Minor Keywords of Political Theory:

Migration as a Critical Standpoint

A collaborative project of collective writing

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Minor Keywords of Political Theory:

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Introduction

Nicholas De Genova and Martina Tazzioli

The present exercise is a provisional effort to dedicate serious critical reflection to a variety of keywords operating within contemporary discourses of power and resistance, which nonetheless retain the status of “minor” terms. By minor keywords, we have in mind the sorts of concepts, categories, and other notions that are often widely used in both in public political discourse and political theory, which therefore must be apprehensible as undeniably part of the working lexicons of both state power and political theory (hence, keywords), but which remain remarkably under-theorized (at least outside of critical migration studies). In this respect, paradoxically, to the extent that they remain “minor” and thus un-remarkable, these “keywords” tend to retain the status of mere words. Therefore, our task here is to de-sediment these apparently banal and routine fixtures of the dominant political language in order to subject them to critical reflection, to de-naturalize their apparent transparency, and re-politicize the de-politicization that ensues from their mundanity. The criteria we have adopted for selecting these keywords are, first, precisely the ubiquity of these terms within the discourses of politics, alongside the fact that they nonetheless have gone relatively unnoticed by political theory and,
second, the relative absence of any extensive political and historical genealogy of these concepts or the practices that they name and describe.

This is not to say that there are not incipient theorizations of these concepts and practices, as indeed many of co-authors of this collective work are among those who have already dedicated substantial efforts toward more focused critical reflection on some of these concepts, categories and terms. However, we remain convinced that many of these keywords have become increasingly central for theorizing contemporary political formations and yet have rather little visibility as concepts with their own genealogies.

Notably, in one way or another, all of the terms that we have selected emerge in a particularly salient way from the global (postcolonial) fact of migration, and remind us of the increasing significance of migration for any adequate theorization of power and politics today. As scholars of migration, some of these terms are already rather “major” keywords for us, and have been significantly theorized in our field. Migration nonetheless serves for us not only as a convenient starting point associated with our specific professional/intellectual locations as scholars of migration, refugee, and border studies, but also as an indispensable analytical lens and standpoint of critique through which to rethink these notions and their ever increasing salience for the conduct of power itself. What we aim to address, therefore, is how each keyword may be understood to be “minor” — increasingly pervasive but taken for granted and under-theorized — within the more general vocabularies of politics, political theory, or political philosophy, and how it may be particularly illuminated from the critical standpoint of border/migration/refugee studies. Here, it is worth recalling Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s understanding of “minor
literature” as a movement that “doesn't come from a minor language” but that, rather, consists in what “a minority constructs within a major language” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986:16). Similarly, our definition of “minor keywords” entails taking migration as an analytics that might be use to introduce some minor but nonetheless disruptive or even subversive uses within the established and taken-for granted lexicon of political theory, unsettling its internal hierarchies and destabilizing its regime of truth. Thus, our goal here is to intervene collectively into the more generalized discourses regarding power and politics to demonstrate the centrality and indispensability of migration for understanding these wider processes.

Modern state power and sovereignty have come to be inextricably entangled with the fetishized figure of citizenship. This has inevitably served to marginalize and render “minor,” if not to silence altogether, the political quandaries of non-citizenship that tend to be embedded in questions of migration. There is, in other words, a substantial consonance between the actual practices of power and the concepts and categories that are conventionally deemed worthy of political theory as such. We concur with the more general critique of J. M. Bernstein, Adi Ophir, and Ann Laura Stoler in the Introduction to their edited volume Political Concepts: A Critical Lexicon (2018), when they argue:

“The overwhelming bulk of work in political theory travels along well-trodden and safe academic pathways. Perhaps the reason for this is that in our academic and intellectual culture there is tacit consensus that political thinking should remain within the confines of agreed-upon disciplinary practices. Creating a space where the rules governing this consensus could be questioned, and where different, sometimes unsafe, sorts of political thinking could flourish was, from the beginning, at the center of [our] project. Thinking about the meaning of a political concept should at the same time be a means of thinking about, and of making possible ways of intervening in, the political realities of the present” (2018:1).
In this spirit, we seek to unsettle and disrupt the consensus around the selection of which keywords may be counted as vital for theorizing power, and to intervene in the politics of knowledge and theory governing the well-worn lexicon of politics, from the critical standpoint of migration.

This is the third iteration of the “New Keywords” endeavor, and follows two earlier projects, different but not unrelated, which culminated in analogous experiments of collective authorship and collaborative publication. The first, “New Keywords: Migration and Borders,” involving 17 co-authors, was coordinated and edited by Nicholas De Genova, Sandro Mezzadra and John Pickles, and appeared in print as a special thematic section in the journal Cultural Studies (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015). The second, “New Keywords of ‘the Crisis’ in and of ‘Europe’,” involving 15 co-authors, was coordinated and edited by Nicholas De Genova and Martina Tazzioli, and published in Near Futures Online by Zone Books (New Keywords Collective 2016). In discrepant ways, all of these endeavors are unified by an interest and commitment to excavating and elucidating the significance surrounding various terminologies, and the ways in which they may be understood to signal deeper sociopolitical transformations, much in the original spirit of Raymond Williams’ landmark work, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (1976). In their introduction to Keywords for Radicals: The Contested Vocabulary of Late-Capitalist Struggle (2016), Kelly Fritsch, Clare O’Connor, and A.K. Thompson make the point incisively: “The fights that sometimes arise around contested terms remain analytically significant. By highlighting moments in which the taken-for-granted associations between concepts and things become untenable, such skirmishes serve as lighthouses marking hazards — but also opportunities — on the horizon” (2016:15). Migration, for us, and all the hazards that
attend to struggles over human mobility, mark just such an opportunity for discerning new potentialities on our global postcolonial horizon, and they can be mobilized to enhance our analytical sensitivity to struggles and movements that tend to remain beneath the thresholds of political visibility.

Some of the minor keywords that we have identified here are predictably and pronouncedly affiliated with migration — take, for instance, terms such as “deportation” and “detention” — yet much as these terms have achieved an unprecedented prominence in political discourse, they remain largely taken-for-granted and unexamined in the realm of political theory – mere words that may be presumed to more or less transparently communicate a simple and straightforward meaning otherwise deemed undeserving of theory’s consideration. Other terms are similarly pervasive but less strictly associated with migration yet remain stubbornly neglected in political philosophy. Consider, for example, the striking contrast between a major keyword such as “citizenship” in juxtaposition with the comparably ubiquitous but persistently “minor” keyword “membership.” Alternately, think of the remarkable circulation and versatility of such keywords as “struggle” or “solidarity,” for which however there is rather little in the way of a genuine theoretical inventory. With respect to these sorts of minor keywords, our contention is likewise that these terms may be particularly well elucidated through the critical lens of migration. These are, however, short entries, and we make no pretension of supplying anything like an exhaustive genealogical accounting or a conclusive analysis.

This is another intellectual challenge of thinking in terms of “minor keywords”: it requires that we destabilize what is customarily taken-for-granted and thereby also foreground the epistemic
violence that it is sometimes at play in some uses of these notions – without proposing normative counter-definitions, however. Indeed, reflecting upon certain keywords as “minor” involves keeping those terms open – to multiple uses, meanings and re-appropriations – instead of fixing them to stable definitions, which may be established once for all. The constitutive incompleteness and partiality of these keywords represent for us a resource, and not a limitation: the interrogation of their “minor” status serves as a tactic for sustaining their openness. Indeed, the politicality of the notions that we have selected in this project is related to their instability as a result of the heterogenous struggles and contestations that constantly unsettle and redefine their meanings. In this regard, thinking dialogically and writing collectively supplies an antidote against the suturing and enclosure of these categories into a fixed epistemic horizon of power and the kinds of disciplinary inoculation that could render them impermeable to the sheer indeterminacy and irresolution of political struggles and events.

Our examination of these minor keywords is intended to reactivate, from the critical standpoint of migration, a more far-reaching analytical sensitivity to our political present. The critical standpoint of migration, we contend, is intrinsically postcolonial. The refugees and migrants whose mobilities may be productively understood to appropriate the space of the proverbial “Global North” most commonly originate from places across Africa, the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America that were formerly the outright or de facto colonies of European or Euro-American masters (De Genova 2016). Contemporary formations of transnational migration are inextricable from their relation to an effectively global regime of capital accumulation, which is itself inseparable from the histories of European and Euro-American colonialism. Furthermore, this contemporary world sociopolitical and economic order would be frankly incomprehensible
without reference to what Derek Gregory (2004) has incisively called “the colonial present,” which is to say, the extended post-World War II era of decolonization during which that colonial world order was eclipsed by the global insurgency of anticolonial liberation struggles, and the resultant consolidation of an ostensibly anti-colonial U.S. imperial formation (De Genova 2007). One of the key features that these protracted planetary inequalities of wealth and power share is the persistence of a global sociopolitical order of white supremacy. Consequently, every question of migration, asylum, and borders more or less immediately presents the concomitant question of its racialization.

The concomitant consolidation of a postcolonial geopolitical order of ostensibly sovereign territorially defined “national” state formations, each ever more invested in the policing of its borders, has likewise ensured that migration and refugee movements within and across the proverbial “Global South” analogously present an unrelenting repetition of struggles over human mobility (Sharma 2020). Predictably, these struggles are commonly predicated on the larger global/ postcolonial hierarchies that are pervasively articulated as nationalist and nativist prerogative and the effectively racialized subjugation of non-citizen “foreignness.” This is remarkably evident in post-apartheid South Africa, for example, as noted by Francis Nyamnjoh, a Cameroonian scholar now based in South Africa:

“black African immigrants [called Makwerekwere] are denied a name of their choice in South Africa, especially by South African blacks…. [ensuring] continuity for the apartheid logic, whose preference was clearly for caricature and affirming a reluctance to share a common humanity and citizenship with strange creatures from beyond the borders of civilization” (2006:14).

Nyamnjoh continues:

“Negative attitudes are not towards foreigners as a homogenous entity but, rather, towards black Africa in general, and certain countries in particular. The hierarchy of humanity inherited from
apartheid South Africa is replayed, with white South Africans at the helm as superiors, black South Africans in the middle as superior inferiors, and the Makwerekwere as the inferior scum of humanity” (2006:44).

What is finally at stake for us, then, is the aim of rendering intolerable some of the power relations by which we are governed, and which implicate us all in the ongoing global/postcolonial production of hierarchies of humanness and the abjection of some of us as less-than human.

Many other minor terms could be readily added to this list, and much more could be said about each of those that we have included here. Thus, these brief reflections are offered as terse provocations, inherently unresolved invitations to engage collaboratively in a renewal of critical political thought and theorizing in the breaks and gaps of the dominant political commonsense, where our customary lexicons stutter and stall — where minor keywords have indeed been minoritized, relegated to a marginal status, and have languished in plain sight.
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MEMBERSHIP

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The concept of membership appears regularly in discussions of citizenship, and for this reason is indisputably a keyword in political theory, but membership remains sorely under-theorized. For related reasons, this concept likewise arises in work on borders, migration, and mobilities, more generally. Sometimes used interchangeably with citizenship or belonging – but also sometimes used in a discrepant manner to signal something more than the conventionally state-centric instantiations of these affiliated terms, including market-based practices that allow (or deny) access to employment, services, benefits, and other goods – membership is plainly a keyword that is overdue to receive more critical reflection and theoretical elaboration.

Political theory has not neglected membership entirely. To take perhaps one of the most prominent exceptions, Michael Walzer has famously argued, “The primary good that we distribute to one another is membership in some human community” (1983:31). As a communitarian, Walzer contends that “community itself is a good … conceivably the most important good – that gets distributed. But it is a good that can only be distributed by taking people in … they must be physically admitted” (29). Likening countries that are “affluent and free” to elite universities, Walzer argues that membership is primarily a matter of deciding on an admission policy: “as citizens of such a country, we have to decide … What are the appropriate criteria for distributing membership?” He continues: “We who are already members do the choosing, in accordance with our own understanding of what membership means in our community and of what sort of community we want to have” (32). From this perspective, of
course, this matter is only pertinent to how membership may come to be extended to “strangers” – persons “not of us” (32). Thus, for Walzer, membership in political communities is best likened to that of a club or a family. The conclusion of this communitarian perspective is predictably conservative: “Something like the sovereign state must take shape and claim the authority to make its own admissions policy, to control and sometimes restrain the flow of immigrants” (39). As Linda Bosniak (2006) has demonstrated, such a perspective entails numerous paradoxes for any political community that upholds some pretense of a commitment to egalitarianism.

What happens, however, when we approach the questions of membership from the critical standpoint of migration? Some see membership as potentially signaling something more expansive than merely belonging to the presumptive polity or “imagined community” of a nation-state (as some discussions of cosmopolitanism, humanity, and more-than-human ecology imply, for instance), or membership may signal something intersectional and overlapping, operating simultaneously across multiple scales such as the local, urban, national, transnational, and transversal (e.g. Holston 2019; Soguk 2011; Youatt 2020). If that is the case, then what is it exactly that distinguishes membership from citizenship, even if we assume that the latter is not exhausted by its conventional state-centric formulations? Alternatively, if citizenship is irrevocably corrupted by fundamental and constitutive inequalities, or too loaded by association with its various statist formulations, then can membership offer a better alternative for theorizing the lived politics of participation in and across the textures and fault lines of everyday life? If so, what is the substantial difference between the two terms? Might membership open up possibilities to conceive of novel ways for re-conceptualizing politics? Would this be a useful
frame of reference for contemporary struggles over the inequalities of citizenship and the ways in which national citizenship is bordered?

If membership inherently signals a distinction between members and non-members, moreover, and consequently evokes the inevitable existence of boundaries as such, then does it always-already present a problem for mobility? Is mobility necessarily in tension with membership? Is this perhaps a productive tension – one that ought to be openly acknowledged and critically engaged, rather than wished away? In today’s world, to be mobile is to move between and across borders and boundaries established both by nation-states as well as others who claim or demand the rights of sovereignty to determine access to, and belonging in, one or another political territory. Mobility can also be a movement between subject-formations at different speeds, for different durations, in different ways, and with different stakes. As a result, mobility offers a challenge to those arguing that more and less exclusive forms of membership may be politically and ethically desirable in different ways at different times. Perhaps by resisting the reification of membership around essentialist and exclusionary tropes, mobility and boundary crossing offer a productive perspective for destabilizing ossified conceptualizations of membership. Furthermore, migration can be productively understood to enact a claim to membership in a global society that is otherwise so perforated and partitioned by state borders, mobility controls, and the often insurmountable boundaries of citizenship which serve to uphold and enforce a larger regime of global/postcolonial inequalities (Ferguson 2002). Membership in this respect might be able to encompass mobility and fluidity in ways that are arguably precluded by the rigidities of citizenship.
Is membership best understood as a status? Arguably no. Instead, membership may be better conceptualized as a state of activity (Arendt 1993:15). Once we re-situate membership as a form of activity, it becomes possible to re-posit what this term could mean through the critical lens of mobility and boundary-crossing. As something more processual, membership thereby emerges not as an absolute and categorical distinction regulating ostensible insiders and outsiders but as a spectrum of greater or lesser degrees of participation and collaboration.

However, if membership is conceived as activity, might it not entail other (essential) exclusions? Activity evokes capacity, contribution, and participation in some formation of collective activity (of which one is a “member”). This raises the question of what forms and degrees of “activity” may be deemed as eligible or qualifying to constitute membership in different contexts, and what may or may not be actually perceived to be genuine or legitimate “activity” by others – and of course begs the question of who exactly may authorize themselves to judge those qualifications or the criteria for such eligibility. After all, membership is always a relation to others, and, if conceptualized as activity, it remains dependent, derivative, and contingent upon interaction or collaboration. Hence, while conceiving membership as practice and activity saves us from the ossification of essentialized notions of membership-qua-belonging, it might nonetheless entail new blind spots of exclusion.

Alternately, might we conceive of membership as arising from coexistence or cohabitation in a locality or within a particular social situation? A politics of presence in a particular locality — the sheer fact of being there — has animated, for instance, certain conceptualizations of membership implicit in movements for sanctuary cities or solidarity movements (Bosniak 1998;
Migrants’ politics of presence have also been theorized as signaling anti-assimilationist and counter-normative forms of substantive membership that may be incorrigible to dominant regimes of citizenship (De Genova 2010b).

 Might a politics of migrant presence provide us with a way to conceptualize membership through notions of mutuality or solidarity that are neither essentializing nor wedded to (voluntarist) activity/activism, but possibly rooted instead in concern? “Concern” here refers to the concerns one shares with others, that is: the issues one is affected by and implicated in; and being concerned with or about the other. Concern is temporary and processual, as life situations and what they entail change. But concern in this double sense is always relational, since all such situations are constituted by our entanglements of co-existence. However, this begs the question of what may constitute the boundaries or limits of a “locality,” and who is authorized to demarcate them? How is one “locality” related to another, especially when some “local” concerns are not politically recognized or even cognizable to some others who presume to be members of that space, or when such “local” concerns nonetheless exceed the confines of any single “locality”? Work on migrants’ transnational urbanism radically destabilizes the spatial conceits of any conventional place-bound notions of “belonging” or “membership” (Çağlar and Glick Schiller 2018; De Genova 2005; 2015; Hall 2012; 2020; Kihato 2013). Such questions prompt us to rethink the very space or place of “society” as such (Schinkel 2009; cf. Urry 2000), and the extent to which conceptualizations of membership are able to overcome various forms of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002).
Would a focus on temporality over spatiality resolve some of these tensions? After all, a key battleground of membership is temporal. While border studies has long been dominated by overwhelmingly spatial questions, temporal questions have become ever more central, not least on account of the relationship between past, present, and future that has always been implicated in the political representations of migrants. Recall, for instance, the classic postcolonial proposition arising from migrant struggles: “We are here because you were there.” The disputes over social membership and substantive entitlements to space, or controversies arising from the presence of migrants in spaces where their membership or belonging is contested, often can only be adequately understood with respect to history and the temporal horizons that serve to re-frame lived connections and spatial concurrences. Even in situations of very long-term residence and effectively permanent residence, however, the societal membership of people branded as “foreign” or categorized as “immigrants” often remains a site of struggle. In what came to be known as the Windrush Scandal in Britain in April 2018, for instance, it was revealed that, during the preceding few years, thousands of elderly Black British residents -- overwhelmingly persons originally from Britain’s former colonies in the West Indies, who had arrived in the UK as children more than 45 years earlier with their migrant parents, or in order to join migrant parents – had come to be treated as “illegal immigrants.” They were fired from jobs; denied social welfare benefits, housing, and healthcare; and made homeless and destitute. Some were detained, some were deported, while others were refused entry to the UK when they tried to return from visits to family in the Caribbean (Gentleman 2019; Webber 2018). In a very important way, re-membering then is literally inextricable from remembering – the identification, recognition, and commemoration of enduring legacies of colonial violence in the
present, as constitutive of contemporary borders and the postcolonial reconfiguration of the boundaries of membership.

Such controversies over membership, particularly as they provoke disputes over history, are no less palpable in the so-called Global South. In South Africa, the post-apartheid constitution has made very little provision for citizenship for Black African migrants from beyond the borders “whose labour reserves were exploited with impunity and ingratitude by the architects of apartheid in their quest for racialised citizenship and modernity” (Nyamnjoh 2006;). Moreover, in the Dominican Republic, the native-born descendants of migrant farmworkers who were recruited generations earlier from neighboring Haiti have been recast as “Haitians,” legally stripped of their birthright citizenship and rendered stateless, denigrated as “illegal immigrants” in the only land where they have ever lived (Hayes de Kalaf 2015a; 2015b; 2018; cf. Kosinski 2009; Paulino 2006). Meanwhile, in Myanmar (Burma), Rohingya Muslim native-born citizens have similarly been legally stripped of their citizenship, castigated as “illegal immigrants” from Bangladesh, and targeted for genocide (Pugh 2013). Subjected to vicious pogroms and confined in virtual concentration camps (Lewa 2009), the mass exodus of Rohingya refugees across the border to Bangladesh has merely converted their violent expulsion into a protracted condition of displacement and rejection in the country where their tormentors insist that they properly belong. Notably, in each of these examples, the label “immigrant,” particularly when coupled with the stigma of “illegality,” operates as a form of racialized branding in the service of an invidious politics of citizenship that aspires to undermine substantive membership through acts of dismemberment (De Genova and Roy 2020). Any decolonial politics of membership, intrinsically a
dispute over space, thus also becomes a politics of history and memory, and consequently requires a politics of re-membering.

This temporal dimension of membership leads back to the suggestion that we might think of membership through the notion of concern. From this perspective, membership in “communities of responsibility” (Eckert 2016) could be said to be constituted by the ways that we are implicated in the lives of others. Our implicated-ness calls us to be concerned, and certain kinds of responsibilities arise from our shared “concerned-ness” (cf. Butler 2012). This conception of membership may move us beyond essentialist conceptualizations of membership and the presumptive voluntarism that might be implicated in more “participation”-centered notions.

In another sense, re-membering is also about re-thinking whether any idea of membership is ever devoid of the violence required to assert and maintain it against others. Both senses of the word prompt questions about concurrence, complicity, and responsibility that converge, for example, in the prospects for reconciliation or reparations as ways of approaching historical reckoning and civil remedy. Are any current ideas or forms of membership adequate to these crucial tasks?

One alternative to membership-centered discussions of politics, relationality, and power may be ideas of the commons and practices of commoning. When thinking about the commons, it is important (and not always easy) to distinguish between the history of commoning (particularly since this history is still largely unwritten in much of the world) and contemporary practices of commoning. These, in turn, are sometimes distinct from many of today’s political demands for a commons. One thing that may connect the past commons from today’s and those of the future is
that the commons/commoning is not reliant on “‘membership” but on the prospective absence of any power to exclude people. Duran Bell calls this the “rights of persons” to remain unalienated from the commons (2004:134). People are commoners by virtue of their very existence and the requirement that they have access to all that makes life possible and desirable. Commons exist as long as a principle of non-exclusion is acted upon and upheld against those attempting to extinguish it through claims of sovereignty (Scott 2009).

Such a conceptualization of the importance of eschewing membership may run up against the same problems about capacity, contribution, and the individual achievement of participating in collective activity. However, Marx’s sense of labor as a defining characteristic of life is helpful here. Marx understood that labor is inherent and necessary to sustain and reproduce human life, and more than a mere necessity, that the exercise of our productive powers and creative capacities in transforming our objective circumstances is nothing less than a veritably existential vocation that distinguishes life for us — our “species being” (see De Genova 2010a). This complex sense of sociality and relationality is not reducible to any simple notion of “community,” however. Most of us are only able to live because of the products of the labor of others, most of whom we may never encounter in person, for example, and consequently we are not ordinarily tied to those persons through membership in any “community.” In the commons, labor is also a social activity but not necessarily an effort undertaken by “communities” as such, and therefore not reliant on any notion of membership or belonging. The power to not be excluded is not equivalent or reducible, therefore, to a politics of inclusion. Inclusion assumes a pre-existing community (with defined membership) that admits others, while the power to not be
excluded enables a practice of commoning that requires co-operation without insisting that commoners form a community.

This has allowed some to argue that the commons is where we can truly benefit from the fruit of our labor(s) (Linebaugh 2008). This, along with the power to not be excluded, means that everyone is always-already on the “inside.” The commons, thus, also affords a way to incorporate mobility into political life in ways that other conceptual frameworks cannot. Of course, this does not mean that the concept of membership in the commons automatically resolves the problems of (self-)government. The challenge remains how to establish and sustain a deliberative process that does not favor a certain category of identity or epistemic privilege, which is to say, how to cultivate a process that is genuinely accessible on equal terms to all would-be commoners. Recent theorists of the commons do not always successfully navigate these tensions effectively, or even address them explicitly (see, e.g. Dardot and Laval 2019).

The multiple perspectives on membership that we invoke here — and the challenges or potential objections to them that we simultaneously raise — necessitate a politics in which membership is not foreclosed or hermetically sealed off, but instead one that is kept radically open, such that membership persists as a constant question. Most importantly, such a conception of membership is not reducible to a mere question of status, juridical or otherwise, or to any essentialized notion of identity or belonging, however amorphous in fact. In this sense, only with recourse to the insights that arise from migration as a critical standpoint can we begin to profoundly unsettle the complacencies of the citizen/non-citizen binary that is often so casually taken for granted as the presumptive horizon of membership.
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STRUGGLE

Maurice Stierl, Manuela Bojadzijev, Nicholas De Genova, Shahram Khosravi, Clara Lecadet, Federica Mazzara, Anne McNevin, and Peter Nyers

Struggle is indisputably a keyword in political theory. Whether it is affiliated more narrowly to the classic thematics of war (famously figured by Clausewitz as “the continuation of politics by other means”), or becomes synonymous with the intrinsic and ubiquitous relations of power and resistance (as we may discern in much of the defining work of Foucault, particularly his provocative inversion of Clausewitz’s dictum, whereby politics becomes the continuation of war by other means), or emerges explicitly as the central figure of all politics (as in classic Marxian formulations of class struggle, whereby struggle is constitutive of effectively all social dynamics of antagonism and conflict) — it seems that there is truly no theory of power nor any conception of politics without some notion of struggle. Yet, despite its pervasiveness and persistent salience, struggle as a concept has truly remained a minor keyword.

Insofar as methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002) commonly impacts the very conception of politics, it consequently also deeply shapes the customary meanings attributed to the term struggle. When confronted by migration-related struggles, however, we are compelled to challenge these national/statist presuppositions because the struggles over migration intrinsically entail human mobility across state borders and political disputes that exceed the confinements of citizenship. To understand what is at stake in the struggles provoked
by migration, it is necessary to move beyond conventional frames of struggle as confined within the parameters of methodological nationalism.

Cross-border mobility itself can be understood to be a form of a struggle, and struggle can be productively understood through mobility (De Genova 2016; Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013; Tazzioli et al. 2015). That is to say, human cross-border mobility — particularly in the form of legalized migration — enacts a collective aspiration for movement that aims to defy restrictive and exclusionary regimes of immigration and asylum and to circumvent or subvert harshly punitive regimes of border control, and therefore entails some measure of collective organization that is commonly necessary simply to make migrant journeys possible. Migration then redraws the contours of struggles geopolitically and does so from the point of view of migrant acts of spatial transgression and appropriation and their concomitant sociopolitical claims. Furthermore, illegalized migration \textit{objectively} involves making a priority of human needs over and against borders, in defiance of border policing and in disregard for the law, and thereby at least implicitly entails a repudiation of the authority of the state (regardless of any explicit programmatic politics or, indeed, of the ideas in the heads of any particular migrants).

Moreover, to the extent that illegalized migrations are disproportionately composed of people originating from formerly colonized countries, the specific stakes of these migrations – understood in this objective sense to be political struggles – tend to have a deeply postcolonial character.

The word movement refers to both the simple act of moving, and therefore a physical or figurative change of place, but also connotes an organized activity that challenges existing
structures and aim towards social change and political transformations. In Europe during the so-called “migrant crisis” of 2015, much like the organized caravans from Central America approaching the US-Mexico border over the last decade, large numbers of refugees and migrants walking on roads, along railroad tracks, or through the fields and forests, often have come to resemble people mobilized for a political march (Chappart 2018; Tazzioli and De Genova n.d.). Migrants/refugees’ movements — in both senses of the word — become the site for the emergence of incipient subjectivities that arise through the sheer act of movement, and particularly through the exercise of a freedom of movement, whereby movement itself instigates a kind of politics, challenging a border regime and the wider political order of things. What may have previously begun as an individual journey now potentially becomes a more or less collective project, in the first instance, simply by walking together. These disparate migrant and refugee journeys thus become a collective movement, both objectively and subjectively.

On the Balkan route in 2015, people often asserted themselves as self-consciously willful subjects, chanting “freedom” (azadi, in Persian) and “openness” (infitah, in Arabic) to express a demand for the opening of the borders, thereby linking the oppressive tactics and technologies of border enforcement in Europe to the oppressive regimes that they had repudiated in Syria, Afghanistan, or Iran. Indeed, we could say that the migrants and refugees moving across the Balkans were “on the march.” This reminds us that one of the hallmark practices of most social and political movements is precisely the march – not simply a gathering or assembly, not only a protest rally or demonstration, but a mobilization of large numbers of people collectively joining together in movement, and through their movement, manifesting their grievances or demands by
appropriating space and indeed producing a new space through their movement (see also the Minor Keyword entry on “Mobility/ Movement”).

Struggles for mobility thus take place in a manner that is intrinsically transversal. Whether we refer to the everyday struggles of migrants to cross borders, or more overtly “political” movements against deportation and readmission agreements, or for the defense of freedom of movement, migration-related struggles ordinarily implicate the involvement of people from both sides of a border, commonly including border enforcement authorities and other state officials in more than one country, as well as citizens (be they migrants or non-migrants). Migrant struggles are themselves mobile, and transgress the regimes of border control imposed by states. In these instances, the means of struggle becomes mobility itself, as an irreducible power that cannot be expelled. Thus, such struggles disrupt the traditional contours of politics as contained within the presumptive parameters of nation-states and their territoriality.

To adequately begin to theorize struggle therefore requires a kaleidoscopic perspective on the multiple and complex shapes that it can take. In “New Keywords: Migration and Borders” (Casas-Cortes et. al. 2015), migration is defined as something “always crisscrossed by and involved in multiple and heterogeneous struggles” (Tazzioli et. al. 2015:81). This emphasis on multiplicity and heterogeneity is instructive, for it demands that we attend to the amorphousness and ambiguity that surround the notion of struggle. Struggle in the context of migration is revealed to be a spectrum or a continuum, whose extreme poles change depending on the positionality of the subject. The narrow room for maneuver at the disposal of legalized migrants to engage in overtly politicized struggles commonly appears to be an inherent part of
their sociopolitical condition. There are specific risks, vulnerabilities, and susceptibilities to the recriminations of the law that pertain to the sociopolitical condition of illegalized migrants (De Genova 2002) — particularly when they dare to express their discontent in public spaces. This is why it is always politically and symbolically important when deportable migrants gather under a collective name to struggle against their condition — whether we refer to the protests of “guestworkers” in Germany who had “legal” permits to work but none for residence during the early 1970s (Bojadzijev 2008), the sans-papiers movement in France and other European countries beginning in the 1990s (Cissé 1997; Diop 1997; cf. Balibar 1998; Derrida 1997; Nyers 2003), the more recent mobilizations of migrants and refugees across Europe (Amaya-Castro 2015; Barron et al. 2011; Freedom of Movements Research Collective 2018; Meret and Rasmussen 2014; Oliveri 2016), the political movements of deportees who have asserted themselves in several African countries since 1996 (Lecadet 2013; 2016; 2017a; 2017b), or the mass mobilizations of migrants in the United States in 2006 and the ensuing struggles of so-called DREAMers (De Genova 2009; 2010; 2019; McNevin 2007; Negrón-Gonzales 2015; Nyers 2008; Walters 2008). Whether migrants mobilize to struggle against the threats of detention and deportation, or against their more general social rejection in the countries where they arrive, or in their countries of origin following their deportations, these movements reveal an array of struggles that involve subjects who have commonly been marginalized or made destitute by state policies and politics, but who nonetheless variously demand the right to stay or the right to move, or to work, or to access health benefits or education for their children, and sometimes even the right to take part in elections — and thereby boldly present themselves in public space as political subjects.
With respect to the relative publicity of migrant struggles, however, it is instructive to distinguish between the visible forms of migrant protest that are intended to break out of the enforced conditions of social and political isolation and marginalization — including collective movements seeking to generate public attention around church asylum/sanctuary, hunger strikes, airport blockades, No Border camps, anti-deportation and anti-detention campaigns — and the comparatively invisible forms of quotidian resistance that take place in the micro-physical spaces of everyday life (including struggles to negotiate movement across borders, to navigate public space beyond the purview of racialized policing or fascistic extra-state violence, to overstay visas, etc.). The defining practices of such smaller scale collective action are more often than not part of the textures of ordinary life (Tazzioli et al. 2015; cf. Bayat 2010:111) rather than performative and extraordinary “acts of citizenship,” as conceived by Engin Isin (2008). Thus, these sorts of struggles are in many respects the mundane practices of “simply” going about one’s life under the specific circumstances of precarity or extraordinary burdens that are inflicted upon migrants: working, securing housing, acquiring food and other necessities, and moving around relatively freely. However, in other respects, these migrant practices stand out from other quotidian practices in that they deliberately and explicitly transgress restrictions inherent in the larger material organization of space, property relations, status orders, and legal regulations. Here, work associated with the concept of the autonomy of migration (especially the concept of the mobile commons) is crucial for coming to terms with the “underground” infrastructures of migration and solidarity (Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013; Trimikliniotis et al. 2015; cf. Simone 2004).
Although some forms of migrant struggle are mundane and relatively imperceptible to the scrutiny of power, all forms and expressions of migrant struggle thus may very well be understood to be manifestations of migrant “resistance” (Eckert 2015). The language of “resistance,” which may seem to implicitly invoke a sense of the heroic, can serve nonetheless to productively complicate and consciously counter the customary de-politicization of the struggles of migrant subjects, so typically portrayed as vulnerable and passive victims who accordingly may be figured within the dominant discourse as needing protection, and thereby reinforcing paternalistic forms of power that undermine or silence the constitutive power of migrant struggles (Stierl 2019). These latter practices commonly remain rather invisible insofar as they deliberately attempt to elude the gaze of dominant regimes of visibility altogether and strategically seek to remain imperceptible (Bojadzijev 2008; Heller, Pezzani, and Stierl, 2017; Papadopoulos, Stephenson, and Tsianos, 2008).

While raising the issue of in/visibility is important, the lines distinguishing visibility and invisibility are often quite blurred, as “forms of visible and invisible migration struggles fold into one another, inter-relate and become constitutive of one another” (Ataç et all, 2015: 7; cf. Tazzioli et al. 2015). Precisely insofar as these forms of struggle seem to be always-already folded into one another, using such binary language is inherently problematic. It is consequently important to emphasize the political hierarchies of visibility that make something appear more or less visible or invisible within the dominant sociopolitical imagination, and not to insinuate that these struggles are truly “visible” or “invisible” in any simple sense. Indeed, many migrant struggles actively disrupt and consciously repurpose this binary of in/visibility. Consider, for example, the remarkable public protests that the Non-Status Women’s Collective has organized.
outside Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s constituency office in Montreal. Convinced that they have been rendered invisible to the eyes of the Canadian state, the migrant women dress up as ghosts and carry placards with no words written on them. They call these protests “hauntings.” Their ghostly apparel affords a striking presence to their invisibility, just as their blank protest signs vocally manifest how they have been silenced. In the words of one of the migrant women: “You don’t see us, you don’t hear our voices, but we are here: we will stay here, we live here, it’s a fact!” (Nyers 2019: 130-33). Alongside questions of visibility, therefore, are also important issues of audibility that need to be raised when trying to come to terms with struggle. Enacting a public critique of the political hierarchies of visibility and audibility, these protests articulated a politics of presence that has repeatedly been at the center of more large-scale organized migrant protest mobilizations (De Genova 2010).

The distinctions between what appear as “visible” or “invisible” expressions of struggle need to be closely scrutinized in light of the hegemonic political hierarchies that in fact aim to govern the complex intersections of visibility, audibility, and legibility. Jacques Ranciere’s well-known conception of politics suggests that we must distinguish politics from what normally goes by this name, and for which instead, Rancière proposes the term “police.” Policing [la police] encompasses everything that would normally be called “politics.” On the other hand, for Rancière, politics is something that breaks the order of policing through acts of dissensus, promoting a twist that has the potential to change things in order to accommodate this disruption. Most importantly, for Rancière, “Politics occurs when those who ‘have no’ time take the time necessary to front up as inhabitants of a common space and demonstrate that their mouths really do emit speech capable of making pronouncements on the common, which cannot be reduced to
voices signaling pain” (Rancière, 2009:xiii). This reframing of the conception of politics allows us to look at struggle as a powerful tool for the activation of dissensus.

Migrant struggles impact the very notion of the political, to adapt Rancière’s framework in yet another way, when they transform the historically given order of struggle itself. The multifarious labor struggles, from the earliest era of capitalist social transformation to the present, remind us of the conflicts that are at stake when divisive distinctions between legitimate/illegitimate representations of labor encircled by the exclusions of citizenship come into play, such as in countless examples of trade union struggles. The impressive legacies of slave rebellions, mutinies, and wildcat strikes, the emergence of avowedly transnational labor organizations such as the Industrial Workers of the World, the development of small-scale workers’ mutual aid associations, self-organization by domestic workers and sex workers, or digital transnational forms of mobile workers’ organizing — these are all parts of a variegated history that remind us that the territorialization and spatial constriction of struggles is not only bound to the geopolitical confines of nation-states and citizenship regimes but also organized by gender and race, by exclusionary skill categories or rigidly bounded employment sectors, or by the reinscription of what is considered to be public and private. Hence, it has often been precisely cultural and quotidian spaces that have provided platforms for the transversal cultivation of struggles that can subvert the citizen/non-citizen binary. Be it in housing struggles and rent strikes, or in organizing for health and education, the creation of worker’s social/cultural centers, or by nurturing cultural and artistic spaces and activities that invigorate the more narrowly “political” aspects of struggles — these have all become instruments with which to make migrants’ and other marginalized people’s struggles visible, audible, legible, and ultimately legitimate,
connecting labor and life, the right to work with the right to residence, the right to a livelihood with the “right to the city,” and wider claims for the transformation of life (Bojadzijev 2008).

A reconsideration of what have been called “non-movements” (Bayat 2010) or “practice-movements” (Eckert 2015) might be fruitful for generating a reconceptualization of “politics” and “political change,” in a manner that could do justice to the fact that such often unorganized and unrepresented struggles are, and always have been, a central site of politics. In her account of the Burmese migrants’ tactics for navigating urban space in Malaysia, where their criminalization subjects them to routine police extortion, as well as arrests, fines, detention, imprisonment, and even corporal punishment, Anja Franck nonetheless demonstrates how these migrants’ “everyday struggles … shed light on both the consequences and limits of state power in the attempts to control and discipline [them]” (2019:22). Throughout the Global South, subaltern appropriations of urban space – very commonly on the part of rural-to-urban migrants (and in some instances, cross-border migrants and refugees as well) – constitute what Asef Bayat (2000) depicts as “the quiet encroachment of the ordinary.” “The silent, protracted but pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in order to survive and improve their lives” (2000:545), Bayat argues, signals the emergence of social spaces, subjectivities, and new terrains of political struggle. Similarly, Partha Chatterjee explains how the burgeoning of slums in Indian cities such as Calcutta/Kolkata was distinguished by a proliferation of popular illegalities:

“Because the settlement is premised on the illegal occupation of public land and therefore on the collective violation of property laws and civic regulations, the state authorities cannot treat it on the same footing as other civic associations following more legitimate social and cultural pursuits. Yet state agencies and nongovernmental organizations cannot ignore it either, because it is but one of hundreds of similar bodies representing groups of population whose very livelihood or habitation involve violation of the law. These agencies therefore deal with the
settlers’ association not as a body of citizens but as a convenient instrument for the administration of welfare to a marginal and underprivileged population group” (2005:85; cf. 2004:137).

Thus, for Chatterjee, “the democratic culture of the postcolonial city” involves an inescapable (and necessarily political) engagement on the part of the state with the illegal practices and spaces of the urban poor, who come to be governed as a population of virtual non-citizens – regardless of their ostensible citizenship. Hence, we must consider the much wider ramifications of Chatterjee’s discussion of political struggles in the postcolonial world by reckoning with his startling but profound proposition that most of the people “in most of the world” (as his 2004 book’s subtitle would suggest) are, in fact, not citizens in any substantive sense. Inasmuch as they are unrepresented or, rather, self-representative, and strive not to rule but to simply live and sustain life, these sorts of struggles may be considered examples of non-sovereign forms of political power which necessitate a rethinking of sovereignty-centered political theory altogether (Jennings 2011:39f).

The differing degrees of visibility and audibility of migrants’ struggles provide another point of entry into the larger question of struggle and how these hierarchies of what counts as “political” reveal much about the enduringly nationalist order of citizenship as the largely unexamined premise of modern “democratic” politics. Indeed, there tends to be an implicit hierarchy between citizen-led struggles and migrant-led struggles (Ataç, Rygiel, and Stierl). Consider, for example, the remarkable publicity gained in recent years (in France, Germany, Greece, Italy, and other European countries) by what have been depicted as “crimes of solidarity” (see also the Minor Keyword entry on “Solidarity”), wherein citizens have been charged and sometimes found guilty for helping migrants make their way through Europe, for protesting against their
deportations, or for simply providing mundane forms of everyday assistance (such as providing access to food, shelter, or bathing facilities). This very serious issue has drawn considerable attention, while yet somehow silencing other forms of struggles that are self-organized by migrants that often more directly challenge the national frame and fixed conceptions of struggle. In some ways, the figure of the citizen — first as engaged in acts of self-sacrifice and generosity towards migrants, and then also as the persecuted victim of wrongful punishments arising from the state’s border and immigration enforcement policies — continues to nourish and re-stabilize dominant national narratives. Meanwhile, self-organized migrant movements can sometimes be undermined by NGOs or other institutionalized associations that authorize themselves to act on behalf of migrants and to defend the ostensible rights of migrants, because such efforts are not usually based on the principle of autonomous migrant self-organization, and more or less intentionally hinder its expression (Picozza 2019). Questions of agenda setting, and disputes over which representations of goals and needs and the proper ways to achieve them should become dominant, are of particular relevance today when various transnational movement networks and NGOs attempt to incorporate migrants’ struggles. The questions of what issues can be raised within these forums and what is relegated to silence (Lukes 1970), what goals are deemed to be legitimate, and which moral or ethical frames are counted as emancipatory — all become urgent concerns for the practical conduct and theoretical exposition of struggle.

Here, it is also instructive to consider those acts of resistance to the less obvious outcomes of the violence of borders, which may be organized primarily by citizens on their own behalf, and might not even affect migrants directly but are still inextricably linked to the toxic impacts of borders and the policing of migration. For instance, consider the struggle carried out in recent
years by a local collective in Lampedusa (Italy) that is resisting the intense militarization of the island which has arisen from the enforcement of borders and the legalization of human cross-border movement, in the effort to confront the wider impacts of the “borderization” of the island on the welfare of all inhabitants, particularly Italian citizens, due to an increase in surveillance and other forms of policing (Mazzara 2019). In such instances, the border struggles typically associated with migrants come to be taken up as the struggles of citizens acting not primarily out of solidarity or any humanitarian sympathy with migrants but rather in their own self-interest as citizens against a border regime that degrades the quality of life for all whom it touches.

The weight of humanitarianism is often pernicious in the field of migration. The fact that it is so tricky for migrants to generate a veritably political space of their own is very closely linked with precisely their sociopolitical and juridical condition of non-citizenship, and thus the ways that they are presumptively figured not as political subjects but rather as the objects of others’ pity, compassion, or humanitarian protection. Activists involved in the WatchTheMed Alarm Phone (2019), a hotline that assists people crossing the Mediterranean Sea by boat, are acutely sensitive to the ways that border crossing constitutes a “battlefield” where people on the move face states and other actors who dedicate their considerable energies and resources to thwarting migratory movements as well as the efforts of those who act in solidarity with migrants (e.g. sea rescuer campaigns, “accidental” rescuers such as fishermen or cargo crews, as well as “freedom of movement” activists) (Stierl 2016). Importantly, here the struggle is also one over in/visibility — but it is never clear-cut. Sometimes, remaining rather invisible and landing (“ghost”) boats in Europe is much better than raising awareness about the location of migrants crossing the sea — not only because one might be interdicted and returned by Europe’s subcontracted north African
junior partners, but also because some migrants, fearing the prospect of apprehension, detention, and deportation, do not want to be “rescued” even by European coastguards or NGOs (Heller, Pezzani and Stierl 2017). At other times, one particular boat may be turned (or turn itself) into a “border spectacle” (De Genova 2013) that attains Europe-wide attention and is also rescued (or intercepted) due to its heightened visibility, generated not least due to the activities of activists and humanitarians.

Rather than being passive in their attempts to cross the Mediterranean, however, people on the move navigate the border in both the kinetic and political senses of the word “movement.” Angela Mitropoulos and Brett Neilson (2006) offer an instructive conceptual distinction when they challenge the distinction “between movement understood in a political register … and movement undertaken in a kinetic sense.” They argue: “To keep these two senses of movement [“movement as politics” and “movement as motion”] separate not only denies political meaning to the passages of migration but, also, fails to think through the complexities of political movement as such, not simply as the incompleteness and risk of every politics but, more crucially, as the necessarily kinetic aspects of political movements that might be something more, or indeed other, than representational.” Struggles of migration are always situated somewhere encompassing both of these two senses of movement, and can therefore be understood as a poignant challenge to traditional conceptualizations of struggle and resistance. Resistors do more than resist. They express goals and desires for a good life, which, even if “pre-ideological” (Bayat 2010:19), not only transgress and resist the status quo but are inherently prefigurative of an alternative future. Like migrants aiming to arrive at a destination, which is
never reducible to a mere matter of geography, all struggles and movements do more than simply protest — they seek to attain a goal, to “arrive” somewhere different, to move to someplace new.

Migrant struggles also challenge us, more or less immediately, to examine and interrogate the ways in which erasures and hierarchies emerge within struggle itself. One need only contemplate the very different categories of people involved in these struggles (migrants, whether “legal” or illegalized; activists or humanitarians, who are commonly presumed to be citizens, but who often may be also be migrants, whether naturalized citizens or non-citizens; etc.). Once we begin to reflect on the impact these discrepant positionalities have on the ways in which struggles and their subjects are framed (as “migrant” struggles, “border” struggles, “anti-racist” struggles, or “civil rights” struggles, for instance), and on which sorts of claims or demands they generate, we readily begin to see the notion of struggle not as something homogeneous or unified but rather as itself a field of struggle, where unequal status positions and power relationships (particularly deriving from the inequalities of citizenship) come into play, and remain at stake. Struggles within a struggle — say, amongst illegalized migrants and their allies, be they solidarity activists, humanitarian advocates, or otherwise — are inevitably engaged with greater or lesser degrees of self-awareness, reflexivity, militancy, or defensiveness. As is well known by anyone who has participated in any sort of activist struggle, conflicts of this kind are often riddled with contradictions and explosive pitfalls that at times corrode a movement from within and can easily be manipulated or exploited to subvert a struggle by sowing or exacerbating distrust or resentments. Often, it may make strategic sense for a struggle to articulate a unified position, but the presence of and potential for conflict remains. The presence of conflict is a compelling reminder of the unequal power relations in which we are inexorably
and inextricably embedded. In this sense, and as agonistic theorists of radical democracy contend, conflicts within a struggle may be something to inhabit and remain conscious of, to name, profile, and examine, rather than attempt to “resolve.” Instead, such tensions must be read precisely as a symptom of unresolved questions, contradictions within the struggle, which often require methodical dedication and care, patience and trust, and a will to listen on all sides. This presents a challenge: how to harness what we might call “goodwill,” with all its problematic starting points, erasures, and potentialities, in ways that somehow serve to move struggles for justice forward (noting that what “forward” means here is, in effect, up for grabs, and ultimately part of the terrain of struggle itself).

One way of thinking about this is to imagine struggle as a collective process of learning about justice – learning what it looks like from multiple heterogeneous perspectives within a struggle. Two examples provide some inspiration here. The first is the activist organization, RISE: Refugees, Survivors and Ex-Detainees, based in Melbourne, the first autonomous organization of its kind to be formed in Australia. RISE is outspoken not only against government policy and the broader border regime, but also against humanitarian and progressive supporters who claim to speak for them without speaking with them. Indeed, their motto is “Nothing about us without us.” Within a struggle that is assumed to be collective, RISE compels those with “goodwill” to think more deeply about their motivations and practical and material investments in the systemic arrangements that perpetuate human hierarchies. RISE is defiant and unapologetic: “We are not a resource to feed into your next artistic project,” writes Tania Cañas of RISE, in “10 Things You Need to Consider If You Are an Artist – not of the refugee and asylum seeker community – looking to work with our community” and “Do not expect us to be grateful.” Their message
instigates a kind of disorientation that comes from learning that justice looks different from different perspectives, and that one’s own well-meaning struggle for justice may produce injustices of its own.

A second example comes from the Movement for Black Lives (M4BL) in the United States. This movement is constantly identifying and attending to hierarchies within the movement itself. As co-founder of #BlackLivesMatter, Alicia Garza (2014) explains that the goal is to refuse the dynamics of antecedent struggles that propelled “straight cis Black men in the front of the movement while our sisters, queer and trans and disabled folk take up roles in the background or not at all.” The M4BL works to raise the profile and leadership of those traditionally most marginalized within the movement itself, in ways that seem to compel others to step back in order to learn better what a struggle for justice might mean. The M4BL has particular significance for border and migration struggles, not least because key statements from the movement theorize carceral technologies transversally as racialized transnational technologies that contain, control, and assault Black persons, citizens and non-citizens alike (M4BL 2016). Likewise, other organizations associated with the movement, such as the Black Alliance for Just Immigration, explicitly work to identify within movements for migrant rights the operations of racism that pit against one another people who might otherwise find common grounds for solidarity.

Yet a third example of a collective process of learning about justice is the much-discussed “Willkommenskultur” in which volunteers, humanitarians, and solidarity activists from diverse backgrounds and political orientations came to be swept up together in projects of “welcome”
and “reception” for newly arrived refugees and migrants in Germany as well as other European countries during the so-called “crisis” of 2015-16 (Karakayali 2016; Picozza 2019; Schiffauer and Rudloff 2017). Frequently originating from a (charitable) impulse to help people in need on the parts of many whose privileged (middle-class, “European”/white, citizen) status had hitherto encouraged them to unquestioningly perceive European nation-states’ legal regimes to be functional and just, an eventual confrontation with the cruel realities of the European border and asylum regime sometimes contributed to transforming their engagements as “helpers” and “volunteers” into a more far-reaching struggle — against the state structures that evidently produced the problems which people set out to tackle together, and for a more just society. The transformation from charity to solidarity, however, remains precarious, and in no sense automatically erodes either more narrowly humanitarian modes of action or the naturalization of “nations” and their borders, the presumptive rights of membership and ownership that they entail, or the wider nationalist logic of the global postcolonial sociopolitical order.

These three examples suggest that there are ways of attending to conflict within struggles that move struggles “forward,” so to speak, and it seems to rest on a consciousness of being implicated in injustice, in ways that have to be learned in and through multifarious struggles for justice.

In conclusion, migrant struggles necessarily play out in conflictual ways, signifying what Sandro Mezzadra has referred to as “the interplay of subjection and subjectivation … or … coercion and freedom” (2015:122, emphasis in original) on the “battlefield” of migration (Stierl and Mezzadra, 2019). To the extent that migration itself signifies a battlefield — indeed, a field of
struggle — struggles related to borders and migration are particularly well-suited for illuminating any attempt to further unpack the enigma of struggle, more generally. Rather than making definitive statements about what migrant struggles simply “are” — visible or invisible, political or apolitical, and so forth — this perspective opens up the very question of what we consider to be political struggles, and therefore of what we understand to be “political” in the first place.
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SOLIDARITY

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Solidarity has increasingly become a contested practice and notion when it is associated with migration. Indeed, the increased criminalization of individuals and networks in support of migrants across Europe, in the United States, and elsewhere, highlights that what falls under the umbrella of solidarity nowadays constitutes a contested political terrain. Unlike other keywords in this migration lexicon, critical appraisal of “solidarity” requires investigating how practices of solidarity have sedimented over time, circulated across spaces, and have become objects of concern for governments, states, and economic enterprises. Therefore, even prior to theorizations of solidarity, it is critical to draw attention to practices, acts and networks of solidarity, and their contributions to the shaping of political spaces, at times able to unsettle and alter political geographies. In fact, we cannot dissociate solidarity from the specific dimensions of their enactment or the often antagonistic dimension in which solidarity practices have historically played out. Solidarity is at times enacted on the sly, to evade state controls, and at other times, solidarity is something that people overtly engage in and which entails a direct confrontation with states and non-state actors.

In critical migration and border studies, the notion and concept of solidarity is often evoked to allude to new relations and support structures that emerge in struggles over migration and borders (Tazzioli and Walters, 2019; Ataç, Rygiel and Stierl, 2016). Through the concept of the
“mobile commons,” scholars associated with the autonomy of migration literature have explored the ways in which people who migrate precariously create forms of solidarity “en route,” thereby calling into being “a world of knowledge, of information, of tricks for survival, of mutual care, of social relations, of services exchange, of solidarity and sociability that can be shared, used and where people contribute to sustain and expand it” (Papadopoulos and Tsianos, 2013: 190). Such relations of migratory solidarity arise as a necessity in order to navigate increasingly violent borderscapes.

Other scholars have pointed to the emergence of forms of solidarity between “migrants” and “citizens” — often unstable signifiers — through which new and commonly transnational alliances and movements come into being, often around issues of “migrant rights,” “no borders,” or “global justice” (Rygiel 2011; Ataç, 2016; Stierl, 2016). The “long summer of migration” of 2015 (Kasparek and Speer 2015) and the much-discussed Willkommenskultur (“culture of welcome”) have been prime examples around which questions of solidarity have been explored (Baban & Rygiel, 2017; Karakayali 2016; Picozza 2019; Schiffauer and Rudloff 2017). Forms of solidarity have also coalesced with humanitarian search and rescue (SAR) engagements in the Mediterranean, in which “ordinary citizens” have gone out to sea in order to fill what they perceive as a “lethal rescue gap” produced by EU member states and institutions (Garelli and Tazzioli, 2018; Heller, Pezzani and Stierl, 2017; Heller, Pezzani, Stierl, 2019). In particular the criminalization of such solidarity at sea has received widespread attention, indeed much more than the draconian measures of criminalization targeting precarious migrants who have engaged in practices of protest and support for other migrants.
Looking at solidarity practices in the field of migration draws our attention directly to the concept of borders, notably to the bordering processes deployed for selecting, controlling, and classifying migrant subjects. The academic debate has turned the spotlight on solidarity mobilizations starting from the “long summer of migration” in Europe in 2015, considering it as the apex of European citizens’ mobilization in the fields of migration and asylum (Karakayali and Kleist 2016; Youkhana and Sutter 2017). However, it is crucial to embed the topic of solidarity within a wider and more complex sociopolitical process, such as the social upheaval beginning in 2011 with the “Arab Spring” uprisings and their implications for the enhancement and entrenchment of the European border regime, maybe most visibly in the Mediterranean region (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013a; 2016; Hess et al. 2017; Fontanari and Borri 2017). Speaking of solidarity in relation to migration today allows us to engage with struggles over mobility within and across frontiers, transit zones, and internal borders. Moreover, solidarity practices in support of border-crossing movements shed light on the precariousness of migrants’ everyday lives as a consequence of the violence deployed by bordering mechanisms.

Solidarity has been extensively approached by migration scholars from a spatial point of view, highlighting how practices of solidarity have travelled across territories. However, it is likewise crucial to consider the temporalities of solidarity, specifically how the memory of struggles and of acts of solidarity are reactivated in the present (Tazzioli and Walters, 2019). Many current migrant solidarity networks form in spaces characterized by the legacies of long-standing political struggles. Hence, retracing the political genealogies of solidarity generates archives of struggles that are not part of the official history of those spaces, but are instead built upon practical political knowledges that are otherwise disregarded or disqualified (Foucault, 2003).
fact, instead of bordering or confining solidarity to punctual and politically visible moments of action, we suggest shifting the attention to the laborious work of solidarity practices over time and to the opening up of political spaces to which these have contributed.

The concept of the mobile commons serves to grasp the heterogeneity of these very unstable political spaces that stem from the legacies of experiments of solidarity and which are the outcome of practical knowledges and modes of action that travel over time (Papodopoulos and Tsianos 2013; Trimikliniotis et al. 2015). In fact, challenging the “refugee crisis” narrative (De Genova, Garelli, and Tazzioli 2018; New Keywords Collective 21016) involves also avoiding the trap of “presentism” (Walters, 2010) about solidarity networks and struggles in support of the migrants in transit: far from being merely a reaction to the recent “crisis,” the histories of solidarity practices towards “people in exile” (Balibar, 2019) is a quite long one. Indeed, if we follow the current and historical geographies of solidarity practices, an unusual map of Europe emerges, distinct from the geopolitical one — an alternate European space shaped by a multiplication and sedimentation of solidarity experiments and by their criminalization and dismantling by state powers.

Despite the existing references to the work of solidarity in critical migration and border studies, solidarity often remains both an under-theorized and taken-for-granted concept and assumption. Solidarity in its many expressions has often been said to unite those in a similar predicament, a “community of equals” (Rakopoulos 2016, 143), in one way or another to better their lot: workers of the world, the wretched of the earth, women, or even “nations” seeking to build new alliances in the context of decolonization. Several authors have claimed that solidarity can only
extend within bounded communities. Will Kymlicka for example, defines solidarity as mutuality amongst an in-group (2015; see also Münkler 2004) and declares all help to others, strangers or those beyond such bounded solidarities, are matters of mere “compassion” and humanitarianism. This tradition disregards much of the actual history of solidarity movements (Roediger 2016) and effectively denies outright the very possibility of solidarity across various lines of difference and amongst those of unequal status, overlooking those “mobile solidarities” that precisely cut across the legal distinctions and cultural categories on which solidarity is often assumed (Squire, 2011).

To enact solidarity in critical terms is to resist the production of hierarchies that underpin conventional distinctions between citizens and non-citizens. Solidarity is also frequently an explicit call to resist the hierarchies that underpin a humanitarian rationale whereby relations of “care” or “compassion” are enacted on pronouncedly unequal terms. Solidarity practices are predicated instead upon a substantial horizontality among the subjects involved, yet without denying differences and inequalities such as those produced by border regimes and racializing mechanisms (Stierl, 2019). The increasing criminalization of solidarity networks in recent years reveals that these practices trouble and disrupt state practices of humanitarianism and the related mechanisms of confinement and subjugation that are at the core of the migrant reception system. More broadly, “crimes of solidarity” (Fekete et al, 2017) — an expression which would appear to be a contradiction in terms — shed light on the laborious emergence of transversal alliances between migrants and non-migrants. Starting from solidarity practices enables a refusal of the pervasive processes of racialization that presumptively portray migrants as the others of citizens, and thereby reproduce and reinscribe divisions between “us” and “them.” At the level of critical knowledge production, a focus on solidarity practices and on their instability shows the hard-won
and precarious formation of unusual collective subjects. And yet, it is important not to replicate the image of the white saviors that is implicitly at stake in narratives of migrant solidarity, especially as these come to be invoked in opposition to smuggling activities. Indeed, if on the one hand it is crucial to study and challenge the criminalization of solidarity which is widespread in Europe today, on the other this should be done in tandem with a radical questioning of the methodological Europeanism (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013b) that sustains much of the hegemonic migration scholarship, by undoing the taken-for-granted binary opposition between (criminalized) “smugglers” and “good” (European) “citizens.”

Solidarity has been customarily conceived as “mutual support between and within struggles for liberation that seek to change unjust or oppressive social structures” (King 2016: 52). This definition, though instructive, eschews the question of how those joining together in struggles against injustice are nevertheless differently positioned within such social structures, focusing instead on the shared project of change towards another — more just — world. In 1981, Michel Foucault (1994: 707-708) expressed his solidarity with the “boat people” fleeing Vietnam and alluded to belonging to “an international citizenry, which has its rights, which has its duties, and which promises to raise itself up against every abuse of power, no matter who the author or the victims. After all we are all governed and, to that extent, in solidarity” (Foucault, translated in Campbell, 2008: 300). Foucault’s reference to solidarity, believed to rest simply on the mutual fact of being governed, nonetheless risks flattening solidarity by failing to take into account the radical inequality among those exposed to the uneven and unequal operations of “government.” Similarly, Nina Glick Schiller and Ayşe Çağlar invoke the term cosmopolitanism for such forms of assistance and collaboration. They see such cosmopolitanism as based on a recognition of human commonality, and stress the need to tone down our attention to difference and rather
explore what is common to us all. They hold that such cosmopolitan “sociabilities might be key to understanding how people are able to form fluid constellations of urban social movements to claim economic and social justice” (2016, 30). These perspectives on solidarity within situations of inequality and difference must inevitably contend, however, with the caveat that what is understood as liberation might differ substantially among those forming relations of solidarity.

Moreover, it is crucial to critically examine how inequality shapes such alliances, affecting who can speak and express visions of justice, what means of struggle are available to whom, and what limits are imposed on differently positioned people (Picozza 2019).

Questions of power relations, hierarchies, and privilege are of central concern (Mohanty, 2003; Razack, 2007) for any conception of solidarity as not confined to communities of equals and, at the same time, challenging the hierarchization of lives at play in humanitarian interventions. Sara Ahmed, when reflecting on her own solidarity with indigenous women in Australia has raised some important questions about the role and work of solidarity. For Ahmed (2000: 50), “as a non-indigenous person, historically implicated in the dispossession of indigenous peoples,” solidarity as a strategic gesture becomes possible only if she “[refuses] to assume solidarity by speaking of or for indigenous women.” For Ahmed, furthermore, the question of solidarity revolves not merely around the question of who speaks, but also, who knows: “Such a shift opens out the contexts in which speaking and hearing take place: what knowledges are already in place which allow one to speak for, about or to a ‘group of strangers’”(2000: 54). Thus, an awareness of these given power relations lies as much at the core of solidarity practices as the “ability to form fluid constellations” (in Glick Schiller and Çağlar’s phrase), and has implications also for transforming them. Chandra Mohanty importantly invites us to conceptualize solidarity.
not in terms of commonalities of oppression, but rather in terms of the practices of “communities of people who have chosen to work and fight together” (Mohanty, 2003: 7). Solidarity as a practice cannot be disjoined, in Mohanty’s view, from a decolonial and anti-capitalist critique. More broadly, feminist approaches to solidarity consist in building on common differences and, at the same time, in undoing the victimization of women as subjects to be saved (Abu-Lughod, 2002) or as targets of a “politics of piety” (Mahmood, 2011). Common differences are put to work, contends Angela Davis (2019), in transversal struggles that have historically worked as catalysts for other solidarity movements. In this light, the horizontal connections among heterogenous solidarity practices must be articulated with an analysis of the sedimented memory of solidarity movements that come to be newly reactivated in different struggles.

As more descriptive anthropological accounts of cosmopolitical practices have come to conceptualize, these practices unlock normative readings of cosmopolitanism in the tradition of Seyla Benhabib (2006) or Ulrich Beck (2006) and interpret them as a symptomatic contradiction within the concept of cosmopolitanism itself. A vital aspect has been foregrounded in a more politico-philosophical discussion of cosmo-politics by Balibar, when he suggests that the movement of people is not just the product of a “globalized” (or “cosmo”) capitalism but part of a concrete global sociopolitical formation that includes the history of colonial domination just as much as the history of exploitation. Hence, in Balibar’s view, while certain conflicts may appear to be merely “local,” “parochial,” or “partial,” the claims they articulate usually imply a degree of universal validity, while at the same time, the very forms and practices of conflicts are inseparable from their concrete sociopolitical conditions. Such conflicts usually entail contradictory claims to universality within complex historical and political constellations. Thus, normative concepts of cosmopolitanism do not naturally tend towards a more multicultural and
cosmopolitan conviviality; rather, the analysis of cosmo-political solidarity, in addition to and beyond normative and institutional aspects, must necessarily include an understanding of the particularities of acts of solidarity as performative practices (Bojadzijev and Liebelt 2014).

Such concerns are of importance for any engagement with solidarity around the contested issues of migration and borders. At the margins, it seems that claims to togetherness are necessarily riven from the very beginning, so that solidarity seems to occur necessarily “without guarantees” (Featherstone, 2012: 244). Solidarity, Featherstone contends, cannot be believed to be “something which just binds already formed communities together,” but, instead, constitutes a political relation “that can be articulated and configured in different, potentially conflictual ways” (2012: 246, 245). Solidarity thus cannot be conceived as the coming together of the like-minded who pursue common interests based upon shared political values and goals, as is the premise of much of the scholarship on social movements. This is especially evident around the issues of migration and borders, where solidarity efforts are saturated by asymmetrical power relations (Picozza 2019). This suggests that solidarity requires constant engagement with differences and inequalities that cannot be erased but which nevertheless do not preclude the collectivization of political relations. For Mezzadra and Neilson, acts of solidarity at the border thus require continuous translations which “become crucial for the political project of the common” (2013:308). As such, the potentiality of solidarity emerges, and can often be discerned as incipient, precisely in contexts of organizing where a constantly shifting terrain demands continually rethinking the question of what constitutes political practices, and who are deemed to be the subjects that animate those political practices (Bojadzijev 2008). Consequently, solidarity cannot take any presumptive identity of subjects as its point of departure (for present purposes,
an identity of citizen and non-citizen). Instead, solidarity must seek to actively subvert the unquestionably powerful and profoundly consequential identities ascribed by borders and the institutions of citizenship by conceiving of the common as something yet to be discerned and elaborated.
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The age of migration. Changing sea currents. Stock market data moving across the globe in moments. Increased numbers of airplanes and cars. Circulation of news, information, goods, people, violence sustained by networked logistics. In social sciences, there has been an intensified interest in exploring experiences of “mobility” and in seeking to understand all kinds of aspects of life and matter as being in motion. Some of it has been grounded in a grand narrative that declares our era to one distinguished by the primacy of mobility (Nail 2019). This sensibility has gone hand in hand with calls for a paradigmatic shift towards mobility studies in social sciences, resulting in a voluminous production of “mobility knowledge” (Urry 2000; 2014).

Rather than jumping on the usual bandwagon of epoch-defining novelties to provide legitimacy and importance to a particular concept or form of knowledge, we approach movement and mobility as minor keywords. They operate as gestures that introduce points of view which interrupt or interfere with forms of knowledge production otherwise grounded in a primacy of sedentary life. More specifically, such gestures invite us to reconfigure key concepts in political theory and conventional understandings of how and where politics takes place.

Starting with mobility as a methodological and theoretical move in political knowledge can mean different things. It can mean focusing on how social and political life often unfolds through
physical movement or is governmentally organized through steering movement, and considering the implications of movement for understandings and arrangements of politics. Such an approach might explore the rise of network governance and the implications for democratic politics, the consequences for citizenship of quasi-instantaneous transfers of information and governing through transactional data, the effects for sovereignty of fast moving weapons with global reach, the challenges of mass migration for how collective political subjects can take shape, and so on. Such approaches inscribe moving and a capacity to move in objects (e.g. drones or data) and subjects (e.g. migrants, traveling business elites, or differently able bodies). They explore how these subjects and objects move, how their movements are fostered, channeled or impeded, as well as the social, cultural, economic and political effects of their mobility. Much of the work that is taking place under the heading “mobility studies” is located here.

However, the primacy of mobility can also mean something else. It can refer to a view of life and matter as primarily in flux, as essentially moving rather than being built up by connecting substantive, enclosed units, such as atoms, individuals, people, or states. Everything political is therefore flow rather than architecture. This understanding seeks to align the social sciences with philosophies of movement and developments in post-Newtonian physics (Serres 2018 [1977]; Nail 2019). Although connected to an interest in mobile things and people, it aims at displacing knowledge that favors substance and stasis with knowledge that sees life in terms of indeterminate but still more or less ordered processes. Movement is then not a question of how matter and subjects move around, but rather of how matter and subjects are themselves made up of and through flux and remain always in motion even when appearing to be stable.
Movement and mobility as minor keywords work across both of these approaches and challenge familiar repertoires of political knowledge by doing so, as we will argue below. We start by asking what it means politically to give movement methodological primacy. Mobility is thus not just the object that we investigate, but a way of approaching and intervening in the world. Subsequently, we explore how a primacy of movement should not be read politically as a necessarily normative good or as privileging processes that may be presumed to equalize and free life from control. Using migration as a critical standpoint, we explore how moving and being moved are entangled, thus showing that movement is tied in with repressive and control-focused technologies of government. In the final section, we reflect further on how the primacy of movement invites debates between different political understandings of mobility as a transformative force.

**Giving methodological primacy to mobility**

To approach mobility as method entails attending to the varied ways in which mobility enacts social and political worlds. It develops an angle that interferes with taken-for-granted binaries in the production of political knowledge and how “objects” of research are enacted. Mobility as method means that we do not start from the oppositions of movement/stillness, mobility/immobility, or flow/blockage. These oppositions have framed much of the theorization and historicization of mobility in relation to an imaginary of static modernity, bounded nation-states, and inside/outside boundary lines. They are inscribed, for example, in state theories that see “the State” as a political historical expression of an evolutionary history in which humans changed from hunter/gatherers to sedentary agricultural settlers and over time dominantly organized themselves in territorially bounded communities. They are also inscribed in
knowledge that understands migration as a phenomenon of moving from one territorially defined polity to another, or that takes “home” as the benchmark of the good life. Concepts of sovereignty as authority over and vested within a bounded territory and people are yet another example.

Recent approaches to movement and mobilities have tended to invoke these oppositions, whether implicitly or explicitly. For instance, the mobilities paradigm in sociology has proposed to offer “remedies [to] the academic neglect of various movements, of people, objects, information and ideas” (Büscher and Urry 2009:99). In International Relations, mobility has challenged visions of international politics as defined by inside/outside boundary lines (Aradau, Huysmans, and Squire 2009). In geography, Tim Cresswell has spoken of a “sedentarist metaphysics” and a “nomadic metaphysics,” the former seeing mobility as suspect, the latter valuing it (Cresswell 2006:26; cf. Malkki 1995). If we do not start from these oppositions, and moreover, if we also do not invert them, where do we start?

Methodologically, giving mobility primacy is an orientation towards how mobility is enacting — as both creating and transforming — different worlds. It is an invitation to not simply dislodge the hegemony of sedentariness and stillness in our political imaginaries, but to attend to the heterogeneous devices that enact mobility. Mobility depends on people, spaces, infrastructures, technologies, laws, and knowledge. It is also an invitation to approach mobility itself as being heterogeneously enacted. After all, as political theorists and historians of science have shown, movement was central to theories of modernity. Mobility is not homogeneous, but is itself enacted in variegated ways.
Giving primacy to mobility means that we eschew the assumptions that states, boundaries, sovereignty, and nationalism are somehow on the side of the sedentary or the static. Rather, how movement enacts them and the worlds it makes possible become the stakes of the analysis. The political theorist Gabriella Slomp, for instance, has argued that Hobbes saw “motion as the key to understanding the world” (Slomp 2010:23). Cresswell concurs that “Thomas Hobbes borrowed from Galileo's new science to place relentless movement at the heart of a philosophy of human life that equated movement with liberty” (Cresswell 2001:9). Thus, it is movement rather than stillness that informs Hobbes’s theories of action and political order. Yet, it is also a particular form of movement, an inertial movement of matter that is only stopped by another object or body. The relentless movement of bodies is also the movement of passions, ideas, and imaginations. Individuals are engaged in an inertial movement that appears inevitably conflictual. The dangers of such movement become the key political problem for Hobbes.

Movement needs to be transformed into orderly movement. Movement is ordered through a heterogeneous assemblage of epistemic, legal, material and political devices — from the “fences” of law to children’s education to the books that are allowed to circulate. Such a reading is quite different from Hobbes as the theorist of a sedentary state and a world of states grounded in an intentional uncertainty in the state of nature. Hobbes’ world is a world first of all full of unruly motion with the political problem being how to organize it into orderly movement.

Given the centrality of this understanding of movement to Hobbes, the political question for him is the authority to pattern movement. Movement itself does not do the organizing; it is being organized by modes of authority. In that sense, movement itself is a problem that is constitutive
of politics, but is itself not political. Politics is about creating orderly configurations in a world full of motion. In contrast, philosophies that take movement as continuous and matter as flux rather than inertia — such as Lucretius (1910), Bergson (1969), or Nail (2019) — invite us to conceive of movement itself as political. If life and matter exist primarily as movement, then the question of politics is not about containing, administering, constituting movement through sovereign acts and social contracts, but about confluences — the crossing over and entangling of multiple flows through which always-emergent groups and constellations unfold, remaining internally as well as externally in motion.

Sovereignty as acts of drawing and policing boundaries, limits, and borders (Walker 1993; 2010) gives way to a conception of politics that focuses on how various pathways run across and into one another, or loop around each other for a while. Politics is then related to a meshwork of entanglements rather than enclosed polities created by lines separating inside from outside. Such entanglements consist of continuing embodied pathways that temporarily swerve into each other, thus creating a confluence of unfolding journeys. It differs from another unbounded organization of politics — networks — in which movement is a connector between nodal points; a crossing of distance (Ingold 2011:145-155). In networks, politics is located in the nodal points — e.g. how to create democratic processes of transparency and accountability in the nodal points — or takes the form of governing movement by reducing and creating frictions in the crossing — speeding up or slowing down transfers of people, data, and so on. Whereas the lines of sovereignty enclose space and the lines of networks connect points that break up the movement, the lines of entangling pathways are continuous. When we experience or reconstruct them, we can only be in the middle of an ongoing entangling, meaning that movement is defined neither by its starting
or destination point nor by its crossing from one enclosed space into another. It summons conceptions of politics without a center or a multiplicity of centers — a reimagining of the political in light of the transversality of phenomena which imply “a very different way of understanding politics than we have inherited from models of the contained polis that are expressed in the formation of states and the international system” (Walker et al 2018:92).

Such a view of life and matter as flux challenges the conception of groups, collectivity, or community that are often mobilized in political theory. The primacy of movement raises serious questions about giving primacy to identity politics in our analysis of contemporary and historical politics. Identity turns pathways into enclosed and relatively stable configurations. Members of a group are rallied into a formation through techniques of self-presentation and encircling that unifies them as an inside distinct from an outside. In a world of continuous motion, the continuous cueing, aligning, resonating of movements to one another is what entangles people and things. Erin Manning (2016) illustrates this choreographic approach to movement by looking at how people move in a metro station. The people at the platform and moving in and out of the station do not exist as a self-presenting group. They coexist through their movements. What happens in a metro station is full of movements entangling temporarily by people taking cues from the sound of an approaching train, aligning movement to the movement of other people and objects in the station, avoiding bumping into each other, and so on. The groupings taking place are shaped by heterogeneous and multiple attunements to other movements. In doing so, we can observe group formation that is inherently unfixed. The group exists in motion — as and in heterogeneous and diffuse movements that resonate, mingle, and mesh for a time. The different pathways people and matter take mesh but continue onwards, taking cues from
other movements and aligning with others. Such a point of view creates openings to understanding how the politics of nationalism are embedded in sedentary points of view, not because of their territoriality but because of how they understand connecting through self-presentation in unity and by means of lines that circumscribe a spatial inside from outside. Giving primacy to matter and life in flux invites challenging the hold of such nationalism on social sciences by understanding group formation and collectivity in more choreographic (Manning 2016) or atmospheric (Closs Stephens 2016) terms of confused mingling and often incongruous movements.

**To move and be moved: mobility as technique of government**

Giving primacy to movement is sometimes seen as giving primacy to freedom over necessity, in particular in relation to understandings of sedentary state politics as repressive, dominating, or hegemonic. Mobility then becomes a politically critical, disrupting, or emancipatory practice and mode of knowledge. However, as minor keywords, movement and mobility are not to be taken as necessarily positive or as privileging equalizing processes or freeing people from control. Mobility also functions as a technique of governing. Political power is also invested in and deploys mobility. Drawing on the example of migration, we discuss what politics can refer to when we shift from Hobbes’ understanding of movement as the natural condition that needs organizing by containing it, to an understanding of governmental techniques that work by making mobile.

Migrants do not only move; they are also moved (Alternied et al. 2018; Walters 2015; Xiang and Lindquist 2014). Starting from this assumption, critical migration scholarship has pointed to
infrastructures and logistics as key analytics for understanding the economies of migration. Through a focus on the entanglements between moving and being moved, scholars have drawn attention to the infrastructures of migration movement and to the spatial and legal strategies for channeling, containing, and selecting migration (Kasparek 2016). Far from being a binary opposition, moving and being moved actually constitute a field of tensions, between migrants’ subjective practices, mechanisms of exploitation, and the politics of control. Indeed, it is noteworthy that migrants are governed by being “followed” along their routes, anticipating or diverting their journeys, more than just through the mere multiplication of barriers and fences (Casas-Cortes et al. 2015; Tazzioli 2019). Such an analytical perspective enables questioning which forms of economic value are produced and extracted out of mobility itself — beyond the commodification of migrants’ bodies or the political economy of detention. In addition, if we consider how migrants are moved, we need to rethink the articulation between forced migration, agency, and strategies of refusal.

Mobility is not only an object of government; it also functions as a political technology for governing and regaining control over unruly migration. That is, migrants are not only governed by being stopped, stranded, and pushed back at the border but also by being kept on the move and forced to remain in motion across convoluted geographies. In fact, the border regime increasingly generates various kinds of forced hyper-mobility: migrants are constantly forced to decelerate and re-route their journeys, as a result of police evictions, repeated push-back operations, and the risk of being deported (Picozza 2017; Tazzioli 2019). The use of mobility as a political technology of migration governmentality has been well documented by geographers who have explored the forced transfer of asylum seekers and detained migrants from one
reception center to another (Darling, 2016; Gill, 2009; Hiemstra, 2013). This scholarship has highlighted how asylum seekers, particularly in the UK, are moved from the main urban centers and dispersed across the national territory as a result of a deliberate state strategy for avoiding big concentrations of migrants and for preventing solidarity alliances among migrants themselves. Yet, mobility as a political technology for governing unruly migration is not limited to official transfer of detained migrants and asylum seekers. It is also enacted through the implementation of the Dublin Regulation that contributes to generate refugees in orbit (Picozza, 2017; Schuster, 2011), and by repeatedly hampering migrants from staying in a place, evicting them from informal encampments (Tazzioli, 2019). This happens on a daily basis in critical border-zones such as Calais or Ventimiglia, where migrants are constantly chased away, moved to other places, and forced to undertake the same journey multiple times. In these respects, it is worth situating the use of mobility as a political technology of government within a longer colonial history. De-essentializing migration as a self-standing field, and thus disrupting the presentism that often underpins migration research, involves retracing partial continuities between present migration governmentality and the governing of colonized populations (Bhandar, 2018; Mongia, 2018).

States’ tactics for keeping migrants on the move, have the direct or indirect effect of rendering migrants destitute. Their movements are constantly disrupted and, at the same time, they are worn out. Shahram Khosravi’s argument (2018) that migrants’ time — indeed, their life-time — is being constantly “stolen” is particularly helpful for capturing how these mechanisms of governing mobility through mobility impact on migrants’ lives. In fact, an insight into the use of mobility as a political technology of government enables grasping modes of subjection,
exploitation, and destitution that cannot be contained within the reductive biopolitical formula “making live” or “letting die.”

Importantly, a political reading of mobility as a technology of government connects governing through mobility to the disciplining of migrant multiplicities and collective subjects. By dispersing and keeping migrants on the move, states try not only to regain control over migrants taken individually, but also to hamper the consolidation of collective formations and to divide any emergent migrant multiplicity (Tazzioli, 2019). “The destruction of conditions of collectivity” (Aradau, 2017:7) is at the very core of the frequent police operations dispersing migrants across territory and dismantling their spaces of life in “transit” camps such as Calais or Ventimiglia, or in urban centers such as Paris, Rome, and many others European cities (see also Minor Keyword on “Eviction”).

Therefore, a critical account of mobility as a political technology of government allows questioning the mobility-freedom nexus that underpins much of liberal thought, as well as some forms of post-structuralist “nomadic” thought, and migration analyses not articulated around anti-capitalist claims (Anderson et al. 2009; see also Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013). As Didier Bigo aptly notes, “under liberal governmentality, mobility is translated into a discourse of freedom of circulation which reframes freedom as movement without being stopped, and confuses the speed of well-channeled movement with freedom” (Bigo, 2011:31). Taking “mobility” as a technique of governing makes it possible to capture the hurdles, chokepoints, struggles, and modes of subjection that distinguish the condition of being a migrant from representations of an ostensibly
smooth circulation of mobile people and goods. On many occasions, migrants are in fact entrapped in mobility: they find themselves “stuck” being on the move.

**Mobility as political force**

Starting from the primacy of movement and mobility also means considering that attempts to control and regulate human mobility, or to turn mobility into a technology of government, are never fully successful, comprehensive, or omnipotent. Rather, attempts of governing, ordering, and regulating mobility are confronted with multifarious movements, practices, desires, connections, and associations that challenge or escape the capacities of existing control mechanisms (Padaopolous et al 2008; Mezzadra 2011; Scheel 2019). Moreover, regimes and mechanisms of mobility control provoke and generate multiple forms of counter-movement, clandestine passage, creative bypassing, and diversions involving various practices of subversion, infiltration, and claims-making. These dynamics point to distinct ways of thinking mobility as a political force. We focus on the following: (1) movement as a political force that triggers social, cultural, and economic processes of transformation, and (2) movement as a stake in migrants’ struggles that functions both as a resource that is claimed and as a vehicle of claims-making.

The first way of thinking the surplus of movement politically sees mobility as a force of transformation that instigates processes of adaptation, turmoil, change, and reorganization of existing political and economic institutions, social realities, and cultural forms. In his book *De l'esclavage au salariat. Économie historique du salariat bridé*, Yann Moulier Boutang (1998) shows, for instance, that the introduction of wage labor as a crucial moment in the history of
capitalism was prompted by the escape of slaves from plantation economies, which thereby rendered them unprofitable and politically unstable. Hence, the freedom to sell one’s labor-power and to choose one’s employer is not a mere ideology of capitalism, but rather emerges as a historical compromise guaranteeing its continuity in the face of disruptive mobilities. Inspired by Moulier Boutang’s work, and drawing on Alfred Hirschman’s (1981) differentiation between exit, voice, and loyalty, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) similarly cite the exodus from the former GDR, which heralded the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of state socialism, as the most impressive example of the transformative power of exit.¹ One of the clearest and sustained expressions of the primacy of mobility over control and government has been the book Escape Routes (Papadopoulos, Stephenson, Tsianos 2008), which contends that it is in the everyday practices and imperceptible moments of people’s escape from a given social order that we find the beginnings of social transformation. What all these works share is that they frame movement as a political force by conceiving of it as an engine of social, cultural, and political change. They do it quite explicitly by opposing surplus movement to established fixed orders, which is somewhat different from the challenge raised by the literature that we introduced in the first section: to think politics through continuously entangling movements within an understanding that life and matter are essentially motion. The latter asks for reconfiguring our conceptions of the political from enclosed order to unfolding confluences of motions (Nail 2015).

The framing of mobility in figures of escape, exodus, and exit thus capture a quite distinct dimension of movement as a political force. It locates the transformative potential of mobility

¹ The economist Hirschman (1981) initially developed his model of loyalty, exit, and voice to describe the possibilities open to wage labourers in the case of dissatisfaction with their companies. While loyalty designates ongoing approval despite dissatisfaction with the company, voice signifies articulation of this dissatisfaction. In the case of exit, the employees leave the company as an expression of their dissatisfaction.
primarily in a movement away from sites of power and control, in their abandonment and
desertion (Mezzadra 2016). Another political conception of movement takes it as force towards,
against, and within cultural, economic, political, and social formations and orders. Instead of
escape or exit, it brings imaginaries of clash, collision, turbulence, infiltration, insurgency, and
so on. Such an understanding of the political force of mobility informs for instance the reading
of migration as a “constituent force” (Andrijasevic 2010:162; Scheel 2018) that instigates social
transformation processes “from below” within existing regimes of governance (Mezzadra 2005).
This reading underscores the autonomous dimensions of migratory movements and practices. It
proposes an acknowledgment of the involuntary transformation of many countries in Europe and
other parts of the world into de facto immigration countries as the contested outcome of
migrants’ political struggles over mobility and the claiming of rights and resources, including a
right to stay (De Genova 2017).

This latter approach introduces another dimension of thinking movement as a political force. It
highlights the importance of mobility as a stake in migrants’ struggles. In this reading, mobility
and movement operate both as a resource that is claimed and as a vehicle of claims-making.
Mobility is here political because access to mobility has become a key factor in the stratification
of the social and the articulation of global inequalities (Bauman 1998). Mobility emerges as a
resource that grants access to other resources supporting life opportunities. Access to mobility is
not equal, however. Regimes of mobility control, like the Schengen and US visa regimes, create
and maintain unequal access to mobility. They make mobility a scarce resource through the
introduction of an entry-ticket whose receipt is subject to the fulfillment of requirements and
conditions that a large share of the populations subjected to a visa requirement cannot fulfill
In this way, regimes of mobility control provoke and entice multiple practices of subversion and resistance, but also new forms of sociality and association, as migrants try to appropriate mobility through a range of tactics and mostly silent struggles within and against contemporary border regimes (e.g. Papadopoulos and Tsianos 2013; Scheel 2017, 2018, 2019; Stierl 2019; Tazzioli 2015, 2019). Many of these struggles happen “under the radar” in the form of clandestine practices of subversion by which migrants try to recode the means and methods of control into mechanisms facilitating the appropriation of mobility and other resources (such as income, housing, or access to healthcare under conditions of “illegality”). However, migrants also frequently engage in visible forms of protest, resistance and acts of citizenship in which they enact themselves as political subjects by claiming “the right to have rights” (e.g. Isin 2008, 2009, McEwin 2011, Nyers 2015; Rygel 2011) or by engaging in a “politics of incorrigibility” (De Genova 2010) which insists on an acknowledgement of migrants’ often illegalized but nevertheless unpreventable presence (see also Minor Keyword on “Struggle”). The irreducible politicality of these highly diverse practices of appropriation, refusal, claims-making, mobilizations, and public protests, as well as other forms of action resides in moments of self-authorization that are central to these struggles.

Migrants can gather and linger at a frontier or can momentarily mobilize collectively to claim rights, for example. A case in point is represented by the migrant organizations “Lampedusa in Hamburg” and “Lampedusa in Berlin” as well as by the “Collective of Tunisians from Lampedusa in Paris,” who named themselves on the basis of their shared geographies of movement (Fontanari, 2019; Garelli, Sossi, Tazzioli, 2013; Meret and Rasmussen 2014; Oliveri 2016). Notably, what these temporary collective formations have in common is their
irreducibility to the political categories of “the multitude” or “the people,” their highly heterogeneous composition, and the tendency to be discredited as “non-political.” Migrant multiplicities are not only the objects of political technologies aimed at disciplining and dividing them; they are also collective formations and political subjects that emerge from their mobility, from the crossing and meshing of pathways, temporary but with duration. Therefore, a political reading of mobility as a technology of government should also take into account the unusual and temporary collective subjects that emerge precisely from migrants’ shared condition of hypermobility and from the convoluted routes they (are forced to) undertake.

In this context it is important to note that mobility does not only feature as a resource to be claimed and appropriated. In many cases, mobility also functions as a vehicle of claims-making. Engin Isin (2012) notes for instance that within international legal regimes that conceive of the human body as a carrier of rights and entitlements, citizens and professionals carry their rights across geopolitical borders, thus often provoking collisions between various legal regimes. Citing an incident in Malaysia, in which a group of illegalized migrants threatened by deportation refused to disembark from a ship, Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013) have in turn highlighted the capacity of illegalized migrants to similarly trigger collisions between different legal regimes through practices of refusal. In both instances, mobility emerges not merely as a resource to be claimed, but as a vehicle of political claims-making that provokes either clashes and collisions between established orders and regimes of government or turmoil and turbulences within them that are not easily ignored.

**Politics of a minor keyword**
Mobility, movement, motion and related concepts are arguably not the key conceptual devices through which we understand the political — the where and how of politics. Yet, life and matter are full of motion; mobility is everywhere; people and things are moving and being moved all the time. How are these mobilities entangled with politics? Does giving primacy to these mobilities challenge our understandings of how and where politics is, how and where issues become politically meaningful? These are the lead questions that have informed this short essay. Obviously, there is much more to say. We intended to show, however, that although mobility, movement, and motion are minor keywords within social and political theory, giving them primacy opens up distinct understandings of politics that bring into view multiple practices and relations through which phenomena become politically meaningful and that challenge instituted repertoires of political knowledge and practice.
References


Meret, Susi and Jeppe Blumensaat Rasmussen 2014 “‘We are here to stay and we won’t shut up’: Lampedusa in Hamburg's indomitable fight for rights.” openDemocracy (21 May 2014); available at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/susi-meret-jeppe-blumensaat-rasmussen/'we-are-here-to-stay-and-we-won't-shut-up'>.


“The mob” calls forth images of people running amok, taking to the streets on a rampage, enraged with the actions or decisions of state authorities or the excesses of ruling elites. Rather than organized social or political protest mobilizations, the mob conjures something unruly, a collection of passions and desires turning into a force that disrupts the institutionally sanctioned forms of movement and expression. Although the concept of the mob has its own history, it generally captures an unease with both people moving in groups and with democratic politics as such, akin to the concept of the crowd in late 19th and early 20th century criminology.

The mob seems to capture two interrelated political elements at once: a fear of ordinary people on the parts of those in positions of authority, and the unruly expression of demands and objections. The mob apparently embodies what democratic, and more generally, mass politics requires — the voice of “the people,” whereby people mobilize to bring their grievances to bear upon the decision-making of those in power. But the mob nonetheless seems to express “the will of the people” in an excessive or illegitimate form. It manifests an unruly, ungovernable element in people, which politically translates into an awkward and uneasy relation to the otherwise venerable democratic figure of “the people.” Democratic rule, understood as rule “of, by and for” the people, is nevertheless a form of rule: thus, it inherently rejects giving carte blanche to people’s political actions, and rather entails governing in a manner that circumscribes what may be counted as legitimate or illegitimate enactments of democratic politics. Hence, labeling a
mass mobilization as the action of a “mob” is one of the standard rhetorical tactics with which to
delegitimize a movement or the articulation of demands — or even to deny its politicality, i.e. its
color as being recognizable or admissible as “politics,” altogether.

Yet, it is precisely the shortcomings of the state’s sovereign power, and specifically its
presumption of an exclusive monopoly over the adjudication and delivery of justice, that tend to
be at least implicitly exposed by what is sometimes called “mob justice.” The assumption by
what typically appears to be a spontaneously assembled group of a popular (ordinarily
majoritarian) prerogative to directly judge and immediately enforce an intuitive sense of “right”
through acts of violence (not uncommonly culminating in killing) against a perceived or
suspected offending individual or group is, after all, the classic scenario of the lynch mob.
Indeed, as is very often the case, when such “mob justice” is perpetrated against a whole social
category of people, the mob’s violent retribution frequently culminates not only in the summary
execution of suspect individuals, but in the wholesale persecution of “suspect” or despised
communities – the classic scenario of the pogrom. Such eruptions of targeted mass violence are
particularly pernicious inasmuch as they commonly prosecute the resentments and perpetrate the
punishments of self-authorized “majorities” against more or less permanently subjugated
“minorities.” In such instances, the mob effectively fashions itself as a supplement to the state,
and the mob’s extra-state violence is delivered as a kind of completion or fulfilment of the state’s
ostensible democratic mission to execute the will of “the people” by enforcing the will of “the
majority.” However, even in such reactionary examples, the mob may be understood (at least
implicitly) to be engaged, in effect, in an indictment the failings of the state.
Hence, the mob tends to expose a menacing rift between the putative democratic sovereignty of “the people” and the sovereign power of the state, which is often perceived to renege or fail in the delivery of its obligations. A commonplace and more quotidian manifestation of “mob justice” thus presents itself especially in postcolonial contexts, where the profound legacies of colonialism – above all, the glaring social inequalities of wealth, power, and prestige, but also the entrenched injustices of judicial and law enforcement systems – have left state formations deeply compromised. Where state institutions have commonly been beleaguered from the outset, formations of the mob’s capacity for extra-state violence are more frequent. “In the mob, the sovereign right to punish is decoupled from mediating institutions such as courts and prisons” (Taussig-Rubio 2011:53). In Kenya, for example, the violence of the mob “evokes some of the texture of everyday life … where state institutions fail to provide security, where individuals feel beset by crime with little police protection, where, in sum, Kenya seems unable to carry out some of its most important domestic sovereignty functions” (Taussig-Rubio 2011:52). Similar instances could be multiplied across the postcolonial world.

The mob’s capacity for nativist violence against migrants has also been increasingly evident in postcolonial settings, perhaps nowhere more than in South Africa. Tamlyn Monson (2015a; 2015b) argues that the deep historical inequalities of racialized citizenship in South Africa remains “spatially embedded” in informal squatter settlements with long histories of popular resistance against apartheid, characterized by distinctive repertoires of collective action that continue to be mobilized in a still-unfinished history of struggle for race and class equality. This continuing struggle for equality and social justice on the parts of South Africa’s Black poor – ostensible citizens – draws on shared experiences of everyday deprivations and collective labor,
exacerbating the social distance between long-established local squatters and “foreign” newcomers whom they perceive to be politically indifferent or opportunistic. At times of protest, familiar practices of insurgent citizenship among the seasoned denizens of apartheid and its aftermaths have increasingly been diverted into mob violence against other Black African migrants. Thus, paradoxically, apparently “xenophobic” mobilizations, while clearly plagued by nativism and anti-“foreigner” racism, may be seen nonetheless to articulate the frustrated claims for inclusion on the parts of structurally excluded ostensible “citizens,” rather than a purely exclusionary impulse on the part of those who are presumed to already belong.

The denial of politicality, and the suggestion that “mobs” are emotional and uncontrolled, has also served as an alibi for evading criminal liability in situations where mobs have been activated to serve as thugs for promoting or enforcing established political projects. Indeed, the term “thug,” with its deeply colonial roots in British India (Roy 1996; Lloyd 2006; Wagner 2007), is rather similarly freighted as the term “mob.” Referring to theories of “mass psychology,” the deployment of the term “mob” by judges in postcolonial India (Eckert 2012) has had consequences for the legal interpretation of certain actions: because of its allusion to affective action, being part of a “mob” has been deployed to imply partial exemption from criminal liability because of the “unsoundness of mind” that purportedly results from group dynamics. Calling collective violence, such as rioting and pogroms, the result of “mob action,” serves to dissolve individual responsibility into mass behavior, such that the violent or otherwise criminal acts of identifiable individuals nonetheless cannot be attributed back to individual actors. The exculpation involved in assuming this sort of diminished responsibility is closely related to the paternalism implicit in pejorative uses of the term “mob,” since people who are part of a “mob”
are generally attributed less capacity for rational ("civilized") action. Because of the presumed immediacy of emotional behavior, the references to affect and mass psychology also serve well to evade analyses of the possible responsibility for command in such scenarios, or other enabling contexts. Media representations of right-wing and racist attacks on migrants in Europe as the spontaneous action of “mobs” similarly serve to disregard the veritable politics of such attacks, and their embeddedness in larger political discourses and practices. Hence, the concept of the mob customarily delegitimizes collective action but also thereby de-politicizes it, specifically by combining three elements: the extra-institutional nature of people in motion; the understanding of that movement as driven by emotional forces or passions rather than reason; and the characterization of it as motivated by a propensity to “irrational” violence.

If we take the mob as neither an expression of a sort of fear of “unruly people” nor the illegitimate enactment of demands and desires, however, but rather as expressing a collective force that does not (yet) exist as a collective political subject, then the concept invites a different question: how to bring the unorganized movements of people in large numbers into political analysis without stigmatizing it as necessarily an “excess” of democratic politics, but instead as something that is immanent to democratic politics? Given the negative connotations of “the mob,” political theorists would normally shun using this terminology. Yet, there remains a great need for conceptual and methodological tools for making sense of the politicality of what manifest themselves as diffuse and turbulent enactments of demands, frustrations, controversies, disputes, and so on. The interest in the politicality of everyday practices that are considered as fragmented, banal, and at best infra-political is one such line of thought. The concept of “the mob” opens another such line.
Mobs come and go without crystallizing into organized movements that enter institutional political arenas. They therefore raise an important issue that is of great interest to contemporary politics: how do people coming together in large numbers and moving through public spaces take on political force by becoming a temporary collective multiplicity rather than a collective political subject? The mob compels us to contemplate the political force of movement as such, rather than a self-conscious political movement organizing itself through processes of representation — such as the internal organization of spokespersons, their legitimacy, and their chain of command — and taking on representational functions – such as the authority to speak for and about a specific set of issues. How can people moving in large numbers be thought of as political, with multiple people participating at one moment and not the next, i.e. without any organized membership, and with a turbulent presence, i.e. springing up in disruptive moments and then dissipating, only to pop up again later or elsewhere without any evident mode of organization that would resemble social or political movements, civil society organizations, charitable associations, and so on?

We develop these issues here with explicit reference to migration. Migration is one of the key areas in which issues raised by the concept of the mob may currently be observed and theorized. However, migration is obviously not the exclusive or privileged area for this theoretical question. Among others, there are the actions of protest movements, such as those described by Bayat (2000), which are not so easily contained within customary conceptions of social movements or classical formations of political subjects, or the contemporary interest in how uncoordinated
everyday or infra-political practice gains collective political significance by moving in resonance (Eckert 2015).

**Mobilising politics and collective formations**

The term “the mob” is etymologically derived from “mobility.” This is particularly telling of the theoretical and political relevance of the concept of the mob for critical analyses of migration. As Claudia Aradau and Jef Huysmans suggest, a critical engagement with the mob entails a “political reading of mobility” that allows us to “to rethink the conditions of possibility of democracy and democratic practice” (Aradau and Huysmans 2009:603). That is, a focus on the mob enables looking at mobility as a democratic practice which might unsettle the order of representative politics. Unlike “the multitude,” the mob retains a much more negative and derisive connotation. Moreover, it does not designate subjects who act in concert, but rather a disorganized and unruly multiplicity. Given the pejorative meaning of the mob, how and to what extent should we stress its political dimension? It is precisely this irreducibility of the mob to “the people” (and the concomitant legal framework of universal rights) that, according to Aradau and Huysmans, open up some leeway for re-inventing democratic politics.

“Democratic theories,” Judith Butler argues, “have always feared the mob […] even as they affirm the importance of expressions of popular will, even in their unruly forms” (Butler, 2015:1). Indeed, the term “the mob” corresponds to incipient collective formations that are both criminalized as unruly and discredited as non-political. Michel Foucault’s reflections on the seditious plebs and on popular illegalisms, in *Penal Theories and Institutions* (1972) and *The Punitive Society* (1973), respectively, provide us with useful analytical tools for complicating a
political reading of the mob. In those two series of lectures at the Collège de France, Foucault engages with popular movements of refusal and protest that cannot be described in terms of “population.” Five years later, in *Security, Territory, Population* (1978), he refers to “the people” as that which resists an assimilation into “the population”: “The people are those who, refusing to be the population, disrupt the system” (Foucault, 1978/2007: 43-44). However, the 1972 and 1973 courses offer a more nuanced and in-depth analysis of the political dimension of criminalized subjectivities that, historically, were disciplined and marginalized as unruly. It is precisely this irreducibility to any pre-established and recognized collective political subjectivity which characterizes the mob.

**Political genealogies of the mob**

In the eighteenth century “the mob” referred to “unstable common people” from the Latin expression *mobile vulgus* (Hayes, 1992: 6; see also Thompson, 1963). The term has been used in the English language since the seventeenth century to designate undisciplined and unruly popular multiplicities (Tazzioli, 2019). This English genealogy of the mob should be articulated with a broader colonial history, well retraced by Marcus Rediker in his genealogy of the “motley crew” in the Atlantic during the second half of the eighteenth century. Significantly, Rediker highlights the “multiracial mobs” (2014: 138) of slaves, workers, and sailors, that formed the motley crew. Indeed, the multiracial mob indicates that the motley crew was not a homogenous collective subject but rather was characterized by a highly heterogenous composition (see also Linebaugh, Rediker, 2013). Overall, throughout history, the mob has been associated with criminalized multiplicities and riotous collective formations.
Thus, a political genealogy of the mob enables tracing a partial historical continuity among a huge variety of criminalized and racialized collective subjects, including migrants. Over the centuries, “the mob” has always had a pejorative connotation, and consequently we cannot mobilize the notion in relation to migration without reflecting on the negative implications that this might have. Ultimately, the dehumanization of migrants in the media relies upon the use of pejorative designations, such as “swarms,” which serve the ends of discrediting them as non-political multiplicities and as potentially dangerous subjects. And, yet, we want to suggest that it is precisely by starting from such an “infamous genealogy” that it might be worth re-activating the mob in the present, to engage with emerging collective formations that can neither be analyzed nor coded through traditional sociological or political categories such as “population,” “social groups,” or “the people” (Isin, 2018). In other words, reactivating the mob in the present to speak about migration and emergent migrant collective formations might be a way for highlighting their politicality. Indeed, the mob, as an analytical lens for studying temporary multiplicities and unusual collective formations, enables us to interrogate the ambivalent processes at work in the criminalization and dehumanization of migration, together with the constitutive excess and incorrigibility of the migrants’ mobility.
References


Unlike “refugee,” which is the object of a voluminous academic and juridical literature, the term “refuge,” which of course is the overt referent in any invocation of refugees, remains largely unexamined as a concept deserving of critical scrutiny. Despite this status as a minor keyword, “refuge” has nevertheless become a popular term both in analyses of migrant solidarity networks and in the literature on refugee humanitarianism. Refuge entails both a spatial and a juridical dimension, simultaneously: indeed, refuge can refer to the opening of a safe space, while also evoking the granting of juridical protection. Moreover, refuge also suggests a temporal dimension experienced by those who seek it: it is not only a spatial destination but also a kind of temporal culmination of the larger process of refugee movement. Yet, refuge ultimately remains a quite under-theorized and ambiguous notion, which deserves to be unpacked and developed in its multiple inflections. As a provisional contribution to this task, we will consider here the spatial, juridical and temporal dimensions of refuge, and will conclude by gesturing towards the mobile “infrastructures of refuge” put into place by migrant solidarity networks.

Spatial dimension

Refuge is ordinarily assumed to be distinguished first and foremost by its spatial dimension as a place of safety, or indeed as a “safe space,” where people fleeing from potential danger or outright harm take shelter and secure their protection. However, refuge may not always be a matter of refugee subjects “taking” shelter for themselves or securing their own safety. In other words, such spaces of refuge, especially in the case of refugees seeking asylum, are often
“given.” Places of refuge, when associated with refugees or other “asylum seekers,” can be organized informally through solidarity campaigns or charitable initiatives, or may be provided by state authorities as a feature of a state’s obligation to process migrants and refugees’ petitions for asylum. For refugees and other migrants, such spaces of refuge are (minimally) supposed to offer “safety” from a life of marginalization and destitution, but such “reception” facilities sometimes are located in remote and isolated sites by design, and thereby in fact enhance and exacerbate their residents’ marginalization. Likewise, asylum regimes commonly restrict if not prohibit “asylum-seekers” – a term that itself exudes an institutionalized suspicion, if not derision, toward suspected “bogus” refugees – from earning a living independently. In this sense, the state-provided conditions of refuge generally enforce a “minimalist biopolitics” (Redfield 2005) that scarcely rises to a standard better than destitution. In contrast, in the case of spaces of refuge provided as a form of solidarity, there is a much greater explicit and emphatic commitment to trying to sustain some semblance of dignity and autonomy for migrants and refugees. As places of safety, moreover, the sorts of refuge organized by solidarity campaigns are also meant to signal safety or protection from the state itself, particularly in the form of raids by police and the threat of coercive detention and deportation, as well as providing a defense against fascistic anti-immigrant attacks. Such spaces of refuge organized beyond the purview of the state likewise tend to offer relief from the often degrading and violent conditions in the overcrowded “reception centers” or detention camps to which states relegate refugees and other migrants petitioning for asylum.

However, it remains crucial to ask: Where is “refuge” located? Is there a spatial (geopolitical) dimension implicitly conveyed by the very notion of “refuge? Indeed, in the dominant political
imagination, “refuge” tends to be associated with the European space, or the so called “Global North” at large. In other words, “Europe” – which is to say, more precisely, the space the European Union – appears in public discourse and much of the academic debate as the presumable space of refuge par excellence. For us, the theoretical stake consists in gesturing towards an open-ended politics that could posit an equal access to mobility and asylum for everyone, while at the same time questioning the taken-for-granted spatial referent of EUrope as a presumptive place of safety and refuge. This tension is ultimately at play in the slippery debate about “safe countries” -- which is deployed by the EU to justify the eventuality of compelling migrants “rescued”/ captured in the Mediterranean to return to the countries through which they have transited, such as Turkey or Tunisia. It is worth noting, therefore, that in Tunisia there has been an important civic mobilization pushing for Tunisia to adopt an asylum law and to become a country that could more adequately host asylum seekers. Therefore, the criticism of the EU’s policies of outsourcing border enforcement should be coupled with a decolonial perspective engaged with the political demands articulated in “third countries” for creating legal spaces of refuge (Cassarino, 2018 Mayblin, 2017).

Indeed, this is not only a matter of addressing the reality that the great majority of the world’s refugees are in fact being hosted in countries of the Global South, but also of foregrounding the ambivalences behind hegemonic assumptions regarding “Europe” as an object of desire and the ultimate space of refuge. Any idea of “refuge” is in fact connected, in an implicit or explicit way, with a specifically (post)colonial geography affiliated with the so-called Global North, and with a geopolitics that is commonly posited from the standpoint of a normative Eurocentrism. In his seminal article “The geopolitics of refugee studies: a view from the South” (1998), B.S.
Chimni argues that “the myth of difference” between refugee flows in Europe and people seeking asylum elsewhere is at the very core of the Geneva Convention. How might we disrupt the Eurocentric gaze on the question of “refuge”? What does a politics of refuge look like in countries whose governments never adopted any asylum law?

**Juridical dimension**

Refuge can also be understood in terms of juridical protection: namely, the permission to legally reside on a territory and to have been granted the rights and substantive welfare benefits that allow those whom state authorities recognize to be bona fide and “legitimate” refugees to pursue a dignified life. Indeed, the spatial meaning of refuge as a “safe place” where persecuted people find hospitality can be expanded to encompass this broader juridical sense.

Our contemporary global society is characterized by an “im-mobility regime” (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013; Faist 2013) that maintains and enforces radical social inequalities among different categories of people: some groups of privileged people are allowed to move quite freely, while others cannot (Shamir 2005). In particular, people subjected to the threat of deportation are made to experience an everyday life constantly under pressure, fear, and uncertainty (De Genova 2002), for whom a “deportation regime” (De Genova and Peutz 2010; Dreby 2013; Drotbohm and Hasselberg 2015) operates at a capillary level within nation-state territories to inflict and uphold their sustained precarity. This pertains not only to illegalized migrants but also all of those “asylum-seekers” who are eventually rejected in their petitions for refuge.
Questions of the law at multiple scales, and with sometimes conflicting aims, therefore emerge as crucial when working on migration, border enforcement practices, and the related concept of refuge. Debates over “sanctuary cities” and “cities of refuge,” for instance, revive the question over what might genuinely constitute an “open city” vis-a-vis the menace of the state’s immigration laws, policies, and administrative practices at the national scale. Accordingly, scholars working on “sanctuary cities” in the United States and Canada have investigated actions and policies that ostensibly aim to protect undocumented or unauthorized migrants from the processes of illegalization and criminalization (Bagelman 2016; Bauder 2016; Hintjens and Pouri 2014; Mancina 2012, 2019; Ridgley 2008). Alongside a proliferation of local (municipal and state/provincial-level) expansions of the purview of immigration law enforcement in the United States, several cities have nonetheless challenged new mandates to implicate local police in deportations, expanded other legal protections to undocumented migrants, and pushed for local policies such as prohibiting state functionaries from requesting and recording immigration status information, or sharing such data with municipal police forces or immigration authorities. Furthermore, a system of valid state-issued identification cards has been developed, including at both the municipal and state/provincial levels, which grant holders access to both public and private services in participating jurisdictions (Varsanyi 2006). What is finally at stake in these examples is what might be called a kind of “juridical refuge” at the sub-national scale that carves out a space of respite and protection from the repercussions of a nation-state’s border, immigration, and asylum regime.

The British movement of “solidarity cities” presents some noteworthy differences from the Northern American one, having the promotion of a “culture of welcome” towards asylum-
seekers and refugees taking precedence over initiatives for protecting undocumented migrants (Darling 2010). However, sanctuary practices and the ideal of hospitality that they aspire to enact tend to inevitably open up disputes over “rightful presence” (Squire and Darling 2013) and broader questions of justice that highlight the political dimension of the struggles around asylum. Likewise, the practical assistance, material support, and legal advice provided to forced migrants by community-based initiatives in the UK and other European “solidarity cities” again signal the failure or refusal of national states as well as municipal state actors to adequately provide refuge and protection. Multiple studies have highlighted how the governments of receiving countries turn a blind eye to the presence of unauthorized migrants, on the condition that they remain invisible and that civil society associations assume responsibility for their welfare (Chauvin and Garcés-Mascareñas 2014; Ambrosini and Van der Leun 2015; Leerkes 2016). However, these practices of disregard on the part of state institutions should not be thought of in terms of an “absence” of the state, but rather as active forms of abandonment affecting migrant subjects’ conditions of life and institutional violence asserting the state’s presence only in terms of surveillance and control (Agier 2011; Davies et al. 2017; Pinelli 2017; Sanò 2017). Thus, the legal dimensions of refuge directly ramify upon its political dimensions.

In the post-2015 period, due to the re-bordering practices deployed by EU institutions and member states, access to refugee status or even more precarious forms of legal protection has been severely restricted in Europe. New technologies of control such as the “hotspot” detention camps have been deployed in order to operationalize a capillary selection mechanism to sort and rank heterogeneous categories of people on the move (Antonakaki et al. 2016; Sciurba 2017; Dimitriadi 2017; Spathopoulou 2016; 2019; Tazzioli and Garelli 2018). The mechanisms of
selection, control, and containment typical of the hotspot strategy have been extended to national bureaucracies that implement asylum rights at the local level (Artero 2018). Increasingly restrictive administrative practices are enforced by local authorities, thus hindering the attribution of legal status to asylum-seekers as prospective beneficiaries of protection. Such “administrative borders” (Gargiulo 2017) reduce the juridical space of refuge by insulating some spheres of local community life from “undesirable” people — namely, migrants. Hence, we witness a proliferation of borders, indeed of borders within borders (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013). These administrative borders developed within national territories entail selective mechanisms for dividing those who are deemed to deserve rights and welfare benefits, and those who do not. Hence, the idea of “juridical refuge” can also serve to identify a space of unresolved tensions and conflicts where various state authorities engage in political acts of drawing the line between people who are deemed worthy of rights and those who are to be deprived of them. Nonetheless, such spaces of juridical refuge also emerge as the effect of migrants’ struggles against their criminalization, deportations, and the wider juridical conditions that expel them to a life of destitution.

Temporal dimension

The concept of refuge also assumes a temporal dimension, which is deeply interrelated with the spatial and juridical dimensions. Refuge implies an understanding of safety that we have related to material spaces, i.e. “safe places,” and to a juridical condition of being protected from the threat of deportation and more general processes of illegalization or criminalization. Reflection upon the concept of refuge should necessarily underscore how the subjective and affective experience of securing protection and feeling safe in the present has profound implications for
projecting ourselves forward into a “safe” future where a dignified life would be possible. The capacity of individuals to construct their own futures (Kabachnik et al. 2010) is, however, significantly endangered for migrants whose lives are embedded within border regimes of mobility control.

Time is directly related to the subjective experiences of the body and the mind and emerges as a fundamental element for understanding the human condition. Some scholars have focused on temporality as crucial dimension in order to develop an in-depth understanding of migration as a complex phenomenon intertwined with other social processes, such as globalization and decolonization (Cwerner 2001; Griffiths et al. 2013; Mezzadra, Neilson 2013; Donnan et al. 2017). Research into the governmental mechanisms for regulating migrant mobility should likewise take into account the intrinsic relation between the mechanisms, relations, and structures of power and the management of time. Similarly, research interested in the subjective experience of migrants should address the temporal dimension as crucial for understanding migration as a process of becoming subjects. In this respect, the juridical dimension of refuge is deeply interconnected with the temporal one. Indeed, keeping people waiting in uncertainty about their chances of legally residing on a territory is a form of exercising power over their time, and thereby interrupting the trajectories of their life projects. Moreover, extended waiting times, combining such agonizing uncertainty with the glimmer of hope related to the prospective resolution of their juridical condition, constitute a clear technique of control for imposing temporal precarity and thereby regulating migrants’ social interactions.

Migration policies, mechanisms of border control, and devices for mobility’s management profoundly affect the temporality of migrants’ everyday lives, consequently impacting their
sense of self. Critical border studies scholars have shed light on how migration is regulated temporally as well as spatially, pointing out the production of “temporal zones of hierarchized mobility” (Panagiotidis, Tsianos 2007) in which people find themselves subjected to a state of “indefinite confinement” (Anderson 2014) or, alternately, become “caught in mobility” (Hess 2012; cf. Tazzioli 2019). Similarly, the literature on mobility (Urry 2005; Cresswell 2006) and the “im-mobility regime” (Shamir 2005; Schiller, Salazar 2013; Faist 2013) have stressed how the global system of mobility control affects the temporal dimension of migrants’ lives.

Accordingly, time becomes another “tool” of migration management with its quick starts and stops, temporary zones of transit, forced (accelerated) mobility, and abrupt push-backs that generate a kind of prolonged condition in which migrants become confined in an existential predicament of endless waiting (Bisell 2007), liminality (Donnan, Wilson 1999), and stuckedness (Willen 2007; Hage 2009; Brekke, Brochmann 2014). Such “temporal confinement” is experienced not only by undocumented migrants (Coutin 2005; Nyers 2013) or asylum-seekers waiting in refugee camps (Agier 2009; Hyndman, Giles 2011) or in deportation centres (Freedom of Movement Research Collective 2018; Griffiths 2014), but also by refugees with a residence permit experiencing heightened levels of mobility (Fontanari 2018), by migrants kept on the move because of the EU’s Dublin regulation (Picozza 2017), and by migrants forced to move as a result of a border regime’s politics of dispersal (Tazzioli 2019).

These analyses demonstrating how time is used as tool of migration government and the regulation of migrants’ social interactions can be fruitfully put in relation to analyses focusing on the subjective level. The consequences upon the inner life of migrants and their processes of self-construction are crucial for our understanding of refuge and its temporal dimensions.
Several scholars argue how subjective narrations (Jackson 2002), emotions, and affects (Clough 2007) are deeply related to subjectivity and its temporal dimension (Ortner 2005; Grønseth 2013). Insofar as emotions are embedded in cultural and historical structures, they can serve to reveal the power relations embedded in social life (Luhrmann 2006; Biehl et al. 2007; Bourgois, Schonberg 2009). Following Sara Ahmed’s (2004) call to focus on “what emotions do” rather than on “what emotion are,” research on refuge is well situated to demonstrate how emotions operate as forms of sociopolitical action to “make and shape” bodies. Scholars working on migration trajectories have emphasized that motivations, emotions, and feelings are among the main components of migrants’ journeying (Schapendonk 2012; Collyer et al. 2012). These affective features of migration are deeply intertwined with temporality.

The individual migrant self is in constant flux as it lives at the intersections of time – past, present and future – (Grønseth 2013), with an intense sensitivity to aspirations, hopes, dreams, and imaginings of the future (de Haas 2010; Pinelli 2013; Van Meerten et al. 2009), together with memories of the past, in the form of loved ones and places left behind, for whom enduring present and future obligations commonly remain prominent nonetheless. The experience of crossing borders also has a strong temporal dimension (Radu, 2010), which is not reducible only to actual movement across borders. The concept of “phantom borders” (von Hirschhausen et al. 2015) helps to highlight how the memories and practices of borders can exercise social, cultural, and emotional power even after their political, juridical and administrative aspects have receded (Donnan et al. 2017). Thus, the dynamic relation between individuals and their affective dispositions toward the past, present and future are crucial angles through which analyze the dimension of refuge.
People subjected to insecure juridical conditions are at risk of mental and physical distress, due to the intense uncertainty about their future. “Uncertainty” is understood here to be an individual situation marked by imperfect knowledge of the present and an unpredictability of the future (Williams, Baláž 2012), and can be seen to be a deliberate governance strategy (Bihel 2015) whose effects push migrants into a marginal life characterized by insecurity about the future. Such existential and mental precariousness directly affects the subjectivity of migrants, who often feel that they are not fully in control of their own lives (Fontanari 2017). Moreover, they are socially marginalized from the prospect of attaining many of the conventional measures of “success,” associated with stable employment, reliable incomes, or gratifying work. Prolonged periods of waiting and uncertainty therefore mean that asylum seekers are not “in time with others” (Khosravi 2010). Likewise, under these conditions of juridical ambiguity and temporal precarity, refugees and other asylum seekers are subjected to a process of infantilization, being treated as children to be instructed, guided, or saved (Pinelli 2013), corresponding to the more generally infantilizing tendency of humanitarian government (Fassin 2011; Ticktin 2011). Individuals commonly internalize such suspensions of their time, characterized by a lack of personal advancement and social progress: they tend to experience this precarious temporality as a sort of barrier to becoming fully “adult.” This can progressively weaken their own self-perception as active autonomous subjects exercising control over their own lives. The transformation of migrants’ perceptions of the future — as a temporal horizon that is made to appear radically detached from the present time and disconnected from their actual situation — is a clear effect of migrants’ subjection to the powers governing them.
Ultimately, refuge can nevertheless be a temporal space of possibility where people seek to act and decide upon their own lives as active subjects, and refuse to be passive objects in a confined space waiting for the state’s decision on their fates. “Temporal refuge” can thus signal a projection toward a future where people see themselves as active subjects controlling their own lives. “Safety” here becomes the sign of an autonomous subjective disposition against or beyond the precariousness of indefinite waiting and protracted uncertainty, whereby it becomes feasible for migrants to mentally project themselves into a future dimension where a dignified life is possible. Such an orientation towards the future should be understood nonetheless as an embodied social experience in the present, which therefore entails sociopolitical practices of everyday resistance that can be conceived as “acts of refuge.”

**Conclusion: Towards mobile infrastructures of refuge?**

While, as this short essay has shown, the act of providing refuge to someone can hardly be detached from the legal and bureaucratic apparatuses of the asylum regime, it is important to register the widespread multiplication of collective mobilizations across Europe for providing logistical, humanitarian, and legal support to migrants in transit. In fact, if it is indisputable that the “long summer of migration” (Kasparek, 2016; Kasparek and Speer 2015) triggered a series of legal, political, and administrative measures on an EU level aimed at containing and regaining control over migration, the infrastructures of solidarity enacted by many European citizens cannot pass unnoticed. Although they could not provide refuge in the legalistic sense of the term (e.g. by granting international protection), many of these mobile infrastructures of migration support have provided refuge by creating safe spaces, shelters, and safe passages, as well as by actively supporting migration movements. In this regard, it is worth recuperating the original
meaning of the word “refuge,” which refers not only to the juridical institution of asylum but more fundamentally to safe spaces and shelters.

These infrastructures of refuge are highly mobile, since they are often compelled by circumstances to literally move and are also reactivated by following migrants’ routes; consequently, they are also extremely precarious and volatile, as they are frequently dismantled or criminalized by state authorities. Some of these infrastructures are underground, inasmuch as they must avoid the scrutiny of state authorities in order to be effective and endure over time, and therefore must also avoid garnering the attention of the media. Others instead opt strategically to make themselves visible insofar as they rely precisely on the support and consensus of a large part of the local citizenry. Infrastructures of refuge have been put into place in response to the neglect or outright practices of abandonment on the part of international and state authorities that fail or refuse to provide refuge to migrants in need, and which have increasingly restricted access to international protection. Paying attention to these mobile infrastructures therefore allows us to stretch the very notion of refuge beyond its legal dimension, and to redefine it by encompassing active practices and acts of solidarity, both collective and individual, in support of refugees and other migrants in transit. To some extent, precisely while the EU has adopted an overt politics of migration containment and racist anti-immigrant populist movements have been on the rise, something resembling an underground railroad has also emerged through the multiple but dispersed infrastructures of solidarity.
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PROTECTION

Peter Nyers, Nicholas De Genova, Enrica Rigo, and Martina Tazzioli

It is customary in the discourses surrounding refugees and asylum to refer to the obligations of states for protection, but while this term is plainly a keyword and indeed an article of faith of the international human rights regime, it remains a distinctly minor keyword that has largely eluded the critical purview of political theory. We propose to consider the matter of “protection” as a political problem, and to examine the politics of protection. When speaking of a politics of protection, furthermore, we must also ask: Who is the subject of protection? Can the protected intervene in shaping the terms and conditions of their protection? What kinds of subjectivities are produced in, through, and against protection?

Any attempt to explore these questions regarding the agency of the protected requires that we begin by unpacking the very concept of “protection.” Here, Didier Bigo’s (2006) etymology of protection is helpful. His analysis reveals that there is not one but several origins to the term. Each of these terms carries a different connotation and structures the meaning of protection in a distinct fashion. The three Latin terms for protection that Bigo identifies in his etymology — tegere, praesidere, and tutore — vary considerably in terms of how the relationship between the protector, the protected, and the enemy or danger is framed. With praesidere and tutore, for example, this relationship involves asymmetrical power relations with the protected rendered either as a passive and neutral object of protection (praesidere) or as a subjugated person from whom obedience is required (tutore). In both conceptions, Bigo argues, the agency and
autonomy of the protected is undermined or otherwise effaced: “The protected is considered as passive. He has no right to speak but only to obey in the name of his own safety. He does not know what the protector knows” (Bigo 2006:88). The protector, in short, neutralizes the agency of the protected and becomes their spokesperson. How refugees and migrants challenge, break, or evade these relations of tutelage and patronage is a pressing issue for political theory. Here, again, Bigo’s etymology provides some guidance. The term tegere, he notes, allows the autonomy of the protected to be considered as an important factor in the politics of protection. The oldest Latin word for protection, which is itself of Greek origin, tegere means “to cover,” “to hide,” and “to shelter.” Protegere (to cover up front) means to provide shelter against an oncoming danger, with a shield, for example. A related word is tegmen, which refers to the armor one uses to protect oneself. What is interesting in this version of the term is that it leaves room for an active role for the protected, whereby one can be engaged in protecting herself, and thus can in fact be the same person or entity as the protector. The implications this has for how refugee and migrant protection can be rethought and reformulated are significant and will be returned to below.

The etymology of “protection” outlined by Bigo is helpful for demonstrating how a single term can move in multiple directions. Protection is not a static concept, but one that kinetically moves across multiple performative fields. In the field of migration, protection can signify a range of activities, from helping someone in danger, to detaining and deporting them, to subjecting them to ongoing monitoring and surveillance. The meaning of protection moves and shifts, depending on its use and context. The conceptual movement has been well traced with regards to the related concept of “security,” which since the late 1980s has been widened in security/strategic
studies to include a broader range of subjects of insecurity, including individuals, societies, economies, humanity as a whole, and the biosphere (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2014). The concept of protection shares this ambiguity, as it moves across and between the practices of policing, defense, and securing humanity and the environment (Huysmans 2006:13). With regard to migrant protections, we can similarly see how protection is reinforced across different realms of human and non-human activity. For example, strong protections for human rights as well as policies that respect and protect the environments in which people live will militate against the conditions that create the forced displacement of migrants and refugees. At the same time, however, the ambiguity of this conceptual movement needs to be emphasized. There is nothing inherently liberating about this movement of protection across different realms of activity. The above example of linking migrant and environmental protections can be easily flipped in order to enable violence against migrants. It is well known, for example, that the manifestos of the white supremacist murderers who massacred scores of people in El Paso, Texas and Christchurch, New Zealand in 2019 contained multiple references to protecting the environment. In their eco-fascist judgement, the protection of the environment required violence to be perpetrated against people whom they racially perceived to be “migrants.”

Protection must be approached critically and deployed with caution because of its close relationship to sovereign power. Protection has historically been an important part of state power and a source for state legitimacy. In this way, protection is not just a political problem, it also provides an answer to a host of political challenges, not least of which concerns the “legitimate” use of violence and coercion by states. Much of what counts as modern state theory is premised on the assumption that, within varying limits, sovereign power is legitimate to the
extent that it can provide protection to its citizenry: protecting citizens from each other through a system of laws and police, and protecting citizens from external threats through the military and border controls. The well-known paradox of this formulation is that states and their coercive apparatuses are more often than not the source of insecurity and violence against their own citizens. This is the “protection racket” that Charles Tilly (1985) famously warned against: the same measures that are supposed to enhance security are those that asymmetrically bring about insecurity. Indeed, putative anti-“subversive” campaigns of state terror and civil wars distinguished by intense state violence against civilian populations have been a major source of many of the mass migratory exoduses of refugees and other asylum-seekers across the Global South. In El Salvador, for example, the repressive violence of “the protection racket state” (Stanley 1996) effectively displaced a significant portion of its ostensible citizenry, only then to have many of their children, raised in the United States, deported back as “criminal aliens” in the genesis of a “transnational gang crisis,” whereby the counter-“subversive”/anti-“terrorist” violence of the state came to be re-purposed and re-packaged as neoliberal “security” measures to “protect” the population against the gang violence attributed to the deportees (Zilberg 2011).

Another reason for critical caution when addressing questions about protection arises from what Teju Cole (2012) has called “the white savior industrial complex,” which is an urgent reminder that a transnational system of “protection” exists which provides whites in the world’s richest countries with ethical cover for the global/postcolonial racial and economic disparities reproduced by neoliberal policies. The problematic connotations of tutelage and patronage found in Bigo’s etymology of protection are well represented here. Through their acts of “care” and “protection,” white volunteers are cast as humanitarian heroes (Kapoor 2013), thereby
effacing from ongoing neo-colonial relationships (Picozza 2019). This presents a challenge to migrants’ rights activists, in particular those at the forefront of campaigns to ensure protection to migrants seeking asylum by entering Europe via maritime routes. Equally, refugee and migrant rights activism in settler states such as Australia, Canada, and the United States face the challenge of reflecting on how cherished principles of “welcome,” “hospitality,” and “protection” may reproduce and refound the assumptions that sustain the project of settler colonialism (Walia 2013). The challenge for activists and scholars becomes how to critically negotiate ongoing forms of coloniality and to be self-reflexive, responsive, and accountable to how their practices of protection may reproduce colonial relations of unequal power and privilege.

Finally, let us return to the question of the agency and autonomy of the protected as well as the possibility for self-protection. Recalling Bigo’s etymology, the term *tegere* allows for the autonomy of the protected to be considered as an important factor in the politics of protection. Bigo (2006:91) credits this meaning of the term for providing an escape from the ‘triangular relation’ between the protector, the source of danger, and the protected. Instead, the protected have an active role and are not rendered agentless and passive in the face of danger. This understanding of protection is becoming more and more urgent in a context when migrant and refugee movements are increasingly constructed as threats, and states and international organizations are more concerned with protecting their borders in the face of global migrations than they are with providing protection to people seeking asylum. When state protection is not granted even at the level of basic humanitarian needs – as is well documented in the refugee camps of Lesvos (Haaland and Wallevik 2019), to take one of many other possible examples –
then other agents and forms of protection must be considered. In conditions of abandonment, the questions about refugee and migrant autonomy begin to supersede questions of legal protection (Nyers 2019: 42-59; cf. De Genova, Garelli, and Tazzioli 2018). Here, the passive meaning of protection is creatively twisted into a political tool for claiming rights. For example, the vibrant self-housing movement of refugees and migrants across Europe (Mudu and Chattopadhyay 2017), often done in solidarity (although not without tension) with local migrant rights activists, is testimony to how protection can be enacted by those in need of protection. Not only do housing squats meet the direct human need of physical protection, they also constitute political acts to the extent that they claim housing as a right of social citizenship and often defy the sanctity of private property. Therefore, while these acts of co-protection arise out of necessity, they also are expressions of an ethos of inventiveness: to devise new forms of mutual cooperation, to engage in transversal solidarity across legal status, and enact new subjectivities that are “within, against, and beyond citizenship” (De Angelis 2019:627).
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ALIEN / FOREIGNER

Josue David Cisneros and Nicholas De Genova

I am a man: nothing human is alien to me.

—Terence (c. 163 BCE)²

It is a commonplace to note the peculiar double sense of the term “alien” in U.S. (“American”) English, referring to both a “foreigner” and an extraterrestrial, alternately naming a creature not of this land, this country, this nation, and a creature not of this earth. As a synonym for “foreigner,” the term “alien” originates as a convention in U.S. immigration law for designating non-citizens, and has acquired a considerably wider (albeit pejorative) colloquial usage, whereby the term’s affiliation with the non-human and otherworldly serves to intensify the nativist suspicion if not animus otherwise at stake when the term names those who are merely non-national.

The term “alien” in English originates from the French aliene, derived from the Latin alienus – both terms that can mean foreign(er) or strange(er). The Latin alienus is related to alius, the word for “other” or “another.” This word, alius, also comes from the same proto-Indo-European word from which comes “else.” Hence, the alien, whether a person (in this case) or a thing, is from “elsewhere,” is strange (strange, from the Old French estrange and the Latin extraneus), is not of one’s own. Etymologically, the alien is both a spatial designation (foreign, from

² Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto.—Terence (Publius Terentius Afer), *Heauton Timorumenos* (“The Self-Tormentor”), Act 1, scene 1, line 77 (c. 163 BCE)
elsewhere) but also an affective and social designation (strange, different, unfamiliar, other). According to Oxford English Dictionary (OED), as far back as the fifteenth century the term has had both of these usages, both descriptive or legal meanings (foreigner) as well as affective and moral meanings (strange, unnatural, even repugnant).

Foreigner has a similar etymology. Foreign comes from the old French forain and the Latin foraneus, both communicating exteriority or being outside. The Latin foraneus comes from foris, which literally means both a door and what is outside of the door. Thus, at least etymologically speaking, foreigner is substantially a spatial term that demarcates one as being “outside” of (or originating from outside of) a bordered space or bounded community, from elsewhere. Notably, the OED suggests that the spelling of “foreign” was altered to end with “-eign” during the seventeenth century in order to mirror other words (such as “sovereign” and “reign”), when it began to be more strictly used to refer to something or someone pertaining to another sovereign country.

Another etymology of the word “alien” is more associated with property law. One alienates her property when she gives or forfeits it to another, making it their property. This usage similarly has roots in the Latin alienare — “to make something another’s, to take away, remove” — from alienus “belonging or pertaining to another”). It is from this tradition of the word “alien” that we inherit the concept of “alienation” in political philosophy inasmuch as, once the self becomes a kind of property during the Enlightenment, it too can become alienated from itself, estranged. It is therefore of particular salience that the ancient Roman playwright Terence, who bequeathed us the famous humanist dictum repudiating the notion that anything human could ever be alien, was
himself originally transported to Rome from North Africa as a slave, reduced in his person and all the faculties of his body to the property of another, literally a “foreigner” alienated from himself.

Ironically, these words from Terence that we have come to revere as an affirmation of human universality were uttered, in its original comedic context, by a nosey busybody in response to his neighbor’s suggestion that he mind his own business – a defiant defense of impropriety on the occasion of having transgressed the presumptive boundary between self and other. The refusal of alienage, even in this ironic assertion, is affirmed as a human entitlement to intrude upon all that is otherwise guarded as private and proprietary.

The theme of intrusion is especially pertinent inasmuch as “foreigner” can refer to a “foreign” person on both sides of a border, whereas “alien” tends to refer almost exclusively to a non-citizen located within the territorial bounds and jurisdiction of the state formation from which s/he is juridically classed as “outside” of citizenship. Aliens, in short, are “foreign in a domestic sense,” to adapt the notorious phrase deployed historically to euphemize the colonial status of Puerto Rico vis-a-vis the United States. The alienage of non-citizens is meaningful only to the extent that they are no longer foreigners “elsewhere” but instead are “foreigners” here, who have intruded upon the space of the state and its ostensible polity and now reside alongside citizens.

Tracing the etymology of the words foreigner and alien demonstrates that each of these is a constructed category central to the projects of modern nation-state formation. Scholars of migration have traced in great detail the legal, social, political, and cultural processes by which
people are made into aliens and foreigners and through which those ascriptions become naturalized as a foundation of the nation.

The legal construction of the alien or foreigner literally takes shape through immigration law and border enforcement policies that define categories of status and subjectivity based on behaviors or ascriptive characteristics. For example, Mae Ngai has shown that the category of the “illegal alien” was historically produced through U.S. federal immigration policies that defined an “impossible subject” — a legal subject who was outside the law, “a person who cannot be and a problem that cannot be solved” (2005:5). Nicholas De Genova (2004; 2005) has memorably detailed “the legal production of Mexican/migrant ‘illegality’,” tracing a confluence of laws, public policies, and legal rulings that produced the iconic figure of “alien-ness” in the U.S. context: the “illegal” Mexican “alien.” Likewise, the category sans papiers — perhaps the paradigmatic, paradoxical term of illegalized “foreignness” in the French and wider European migration context — was produced across the twentieth century through a number of legal and administrative decisions (Noiriel 1991). With the proliferation of border disputes and migration and refugee movements across the Global South since the era of decolonization, amidst agonistic and antagonistic claims to national self-determination and sovereignty, postcolonial states have come to rely ever increasingly on the construction of “alien” border-crossers as putative “security” threats, if not outright “enemies” (Sharma 2020). This has been the case for Bengali Muslims in India’s northeastern borderlands, including not only actual migrants from Bangladesh but also millions of Indian citizens, who, in an era of Hindu chauvinist political ascendancy, have come to be reconstructed as “illegal”/ “Bangladeshi”/ “aliens” and stripped of their citizenship (Encinas 2017; Murshid 2016; Upadhyaya 2006; cf. De Genova and Roy 2020).
Yet, as the broader uses of the terms attest, “alien-ness” or “foreignness” are not solely legal or political categories but broader affective and social conditions produced on and around particular subjects. In fact, Sara Ahmed has argued that the alien/foreigner is a paradoxical figure par excellence, for the alien/stranger is both the figure that we cannot identify but that we have already identified as other, as what we avoid contact with but through whom we assert or reconfirm our own identity and subjectivity, representing “the danger of the unknown” while yet “a source of fascination and desire” (2000:2). As with the paradoxical legal designations of “illegal alien” or “sans papiers” (paradoxical because they legally designate a subject outside the law), the broader social categories of alien and foreigner designate figures that are, at once, strange/unrecognizable and also wholly recognizable, familiar, and ever present. Several scholars, including Linda Bosniak (2007) and Bonnie Honig (2001), have demonstrated that, even as they are marked as “other” and “from elsewhere,” the alien/foreigner is integral to the production and maintenance of democracy and citizenship. For example, Honig traces the important role that the figure of the foreigner plays, both culturally and socially, in both founding and restoring democratic communities — from ancient Rome to the contemporary United States.

Because of these intimate relations between the native/citizen and the alien/foreigner, several perspectives situate the experiences and struggles of the alien/foreigner as central for challenging traditional paradigms of citizenship and nationality. These include forms of cosmopolitanism that eliminate the status of the alien or foreigner by rooting belonging in humanity or “world citizenship,” or paradigms of hospitality that create ethical systems of obligation to welcome the stranger (e.g. Derrida 2001). It is perhaps in this spirit that Terence, in
suggesting that all human concerns were also properly his concerns, and that all human experiences corresponded to his own, was effectively also implying that no fellow human could be alien to him. In contrast to these perspectives, which seek to solve the “problem” of alienage or eliminate the status of the foreigner, others find in the political struggles of alienized communities, such as illegalized migrants, forms of political subjectivity, solidarity, or visions of community that challenge the limited and exclusionary paradigms of territorially defined nation-states and citizenship (De Genova 2010; McNevin 2011; Nyers 2003). In a similar vein, queer/feminist scholars have suggested that the broader affective and social condition of alien-ness — of feeling out of place, of being seen as a stranger — may provide under-theorized and fugitive forms of agency and resistance, such as in Sara Ahmed’s figure of the “affect alien”: the subject who, by virtue of not feeling the right sorts of feelings or not being oriented toward the proper and productive objects, holds the potential to challenge and change social conditions (Ahmed 2010). That other sense of the term alien — as the extraterrestrial, reflected in science fiction — is telling in this regard, speaking both to the fear and exclusion produced around the figure of the foreigner as a veritable “space invader” (Puwar 2004), as well as the dreams and visions of a new (other) world that this foreigner can inaugurate.

What this brief survey illustrates is that the minor keywords “alien” and “foreigner” are much more complex and contingent than would appear at first glance. The etymology of these terms demonstrates their intimate connection to traditional paradigms of social membership and belonging, as re-stabilized and reinforced by the nation-state and citizenship. Defined as what is outside, elsewhere, or strange, the alien alien/foreigner serves to constitute and maintain the dominant political and social community. Furthermore, this overview of these terms also
demonstrates that the status of alien/foreigner is fluid and fragmentary, consisting of legal designations, political relationships, affective economies, and sociocultural representations. The alien or foreigner is neither a fixed social position nor a simple juridical or political ascription, but rather a complex assemblage affects and emotions, laws and policies, histories, ideologies, discourses, and more, each of which are assembled to produce alien-ness or foreignness not merely as attributes of individuals but also, still more importantly, as sociopolitical constellations of difference. Finally, it is worth highlighting that the position of the alien/foreigner is not only a source of estrangement, exclusion, or exploitation, but also can become a site for collective life and resistance precisely because of the variegated and fluid nature of these designations. As with Terence’s famous dictum, articulated by the foreigner and former slave, those who are rendered alien and made foreign — whose legal and social status is defined by lack — can also leverage these positionalities to challenge their marginalization and produce alternate visions of human sociality, conviviality, and belonging.
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Containment, confinement and detention are terms widely used across the social sciences that have gained particular traction in analyses of migration and border regimes. And yet, these terms tend to be used almost interchangeably in the literature, with no rigorous analytical distinction among them. This is surely due to some extent to the ambivalent and constantly changing ways in which migrants are detained, confined, and contained. In part, we suggest, this analytical confusion comes from the conflation of these three terms with spatial immobilization. Common conceptions of migrant detention are often conflicting and contradictory. Official designations legally define detention as an “administrative process” for immigration-related matters even as migrants feel and experience it as punishment or banishment. Media accounts ambivalently refer to the spaces of detention, alternately, as: “reception centers,” “prisons,” “for-profit prisons,” “camps,” “family residential centers,” “baby jails,” “processing centers,” “tent cities,” “holding facilities,” or “black sites” (among other terms). Public opinion and political attitudes toward detention are similarly, and predictably, erratic. In United States opinion surveys, for example, a majority opposes “family separation” through detention and deportation, yet overwhelmingly supports family detention “under humane conditions” (Newport 2019; Clement 2018). The veritable ubiquity of these heterogeneous depictions of migrant detention — alternately banal and euphemistic or evocative and lurid — nonetheless only throws into ever more stark relief just how little this topic has garnered the consideration it commands in political thought.

Detention and the associated concepts of confinement and containment are ever more salient
keywords in the dominant discourses of power and politics, and yet they remain stubbornly “minor” terms within the lexicon of political theory.

**Detention**

That migrant detention appears at once humanitarian and punitive reflects the context of its global resurgence. Political elites (particularly in “liberal democracies”) offer detention as a policy response to a “crisis.” However, detention can be better understood in the context of political, economic, and cultural struggles associated with neoliberal globalization. In the 1990s and 2000s, the rise in migrant detention occurred during intense political struggles over migration, demographic change, “cultural denationalization,” “multiculturalism,” and “minority rights.” In the United States, policy advocates and activists drew on civil rights and human rights discourses when advocating for migrant rights. This framing of migration as a civil rights issue coincided with a punitive turn in migration and border controls (Macías Rojas 2016; Garcia Hernandez 2014, 2013). In the 1980s, the Reagan administration borrowed a detention policy from the Thai government that forcibly detained migrants who were bypassing refugee camps, migrating without official documents, and claiming asylum (Helton 1986). But it was in the 1990s that the Democratic Party drew on the law-and-order frameworks of the New Right and mobilized political rhetoric that drew distinctions between “legal” migrants worthy of protection and rights and “illegal aliens” who “break the law” (Macias-Rojas 2018a). Criminalizing the autonomous cross-border movements of unauthorized migrants justified an intensification of U.S.-Mexico border controls that increasingly implemented militarized counterinsurgency tactics without appearing to be racist or nativist (Dunn 1999; Macias-Rojas 2018b; Nevins 2001).

Following the events of September 11, 2001, the punitive turn reached a new scale (De Genova
2007; Fernandes 2007). To be sure, migrant detention is a global phenomenon and the United States is by no means the only state detaining migrants, but these shifts are important for understanding migrant detention globally because they allow us to begin to map how penal knowledge travels globally along with migrants and capital (Aas 2013; Peck 2003; Wacquant, Gillian, and Pratt 2004).

In response to the rapid proliferation around the globe of migrant detention in airports, repurposed military sites, rural areas, and remote islands—particularly in the aftermath of the so-called War on Terror—critical migration and border scholars began writing about its political and conceptual ambiguity. Early work by critical geographers and anthropologists called attention to its spatial and temporal logics (De Genova 2016; Casas-Cortes et al. 2015; Mountz, Coddington, Catania, and Loyd 2013; Martin and Mitchelson 2009). In this entry, we seek to build on this critical scholarship by making further analytic distinctions among detention, containment, and confinement.

Here we seek to move beyond the definition of policy elites or the bureaucratic and doctrinal definition of migrant detention that define it as an “administrative” holding facility, whether situated in airports, processing centers, or privately-operated or subcontracted sites in correctional facilities. Particularly in liberal democracies, adherence to legal frameworks ordinarily necessitates a rationale for captivity and holding someone against his/her will (a humanitarian rationale for punishment that may not be as necessary under authoritarian regimes). Certain common logics arise:
1) First and foremost is the classificatory logic of collecting information or “intelligence,” of “knowing the unknowable” through registries, surveillance technology, biometrics, risk assessments or “big data” (Mountz, Coddington, Catania, and Loyd 2013).

2) A second logic is that of assigning “new legal identities,” that are often tainted or stigmatized or “spoiled” (e.g. illegal, criminal, stateless, terrorist). These new legal identities have a racialized (and gendered) component in the sense that they impose a lasting historical racialized stigma that is permanent and unbridgeable and which justifies forced confinement (Garcia Hernandez 2011; Hernandez 2008; Macías Rojas 2016; Paik 2016; Rios 2011; cf. Goffman 1963). This arguably goes beyond the traditional usage of labels such as “undocumented” or “irregular,” which have historically implied at least the possibility of an eventual adjustment of status or assimilation. New criminalized legal identities are branded.

3) A third and seemingly contradictory logic is that of “people processing” (Hasenfeld 1972) and punitive humanitarian approaches to it (Macias Rojas, forthcoming; Campesi 2014). This is particularly the case in liberal democracies that funnel migrants through processes that (depending on how they are classified) either purport to “rescue” or punish, “protect” or indefinitely detain.

4) Fourth is a logic of spatial confinement, separation and control (Campesi 2018; Paik 2016; Coutin 2010; Martin and Mitchelson 2009; Foucault 1978). At times, it resembles the logic of a camp (a non-juridical or extra-legal space). At other times, it resembles the logic of a prison (a legally codified, juridically regulated space, guided by the liberal presumption of “equality under
law”). These two aspects have increasingly blurred. As with containment, this logic extends beyond the physical space of the detention center itself.

5) A fifth logic is that of containment, which conventionally has been used interchangeably with detention (Campesi 2018; Mountz, Coddington, Catania, and Loyd 2013.) Here we refer to it as a practice that extends beyond the actual detention center to describe a logic and function of disrupting mobility, “keeping people on the move” or decelerating movement and disrupting settlement. Another aspect of the logic of containment is the way in which it reinforces a “sense of group position” (Blumer 1958). Internalizing one’s place in sociopolitical and especially racial hierarchies seems central to the logic of containment, which inflicts an embodiment of these new legal classifications and identities.

6) Finally, there is the element of violence. Detention is maintained through the state’s monopoly on violence (Paik 2016; Martin and Mitchelson 2009; Torpey 1998). What is labeled as “violence” is often quite selective and delimited, defined through private or deviant acts such as hate crimes or domestic violence (Jackman 2002). In matters of detention, consequently, state violence is systematically “misrecognized” as ostensibly private and aberrant violence at the hand of a (“rogue”) detention officer, or a private corporation with insufficient oversight. Likewise, whereas structural and systemic forms of violence are obfuscated, labels such as “abuse” tends to be reserved for the predatory actions of smugglers or drug cartels, or even for migrant parents castigated as negligent and deemed ultimately responsible for any suffering their children may experience in and through detention.
**Confinement**

Confinement refers to separation and control through internment, incarceration, detention, custody, captivity, or house arrest. It can be conceptualized as an “instrument of social closure and control” characterized by “impassable social boundaries inscribed in space” (Wacquant 2004). Migrant detention is one form of forced confinement. Others include prisons and internment camps. The intersection of spatial enclosure with coercion, however, can also be true of many refugee camps, migrant labor camps, or spaces of migrant “transit” controlled by smugglers, to name but a few of the most pertinent.

One logic and function of forced confinement is to “govern,” dominate, subjugate, exploit, regulate, manage, exercise control over, have control of, command, direct, administer, or oversee through coercion and consent. It does so through its other logic of maintaining social distance through ostracization and stigmatization, “enforced isolation” “external hostility” “exclusionary closure,” “inflexible spatial seclusion,” “collective violence inscribed in space,” and other mechanisms that maintain rigid social hierarchies and prevent or limit contact and contagion (Wacquant 2004).

Forced confinement is also a form of boundary-making with mental, social, and spatial dimensions. In this way it rests on and produces stigmatized identities. There is a racializing element to the “new legal identities” produced in detention in that they carry a rigid, permanent, unbridgeable, or inherent quality (Fredrickson 2002). These racialized qualities differ from
xenophobia or the fear of strangers, which presumes at least the possibility of assimilation or integration. In the case of confined populations in black sites, prisons, and detention centers, the classifications (terrorist, criminal, gang member, evildoer) are rigid and unbridgeable and rooted in racial ideologies, even if they are not explicitly expressed as such.

As with detention, these intersecting logics of governing through spatial seclusion and stigma sometimes take the form of an extra-juridical space, and other times resemble more the logic of a liberal, legal, “regulated” space, like a prison, but these divisions have increasingly blurred.

Forced confinement may also operate on different scales at the level of the self and beyond the walls of the prison, detention center, or refugee camp. It operates at the level of the body, as when detainees are subjected to torture and solitary confinement in ways that are designed to further isolate them within the spatially confined place of detention. Ultimately, migrants’ detention thus reinforces racism, particularly as conceived in Ruth Wilson Gilmore’s terms as “the state-sanctioned and/or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (Gilmore, 2007: 247).

Ostracism and stigmatization are critical elements of forced confinement. Such stigmatized identities serve to constrain and control. Forced confinement may even be internalized by those subjected to it in ways that facilitate self-regulation or self-discipline. Forced confinement can also be experienced within and beyond the scale of a national territory, as in the case of “unauthorized migrants who cannot travel” or deportees who feel spatially confined in their countries of origin after deportation (Coutin 2010). Nevertheless, forced confinement and the
collective identities that it cultivates may serve to mobilize and facilitate collective action in the forms of migrant caravans, hunger strikes, or prison rebellions.

**Containment**

Containment is defined as “the act of keeping something harmful under control or within limit.” Its etymology can be traced to the Latin *continere* (transitive): to hold together, enclose.

The notion “containment” is often treated as synonymous with detention and confinement, to designate how migrants are eventually spatially segregated into an enclosed (fenced or walled) space, or an absolutely bounded place, such as an island. Containment, particularly in the expression “migration containment,” achieved an unprecedented prominence over the last few years in the academic literature as it came to describe the strategy and the effects of the EU’s border regime and migration agenda, especially with reference to the Mediterranean seascape and the renewed externalization of the European border regime into Libya. And yet, as noted by scholars such as Nora El Qadim (2014) and Jean-Pierre Cassarino (2018) among others, the very term “externalisation” should be cautiously employed in light of the resistances and active roles of so-called “third-countries” in the Global South in the asymmetric border cooperation policies enforced by the EU.

We contend that there is a need to elaborate an analytical distinction between containment and similar, but not equal, spatial technologies of migration governmentality. While containment might involve spatial confinement and detention, it need not be narrowed to those technologies
(Coddington et al. 2013). Instead, for present purposes, containment refers to a variety of spatial strategies that operate to disrupt and hinder migrants’ autonomous movements. In this sense, containment does not necessarily involve coercive immobilization, or enforced strandedness; rather, it can entail a convoluted hyper-mobility, insofar as migrants are forced to constantly move – as they are dispersed, chased away and hampered from staying in a place. In this sense, it is worth speaking of modes of containment through mobility (Tazzioli, Garelli, 2018; Tazzioli, 2018) through which migrants are disciplined, exhausted and forced to undertake convoluted routes. For instance, migrants might be forced to undertake the same journey multiple times, as frequently happens at the internal borders of Europe, or to repeatedly find new ways for crossing a border.

Containment can also involve a temporal dimension, and not only a spatial one: migrants are also contained by being entrapped in a condition of indefinite waiting, being robbed of their time, which is to say, deprived of the very possibility of making future plans (Khosravi, 2019). In so doing, containment might be no less violent than protracted detention, as long as it can produce effects of destitution, wearing out migrants and depriving them of the infrastructures for sustaining life. A case in point is the self-organized migrant camp at Calais, where migrants are constantly harassed and chased away by the police, and their spaces of life (‘lieux de vie’) are repeatedly dismantled. Hence, containment is not only about obstructing free mobility, it is also about hampering migrants from staying and building spaces of life (Aradau, 2017).

A focus on containment enables moving beyond customary and sedimented binary oppositions that underpin much of migration research and political theory, such as inclusion and exclusion,
mobility and immobility, showing that migrants can be governed, hampered in their freedom of movement, even by being kept on the move, even from within the borders of the state. 

* * *

Detention, confinement, and containment are key notions in political theory, as well as in migration studies; yet, they remain surprisingly under-theorized in the literature. Paying attention to the entanglements among containment, confinement and detention, as well as to the differences between them in the material practices of control, enables us to scrutinize and critically apprehend governmentality in its actual heterogeneity. The proliferation of modes of containment and confinement that are limited neither to physical incarceration nor to the prison institution pushes us to recognize, conceptualize, and elaborate further how we might formulate anti-detention claims. Building on Angela Davis’ argument that “the prison abolitionist struggle follows the anti-slavery abolitionist struggle” (Davis, 2016: 26), we must situate struggles against migration containment, confinement, and detention as part of that larger colonial and racial legacy.
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Deportation is typically regarded in terms of the forced removal of a person from a country in which s/he does not have citizenship. In critical border and migration studies, precisely because it is figured as the ultimate “remedy” for non-citizenship, deportation has been understood as a “technology of citizenship” (Walters 2002: 267). Accordingly, deportations are constitutive of citizenship insofar as they enact legal distinctions between citizens and non-citizens through the physical removal of non-citizens from a state’s territory, as well as from the imagined “national” community of the citizens of that state (Anderson, Gibney, and Paoletti 2011). Deportation thus requires the creation of a coercive state apparatus capable of deporting people, as well as a global deportation regime (De Genova and Peutz 2010) through which international norms and policies govern the admission and relocation of deportees to other states. Hence, the capacity to forcibly remove non-citizens from their territories has become a token by which modern nation-states seek to give credibility to their alleged sovereignty and the related claim of a prerogative to control people’s access to, and conditions of stay in, their jurisdictions (Torpey 1998). This explains why modern nation-states invest so much effort and resources in (often failing) attempts to physically remove non-citizens from their territory: deportations are veritable performances of the modern nation-state’s alleged sovereign power — precisely because they involve the use of force and violence by state authorities.
Yet a glance at the definition of the word “deportation” is important: “the action of carrying away; forcible removal, especially into exile; transportation” (OED online). The absence of any reference to citizens and non-citizens is telling and should remind us, as Kanstroom (2007: 26) does, that the “direct link between citizenship status and the ‘right to remain’ is a modern one.”

The corollary of this point is that, historically, practices of deportation were not confined to the non-citizen but operated instead in relation to a complex mosaic of statuses, liberties, memberships, and identities. At different times and in different places convicts, paupers, fugitive slaves, political dissidents, seditious peoples, and rebellious groups have all been subject to various forms of deportation and transportation. Once seen in this light, and once considered in relation to forms of territoriality and sovereignty marked by empire, or the legacies of feudalism, the question becomes one of understanding how deportation acquired its modern form. Rather than presume that it applies only to non-citizens, we might ask under what circumstances did legal and moral prohibitions against the deportation of the citizen take force? And rather than taking for granted that the target of deportation laws and norms is the individual, we might inquire into the circumstances under which deportation on the basis of group membership, racial identity, and religious affiliation became normatively and politically problematic. Asking such questions not only sensitizes us to the great transformations in governance that underpin modern deportation, they also raise the possibility that these antecedent and archaic forms of deportation are not entirely past. At the very least they are historical memories that are frequently awakened in controversies such as the Windrush Scandal in the United Kingdom (UK) when the racial and imperial contours of deportation become painfully and palpably visible (Gentleman 2019; Webber 2018). In the current conjuncture of the Global War on Terror, moreover, the deportation of citizens also resurfaces in practices of citizenship-
stripping and the subsequent deportation of terrorism suspects with dual citizenship. And in the European Union (EU), the forced removal of EU-citizens by EU-member states is on the rise despite the fact that EU-citizenship grants its holders, in principle, the right to move to and reside in another EU-member state, as we explain in detail below.

**Deportation trends around the world**

In the United States, a modern deportation system took shape at the end of the nineteenth century, facilitated by the federalization of immigration controls and the extension of post-entry control inside the state’s territorial borders. The first deportation from the United States was recorded in 1892. Between 1892 and 1996, there were about two million people removed from the United States. Between 1996 and 2018, six million people were removed. The dramatic increase in deportation beginning in 1996 is due to the passage of two laws in that year: the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) and the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). Another increase occurred with the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2003.

In Europe, we can observe intensified efforts to close the so-called “deportation gap,” i.e. the divergence between the number of migrants issued with a deportation order and the much smaller number of people who are actually deported (Gibney and Hansen 2003). This gap is quite significant, not only in the context of intra-European deportations under the Dublin agreement (EC 2007, Lorenz 2015, Schuster 2011), but also in context of deportations to third countries outside the EU. In this regard, a communication of the European Commission (EC) on the ‘EU return policy’ notes: “statistics demonstrate that there is a considerable gap between the
persons issued with a return decision (approximately 484,000 persons in 2012, 491,000 in 2011, and 540,000 in 2010) and those, as a consequence, have left the EU (approximately 178,000 in 2012, 167,000 in 2011, and 199,000 in 2010)” (EC 2014: 3). Crucially, the so-called “rate of effective returns” — the rate of deportable migrants who are actually returned to third countries outside the EU — has not increased since, standing below 40% for the years 2014 and 2015 (EC 2017: 2). The most important obstacles for the execution of deportations are deportable migrants’ attempts to conceal their identity and to abscond at the last moment, as well as the reluctance of alleged countries of origin to issue travel documents to them (cf. Broeders 2010, Ellermann 2008, Broeders and Engbersen 2007). In order to close, or at least reduce, the deportation gap the EU and its member states have, in particular since the “long summer of migration” of 2015 (Kasparek and Speer 2015), therefore introduced a range of measures. These include, among others, the negotiation of readmission agreements with third countries, the expansion of member states’ rights to detain deportable migrants, and the registration of potentially all third country nationals entering the EU in a range of biometric databases (EC 2017).

Importantly, these measures are increasingly also used to facilitate the deportation of EU-citizens. In many EU member states such as Belgium, Germany or the UK, the forced removal of citizens from other EU member states is on the rise, despite the fact that the right “to move to and reside freely within the EU” constitutes – at least in theory – one of the cornerstones of EU citizenship. Yet, more and more EU-citizens are subjected to deportations, especially if they face criminal charges or live on welfare benefits. In the UK, for instance, deportations of EU nationals have gradually increased since the electorate’s referendum decision to leave the EU,
from 3,435 people in 2015 to 5,301 people in 2017. Likewise, the tiny country of Belgium deported 2,712 EU citizens in 2013 alone, while France and Italy have run veritable deportation campaigns against Roma with EU citizenship since 2010 (van Baar et al. 2019; Yildiz and De Genova 2019). Thus, the threat of deportation hangs not only over the heads of non-citizens but increasingly also over the heads of citizens, above all those who are racially subjugated (see the Dossier on deportation in Radical Philosophy 2018, 2.03).

Deportation has likewise been increasingly prominent in the Global South, both as postcolonial states have become increasingly aggressive in the expulsion of migrants and refugees crossing their borders, either with the intention of settlement or temporary “transit.” One prominent example are Iran’s routine round-ups and mass expulsions of “illegal” Afghans (Majidi 2017; Schuster and Majidi 2013; 2015). Another is the analogous mass deportation of Zimbabweans from Botswana (Galvin 2015). These deportation regimes have often arisen particularly when these postcolonial states are contracted to serve as junior partners in the externalized policing of the borders of their wealthier neighbors in the Global North (Alpes 2017; Andersson 2014; Lecadet 2013). Many states across the Global South are also major “sending” countries for migrants and refugees, of course, which importantly has meant that they also become the “receiving” sites of the unresolved dilemmas and struggles of an inordinate number of deported migrants rejected and returned form richer deporting states (Brotherton and Barrios 2011; Coutin 2010; Drotbohm 2011; 2015; Golash Boza 2013; 2015; Hiemstra 2012; Khosravi 2017; Lecadet 2013; 2017; Peutz 2006/2010; Zilberg 2011; cf. Kanstroom 2012).

Consequences of deportation
Deportation is the ultimate threat that weighs down upon migrants’ lives (Sayad 1999). Nicholas De Genova (2002, 2010) has elaborated the concept of deportability to emphasize that legalized migrants’ susceptibility to the threat of deportation serves to discipline them into lifelong careers as precarious and eminently disposable labor. In other words, even for those who are not deported, deportation is a productive power that profoundly shapes their lives. In light of these insights, we need to foreground migrants’ subjectivities and processes of subjectivation (whether individual or collective) before, during, and after deportation.

Deportation itself is often traumatic insofar as it involves a confrontation with the coercive arm of the state. This trauma is exacerbated when a deportee leaves behind family and community and when a deportee is unfamiliar with the land of his/her birth or citizenship. Nathalie Peutz’s (2006/2010) call for an anthropology of removal invites us to recognize that deportation is not a simple and singular relocation of a person from a deporting country to the country of citizenship but rather is a process that spans over extended periods of time and expansive geographical areas. Deportation involves a variety of people and institutions – the deportees, their families and communities, and a wider nexus of social and economic relations, as well as state agents and agencies in both countries. Rather than a clearly divided process of pre- and post-deportation, we see a spatial and temporal stretching of expulsion, both in the deporting country and in the country to which a deportee is returned. The experience of many deportees is an experience of “double abandonment” (Lecadet 2013)— expelled from one country and rendered abject and outcast in another, where life is commonly inviable (Coutin 2010). Deportation engenders an abject social status, exacerbated and perpetuated by practices that continue long after the forced removal. Financial hardship, facing discrimination in the labor and housing markets,
stigmatization, lack of access to social services, and sometimes even lack of protection from various sorts of harm, and cultural estrangement are common difficulties with which deportees are confronted (Khosravi 2017). Deportation and its outcomes thus can encompass several countries and stretch over a protracted period of time.

The experiences of hardship and social and political destitution lived by deportees are the diminutive human feature of what is otherwise a global regime (De Genova and Peutz 2010), which implicates not only the bipartite relationship between deporting and receiving states but also increasingly involves the IOM and other intergovernmental organizations, as well as NGOs, in setting up and sustaining multilateral international deportation frameworks for the global government of populations (Hindess 2000). Collective chartered flights and individual deportations on commercial flights, IOM “humanitarian repatriation” operated on special flights and mass deportation campaigns, muzzled and bound deportees and migrants going home under the conditions of “voluntary return”: deportation is enacted worldwide through a vast array of diverse practices of coercion and punitive measures. From an analytical standpoint, we must maintain our critical distance from the prevalent institutional and political categorizations and labels, in order to assess the continuum that connects all of these tactics and mechanisms.

If deportation assumes multiple forms and is accompanied by various labels, in an increasing effort to legitimize measures of expulsion, the very notion of “return” promoted by institutional policies (see European Return Directive 2008) must be challenged. It offers a simplistic view of migrants’ journeys, with deportation reduced to a mere “return” to the place of departure. Such a vision, which fits with a global political agenda of controlling population movement and of
discouraging people in the poorest areas of the world from migrating, is largely contradicted by ethnographic accounts of the complexity of deportation and post-deportation predicaments, which are often followed by re-migration, but also by plagued by severe consequences such as family estrangement, social destitution, poverty, disease, and premature death (Khosravi 2017).

Furthermore, attempts to legitimize deportation under the pretense of free will as “voluntary return” (Willame 2000) should be radically critiqued as a project aimed at the normalization of expulsion – a contemporary manifestation of “the banality of evil” (De Genova 2014). In a global context of migration control marked by coercion and castigation, the structural violence and abuse inherent to these deportations must remain at the forefront of analysis (Fekete 2006).

If analyses usually focus on the deportations from the Global North to the Global South and see them as a legacy of colonial hegemony and unilateralism, this should not obscure from view the fact of deportations within the Global South. These South-South deportations arise partly as a result of the externalization of the borders of major migratory destinations such as the United States and Europe, which deploy various types of economic aid and trade to effectively subcontract countries of the Global South to serve as their border police in extended geographies where migratory movements are interrupted long before they ever come close to crossing the borders of the richest countries. But South-South deportation dynamics also arise as an effect of uneven postcolonial development. Consider, for just a few examples, the major deportation campaigns from Saudi Arabia (up to 1 million deportations a year), or the repeated mass expulsions of Afghans from Iran, or the long history of deportations within and across Africa.
The postcolonial inequalities of wealth and power among countries, which facilitate deportation dynamics worldwide, are commonly reproduced in an asymmetry at play in the academic field. Deportation studies have sometimes reproduced the territorial division that deportations enact by scrutinizing methods of immigration and border control, detention, and deportation in the deporting states while tending to neglect their consequences and their sociopolitical implications in countries to which people are deported. This epistemic “division” should be replaced by a conception of deportation as a transnational, comprehensive, and enduring process – indeed, a global regime (De Genova and Peutz 2010) – with political and social consequences that involve both the deporting states and the deported migrants’ countries of origin or other countries where they are sent (which are not always necessarily the countries of their formal citizenship or the countries where they have deeper social ties).

**Conclusion: some repercussions of a minor keyword**

In light of these insights from the emerging field of deportation studies we are convinced that introducing deportation as a keyword in political and social theory can be a conceptually productive and theoretically challenging move. In short, deportation – as a minor keyword – can offer a conceptual vantage point for complicating, confronting, fracturing, destabilizing, and rethinking some of the established “major” keywords of social and political thought. In the following we will briefly illustrate this point by engaging two major keywords of political theory — citizenship and sovereignty — from the perspective of deportation. The aim is not an exhaustive discussion of these important concepts. Our objective is rather to showcase the conceptual and analytical potential of this move.
What an engagement of citizenship from the angle of deportation (practices) highlights, in our view, is that citizenship is not reducible to a legal status that comes with a bundle of rights and responsibilities. While the enactment of citizenship as a clear-cut legal status seems to feature and implicate the deportation of non-citizens, contemporary deportation practices complicate and undermine the enactment of any clear-cut distinction between citizens and non-citizens insofar as they also increasingly concern citizens. Some citizens — particularly, the offspring of migrants, who often hold dual citizenship — have been increasingly subjected to the risk of being stripped of their citizenship in the countries where they have commonly resided virtually all their lives in the context of the so-called War of Terror. Consequently, naturalized migrants and their children have seen their ostensible citizenship debased and have been effectively rendered as “second class citizens.” Hence, some citizens are more equal than others. What the enactment of this partition within the citizenry of a nation-state illustrates is that citizenship as legal status seems to be inseparably interwoven with a politics of national belonging which determines who can be officially recognized as a member — in both legal and symbolic terms — of the imagined community of (national) citizens (see also the Minor Keyword on Membership). Hence, contemporary deportation practices and policies bring to the fore the often-neglected dimension of citizenship as “a marker of identification, advising state and non-state agencies […] to which [nation-state] an individual belongs” (Hindess 2000: 1487). From the viewpoint of deportation, this often-forgotten aspect of citizenship operates as a technology of government that allows states to subdivide and allocate a global, increasingly mobile population of billions of individuals into subpopulations defined along the lines of putatively national belonging. As deportable migrants’ tactics of “identity stripping” (Ellemann 2008) and their attempts to conceal their country of origin in order to forestall their deportations demonstrate, citizenship is not always
experienced as an empowering legal status and set of rights, as liberal political theory would have it, but as a stigma, a burden, and a liability. Hence, engaging citizenship from the viewpoint of historical and contemporary practices of deportation can be read as an invitation to social and political theory to take seriously these often-neglected aspects and experiences of citizenship.

Similar complications and questions arise if we engage the notion of sovereignty from the viewpoint of deportation (practices). In political theory, sovereignty is often defined as comprising both the formal authority of rule-making and the empirical capacity to enforce these rules. However, in the context of the enforcement of deportations, states rely on the cooperation of other states in order to enforce their claimed authority to control access to and conditions of stay on their territories. In order to be able to physically remove a person from their territory, states rely on the cooperation of the country to which they seek to deport that person. In practice, the person’s alleged country of origin has to accept that person as one of its citizens and issue a passport. Yet, countries of origin are often reluctant to issue such papers, especially if emigrants constitute an important source of remittances. Hence, destination countries — particularly in the Global North — have tried to tie cooperation in matters of deportation to other policy fields and incentives such as increased development aid. We are thus confronted in the context of deportations with not an international system of mutually exclusive sovereign entities, but a complex field of overlapping and shared sovereignties in which a country’s capacity to enforce rules relating to the state’s claimed authority to control “the legitimate means of movement” (Torpey 2000) hinges on cooperation with other nation-states. Ultimately, the state’s claim to sovereignty emerges — from the viewpoint of deportation — as a claim that is
vulnerable insofar as its enactment hinges on successful cooperation with (or coercion of) others, which is constantly prone to failure and embarrassment.

However, this is not where the complications of sovereignty from the viewpoint of deportation end. If we consider that the state’s claimed authority to control access to and stay on its territory and the related deportation of non-citizens have become tokens by which states seek to give credibility to their alleged sovereign power, then the state’s repeated failure to enforce deportations reveals a significant gap between the two dimensions of sovereignty, i.e. the formal authority of rule-making and the empirical capacity to enforce these rules. Indeed, if we consider the often significant divergence between the number of deportable migrants and the often much smaller number of people who are actually deported, then migrants’ seemingly minor and desperate practices of identity-stripping, absconding, and physical resistance against deportations call for a thorough reconsideration of one of the core concepts of political theory. Indeed, deportable migrants’ proven capacity to frequently defy and embarrass seemingly omnipotent state apparatuses equipped with the latest biometric identification and surveillance technologies invites a reconceptualization of a sovereignty that builds on Judith Butler’s notion of the performative (Butler 1993). From the viewpoint of (often failing) deportations, sovereignty emerges first and foremost as a claim, and nation-state borders as stages where states try to substantiate this claim through performances like deportations, which are meant to demonstrate the state’s capacity to enact its authority to define rules with an irresistible power. But precisely because these demonstrations often fail, deportations reveal the state’s claim to sovereignty, more often than not, as a political delusion that, while mostly falling short of its promises, expresses a practical will with very real effects. Such a theorization of sovereignty
might contribute, just like deportable migrants’ practices of resistance, to eventually lay to rest, in both conceptual and practical terms, the stubborn anachronism of sovereign state power.
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EVICTION

Huub van Baar, Brenna Bhandar, and Martina Tazzioli

Eviction is an organized practice of the displacement of politicized human subjects that usually leads to forced mobility on the one extreme of the spectrum and to forced immobility on the other. Eviction includes—and intersects with—practices as diverse as dispersal, forfeiture, confiscation or destruction of property, deportation, subordination, exploitation, and detention. Eviction is never only a territorial practice of expulsion, for it always coincides considerably with, most notably, economic expulsion from formalized or informalized means of existence, political expulsion from decision-making and the constitution of publics, psychological expulsion from sanctuary and building or continuing affective relationships, and juridical expulsion from the sphere of those who are legally regularized and protected (see also Nail 2015). Eviction is also never just spatial; it also entails various temporal dimensions related to waiting, suspension, postponed or denied access, and the reconsidering and redirecting of life trajectories (Khosravi 2017).

Eviction as a practice of displacement functions to a considerable extent in tandem with the introduction of the more fundamental condition of “evictability”, that is “the possibility of being removed from a sheltering place” (van Baar 2017: 214). In a formally similar way as in the relationship between deportation and “deportability” (De Genova 2002) — where “some are deported in order that most may remain (un-deported) as workers whose particular migrant status may … be rendered ‘illegal’” (2002:439) — evictability is crucial in the production of the “irregularity” and “illegality” of political subjects who are confronted with the possibility or
reality of being evicted. While some are faced with the diverse realities of eviction and the spectacles of security that habitually accompany them, many more fear that they could be the next to be evicted and are often forced into precarious labor and housing conditions that themselves are temporary and fundamentally unstable.

As a governmental strategy that specifically deals with “irregular” “migrants” and that is closely related to deportation and deportability, eviction is often a way to avoid more costly and bureaucratically cumbersome cross-border deportations and a perverse incentive to encourage them to leave “voluntarily”, often accompanied by putatively humanitarian logics, discourses and practices of benevolence (see, for instance, Vrăbiescu 2019). At the same time, as a form and practice of governmentality, eviction stretches far beyond the specific context of “irregular” migration and practices and conditions of deportation and deportability. Eviction is perhaps the practice of expulsion par excellence that reveals that the distinction between “regular” and “irregular” or between “migrant” and “citizen” is fundamentally unstable and untenable.

Therefore, a critical reflection on practices of eviction considerably helps to challenge methodological nationalism in migration, border, and citizenship studies or, in the specific context of the EU and Europe, methodological Europeanism (Garelli and Tazzioli 2013) and methodological Eurocentrism (van Baar 2017). Critical migration scholars have convincingly argued that the distinction between “regular” and “irregular” migrants is unsustainable and, thus, that the boundaries between these two conceptual categories and their daily uses are considerably blurred. Moreover, an exclusive focus on the struggles of irregular migrants “risks producing a binary that obscures the fact [that] ‘regular’ migrants also live and struggle in conditions that are
produced by the same regime of control that produced a system of stratified and often racialized citizenship and ‘irregularity’” (Mezzadra 2011: 124). More generally, therefore, we should avoid isolating the struggles and movements of the irregularized and unauthorized from “other conflicts involving ‘legal migrants’ and even autochthonous populations in order not to replicate the language and taxonomies of migration policies and governance” (Mezzadra 2015: 124, our emphasis). Correspondingly, Peter Nyers (2019) has argued that the distinction between the “irregular migrant” and the “regular citizen” is as much on shaky grounds as the one between the “regular” and the “irregular” migrant. Huub van Baar (2017) has introduced the notion of evictability to enable a further denationalization of the conceptual and methodological tools used in migration, border, and citizenship studies to critically interrogate practices of displacement.

The concept of evictability is not meant to downplay the crucial role states, the interstate system, nationalisms, Europeanism, and nationalized borders continue to play in practices of bordering. Rather, it is defined to articulate that contemporary forms of displacement and irregularized citizenship are not limited to practices that are based on a rigid or crystal-clear distinction of border crossers along the (imagined) lines of the nation-state, state actors, or political entities such as the EU and of those of ir/regularized “migrants” and “citizens.” Evictability refers to a set of irregularizing practices that includes those implied conceptually in deportability and that is, more generally, situated beyond and “below” the frame of the nation-state. Therefore, the concept of evictability brings the logics of deportability and irregularity together in the context of diverse practices of expulsion and displacement that are not primarily organized along the dividing lines of polities such as the nation-state and the EU, but that are situated on a continuum, an entire and wider spectrum (see van Baar 2017, forthcoming).
A critical examination of practices and conditions of eviction should therefore avoid the reproduction of any strict binary between “migrants” and “citizens”; indeed, practices of eviction and the concomitant production of conditions of precarity, vulnerability and inequality are shared by political subjects beyond this “migrant”/“citizen” binary. A critical focus on the condition of evictability demonstrates that practices of displacement are far less exceptional than the primary focus on “irregular” and “illegal” migrants often tends to suggest and, thus, helps to “de-exceptionalize” displacement as a contemporary practice and condition, and enhances our understanding of it—something that several studies have convincingly clarified in the specific case of practices of eviction.

The eviction of migrants from informal encampments generates dispersal: migrants are scattered, dispersed across spaces. However, dispersal is not just an effect of eviction but also a state strategy for coping with migrant multiplicities – temporary collective formations of migrants that gather at the border or in urban contexts. Furthermore, reading eviction in relation to dispersal enables capturing the political dimension of eviction, showing how this latter is often enacted as a spatial tactic for dividing and disciplining migrant multiplicities. Relatedly, eviction in the field of migration is often used for dismantling migrants’ spaces of life and preventing them from settling. In this sense, eviction, read through the lens of dispersal, is a political technology for undermining collective infrastructures of livability. Eviction as dispersal is, by definition, a phenomenon quite difficult to map and to account for, since it is connected with marginalization and partial invisibilization. Therefore, it leads us methodologically to interrogate how we can do research on eviction and on the effects of migrant dispersal that
ensue. By looking at contemporary modes of migrants’ eviction that generate dispersal, it is worth observing the partial continuity with colonial techniques of dispersal enacted by the French authorities to discipline and control the Algerian population both in colonized Algeria and in, later on, in the sixties, in French cities (Tazzioli, 2019). In fact, dispersal was used as a tactic of policing and managing urban space or preventing the formation and the consolidation of collective social formations. Tracing the colonial genealogies of eviction as dispersal allows investigating how some spatial tactics of governmentality adopted in the present have antecedents in the past – albeit with some noteworthy differences – for controlling and disciplining “unruly” collective subjects.

Notably, in *Expulsions: Brutality and Complexity in the Global Economy*, Saskia Sassen gives a bleak overview of the incredible numbers of evictions that have taken place in Europe since 2007, with peaks in countries as diverse as Germany, Hungary, Spain and the UK. By the end of 2012, for instance, in Spain alone the number of evictions of people from their homes “had surpassed 400,000 since 2007” (Sassen 2014: 48). This phenomenon is limited neither to Europe, nor to those who are legally “citizens.” In *Evicted: Poverty and Profit in the American City*, Matthew Desmond notes that, only in the US, every year “people are evicted from their homes not by the tens of thousands or even the hundreds of thousands but by the millions” (2016: 295). In the case of incarceration, moreover, many studies have elaborated on the problematic, increasingly mainstreamed ways in which practices of detention have interactively contributed to irregularizing “citizens” and illegalizing “migrants,” frequently in direct interaction with practices of eviction that led to detention (Wacquant 2008, 2009; De Genova and Peutz 2010; Sassen 2014; Jansen et al. 2015; Comaroff and Comaroff 2016; Fassin 2017).
The predatory logic that is related to evictability is not restricted to the US and Europe, either. In many parts of the world where, following Aihwa Ong’s appropriate expressions, “neoliberalism as exception” and “exceptions to neoliberalism” (2006: 3) have been firmly articulated, eviction has become a key technology of citizenship in which not only state or intergovernmental and international actors are involved, but also a variety of non-state actors, ranging from landlords, businesses, housing corporations, and for-profit prison companies to political parties, private security companies, and non-governmental organizations (see, e.g., Wacquant 2008, 2009; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; Levenson 2017). Thus, when it comes to the actors involved, we need to look beyond the limited range of the nation-state and other governmental actors in the context of the state and underline the key role that non-state actors play in eviction, deportation and, more generally, in the production of the conditions of evictability and its logics of displacement. As one vital technology of citizenship among others, eviction contributes productively to the installation of what Ong, among other scholars, has called “graduated” or “differentiated” citizenship: “components formerly tied to citizenship—rights, entitlements, as well as nation and territoriality—are becoming disarticulated from one another and rearticulated with governing strategies that promote an economic logic in defining, evaluating and protecting certain categories of subjects and not others” (Ong 2006: 16). Assessing political and socioeconomic membership in terms of the capacity for neoliberal responsibilization or in those of socio-human capital and “deservingness” has introduced logics of expulsion in which “the neoliberal exception is allied to a moralized system of distributive justice that is detachable from legal citizenship status” (ibid.). Under these circumstances, “citizens who are deemed too complacent or lacking in neoliberal potential may be treated as less-worthy subjects,” leading to
a situation in which “low-skill citizens and migrants become exceptions to neoliberal mechanisms and are constructed as excludable populations in transit, shuttled in and out of zones of growth” (ibid.).

The notion of evictability as a set of irregularizing practices that render some people vulnerable to displacement and expulsion draws our attention to the central role that property and logics of ownership play in the very fabric of contemporary nationalisms and prevailing understandings of citizenship. How are property logics implicated in constituting the conditions of evictability, both conceptually and materially? The concept of “possessive nationalism” (Bhandar 2018) helps us to reflect on how, at an abstract level, the subjectivity of the possessive individual is deeply connected to contemporary forms of nationalism that treat the boundary of its self as analogous with—and as sacred as—the boundary that protects his property, analogous with the border of the nation state that legitimately belongs to him and other descendants of those who rightfully bequeathed his national patrimony:

The notion of possessive nationalism can be understood as a corollary of possessive individualism. The psychoaffective dimensions of the possessive individual, including the desire to possess exclusively, to fulfill the need for security and to calm the fear of losing one’s property, are transmuted to the stage of the nation-state; the possessive individual develops a close identification with national identity (Bhandar 2018:224n.28)

Eviction, then, as the most draconian weapon in the bundle of rights enjoyed by the proprietor, operates on different scales that incorporate a logic of ownership and feelings of proprietorship into their operations.

That the border of the nation-state can be understood as a highly militarized frontier zone, yet one that has a certain mobility as it is enforced by a range of public, private and hybridized
organizations, agencies and individuals reflects two different relations of key importance to the propertied logics of eviction: public/private and state/capital. With respect to the first, it is of utmost importance to consider how the state operates through actors in the private sphere when it comes to maintaining a hostile border that is intended to shore up security and safety for those deemed to be proper citizens of the nation-state, while rendering others evictable in a way that comes to mark people regardless of their actual physical location. This mode of exclusion incorporates colonial technologies of governance that used the concept of juridical status to render indigenous and other racialized populations as juridically inferior to the white proprietor citizen-subject. It also, however, utilizes a key modality of neoliberal economy and governance, which is the privatization and marketization of social goods such as health, housing and education to create conditions in which the markings of evictability operate as a form of foreclosure. People who are seen as evictable from the borders of the nation-state, including from those of irregularized neighborhoods, are prevented from accessing basic social goods as an a priori condition of their presence in places like London.

For instance, in 2014, the ‘Hostile Environment’ policy devised under the leadership of Theresa May, who was then Secretary for the Home Office, was a strategy to “encourage irregular migrants to leave the UK.” As part of the policy, vans bearing the slogan “go home” were used to circle through parts of London with concentrated populations of people of color. Basically, this policy was intended to make life in its entirety so unbearable for irregularized migrants that they would leave of their own accord, embracing a neoliberal logic whereby people should pay for their own deportation. Part of this strategy which was enshrined in sections 20-37 of the 2014 Immigration Act (the ‘Scheme’), which imposed a legal duty upon landlords to “take
measures to ensure that they do not provide private accommodation to disqualified persons” (§4, judgment). A disqualified person was defined as someone who is “other than a British, EEA or Swiss national who needs but does not have leave to enter or remain in the UK” (our emphasis).

If a landlord were to allow a disqualified person:

to rent or occupy accommodation, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe they are disqualified, [they would be] liable to be fined and/or imprisoned unless they [could] demonstrate that they undertook the prescribed checks and, where necessary, informed the Home Office of the disqualified person’s occupation of the premises. Where a landlord is made aware that an occupier does not have the right to rent, the landlord is required to take reasonable steps to lettings which may include steps to repossess the property. (§4)

These provisions are notable for three reasons: one is the use of the private sphere to enforce a government immigration scheme; the second is the way in which the legal challenges to this Scheme did not address the way in which it violates the human rights of “irregular” migrants and asylum seekers, instead adopting a more circumscribed notion of human rights; and third, the degree to which citizenship discourses have been saturated by a market logic of ownership, exchange and consumption.

With regard to the first, the Scheme effectively turned proprietors in the private sphere into border agents. The fact that landlords would be subject to potentially severe penalties for failing to ensure that their properties were not occupied by or rented to anyone without the legal right to be in the UK practically ensured that landlords would discriminate against would be renters who appeared to be “non-British” (even if they were). Given the racial schema of white superiority, if not supremacy, that has been at the heart of modern British nationalism, it was entirely predictable, as various NGO and civil society groups warned, that the Scheme would result in racial discrimination against non-white citizens and others with the “right to rent.” This Scheme enabled, or indeed led proprietors to racially discriminate against people of color; a seemingly
bizarre inversion of the long struggle to get the government to prohibit racial discrimination in housing, which has long been ubiquitous in the British private rental market. Eviction as a mode of governance cuts across the divides of “citizen” and “non-citizen,” challenging the notion that the border, and the borders internal to the nation-state and its body politic are somehow immutable, strong and stable.

With respect to the second issue, as widely reported in the media, the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants was successful in having the Scheme struck down in March 2019 on the basis that it interfered with the Article 8 right under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that provides a right to respect for one’s “private and family life, his home and his correspondence,” and relatedly, that it discriminated against people on the grounds of national and racial identity (Article 14 of the ECHR). While this was certainly a victory for campaigners and all those concerned with racial equality, the judgment did not address the policy aims of the Scheme. The problem in legal terms was essentially that the Scheme cast the net too wide, treating people of color who have the right to rent as if they did not. The Scheme turned “legitimate immigrants” and “citizens” into evictable personae non-gratae. In other words, the policy aims of making it impossible for asylum seekers and migrants who do not have permission to be in the UK (and the paperwork to demonstrate this) to find shelter was not challenged. Both claimant and court agreed that Article 8 does not give one a “right to a home” and the settled jurisprudence on this issue was not challenged. Market forces and neoliberalism – and in this case, the privatization of the housing market – have saturated discourses of citizenship; what was at stake here is the right to rent, not a right to a home, which is excluded from the legal claims altogether.
We can see, then, when the Hostile Environment policy is taken as a whole – encompassing provisions that relate to National Health Service hospital care, public education, and the denial of any benefits or support to asylum seekers, alongside the Scheme discussed above – how eviction as a mode of governance has become totalizing, making the reproduction of life itself impossible for asylum seekers and some migrants. Drawing on the work of Frances Webber, it is clear that the government has achieved the creation of a racist, Islamophobic, and nativist hostile environment through several policies that treat the “non-citizen” domestic work as “property of their employers” (by using highly restrictive visa policies that limit legal rights to enter and exit the UK); that treat asylum seekers as tenants deserving of only the most “squalid accommodation”; of rendering asylum seekers and non-citizens homeless through the Scheme discussed above, and of excluding them from basic social goods such as healthcare and education (Webber 2019: 86). There is a spectrum here of property relationality – from being treated as a commodity (labor) to be owned, to being excluded from shelter and rendered as lacking the legal capacity to hold property rights (and with respect to the racial dimensions of nationalism informing these policies, as seen above, as lacking these capacities in some kind of ontological and a priori sense). Simultaneously, these subjects of ownership and control are bound by legal and regulatory frameworks that “make it impossible to live without working and simultaneously making work illegal, [forcing] vulnerable people to accept conditions of super-exploitation and total insecurity as the price of remaining in the country, and enables private companies to profit from such super-exploitation” (ibid.: 86).
In the case of the British ‘Hostile Environment’ policy, governmental policies and national laws have considerably rendered “non-citizen” domestic work as evictable property of their employers and, consequently, treated “non-citizens” capriciously as commodities to be owned or to being excluded from a sheltering place through rendering them as political subjects who lack any legal capacity to hold property rights. It is also possible, as our second case study will illustrate, that the “illegality” that is produced in the law but largely hidden from view relates first and foremost to the indefinite postponement of the ratification of particular legal arrangements. Like in the first case study, securitizing border spectacles are required to legitimate the continued conditions of evictability, the interrelated but largely invisibilized exploitation by private and public actors and, last but not least, forms of law enforcement that have effectively turned entire border zones, including those fully incorporated in the nation-state and its history, into alleged, highly visible “crime scenes.”

Our second case study is that of historically racialized Roma living in contemporary France. The racialization and irregularization of French domestic Roma—who, since a 1969 law, are officially called gens du voyage or “traveling people”—have a notorious tradition, which partially originates in French colonial practices (Picker 2017). Two laws of 1990 and 2000—the first and second so-called “Besson laws”—are of particular importance here, because they have established the legal framework that considerably determines the current French approach to their “domestic” Roma. These laws aim at the “protection” of them and their “itinerant lifestyles”, but they do so highly ambiguously through, on the one hand, demanding from municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants to provide halting sites and services for Roma (regarding education, health care, and access to water, electricity, gas, sewage, garbage
collection, and so on) and, on the other, not allowing them to stay at any other place outside these halting sites. The so-called “security law” of 2003, which was introduced by Nicolas Sarkozy when he was still France’s Minister of the Interior, considerably reinforced this latter, repressive aspect of the Besson laws, because it explicitly considers it a criminal act for Roma to stop on French territory outside designated halting sites. Their presence outside these sites is considered as a threat to public peace and security or deemed to threaten public health. With the ratification of Sarkozy’s security law, forcible eviction is allowed, even from private land owned by Roma, on the grounds of threatening public health, security, or peace (ERRC 2005: 95-98).

The main problems have emerged due to the fact that many municipalities—in 2010 half of all of them in the countryside (Cour de comptes 2012)—have never done anything to construct the halting facilities for gens du voyage that they are required to provide according to the Besson laws. The fact that numerous municipalities violate the law or, at least until 2007, repeatedly took profit from officially sanctioned delays of the deadlines by which the sites had to be completed, has resulted in a situation in which many French Roma could and still cannot live or stop on a legally authorized site, simply because there are not enough sites where they can stay and due to the municipalities’ unwillingness to construct them. Paradoxically, however, French authorities and particularly municipalities that do not fulfill the requirements of the Besson laws, have simultaneously turned to Sarkozy’s security law to evict Roma, destroy, seize or confiscate their property, fine them, take away their driving licenses or imprison them, usually claiming that they threatened public order, health, and security (ERRC 2005, 2013). Consequently, the ways in which consecutive French governments have approached their Roma minority have actively contributed to the production and maintenance of the condition of evictability. Following De
Genova’s (2002) original argument, we could argue that the law’s virtual invisibility in producing “illegality” is accompanied by a border spectacle—at the halting sites—that renders a racialized Roma “illegality” hypervisible and gives it the flavor of being part of a “natural” social order. The securitizing border spectacle, thus, transforms these sites into irregular borderzones and presents them as incorrigible, natural crime scenes.

This argument can be extended to the way in which “non-French” EU citizens with a Roma background have been irregularized in France, and not only because they have literally migrated in the context of the persistent production of the condition of evictability just discussed. The recent French approach to Roma has probably become best known due to the way in which, in the summer of 2010, the then French President Sarkozy publicly announced the deportation of (mostly) Bulgarian and Romanian Roma from the country and due to how commissioner Viviane Reding, in the name of the European Commission, strongly condemned the approach of Sarkozy’s government and, in her turn, caused a lot of turmoil, because of her comparison to deportations during the Second World War (van Baar 2011). The French approach received much media attention in and directly after the summer of 2010, but remarkably less once the evictions and deportations had been fully normalized.

Both Sarkozy’s public announcement and the media attention that followed can be considered as clear manifestations of “border spectacles” (De Genova 2005: 242-49; cf. 2013) in which social and biopolitical borders are actively produced as tangible, physical ones through spectacular dramatization and its interrelated dynamics of in/securitization. In 2010, Sarkozy and several other French politicians problematized Roma, their lifestyle, and their transnational mobility.
practices as security threats, most notably as dangers to public order, public health, national values, and what Sarkozy himself described as the “republican order” (Sarkozy quoted in Bărbulescu 2012: 282). Following the logic of his so-called “security declaration” (Déclaration sur la sécurité) of July 2010, Sarkozy suggested that the arrival of new Roma from Central and Eastern Europe would cause a major problem to this “republican order” and, therefore, he claimed, measures had to be proposed “adequate to the situation”:

I have asked the Minister of the Interior to put an end to the wild establishment of Roma settlements [implantations sauvages de campements de Roms]. These are areas of lawlessness [zones de non-droit] that cannot be tolerated in France… Within three months, half of these wild settlements will have disappeared from French territory (Sarkozy, Grenoble 30 July 2010, my translation).

Sarkozy’s choice of words is telling. By speaking of implantations sauvages, literally “savage implantations,” he projected a number of historically notorious stereotypical features on the Roma and their practices: they would be violent and uncivilized and, thus, are or behave in opposition to the civilized “republican order.” Furthermore, their “camps” would be “implanted” like new plants or artificial organs (thus not belonging there “originally”), but then evicted violently, thereby clearly evoking the trope and well-established Gypsy stereotype of rootless, nomadic wanderers or tramps, something which is explicitly strengthened by considering these “camps” as “areas of lawlessness” (or “outlaw zones”), thus, finally, also rendering both their presence and practices “illegal” and “criminal.”

It is important to remark that, when Sarkozy made his “successful” securitizing moves in 2010, practices of eviction and deportation, including the more fundamental production of the generalized condition of evictability, had already been steadfastly established as basic ingredients of police work, as they have continued to do ever since. At least since the EU entry
of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, EU citizens from these countries, and Roma in particular, have been faced with a variety of dubious or simply illegal police practices. During his fifteen months of fieldwork among notorious French anticrime squads, Didier Fassin (2013: 64-68, 157-63) observed that Roma from abroad, like North Africans, were overrepresented among those who were stopped and searched and harassed by the police, even while, in the vast majority of cases, no offenses against these Roma were reported. In accordance with Fassin’s findings, the Romanian Ministry of the Interior reported that many of the Romanian Roma who were deported had no criminal record (Bărbulescu 2012: 289). On top of this, in a 2008 report of the European Commission that assessed the EU member states’ transposition of the EU’s “Free Movement Directive” (2004/38/EC), the Commission concluded that France is in violation of EU law over the procedural safeguards of the directive (Carrera and Atger 2010). The Commission mentioned that “in cases of absolute urgency, no procedural safeguards apply in France. The EU citizen receives no written notification of the expulsion decision, is not informed of the grounds on which the decision was taken and has no right of appeal before the decision is enforced” (European Commission 2008).

The situation would not improve after 2008. In August 2010, it was discovered that, despite Sarkozy’s repeated insistence that his self-declared war on crime and illegal migration was not stigmatizing Roma or explicitly targeting them on the basis of their ethnic background, the French Ministry of the Interior had issued a by-now notorious memo for its police personnel with clear instructions to prioritize Roma as the key target group of the repressive measures (Carrera and Atger 2010). Likewise, in October 2010, Le Monde revealed that, for many years, the French gendarmerie had created ethnic profiles of Roma and compiled databases illegally (van...
Particularly in this light, the reversed depiction of the state of affairs by Jacques Myard, one of the members of former French President Sarkozy’s ruling party UMP, was remarkable. In August 2010, he stated that the so-called “European Roma problem” is caused by the way in which Roma interpret the right to travel freely. Their “excessive mobility” and “medieval lifestyle” would cause security problems and, he suggested, should lead us to seriously reconsider the EU’s free movement directive (van Baar 2011: 206-07). Thus, rather than France violating the EU directive and, therefore, causing problems to the Roma involved, conversely, the Roma’s practices would be problematic and require the directive’s revision. This is a qualification that fits very well what van Baar has designated to be a “reasonable antigypsyism” (2014), that is, a form and practice of anti-Roma racism in which the roles of the perpetrator and victim are reversed and unorthodox measures against Roma are presented as “reasonable” and “legitimate” on the basis of this racial reversal.

Once more, but now in the transnational dimension of mobility within the EU, we have thus been able to notice a highly ambiguous relationship between the law, the production of illegality, and the securitizing border spectacles implied in the evictions and deportations of now “non-French” EU citizens, primarily Roma from Romania. Since these expulsions have targeted primarily Roma, the French spectacles have clearly become racializing spectacles that have turned “human suffering into a spectacle, framing and editing the realities of violence, and in doing so renders some lives meaningful while dismissing others as disposable” (Evans and Giroux 2015: 32) and, therefore, both evitable and evictable. Once again, we see that “illegality” has been displaced from its point of production in the law—through the inadequate transposition of EU law in domestic French law, but also through the disputable way in which the EU directive
differentiates between “desirable” and “undesirable” practices of mobility (Aradau et al. 2013; van Baar 2011, 2019)—to the “wild Roma camps” as irregularized borderzones represented as natural crimes scenes.

Although limited because of their geographical and geopolitical focus, the two case studies and their relationship to the contemporary conditions of evictability are nevertheless able to explain some key dimensions of how the boundaries between the main categories of prevalent migration and citizenship studies—“regular” and/or “irregular” “migrants” and/or “citizens”—are significantly blurred, also beyond the prevailing binary of “EU” versus “non-EU” “nationals.” While the French “domestic” case clarifies that the production and maintenance of conditions of evictability co-produces irregular, evictable citizens no matter their official, legal political status, both the British and Roma cases elucidate that this production and maintenance co-constitute irregular EU and non-EU citizens and migrants. Central in the production of irregular political subjects is the way in which securitizing border spectacles create a dynamics of visibilization and invisibilization that helps to make the involved subjects socioeconomically productive.

Indeed, while the territorial and border-producing dimensions of eviction are key to securitizing border spectacles and, thus, to the visibilization of the purported “irregularity” of the “citizens” or “migrants” involved, at the same time the political, economic, juridical and historical (including colonial) dimensions of their marginalization and racialization tend to drastically disappear from view. The production and maintenance of conditions of evictability have strong roots in the history of socioeconomic, political and juridical marginalization characteristic of European modernity and coloniality. Spatial-territorial marginalization and the consequences it
has had for access to adequate housing, employment, education, health care, infrastructure, and justice have often pushed those who live under the conditions of evictability into grey and black economies and left them no other choice than accepting informalized and irregularized employment.

Thus, their labor subordination, including practices of their exploitation, and the securitization of their practices through border spectacles, operate in tandem with the considerable and highly influential production of their “illegality.” Much like in the case of deportability (De Genova 2011: 94; cf. 2002, 2013), the vitality of evictability as a condition for “illegality,” and the policing of the borderzones where many who are deemed evictable reside, is that some are evicted or deported, while most may remain where they live and work, though under hard, exploitative and precarious conditions, and often with the fear of being the next who could be expelled. Consequently, “the spectacle remains inevitably accompanied by the invisibility of the real social relations of (alienated, exploited, and subjugated) life—hidden in plain sight, as it were” (De Genova 2011: 100, our emphasis).
References


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