspect, being both that point when we can gain a complete understanding of what has gone before, but being also a place of judgement, a time of reckoning which sees our abilities as readers put to the final test by the Author God. The significance of our situation is underlined by the corresponding pattern of Oedipus's experiences. When Oedipus provides the answer to the Sphinx's riddle, he assumes his father's position as King of the city and husband to the Queen, and once we discover the truth to this text's cypher, then we too will have gained the place of the Father, and our destined arrival at the end will herald only our triumphant entrance onstage. The alternative, as when Oedipus is provided with the key to his own identity, is to have our own eyes put out, to suffer our intellectual castration at the hands of the Father we challenge, but whose text defeats us.\(^80\)

As the place of ultimate judgement, the end of the text is, ultimately, death in the text, for, as Kermode comments, "the real point is surely that reading is, or mimes, a matter of life and death - the structuring of a life by a death" ("A Reply" 588). We saw too in Kepler an expectation of the end as a moment of revelation, death as "the perfecting medium" (134). There are at least two, admittedly rather minor, occasions in The Unconsoled where death is clearly portrayed as a certain end. At one point, we learn of an important event in Sophie's life, when, as a child, she had placed her pet hamster "inside this little gift box she had, all ready to go out, but then something had happened," and she forgot that she had ever put him in the box until some weeks later, by which time, of course, he had died (Ishiguro 84). Elsewhere, death is more clearly associated with the end of narrative, or, rather, those narratives which are destined to end in a particular way are seen to lead to death. Strangely, this occurs when Boris is playing his games of table-tennis. Then, the most impassioned tales of "dramatic reversals and nail-biting comebacks" centre on the player Number Nine, a player so gifted that soon "the inevitability of the outcome once he had received the ball was such that the commentator would say: 'It's a goal,' in tones of resigned admiration, not when the ball actually went into the net, but at the moment Number Nine first gained

\(^79\)In fact, in what follows after he hears the words of the Pythian oracle, Oedipus seems comparable to that Ryder who fails as a reader but still keeps to the line of the text, for Oedipus, while trying to avoid the future prophesied for him, nevertheless fulfils its every word.

\(^80\)This conflation of the sexual and intellectual is not discounted by the various connotations of the name Oedipus, for, as Freud himself suggested, "the signifier pous, ... in Greek not only signifies 'foot' but
possession" (Ishiguro 41, 42). The outcomes of Boris's miniature narratives are as inevitable as Oedipus's fate, and the end result is also a small death, for when Number Nine gets damaged, Boris puts "him in the box, it was a special one, so I wouldn't forget where he was. But we left him behind" (Ishiguro 42). In each of these cases the small, special box seems an obvious coffin, but it is important also simply as an example of an enclosed space, clearly bounded on all sides, like a narrative governed by teleological principles, with its creator, such as young Boris, standing over it to impose the law, and defined by its relation to death, which gives it its final meaning.

If we are looking solely to Ryder as an example of the reader's experience, however, we should remember that Ryder's end discovery is the absence of the Father, so that whatever faith we might have in a Father figure who is both our origin and goal is problematised by the text itself. Within the context of the Oedipal story as it appears in The Unconsoled, the role of the Father was given to Hoffman, and, we might recall, Stephan's apparently successful slaying of his father was actually seen to sit uneasily with the interpretation of the text as an anxiety-dream, although Stephan's ready admission that his parents were right after all seemed to indicate the intervention of the censoring agent. Certainly Hoffman seems to fit the role of the Author God when we consider that, throughout the book, he "supervised the larger structure of events" (Ishiguro 508), and he is seemingly alone in knowing what exactly the future holds. His awareness of what lies ahead is seen in his regular declaration of "An ox! Yes, an ox, an ox, an ox!" (Ishiguro 123) and the action of banging his fist on his forehead, both of which Ryder witnesses on a number of occasions. These acts form part of his rehearsal for that moment which, for him, is the purpose of all that has gone before. It is he who has guaranteed the disastrous turn of events by misdirecting his son in his choice of music, by sabotaging Brodsky's relationship with Miss Collins, and by plying Brodsky with whiskey before the show. Now, finally, he can confront his wife with what he believes must be her extreme disappointment in him, a man of such mediocrity, "nothing but an ox, an ox, an ox!" (Ishiguro 507). He was "the very ball and chain on your ankle" (Ishiguro 507), but she had been as much a prison for him, silently pressuring him to perform, demanding success, and his only aim had been to free himself. Now we have fresh evidence for the failure of the Oedipal desire in the text,

metaphorically also the male sex," so that the name of Oedipus "might point to the signification of the phallus and libido in their relation to intellectual curiosity" (Pucci 76. See also n28 193-94).
for, rather than interpreting Hoffman's failure on the night of the concert as a variation on the murder of the father by the son, we should now instead see the ruin of the evening as something planned and directed by Hoffman from the beginning. It is not so much murder, then, as a form of liberation through self-destruction, the Father absenting himself from the sphere of action.

The absence of the father-figure, the representative of the *logos* which would give the narrative line its aim and purpose, means Ryder, the writer, our representative, never comes to the end, or at the end, never dies, or lays claim to a finality. If we could read the signs, however, we would have known from the beginning that there was to be no end, for the very first sentence tells us that "there was no one - not even a clerk" (Ishiguro 3) to receive Ryder into the text. No one, then, or no One, no singular being, or absolute truth, no monological force to propel him through to the end, but also not even a clerk, a clergyman or priest, and representative of the Father God, no Teiresias, to instruct him. When a clerk finally does appear, he can only apologise for his absence, and for Hoffman's, who had wanted to meet with Ryder personally. Here, again, we find Kepler mirroring *The Unconsoled*, for there, too, those first few lines tell us all that we will be told, but it is, as Wincklemann says, that "Everything is told us but nothing explained" (Banville 191).

The question then, however, is who is telling us that there is nothing to be told, who produces the signs of the absence of the signifier. Some possible answers might be found in what follows this negative beginning, in the nature of the fulfilment of the prophecy, in what we have described as the re-tracing of a written past. In particular, the uneven, often unintentional nature of the rewriting, casts a fresh light on the original lines. For example, we have said that Oedipus's life seems governed by *telos*, by "origin, continuity, and finality," and the word of Apollo, but it is also not without its elements of "indeterminancy, chance, and arbitrariness," marked throughout the play by the appearance of the word *tukhē* (Pucci 5). The figure of the Father may be the teleological force behind Oedipus's life, but he "has a mother that the text explicitly identifies with the notion of chance (*tukhē*)" (Pucci 5), Oedipus identifying himself as the "child of Fortune" (Sophocles, *Oedipus* line 1080), and sent out into the world by antagonistic parents. Oedipus's ties to the chance event are evident even in the origin of his name, given to him on account of the misfortune of his riveted ankles, instead of being bestowed to him by a father who would "insure his identity and that of his
"lineage," and so preserve his family line (Pucci 32). In its ambiguous etymology, his name presents two contrasting readings, "Swollenfoot, allied to the element of finality, and Knowfoot, partaking of the element of chance," so that Teiresias may even claim that Oedipus arrived at the answer to the riddle of the Sphinx not by any innate intelligence, but by the "vagaries of chance [tukhê]" (Pucci 13, 35), by the fortuitous combination of an accidental naming and a timely misreading which produced a final answer. The intervention by chance into Oedipus's affairs problematises the theological assumptions behind the play, questioning both the real presence of Apollo in the words of his oracles, and his ability to effect change when necessary. As Pucci argues, within the play's "ideological framework there should be no places for either tukhê or the absence of the father" (29).

Significantly, however, these chance occurrences don't divert Oedipus from his destiny, but rather guarantee it, for the divine word of Apollo which preordains Oedipus's destiny is seemingly fulfilled only through events which the language of the text itself marks as random or accidental. For Pucci, the two ideological stances, telos and tukhê are "simultaneously in conflict and in complicity" (5). Perhaps this is partly explained by the changes affecting the concept of tukhê around the time of the play's writing. Where once Tukhê had been thought of as a divinity herself, and the word had "theological associations with fate, fortune, and providential (and unexpected) chance," it had begun now to diverge from its traditional meaning to suggest the "mere accidentality" featured in Sophocles's play (Pucci 30. See also 181n). Pucci points out, however, that tukhê "has a wide range of connotations, implying both the providential (and unexpected) intervention of a god and the secular notion of randomness, and chance" (12). Sl Tukhê embraces both the concept of purposeful intervention by an Author God in an ordered plan, and the purposelessness, though not necessarily meaninglessness, of chance occurrences, leading Pucci to "use the word chance - and more precisely the term scriptural chance - to designate the effects of the difference and deferral of the linguistic sign. . . . In fulfilling this function tukhê may be almost synonymous with telos, or its direct opposite" (36). This is in accord with Derrida's

81The first of these, unexpected intervention, seems to return to Mueller's description of fate as something which lies outside of human control (n7), so that tukhê circles back to telos to illustrate their close relation. Remarkably, the historical Kepler also wrote of the part played in his life by what we are here calling tukhê: "I believe Divine Providence arranged matters in such a way that what I could not obtain with all my efforts was given to me through chance" (qtd. in Imhof, Banville 105).
description of the play of *différence* as announcing "the unity of chance and necessity in calculations without end" ("Différance" 7).82

Perhaps coincidentally, an excellent example of a text which begins by chance is *City of Glass*, the text which fittingly guided us in our initial reading of *The Unconsoled*. There, of course, "It was a wrong number that started it" (Auster, City 3), that was "the mistake that sets the whole story in motion" (though the text itself, the actual writing of the story, was similarly "inspired by a wrong number" (Auster, Red Notebook 377).83 Even on the first page we are being told that, by the end, Quinn's feeling was that "nothing was real except chance" (Auster, City 3). Yet the most remarkable chance event in the text occurs when Quinn first goes to Grand Central Station, to find and to follow Stillman. Quinn spots Stillman on the ramp, but "what happened then defied explanation. Directly behind Stillman, heaving into view just inches behind his right shoulder, another man stopped, took a lighter out of his pocket, and lit a cigarette. His face was the exact twin of Stillman's" (Auster, City 56). As "the first turned right, the second turned left," Quinn, as Auster, had to choose to follow one or the other, but he knew that that choice "would be arbitrary, a submission to chance. Uncertainty would haunt him to the end" (Auster, City 56). Quinn has only a fifty-percent chance of following the right Stillman because there are two of them now, Stillman is a repeated figure. Moreover, this repetition interrupts Quinn's pursuit of Stillman, it introduces an element of hesitancy into what follows, and into the telling of what follows, for though we continue to follow the line of Quinn's story as he tails Stillman, we are now always aware of that second possible storyline, where Quinn follows the other Stillman.

This brief instant in Quinn's tale bears scrutiny because it mirrors exactly the structuring elements of the space of text identified in the first chapter, where repetitions in the textual line mark points of intersection which divert us from our course. The closeness of Auster's account to our own is emphasised by a passage in *The Invention of Solitude*, where the vocabulary constantly recalls our own discussions, touches on similar points. Auster writes:

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82 We can compare this to Agamben's statement that rhythm opens the work of art "in a space in which calculation and play appear to blur into each other" ("Original Structure" 99).

83 Blanchot also points out that "Valéry often reminded us that his best works were created for a chance commission" ("Literature" 362).
As in the meanings of words, things take on meaning only in relationship to each other. . . . The faces rhyme for the eye, just as two words can rhyme for the ear. To carry the proposition one step further, A. would contend that it is possible for events in one's life to rhyme as well. . . . Wherever his eye or mind seems to stop, he discovers another connection, another bridge to carry him to yet another place, and even in the solitude of his room, the world has been rushing in on him at a dizzying speed, as if it were all suddenly converging in him and happening at once. Coincidence: to fall on with; to occupy the same place in time or space. (161-62)

The image of repetition in the text requires that one line touch upon the other, that, for a moment, they coincide, co-occupying a section of the space of the narrative, the two lines intersecting at a point which diverts us from the path to an absolute end. Now, however, this coincidence means not simply a spatial co-existence, but implies also a certain arbitrariness, a connection without causality, a chance occurrence which may, nonetheless, happen by design, be the work of the Author God.

Such coincidences are equally apparent in The Unconsoled, but manifest themselves only at very particular points in text. In each case, Ryder will have travelled to some place but then, when he wants to return to where he was, will realise that where he is is simply another part of where he wants to be: "it suddenly dawned on me that we were in the atrium of the hotel;" "I had at that moment remembered that this café and the one in which I had left Boris were in fact parts of the same building;" "I recalled from the previous evening that the house adjoined the hotel;" "only then did it dawn on me that I was in fact sitting in the Old Town by the main square, looking over to the Hungarian Café" (Ishiguro 148, 203, 277, 390). In each case Ryder must move through darkness from one section to another: "Somewhere in the darkness on the far side," "I could see only darkness," "the long dark corridor," "the square was largely in darkness" (Ishiguro 148, 203, 280, 390), as if the world of the text had been sliced apart, rearranged, and darkness fills the joints. Here again we witness the relation between repetition and coincidence, for the return to a particular location, the repeated appearance of that location, results from the discovery that the desired location shares its space, or coincides with, the present location. Of course, this coincidence does not exist in the world of the text, or at least it seems irrational to believe that the Karwinsky
Gallery, located on a "quiet road rising between meadows" (Ishiguro 259), is also the hotel in the city centre. Such a coincidence, however, may easily exist in the space of the text which produces this world, and which will regularly transport us from one place to the other within the space of a sentence, in a way which would suggest that these places really did adjoin each other if, as Ishiguro does, we saw no difference between the world and space of the text. Ryder must indeed traverse a black passage, then, because it is the printed text which returns him to his point of departure, the locational repetition being no more than a repetition of text.

If we try to map the movement of the path of the text at these points when Ryder can suddenly change the direction he appears to be following, we can see that the narrative has here arrived at something of a fork in its own road. The apparent route of the text is diverted from its original course by this coincidence of textual parts, by this intersection of narrative elements. This image of the diverging narrative line is not uncommon for, as Hillis Miller points out, "Another area of narrative terminology involves topography: roads, crossroads, paths" and, of course, "narrative motifs like Oedipus murdering Laius at the place where three roads cross" (Ariadne's Thread 20) (Pucci reminds us also that "the crossroad is the place . . . of tukhê" (Pucci 106)). The fork at which Oedipus meets and slays his father is that "place where three roads meet" in the "land called Phocis - where the road divides, / Leading to Delphi and to Daulia" (Sophocles, Oedipus line 716, 733-34). Laius would have been travelling the road from Thebes, about to head down the road for Delphi up which Oedipus was coming. These two lives, then, which had diverged so many years previously, come together at this point from which emerges only one life-line, the other ended at the crossroads. In The Unconsoled, however, the crossroads are significant not because they are being alluded to as part of a recurring narrative motif, but rather because the text itself is obeying the law of the crossroad, eliminating one potential narrative line to enable another to continue.84

Ishiguro's mapping of the space of the text onto its world therefore dramatises the way in which these repetitions in the narrative line, as points of intersection, act to divert us from our path. If we think of the narrative as being represented by a straight line, we can form the point of intersection by curving that line back upon itself, creating
a sort of bow shape, with two loose ends forming a 'V' above the point of intersection, and a small loop below. If we think of the line going from one end to the point of intersection as the account of Ryder's journey to the Karwinsky gallery, and the line going from the point of intersection to the other end as the account of what happens after he leaves the hotel, we can see that the point of intersection does away with the need to account for the loop, that is, to describe the journey from the gallery to the hotel. Ryder's journeys back to the hotel, or café, or square, need now never be related because the textual intersection enables another narrative route to be taken instead. The 'natural' course of the narrative is diverted onto this intersecting line, selecting a new direction provided by this textual coincidence.

Ishiguro's text, in its explicit imbrication of world and space, is making manifest what occurs in almost every text, that is, the manipulation of the space of the text so as to edit the narrative line. Most interestingly, this manipulation occurs especially at the physical level of the space of text. In chapter one, we saw how Hillis Miller distinguishes "between effects of discontinuity, spaces or hiatuses between segments of a narrative line, and true disturbances of the line that make it curve back on itself, recross itself, tie itself in knots" (Ariadne's Thread 6). Such spaces include the break between volumes or chapters, and we saw also how Sarah Fielding praised her brother's use of divisions, which moved the reader "without hurry or apparent absurdity to and from the several places" (qtd. in Watson 67). Of course, the word 'absurd' has its root in the Latin surdus, meaning 'not to the purpose', or, even, anti-teleological, so that the line of the text is being saved from purposelessness by a break in the course of the line which mimics a redirection through textual coincidences. In other words, the black text through which Ryder passes is here replaced by the white space of the textless, so that the line of the text, though here severed and broken apart, nevertheless preserves its sense of order and is saved from the unreasonableness of "absurdity."

If we question why chapter breaks should be chosen over textual coincidences, we need only look to the way such coincidences explicitly divert the narrative from its

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84 The importance of the crossroad in the formation of our narratives is seen also in Kepler's story, for "all his life was summed up in this picture of himself, a little man, wet and weary, dithering at a fork in the road" (Banville 187).
85 In contrast with those texts where chapters enclose narrative units, or where chapter divisions allow a discreet change of scene or setting, chapter breaks in The Unconsoled coincide with Ryder's periods of sleep, so that the text is never absent from him. Given our description of Ryder as one who wakes into a dream world, we could, if we wished, suggest that this Ryder is the dream-form of a real Ryder whose life occurs in these non-textual spaces.
natural line, so physical divisions are a preferable option if a sense of realism is required, with the narrative seemingly progressing naturally. As Lefebvre argues when discussing the illusion of transparency, because the space to be described is assumed to be fully comprehensible, then "it is assumed that absurdity and obscurity, which are treated as the same thing, may be dissipated without any corresponding disappearance of the 'object'" (28). The elision of the spatial repetitions which would act as "true disturbances of the line," an elision which is a veiled manipulation of the textual line, means the line more fittingly acts as a representation of space (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Thread 6).

If the text is to preserve the illusion of logical order, then it would be preferable to remove points of repetition from the narrative line, for the striking thing about coincidences is their own lack of any causal determination; they are coincidental only in that they are not linked by any causal connection, but only, by chance, occupy the same place, occurring simultaneously. The Unconsoled, therefore, reveals how the linear narrative order implied by the constant line of the text, depends on the intervention of chance, the rupture of order, to preserve its apparently constant progression. In this way, then, the idea of repetition, or re-occurrence, a textual coincidence working against a logic of narrative but still presented in the printed line of text, leading us to the end of the book, parallels the interplay of telos and tukhé which preserve the trajectory of Oedipus's fate.86

What must also be asked is what follows this point, where the line hesitates between chance and destiny, between accident and design. We can see that, at the point where he encountered two Stillmans in Grand Central Station, Quinn made a decision and "went after the first Stillman, slowing his pace to match the old man's, and followed him to the subway" (Auster, City 56), but there is no way for Quinn to be sure that the Stillman whom he intended to follow from Grand Central Station, is the same as the Stillman he is following. By creating a fork in the path and sending the line on a detour to another place, the coincidence, whose elision was meant to prevent absurdity, here creates in the text an anacoluthon, for that which comes after the point does not follow from that which precedes it: the line is lacking sequence (this is even more apparent in The Unconsoled, where a door in the Karwinsky Gallery can open onto the hall of a city

86Strangely, graffiti sprayed on a wall at the intersection of Great Eastern Street, Rivington Street, and Old Street in London EC2 reads "Solid configuration formed by chance events."
hotel). This interruption in Quinn's pursuit of Stillman can be seen to reflect on his later role as the inheritor of Stillman's mission to recover the prelapsarian tongue, for Derrida has argued, in "Perjuries," that an anacoluthon is always implied in the figure of the acolyte, the one who follows ('anacoluthon' and 'acolyte' come from the Greek 'akolouthos' and 'akoloutheein', meaning 'following' and 'to follow'). As a follower of Freud and Heidegger, Derrida says of himself that, though he may try to be faithful, nevertheless there is always an element of betrayal, a break in his following. When he adds something new to what they have written, that is a betrayal, but if he were to follow mechanically, repeating exactly what they have said, that would be a betrayal too. As he follows, therefore, he displaces also.

And this is exactly what Quinn does as well, as a reader following in Stillman's wake. We have seen how Quinn's reading allows him to take what is effectively the fabula of Stillman's progress, a chronological record of the events as they happened, and reorder the steps according to their spatial organisation so that what once appeared to follow one from the other are now seen in a different relation, a spatial relation produced by the course that Stillman plots. Yet we have to wonder if this chronology is not so much a record of Stillman's movements as of Quinn's experience of them, a record not of Stillman's writing, but of Quinn's reading. Quinn, trailing behind Stillman, tracing his every movement, is "seeing the thing and writing about it in the same fluid gesture" (Auster, City 63), so that reading is already a re-writing, a synchronised repetition of the deliberate and hesitant progression of the writer, a mirrored experience of the rhythms and motions of moving through the text's space. Quinn's mapping, or interpretation, of Stillman's passage is, then, a re-tracing of his own path, and not a representation of the equivalent, but not identical, path taken by Stillman. It is the "thread and labyrinth," as Hillis Miller writes, "thread intricately crinkled to and fro as the retracing of the labyrinth that defeats the labyrinth but makes another intricate web at the same time; pattern is here superimposed on pattern" (Ariadne's Thread 12). Nor can the form of Quinn's interpretation of his writing reproduce his own experience of it,  

87 As Blanchot asks of Lautréamont's prose, "At what moment, in this labyrinth of order, in this maze of clarity, did meaning stray from the path? At what turning did reason become aware that it had stopped 'following,' that something else was continuing, progressing, concluding in its place, something like it in every way, something reason thought it recognized as itself, until the moment it woke up and discovered this other that had taken its place?" ("Literature" 390-91).

88 Todorov points out that "two accounts dealing with the same text will never be identical" because "these accounts describe not the universe of the book itself but that universe transformed, as it is found in the psyche of each individual" (42).
for the interpretation cannot take place in the space of that initial reading/writing whose words are inseparable from the "streets where they had been drawn" (Auster, City 71), but must instead be removed from it, displaced and recontextualised. Quinn must appeal to an abstracted representation of the city's physical space, re-tracing the letters on a map of the city, so that he may finally read what it is that he himself has already written, betraying the one he has followed.  

And, of course, we have been following Quinn ourselves as he follows Stillman, analysing his every move, looking over his shoulder to reproduce faithfully his reading. In fact, if we wish to text our adherence to his methods, the text seems to provide us with the perfect opportunity, an excellent chance to act the part of the detective reader, for, with Stillman gone, and having visited the character Auster, Quinn spends one "day on his feet," walking through the city (Auster, City 106). We know how Quinn reacted to such a situation, and we are encouraged to follow his lead. In The Invention of Solitude, Auster writes:

> It sometimes seems to A. that his son's mental perambulations while at play are an exact image of his own progress through the labyrinth of his book. He has even thought that if he could somehow make a diagram of his son at play...and then make a similar diagram of his book (elaborating what takes place in the gaps between words, the interstices of the syntax, the blanks between sections - in other words, unravelling the spool of connections), the two diagrams would be the same (165)

and in City of Glass we will find Quinn himself wondering "what the map would look like of all the steps he had taken in his life and what word it would spell" (129). Indeed, if we map the path that Quinn takes on that one day in New York city, the result is suggestive, but it is hard to read any letters in it, to see it spell any word (see Fig. 1). Sometimes it looks like Manhattan Island, but it doesn't correspond too closely, and we begin to feel we're straining to make things fit. Yet there is another map that we can superimpose on this one, the map of places linked by this walk through the city. There's the statue of Columbus (in The Locked Room, the narrator meets the character Fanshawe in Columbus Square, Boston); there's Grand Central Station, where the text

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89Barthes writes that Sollers's H should be read "not looking directly at the book as though it were an object which was kept and contemplated and consumed in the absence of any subject, but over the shoulder of the person writing it, as if we were writing it at the same time as the author himself" (Sollers 92).
Figure 1. A map of Quinn's path through New York City
divided; the Flatiron Building, New York's first skyscraper, and the first Tower of this
Babel; Sheridan Square, named after the Civil War general, and scene of one of the
worst of New York's Draft Riots in 1863; Washington Square, the title of a novel by
Henry James; the World Trade Centre, whose own story now seems a sad echo of the
Tower of Babel and its divisive end; Bowling Green, where the Dutch colonists bought
Manhattan from the Native Americans for approximately $24; the Staten Island Ferry;
Union Square; the United Nations. This path, marked out by Quinn, might almost tell
the tale of the fall of America, how the New World failed to be the New Eden also (see
Fig. 2). Yet Quinn's related experience of the same route is very different, for though
he, too, "concentrated on the things he had seen while walking," he finds different
(broken) words to describe them, speaking of "the tramps, the down-and-outs, the
shopping-bag ladies, the drifters and drunks" (Auster, City 108). Though we never lost
sight of Quinn, and followed closely in his footsteps, our map of his movements betrays
his vision, and brings us into contact with only our own interpretative stumblings.

But still we cannot think that we have arrived at this place by ourselves, that our
unfaithful translation of Quinn's passage means a complete rupture in our relations with
him. In the previous chapter, we mentioned how, in The New York Trilogy, the
detective, the one who follows, becomes a writer, but we had not yet recognised that the
writer also becomes the one to be written about. This is most evident in The Locked
Room where the narrator, who is to write a biography of Fanshawe that "could be as
much about you as about him," says that Fanshawe "is the place where everything
begins for me, and without him I would hardly know who I am . . . . He was . . . the one
I saw whenever I looked up from myself" (246, 199). Therefore, when Fanshawe, in a
letter, writes that the narrator should "say nothing to Sophie. Make her divorce me, and
then marry her as soon as you can," then this is exactly what the narrator does, so that,
as Bernstein writes, "Fanshawe's writings - his manuscripts and letters - become a meta-
writing that scripts the course of the narrator's existence" (91).90 The narrator may try to
write of Fanshawe, but his efforts return him only to himself: "we substitute ourselves
for the person in the story, pretending that we can understand him because we
understand ourselves. This is a deception. We exist for ourselves . . . . No one can

90As Perec writes, "Puzzling is not a solitary game: every move the puzzler makes, the puzzle-maker has
made before . . . each hope and each discouragement have all been designed, calculated, and decided by
the other" (Life Preamble and 191).
Figure 2. An annotated map of Quinn's path through New York City
cross the boundary into another - for the simple reason that no one can gain access to himself" (Auster, *The Locked Room* 247).

This theme of the "inability to enter Fanshawe's thoughts" (Bernstein 97) is very apparent in a scene set in a cemetery on the day of Fanshawe's father's death. Fanshawe has climbed down into a freshly dug grave and is lying at the bottom, staring at the sky above. The narrator recalls that, for a period when they were very young, Fanshawe took to sitting in a cardboard box, removed from everyone else, leading the narrator to admit that "nothing interested me so much as what was happening to Fanshawe inside that box" (Auster, *The Locked Room* 220). Now, with Fanshawe in the grave, as if in an invisible coffin, the narrator again sees that "Fanshawe was alone down there, thinking his thoughts, living through those moments by himself, and though I was present, the event was sealed off from me, as though I was not really there at all" (Auster, *The Locked Room* 220-221). The box and the coffin mirror exactly the two illustrations in *The Unconsoled* of the death-defined end of logically constructed narratives, epitomised by the footballing exploits of Boris's Number Nine. The narrator in *The Locked Room*, too, is concerned "to reason out the relationship between death and closure" (Bernstein 98), suggesting that "it would seem impossible to say anything about a man until he is dead" (Auster, *The Locked Room* 253). His attempt to enter into Fanshawe's thoughts represents a desire on his part to gain access to the Authorial position, to know for certain the way of the world, but we are aware ourselves of the difficulties he would face in this.

Instead, we should notice other similarities between this scene in the graveyard and those points of coincidence in *The Unconsoled*. In the description of the way in which "the snow was coming down heavily, and the ground was turning white. Somewhere in the middle of the cemetery there was a freshly dug grave" (Auster, *The Locked Room* 220) we have again a blank, clean page marked by a black hole, like the black passage which brings Ryder from one line of the text to the other. Unlike the closed coffin, in the open grave, which was there as "a matter of pure chance," we find the expression of a further repetition, and again an anacoluthon, for just as Fanshawe lay there and "looked up at the sky, his eyes blinking furiously as the snow fell onto his face," so the narrator, standing and waiting, "turned my head up to the darkening winter sky - and everything was a chaos of snow, rushing down on top of me" (Auster, *The Locked Room* 221, 220, 221). In the displaced repetition of Fanshawe's actions, what
the narrator encounters is not a sure reality ordered by an Author God, but a random
constellation of points, formed of the same matter though all different, and all seemingly
meant for him.

Bernstein refers to this moment as "one of the novel's first figurations of the
sublime" (96), and as we begin to understand why this might be so, we begin also to
comprehend why these points of repetition, these coincidences, the hinges which bring
the anacoluthon into play, and the manifest structure of a text's spatiality, inform the
entire reading experience. Looking up into the sky, the narrator is like Kepler (who
sought patterns in the stars) with his eye to the knot in his world formed by chance
coincidences, thinking "if only he could find the right way to apply his eye, he might
glimpse enormities" (Banville 174). At this point, Kepler, as reader, expresses the same
sense of arrogance and self-doubt we saw in Ryder as well ourselves, thinking that it is
simply a matter of applying his abilities in the right way, but perhaps wary of being
overwhelmed by what he might then see, just as, in the European Enlightenment, the
sublime "was strangely transformed into a vision of the terror that could be perceived
both in nature and in art, a terror uneasily allied with pleasurable sensations of
augmented power, and even of narcissistic freedom, freedom in the shape of that
wildness that Freud dubbed 'the omnipotence of thought,' the greatest of all narcissistic
illusions" (Bloom 182).

It is in Freud's essay "The 'Uncanny'" that Bloom reads his theory of the
sublime. There, Freud, tracing the word through its linguistic usage, first defines
'uncanny', in German 'unheimlich', as "the opposite of what is familiar" (220), in
contrast with what is heimlich, homely or familiar. This simple opposition, however, is
troubled by other meanings attached to 'heimlich', which suggests also a thing
"concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know of or about it" (Sanders
qtd. in Freud, "Uncanny" 223). That which is homely is, in turn, that which is not for
strangers to see, so that, finally, "among its different shades of meaning the word
'heimlich' exhibits one which is identical with its opposite, 'unheimlich'. What is
heimlich thus comes to be unheimlich" even as the word itself returns to itself as
something altered, the same but different (Freud, "Uncanny" 224).91 The uncanny now
becomes "that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and

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91 Heimlich and unheimlich here reflect the movement of tukhē towards telos, where it comes almost to be
synonymous with its supposed opposite.
long familiar" (Freud, "Uncanny" 220), implying a repeated encounter, or a return to a familiar place. Indeed, Freud later links the uncanny to "the repetition of the same thing," or "an unintended recurrence of the same situation," recounting from his own experiences an occasion where three times he found himself on the same street, despite all attempts to leave it ("Uncanny" 236, 237).

Now we can begin to see how the uncanny might relate to our experience of textual space, where the repetitions in the line bring us again and again to the same place, and as Freud furthers his argument we find him describing familiar situations. "This factor of involuntary repetition," he argues, "forces upon us the idea of something fateful and inescapable when otherwise we should naturally have spoken only of 'chance'" ("Uncanny" 237), recalling Kepler's growing conviction that the chance occurrences in his life are a sign that "it had all been slyly arranged" (Banville 101). Yet as we have seen time and again, this move towards an acceptance of a guiding telos cannot erase the sense that tukhê may underlie everything. It is in that experience of repetition that we come face to face with the tension between design and chance, and it is in the need to decide if any coincidence is in fact the truest intervention on the part of the Author (is it coincidence or design that Djuna Barnes's first novel was called Ryder, or that Kepler is lent a hat by a Baron Hoffmann?) that we become most keenly self-aware of our own involvement in the text. More than this, it is not simply our involvement which we become aware of, but our very selves, our presence within the text, for our repeated entrance into that place in the text includes both our first, unquestioning passage through that point, as well as that second time, when we are suddenly alert to possibilities. Returning to that place, it is as if we come fact to face with our prior selves, experiencing "the phenomenon of the 'double'" where there is "a doubling, dividing and interchanging of the self" (Freud, "Uncanny" 234), another uncanny repetition, and another rupture also, this time in our perception of our self, for suddenly we ourselves are that long familiar thing become unfamiliar. The spatiality of the text, therefore, enables us, as Culler says, "to read ourselves in the limits of our understanding" ("Towards" 262). "We are nothing more that this movement, nocturnal and diurnal, of the readable and the unreadable, in us, outside of us" (Sollers qtd. in Culler, "Towards" 262).
Freud's understanding of the uncanny here expands on what we had said so far of the reader's experience of the moment of repetition, and he takes us yet further when he argues that "whatever reminds us of this inner 'compulsion to repeat' is perceived as uncanny" ("Uncanny" 238). From this, we can argue that the textual space produces an uncanny effect not only because it shares with this compulsion the matter of repetition, but because the 'content' of that repetition also relates back to the compulsion. In our earlier discussion of the compulsion to repeat, in relation to Ryder in The Unconsoled, we saw Freud, asking "how is the predicate of being 'instinctual' related to the compulsion to repeat?" argue that "it seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things" (Beyond 36). Ryder, we argued, seemed compelled to repeat the loss of his parents, this loss seemingly motivated by their recognition of his Oedipal desire, so that at that point where he was to achieve that which he most desired, he instead found himself utterly alone. So it is also for the reader who, at that point where the long hoped-for meaning of the text should be most clearly expressed, instead finds only the echo of their own reading.

The instinctual urge behind the compulsion to repeat reveals a more fundamental drive as well, however, for the first instinct, claims Freud, is "the instinct to return to the inanimate state" (Beyond 38), the death instinct. The image of Fanshawe in the grave connects that uncanny moment clearly to death, but all coincidental intersections involve a death, for they mean the death of a narrative line, as when Laius is killed by Oedipus at the crossroads, or Quinn follows the first Stillman so that the story of the second is no more. And with every step Stillman himself took in his path across the city, there was a near infinity of steps which would never be taken, so many messages which would remain unwritten. Yet these deathly points are in no way an end, for there is always that which follows on from there, and, indeed, we can recast the image of one line emerging from the meeting of two as the birth of a new narrative path, not the death of the one. Indeed, as we have seen, if the line is to be saved from absurdity, then it must interact with another, so that the two lines become like those animalculae who, if "at the moment before they show signs of senescence, are able to coalesce with each other, that is to 'conjugate' (soon after which they once more separate), they are saved from growing old and become 'rejuvenated'" (Freud, Beyond 48). In fact, at the point

92Imhof sees in Kepler's successful discoveries "the uncanny intuition of a dreamer" (Banville 106), while Pucci says of Oedipus the King that "the chain of events in the play produces an uncanny feeling of
where the two Stillman's appear, Auster writes that "Quinn craved an amoeba's body, wanting to cut himself in half and run off in two directions at once" (City 56). Now, we can read the repetition on the line of the text as a function of the life instincts, for "conjugation . . . has a life-preserving and rejuvenating effect" (50), and again we find support in the texts, for we had already seen how, at these points of intersection, Ryder often moves from a dark passage into light, like a reenactment of birth, while the concert hall where Ryder is scheduled to play seems like a womb in which he is held.

In the space of the text, then, life and death do not coincide with 'in the beginning' and 'the end'. Instead, Fanshawe lives to say "I'm already dead. I took poison hours ago" (Auster, The Locked Room 312), and The Locked Room can become a tale where "new, botched beginnings fill the latter portion of the text, and even the final chapter finds the narrator meditating 'that the story wasn't over'' (Bernstein 92). In The Unconsoled, death seems most clearly represented in that passage when Ryder moves out onto the empty stage to be faced with the "vast, dark, empty space" (Ishiguro 519) of the auditorium, and this marks the point of the most fundamental repetition, when the various Oedipal narratives begin again. Stephan, as the younger Oedipus, is about to leave his parents. Ryder, as Oedipus the King, is about to enter a new city, having apparently solved an impossible riddle. And Brodsky, the elder Oedipus, is being sent to his own version of Colonus, the St. Nicholas Clinic, "the place that takes in down-and-outs" (Ishiguro 522). At this point of intersection, therefore, where the line turns right back upon itself, the life instincts come into play and the result is "the influx of fresh amounts of stimulus . . . [which] increases those tensions, introducing what might be described as fresh 'vital differences' which must be lived off" (Freud, Beyond 55). In fact Lefebvre, whose criticism of Freud is that his "bio-energetic theories tend to collapse into mechanism," argues that "the explosive waste of energy is indistinguishable from its productive use: beginning on the place of animal life, play, struggle, war and sex are coextensive" (177), so that, though Freud might see "these two instincts . . . struggling with each other from the very first" (Beyond 61n), Lefebvre see the death instinct as no more than "an unproductive use or misuse . . . of basic energy," "a joyful pessimism" (180).

This injection of vital differences places the reader in an interesting situation, however, especially when we remember that Freud has already set out as one of his random finality, of controlled arbitrariness, and undetermined decisions as in an anxiety dream" (41).
tenets the belief that "the course of those [mental] events is invariably set in motion by an unpleasurable tension, and that it takes a direction such that its final outcome coincides with a lowering of that tension - that is, with an avoidance of unpleasure or a production of pleasure" (Beyond 7). The burden of presence placed on a reader by a text such as The Unconsoled, which so clearly demands from the reader an adequate performance, seems exactly the kind of experience which might produce such an unpleasurable tension in the mind. For some, therefore, this fresh stimulus, which coincides with a further reminder of the absence of the Father, means only that no pleasurable release of tension is possible, either through intellectual victory or defeat. The end which was to reveal the law which had governed the whole instead loops us back to the beginning of the story, and with no Father to guarantee its meaning or reveal its intended sense, the text takes its meaning now only as a re-writing of itself, one in an unending series of texts we are compelled to read. This repeating act of reading is also now no longer simply Ryder's story but ours also, for what else are we to do now but move on to another text, another labyrinthine city, and start again on the path to the conclusion. Textual repetition brings only the continuation of a reading life which is a routine of constant stress and tension without relief, to the extent that a true conclusion is asked for, even if that conclusion were death at the hands of the Father. The desired end would be the death of the text, as well as the death of our ambition as readers, but would bring a welcome relief from unpleasurable tensions. It is as Freud says, that "it may be . . . that this belief in the internal necessity of dying is only another of those illusions which we have created 'um die Schwere des Daseins zu ertragen' ['To bear the burden of existence']" (Schiller qtd. in Freud, Beyond 45).

The Unconsoled does not provide us with such an ending, for even the material end of the book is not allowed to signify the end of the text, but it does suggest a more pleasurable motivation for repetition instead. In those last few pages, Ryder is breakfasting on a tram which never arrives at the end of the line but instead "goes right the way round the entire circuit" (Ishiguro 533). Making his way towards the buffet at the rear of the tram, Ryder begins to imagine the conversation he might have with his fellow passenger, the electrician, discussing football and the cinema, the usual subjects, and then he considers what might happen after that, the second helpings, the comradely talk, until, finally, "as the tram came to a halt, I would perhaps give the electrician one last wave and disembark, secure in the knowledge that I could look forward to Helsinki.
with pride and confidence” (Ishiguro 353). The text projects a future which lies beyond the end of the book, but which is also the repetition of the story which has just occurred, the story of an arrival at a hotel, a planned performance, the non-appearance of the parents. The final sentence of the text replays this pattern on a smaller scale, for as Ryder "began making my way back to my seat" (Ishiguro 535), it seems that what would follow next would be the repetition of the imagined passage just read.

In this serene account, the text offers such an easy and guiltless pleasure that there is hardly much need for explanation if we attempt to repeat the experience. As Freud says, "Novelty is always the condition of enjoyment" and "repetition, the re-experiencing of something identical, is clearly in itself a source of pleasure" (Beyond 35, 36). The Unconsoled seems to illustrate such innocent pleasures when it describes Ryder's final, circuitous tram journey, with its routine conversations and second helpings of such delicious food. If, however, we relate Ryder's experience here to his experience as writer, just as we have his other paths through the city, we can see that the circular route of the tram, reached via a path which "cut a completely straight line through the woods" (Ishiguro 528), suggests a very different textual experience, for the tram's passage is uninterrupted, unbroken, enclosed, and the tracks which carry it inevitably to its destination allow no deviation from its course. This is the purely linear text, unmoved by tukhê, or, at least, with any hesitation in the line superbly disguised. This is the text as a representation of an exemplary space, the illusion of transparency meaning that all that might be hidden is supposed to have been brought "from the shadows into the light" (Lefebvre 28) of "another sunny day" (Ishiguro 529). Suddenly, all that Ryder has become aware of during his time in the city, is again repressed, veiled from him, and he believes again that he is living "good life" (Shields 40), with no desire to change. As Freud says, "If conditions remained the same, it [the living entity] would do no more than constantly repeat the same course of life" (Beyond 38). This circular repetition, therefore, is nothing but the "repetitiveness of daily routine" (Shields 33), a monotonous and banal motion which dulls the senses and makes us strangers to ourselves because we never encounter ourselves. Lacking the uncanny repetitions of that textual space which is a space of representation, the linear text can become a space of alienation, deadening rather than death-defying.

The reader’s experience of the space of the text, then, can appear as something rather negative, meaning either the loss of a desired object, the perpetuation of uneasy
tensions, or a lulling into a false haze of pleasure. But the vital differences introduced
by the life instinct which motivates the compulsion to repeat do not necessarily result in
disturbing tensions, for, as Freud describes, "our consciousness communicates to us
feelings from within not only of pleasure and unpleasure but also of a peculiar tension
which in its turn can be either pleasurable or unpleasurable" (Beyond 63). Lefebvre,
also, says that "the release of energy . . . modifies space or generates a new space" (177),
but perhaps it is hard to see how the space opened up by the energies of the life instinct
can produce pleasure. In part, this is because what happens in this space depends on the
reader and how they react, in that moment of uncanny repetition, to the doubling which
confronts them with their self made unfamiliar, defamiliarised. In this break in the line,
which is in such contrast with the soothing homogeneity of the circle of routine, what
was meant to remain hidden is revealed, "for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or
alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has
become alienated from it only through the process of repression" (Freud, Beyond 241).
In the darkness within the text, everything comes to light, and a true experience of the
unalienated self becomes a possibility.93 It is these uncanny repetitions, therefore,
which enable the space of text to be a truly lived space, for, as we have seen, for
Lefebvre living is "the practice of overcoming alienation to reach a deeper level of
understanding" (Shields 43).

In the previous chapter we saw how Quinn, the acolyte who had betrayed his
master, achieved an authentic experience of his place in his world, a moment of reality.
Now we see how the reader in textual space, having lost the one they followed in the
maze, is offered a similar moment of presence. The lived temporality of this moment is,
for Lefebvre, uncanny, "repetitive and reversible. It is full of anticipations, insights into
the future and of déjà vu, the sensation that one has already been through the moment
one is now living" (Shields 59). This moment is sublime, linked to Dada which was
"the prototype of the 'modern sublime', that is, a mixture of awe and terror as our
imagination and concepts fail to grasp an experience" (Shields 57). It is also a moment
of adventure, of danger, of release, of "waste, play, struggle, art, festival," taking place
at the point where life and death are in the balance, where "production, destruction and

93Literature, says Blanchot, "is not the day, it is the side of the day that day has rejected in order to
become light. And it is not death either, because it manifests existence without being, existence which
remains below existence, like an inexorable affirmation, without beginning or end - death as the
impossibility of dying" ("Literature" 384).
reproduction overlap and intersect" (Lefebvre 177). This has to be so, for, as we have seen, the uncanny moment when we find ourselves repeated coincides with our most intimate insight into the workings of the text. If we saw in Ryder's movement through the text an image of birth, there is also something sexual in this movement slipping between two surfaces of the text which are joined but not joined, formed of a line which breaks with itself. For the reader, it is as if the Oedipal drive becomes the instinct behind the repetition in the text, for when we come upon ourselves, it is as a reader in close contact with the body of the very text which has made readers of us. As Oedipus's answer to the riddle of the Sphinx leads ineluctably to incest, so our own desire to arrive at an answer means a further penetration of the form of the text. "Like the solved riddle," says Lévi-Strauss, "incest brings together terms meant to remain separate: The son is joined with the mother, the brother with the sister, in the same way as the answer succeeds, against all expectations, in rejoining its question" (2: 23). We may not arrive at an absolute answer, but in the anacoluthon which keeps us on our path, we join one part of the text to a part which would otherwise remain distant.

Now, death must also become a part of the equation, for we have placed ourselves at the intersection of lines, at the crossroad, the place of tukhē, the mother, and so "symbolic of the woman" (Pucci 118). Even as the meeting of Oedipus and Laius at the crossroad is "a clear scene of competition for the possession of the woman" (Pucci 118), so the moment of repetition asks us to recognise the ruling telos of the father, or engage in productive play with the tukhē of the mother, betraying then the father, the (blood)line we have followed. This moment here assumes a further uncanny aspect, for this betrayal will conjure up a fear of the father, of the law, of the punishment for doing wrong, of castration. Freud says that "anxiety about one's eyes, the fear of going blind, is often enough a substitute for the dread of being castrated. The self-blinding of the mythical criminal, Oedipus, was simply a mitigated form of the punishment of castration," and then, in his analysis of E. T. A. Hoffmann's "The Sand-Man," he shows how "the feeling of something uncanny is directly attached to the figure of the Sand-
Man, that is, to the idea of being robbed of one's eyes" ("Uncanny" 231, 230). So it is that we become aware of ourselves in the moment of the uncanny, and find ourselves in the tension between the mother and the father, between the desire to live and the urge to die, between knowing and forgetting, between the rule of a controlling power and the chance of creative play.

The aim of this chapter was to explore the reader's experience of textual space by observing reader's in their texts, Quinn in Stillman's letters, Ryder in the city of The Unconsoled. Trailing them as they followed their father-figures, their authors, through the texts, we found that, even as they came only to realise their own place in those texts, so our paths circled back on us. Though the lines we retraced were theirs', the experience of that repetition was fully our own, a moment of potential authenticity. Lefebvre writes in his 1961 lecture on the imagination, "Towards a New Romanticism?"

When magical operations were repeated exactly - words, gestures, dances, mime, certain actions which were repeatable at will in a specific form of repetition which could be pushed to the point of delirium - they would induce strange states. They had an effectiveness which was both illusory and real, and ... they organized the repetition and the resurrection of what had already been accomplished. Such practices still go on. These operations made time reversible (in a semi-fictitious, semi-real way). . . . Thus magical actions determined an intense participation on the part of those 'present' in a vaster and more total reality, on the level of a lived fiction. . . . These 'categories' of magic - repetition, resurrection, evocation, participation, projection - are also categories of imagination and the image. . . . Receiving their content from emotions and representations (knowledge), these categories have developed socially. In this way they have become and are becoming categories of aesthetics or art. (281-83)

The repetition of words which the space of the text produces, the repetition of rhythms and gestures in a participatory movement, indeed induces a strange, uncanny state. It reverses time (induces déjà vu), and embraces magic and resurrection (the doubling of the self and the coming of life from death), but we have seen these yet in relation to the

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97Hoffman, of course, was our father-figure in The Unconsoled.
individual alone, the sole reader. It is in the next chapter that we bring to this a social dimension, as we attempt to place textual space in the real world.
IV
CITING TEXTUAL SPACE
The last chapter began with the aim of following the reader through the space of the text, to analyse the effect of that space upon them so that we might better understand its nature. Of course, we have been observing the reader for some time, as well as the writer, placing them at their desk, book before them, their eyes moving across the lines, their hands turning over the pages. In the second chapter, these actions became the most visible manifestation of the rhythms of the body which produces the space of the text. We saw also the reader put the book down, leave the room, to eat and sleep, and return to it again, saw them reaching to take the book from a shelf, and sit again at a desk in a room whose walls are lined with shelves holding books. What we have not asked, though, is at what point the reader actually comes in contact with, or enters, the space of the text, for we have not adequately disturbed the idea of the space of the text as contained within the space of the book as volume, arranged on the shelf of the library, or shop, or study, and this despite the fact that any easy notion of the space of the text as something contained, beginning at the first line on page one of the first chapter of the book, and ending at a final fullstop, has already been problematised by our conception of that space as a network of intersecting lines, a nexus of repeated points without a beginning and without an end.

This chapter, therefore, centres on the question of where we might site textual space, and how far it extends, always assuming, as it attempts to address these questions, that the divide between the space of the book and the space of the text is a far more porous line than some might expect. As an easy illustration, it might be remembered that in the first chapter I mentioned how I didn't yet own a copy of Banville's Dr Copernicus. Since writing that, I have moved, inherited new bookshelves from my flat's previous occupant, arranged my books in 'proper' order (from left to right on the shelf, from the top shelf down, moving clockwise from unit to unit), and have added Dr Copernicus to my library. Still, however, I haven't read it, so on the one hand I wonder if I can say that I have yet encountered its space, while on the other I recognise that when the book was absent from the space of my room, I questioned whether this very lack had an effect on my approach to Kepler, the space in this way already exerting some small influence on my reading of Kepler. And now, having taken its place among the other books on the shelf, the question is whether the fact of it being closed means also that it is sealed, for even as we read the titles on the spines of the books on the shelves, we must consider whether what we encounter at that point, in those letters
isolated from the main body of text, is a part of the book or of the text, or whether we can even talk of a division between an external or internal space.

**The edge of somewhere: the paratext**

The title, in fact, is something which Gérard Genette positions within a class of devices which includes, amongst others, the cover of the book, signs of authorship, dedications, epigraphs, prefaces, intertitles, and notes. These elements can be placed within the one set because they all stand in some way at the outer limits of the text. They are liminal devices placed at the threshold to the text, introducing us to the text, drawing us in, but also framing the text in such a way that we can recognise it as a text. "Although we do not always know whether these productions are to be regarded as belonging to the text," Genette says, "in any case they surround it and extend it, precisely in order to present it, in the usual sense of this verb but also in the strongest sense: to make present, to ensure the text's presence in the world, its 'reception' and consumption" (Paratexts 1). As briefly mentioned in the first chapter, Genette terms these means of presentation the paratext, defined simply as that which "enables a text to become a book" (Paratexts 1), but always with an acknowledged awareness of the potential ambiguity of the prefix. As Hillis Miller describes it:

'Para' is a double antithetical prefix signifying at once proximity and distance, similarity and difference, interiority and exteriority, . . . something simultaneously this side of a boundary line, threshold, or margin, and also beyond it, equivalent in status and also secondary or subsidiary, submissive, as of guest to host, slave to master. A thing in 'para,' moreover, is not only simultaneously on both sides of the boundary line between inside and out. It is also the boundary itself, the screen which is a permeable membrane connecting inside and outside. It confuses them with one another, allowing the outside in, making the inside out, dividing them and joining them. ("The Critic as Host" 219)

For Genette also, the paratext is "more than a boundary or a sealed border, . . . is, rather, a threshold" (Paratexts 1-2).98 The paratext, therefore, stands for us at the point of entry

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98 The original, French edition of *Paratexts* has the title *Seuils*, meaning 'thresholds'. The title is possibly also meant as a reference to Genette's own publisher, Editions du Seuil.
to the text but, more than this, it also provides us with this point of entry, for it is that
point, or line, or area beyond which the text begins, simultaneously a part of and apart
from the text. Reading the title of the text, then, whether on the spine, or the cover, or
the dust jacket, on the title page, or the half-title page, or even in the running heads
along the tops of the pages throughout the work, there is the sense that we are standing
at the entrance to the text, facing in, seeing in the few words of the title a concentrated
embodiment of the text which will funnel out from this point. Yet the title itself is
directed outwards also, towards potential readers and the wider public, for the paratext
stands "between the inside and the outside, a zone without any hard and fast boundary
on either the inward side (turned toward the text) or the outward side (turned toward the
world's discourse about the text)" (Genette, Paratext 2). These marginal additions to the
body of the text possess, then, an enviable potency, for though they exist for the text,
and, as Genette says, "the paratextual element is always subordinate to 'its' text," it is
also true to say that we cannot encounter the text without first encountering the paratext,
for "a text without a paratext does not exist and never has existed" (Genette, Paratexts
12, 3).

The title, then, which so often stands for us as the leading edge of the expansive
text which follows, is also a member of an equally extensive set which is formed by the
proliferation of the title itself as it fulfils another of its functions, to bring the text to the
attention of others. As Genette says, "if the text is an object to be read, the title . . . is an
object to be circulated" (Paratexts 75), and so it cannot be permanently tethered to the
text it names, but instead is dispersed beyond what is bound with the text, while still
standing as the boundary to that text.99 The paratext, then, which may stand in contact
with its text, or be separate from it, "necessarily has a location that can be situated in
relation to the location of the text itself" (Genette, Paratexts 4). Genette, therefore,
distinguishes between the peritext, the "spatial category" which refers to those
paratextual elements which are to be found, or bound, within the same volume as the
text, such as the title, preface, and so on, and the epitext, formed by those elements
which "are located outside the book, generally with the help of the media (interviews,
conversations) or under cover of private communications (letters, diaries, and others)"

99This ability of the paratext to float free of its text means that, whereas there can be no text without
paratext, a paratext can exist without its text for "there are certainly works - lost or aborted - about which
we know nothing except their titles" (Genette, Paratexts 4).
As the difference between the peritext and the epitext "is in theory purely spatial," the epitext being simply "any paratextual element not materially appended to the text within the same volume" (Genette, *Paratexts* 344), it means that any epitextual element may at some point in the future become a peritextual element if it is included within the book, while any peritextual element might become epitextual by being excluded. It should be noted, however, that all paratextual elements, whether of the epitext or the peritext, must be acknowledged by the author in some way, and that "something is not a paratext unless the author or one of his associates accepts responsibility for it" (Genette, *Paratexts* 9). Therefore, the critical essays which are so often included within a scholarly edition of a text do not generally qualify as an element of the paratext, since they can be included without the author's explicit approval, and often posthumously (Genette uses the term metatextuality to describe the relationship between a text and its commentary; "it is the critical relationship par excellence" (*Palimpsests* 4)). We cannot deny, however, that when essays are bound with the text they comment upon, they are granted a certain authority in the process.

The existence of the epitext means that we may be absent from the space of the book, removed from its physical presence, and yet already on the threshold of the space of the text, moving into its sphere of influence. Far from containing the space of the text, the physicality of the book is seen now as only one element of a paratextual presence which extends way beyond the confines of the covers which hold the printed pages. What is perhaps more important, however, is the effect that the paratext has on the reader moving through it, towards the text, for the paratext is not a passive force, presenting the text to us in neutral fashion. As Genette indicates in his own paratextual subtitle, paratexts are the "thresholds of interpretation," guiding us and directing us in our approach to the text. Largely an expression of the authorial voice, the paratext's function is to ensure "a better reception for the text and a more pertinent reading of it" (Genette, *Paratexts* 2), so that it becomes "a fringe of the printed text which in reality controls one's whole reading of the text" (Lejeune, qtd. in Genette, *Paratexts* 2). Moreover, the varied appearance of the paratext is such that we may not even be aware when it is that we first encounter it. As Genette points out, "the epitext is a whole...

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100 Further sub-categories are defined by their temporal relation to the text. Prior paratexts are those elements which appear before the original appearance of the text, original paratexts appear at the same time, and the later and delayed paratexts appear after the original text (the latter is used when the length
whose paratextual function has no precise limits and in which comment on the work is endlessly diffused in a biographical, critical, or other discourse whose relation to the work may be at best indirect and at worst indiscernible" (Paratexts 346). The epitext, then, formed of material "circulating, as it were, freely, in a virtually limitless physical and social space" (Genette, Paratexts 344), offers a rich vein of material to be plumbed by critics, commentators, theorists, historians, and readers, so that sometimes it seems that everything about the text, the rhythms of its prose, the details of its plot, the complexity of its themes, is already known to us, when we have never even read the text itself, never encountered it on the page.

The paratext itself, however, is only one of five forms of what Genette calls transtextuality, meaning "textual transcendence - namely, everything that brings it [the text] into relation (manifest or hidden) with other texts" (The Architext 81). The others in this set include metatextuality, which we've mentioned above; architextuality, by which Genette means "the entire set of general or transcendent categories - types of discourse, modes of enunciation, literary genres - from which emerges each singular text;" hypertextuality, by which he means "any relationship uniting a text B (which I shall call the hypertext) to an earlier text A (I shall, of course, call it the hypotext), upon which it is grafted in a manner that is not that of commentary," as in parody for example; and intertextuality, which Genette defines as "a relationship of copresence between two texts or among several texts," as in quotations, allusion, or plagiarism (Palimpsests 1, 5). The significance of these relations is that they too, like the paratext, though not involved in the making the text a book, all contribute to making the text present, to further distributing it in the world. Just as the paratextual devices of both Kepler and Dr Copernicus, the brief biography of the author placed on the opening page, the included list of works by the author, the advertisement for Dr Copernicus placed at the back of Kepler, all act to make me aware of the existence of Dr Copernicus, so it is that one text, through quotations, allusions, criticisms, and so on, can put us in touch with others. Michel Foucault, for example, says of Flaubert's The Temptation of Saint Anthony, that it "exists by virtue of its essential relationship to books," placing itself within a space of intertextuality where "it is born and takes shape in the interval between books," with the result that "it serves to circulate the fiction of books . . . it serves, in of time separating the appearance of the text and the paratext is considerable). Posthumous paratexts appear after the author's death, while anthumous paratexts appear during the author's lifetime.
actuality, to extend the space that existing books can occupy" ("Library" 91). Therefore, though George Perec's *Life A User's Manual* occupies its own place on the shelf, it appears also in Genette's *Paratexts*, where he mentions how "the 'appendix' of Perec's *Vie mode d'emploi* [Life: A User's Manual] contains a floor plan of the building (sic), an index of persons and places, a chronology, a list of authors quoted, and an 'Alphabetical Checklist of Some of the Stories Narrated in this Manual'" (404). By referring to that list of authors quoted, we find that Perec can place us within a number of other volumes on the shelves (or bring those texts to us), for the list includes Jorge Luis Borgès, Michel Butor, and Sigmund Freud, while Freud, in turn, can take us to *Oedipus the King* and, through this, to *The Unconsoled*, which, we have seen already, has its own ties to Freud's work.

We begin to see that a complex network of connections and relations exists between the books on these shelves, but that this woven web of connections extends far beyond the limits of this room, producing an unending library, "a literary space wholly dependent on the network formed by the books of the past" (Foucault, "Library" 91). Of particular significance, however, is the way that this networked space, which extends the space of texts, is structured, for when we begin to think of how we can visualise that situation where a quotation from one text appears in another, and whether quotations transport us to another part of the literary space or insert another space into their own, we realise that we are reproducing the images we used to describe the formation of textual space, for "we can see the spatiality of the work as extending outwards into an intertextual space, lines of connection radiating out from the points of the narrative, or we may see the line of connection as a point of contact, drawing the lines of narrative together so that they intersect" (Coughlan, "Framework" 134). Even as we spoke of those points of repetition which divert us from the line of the text, so now we can speak of those citations which are always anyway a rewriting, and which, in their "copresence" (Genette, *Palimpsests* 1), mean a repeated reading also, once of them in their original context, and once more along the line of intersection.101 As Agamben points out, "In his article "What Is Epic Theater (ii)," Walter Benjamin defines the characteristic procedure of quotation as 'interruption': 'To quote a text means to interrupt its context'" ("Melancholy Angel" 104n). What this homology in design reveals is that the

101The same sense of similar structures on different scales is seen in Julia Kristeva's statement that "each word (text) is an intersection of word (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read (sic)" (66).
transtextual or, more usually, the intertextual, that "in which every text is held, it itself being the text-between of another" (Barthes, "Text" 160), is not a means by which we can link one textual space with another, or move from one to another, but is itself a part of that space, is, in fact, the whole of that space. Like Lefebvre's l'espace, textual space is a space made up of spaces, and though we may often see the covers of the book as the borders of our wandering, a wider horizon is always available. The shelves which hold my books may represent only a small section of this space, but they open on to it in its entirety nonetheless. Since this is so, then to complete our picture of the space of text it is necessary now to see how intertextuality, its form and situation, is portrayed.

**Mapping the intertext: Thomas Pynchon**

Certain texts lend themselves to an analysis of intertextuality because they so clearly position themselves within the network of relations between texts, drawing attention to the links between their space and others'. Examples include Umberto Eco's The Name of the Rose and, of course, Auster's City of Glass which presents itself as a textual nexus, composed of paraphrases and quotations from Quinn's red notebook, and Stillman and Dark's books, all fictitious, but also connecting this space to works by Marco Polo, Haydn, Vermeer, Herodotus, Montaigne, Defoe, Poe, Melville, and, of course, Milton and Cervantes. It is no wonder then that Auster says of Quinn, "What interested him about the stories he wrote was not their relation to the world but their relation to other stories" (City 7).102 If, however, the intention here is to investigate the ways in which intertextuality and, ultimately, an intertextual space, is conceived of, represented, and used in certain fictions, one of the most fruitful places to begin would be with the work of Thomas Pynchon who has always displayed an awareness both of the intertextual nature of his own work, and of the relation of textuality to what Pynchon might call "nonverbal reality" (Introduction 22). Pynchon is known for his verbal acuity, though it's a characteristic of his writing he sometimes dislikes, accusing himself of spending "too much time and energy on words alone" (Introduction 15), and, indeed, some argue that this energy is spent at the expense of a greater emotional or personal

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102 For an analysis of the intertextuality of Eco's text, see Coughlan, "Situated Intertextuality."
"Framework" discusses the intertextuality of the filmic texts of Canadian artist Nathalie Melikian, whose work dissolves the substance of its own body as it "charts the architexture, mapping the in-between" of the intertext (Coughlan, "Framework" 136).
reality. One of the reasons for the peculiar nature of Pynchon's texts is his scrupulous research, resulting in factually detailed and highly allusive texts, allusive not only through implicit or explicit textual reference, but also through the adoption of differing voices, styles or tones. Any section of his text, therefore, may combine the grotesque with the comic, the scientific with the tragic, the sexual with the pathetic, or all of the above, to produce an original, yet also strangely suggestive piece.

Pynchon does not, however, simply employ intertextuality, but is concerned to explore the nature of the contact between text and text, providing us with a model of the intersection and interaction of texts. Probably the best place to start such an exploration is with his first novel, V. Essentially a quest novel, the novel structures itself around two characters. One, Benny Profane, provides the link between those sections of the novel set in the years 1955 and 1956, and through the other, Herbert Stencil, we gain access to the historical sections, which are set at periods from 1898 to 1943. Though Stencil's search for V. is ostensibly a search for a particular woman, it is also at times cast as a semiotic quest, "merely a scholarly quest after all, an adventure of the mind" (Pynchon, V. 61). Even when the hunt is seen as far more real than a merely intellectual investigation, the description given of it is as a "simple-minded, literal pursuit," a pursuit of the letter, word for word (Pynchon, V. 61). The inevitable failure of the chase, however, is inscribed in the very form of its quarry, which reflects the limited field of vision of the reader at 'ground zero'. As Pynchon says of history, it "is rippled in its fabric such that if we are situated, as Stencil seemed to be, at the bottom of a fold, it's impossible to determine warp, woof or pattern anywhere else. . . . Perhaps if we lived on a crest, things would be different. We could at least see" (V., 155-56).

Similarly, trapped at the point of the V, we cannot see beyond it, cannot see how it relates to its surroundings. Instead, the quest is confounded by its floating signifier, as the sign of the abbreviated V attaches itself to countless objects, while elsewhere single referents attract multiple signs. Even in the early pages of V., there is a peculiar concentration on vocabulary, on variation, so that Benny Profane and his former comrades are sailors but also marines, seamen, a crew, deck apes, yeomen, corpsmen, boatswain mates. For Alec McHoul and David Wills "the text is about signification in a world where the transcendental signified is absent. So the opposition, 'V.' v. V., is broken down, levelled to a single plain of signification (sic)" (163). In the deferred absence of the signified V., the text becomes an "ensemble of material graphemes +
signifiers. For V. is no thing, res, object. . . . Character, name, text: they are fused" (McHoul and Wills 164), as we have seen already in Quinn and Ryder. Vs proliferate throughout the novel, from the shapes of the chapter headings, to the Virginia of the first page, to the asymmetric V of lamps on the second, and so on. Victoria Wren is Vera Meroving and Veronica Manganese also, but she shares her name too with Queen Victoria, the Hotel Victoria, Vittoriosa, and the Piazza Vittorio Emmanuele. The abbreviated V is incomplete, deferred, open to endless recontextualisation. "Beyond V. there is the [full]stop, the closure, the end (as both finality and goal). But that can never be reached" (McHoul and Wills 164). Stencil understands; he tries "not to think, therefore, about any end to the search. Approach and avoid" (Pynchon, V. 55).

The V., then, is the rhyming repetition which threads a line through the text, relating part to part, but if we are to develop an understanding of intertextuality from this, then we need to see how the represented structures in the text which link the V.s can also act as models for the connections between texts. One possible starting point is the seventh chapter, "She hangs on the western wall." Set in Florence, Italy, in 1899, this chapter twines together a number of different plot strands which constantly connect and overlap; a young Evan Godolphin arrives in Florence to find his father, Hugh Godolphin, having received a mysterious telegram from him mentioning the fabled country of Vheissu; Signor Mantissa and his accomplice Cesare invite the south American Gaucho to help them steal Botticelli's Birth of Venus; at the same time, the Gaucho continues with his plan to organise a riot of the Venezuelan population of Florence outside the Venezuelan Consulate. Coincidences abound. Evan is arrested by the Italian police and a clerk misspells his name, calling him instead Gadrulfi, the name of the florist, also under surveillance by Italian spies, who is to provide Signor Mantissa with a Judas Tree in which he will hide the stolen Venus. Godolphin arranges to meet his son at Scheissvogel's Biergarten und Rathskeller, a German beer hall, which is also where the Gaucho usually meets his lieutenant, Cuernacabrón, and where he intends to meet Signor Mantissa (as it happens an old friend of Godolphin's). Each coincidence means the confluence of plotlines, their paths and final contact inevitably recalling the sign which lies at the heart of the confusion, the variously associated V.

Victoria Wren is here of course, a former lover of Goodfellow in Pynchon's "Under the Rose," now serenaded by Evan, but also Godolphin's confessor and Sidney Stencil's informant. Perhaps the central V. here, however, is Vheissu which becomes,
like Stencil's V., a shifting signifier, interpreted differently by the different communities in Florence. Evan knows Vheissu from the stories told to him as a boy by his father, an adventurer and explorer, but "he himself had stopped believing in the place" (Pynchon, V. 157). When the Italian police hand Evan over to the English Foreign Office he is quick to tell them about his search for his father and of Vheissu, but already its identity is becoming confused, for "someone in the higher echelons had got the idea Vheissu was a code name for Venezuela," so that, when the Gaucho is brought in for questioning, it is Vheissu he is asked about not Venezuela (Pynchon, V. 192). Yet it is Victoria's belief, reported to the Foreign Office, that Godolphin is in danger from Vheissu emissaries, together with reports of Godolphin's recent expedition to the Antarctic, and Evan's story, related to the Gaucho, of cities in Vheissu built in the mouths of volcanoes, that form the elements of the memorandum eventually sent by Stencil to London. The story as told in turn by the Italian secret police is that "a barbaric and unknown race, employed by God knows whom, are even now blasting the Antarctic ice with dynamite, preparing to enter a subterranean network of natural tunnels, a network whose existence is known only to the inhabitants of Vheissu, the Royal Geographic Society in London, Herr Godolphin, and the spies of Florence" (Pynchon, V. 197). One spy can only conclude that Vheissu is a codename for none other than Vesuvius while the other, covering, says, "It could stand for Venus, for all I know" (Pynchon, V. 198). To complete the circle, we need only see the crucifix comb worn by Victoria Wren in her hair as her link to Venus and her associated cult.

Vheissu, then, presents a point of contact between each of the other V.s, Venezuela, volcanoes, Vesuvius, Venus, Veronica, bringing them into relation with each other, but its own ontological nature remains unclear. Its positioning within the world of the text, at the heart of a network of subterranean tunnels, seems to distort McHoul and Wills textual plane of signification, give it an extra dimension. We would not, however, describe it as the transcendental signified, the centre that "is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it" (Derrida, "Structure" 279). Though for Godolphin it is real, there are only his reports to confirm its existence, the reports of a man perhaps traumatised by what he had witnessed in Khartoum, and perhaps hallucinating when he later finds a spider monkey frozen in the ice of the Antarctic, a sign from the inhabitants of Vheissu. Certainly, in the world of Florence Vheissu exists

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103 See Seed 93.
purely in textual terms, it appears in the world only as text. Originally mentioned in a Foreign Office memorandum condensed from Godolphin’s personal account, the loss of that original memo means that when the Foreign Office again becomes aware of Vheissu fifteen years later, Godolphin's testimony has to be reconstructed by interviewing the remaining members of the Board of Inquiry of the Geographical Society, to whom Godolphin reported. It had become for Evan "a bed-time story or fairy tale," until he sees the repercussions its apparent reappearance has on the political world around him, though even here its appearance is as a series of memoranda, as a story, or codeword (Pynchon, V, 193). Held within a narrative web which connects to all the plot-lines which riddle this chapter, Vheissu suspends itself within the space of textual transcendence. As such, it is no longer constrained by any physical location, it "is without volume or place, for it is dependent on the non-physical connection between texts," but it can exist at any point in its network, forming a point of intertextual contact between the narratives of the various Florentine communities (Coughlan, "Framework" 135). Imagined as a political state, Vheissu became a centre of intimidating power, linked to points over the entire surface of the world by tunnels which "lace the earth's interior," which would allow instant invasion by its inhabitants, claiming Venezuela or Vesuvius as colonies of Vheissu (Pynchon, V. 197). Within the textual landscape of V., however, the subterranean earthen network which would allow the proliferation of the cities of Vheissu becomes instead an information network through which Vheissu appears in the criss-crossing texts as a variable sign.104

The desire of so many to penetrate then and occupy the system of naturally existing underground tunnels reveals a desire to take control of the textual network so as to be able to both regulate the appearance of the rogue sign and fix its meaning within the system when used. Otherwise, Vheissu acts like a rogue nation disrupting the authority of those who rule elsewhere. For Evan Godolphin at least, it is a "nexus" "where the Establishment held no sway," one of his "private colonies of the imagination whose borders were solidly defended against the Establishment's incursions or

104 A similar model of intertextuality as a network of underground tunnels can be found "under the Street" (Pynchon, V. 42), where Benny Profane finds a job hunting albino alligators down in a sewer system which is marked as a textual network, Profane finding that "scrawled on the walls were occasional quotes from the Gospels, Latin tags," so that he walks between "chalkwritten walls of legend" (Pynchon, V. 120, 122). The labyrinthine structure of the sewer underground is mirrored by a similar communications network aboveground, formed by "roving anchor men, who would walk around a route of certain manholes," keeping contact with the office through walkie-talkies, making the office the centre of "a great net spreading out all the way to the boondocks of the city" (Pynchon, V. 113, 114).
depredations" (Pynchon, V. 158, 159). Even when imagined as a real location, Vheissu has resisted any attempts at colonisation. Hugh Godolphin sought Vheissu so that there would be "Contour lines and fathom-markings, cross-hatchings and colors where before there were only blank spaces on the map. All for the Empire" (Pynchon, V. 171). But the failure of the mission means that Vheissu, V., remains unmapped and unrepresentable. Why Vheissu is so resistant to colonisation might not be immediately obvious, but it is surely related to its place in the space of intertext, a space defined "by the Library: by the ranging to infinity of fragmentary languages" (Foucault, "Language" 67), an "impossible space in which fragments of disparate discursive orders . . . are merely juxtaposed, without any attempt to reduce them to a common order" (McHale, Constructing 250). For Vheissu, "the violence of competing forces . . . is a feature of its composition" (McHoul and Wills 205). Its defining characteristic is the intensity and variety of its colours which produce vivid dreams full of random and meaningless shapes, dreams which "are not, not closer to the waking world, but somehow . . . do seem more real" (Pynchon, V. 171). Hugh Godolphin says of it that "There's barbarity, insurrection, internecine feud. It's no different from any other godforsakenly remote region. The English have been jaunting in and out of places of Vheissu for centuries," and yet it remains unattainable (Pynchon, V. 170). The word 'jaunting' signals here a further connection, that of the link between colonialism and tourism, a form of consumption. Godolphin speaks of tourists as "the lovers of skin" because their contact with the land is purely superficial (Pynchon, V. 184) and wonders what they would make of Vheissu which seems to be skin alone, "Like the skin of a tattooed savage" (Pynchon, V. 170) whose "violence also has the positivity of constant change, playing upon a signifying surface which is the sole medium of meaning, for here there is surface without depth, skin without soul" (McHoul and Wills 205). His desire is to strip that skin away, to "leave the veins and ligaments raw and quivering and open at last to your eyes and your touch," but when at last he sees beneath it all he finds is "Nothing" (Pynchon, V. 171, 204). Godolphin's need to map Vheissu, to flay the skin and reveal the structure beneath, seems to be the need of "a hero of the Empire" to control and colonise (Pynchon, V. 156). Vheissu, "that skin, the gaudy godawful riot of pattern and color," that single layer of signification, remains outside of the tourist route, of the colonial sphere, outside of hegemonic influence (Pynchon, V. 171). If Godolphin views
it as a "Dream of annihilation," then perhaps it is the annihilation of the empire it dreams of (Pynchon, V. 206).

Yet, though Vheissu remains distant from us, vast and uncharted, we encounter it almost everywhere, skirting its edges, always at the margin, for, of course, though the intertext has no place of its own, every textual space is a part of it, opens onto it, and holds it, for the intertext would be nothing without the materiality of the texts which produce it. Through the space of the text, then, we are exposed to the skin of the intertext, to that "riot of pattern and color" (Pynchon, V. 171). Some sense of the potential for violence in this gaudy riot is apparent in Butor's writings on embedded texts and quotations, where he speaks of the "tensions we so often feel today in our cities covered with slogans, titles and signs" ("Object" 55), suggesting a forced intrusion as the space of the text interferes with the space of the city. Elsewhere, in Butor's "The Space of the Novel," a more positive aspect, as the text opens on to a network (of subterranean tunnels) giving access to points across the globe, so that, Butor says, "In my own city many other cities are present, by all kinds of mediation: signposts, geography manuals, the objects which come from them, the newspapers which discuss them, the images and films which show them to me, my memories of them, the novels which make me pass through them" (37). The effect is of the space of one city being quoted within another so that the two spaces commingle, the one containing the traces of the other and linked to it. For Butor, "Space, as we experience it, is not at all the Euclidean space whose parts are mutually exclusive. Every site is the focal point of a horizon of other sites, the point of origin of a series of possible routes passing through other more or less determined regions" ("Space" 37), and Foucault says, "we are in the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a network that connects points and intersects with its own skein" ("Spaces" 22).

Raymond Federman relates this to the text, arguing "If life and fiction are no longer distinguishable one from the other, nor complementary to one another, and if we agree that life is never linear, that, in fact, life is chaos because it is never experienced in a straight, chronological line, then, similarly, linear and orderly narration is no longer possible" (Introduction 10). The networked text is necessary, it seems, to tell of a networked life, but Butor's experience of the city suggests that textuality, as something
wired into reality, making its presence and possibilities known, does not simply reflect a pre-existing ontological plurality of the world, but contributes to it. This is as we would have expected, for it textual space is a lived space, then the space of intertextuality must be a social space also. "Language is not truth," says Auster, "It is the way we exist in the world. . . . The world is not just the sum of things that are in it. It is the infinitely complex network of connections among them" (Invention of Solitude 161).

**Suppression and subversion: intertextual spaces**

We must always remember, however, that, as a social product, textual space can be employed in different ways, and we have already seen in chapter two Lefebvre's concerns regarding the abstract space of capitalism, wherein conceived spaces dominate lived spaces, and the text no longer simply participates in reality, but displaces it through its representations of space. A useful illustration of this process appears in Pynchon's short story, "Under the Rose," a tale of intrigue and espionage set in Egypt in 1898, later to appear in a greatly altered form as the third chapter of *V.*, "In which Stencil, a quick-change artist, does eight impersonations." The story is remarkably allusive, plugged into the intertextual network at a number of points, with Pynchon himself providing us with some of the sources for the story, pointing out how the name of the central character, an English spy named Porpentine (meaning 'porcupine'), comes from Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, while his German adversary's title, Moldweorp, is both an Old Teutonic name for a mole and an allusion to the character Wormold, "a reluctant spy," in Graham Greene's *Our Man in Havana* (Introduction 19-20). Pynchon also speaks of the influence of John Buchan, author of *The Thirty-nine Steps*, while Puccini's opera *Manon Lescaut* also makes an appearance, and there are references to *Antony and Cleopatra*, Sidney J. Webb's *Industrial Democracy*, and Arthur Conan Doyle (119, 123, 124). David Seed also shows where Pynchon has incorporated the views of the British Consul-General of the time, Lord Cromer, as published in an article, "The German Historians" (57). It is Pynchon's use of one text in particular, however, which demands closer attention, namely Karl Baedeker's *Egypt: Handbook for Travellers*.

Pynchon's own description of his relation to Baedeker is that he did "loot the Baedeker," taking from it "all the details of a time and place I had never been to, right down to the names of the diplomatic corps" (Introduction 17), but his use of the
Baedeker is in a sense more complicated because of the extent to which it pervades the world of the story. Porpentine for instance, a spy by profession, plays at being a tourist, "living in the most frequented hotels, sitting at the tourist cafés, traveling always by the respectable, public routes" ("Rose" 102). He signals that he is a tourist by looking the part and by acting in the correct manner, by adhering to the accepted conventions, often reinforced by Baedeker in his guides. The ubiquity of Baedeker for the tourist is evident in the fact that when Porpentine is faced with Hugh Bongo-Shaftsbury, an archaeologist whom he suspects of being a German spy, he has to question the sources of Bongo-Shaftsbury's information, for he "could have got the data, of course, from any Baedeker" ("Rose" 115). When Porpentine is led into unfamiliar territory, discussing his partner Goodfellow's love life, he wishes for "any Baedeker of the heart" to guide him in this matter, to show him how to behave ("Rose" 130). Even the co-ordinates of the landscape the characters move through are taken from the Baedeker, so that they orientate themselves in relation to the known tourist sights and calculate their position in terms informed by map-reading, speaking of "staying at the Hotel Khedival, seven blocks away" and of the "Hotel Victoria, four blocks south and west" ("Rose" 104, 124). Therefore, though superficially Pynchon draws on the Baedeker to provide factual details about the period and country he is writing about, he constantly goes beyond this, at times quoting verbatim from the Baedeker, describing the world around his characters in the very words used by the tourist guidebook. His references to that text are not mere factual details about the country Baedeker refers to, but rather the integration of a world which is specifically Baedeker's, the world of Baedeker's text rather than that 'nonverbal reality' it writes about. In fact, we cannot say either that the Baedeker's first reference is to a nonverbal reality, for, in the Preface to the eighth edition, we will find that "the Handbook to Egypt . . . is founded on the combined works of several Egyptologists and other Oriental scholars. The first edition, which appeared in 1878, was founded on the manuscript of Professor Georg Ebers (1837-98)."

The importance of Baedeker's text becomes even more evident in the corresponding section of V., where the itinerant lifestyle which follows Maxwell Rowley-Bugge's flight from Yorkshire is said to take place in "Baedeker land" (V. 70), not only in the sense that the reader is reading of a place whose topography has been informed by Baedeker, but also in the sense that certain of the characters of V., as in "Under the Rose," have an experience of the land which is inseparable from their
experience of the Baedeker text. Their behaviour in the land is affected, Pynchon might even say conditioned, by their reading of Baedeker, so that they expect and respond to perceived conventions of their situation, much as one seeks and responds to certain features in a text of a particular genre. When Pynchon speaks of, "A common game among tourists. . . . it was in the unwritten laws of Baedeker land" (V, 71) he blurs the line between the social conventions of the world within the text and the generic conventions of the text which informs the writing of his own work but also the behaviour of those existing in it. Ultimately, Pynchon is able to speak of "a world if not created then at least described to its fullest by Karl Baedeker of Leipzig" (V, 408), with the intertextual intervention of the Baedeker in his own story simply mirroring the displacement of the reality of Egypt by the text of the Baedeker.

The world as filtered through the Baedeker is one meant for the eyes of tourists alone, and the Baedeker goes so far as to direct the tourist's gaze to selected sights, manoeuvring the traveller physically along paths it has chosen. Travelling from Alexandria to Cairo, for example, the Baedeker describes how "we cross the Mahmūdiya Canal by a drawbridge, and the triangular sails of the boats which appear above its banks enable its course to be traced for quite a distance. . . . Cotton-fields now appear to the left," while "beyond Taufqiya the train crosses the Sāhil Marqas Canal . . . and an iron bridge over the Rosetta arm of the Nile (fine view to the left)" (Egypt and the Südān 33, 35).105 The Baedeker's representation of the space of Egypt reduces it to the level of a work, "usually the object of a consumption," instead of opening it to the text which "participates in its own way in a social utopia" (Barthes, "Text" 161, 164), with interesting results. For example, on arrival in Cairo, Porpentine, "in a holiday mood" (Pynchon, "Rose" 124), takes chase after his partner Goodfellow who has gone off in a carriage with Sir Alastair's daughter, Victoria Wren. A similar chase occurring towards the end of the story, but this time involving Porpentine's arch-rival Moldweorp, is a far more serious matter for Porpentine, but for Victoria is a chance to do some sight-seeing, as their route follows the traditional tourist trail to the Sphinx. Veronica can react to the situation only as it relates to the confines of the Baedeker text. Her only

105 The path of the tourist is even reflected in the Baedeker's typography, where "an attempt has been made to indicate clearly the most important among the bewildering multiplicity of the monuments of antiquity, and the descriptions of these have been so arranged that he [the traveller] will find adequate guidance on the spot in that portion of our description that is printed in larger type, while those who have time and inclination for a more thorough examination will find additional particulars in small type"
other alternative is to exhibit "the honest concern and bewilderment of any English tourist confronted with a happening outside the ken of his Baedeker or the power of Cook's to deal with it" (Pynchon, V., 190).

If the Baedeker in "Under the Rose" enacts the way in which the space of the text, as a representation of space, replaces a lived space with conceived space, then in chapter eleven of V., "Confessions of Fausto Maijstral," set in Malta between the years 1937 and 1943 but concentrating on the period during the second World War and especially the Siege from 1940 to 1943, Pynchon uses another intertext to illustrate how textuality works within society as a representational space also. This chapter has as its intertext the work of W. B. Yeats, but especially those works which link Yeats as poet to Yeats the occultist and spiritualist, activities he himself described as "next to my poetry, the most important pursuit in my life" (qtd. in Jeffares xi). Yeats's Sligo upbringing meant exposure from an early age to the myths and folk-tales of Irish culture, enriched by an oral tradition of story-telling. Many of these stories told of a fairy-land existing side-by-side with our own, accessible through the raths and stone rings which dotted the landscape, a land of excess and great achievements, like the mysterious Vheissu. Yeats found confirmation for his belief in an other world, co-existent with this one, through his involvement with theosophical and occult societies, leading him to believe in "the existence of an anti-world, an invisible complement to the earth, keener and greater than ours, where the dead could think with superhuman speed and sureness" (Albright, Introduction xxxvi).

As with Pynchon's Fausto Maijstral, however, knowledge of this world is not independent of the poetic impulse. If for Yeats the anti-world was a superior one, the aim of art should not be to mirror reality but to provide insight onto this greater reality: "Yeats hoped to subvert a language created for the description of the everyday world, in

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(Baedeker, Egypt and the Sudan Preface). From his knowledge of Mr. Flinders Petrie, we can tell that Bongo-Shaftsbury reads the small print.

The part played by texts in Porpentine's world creates difficulties for him also. The new generation of spies "read books" to learn their trade, and are "full of theory," producing a text with which he is unfamiliar, giving him no "time to learn the new role" (Pynchon, "Rose" 123, 137).

Yeats was interested in magic all his life. Some significant dates include his founding of the Dublin Hermetic Society with Charles Johnson in 1885, his first visit to the spiritualist Madame Blavatsky in 1887, and his membership of the Esoteric Section of the Theosophical Society in London from 1888 to 1890, of the Society for Psychical Research from 1913 until 1928, and of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn from 1890 on. Yeats attended his first seance in 1888 in Dublin with Katharine Tynan but the disturbing nature of the experience meant he didn't attend another for many years afterwards. Yeats also intended to found a Celtic Order of Mysteries, but this was abandoned before 1900. The Order of
order to embody visions of the extra-terrestrial" (Albright, Introduction xxxiii). Part of Yeats's project was to discover images which would transcend description of the everyday and provide access to the spiritual realm. If the Irish countryside was a land strewn with sacred places, gateways to fairyland, in the same way the language available to the poet contained points of symbolic power, images which would reveal the spiritual kingdom. Eventually, Yeats was convinced that these images with which poets unveiled the other kingdom were drawn from a store of images called the *Anima Mundi*, the Soul of the World, a site of shared memory which Yeats sometimes describes through the image of a "great pool or garden" ([*Per Amica* 54]. At death we return to the *Anima Mundi* and our memories eventually blend with those already there, but we "carry to *Anima Mundi* our memory, and that memory is for a time our external world" ([*Per Amica* 55].

The form of the interaction of the two worlds, the physical and spiritual, the prosaic and poetic, is given in Yeats's philosophical work *A Vision*. It is here that Yeats develops fully his concept of the gyre, formed by two interlocking cones, the tip of each cone touching the centre of the base of the other. It's visualised most clearly in [*V.* in a discussion of the Maltese children's view of the evil of the Germans in conflict with the pure good of the Allies: "if their idea of the struggle could be described graphically it would not be as two equal-sized vectors head-to-head - their heads making an X of unknown quantity; rather as a point, dimensionless - good - surrounded by any number of radial arrows - vectors of evil - pointing inward" ([*Pynchon, V.* 338]. Here the two cones, the antithetical and primary, are placed tip to tip and then interlocked, so that the final image is of the point of one surrounded by the base of the other. As a result of the organisation of the cones, any series of cross-sections taken which begins at the base of one cone and works towards the tip will see a decrease in size of that cone while the area of the other cone will increase. Yeats saw a corresponding relationship between other oppositional forces, including the spiritual and physical. An increasing presence of one would result in an increasing absence of the other, or, as Yeats quotes from Heraclitus, "Dying each other's life, living each other's death" (*A Vision* 120).

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the Golden Dawn is mentioned in *Gravity's Rainbow* in connection with a discussion of the tarot card The Tower, the title, of course, of Yeats's 1928 collection (746-48).

108It may not be a coincidence that Majistral and his friends Maratt and Dnubietna refer to themselves as the "Generation of '37" ([*Pynchon, V.* 305], the year of the revised edition of *A Vision* (Grant notes that "Chambers identifies Pound, Eliot, and Yeats as models" for the Generation of '37 (149)). It is also
The form of the gyre is used by Pynchon especially in an account of one day in the lives of Fausto and his wife Elena. This section draws closely on two poems, "Sailing to Byzantium" and "Among School Children," from the collection The Tower, which shares its structure with A Vision. Also important are the third and fourth sections of "Anima Mundi" from Yeats's Per Amica Silentia Lunae, where he says, "From tradition and perception, one thought of one's own life as symbolised by earth, the place of heterogeneous things, the images as mirrored in water, and the images themselves one could divine but as air; and beyond it all there were . . . the fire that makes all simple" (50). Pynchon traces a movement from earth to water to air and fire through the course of the passage. The couple emerge in the morning from the sewers, washing themselves in a stream of rainwater which has "caused a merry water-fall to enter our quarters" (Pynchon, V. 332). They spend the morning walking by the sea and then head inland ("Forenoon for sea, afternoon for the city") where the wind begins to blow off the harbour and clouds to surround the sun, as if "winds were blowing today from all thirty-two points of the rose" (Pynchon, V. 334, 335). Finally gulls fill half the sky, "drifting slow, up and down and inexorably landward, a thousand drops of fire" (V. 337).

By the same train of imagery, Pynchon transforms Valletta into Byzantium, so often for Yeats the epitome of the anti-world where life is abstracted into art. One of the characteristics of Byzantium is its ethereal nature, as if it were "manufactured out of air and shadowed on water" (Albright, Notes 629), and in an early draft of "Sailing to Byzantium," Yeats spoke of "St. Sophia's sacred dome . . . . Mirrored in water" (Stallworthy 95). In keeping with the construct of the gyre, the abstract nature of Byzantium can only be at the expense of the physical Valletta, and Pynchon signals through simile the spiritual seeping into the spaces left by the destroyed buildings and broken streets: "Sunlight came to us broken by walls, window frames, roof beams: skeletal. Our street was pocked by thousands of little holes like the Harbour in noon's notable that Pynchon gave the title of "Under the Rose" to a story set in 1898, one year after the publication of Yeats's short-story collection The Secret Rose.

109 Note also the images Pynchon includes from Coleridge's "Phantom," which Yeats quotes in "Anima Mundi." Elena (her name means 'bright') seems young again to Fausto, she speaks "adolescent girl talk" (Pynchon, V. 332). Her appearance is similarly youthful, "Her face, fresh from sleep, was so pure in that sun. Malta's old sun, Elena's fresh face," and she laughs at "an English club building whose side wall had been blown away" (Pynchon, V. 332, 333). The Coleridge poem speaks of how "All accident of kin and birth, / Had passed away" and "There was no trace / Of aught on that illumined face, / Upraised beneath the rifted stone" (qtd. in Yeats, Per Amica 51).

110 See also T. Sturge Moore's original cover design for The Tower.
unbroken sun" (V. 334). Fausto becomes a Yeatsian figure, the old scarecrow of "Sailing to Byzantium" and "Among School Children," for as Fausto and Elena enter the park the birds have abandoned their nests, "all but one whose head was visible, looking out at God knew what, unfrightened at our approach. It looked stuffed," as artificial of course as Yeats's golden bird. Elena becomes Fausto's Maud Gonne, linked by her name to Gonne's mythical precursor, Helen of Troy. Pynchon's portrayal of Byzantium, however, is not a positive one. Gonne's ageing face in "Among School Children," "Hollow of cheek as though it drank the wind / And took a mess of shadows for its meat" (4.3-4), is reflected in the faces of Fausto and Elena who "had been using, it seemed, nothing but Valletta to fill up the hollows of ourselves. Stone and metal cannot nourish" (Pynchon, V. 335). Pynchon equates the artifice of Byzantium with the inanimate which is so often the villain in V. The later Fausto, reading back on his account of that day, criticises the "human attributes applied to the inanimate . . . a resurgence of humanity in the automaton" (Pynchon, V. 337). The form which offers eternity offers no sustenance, and the abstract unity of "Among School Children," "our two natures blent / Into a sphere" (2.5-6), contrasts with the fleshly vulnerability of Fausto and Elena's embrace: "Her nails, broken from burying the dead, had been digging into the bare part of my arm . . . . My own nails fastened in reply and we became twinned, symmetric, sharing pain" (Pynchon, V. 336).

Yet Pynchon's rejection of the dead Byzantium does not necessarily entail a rejection also of poetry. One of the "apparent contradictions" (Pynchon, V. 337-38) in the account of this day is the strange relation between "the street and under the street," where Fausto, Elena, and their young daughter Paola shelter from the air-raids in the old sewer (Pynchon, V. 337-38, 325). We might expect the underworld to be here associated with death, but Fausto himself seems to imply that the opposite is the case when he says, "But in dream there are two worlds: the street and under the street. One is the kingdom of death and one of life. And how can a poet live without exploring the other kingdom, even if only as a kind of tourist? A poet feeds on dream" (Pynchon, V. 325). The same division appears in the chapter, "In which Stencil nearly goes West with an alligator," where Father Fairing had originally moved underground because he foresaw nothing but death aboveground, "foresaw nothing but a city of starved corpses, covering the sidewalks and the grass of the parks, lying belly up in the fountains, hanging wrynecked from the streetlamps" (Pynchon, V. 118). Now war, which was a
constant threat in "Under the Rose" also, has laid waste to the streets of Valletta, ended life there. Below the street seems no better, with Fausto the poet describing his underworld in terms of dead history, writing of how, in the sewers, "in this wretched tunnel we are the Knights and the Giaours; we are L'Isle-Adam and his ermine arm, and his maniple on a field of blue sea and gold sun" (Pynchon, V. 310).

But, like the Animus Mundi, this is an underworld enriched by death, for the children, poets also, draw their inspiration from the deathly world they know, spread their "arms like aeroplanes and run screaming and buzzing in and out of the ruined walls, rubble heaps and holes of the city," the R.A.F. game being "only one metaphor they devised to veil the world that was" (Pynchon, V. 331). Textuality follows on the heels of the children, for it was their presence in the park with Fausto and Elena which marked also the increasing penetration of the Yeatsian hypotext into Pynchon's own text. Through the figure of the children, Yeats's Soul of the World, a storehouse of images, is now recast as an (inter)textual realm that is not simply "a literary space wholly dependent on the network formed by the books of the past" (Foucault, "Library" 91), but is a space of the present also, ever changing. The spiritual realm becomes comparable to Eliot's sense of "'tradition' as a timeless order of works" (Mitchell 549n), for they "form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction of the new (the really new) work of art among them" (Eliot, "Tradition" 15). The textuality of the space, however, is not incompatible with its spirituality. Though they "have had only one father, the war," who brings death, these children of the island bring a poetic life to the streets which is not the eternal form of dead art, but a force of the spirit. "Raids," writes Fausto, "the death of a parent, the daily handling of corpses had not been able to do it. It took a park, a siege of children, trees astir, night coming in. 'Elena'," he says, "Her eyes returned to me. 'I love you'" (Pynchon, V. 337). If Valletta is Byzantium, the cold though perfect city, the children are the threads of true poetry through it, like the pulp which is "soft and laced with little blood vessels and nerves" in contrast with the enamel which, "mostly calcium, is inanimate" (Pynchon, V. 153). The space of the text here links back to one of the earlier forms of space, absolute space, which is "lived' rather than conceived, and it is a representational space rather than a representation of space" (Lefebvre 236). Absolute space disappeared from Western Europe at the end of the Middle Ages, existing only in an altered form in representational spaces, themselves, now, dominated by representations of space, but it
was originally perceived "as sacred . . . as magical and cosmic," becoming "above all the space of death," of the underworld (Lefebvre 234, 235). That the space of text might assume its place in society is less surprising when we find that "considered in itself - 'absolutely' - absolute space is located nowhere. It has no place because it embodies all places, and has a strictly symbolic existence. This is what makes it similar to the fictitious/real space of language" (Lefebvre 236).

These children, however, who "got about Valletta by their private routes, mostly underground" (Pynchon, V. 332), also show how the intersecting network of the intertext, though always seen as subterranean, is not identical to the underworld. Just as Vheissu does not exist in its theoretical network of tunnels, but in the multiplicity of contexts it inhabits, so here the significance of these underground routes is not, as we might initially think, that they seem to occupy the same space as the underworld, but that they enable the recontextualisation of the aboveground as underground, and of the underground as aboveground, bringing the two worlds, bringing life and death, into contact. Just as the space of the text had to be distinguished from the world of the text, so the space of the intertext must be distinguished from the reservoir of worlds it holds. The imagined networks of underground tunnels do not form the body of the intertext but act to illustrate the relations between the repetitions and displacements which structure the intertext and which make it that place where life comes again from death, where society is restored. In Fausto's declaration of love, we see again how the space of text creates the opening for authentic experience, except, in Valletta, death is too strong, and even after a "thousand drops of fire . . . there are no epiphanies . . . no moments of truth" (Pynchon, V. 337).

This exploration of the intertextual underworld continues in Pynchon's *Gravity's Rainbow* but in an even more sophisticated form. It begins most obviously in London, in December 1944, where Pynchon's Tyrone Slothrop is interrogated by agents of PISCES (Psychological Intelligence Schemes for Expediting Surrender) using Sodium Amytal. In his drug-induced trance, Slothrop sees his beloved mouth organ, his harp, fall into the toilet in the men's room of the Roseland Ballroom in Boston, and pursues it down the shit-encrusted tunnels to an underground world of "waste regions" (Pynchon, *Gravity's Rainbow* 66). This unsalutary episode marks the first intersection of Slothrop's story with the myth of Orpheus, the poet whose music won him entry to the underworld so that he might save his wife Eurydice. He loses her, however, when he
looks back too soon to see if she is following him. Later, he is dismembered by Thracian maenads, his mother among them, who throw his head and lyre into the river Hebrus, from where they float out to sea, landing on the island of Lesbos, where Orpheus's head becomes an oracle. The links between Slothrop and Orpheus have been detailed elsewhere (see Bass, Hume 168-174, and Hume and Knight), but what is important to note is that the Orphic Slothrop immediately reconnects us with the experience of textual space, not only because of Orpheus's journey through the underworld, but because Orpheus, like Oedipus, loses that which he most desires at the point where he seems most certain to attain it. Blanchot describes Eurydice as "the limit of what art can attain . . . the profoundly dark point towards which art, desire, death, and the night all seem to lead," like the dark passages which mark The Unconsoled ("Orpheus" 437). Orpheus loses Eurydice because he cannot resist turning to see her, because "his error is that he wants to exhaust the infinite, that he puts an end to what is unending," just as the reader can desire an end to the text, a true finality (Blanchot, "Orpheus" 439). As we have seen, however, to face the dark in the text is to break with the line of the text, to rupture that line, just as "by turning around to look at Eurydice, Orpheus ruins the work, the work immediately falls apart, and Eurydice returns to the shadows . . . he thus betrays the work and Eurydice and the night" (Blancot, "Orpheus" 437). Yet it is only by turning around that Orpheus is true to himself, for otherwise he would "be betraying, being disloyal to, the boundless and imprudent force of his impulse" (Blanchot, "Orpheus" 437-38). Nor is what he does wrong, for "the ultimate requirement of his impulse is not that there should be a work, but that someone should stand and face this 'point' and grasp its essence where this essence appears" (Blanchot, "Orpheus" 437).

Equally significant is that Slothrop is an Orpheus who "never really emerges" from his underworld (Hume and Knight 302). Instead, "the entirety of Gravity's Rainbow itself can be said to take place 'underground,' in an above-ground underground where dreaming and waking exist as inverted images of each other. The boundary between the two is permeable" (Bass 29). Where the division in V. between the above-street and under-street placed the textual worlds in an elsewhere which was accessible only through the mouth of the tunnel (the book as a portal onto another world), Gravity's Rainbow more accurately places the real and textual worlds on the same plane, intertwined. This does not disqualify the representation of the interaction of the two
worlds seen in Fausto and Elena's Byzantine day in Valletta, which finds a parallel in *Gravity's Rainbow* in the Zone, the newly occupied Germany of post-war Europe. In Berlin, for example, in "an inverse mapping of the white and geometric capital before the destruction...the straight-ruled boulevards built to be marched along are now winding pathways through the waste-piles, their shapes organic now" (Pynchon, *Gravity's Rainbow* 372-73). Berlin is as desolate as Valletta, "Ceilingless rooms open to the sky, wall-less rooms pitched out over the sea of ruins in prows, in crow's-nests," while, even as the destroyed city of Valletta had yielded to poetry and the non-physical, so in Berlin the advertisements which had once been kept within the pages of the newspaper are now "out in the wind, when the wind comes, stuck to trees, door-frames, planking, pieces of wall - white and fading scraps, writing spidery, trembling, smudged, thousands unseen, thousands unread or blown away," the needs and wishes of the citizens, some unspoken, some unheard, distributed throughout the city, uncontained (Pynchon, *Gravity's Rainbow* 373). The waste-piles recall the shit and excrement of underground sewers, brought now to the surface, linking back not only to Slothrop, and to Fausto and Elena, but also to the textual networks of Profane's sewer system. The newspaper pages, therefore, are not the only textual element spreading across Berlin, for *Gravity's Rainbow* continues the association of sewers and text, or, more precisely, shit and information, when Slothrop studies rocket manuals translated from originals "salvaged by the Polish underground from the latrines at the training site at Blizna, stained with genuine SS shit and piss" (Pynchon, *Gravity's Rainbow* 211. See Tololyan 47-49).

With the Zone revealed as an area laced with the space of textuality, Slothrop's passage through that space, as a creature of the underworld, assumes a significant aspect. Making his way from England to France, through Switzerland to Germany, Slothrop adopts a number of different disguises, including Ian Scuffling, war correspondent; Raketemensch, the Rocketman; the Russian officer Max Schlepzig; and Plechazunga, the Pig-Hero. As Hume points out, however, his "adventures themselves follow no very obvious logical sequence," so that Pynchon "estranges us from the known hero pattern by making his traditional figures part of an open system, a series of possibilities without absolutes. It is as if each hero represents a square on a chess board, and Slothrop, by his moves, comes into the territory of each, one at a time" (175). A chess board is formed, of course, of a series of intersecting horizontal and vertical lines,
so that Slothrop's story can be read as one which uses the intertextual intersection of plots to move from one heroic text to another, but rarely to any purpose or to serve any logic. Nevertheless, the apparent randomness of Slothrop's progression, and his failure to carry storylines through to their expected conclusion, is exactly that which enables him to survive, as when, at Putzi's, he avoids becoming the sacrificial pig. Major Duane Marvy assumes the velvet pig suit instead and meets an Oedipal end when mistaken for Slothrop and castrated.

The only time Slothrop is conventionally heroic is when he saves Katje from the octopus, and this is an event engineered by Them, controlled, and not an act of free will: "after all, we were meant to meet..." (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 189). Slothrop's textual freedom from such pre-determined plots is explicitly spatialised in Gravity's Rainbow, his wanderings through the Zone made possible only because those "straight-ruled boulevards built to be marched along are now winding pathways through the waste-piles" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 372-73), the liberating randomness of intertextuality contrasting with the ordered routes which normally confine movement. Their construction is motivated by a desire to control which we saw also in the attempts to map Vheissu, exemplifying the aggressive rise of representations of space in social space, forever "winning away from the realm of the Sacred, its Borderlands one by one, and assuming them unto the bare mortal World that is our home, and our Despair" (Pynchon, Mason and Dixon 345). As Brian Jarvis describes it, "As colonial dependencies and supermarkets are built up, so too are all spaces of myth and magic razed to the ground," and driven underground (58). In Zurich, however, Slothrop hears the Argentine revolutionary Francisco Squalidozzi speak of the possibilities offered by a Germany free of the state borders and demarcations which had been mapped out over the centuries. This virgin Germany reminds him of the early days of the Americas, when it "was a blank piece of paper," as yet untouched by the obsession with property which would see the country fenced, divided and subdivided, the new boundaries tracing "complex patterns on the blank sheet" in a way reflected now around him in the "engineered scars of Swiss avenues" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 264). The

111As Rosello argues, "No map is neutral. When the wanderer roams around the tight network of city streets, his or her map makes sense - a different, more local sense - and this body reminds us that the supposedly anonymous and abstract map is not only a conduit for human information but also a political text" (137).

112In Pynchon's Mason and Dixon, which has space as one of its major themes, the regulated surface of the world is again contrasted with the underworld, so that "A Knowledge of Tunneling became more and
parallels drawn between land and paper, colonisation and the act of writing, invite us to see Germany too as a clean sheet ready to receive a new inscription, and indeed Slothrop imagines that Squalidozzi can only be hoping to seize this land for himself, writing his name across it as if signing the deed to the land. Squalidozzi, however, insists that the war has not simply erased the previously existing lines but has "wiped it clean. Opened it," and "in the openness of the German Zone, our hope is limitless" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 265). The openness of the Zone suggests that the image of the page alone is insufficient, limited as it is by its own physical dimensions, and limiting once used, since the purpose of the page is to be written upon, to have its own area divided and marked. Once we perceive this page as a part of the wider textuality of the Zone, however, the material manifestation of the intertextual network, the landscape becomes not a new sheet, virgin and untouched, but a newly erased palimpsest, the surface unmarked but bearing everywhere the traces of previous texts. Hope now is not limited by the surface area of the page but open to the infinite intricacy of the relations within it.

Slothrop's fate in this textual space is to become "a crossroads, a living intersection," the embodiment of intertextuality, which means his disembodiment, as he is "scattered all over the Zone," echoing Orpheus's dismemberment (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 625, 712). Now, "he is no less dead than she [Eurydice] was, not dead with the tranquil death of the world, the kind of death which is repose, silence, and ending, but with that other death which is endless death, proof of the absence of ending" (Blanchot, "Orpheus" 438). His path to this point is remarkably similar to that taken by Quinn in his final few months. After his time outside the Stillmans' building, Quinn's "clothes were discoloured, disheveled, debauched by filth. His face was covered by a thick black beard" (Auster, City 120). In the apartment, he takes off all his clothes, and eats the food which appears without explanation in the room for him, until the dark and the closing notebook bring an end to him. In a text itself presented as one woven of other texts, this figure, of whom it was said "whatever he knew about these things, he had learned from books, films, and newspapers" (Auster, City 7), dissolves into the weave of the intertext, existing now only at the intersection of his text with others.
appearing, perhaps, as the "man named Quinn" in The Locked Room (202). Slothrop had been leading an equally solitary existence, "letting hair and beard grow," spending "whole days naked, ants crawling up his legs, butterflies lighting on his shoulders," noticing that "offerings of food were being left near the lean-to he'd put up," though "he never saw who was leaving them" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 623, 622). Now, he finds himself everywhere in text, sitting in "Säure Bummer's kitchen, the air streaming with kif moirés, reading soup recipes and finding in every bone and cabbage leaf paraphrases of himself" (a moiré "involves the superimposition of one repetitive design on the same or a different pattern" (Weisenburger 270)) (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 625). Later, he will become "the story about Tyrone Slothrop, who was sent into the Zone to be present at his own assembly - perhaps, heavily paranoid voices have whispered, his time's assembly - and there ought to be a punch line to it, but there isn't. The plan went wrong. He is being broken down instead and scattered" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 738), and later still he can be found even further afield, appearing out "in the zone" of Melvin Jules Bukiet's After as Rocketmann, who, as they say, "was legendary in a place where legends were hard put to contend with actualities" (97, 255). Even here, his time on the ship Anubis is prefigured by "harmonica music that seemed to vibrate underneath him [Fishl], the clear pool rippling with tidal affect, bubbles ascending from the toilet's sole orifice to break like notes at the surface" (Bukiet, 160).

Slothrop as living crossroad encompasses all that we've dealt with in our exploration of textual space, even to the extent that his transformation includes an uncanny experience, as he discovers the message "ROCKETMAN WAS HERE" and "his first thought was that he'd written it himself and forgot" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 624). Most importantly, Slothrop comes to illustrate the significance of textual space's role as a representational space in social space. As we saw in the previous chapter, the crossroad, as a place of repetition, of absurdity and chance, undermines the authority of the figure who would rule the line of the logical text. It is "Outside and Inside interpiercing one another too fast, too finely labyrinthine, for either category to have much hegemony any more" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 681). Here, the crossroad is where Slothrop finally frees himself from his pre-ordained role and the place assigned to him in others' plans. David Cowart reads this moment through E. M. Forster's story "The Other Side of the Hedge:"
[The] main character also pauses by the roadside and ends up discovering a completely different and richer order of experience. . . . The story presents modern life as an endless, meaningless trek along a dusty road bordered by a hedge. The point is to press on, to cover distance, though no one has any idea where the road actually leads. The main character cuts through the hedge beside the road and finds himself in a beautiful and timeless landscape - one that does not 'go anywhere'. (116)

This dusty road, like the straight-ruled Boulevards of Berlin, the Swiss avenues, even the grid-like arrangement of New York streets, designed as if to convey a purposeful intent, are representative only of the routines which regulate our lives, and make us strangers to ourselves. Slothrop's crossroad, as a representational textual space, puts him in touch with himself again, existing, "just feeling natural" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 626).

For Pynchon, textual space becomes most meaningful at these intersections which undermine its linear progression to nothing. It is not only the act of interpiercing, however, which is significant, but the site's orientation also, the form of its crossing and intercrossing, resulting in "crosses, swastikas, Zone-mandalas," or a drawing of "the A4 rocket, seen from below" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 625, 624). These forms, "a square (the mandala), a circle or sphere, a triangle, a rational volume occupied by a divine principle, a cross, and so on" are the forms of absolute space also (Lefebvre 237). Pynchon appreciates the significance of such spaces, admires the spaces of Herero villages, which "were circular, set up like the ancient yang/yin diagram, women living on the north half, men on the south, the whole thing oriented like a mandala on the points of the compass, each direction having a special meaning. Their god embodied male and female, creation and destruction, life and death" (qtd. in Seed 241). He contrasts such living social spaces with "the Cartesian grid system layout in Windhökö or Swakopmund," with "the whole Western / analytic / 'linear' / alienated shtick," made all the more lamentable by the fact that "the physical shape of a city is an infallible due to where the people who built it are at. It has to do with our deepest responses to change, death, being human" (qtd. in Seed 241, 242). Pynchon makes his own text a meaningful space in that it is, as Weisenburger shows, "plotted like a mandala, its quadrants carefully marked by Christian feast days that happened to coincide, in 1944-45, with
key historical dates and ancient pagan festivals," the design "formed as much by traditional, orderly patterning as by contemporary, purely coincidental event" (9-10, 10).

The final meaning of this specific orientation is undecidable, however, for the "liturgical structure seems to focus the novel around a theme of salvation, a redeeming earthly savior. Equally as well, the pagan coincidences suggest that the whole enterprise is a poisson d'avril, a red herring, a fool's quest. And one can find nothing in the novel to resolve this antimony" (Weisenburger 10). The circular mandala is "a symbol of opposites held in delicate equipoise" (Weisenburger 10-11), seen most obviously in the planned circle at the heart of the text, where the arc of Slothrop's quest underground, bringing life from Hell, is one side of a circle which would be completed by the projected arc of the Rocket 00000, fired during Easter of 1945, bringing death from Heaven. Blicero, whose name means 'death', is of the text too, but would occupy its absolute space to serve his own ends, joining the "priestly castes and the political power they exercise" (Lefebvre 237), "seeing the world now in mythical regions . . . . It was not Germany he moved through. It was his own space" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 486). The open circularity of the form of the text, however, its line broken by an Orpheus who never finds his love, a Rocket which never strikes, revolts against any would-be hegemony, but keeps these opposites in balance, the space of the text keeping "the work in suspense in such a way that it can choose whether to take on a positive or negative value and, as though it were pivoting invisibly around an invisible axis, enter the daylight of affirmations or the back-light of negations" (Blanchot, "Literature" 397).

Now the space of the text seems to move away from absolute space, the space of the past, towards the space of the future, differential space, a space which "accentuates differences," "a theatricalized or dramatized space," a space "eroticized and restored to ambiguity (Lefebvre 52, 391). If the textual space is as we have described it, then it is perfectly placed to become this differential space, for it has at its heart the body which produces "differences 'unconsciously' out of repetitions - out of gestures (linear) or out of rhythms (cyclical)" (Lefebvre 395). In the form of its repetition, producing always vital forces, "a concentration of energy," as it intersects with its own body, it holds differences in dialectic tension with each other, "condensation-radiation . . . concentration-eruption, implosion-explosion," life and death, each text opening "in play which leaves room for both repetition and difference, for both time and juxtaposition" (Lefebvre 399). Pynchon's textual space is a liberating place, playful, fun, diverting,
sexual, subversive, magical, sacred, but it is difficult to know what the future holds for the text as differential space, if this is what it is to become. As Lefebvre says, "The revolutionary road of the human and the heroic road of the superhuman meet at the crossroads of space. Whether they then converge is another story" (400).
CONCLUSION
If, in the last chapter, we wondered at what point the reader comes in contact with the space of the text, in our reply we seemed always eager to extend the range of the space of the text, to see it explode outwards through all manner of transtextual relations, so removing the reader further and further from the space of the text in its most convenient form, the book. Though we would hope that our argument has shown the significance and importance of textual space's facility for recontextualisation and connectivity, nevertheless it can, with justification, be asked if there is not another side to textual space, a sense in which it is not dispersed and open, but concentrated and closed, a space of the work more than text. The concern here might be said to parallel Genette's warning that "inasmuch as the paratext is a transitional zone between text and beyond-text, one must resist the temptation to enlarge this zone by whittling away in both directions" (Paratexts 407). Just as the description of the paratext might grow to the exclusion of all that is purely textual, so the space of the text, as a place of diversion from the body of the text, might be criticised as hollow and without substance.

In response to such criticisms, we need to clarify the relation between the work and its space. A useful illustration is provided by Thomas Moore's description of a design detail in Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow:

The 1973 Viking edition of the novel features an odd design element: between each two adjacent blocks of narrative is a row of seven precise little squares, these suggesting movie frames, and the rows in turn suggesting sprocketed separations between successive frames of the novel film. Although the little squares are rumoured to have been a Viking editor's inspiration, not Pynchon's, the fact of their thematic pertinence remains. (30)

These small squares are not textual but paratextual, a part of the publisher's peritext. Though placed within the body of the text, they are extraneous to it, but as the markers of the divide between one textual block and the next, their place is significant. They are, in fact, what Kant would call a parergon, which "is only an adjunct, and not an intrinsic constituent in the complete representation of the object," for examples of parerga include "the frames . . . of pictures or the drapery on statues, or the colonnades of palaces," ornamental additions to the body just like these small squares, suggesting movie frames (Kant qtd. in Derrida, Truth 53).
The *parergon*, sharing the same ambiguous prefix as the paratext, raises similar questions, Derrida asking "Where does a *parergon* begin and end," and then, "Where does the frame take place. Does it take place. Where does it begin. Where does it end. What is its internal limit. Its external limit. And its surface between the two limits" (Truth 57, 63). The movie frames of *Gravity's Rainbow* ask the same questions, for they are both the square-framed holes which accept the sprockets which drive the film through the projector, put it into action, and also the frames on the film itself, the edges marked by the limits of the visible image and the celluloid which is to remain unseen. As such, these frames run alongside the film, the work, the text, but also surround it, support it, project it. But the frame here seems, above all, to act as a description of the space of text, that which physically bears the text, but is bound in with it, that which is produced by the text, but without which the text itself could not be.

That the *parergon* might illuminate the space of text is not surprising when we consider how the space is the product of "an indeterminable wealth of contingencies, accidents, appearances, and - I was about to say - ornaments" (Lefebvre, "A Vision" 130). For Derrida, the *parergon* becomes something "extraordinary," it is "neither work (*ergon*) nor outside the work (*hors d'oeuvre*), neither inside nor outside, neither above nor below, it disconcerts any opposition but does not remain indeterminate and it gives rise to the work. It is no longer merely around the work" (Truth 58, 9). Indeed, we have seen again and again how the space of text disturbs simple oppositions, for in that place there are always "three. The third term. On every side. Inside the limits, in the relation between what is limiting and what is limited. Beyond the limits, in the limitless depths of harmonics and in the amplitude of space" (Lefebvre, "A Vision" 130).

The space of text is not so much a frame as a framework, the work that forms the frame. It is to be understood in terms of the *passe-partout* ("a square of cardboard ... open in its 'middle' to let the work appear") which "occurs everywhere" (Derrida, Truth 12, 7). The *passe-partout* exhibits the strange nature of the frame, of the *parergon*, for it occupies a space "between the outside and the inside, between the external and the internal edge-line, the framer and the framed, the figure and the ground, form and content, signifier and signified, and so on for any two-faced opposition" (Derrida, Truth 12). This "topos," this place, between the outside and the inside, "between the visible edging and the phantom in the center" (Derrida, Truth 12), is where we situate a space of text that is truly Lefebvrean, bridging centre and periphery, being both/and also.
Held in tension between the elements which it simultaneously unites and divides, holding them together while always threatening to disperse them, the space of the text, as frame, neither belonging to the work, nor not belonging, is everywhere in the work, with no 'between' the framer and the framed, no space of the text and, then, now, suddenly, the space of the work. This is why we can be at the very limits of the space's reach and feel close to the text, and this is why we can be at the very heart of the textual space and still wonder where we are. This is why the most expansive, glorious space can arise from the most humble and innocent place, a book.
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