

Trade-marking Tradition: An Ethnographic Study of the Lebanese Wine Industry

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Abstract

This thesis is an ethnographic study of Lebanese wine producers and their on-going efforts to create and sustain a niche in the international market for their high quality wines. By focusing upon enterprising strategies deployed within the Lebanese wine industry and on the types of work relations that are formed, I explore how knowledge required for the construction of a market entails a capacity to (re)produce it as a social reality. In so doing, I pay particular attention to the change in work-related and familial bodies of knowledge in the Kefraya region of the Bekaa Valley, a major wine-growing hub in Lebanon. Villagers in Kefraya have sold their grapes to wineries across Lebanon since the first harvest of the early plantations of the 1950s, which was initiated by a member of the urban mercantile elite whose family owned land in the region.

Part of my analysis considers the history Lebanese wine production and its modernization as part of a wider and much longer project of French cultural hegemony in the region that pre-exist even the French Mandate of the early twentieth century; it can be traced back to the sericulture industry of the seventeenth century. Entangled with the French hegemony are the political and economic interests of local actors with extensive trade networks extending well beyond the peripheries of the rural plains of the Bekaa, the urban port of Beirut, and into the very heart of Europe. I argue that the current enthusiasm for the production of high quality wines by elite urban entrepreneurs speaks of a history of social transformation and shifts in perceptions of place. Here the discourse of nature that shape the production of quality wines also fits within an understanding of history and the market, where practices of winegrowing not adhering to standards that serve as elitist markers for singularity and authenticity result in lower rankings or failure to be classified as wine at all.

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Introduction

The idea of conducting ethnographic research into the Lebanese wine industry came to me in 2004 after the assassination of the former Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri, on February 14th of that year. I was already enrolled on the Master of Research programme in the Anthropology Department at Goldsmiths, with the aim of designing a research proposal for doctoral study on place-making and the role of collective memory in the south of Lebanon. My proposed fieldwork site was the Khiam Detention Centre, located in the eponymous town, where Israeli Defence Force and their allies, the South Lebanon Army, had kept political prisoners for the duration of their nearly 30 years of occupation. Following the IDF's withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000, the Hezbollah party liberated the prisoners, documenting the event on camera. Months later, Khiam prison became a site of memory where visitors were offered tours by former prisoners. I was a visitor in the summer of 2000, when I joined my mother and father on a trip from their Beirut home to the south of Lebanon. At the time I was near completion of a Bachelor of Art degree in Archaeology and Art History, and had developed a general interest in how the organization of space can contribute towards reproducing certain types of social realities.

Upon arriving in Khiam, I was struck by the location of the prison. It was on the highest peak of the town, and right in the centre, so that it overlooked the homes below and the hills, mountains, valleys and rivers beyond. It appeared in every sense to be a surveillance machine, monitoring the daily lives of people below and afar. I wondered how the towers of this building might have served as a panopticon, affecting and

transforming peoples' lives during the Israeli occupation. After further research, I was surprised to learn that the detention centre was in fact much older than the Israeli occupation. The Khiam Detention Centre was constructed during the French mandate in the 1930s, apparently as fortified military barracks. Significantly, it was only a decade or so earlier that the new borders of Lebanon had taken shape, following secret negotiations between Sykes and Picot that came to conclusion during 1916, in the Asia Minor Agreement. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire just three years later, the borders that had been agreed upon between Sykes and Picot became a reality. South Lebanon would eventually become a governorate in the modern state, which was formally granted independence from France in 1943. In light of these observations, I started to think more about the legacy of the French administration in the region.

Unfortunately, my research into Khiam ended not long after. Following the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the country was once more in turmoil and about to undergo further change. The political division between the 8th and 14th March coalitions emerged, where the latter demanded the withdrawal of the Syrian military presence from Lebanon. Meanwhile, members of the 8th of March alliance included the Hezbollah party, and they took an open pro-Syrian stance. The large-scale protests and sit-ins of both political camps in the Martyrs Square of downtown Beirut initially seemed well-described by journalist Michael Young: as a political awakening of the Lebanese youth (2010). Indeed the changes taking place across Lebanon since 2000 seemed to be in line with a hope for a better future. Yet despite coming from a Lebanese background on my father's side, and having lived on the outskirts of Beirut as a teenager, I was unable to feel any affiliation to the politics of the time. I felt uneasy, especially because as it appeared to me that it had taken the murder of one man—an extremely wealthy

entrepreneur at that—to instigate the mobilisation of so many people. Why had he become such an influential figure? I also heavily distrusted the involvement of many of the politicians—mostly men—who preached the importance of honour, self-determinism, and freedom to citizens of a country where levels of inequality are not entirely unrelated to the types of political patron-client relations maintained.¹

While my somewhat conclusive observations now belong to a young(er) and (more) naïve self, they were a catalyst for the change in my research topic. To be based in the south of Lebanon, where the situation remained volatile and unstable, would have left me feeling completely out of my depth. Not long after, during the summer of 2006, the Khiam Detention Centre was annihilated by Israeli cluster bombs. By this time, I had already designed my research proposal for an ethno-historical study of Lebanese wine production. I had retained my original interests concerning the historical diversity of French hegemony in the region and particularly in terms of the reproduction of space. I retraced the steps that had taken me to Khiam, taking with me a simple question: What other obvious features can be found across the Lebanese landscape that appears to be entwined with a history of the French presence in the region? The inquiry produced some rather interesting but complex results.

As I dug deeper into the literature, it became clear that such a history was actually much longer than I had initially envisioned. For example, the beginnings of modern Lebanon's *laissez-faire* political economy had actually started to take shape as early as the nineteenth century, following the integration of Mount Lebanon into the

¹ An article in 2009 by Taylor Long for the Now Lebanon news website provides an interesting account of the political patronage systems of north Lebanon, where poverty continues to increase. See <http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArchiveDetails.aspx?ID=31275>. A report published in 2008, by the International Poverty Centre, draws attention to disparately unequal levels of consumption in the country (Laithy, Abu-Ismaïl & Hamdan, 2008).

international (capitalist) market of silk production. It was during that period that one can increasingly see how shared political and economic interests between the French and British investors and Beirut's silk mercantile oligarchy contributed towards the decentralisation of the Ottoman administration and facilitated the emergence of a market-orientated economy (Gates, 1998). I wondered how such interests might have shaped more recent trends in agriculture and industry in the region.

I consequentially became interested in pursuing a line of enquiry with a question raised by Gilsenan concerning the extent to which men are able to actually maintain images of status and honour in a “bourgeoning *laissez-faire* Lebanon”, where the very notions of autonomy or self-sufficiency are hardly sustainable (Gilsenan, 1996: 59). The predicament of anthropology, as mapped out by Nader, articulated some of my concerns about the politics of representation and the production of knowledge (1972 & 1997). What kinds of understanding of society and individuals are potentially generated from anthropological perspectives? In thinking further about these questions, I found it poignant that Nader claims how there has (historically speaking) been a tendency for anthropology students to study “problems” that they do not have any “feelings” about (1972:2). Nader convincingly argues that studying social problems that directly concern us in some way or another generates a much richer understanding about the world we live in. Indeed, as Abu-Lughod suggests, the deeply entrenched dichotomies between self and other in anthropological endeavours can at the very least be acknowledged through a process of making connections and interconnections that are at once historical and contemporary between the anthropologist and community of study (1991).

I therefore felt it pertinent to study elites in order to fill out the ethnographic gap, and saw that this was all the more urgent in Lebanon where men of power—especially

economic power—appear to have affected so many lives—including my own. At the same time, and following a closer (re)reading of Nader’s essay, my view of what might constitute the “object of study” shifted slightly, so that I began to explore potential “social fields,” bearing in mind that the power of “cultural transmission” did not necessarily occur vertically (or horizontally) (and see also Bourdieu, 1993). While manifestations of power remained unevenly distributed in my mind, I saw that there was something much more complex about power dynamics than I had initially realised. As Nader points out, by studying the culture of the powerful, such as U.S. food chains, one can begin to understand how such institutions can affect not only our lives, but also those who live in “traditional” and “non-Western” societies (1972:9).

With this in mind, I recommenced my search across the Lebanese landscape through media articles and old family photographs of trips to different regions of Lebanon. I finally recalled a family visit when I was around thirteen years old, to the Chateau Kefraya winery, far to the west of the Bekaa Valley (not far from Ain Zebde on the map presented earlier). The civil war in Lebanon had only come to an end a year or so earlier, in 1992, and as my father drove his old Peugeot 505 with pride across the winding roads into the Bekaa Valley, remnants of decades of conflict were stamped into the memory of my mind. Yet I remember that when we arrived in the Kefraya region, the chateau, with its rather panoptical tower, was as it still is today, peering out from above a group of poplar trees with a view that some say extends as far as the Golan Heights in southerly hinterlands. As we took some shade from the midday sun, my mother was surprised to see that we were not the only visitors to the winery.

In fact there were a number of other intrepid explorers who had come over that Sunday afternoon from Beirut, and there were even a few tourists from France who had

come to visit the winery and gaze upon the small patchwork of vineyards encompassing the chateau. My father translated my mother's observations to a guard who had emerged from the entrance of the chateau's gates. He was from the village of Kefraya, located further up on the slopes of the mountain range. I vividly remember his response. "Of course there are many visitors here," he said, proudly, in Arabic, "this is the most beautiful landscape in the country." He went on to explain that despite the years of war and destruction, the region, like the rest of Lebanon, was in a process of reconstruction so that its original beauty would return. Homes would be rebuilt and vines (re)planted across the way, on the slopes that surrounded the village. Little did I realise then that over a decade later I would settle into a home in the Kefraya village for the duration of a year, and that I would walk or drive past this entrance on a daily basis. It was somewhat frustrating that I could not recollect the man's name, and I will always wonder who this man from Kefraya was, whom I met when I was barely a teenager. When I thought about his comments as a young PhD student, I began to think about what he might have meant by landscape and beauty—and what understanding of the environment was required to produce such a world. Further questions also arose from these early memories of Kefraya. Who did this chateau belong to? When was it built? How were relations forged through such an arrangement of space? What changes have come to the region since the end of the civil war? Finally, were there other similar constructions across Lebanon?

Pre-fieldwork Encounters

My second encounter with members of the Lebanese wine sector took place in the winter of 2005, during the book launch for Michael Karam's *Wines of Lebanon*. Comfortably tucked into the corner of London's Westbourne Grove, Al Saqi bookshop was the venue for the event. Founded in 1978, this independent publishing company has since specialised in stocking and publishing books related to Middle Eastern topics. Michael Karam's book was no exception, offering the inquisitive reader a detailed guide of the many wineries of Lebanon. I had arrived early, so I purchased a copy of *Wines of Lebanon* and took refuge in the Lebanese (healthy) fast food shop across the road. While awaiting the arrival of my falafel, I gazed up at the shelves, which were neatly aligned with different kinds of jars filled with pickled vegetables from Lebanon. A few bottles of Lebanese araq and wine stood casually next to some of these jars. Other jars had stacked piles of vine leaves. The stuffed vine leaves lay covered in olive oil in aluminium containers in the refrigerated counter below. The man who made my falafel personally delivered the sandwich to my table and smiled as he looked at the cover of the book I had set in front of me. I returned the smile, before I began to eat my sandwich and flick through the pages of the large coffee-table book.

It was clear that the Lebanese wine industry had come a long way since my first encounter in 1993. In 1993 the three main producers of wine in Lebanon were Chateaux Musar, Ksara, and Kefraya, and production levels were, at a rough estimate, 2.5 million bottles. By 2005, production levels were at nearly 6 million bottles with something close to 30 wineries, mostly situated in the Bekaa Valley—many of which featured in Karam's book about Lebanese wineries. Some of these wineries were not necessarily new, but had ceased production during wartime. I jotted my observations down in my

first (pre)fieldwork notebook and also noted with interest that Chateaux Musar, Kefraya, and Ksara had maintained production throughout the war and even had managed to export a substantial amount of their wines. Indeed these wineries remain the largest in the area, where the combined production of Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya contributes something like 80% of all wine produced in Lebanon. As I skimmed through the book, I thought about its importance for the promotion of Lebanese wines. The layout of the book wove together images and texts, giving a particular historical tapestry of Lebanese wine.

According to Karam, winemaking in Lebanon can be traced back to ancient civilisations. One of the temples in the three-part temple complex in the Baalbek region of the Bekaa Valley is dedicated to the Roman god of wine, Bacchus. The Phoenicians who set up trade posts in Beirut and Tyre were important merchants, and wine vessels, such as amphorae, are frequently found amongst their artefacts; thus suggesting the presence of wine trade in the region. Karam also includes an interview with archaeologist Patrick McGovern, who explains that despite the little evidence uncovered due to recent conflicts, what has been unearthed indicates that regions of modern-day Lebanon were covered in vineyards during ancient times. It was not just ancient civilizations of the region, however, that had a hand in painting the history of wine in Lebanon. The Jesuit priests and French mandate administrators also had a role in altering the viticulture and wine landscapes. The first winery to produce wine the “modern way” was constructed by the Jesuits of Ksara in 1857, who also planted *Cinsault* grape varieties brought over from plantations in their monastery in Algeria. Such changes led me to think more about the history of wine in Lebanon and of possible alterations across the landscape following the modernization of wine production.

Although Karam points to a long-standing tradition of wine and araq production in Lebanon, I began to wonder how modifications in wine and vine production techniques may even reflect broader historical changes not only in agricultural practices, but also within political and economic processes. Thus for example, while archaeological evidence might be able to prove that wine has been made in Lebanon as far back as the Phoenician period, I wondered why such scientific proof might be of importance. Given that the viticulture landscape had dramatically altered in the last 3000 years, I also wondered if Phoenician wine would taste even remotely similar to contemporary Lebanese wine, which Karam eloquently described as having been fashioned to suit French palates since at least the mid-nineteenth century (2005). If not, then why call it wine?

Karam does hint at the interrelatedness of such types of changes when he informs the reader that the Chateau Ksara winery remained under Vatican ownership until 1973, when it was sold to a consortium of Lebanon's business elites (2005). The winery has since become one of the two biggest producers of wine in Lebanon. The other, Chateau Kefraya, began production in 1979. However, the founder and current chairman, Mr Michel de Bustros, a man described by Karam as belonging to the Beirut "aristocratic" class, had initiated vine plantations on family land in the Kefraya region as early as 1949, before extending his project onto villager's lands in the 1950s. What type of vines did he plant? Significantly, while Karam mentions the viticulture of Kefraya, there was on the whole little discussion about the region's vine growers. One exception was the Cave Kouroum winery, located in Kefraya and owned by a local man, Mr Bassim Rahal. The establishment of this winery, as Mr Sami Rahal, the general manager, explained to Karam, resulted from a surplus of grapes from the Kefraya village originally intended for the Chateau Ksara winery. However as Chateau Ksara had

decided to start up new contracts with vineyard owners in other regions of the Bekaa, the Rahal family, who were acting as distributors at the time, had to do something with the grapes—and wine seemed like the only option. I began to wonder about the vineyard owners in Kefraya. Who were they? And why was there so little information available about them in Karam's book?

The positioning of the vineyard owners, firmly in the background, was also reflected in the colourful photographs laid out in the book. The photographer Norbert Schiller had been Karam's partner in the project and there were an abundance of eye-catching shots recording scenes of daily winemaking activities; such as the somewhat romanticized images of Bedouin women dressed colourfully, and smiling as they pluck the grapes from the vines in Kefraya. Other images featured men wearing red and white *kafiyeh* over their heads to protect them from the sun, as they shoulder crates of white and red grapes. One photograph that caught my attention back then was that of the chief of agricultural affairs at the Chateau Kefraya winery. This was Mr Nabhane, who stared piercingly through his darkened sunglasses straight into the camera lens; behind him a red tractor glaring under the sun looked just as menacing. I wondered about Mr Nabhane and what his job entailed. Then there was the larger than life photograph of Mr Yves Morard, an oenologist from Bordeaux who had worked at Chateau Kefraya and then at Cave Kouroum. Were there other French oenologists working in the Lebanese wine industry?

Also portrayed were different prominent and esteemed individuals of the Lebanese wineries. These colourful photographs hinted at the status and sophisticated styles of the wineries' owners, managers and wine-makers in Lebanon. At times, a winery-owner and other members of his family, who also worked in the trade, are

pictured amongst the oak barrels of the wine cellar, his facial expression suggesting concentration as he inhales the aromas of one of his wines from a glass. Other photographs depict winery owners and shareholders in more casual clothes against a backdrop of exquisite gardens, chateaux, or vineyards. I pondered upon these images before writing some final notes in my notebook. What kind of status was conveyed through the symbolic use of elite forms such as the chateau? How were they similar—if at all—to those used in the production of French wine? Why for example, was Michel de Bustros described as an aristocrat? Did vineyard owners in Kefraya also perceive him as nobility?

After noting these thoughts, I closed Karam's book and prepared myself for the evening cold awaiting me outside. A room adjacent to the bookshop had been set up for the event, with publications of *The Wines of Lebanon* proudly displayed on tables covered in white cloth. Guests also had the opportunity to taste different wines from Lebanon and speak with wine merchants. Ms Jane Sowter, manager of Chateau Musar UK LTD, explained that during the civil war the winery had gone as far as to establish a UK-based company. She was happy to discuss the unique styles of Chateau Musar wines, highlighting the fact that these wines improved with age. Chateau Kefraya was represented by Phoenicia Wines LTD, whose Lebanese wine merchants were as enthusiastic as Ms Sowter and offered me further wine tastings.

Guests were delighted to have to hand such an array of different wines. As one young woman took a seat around the podium, she gushed that these wines tasted like "Lebanon in a glass." She pointed out the bouquet of cedar and thyme coming from her glass. These aromas, she explained, stirred up memories of her family's summer home up in the mountains of Lebanon, where she played in the garden as a child. I was

intrigued by the powerful qualities of this wine, which brought forth and conjured up exclusive perceptions of place and identity, symbolically charged with notions of rootedness and attachment to land. I returned to my seat and later, as the evening became a bacchanalian night for some, a couple of Al Saqi's authors took to the podium and read excerpts from the Al-Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam, expressing their desire for a "little ruby wine and a book of verses."

The audience clapped, and pleaded for another verse. The speakers were only too happy to oblige and filled their glasses before the poetry reading began again. I was making every attempt to limit the effects of the wine and continued to politely decline the glasses of red and white circulating amongst the audience. I had been invited by the author himself to launch, and hoped to speak with him. After hearing about his book, I had contacted Karam directly by email, in the hope of obtaining some advice on my research. Unfortunately, we did not have the opportunity to speak much throughout the evening as he was in demand. However, he was happy to sign my book, including the message: "Happy Hunting in the Bekaa!"

Fieldwork

I arrived in Lebanon at the end of 2005 for a brief pilot study and seeking permission to conduct research at some of the wineries in Lebanon and to secure a place to stay for the duration of my extended fieldwork. My initial plan was to find out if it would be possible to arrange accommodation at either Chateaux Ksara or Kefraya—both in the Bekaa Valley. My first appointment was with Mr de Bustros at his Beirut office, and he agreed that I could visit Chateau Kefraya whenever I chose and make contact with those

working at the winery in the Bekaa Valley. I was informed that accommodation was not available at the winery. I expressed my interest in possibly staying in Kefraya village, and asked if he might be able to offer me any suggestions or contacts in the village? De Bustros seemed amused by this idea and smiled, stating that if I could find a place to stay there, then by all means, it would be a good place to be.

Communication with the general manager of Chateau Ksara did not run as smoothly. Mr Charles Ghostine was initially unwilling to meet with me. It took several emails and telephone conversations before Ghostine suggested that I meet with Michael Karam, who had just been commissioned by the winery to write a book for their 150th anniversary. If Karam agreed with my research then so might Ghostine. Fortunately, Karam was willing to meet with me at a café at the ABC shopping mall in the Achrafieh district of Beirut. I have to admit that I was starting to feel some pressure to prove myself as a worthy researcher, and had become less confident about my intentions to study wine production in Lebanon. After about half an hour of nervous rambling to Karam, he stopped me and looked relieved. I recall it was at the point when I had somehow started to discuss the way Marx might have perceived agriculture in Lebanon. I am not sure if Karam's relief was because my monologue on Marx and the vineyards of Mosel had come to an (unfinished) end, or because it had become clear to him that my research aims were quite different to his interests. Nevertheless, within an hour of our meeting, I called Ghostine, who was now ready to grant me permission to visit the Chateau Ksara winery. I was surprised by Ghostine's change in attitude and thankful to Karam for his support. I recall one conversation over the telephone with Ghostine, where he warned me to not write any "rubbish" about Chateau Ksara. I truly hope I have not.

Given that securing accommodation at Chateau Ksara proved impossible, I began to turn my attention to finding a place to stay in Kefraya village. As I thought more about the possibility, the more sense it made. During a meeting with a winemaker working at the Chateau Kefraya winery at the time of the pilot study, it was brought to my attention that out of the 700 hectares of vines in the region, approximately 400 belonged to those living the Kefraya village. Vineyard owners would then sell their grapes to wineries across Lebanon. I thought it would be interesting to study the types of arrangements vineyard owners had with the wineries. Another dimension was the historical relationship between local residents in Kefraya and de Bustros, who is recognised for transforming the region into a viticulture landscape.

It became clear during my initial contact with Kefraya villagers that things were very different here, and I would have to go about this communication rather differently to the way I had instigated communication with the wine companies. There did not appear to be any official viticulture organization in Kefraya and I would have to make contact with someone in the village. I felt this was especially difficult because I did not know anyone from Kefraya. Further, I was aware from personal experience of Lebanese village life that a young woman arriving at somebody's front door and asking in broken Arabic for a place to stay for a year would be unusual at best. While the person at the front door would, most likely, be as hospitable as one can be to a stranger, all sorts of questions and eyebrows would probably be raised. So taking lead from Abu-Lughod (1999), who with the support of her father negotiated a place in an Egyptian Bedouin community, I decided to take a similar route. It took some convincing before my perplexed father finally gave in, agreeing that if I wanted to stay in Kefraya, then his asking for permission on my behalf would be the most appropriate way to go about it.

So my dad did what all Lebanese people do when they arrive in a village and don't know anyone. He stopped at the local snack point and asked for directions to the house of the *Mukhtar*.²

Fortunately the *Mukhtar* was willing to help and informed my father that a room would be available to rent once I returned from England to start my fieldwork in the summer of 2006. While delays were to be expected, I don't think anybody foresaw that the reasons for my postponement of fieldwork would be war. The Kefraya region was not spared Israeli bombardment. A well-kept memorial for refugees fleeing from the south stands on the side of the main road, not far from where they were killed by Israeli bombs. Further up in the hills, an Israeli drone crashed not far from another road. As I learnt about these events during my time in Kefraya village, I began to wonder if I could weave the memory of war into my doctoral thesis. Since at least the 1980s, the region at one point or another had been occupied by both Israeli and Syrian militaries, and I managed to document many narratives about this period, trying to make sense of these memories. Indeed, these experiences could never really be left behind; only a few months after my arrival someone uncovered by chance an unexploded mine in a vineyard of the Chateau Kefraya estate. After much deliberation, however, I decided to steer the focus away from explicit narratives of war and violence because there remained several pending ethical issues that I had to address. Generally speaking, these have to do with the complexities of negotiating consent. My concerns grew largely from the EASA ethical guidelines, where, under the heading of "undue intrusion," there is mention of

² I was informed during fieldwork that the meaning of the word "*Mukhtar*" is "chosen," and that the *Mukhtar* of Kefraya had been elected by local residents. The office of *Mukhtar* can be traced to the Ottoman Law of Vilayets of 1864 (Baer, 1982). It is unclear if Kefraya village existed at this time, however if it did, then the *Mukhtar* would have been appointed by Ottoman officials. At present the *Mukhtar* mediates internal village disputes, but his role also includes civil servant duties, such as stamping passports and assisting in applications. The position of *Mukhtar* is usually unpaid.

potential harm to participants “having been caused to acquire self-knowledge which they did not seek or want” (1999:3). Simply put, I feel that further research and consideration of the politics of positionality is necessary before presenting these accounts.

When I finally arrived at the *Mukhtar*'s front door in December of 2006, his wife greeted me and showed me inside. My parents were also present and we all shook the hand of the ageing *Mukhtar* and waited for him to be seated. A few moments later, the *Mukhtar* began to speak and pointed out of the red-paned terrace window to the valley below. Beyond the vineyards and rustic ornate villas of the village, the chateau of Kefraya crept out once more from the poplar trees. The *Mukhtar* turned to me, asking in his gruff voice, “...and you spoke with de Bustros?” I confirmed that I had. “And he knows that you want to research the winery?” I nodded. With that, the *Mukhtar* and his wife got up and I was taken across the road to my first home in Kefraya. This was with an elderly couple who had no children and, interestingly, came from one of the two families in the village who didn't own any land (and thus no vineyards).

Within two weeks of arriving at Kefraya village, I was able to conduct participant-observation on a daily basis, both at the winery and in the vineyards of Chateau Kefraya, where the recently-hired French oenologist and technical manager, Mr Fabrice Guiberteau, allowed me free-range to work with other obliging employees. Not long after, I had the opportunity to interview de Bustros, this time at his office in the chateau. Local residents in Kefraya also invited me out into the *kouroum* (vineyards), teaching me (with a lot of pride) how to prune and how to pick wild edible plants. As my time began to revolve around when and where I could meet with people who worked in viniculture and viticulture, it became clear that it was increasingly difficult for the elderly couple to accommodate my sporadic schedule. So I took the initiative to speak

with the *Mukhtar*, asking if there were any other places to rent in the village. Not long after, the first of the *Mukhtar's* three wives passed away. She had lived in one of the ground apartments of the *Mukhtar's* three-storey red-roof house. His second wife was from Beirut and had long since passed away. His third wife lived with him upstairs. Meanwhile, his grown son and his family lived on the top floor. Following a month of mourning, the *Mukhtar* offered me the flat to rent. I felt unsure about the correct response, but after much discussion with people in the village, expressing my concerns about being disrespectful to other members of the family, I accepted the offer. My bedroom was close to the entrance and shared the view the *Mukhtar* had pointed out upstairs. A hot stove stood next to my bed, which was invaluable during the long cold winter nights, where I wrote covered in layers of blankets and, quite frequently, by candlelight when the electricity had gone out.

I did not, however, spend a great deal of time in my new home. The longer I spent out in the vineyards, the closer I grew to the Nabhane family and the more evenings I would pass at their villa, which was a little further downhill. Mr Nabhane Nabhane, whom I later called *Amou* or Uncle Nabhane, was in charge of overseeing work in the vineyards of Chateau Kefraya, a role he inherited from his father, Mr Abdel Helim Nabhane. Nabhane was extremely helpful, particularly when I began piecing together a historical narrative of Kefraya. It was, after all, his father who had worked so closely with de Bustros to transform the region into what it is today. It was also Nabhane who urged me to follow leads that took me out of Kefraya as well. As he reminded me, wineries from across Lebanon converge on Kefraya during the harvest.

Nabhane's suggestions draw attention to a certain crossroads that I had arrived during fieldwork. That is, I had to consider the theoretical consequences of limiting my

fieldwork site to the Kefraya region. In some respects, my concerns were similar to those expressed by contributors to the edited volume by Gupta and Ferguson (1997). In other words, I felt it pertinent to explore the entanglement of local and global processes of power that might have influenced the way the Kefraya region is perceived as a centre for wine-growing. I therefore had a choice to remain in Kefraya and visit other regions in the Bekaa, or to redesign a methodological framework for a multi-sited fieldwork across Lebanon (e.g. Marcus, 1995). I felt that in choosing the former, I would have the opportunity to develop strong ties with Kefraya residents and at the very least, become acquainted with seasonal migrant workers who came from Syria and beyond. Given that it was difficult for me to follow seasonal workers across the borders, I decided that there were several practical advantages to setting up base in Kefraya in that I could gain some insights into the perspectives of different actors as they converged in the region. Yet it is also important to point out that my focus on the seasonal workers remains somewhat marginal in my thesis. I chose instead to focus on the management of the wineries so as to gain further insights into what types of knowledge were deemed important in the decision-making process to make high quality wines—and the repercussions these decisions had on the transforming Kefraya landscape for the villagers.

I thus also began to visit the wineries. Given constraint on time, however, I limited my fieldwork to visiting wineries located only in the Bekaa Valley who bought grapes from the Kefraya region, interviewing winery owners, managers, and oenologists. I soon saw that since the end of the civil war in 1991, an important objective for many of the wineries has been to increase their exports abroad, creating a niche in the international market for high quality wines. Significantly, also brought to the fore was that essential for success in carving out a place in an already well-established global

goods market was not only an understanding of the prerequisites for market entry but also knowledge of the networks that could facilitate such strategies.

In learning about these networks, I gained further insights into the subtleties of the power dynamics, as the larger wineries, Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya not only monopolized production in terms of quantity, but also in generating an understanding of what quality actually meant. I also became aware of the role of the wine business association, the *Union Viticole du Liban* (UVL), in campaigning for the passing of a wine law in Lebanon. I also saw how important were their links to the state and international wine organizations—most notably, the *Office International de la Vigne et du Vin* (OIV), seemed to play an important role.

Winery	Location
Domaine de Baal	Zahle, Bekaa Valley
Domaine des Tourelles	Chtaura, Bekaa Valley
Domaine Wardy	Zahle, Bekaa Valley
Cave Kouroum	Kefraya, Bekaa Valley
Chateau Ka	Chtaura, Bekaa Valley
Chateau Kefraya	Kefraya, Bekaa Valley
Chateau Ksara	Ksara, Bekaa Valley
Chateau Musar	Ghazir, north Lebanon
Clost St Thomas	Qb Elias, Bekaa Valley
Coteaux du Liban	Zahle, Bekaa Valley
Chateau Heritage	Qb Elias, Bekaa Valley
Massaya	Taanayel, Bekaa Valley
Vin Nakad	Jdita, Bekaa Valley

Table 1: Wineries visited during fieldwork

The data I obtained through these formal and informal interviews also proved invaluable, and complemented the data I was gathering at Kefraya; especially in terms of the economic and social consequences these strategies might have upon vineyard-owners in Kefraya who were facing continuous pressure to change the types of grapes varietals they grew. The pressure was to grow those deemed desirable by wineries such

as Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara. In particular, information from Chateau Ksara's Mr Ghostine and French oenologist Mr James Palgé was extremely useful in terms of understanding how the strategies they deployed in order to improve the quality of wines not just at Ksara, but across Lebanon, contributed towards the reproduction of other enterprising manoeuvres—within both viniculture and viticulture. To add to this perspective, I also made several trips to vineyards across the Bekaa Valley, where I conducted similarly formatted interviews, asking about the age and grape varieties they grew and about the types of contracts they had with wineries buying their grapes. Of interest here was that as some of the Kefraya vineyard owners heard about my visits to wineries sourcing their grapes, they too became more at ease discussing some of the issues pertaining to costs and contracts.

Yet it is important to point out that information about the exact costs for viticulture maintenance, wages for itinerant workers and how much vineyard owners could make from selling grapes was extremely difficult to obtain. Vineyard owners, seasonal workers and wineries were all reluctant to discuss such issues. For example, it is apparent that a vineyard owner in Kefraya can make anything from \$400 or to at least ten times the amount depending upon the amount of land, the type of vines and how many vines planted per hectare. Yet obtaining the exact figures proved impossible for several reasons. First, I was unable to gain access to records of land ownership. Second, residents of Kefraya and beyond were uncomfortable providing me with the exact amount of money they received from selling grapes. Third, while the data sheets I acquired from Chateau Kefraya did register who the vineyards belonged to and the amount of grapes (in kilograms) that were bought, there was still some ambiguity if the owners of these vineyards, also sold grapes (perhaps from other vineyards) to other

wineries. Nevertheless, visiting vineyards eventually became less formal and thus allowed my fieldwork to flow more smoothly—particularly during harvest time.

Archival research conducted at the Jesuit-run Taanayel Monastery in the Central Bekaa was another significant part of my fieldwork. Historically the Taanayel properties were linked with Chateau Ksara and the former continues to grow and sell grapes to the latter. Gaining access to the archives was more of a challenge than I had envisioned. While the reasons remain unclear, in hindsight I suspect that one aspect had to do with the monastery's relationship with Chateau Ksara and the fact that Karam was writing a book about the history of the winery. However, through the support of Mr Elia Ghorra, the agricultural engineer in charge of the Taanayel Laiterie, and Père Paul Brouwers, I was finally permitted to enter the monastery. The Jesuits residing at the monastery were extremely helpful and also kindly allowed me to photocopy less fragile documents. After spending approximately two days a week there over a period of two and half months, I managed to collect accounts by Jesuits involved in wine production during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which has provided some useful insights into the history of agricultural knowledge. I do, however, feel that further archival research would be useful in order to develop further understanding about shifts in the styles of production that have taken place since the arrival of the Jesuits.

Nevertheless, after spending time at the monastery I had the opportunity to develop contacts at the agricultural department of the Jesuit-run University Saint Joseph, which is located a few metres down the road. There, some members of the faculty were working with the Chamber of Agriculture, Commerce and Trade to support a viticulture cooperative further north in the Bekaa, part of a mission to replace illicit crops (hashish and opium) with vines. I have not incorporated their perspectives directly into the thesis

because of my decision to maintain focus on Kefraya—and more specifically on the region’s residents. Nevertheless, such discussions have allowed further contextualisation of Kefraya within the Lebanese viticulture landscape.

Some notes must be made in this section. First, communication during fieldwork was in Arabic, French, and English. The degree of interchange between these languages during conversation was an interesting aspect of my research, particularly in terms of how it demonstrated different senses of positionality. Yet—and to speak of my positionality once more—I must confess that at the start of fieldwork my confidence speaking Arabic and French was frail, to say the least. However, after a month in Kefraya, where to my advantage people were more than happy to correct my grammatical mistakes in Arabic and teach me new words, my confidence grew. Unfortunately, my Arabic reading and writing remains at an intermediate level and presents some self-evident limitations to research. Spending time with French and Francophone employees at the wineries allowed me to develop my conversational skills in the language. Meanwhile I am able to read French with fluency. Unless stated otherwise, I have translated all conversations and texts in this thesis. Second, in order to provide some sort of continuity and avoid some confusion, I have used the same transliteration format from Arabic into English as used by scholars who I have frequently referred to in this thesis. This is also the case for certain terms such as *kouroum* that have already been transliterated by informants. For other words that I have translated directly from Arabic into English, I have followed the system of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES)*.

Third, with productivity levels at approximately 6 million bottles, the Lebanese wine industry is relatively small- only a fraction of Bordeaux’s average annual

production of 850 million bottles. Anonymity therefore remains on all accounts somewhat problematic. I believe that it would have been impossible to conceal the name of the region in which I was working, or the names of the wineries—especially those that are more established. It was also clear that, particularly amongst the upper management of most wineries, many were experienced in being interviewed—perhaps more so than I was as an interviewer. In this respect, I consistently felt that most of my questions were well anticipated—or strategically left unanswered. This was, at times, unnerving, but as time progressed I began to take account of these experiences as part of fieldwork. Nonetheless, I constantly asked participants for their consent, and checked whether they wished to remain anonymous. Those that expressed such a desire remain unnamed and contextualised within this thesis in such a manner as to disassociate them from respective wineries, vineyards, and the like.

Fourth, I must also point out that I have avoided extensive discussion of religious sectarianism in Lebanon. This is despite the fact—and to the surprise of many colleagues and friends—that Kefraya village is a predominantly Sunni-Muslim, and there are a number of prominent non-Christian Lebanese business elites who are major shareholders of some of the wineries. I did not side-line these issues because they are unimportant. Instead, it reflects my feeling that sectarianism as practiced within the Lebanese wine industry is less about how relations are forged and bounded explicitly through religious affiliation, but rather more subtlety entangled within a wider cultural hegemonic project. In this way, Makdisi's critical approach has been informative, because it allows for further understanding as to how sectarianism belongs to a much broader (and longer) modernization hegemonic project in the region (2000). Finally,

taking heed of the “ethnographic present,” particularly the perspectives of Fabian and Said, I write this thesis in the past tense (Fabian, 2002 & Said, 1979).



A view of some of Kefraya's vineyards

Outlining the Trade-marking Tradition

In 2005, in a newsletter released by Lebanon's Investment Development Authority (IDAL), the Lebanese wine industry was featured as the country's most successful agro-industry. The article reports that in 2003 grape production ranked third in agricultural production, with 110,000 tons of grapes harvested that year. While only 6,000 tons of those grapes were destined for wine, the industry was deemed a rapidly growing industry that merged the agricultural, industrial, and trade sectors. According to IDAL,

the wine industry was a \$20 million industry in 2003, and although constituting only 0.05% of the overall national industrial output, it was still outperforming all other industries. To illustrate their point, the newsletter informs its readers that from 1996 until 2003, wine production in Lebanon had doubled to just over 4 million bottles, with a number of wineries selling their wines abroad in international markets. Indeed, since the end of the civil war and up to the time of my fieldwork, more than ten new wineries had been established, and the number has continued to grow to approximately 30.

Notably however, IDAL—nor any other governmental organization for that matter—does not offer any financial support for investment or export of Lebanese wines and nor are there any subsidized agricultural plans made available for grape growers (either wine or table grapes). This is in spite of post-civil war projects such as *Export Plus*, developed by IDAL, which allocated nearly 50 billion Lebanese pounds (around US\$ 33 million) to support farmers and exporters with quality control, packaging, and labelling, as well the as in the transporting of vegetables and fruits to Arab markets (Baroudi, 2005). In drawing attention to the accomplishments of the wine industry, the IDAL article thus inadvertently sheds light upon some of the broader issues surrounding the country's agricultural development. To put it another way, while agricultural production in Lebanon constitutes approximately 6% of the national income and represents 17% of the country's exports, the funds made available to the ministry of agriculture makes up less than 0.4% of the national budget (Zurayk, 2013). The disparity of these figures is indicative of the importance of private investment in agriculture and thus, to some extent, the role it has in shaping Lebanon's agro-industries and rural development. It is all the more significant, therefore, that wine production, which is predominantly if not completely privately funded, was officially deemed the fastest

growing and (most successful) agro-industry of 2005, with a growing presence in the international market for high-quality wines.

To some degree these observations resonate with those made by Gates in her historical analysis of Beirut's mercantile elite and the emergence of Lebanon's *laissez-faire* political economy (1998). That is to say, not only has policy oriented towards establishing an open market economy facilitated in the marginalization of state investment in agrarian development, it has also contributed to the formation of particular agricultural enterprises in rural Lebanon sustained through investment by the urban elite. The significance of contemporary private investment in agriculture might thus reflect more recent entrepreneurial strategies by urban elites to secure their market hegemony. Given the apparent long-standing interest of Beirut's elites in wine production, an anthropological study of the industry can provide a useful lens through which to explore the materialisation of entrepreneurial strategies—both old and new—in rural regions of the country. By exploring the materialisation of these strategies as they converge in Kefraya, this thesis considers this research question: what can an anthropological study of wine contribute to our understanding of the role of elites in shaping and influencing the agricultural landscape in Lebanon?

In this light, the title of this thesis, *Trade-marking Tradition: An Ethnographic study of the Lebanese Wine Industry*, alludes to the normalisation of certain economic practices associated with the emergence of a market society. At the same time, it also refers to the more contemporary praxis of Lebanese elite entrepreneurs, where market privileges are secured by obtaining monopoly rights as producer and supplier of a particular brand (e.g. Pratt, 1994). In Chapter Two I explore how the qualities that wine,

as a type of prestige good, might possess can potentially allow for a study of elites and the transmission of knowledge linked to certain forms of immaterial and manual labour.

Although wine production may have an extremely long history across the region, the methods of viticulture and wine production introduced by the Jesuits during the mid-nineteenth century continue to have a far-reaching legacy in the Lebanese wine industry. For example, *Cinsault* vines, which were initially shipped over by the Jesuits, have become the most prevalent type of wine grape across the country. These new forms of production radically altered the viticulture landscape of the Bekaa Valley, and will be explored in Chapter Three where I suggest that such practices transformed the very notion of the potentiality of the land. We might suggest that the area, which had been perceived within the then-weakening ideologies of Ottoman governance, was brought to (re)produce European market hegemony (see Mundy, 2004). It is notable, therefore, that by the time of the French mandate during the early twentieth century, there was already a burgeoning wine industry in Lebanon. The chapter also draws attention to the emergence of the term “chateau” within Lebanese wine production, arguing that such practices are suggestive of new conceptual arrangements of space that allowed for the forging of new kinds of connections between urban and rural, as well as between local and global.

Chapter Four introduces the Kefraya region, where the “urban aristocrat,” Michael de Bustros, instigated the plantation of *Cinsault* vines a few years after the establishment of the independent Lebanese state. Following successful plantations on his family land, de Bustros then extended the vineyards onto lands belonging to residents of Kefraya, before finally establishing the Chateau Kefraya winery in 1979. Kefraya has since become the winegrowing hub of Lebanon, while also being recognized as having a

particularly beautiful landscape. Yet despite the fact that most of these vineyards belong to residents of Kefraya, they are rarely mentioned in literature about the Lebanese wine industry—even within scientific studies about Lebanese viticulture and wine business. At the same time, however, it is also of significance that, just as the notion of landscape is of importance to non-Kefraya residents and wine experts, villagers also frequently used the term “landscape”.

This shared sense of aesthetic appreciation suggests the materialization of a model of place in Kefraya, one that can be situated within wine’s productive forces and more broadly within the global market economy. And as with the accounts of non-Kefraya residents, villagers’ narratives also entangle with those that speak of the important role of de Bustros in creating the viticulture landscape—especially for one family in particular. Yet such accounts portray a hierarchical relationship with de Bustros that suggest a history of power relations where urban elites began to reinforce and articulate their powerful positions over land and labour in way characterised by the open market economy. Narratives of the landscape, as told by residents in Kefraya, however, also speak of family histories that are entwined with practices out in the vineyards of Kefraya.

Recent demands imposed on residents to pull out their *Cinsault* vines appear to have contributed towards the emergence of new enterprising viticulture actors from Kefraya village, who are able to comply with the new expectations of quality. This is suggestive of the types of socio-economic changes occurring across the landscape, which appear to replicate the cultural norms and forms practiced by wineries in the marketing of Lebanese wines. At the same time, such actors do not seem to be willing to allow land in Kefraya to be sold off to non-Kefraya residents. Chapter Five continues to

explore this theme of transformation begun in Chapter Four, by considering how the changing concept of *bayt* (house) is understood and experienced amongst members of the Rahal following their establishment of the only winery owned by villagers from Kefraya. The chapter considers the (re)productive powers of *Bayt* Rahal, exploring how relations in the spheres of family and business (as well as politics) inform, shape, and affect the other. Chapter Five also extends the trade-marking theme of this thesis by examining, in the final section, how the name “Kefraya,” that was trade-marked by Chateau Kefraya, has had some important ramifications upon the sentimental attachments residents have to kin, house, and place. That is, despite attempts to preserve some degree of autonomy and exert control over change, the competing strategies of an urban elite attempting to secure market power have endured.

Chapter Six thus focuses upon the joint enterprising projects envisioned by the Lebanese business association of wineries, the *Union Viticole du Liban*, established in 1997 by Chateaux Ksara, Musar, and Kefraya, with the objective of improving the overall quality of Lebanese wines and orientating production towards higher categories within the international markets. The objectives of regulating and standardizing production, while adhering to international guidelines, materialised through the UVL’s successful campaign and lobbying for the passing of a wine law in 2000; the first of its kind, since the wine legislation passed in 1938 was thrown out in 1983. Perspectives of UVL members are explored in the chapter to show how the precariousness of the Lebanese state is negotiated to allow wine production to continue to be regulated, in order to meet standards stated under Euro-Lebanese trade agreements.

That the shareholders—especially those of Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara—belong to broader trade networks with links extending across political and trade organizations in

Lebanon and beyond, suggests that they are already well-connected provides a pretext for an examination of the patron-type business relations formed with more recently accepted UVL members. These seem to have the goal of controlling production and securing market power. In Chapter Seven, the focus is extended to the role of technical expertise in that process. I explore the perspectives of two oenologists, Palgé and Guiberteau, who were hired respectively by Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya, concerning the concept of quality in the vineyards. They were especially concerned with improving the quality and quantity of the grapes sourced from vineyard owners in Kefraya and elsewhere in the Bekaa Valley. Central to their objectives was to terminate the use of *Cinsault* grapes grown in Kefraya, which were thought to produce low quality table wines. While Palgé had commenced this project as far back as 1993, the repercussions of these strategies continue to be far-reaching and will be considered in terms of the types of contracts forged with vineyard owners in Kefraya and beyond, examining those who were willing to comply with expectations to maintain certain types of grape varieties.

2: Thematic Contributions

In the following pages I provide a selective literature review of the themes that are central to the analytical framework of this thesis. This is my main point of departure: I aim to explore the reproduction of certain wine-related practices, practices that fall into categories that bring forth ideas of exclusivity—or in Bourdieu’s terminology, a sense of distinction (1984). In so doing, I set the pretext for asking this question: what are the characteristics of wine associated with a motivation and desire to participate in its commodity production that appear to be specific to the case of Lebanon?

Visions of Lebanon

The historian Kamal Salibi notes that “when speaking historically of Lebanon, past or present”, there is no “one historical script relating to a fully coherent body of territory and population” (1988: 4). On one level, Salibi is referring quite literally to how the regions that currently make up modern Lebanon did not all belong to the same Ottoman administrative unit (*wilaya*). Thus, unlike the urban notables known as the *a’yān* of the Syrian cities of Damascus and Aleppo, who were the primary *multazims* (tax collectors) for rural regions that encompassed sections of the Bekaa Valley and north Lebanon, the Mount Lebanon Emirate “fiefdom” was organized through a system of contracts between the “*muqata’ji*, *mudabbirs* (lords’ assistant), farmers and peasants, which were all mediated by the Maronite church”(Ghazzal, 2007: 9; see also Chevallier, 1971; Harik, 1968; Hourani, 1994; Traboulsi, 2007).

On another level, however, Salibi's comments regard how different political visions of contemporary Lebanon utilize a particular understanding of the country's complicated past as a means to explain and justify more recent events and identities (1988 & 2003 & see Hudson, 1985). Salibi's critique, which seems to be aimed at the country's political and economic elites—as well as its historiographers—is somewhat circular in that he concludes by setting up his own view of Lebanon's past. Nevertheless, his observations raise two pertinent, dialectically related issues that will be continuously picked up upon throughout this thesis that concern the relationship between how one perceives one's positionality in the world and the production of particular kinds of knowledge.

One issue is concerned with how a certain understanding of the past might shape the reality of the present. There is therefore, substantial currency in thinking critically about historical process and how social relations within certain contexts may contribute towards the production of that history (Davis, 1989 & 1992). On one hand, the writing of history can be presented as linear and attached to an awareness that contemporary circumstances are cumulative, namely in the way that people become knowledgeable about certain types of activities over time, such as the “experienced magicians and gardeners in the Trobriands” or the “pruners and wine-makers in southern Italy” (1992:17). On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that history is not just written but also *made* through the way people interpret and perceive past events, not to mention how this may influence future decisions.

In this light, Saree Makdisi's observations concerning a fixation in contemporary Lebanon, upon a pre-war past and that they should be perceived as a kind “fetishized desire,” resonate quite strongly throughout this thesis (2006). Makdisi suggests that this “fetishized desire” is materialised through an active engagement with,

for example, black and white photographs and post cards depicting images from the era before 1979 and represents a way to come to terms with trauma by filling in gaps of periods people do not want to remember. This thesis begins to explore how this sense of “fetishized desire” to rebuild an idea of the past might also be one of building a particular kind of future intertwined with the motivation to produce and engage in the production of wine. In so doing, this thesis considers how the making of wine and other grape derived products in Lebanon might be able to establish a sense of cultural continuity precisely because of their historical resonance (Zubaida, 2000 & Tapper, 2000). At the same time, with a stronger focus on the sphere of production-as opposed to the consumption we can also begin to examine how the choice to grow vines might also reflect geological and environmental factors that are result of on-going human interaction (Braudel, 2012 & 1982; Purcell & Horden, 2000; Allan, 2000).

In so doing, I adopt an approach similar to Tomich’s understanding of Braudel’s *longue durée* as a continuous and uneven process of long gradual change (“temporal movement is produced through very slow, almost geological, societal interaction with geography and environment over the very long term”) (Tomich, 2012: 10& Braudel, 2012). Like Tomich, the exercise here is to redeploy the concept of the *longue durée*—and the very long *longue durée*—through the lens of mid-term and short-term social temporalities in an attempt to develop an analysis of the interaction of humans and their environment. The point here is that such an exploration of changes in the modes of wine production of Lebanon can hopefully elucidate how social transformation is at once both cumulative and instigated by agency. In other words, as Wallerstein points out, just as with a world-systems approach, Braudel’s notion of the *longue durée* does not imply an eternal and ever-lasting historical era, but an “organic” historical system

that entails a particular understanding of the world and which must ultimately come to an end (2002).

Following Wallerstein, I thus situate the emergence of the Lebanese wine industry within a capitalist world-system characterised by a certain kind of historical system (Wallerstein, 2002). This type of historical system is one that operates on “repeated cyclical rhythms of expansion and contradictions,” and with “secular trends of development” (Wallerstein, 1979: 390). Such historical processes contrast with those of world-empires, which are characterised by “one long history of expansion and integration” (ibid.). Notably, there is considerable debate concerning the point at which the Ottoman Empire was incorporated into the capitalist world-system (e.g. ibid, Mundy, 2007; Mundy & Smith, 2007; Islamaglu-Inan, 1987 & 2004). However, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. This is because the apogee of the *modernization* of wine production in Lebanon seems to have occurred during the mid-nineteenth century, which was a time when the region had already been integrated into a world market economy. Yet it is also important to bear in mind that in the region constituting modern-day Lebanon, the production of silk for the market emerged during the seventeenth century due to the role of the “merchant” Emir Fakhr al-Din Ma’n (Traboulsi, 2007).

A second issue that arises is thus concerned with the extent to which “written” historical knowledge can actually reflect social reality and how it might influence it. Especially salient here is what Lee observes as a shift in the demarcation, or at best, a separation of different bodies of knowledge into two distinct domains: facts and societal/morals/values (Lee, 2007; 2012). That is, the (re)production of “facts”—the authoritative form of knowledge—occurs through the scientific disciplines associated with discovering, uncovering, and transforming nature (2007: 2). Notably, entangled

with the type of scientific knowledge required in the transformation of environment is a particular understanding of the economy that is also classified within the realm of the factual. This form of economic rationality emerges out of the neo-classical models proceeding from Adam Smith's treatise of the *Wealth of Nations* (Smith, 1982; Hart & Hann, 2010). How can value given to scientific knowledge and to those who possess such expertise influence perspectives and experiences of the world? In attempting to explore these issues, I start by drawing from Stirling's model for mapping out social change (1974 & 1993 & Hann, 1994). Stirling suggests four types of changes to look for when conducting research, which are shifts in: social relations, knowledge and beliefs, value, and the general circumstances of a society. While these changes overlap and are interrelated, my main interest in this thesis is to map out modifications in the forms of knowledge that are of value in the production of wine in Lebanon.

Notably, the advent of the modern wine industry in Lebanon appears to be tangential to the growing importance of Beirut as a significant urban centre during the mid-nineteenth century and in conjunction with changing urban-rural relations at that time (e.g. Traboulsi, 2007; Burke III, 1988 Baer, 1982) We thus need to understand how the kinds of capitalist relations that emerged and dominated economic activities during Beirut's transformation facilitated rural change that would "delimit the space" in which other forms and activities could come into existence-including wine production (Pratt, 1994: 6).

The Elitist Tradition of the Chateau

Notably, it was during the mid-nineteenth century that the "embryonic" mercantile-financial elite of Beirut began to grow significantly due to increasingly shared

economic interests with the Europeans (particularly French) in the region—and especially in relation to sericulture and the trade thereof (Gates, 1998: 16). Given this apparent shift in economic interests, which aspects of wine production were so appealing for investment by certain elites?

Keeping in mind such types of European alliances in the region, it is useful to begin this section by pointing out that it might be significant that the term “elite,” as a social category, is prominent in histories of the *ancien régime* of Europe—and especially France (Williams, 1985 & Marcus, 1983). While the term shifted in meaning during the eighteenth century, when it went from conveying the idea of a group who were elected by God to denoting high-ranking feudal status, and then again in the nineteenth century, when it became more oriented towards class power, the notion of an elite has the potential to evoke much older ideals of nobility and aristocracy (ibid). One especially important work that addresses such issues, with which I enter into dialogue throughout this thesis, is Ulin’s ethno-historical study of hierarchies in French wine production (1996; 1995; 1988; 2002). Ulin explores the historical relationship between broader political and economic processes and elite growers in France, who have come to monopolize production as well as local and international wine markets, arguing that their historicity should be situated within the emergence of the world market during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. For example, the term “chateau”, used in French wine-growing, was chosen as an architectural model so that elite proprietors were able “to distinguish themselves culturally from the masses” (Ulin, 1996: 54). Yet most of the wine chateaux of Bordeaux built during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (post-French revolution) were small-scale replicas of those constructed during pre-revolutionary France. There was, in this regard, no *real* connection to the nobility of

France's *ancien régime*, and as such these forms were, as Ulin argues, an invented or selective tradition (c.f. Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1992; Williams, 1973).

This incorporation of the chateau into wine production evokes a hierarchical connection to place that, over time, has come to be the generally accepted and most replicated model. As I argue in this thesis, this model is not only of importance in France, but also in Lebanon, where it serves as one of the pre-requisites for entry into the international high-quality wine markets. However, the replication of the chateau, surrounded by vineyards, does not necessarily imply cultural homogeneity amongst wine producers who emulate such forms associated with high-quality wines. Rather, as Ulin suggests, these practices are indicative of a “market culture”, as opposed to a “market society”. This is because the former suggests “differentiated and even discordant social assumptions and practices”, whereas the latter does not (Ulin, 2002: 691). Significantly, such a critique might also imply that there is no need to assume the universality—or homogeneity—of particular class categories; allowing instead for an exploration of the heterogeneity and diversity of practices of status and rank in local contexts (Hall, 1988 & 1986; Yanagisako, 2002; Sider, 1998). From such a stance, dominant ideas can be understood as part of a process of creating cultural hegemony, where the capacity of an *elite* group to create and reproduce diverse conceptions of reality, through an intricate layering of social structures in both *immaterial* and *material* dimensions, is always implicit (Gramsci, 1971). What sort of historical links, we must then ask, are therefore evoked in Lebanon, where it is apparent that similar architectural models exist and are utilized by urban elites in rural regions such as Kefraya?

Gilsenan's ethnographic exploration of narratives of power in the Berqayl village of Akkar, in north Lebanon, might offer a useful starting point from which to consider the social cogency of local elite categories in Kefraya and Lebanese wine production

more generally (1996). For Gilsenan, narratives are not simply recounted through speech but are communicated via performances, moves, and gestures that are able to reproduce cultural norms or generate change; thus the enactment of narratives is just as important as their content. At the same time, narratives are perceived as “variations on and framed within master narratives of history, of the nature of the community in space and time, of hierarchy, identity and place in the world” (Gilsenan, 1996: 60). Gilsenan suggests that in the case of Berqayl, narratives often centred on ideas concerning qualities of virtue and the “due and worth” associated with men from different social ranking.

A significant aspect of Gilsenan’s perspective of narrative is the concept of “status-honour”, where displays of prominence and influence by powerful men were often articulated through performances (Gilsenan, 1984 & 1996). Such displays of status-honour usually took place during celebrations in “the chateau or villa in the countryside”, or in ornate apartments in urban settings, and helped “reproduce and produce” notions of personal authority and status while also enforcing their right to monopoly privileges over resources such as land (1984: 462). In so doing, the evocation of historical continuity reasserted social and economic power, while simultaneously *concealing* how changing spatial divides between urban and rural often came about beyond the direct influence of local elites (ibid: 460).

Broadly speaking, Gilsenan’s take on status-honour as part of Akkar’s “*histoire mentalités*” is an interesting approach to understanding the interrelatedness of cumulative forces of historical process and the extent to which an idea of the past can shape and inform the development of the future. This future includes decisions, actions, and an understanding of the past. Given the importance of wine production in regions

such as Kefraya, which specific tropes of wine offer such a sense of historical continuity in the process of social transition and change? In providing a pretext for historical continuity, has wine production contributed to the establishment of a relationship between urban and rural regions, such as Beirut and Kefraya, in new ways? Finally, what particular relations of power and hierarchical notions of personal authority and status-honour might be distinctive to wine production, and which were reproduced within the village of Kefraya?

Similarly to Cohen's observations about the dramaturgical legitimization process of Sierra Leone's elite Creole community, Gilsenan also demonstrates how narratives of men of power sought "to establish that deeds were commensurate with claims, actions congruent with words, appearances matching with reality" (ibid: 60 & Cohen, 1981). In contrast to Cohen however, Gilsenan shows that narratives of local categories tell us about the social potencies of different elites within Berqayl, and show that these have been continuously shaped by their connection to social networks outside of the village. For example, the status and influence of the *bey* (lord) derives mostly from his political and economic links to urban centres such as Beirut and Tripoli. Although initially they were not the legal proprietors of the land, but were, rather, tax agents for the Ottoman administration, the "lords of the marches" were still effectively the possessors of the land. That is, their influence was expressed through powerful "symbolic markers", such as their fortress-palaces, hunting, and horsemanship. Meanwhile, their *aghas* played the role of supervising and controlling the land and labour.

Exploring this historical dimension of Berqayl's social hierarchy, Gilsenan shows how the interaction between the *bey* and *aghas* continuously reaffirmed and reproduced

their different elite statuses in the village. Notably, while the relationship between these two different elite groups was constantly shaped by other, broader processes of power—such as the region’s shift to a market economy during the late nineteenth century—the persistence of such local categories, which still denoted rank when Gilsenan arrived in Berqayl during the 1970s, suggests that such elites groups have succeeded in securing their dominance over long periods of time. I will explore the dynamics involved in this reproduction of status in further detail later in this chapter, but here it will be useful to raise some general questions pertaining to the relationship between Kefraya village and the Lebanese wine industry. What kind of local categories in Kefraya village might reflect similar social dynamics to those in Berqayl—including the interplay between more local and broader flows of power? For example, while it is apparent that Michael de Bustros has played an influential role in shaping the viticulture landscape of Kefraya, what terminologies might be used to describe his status, both in Kefraya and beyond? These questions I explore in Chapter Four.

Methods of the Elites

More generally, studying elites can throw up certain methodological issues that might initially appear rather challenging to any anthropological endeavour. After all, as Shore aptly illustrates, perhaps with some degree of humour, “one cannot simply pitch one’s tent in the board room of the World Bank or the Pentagon, or unobtrusively observe the bargains being struck at a European Council Minister’s meeting” (Shore, 2002: 23). Nugent has argued that even within more accessible settings one is still faced with having to identify different flows of power that do not necessarily originate at a local

level (2002). In his study of Amazonian elites, for example, the topic must be understood, “not as a fixed feature of the social landscape” but instead incidentally shaped by the flows of power in the world system (2002: 63). Such a methodological framework thus facilitates a more nuanced discussion, concerned with what Nugent describes as the “institutional conditions under which elites are socially reproduced” (ibid: 61).

Such a perspective also resonates with Marcus’ observation that, through analysis, the notion of elites can be differentiated from other concepts like class and state because of the way that “it focuses one’s imagery at a much lower level of abstraction than do the latter terms” (1983: 8; and for further discussion and debate: Cohen, 1981; Pareto, 1979; Marx 2000). Adopting such an approach for studying elites can thus allow for power—and the responsibilities adjacent to that power—to be associated with particular persons or groups, rather than attributing it to the “impersonal” of social and historical processes (Marcus, 1983 & Shore, 2002). That is, the notion of an “elite” might conjure up ideas of “‘agency,’ ‘exclusivity,’ ‘power,’” thus elucidating how—and to some extent why—particular individuals and groups are distinguished from the masses due to certain distinctive practices and their associated qualities (Shore, 2002: 4 & Bourdieu, 1984). Yet as both Shore and Marcus suggest, it is only through a comparative and historical approach that we can more fully explore the extent of the influence of such elite strategies. Such methodological approaches to studying elites thus draws attention to the way that usages of language and other forms of representation reveal ranks and categories of status that might reinforce social stratification at both the local and global level (Shore, 2002 & Marcus, 1983). Indeed, Nugent has suggested that, rather than attempting to identify what constitutes as an elite *per se*, it would be more beneficial to document—historically and

ethnographically—“what passes as the local category/categories, or examination of the conditions which make possible (or preclude) the emergence of that category as socially potent” (ibid).

It is apparent that while ethnographic accounts of elites use participant-observation in order to explore the prevalence of particular ideas of affluence, there is also a tendency to rely heavily upon other qualitative methods such as interviewing and archival research. Nevertheless, they are still able to gain some intimate and unique insights about the heterogeneity of elite groups. For example, Lomnitz and Pérez-Lizaur’s meticulous ethno-historical study of the elite entrepreneurial Gomez family of Mexico that was based on a combination of extensive archival research and interviews, and these highlights a somewhat tentative relationship between patriarchal sentiment for autonomy and succession and economic action (1987). In particular, their research sheds light on how the Gomez family negotiated and compromised with other business elites, such as members of multinational corporations, to uphold influence and status in Mexico.

Another useful example is the study of the “good families of Barcelona” by McDonogh who integrates archival research and interviewing into his fieldwork. In so doing, he explores the “the interplay of historical consciousness and historical materials” in terms of how ideas and images of elites that were reproduced required efforts in both private and public settings (1986:14). For instance, regarding how oral histories discuss affective labour, or “domestic power”, and the role of women’s labour in the reproduction of the elite status of these Catalan families (ibid: 14). In this regard, McDonogh’s study brings to the fore an especially relevant issue concerning immaterial and material contributions to the propagation of elite power. I will pursue the theoretical thread of this inquiry concerning the material and immaterial in further

detail later on in this chapter, but for now it is important to draw attention to the specific advantages of incorporating archival research and interviewing into my methodological framework, especially in terms of elucidating the more subtle nuances of elite practices. Indeed, I have utilized the methodologies of both McDonogh and Lomnitz and Pérez-Lizaur in my research when exploring how expressions of particular historical perceptions come from a specific understanding of particular elite practices.

In Chapter Three, I trace the shifting practices of winemaking and grape growing across the Bekaa Valley's landscape during the mid-nineteenth-century, as French influence in the region grew. Similarly to McDonogh, I make use of historical material and oral narratives in order to explore the reproduction of certain elite images and symbols of wine-making in Lebanon. Meanwhile, my observations in Chapters Four and Five parallel the conclusions drawn by Lomnitz and Pérez-Lizaur. This is especially so in regards to how the economic motivation for producing wine cannot necessarily be separated, analytically, from the patriarchal desire for succession and autonomy. The importance of such forms of kin-related sentiment in motivating both capitalist action and class-formations is of particular relevance in Chapter Five where I explore the relationship between family and work in the Cave Kouroum winery. I thus also make use of Yanagisako's ethnographic study of Italian family firms to explore how sentimental attachment to place has a role to play in "shaping production, reproduction and transformation of economic action" (2002:10).

Significantly the concept of "elite" can at times be fairly ambiguous and difficult to attribute to a particular group or certain persons. As Shore has observed, there is the tendency for certain types of elite networks to strategically conceal (and at times reveal) the extent of their privileged positions in order to generate influence (2002). Yet as I show in Chapter Six, such practices can also lead to ambiguity concerning the

boundaries of networks and membership, where the requisites for joining the UVL, Lebanon's wine business association, remain nebulous. These ambiguities help make the UVL an influential organization, since, as I also propose in Chapter Six, the involvement of the initial UVL founders in the writing and passing of the Lebanese wine law in 2000 suggests that their influence in shaping wine production extends beyond current UVL members. However, while this is indicative of their attempts to exert control over production, the role of the state as an officialising medium for wine production is in itself a pre-requisite for the export and the trade of Lebanese wines across the globe, and especially to Europe. Bearing this in mind, the important role of French oenologists working at prominent wineries brings to the fore once more the extent of the European influence in shaping contemporary wine production in Lebanon—a focus for Chapter Seven.

Patronage's Labyrinth

By broaching the topic of elites in anthropology, I feel that there are also certain issues I would like to raise concerned with how particular types of hierarchical relations, that, to borrow a phrase from Appadurai, have become “prestige zones of anthropology theory” (1986:358). In particular I refer to the anthropology of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, where studies of elites have mostly focused on patron-clientalism and/or systems of patronage, broadly defined as a “personalized, affective, and reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships” (Weingrod: 1977:42). The problem here is not necessarily that such approaches might be insignificant or provide inaccurate

representations of the region, but rather that there is a potential for the dialectical process of othering and self-making, derived from a “fundamental structural inequality” (Abu-Lughod, 1989:270 & more broadly, Bromberger, 2006).

Given this, such approaches have a tendency to make certain temporal assumptions about places; and the praxis that takes precedence is one that spatialises culture, fixing it in time—which is then confirmed as an empirical truth through the ethnographic present (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997). In the study of elites in the Mediterranean and Arab world(s), the issue especially regards how the prevalence of patronage is often used to gauge the extent to which different communities—and mostly those located within rural regions—have transitioned into a market society. Generally speaking, such perspectives tend to start with the proposition that “traditional” patron-client relations have hindered or contributed to the postponement of the marketization of communities across the region (e.g. Blok, 1969 & Campbell, 1964).

These observations can be extended to aspects of Johnson’s ethno-historical study of class relations amongst Beirut’s Sunni community from 1840 until 1985 (1986 & 2001). The main premise is that, in order to ensure post-independence, Lebanon remained stable for business investment from the mercantile elite, who developed a complex patronage system extending into Beiruti neighbourhoods. The local political bosses, or *zu’ama* (singular *zaim*), were able to assert and maintain their privileges through local political subservients known as the *qabadayat*, who monitor the streets, both ensuring law and order and controlling their patron’s clients. In turn, the political strength of the *zaim* was reaffirmed through family allegiances, and as members of the Lebanese parliament, they also had access to state patronage.

Johnson follows a system of kinship alliances up through the confessional political framework of the state to the position of prime minister, which is always held by a

Sunni Muslim—thus highlighting the pervasive role of Lebanon’s religious sectarianism in shaping hierarchical social relations. He observes, however, that the higher the *zaim* rose in state ranks, the greater the necessity for him to forge cross-sectarian alliances. Yet the growing presence of new regional actors during the 1960s and 1970s, (i.e. Nasserism and the effects of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war) led to broader reconfigurations of power and more local realignments of nationalist sentiment that resonated with the ideologies of Nasr’s Pan Arabism. The role of the *zaim* and his *qabayat* in controlling peoples’ daily activities in Beirut’s Sunni neighbourhoods therefore weakened, providing space for the violence of the civil war to persist. In conjunction with these events, the economic elite diverged business interests abroad, weakening both the *laissez-faire* state infrastructure and the cliental system.

While Johnson’s perspective provides interesting insights about the role of Beirut’s political and economic elites, his historical treatment of Lebanese society makes his approach reductionist. Johnson makes it clear early in his introduction that clientalism was indicative of a society where “capitalism had not yet transformed social relations by fully transforming the mode of production” (1986: 6). This leads him to draw various conclusions concerning, for example, the role of kinship and religion in forging social ties in Lebanese society. To elaborate further upon the problem I have with such assumptions, I turn to a more recent study by Johnson where he recounts his earlier perspective of Lebanon and quite rightly points out that his previous approach was too Marxist and structural in that the underlying basis for his argument drew upon the idea that the emergence of a proletariat class consciousness would eventually break down a traditional system of clientalism.

In an attempt to move away from this earlier approach, Johnson argues that the “development of capitalism undermined an order based on the inherited honour of

warrior lords” and gave rise to an “egalitarian ethic” where the *fellahin*, or peasant population of rural Mount Lebanon, possessed rights equal to their feudal lords—and this included the desire for honour and status associated with their patrons (2001:15). With the growing rebellions across Mount Lebanon, such as the Maronite *fellahin* uprisings of 1860, notions of honour became a significant aspect of the rights of men. The act of claiming that right, in a society where an “egalitarian ethic” became central to social practices and relations, was largely founded upon an intricate relationship between honour and feuding—one that also inadvertently maintained a sense of order in a highly competitive economy and an individualistic society. Johnson also points to a shift in gender relations characterised by the way that patriarchal honour was increasingly articulated through “the control of women [more] than the imposition of domination on lesser men” (ibid: 19). Here, much in way the Foucauldian panopticon functions, Johnson’s notion of “patriarchal surveillance” illuminates the internalization of discipline and the production of docile and gendered bodies.

Johnson continues to believe, however, that this sense of patronage is part of the *modernization* of Lebanon rather than a consequence of the process itself, assuming, once more, a universal (and homogenous) temporal framework for the development of a modern society. Indeed, despite retracting some earlier arguments, Johnson concludes his most recent account by suggesting that conflict in Lebanon can only end once there is further economic development towards a free and open economy without any system of patron client dependency. To elaborate upon this point, Johnson refers to the decades just after independence, where relative civic order and economic development prevailed and the urban mercantile-financial elite had direct control over the state. As the control of the business elite began to weaken in the years leading up to the war, so too did their grip over civic society. Violence became the norm, following the growing presence of

external political actors, and emotive motivations to protect the home—and homeland—and honour came to the fore. The weakening political (and economic power) of the mercantile oligarchy, according to Johnson, thus unleashed the (overly) emotional warrior from within the Lebanese male psyche so he could maintain his honour and seek vengeance when it was lost. Johnsons' analysis therefore remains as reductionist as it is essentialist in its approach, not least because of the assumption that kin-related sentiments, such as patriarchy or emotive motivation, remains separate—or stems—from outside of the (modern) economic sphere.

That is, such an approach to patronage can be reductionist due to a supposition of cultural homogeneity and universally-shared ideals and values. Or, as Goddard puts it, such studies have “long rested on the assumption of generalized and shared values of honour and shame” (1996:8). The demarcation of social life into distinctive spheres of politics, economics, and kinship thus limits a broader understanding of what Goddard stresses as the heterogeneity of capitalist processes. Graeber presents a similar critique, extending the focus to include Melanesian and Arab societies. Here, “men of honour” or “big men” are considered to be the main actors in the (re)production of certain “key values” during the “cosmological ritual”, and are further perceived as representing the society as a whole (2001:19). Like Goddard, Graeber suggests that in order for a perspective such as Johnson's to reach conclusions, they are almost forced “to make a strict division between ‘modern’ societies, in which people are individuals and seek economic values, and ‘holistic’ ones, in which they do not” (2001: 20). This perspective on the Mediterranean and Arab world is of course not restricted to Johnson's view on patronage. Gellner (1977) presents a similar view when describing how patron-client “unsymmetrical” relations are separate from economic

activities—and more specifically the market. Gellner argues that while economic relations might be exploitative, they are inherently impersonal, and therefore “hardly patronage”.

Patrons of Capital

It is important to point out that, while perspectives separating patronage from market relations may continue to persist in the knowledge production of Mediterranean and Arab societies, another line of enquiry has also emerged that is precisely concerned with how patronage can actually exacerbate the exploitative nature of class and labour relations. Most notably, Gilmore demonstrates quite convincingly how systems of patronage were used by large local proprietors known as *senioritos* (little lords) in Fuenmayor, Western Andalusia, as a strategy through which to secure political and economic resources (1977). In drawing such conclusions, an important point that Gilmore makes is that patronage systems might reflect local ideas of class and labour relations. Indeed Gilmore goes on to demonstrate how patronage can actually serve to not only personalise but also shape economic relations and decisions by establishing informal contracts and reciprocal obligations “between people of unequal status and power” (1977: 446; Silverman, 1965; Li Causi, 1981, Scott, 1977). By viewing patronage from such a stance, we can begin to see how these “imbalanced” reciprocal yet affective and emotive relations are more a part of current practices within capitalist economies than the likes of Johnson would have us believe.

I demonstrate in this thesis, it is precisely through the forging of implicit agreements and informal contracts that wine elites have managed to strengthen and

secure their influence over the social means of Lebanese wine production. Indeed, more recent work on the subject also demonstrates that patron-client relations are more commonplace than assumed within business institutions. This evokes the way in which Eric Wolf describes patronage as resulting from a process whereby “instrumental friendships” eventually reach a “maximum point of imbalance” due to political and/or economic superiority and the ability of one “partner” to provide goods and services to the other (1968:16). In particular, the edited volume by Haller and Shore on anthropological approaches to corruption offers some interesting perspectives on how patronage within neo-liberal market relations can serve to assert political and economic power—another point that I continuously explore throughout this thesis (2005).

This is especially so in terms of how such works on issues of corruption share some similarities to social analyses of the Arab world (including Lebanon) that frequently comment on the role of *wasta* in both business and bureaucratic networks. While *wasta* was not a term I heard a great deal during fieldwork, how it has been conceptualised within social theory is of relevance. “*Wasta*,” usually refers to one’s ability to use connections and privileges for particular purposes. At the same time, *wasta* is perceived as a phenomenon that is quite deeply entrenched in daily life; and as Joseph remarks, “without *wasta* one gets nowhere” and “without *wasta* there is little belonging” (1999: 67). Sharabi describes *wasta* as the “lubricant” of the patronage systems in the Arab world, serving as a form of social cohesion in that everyone has something to gain (1988).

Here, *wasta* acts as a mechanism where the “bestower of favour” gains the most, while still allowing the lower and “most impotent” of the system to operate within such frameworks of power (1988: 46). Such notions of *wasta* in relation to systems of patronage thus resonate with observations concerned with the nebulous

nature of corruption within business network. And this is especially in relation to how issues of non-transparency that surround ideas of corruption and *wasta* draw our attention to the kinds of tensions that are rife in the way business networks (West & Sanders, 2003). Indeed as Zinn notes, “opaque” characteristics such as friendship and nepotism usually associated with patron relations are now used to describe forms of corruption that tend to occur within business relations (2005). She further suggests that by exploring the motivation to join such official networks, there is also the possibility to consider the power dynamics behind the processes of inclusion (and exclusion) from such alliances.

In this light, it is also useful to briefly draw attention to Boissevain’s network analysis of patrons and “friends of friends” (1974 & 1979). There are of course some apparent issues with network analyses in that there is a tendency to portray those involved in forging alliances and transactions as somewhat anonymous and ahistorical, and therefore without much room for an understanding of the more intimate dynamics between status and power (Cohen, 1977, Miller, 2002). Nevertheless, as an “analytical instrument,” network analysis can generate some understanding concerning with what Boissevain describes as the “difficult analytical category of friends-of-friends, those persons who lie just beyond the researcher’s horizon because they are not in direct contact with his informants” (1979: 393 & Callon, 1998).

In some ways, Boissevain’s application of network analysis as an attempt to take into account the social significance of actors who are—usually for practical reasons—out of reach for the ethnographer, is reminiscent of Shore’s comment brought up in the previous section concerning the challenges to studying elite. In this respect, Boissevain’s approach offers a broader lens for exploring the ways different relatives, friends, religious groups and coalitions might be linked, albeit at times hierarchically, to

one another. For example, in Chapter Six I explore how patron networks characterise at least some aspects of how entrepreneurial wine elites—where some are also prominent businessmen in transnational business corporations—attempt to negotiate with both the state and international wine organizations. In so doing, I draw attention to how the wine business coalition formed by the certain wine elites serves to secure their interests and retain status and influence at both local and global levels.

Handwerk or Commodity Fetishism?

The discussion thus far has focused mostly on the social significance of local classifications of rank and status and on the types of performances and displays of wealth that are associated with elitist ideas. Further exploration would therefore be beneficial for understanding the arrangements of such types of performative exchanges, and also the way value is ascribed in such contexts to certain “props” that are utilized during such performances, including the prestige of particular objects, artefacts, goods, and “things” associated with such events and certain types of elites. Upon briefly establishing the thematic approach that I am adopting to explore the way value is ascribed to prestige goods, I will proceed to discuss issues more specifically in relation to wine.

Appadurai associates luxury goods with elite groups who are responsible for influencing a refined taste of consumption through the construction of specialised bodies of knowledge and the manipulation of notions of scarcity by means of price setting and/or law; they thus establish “regimes of value” (ibid). He argues that such social goods are “*incarnate* with signs”, where their function and necessity are

predominantly “rhetorical” and “political” (1988: 38 & more broadly of anthropological discussions of prestige goods: Bohannans, 1968).

This aspect of Appadurai’s perspective is especially useful in terms of exploring both the rhetorical use of certain goods and the way such items are perceived as exclusive to a particular elite within any given society. However, his overemphasis on consumption and the “social life” of goods as they undergo different regimes of value as well as assuming an *a priori* of economic rationalism dictating all kinds of exchanges (including those that exist outside of capitalist market relations) overlooks the political and rhetorical role of production—and this is both in terms of the production of certain goods as well as the ideas that ascribe a particular value to such luxury goods (see Graeber, 2001 & Callon, 1998). Generally speaking, this has to do with Graeber’s critique concerning how Appadurai’s adoption of Bourdieu’s approach to gift-exchanges dismisses the significance of what the latter describes as “symbolic capital” (Graeber, 2001: 32). That is, the uniqueness of such types of goods has to do with the way they have managed to “accumulate a history” (Graeber, 2001:34; c.f. Kopytoff, 1988; Mauss, 1990). Not all exchanges are therefore necessarily about the acquisition of prestige goods, but can also be about securing certain *prestige ideas*; that is: “establishing one’s honor, or generosity, or of putting a rival to shame” (ibid).

Nevertheless, Appadurai rightly points out that to appreciate such historicity and tradition, just as knowing how to decant an aged wine and to reciprocate accordingly, represents a certain aesthetic disposition. And, underlying such symbolic competence is a form of economic power attempting to create distance from that deemed to be economic necessity (Bourdieu, 1984: 54). The “disinterested gaze” is thus an important feature, in that it acts to disguise the real value of economic necessity by reproducing

the conditions required for the continuation of this aesthetic disposition. For example, while the chateau in southwest France might evoke a romantic image of an aristocrat residing (and not working) in his domain, as peasants work their lands from one generation to the next, in reality such chateaux are usually owned by multinational corporations (Ulin, 1996). After all, the “powerful symbolic association” of the chateau evokes images of a rustic countryside that Ulin demonstrates to embody subliminal commercial benefits within *seemingly* less strategic (and more seductive) cultural forms (1996: 55). Yet the marketing of such invented traditions also conceals histories of hierarchical labour-relations as well as the establishment of cooperatives by table-wine growers attempting to compete in the wine market (ibid.). Broadly speaking therefore, unlike mass-produced commodities, wine can conjure up, for example, images of a landscape, of a chateau and vineyard—an image that fits closely with ideas of aristocracy and nobility more than business and trade (e.g. Ulin, 1996).

Whilst seemingly situated outside the market, the commodity production of wine appears however, to operate according to Smithian economic principles regarding scarcity and market prices. That is, the market price for a product remains closely aligned with its natural price, until scarcity occurs in the availability of labour and/or the product, resulting in a disparity between the two (Smith, 1982). Yet, like Quesnay and Turgot, the founding fathers of the Physiocrats, Smith argued that wealth began with the productivity of agriculture—and more specifically from the potentiality of the land (Gudeman, 1986; & Meek, 2009). Agricultural production, as Marx argues, thus appears as a “gift of nature” rather than of labour, thus paving the way for the (re)production of capital (Marx, 2000). Indeed, as Pratt observes, the economic organization surrounding the production of wine and various other agricultural goods

aims to manipulate such notions of scarcity through marketing strategies that link the wine with intimate “biographies” of its production (1994: 155). The notion of a scarcity of natural resources—a gift from nature—thus has the potential to transform into a cultural norm, evoking, once more, ideas of distinction, authenticity, and tradition.

There is, in this regard, something to be said about the transformative value of craftsmanship in the production of wine. This has already been documented by Black, who draws a correlation between the way *handwerk* is perceived by Benjamin to pre-date anonymous capitalist production but could also potentially redeem it and the way the contemporary natural wine movement seeks to reject industrialisation by limiting the use of technology in their production of wines, both in the vineyards and winery (2013). Black’s analysis sheds interesting light upon the way nature is not only perceived, but also how notions of nature (and technology) are negotiated in both spheres production and consumption, in order to define wine as natural. Yet Benjamin’s allegorical narrative of craftsmanship can perhaps be extended to the way wine in general possesses potentially powerful symbolic qualities as a “prestige good”. That is, the prestige value attributed to wine is derived from its potential to converge both spheres of production and consumption precisely because of the way it has been endowed with qualities evoking “non-reproducible authenticity” that are associated with craftsmanship (Leslie, 1998; Benjamin, 2003). In other words, wine potentially carries with it a ritualized potential to “negate” and “repudiate” the “unattractive institutional forces” of capitalism (Miller, 1998:193).

Indeed, as Black observes, despite the fact that the natural wine movement might be “an ill-defined and rag-tag movement,” a strong motivation for its producers and consumers is “to *reconnect* agriculture with craftsmanship” (2013: 280 & 293. My

emphasis). That is to say, a presumption seemingly held by members of the natural wine movement is that, prior to industrialisation, producers were intimately linked to production precisely because wine-making is perceived to have been at its closest to natural processes at that time. However, Black also suggests that the emphasis placed upon the importance of knowing which individual producers are within the natural wine movement is somewhat paradoxical. This is because, simultaneously, it is a variant of wine marketing strategies attempting to evoke differentiation and distinction. It is especially in this light that a significant aspect of the value of wine derives from its ability to appear outside of commodity production, and instead within the realm of “art and luxury” (Bourdieu, 1984: 52; c.f. Ulin, 1996: 55). For wine to achieve a status of distinction, it must be able to successfully carry artisanal life histories that are intimately connected not only to agriculture but also to land. Where this is the case, wine also has the potential to generate dominant discourses of value concerning work, identity and also locality. Yet as Black and Ulin both point out, while such discourse of wine might seek to forge intimate connections between *handwerk*, agriculture, land and locality, such relationships more often than not exist only in theory.

Similarly, Demoissier has observed that in the case of Burgundy, despite investment from international companies such as AXA insurance, there initially appears to have been little affect upon the “social configuration of the place” (2013: 185). Indeed, such investors have often assisted in both offering employment for locals and attempts to “keep everything as it was” (ibid). Indeed, Demoissier goes on to demonstrate that globalization and transnational practices have affected the production of Burgundian high quality *grands crus* wines. Producers are not only faced with having to ensure that their wines suit consumer trends, but must also compete with New

World wine producers such as New Zealand and the U.S. This was despite the fact that the international companies were keen to stress that their activities would have minimal effect on local life. In some respects, the apparent objective of such investors echoes Black's observations concerning the artisanal value placed on wine. And as Demoissier points out, such statements draw attention to the entanglement of global forces and work identities in Burgundy that were "above all compounded by its essentialization in public discourse with the figure of the *vigneron* as an artisan and artist dominating the field of action" (ibid: 184). Yet it was precisely this process of labour abstraction (i.e. alienation) that also advertently facilitated the fetishization of winemakers and their toil as artisanal worker (ibid & Ulin, 2013).

Regarding this, we should also note that while Demoissier elucidates the way such an emphasis upon work-related practices can potentially reduce the value of other important factors in the production of wine, such as soil and climate in Burgundy, her methodological focus on the notion of *terroir* demonstrates the enduring entanglement of both human and non-human factors in the production of wine. Generally, the notion of *terroir* refers to the geological and geographical characteristics of a particular place (Vaudour, 2002). Although the notion of *terroir* is based upon scientific and empirical research, its epistemological foundations and contemporary usages in wine production are as inherently political as they are rhetorical (ibid.; Black & Ulin, 2013). That is, the meaning of *terroir* shifts depending upon the ways in which humans and non-humans are linked together.

While this thesis only provides minimal attention to the notion of *terroir* until the conclusion, this is simply because the term was only mostly brought up by the French oenologists working at Chateau Ksara and Kefraya (a focus for Chapter Seven).

In this regard, the term remains important mostly because of the way it draws attention to the important role of such oenologists and in connection to the way some features of wine function similarly to what Sperber refers to as “biological cultural artifacts” (2007). That is, the repeated performance of certain biological and/or natural traits qualifies the transformation (and fermentation) of grapes into a cultural artefact is recognised as wine (ibid.). In this light, the value of wine does not solely come from the transformative potential of grapes: importance is also placed upon the combination of certain natural resources where both human and non-human factors are associated with a particular place. The ability to successfully combine the necessary natural features thus requires workers who have both specialised and practical knowledge of the industry. In other words, significant value is given to those who possess an intimate understanding of market dynamics—and thus also to the importance of manipulating symbolic qualities during the production of wine. That is to say, what is important is the capacity to forge a connection between the marketing of wine and the relations of production (MacKenzie, Muniesa, Siu, 2007).

More broadly, such characteristics of wine are shared with other cultural commodities produced under contemporary capitalism, where significant social and economic value is derive from the ability and capacity to generate capital through commerce, trade and other forms of service-based labour. Such forms of immaterial labour thus also included activities that were not perceived as work *per se*, but perceived as activities defining and fixing cultural tastes and norms and also creating niches markets for cultural commodities (Lazzarato, 1996; Hardt & Negri, 2001; Harvey, 2009, see also Ong & Collier, 2008). Similarly to Ulin, Harvey argues that such cultural commodities have a tendency to invoke notions of cultural authenticity

and tradition by evoking historical links to the past—especially in terms of their aesthetic value—which are of special importance to urban entrepreneurs seeking to accumulate surplus-value (2009). Two forms of monopoly rent thereby intersect. On the one hand there is the land, recognized for producing distinctive wines augments in value. On the other hand there is the wine produced from that land, which can also be traded for monopoly prices. An “economy of qualities” thus emerges, whereby goods such as wine must undergo a qualification process whereby they are attached with intimate biographies (Callon, Me’adel & Rabehariso, 2008).

The globalisation of specialised labour, required in the production of wine and other such cultural commodities, is vital in guaranteeing that the “special qualities” attributed to such goods during production do not prevent it from meeting the requirements of tradability. Such experts are not only valued for their technological knowledge in creating such goods, but also for their ability to establish a distinctive label for that product that can bring forth notions of historical continuity. Yet what particular kinds of specialised workers are essential in this type of production process? And when and how did they gain ascendance in global wine markets? And how does the value of these types of workers, such as oenologists but also entrepreneurs, inadvertently devalue the skills of other workers? These questions are explored in Chapter Seven, where I examine the role of French oenologists in shaping Lebanese viticulture.

While the importance of specialised workers is considered in the final chapter of this thesis, for now it is important to draw attention to how their employment reflects an extension of “the strategy of the trademark”: an attempt by wineries in Lebanon to gain monopoly privileges (Pratt, 1994: 155). In Chapter Six, I consider collaborative efforts

by such wineries as they engage with the state and supra-national organizations in attempts both to create a niche in the global wine market and retain their monopoly positions I ask how the knowledge possessed by both types of experts—entrepreneurs and oenologists—give more value than other locally-based forms of rural knowledge and what the social ramifications of this expertise are. These questions set the pretext for Chapters Four and Five, as well as Chapter Three, where I trace the emergence of such types of expertise to nineteenth-century Lebanon.

Arcadian or Agrarian Landscapes?

The previous section has drawn attention to Ulin's observations that the process of fetishization of both wine (the product) and its production has contributed towards the elevation in status of oenologists and various other specialised workers, rendering other more itinerant workers as invisible, or at best, misrepresented (2013 & more broadly Mintz, 1986). Yet what can this apparent process of fetishization surrounding the social relations of wine production tell us about Lebanon?

Gilsenan's perspective is perhaps reminiscent once more with regards to the way that status-honour can be used as a lens to explore how labour relations are viewed and, more specially, the way negative value is inadvertently ascribed to manual labour (1996, 1984 & Gilmore, 1982). Indeed links constructed between a chateau and its domain, and the creation of an aesthetically pleasing viticulture landscape, can, like the displays of status-honour, potentially—and somewhat paradoxically—valorise processes of immaterial labour such as marketing over manual work, placing the latter

against the background of the landscape and reducing its importance in the production of wine (Ulin, 1996).

While it is apparent that status-honour and wealth are directly linked in that each is conversely reproduced through elaborate ceremonies, these ritualised events of leisure have also created a distance between these elite patrons and the necessity of work — and especially manual work. Such economic distancing resonates with Bourdieu's notion of distinction and the process whereby “the 'pure', 'disinterested' disposition to the conditions which make it possible, i.e., the material conditions of existence which are rarest because most freed from economic necessity” (1984: 55). That is, the influence of these men of power came about from their ability to appear free from the necessity of work. Such displays of status-honour might appear to be inseparable from leisure; yet given that such performances functioned as a means to legitimize their right to monopoly, privileges, and resources, this demonstrates how such performances were constituted and informed by labour and property relations. Thus, given the apparent role of the urban entrepreneurial elite in contemporary wine production in Lebanon, what might the concept of status-honour tell us about the way work relations are currently viewed, practiced and valued in Kefraya and beyond? More pertinently perhaps, how can the notion of status-honour allow us to explore the broader implications of the potential valorisation process of immaterial labour in Lebanese wine production?

It is also important to bear in mind that elsewhere, Ulin adopts Arendt's approach to work, arguing that the concept of “labour,” especially from an overly Marxist perspective, has the potential to limit an anthropological enquiry because “it fails to take account of the culturally and politically formative potentials of work”

(2002: 693 & Arendt, 1998). This is because the concept of labour suggests both instrumentality and a human existence based solely upon the “technical demands of subsistence and human needs” (ibid). Whereas, in contrast, the concept of work has the ability to take into account the social process by which particular kinds of identities and relations are produced as something culturally defined. I do however feel that delving too deeply into this discussion is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless I also think that Arendt’s distinctions amongst the concepts of work and labour as well as the performative qualities of action (as opposed to fabrication), remain useful to bear in mind whilst reading this thesis not least because of how it can allow us to potentially rethink the overly rigid distinction made by Hardt and Negri between material and immaterial labour (2001). In this light, Gilson’s notion of status-honour might also allow us to think further of the relationships between labour, work and action and thus ultimately away from overly structural Marxist approaches. I will attempt to further explore some of these issues in the conclusion of this thesis.

In this light, it is important to point out in this final section that one of the major issues with Marxist analyses of capitalist agricultural production regard the way in which they tend to combine a study of the relations of production with a linear historical perspective on the “development of productive forces” (Pratt, 1994: 12). Such approaches pose particular problems for understanding how non-wage labour may actually be a direct result of the expansion of capitalist markets rather than a precursor to them. Federici makes a similar argument, by starting with the suggestion that primitive accumulation did not instigate capitalism, but was instead a product of it (2004). In some respects her argument is similar to Harvey’s argument concerning accumulation by dispossession, in that the basis for the proliferation and expansion of

capitalist markets is the process of expropriation and the production of scarcity through land privatisation (2003). Yet a central aspect to Federici's thesis is that, in the process of primitive accumulation, the reification of the notion of the family unit serves to displace increasing practices of communalism, and becomes a "key institution" for the state in the monitoring of the "transmission of property and reproduction of work" (ibid: 87). In doing so, primitive accumulation gendered, marginalized and concealed affective work (immaterial labour), effectively situating it outside of wage labour. While Federici's analysis might not necessarily be chronological, in that there are other preceding works that explore the consequential transformations of peasant households under capitalist agricultural production, it nevertheless covers significant ground concerning the basis from which these subsequent changes could occur.

An especially relevant ethnography of this kind is the reflexive study by Gudeman and Rivera of shifting models of place in rural Colombia (1990). Gudeman and Rivera use the metaphor of a conversational community to highlight the long and on-going relationship between the household economic models of rural Colombia and "Western" corporations. The general thrust of their argument is that while such types of folk economic models might "echo" earlier European economic philosophies, they are nevertheless eventually displaced by more contemporary economic discourses and ever-encroaching corporations. Rural farmers are consequentially dispossessed and their lands are appropriated into capitalist economies. Significantly, the authors do not suggest that such households existed outside of a market economy; the market was used to assist in their subsistence economies by providing access to products that could not be produced. The on-going displacement of such households is instead a characteristic of the uneven development and manifestation of capitalism as it moves into its later stages.

Given their different histories in relation to market expansion, it is apparent that rural Colombia is rather different to Lebanon, and does not share its rural predicament. This is perhaps especially so in relation to Kefraya's vineyard owners, who are more integrated into the market, selling their grapes to wineries across Lebanon. Nevertheless, the manner in which the authors highlight the temporal interaction between different stages of capitalism through the metaphor of the conversational community is an especially useful lens through which to explore changing models of place in Kefraya—from the registration of the region's land during the French cadastral survey of 1926, to more contemporary events when wineries began to change production methods to suit the demands of international wine markets (a focus for Chapter Four). Although the authors provide detailed accounts of such household transformations, including that of the role of women's work, there appears, however, to be little discussion of inter-household relations. What kind of a shared sense of community might generate an element of resistance to external forces? This is also the focus of chapters Four and Five, where I explore various kinds of collective attempts at controlling the transmission of property and social transformation as whole by Kefraya villagers.

While Pratt does not necessarily pick up on the above-mentioned observation in his critique of Gudeman and Rivera's ethnography, he does raise a related issue concerning the significance of industrial appropriationism in rural economies. Pratt demonstrates that industrial appropriationism and technological innovation, can be successfully adopted by household farms. He argues that the assumption that corporations inevitably replace or displace household organization, or that household economies are in opposition to corporations, is invalid and such an assumption dismisses the significance of "a reconstituted set of social relations" such as kinship, property rights, and

inheritance in shaping economic activity (1994: 175). In other words, while economic rationality might shift in rural regions to fit within the wider forces of market production, such a process does not necessarily “privilege one form of economic activity over the other” (ibid.). In Chapter Five, I explore such transforming concepts concerned with notions of house and corporation, kinship and collective identity in Kefraya, focusing on the only family from the village to have established a winery. In so doing, I also begin to consider the ways in which such a form of economic rationality reproduces what Lem has described as a “familial hegemony” (2013).

Dispossession, therefore, does not necessarily only entail an abrupt displacement of inhabitants from their lands, or the replacement of households by corporations. Indeed, Mundy and Smith have demonstrated that in the village of Kufr Awan of modern northern Jordan the gradually transforming concept of concept of *mahr*, or “the object that the groom gives a bride as a condition of Muslim marriage contract” reflects a transition in the way property is perceived and thus exchanged (2003: 119). Most notably, is not only in that the *mahr* that was offered shifted from land and olive trees to cash, but that the way it was given resulted in the economic isolation of women from the land (ibid.). In this regard, as economic rationality shifts, expropriation and commodification can be seen in a diverse number of ways, which can serve to rupture and radically displace a variety of intimate ties and connections that are forged within daily life (Seremetakis, 1996: 21 & Benjamin, 2003). In her examination of Greek material culture, Seremetakis demonstrates how the displacement of certain fruits by others imported from abroad due to “EEC market rationalities” resulted in the loss of a “mosaic of enmeshed memories, tastes and aroma” intimately linked to the temporality of the seasons (ibid: 2). For example, the “erasure” of a certain Greek peach varietal, known locally as Aphrodite's peach, thus entered into the realm of memory and

narrative, told by generations who could remember the texture and taste of the fruit. Meanwhile, for the younger generation, Aphrodite's peach was "digested through memory and language", and consequentially distanced from the everyday experience of consumption (ibid.). In the displacement of certain types of fruits there was, therefore, a correlating loss of intimate knowledge that was connected to sensory experience, the seasonal perception of nature, and the environment.

I take a similar approach when exploring the dispossession of particular forms of knowledge within capitalist processes of wine production in Lebanon. In Chapter Three I examine the relationship between the first plantations of *Cinsault* vines during the nineteenth century, which have come to be the most prevalent variety in Lebanon, and those varieties that seem only to appear in the narratives of older generations from the Bekaa Valley. What sorts of perceptions of the environment and nature are brought to light in these narratives? I extend the theme of dispossession in the subsequent chapters, exploring more contemporary strategies for replacing *Cinsault* vines in Kefraya. In Chapter Four, I explore how the displacement of such vines has not only alienated the men of Kefraya from work in the vineyards, but has also contributed to breaking down a sense of familial time affectively reproduced by seasonal activities in the vineyards, of which the *Cinsault* vine had certain potencies. (c.f. Lem, 1999: 27 & Zonabend, 1984). Then, in Chapters Six and Seven, my focus shifts on to those elites that facilitated such ruptures and transformations.

Concluding Comments

This chapter has attempted to provide the theoretical basis from which the rest of the thesis will develop. Broadly speaking, there are three themes that are especially salient to the overall argument. The first regards ways in which anthropologists can study elites. By considering this, I have drawn attention to the types of power dynamics that appear to be implicit within elite practices, especially in relation to the role of patronage in contemporary market relations. I also suggest that, while the idea of the immaterial concerns more subtle practices of elites to normalize their positions, in the case of Lebanon, the notion can also be linked more specifically with the valorisation process of certain types of labour practices. The second theme has to do with the issue of luxury and/or prestige goods in terms of understanding the implications in terms of wine (and related items) belong to a sphere of value that at least appears to be outside the realm of the market. In this regard, I have considered whether or not the type of expertise associated with wine production be understood as a form of commodity fetishism. Moreover, I discuss whether the valorisation of such types of knowledge can also reflect the complex entanglement of wine production with practices of place-making and more broadly identity in Lebanon. Third, I have discussed the ways in which anthropologists consider social transformation and transition as a process that is at once cumulative and actively constructed. Given that the notion of social transformation, as well as transition, potentially implies a natural—and even ahistorical—unfolding of events, it thus potentially conceals the types of power relations that facilitate such changes. Indeed, and as I have suggested, efforts to hide or disguise sources of power are in themselves manipulations of the way that events are perceived and experienced.

3: The New, Old Wine: Changing Means of Production

In 1928, the recently established *Office International de la Vigne et du Vin* (OIV) announced that wine would hence forth be officially defined as any beverage resulting directly from the “complete or partial alcoholic fermentation of fresh pressed or un-pressed grapes or must” (Hannin, Codron & Thoyer, 2006: 76). With the exception of certain wines such as *rasinate* in Italy, wine sold across the international markets would henceforth exclude all alcoholic products made from raisins and/or other fruits and entail the reconstitution of wine with distilled or frozen water (ibid.).

Arguably, the universalization of this definition of wine also forged a particular connection between the region where the grapes are grown and the place where the wine is then made (Hannin, et al, 2006: 76 & c.f. Ulin, 1996, Unwin, 1996). And at the basis of this relationship between viticulture and viniculture lay a certain assumption about the connection between humans and their environment (ibid.). That is, distinctive wine styles have to do with the cultural specific qualities emerging through a continuous interaction between people and their natural surroundings. While such links between people and place might appear natural, it was part of an on-going strategic attempt by elite winegrowers from across Europe to establish a global winegrowing hierarchy that secured their economic superiority (e.g. Ulin, 1996). It is therefore significant, that, ten years after the international definition of wine was officially declared, a wine law was passed in the French mandate of Lebanon based around this very description of wine. Yet while the Lebanese wine law might have made this notion of wine official, such a perception of the

relationship between viticulture and viniculture, and humans and their environment was already in the making for almost a century.

This chapter traces the emergence of this relationship between winegrowing and winemaking in Lebanon to the nineteenth century with the return of the Jesuit Mission in the Orient, as well as the growing influence of Beirut's entrepreneurial elite. That the beginning of "modern" wine production is marked by the Jesuit's *mission civilisatrice* in the region is, given that their vision entangled with a French agenda of hegemony, of particular significance (Makdisi, 2000 & Dueck, 2010). While the Jesuits' winemaking projects were only a small part of their larger undertaking to educate and civilize the populations residing in the region at the time, the introduction of new grape varieties had far-reaching ramifications, eventually altering the viticulture landscape of the region completely. In reflecting upon such changes, this chapter also considers the validation process of seeking to legitimize such shifts in knowledge production and its relationship to the political ascendance of Beirut's merchants.

Certain aspects of my research into the history of Lebanese wine production do however remain somewhat cursory. I have therefore made an attempt to present the data in a more anecdotal manner, examining some of the epistemological foundations that gave rise to contemporary wine production in Lebanon. In adopting such an approach, I attempt to provide some historical background for the chapters to follow, contextualizing the materialization of more recent strategies that have been deployed and the subsequent changes to have taken place. I also suggest some questions that can hopefully be answered should the opportunity to conduct further historical research arise.

Hidden Within the Wheels of Commerce

One afternoon during the peak of summer, I was invited to the home of Mr Selim Nakad of the Nakad Winery located in the small hamlet of Jdita in the Central Bekaa. Established by his father during the French mandate, Vin Nakad (formerly Chateau Nakad) remains a testament to this period of Lebanon's history. Winemaking instruments such as a bright red grape press, imported from Bordeaux at around 1930, while out of use, were still present but gathering dust. Wine continues to be produced on a small-scale, and as there are no vineyards in the area, grapes are sourced from regions around the Bekaa Valley, and especially Kefraya. Yet despite of the absence of vineyards in the Jdita region, Mr Selim offered to take me out that day in his old Mercedes for a guided tour of Jdita. He said that this tour was paramount to my education of the history of wine production in Lebanon. Besides, there was not much happening at the winery, as everyone awaited the harvest that was about to begin in Kefraya.

We drove out of the driveway of his family home, which is adjacent to the winery, and turned left, heading upwards away from the Bekaa and onto the slopes of the Mount Lebanon ranges that rise gently up behind the hamlet. We then passed an area of recently constructed apartments, and the abandoned Jdita railway station that had once been part of the Damascus-Beirut railway, which was built during the late-nineteenth-century³. Finally we ascended the hills. Here there were crumbling dry stone wall terraces on each side of the road; and in between these terraces, with the exception of a few sparse weeds, the land was fallow and the soil quite dry. Eventually, Mr Selim drew the car to a halt and told me to follow him onto one of the plots of land. At the edge of this terrace was a rather large (and

³ For an interesting historical overview of Lebanon's now defunct railroads see: <http://almashriq.hiof.no/lebanon/300/380/385/railways/index.html>

impressive) stone press, and I could imagine how the juice from pressed grape berries might have flowed down through the carved out grooves and into the stone basin that rested below. Mr Selim said he took the stone press, along with the artefacts scattered around the area, to be archaeological evidence suggesting the possibility that winemaking in Jdita could be traced as far back as the Bronze Age. He hastened to add that an archaeological excavation of the site would be necessary for a more precise date. While I found such artefacts interesting, other more recent historical narratives of wine were brought to the fore that day.

As I continued to follow Mr Selim around the empty terraces of Jdita, he told me that vines were once cultivated here and that their disappearance occurred relatively recently. Mr Selim recalled walking through these vineyards as a child with his father, and recounted stories to me about eating grapes that “tasted like honey.” Interestingly, there are many others from the Central Bekaa who have similar memories. From the slopes of Jdita to the hills of Ksara and ravines of Zahle, the older generations would often tell me that the slopes of the Central Bekaa, that are now mostly empty plots of land or sites for newly constructed apartments and villas, were once used for cultivating vines. While the relatively recent civil war also had a role in changing the landscape, I was told that most of the older vines had disappeared following the arrival of the root-eating louse known as phylloxera. The story of its arrival as told by Mr Selim is similar to how it was explained by others:

The parasites came into Lebanon on the wheels of the French officers’ trucks at the beginning of the mandate and slowly began to infect the vines. We never replanted and had to start buying grapes from others. But the vines were growing here on these slopes all my life, as a child and (I am sure) also my father’s life.

When I asked what types of varieties had been cultivated on these slopes, his response was that the grapes were most likely *Merwah* and *Obeideh*. He was not certain however, because “back then, we were not so concerned with varieties as we are now.” Notably, wine was in fact only one of many products made from the grapes of these vines. Other products included arak, vinegar, molasses and raisins—apparently all for personal consumption. Somewhat nostalgically, Mr Selim explained that prior to the mandate period, his family used to make wine from raisins rather than directly from fresh grapes and moreover that many homes had their own small distilleries to make arak as well as small plots *kouroum* (vineyards). Yet with the destruction of the vines due to phylloxera, many families were eventually unable to continue making such products with the grapes from their vineyards; some began to buy grapes elsewhere, while others apparently ceased production entirely and were forced to buy such products in the market. I thus began to wonder how the relationship between viticulture and viniculture might have changed following the spread of phylloxera into the region. Where, I pondered, did locals buy their grapes? And from whom? Did they even continue to produce wine and other grape derived products? What is the significance of “the French” in these changes? And, lastly, what had happened to the local grape varieties after phylloxera reached the region?

Possible Socio-Economic Effects of Phylloxera

In Europe, the phylloxera plague of the nineteenth century was a socio-economic catastrophe—where, in the case of France, for example, over one million livelihoods were at stake (Paul, 2002). Technological advancements in wine production that took place during the industrialisation of France between 1860 and 1939 were thus very much linked to saving its wine-growing economy following the phylloxera blight (2003 & 2002). It was also during this time that universities such as those in Bordeaux and Montpellier, which

specialised in the agronomic sciences and with special attention to the advancement of technology in order to stabilise and secure production, were established. Indeed, it was one of Montpellier's former students, Planchon, who, with two American botanists, was able to successfully graft the American *Vitis aestivalis* rootstocks, (which are resistant to phylloxera), to different varieties of the *Vitis Vinifera*, allowing for the revival of a devastated French wine growing economy (ibid).

Phylloxera did not only destroy the vineyards of Europe. According to Quataert, Aydin, one of the major grape growing and raisin producing regions of Ottoman Anatolia also went into decline during the nineteenth century (1993 & see also for broader industrial info 1993a). The region made up one-fifth of all Ottoman vineyards and when “thousands of acres” were destroyed, both production and export went into a sharp decline (ibid: 20). In the case of Lebanon, however, official information about the region's grape production, as well as the date of the arrival of phylloxera appears somewhat limited.⁴ A cursory glance over agricultural and geographical journals has only uncovered one brief mention of phylloxera by the British geographer Norman Lewis, in his article published in 1953 about terrace-farming in Lebanon. He notes that two-thirds of the 53,425 hectares of fruit plantations were “devoted to grapes and olives, neither of which needs irrigation” (1953:10). Lewis writes that while vineyards were found everywhere, phylloxera had resulted in the uprooting of many vines in the southern mountains and across the Bekaa (ibid). Interestingly, he also notes that wine produced from “foreign rootstocks was concentrated around Zahle and Chtaura, on the lower eastern slopes of the Lebanon” (ibid).

⁴ A significant reason for the lack of official information about phylloxera might have to do with the 1916 famine caused by the locust plague and resulting in over a half a million dead. Further research into the plague may provide more concrete information regarding the arrival of phylloxera.

In the Jesuit records at the Tanayil Monastery located in the Central Bekaa, an account written by Père Torrend in 1913 mentions that regulations had been imposed by the Ottoman authorities during the late nineteenth century to prevent the importation of different vines from outside of Mount Lebanon and Greater Syria—due to fear of the spread of phylloxera (Torrend, 1913). It appears, however, that through the use of *bakshish* (bribing), the Jesuits were able to successfully ship over cuttings of *Cinsault* and *Alicante* varieties from the Trappistes de Staouëli monastery in Algeria, for plantation on recently acquired lands in Ksara and Tanayil—less than ten kilometres from Jdita. Also noted elsewhere in the Jesuit archives is that in 1929, Père Alphonse saved the Ksara vineyards from the phylloxera aphid by replanting these varieties grafted with an American rootstock resistant to phylloxera. Interestingly, Torrend speculates that if phylloxera were to ever invade “the country,” there would be a strong possibility that the “robust Arab vines” may well be resistant to phylloxera, and vine farmers who had decided to pull out their “native vines” may well regret not keeping their “ancient vines” (1913: 408). Notably, despite numerous botanical books having been published by the Jesuits, there appears to be a gap in documentation of local grape varieties of the Bekaa Valley.

An interesting study of such varieties was conducted by agricultural engineer, Mr Jean Hage Chahine, during 1955. The book, entitled *La Vigne Au Liban*, classifies different grape varieties found across Lebanon and follows the structure of the tomes of Pierre Galet, an ampelographer who provides a meticulous profile of different varieties of *Vitis vinifera* (Galet, 1979 & 1990). Each page of Hage Chahine’s study offers a photograph of the varietal’s leaf and grape, followed by a brief discussion of the shapes, nodes and hues of the leaf. There is also discussion of the different names given to these grapes across the regions of Lebanon, and information about which products are made using the different

grapes. The study is especially valuable, since it appears that very few of these varieties can still be found across Lebanon.

Chahine grew up in the Ksara hamlet, trained as an agricultural engineer at the Jesuit-run Saint Joseph University and worked as an intern with the Jesuit wine-makers at the Ksara Monastery. He has lived in Algeria, France and India and was also employed by Chateau Kefraya for over a decade, taking up his position when the winery was established in 1979, until approximately 1989. Chahine has since retired to his home in Ksara, where he permitted me to interview him. It was another quiet summer's day before the harvest was about to begin and when I arrived there, Mr Chahine invited me to sit outdoors on the terrace that overlooked his garden. As he poured some coffee, Chahine explained that, prior to the spread of phylloxera, the vineyards looked quite different. First, they tended to be quite small and other plants such as olives were also planted on the same plot of land. He also reminded me that the Arabic word *kouroum* does not only refer to a vineyard, but also an olive grove or fig tree orchard. Second, there would usually be a number of different varieties planted within the *kouroum*.

Chahine then snapped a piece of branch from a grape vine growing not too far from where we were sitting, and demonstrated how vines were planted prior to the arrival of phylloxera: "You are able to take a cutting from a vine that produces the grapes you might like, and plant it vertically (and directly) into the soil". Chahine pointed out that, once the phylloxera aphid is present in the soil, it is impossible to plant vines in such a manner. The grafting of the American resistant rootstock *Vitis aestivalis* with the *Vitis vinifera* thus changed how farmers were able to plant their vines. Also, unlike the previous method of vineyard plantations, a farmer would now have to pay for his vines. Chahine explained that the type of vine with a grafted American rootstock that was made most available at the

nurseries was the *Cinsault* varieties. The advantage of the *Cinsault* was that the berries were large and could be used to make products other than wine, such as raisins and molasses. Significantly, the same logic applied for prominence of the *Cinsault* vine is applied to the reason for the survival of varieties Chahine considers as more local to Lebanon:

Mainly edible grape varieties remain because they are planted for export to the Arab countries. For example are the *Tfeifih* and *Beitamooni*. The *Obeidi* variety remains because it provides a lot of juice and sugar that result in a high alcoholic degree which are all good factors for the production of arak and sometimes wine. But all the rest have disappeared such as *Mariami*, *Zeini*, *Dorbali* and *Souri*.

Chahine's theory is interesting, and further archival research will hopefully be able to shed light upon the socio-economic effects of phylloxera. Nevertheless, his perspective does allow for some preliminary conclusions to be drawn. First, the spread of phylloxera appears to have contributed to the emergence of the *kouroum* that appear more common- place in contemporary Lebanon: predominantly mono-varietal (and mono-species) plantations. Second, the way these new methods in the plantations of the *kouroum* reflect transforming modes of grape production, from one that appears to have been mostly based on household sustainable economies, to one where farmers were unable to grow vines without purchasing new phylloxera resistant varieties in the market⁵.

⁵ It is important to point out, however, that while phylloxera might have been somewhat instrumental in facilitating such socio-economic change, mono-cropping agriculture for market production already had a long history across Mount Lebanon and certain parts of the Bekaa Valley. Traboulsi has noted that, by the early seventeenth century, the Emirate of Mount Lebanon had become a semi-autonomous polity under the Ottoman administration characterized by: "sizeable Christian numerical majority; an early conversion to production for market (silk) and to international trade; a long cultural exposure to Europe, and a tradition of intervention by European powers in its internal affairs" (2007: 3). In this light, it is apparent that, although grape production might not have been commercialised, capitalist market exchanges were already well established across the region.

Notably, my discussions with Chahine were not only able to provide some insights concerning the subtle and gradual role of phylloxera in changing the landscape, but also some further insights concerning shifting perceptions of place. Significantly, although Chahine was able to identify over 22 kinds of “indigenous” *Vitis vinifera* varieties, these varieties did not necessarily *originate* in Lebanon. That is, other regions in the Levant may well have cultivated such varieties too. Chahine provided the example of the grape variety that was known locally in the Bekaa as *Souri*, (Syrian), which may have acquired such a name because it was grown across the whole of Greater Syria. Interestingly, discussions with some older residents who recalled both the *Souri*, and other varieties that appear to have disappeared such as *Mariami* and *Zeini*, were able to provide detailed descriptions of what these grapes looked like and how they tasted. Yet, when I asked where these grapes might have come from, the usual response in the case of *Souri* was: “well if its name says Syria, then probably Syria!” Meanwhile, other grape varieties with names not associated with places were shrugged off, “it was called *Mariami* because of *Sitta* Miriam (Holy Mary).”

While the reasons for the lack of importance given to the origin of the grapes can only be speculative in terms of how things were really experienced, I was nonetheless prompted to think critically about the usage of certain “aborescent root metaphors” within the modern winegrowing political economy (Malki, 1997:57). This was especially so in regard to conversations I had with those who could recall a very different viticulture landscape, and I realised that I had been influenced by my discussions with many winery owners and upper-managers who were often quick to point out to me, Lebanon’s very long historical tradition of wine-making potentially dates back to 4,000 BC. This was something that Mr Selim was quite enthusiastic to point out during our outing to the slopes

of Jdita. Similarly, I had also been influenced by what I had read in Karam's book on Lebanese wine (2005). When interviewing McGovern, Karam asked the archaeologist if the indigenous varieties to Lebanon, *Merwah* and *Obeidi* were the respective ancestors for the French varieties, *Semillon* and *Chardonnay*, and *Cabernet-Sauvignon*. McGovern's response was that DNA testing has been able to disprove the theory that the *Merwah* is the ancestor—or of any relation—to the *Chardonnay* and *Semillon* varieties. Thus far however, there has been not been any DNA testing carried out to confirm the theory that the *Obeidi* might be the origin of the *Cabernet-Sauvignon* (Karam, 2005 & see McGovern, 2003, 2009; McGovern, Fleming & Katz, 2013). While such insights are interesting, I initially overlooked something significant in this interview: which kinds of knowledge, I should have asked, are prioritised when one is speaking of “Lebanese,” “indigenous” or “local” grape varieties?

The Legacy of Père Billotet

In the next two sections I shall explore how vineyards, such as those planted by the Jesuits of Ksara during the mid-nineteenth century spoke of changing visions of the land that might have ultimately contributed towards reshaping the viticulture landscape of the Bekaa and thus also of the kinds of knowledge prioritised when speaking of “indigenous” grapes and vines. In drawing attention to the role of the Jesuits in altering methods of wine production in Lebanon, I do not mean to suggest that wine was not produced or consumed in the era preceding the return of the Jesuits to the Orient in 1831. After all, wine for the Ottomans was, as described by the seventeenth century Ottoman chronicler, Peçevi, a cushion on the “sofa of pleasure” (Creasey, 1854). Yet without extensive archival research beyond the Jesuit archives, it is somewhat difficult to develop a holistic analysis concerning viticulture prior to the mid-nineteenth-century.

Halenko's research of viti-viniculture in the Ottoman *sancak* (province) of Kefe in Southern Crimea can, however, shed some light upon how wine might have been taxed (2004). Halenko's analysis of the only "detailed" surviving tax registers of Crimea from 1542 indicates that tax was only imposed upon the *sura* (grape juice), while other grape derived products such as *'araqi* (arak) and *pekmez* (grape molasses) were excluded. Halenko observes that, in other Ottoman regions, taxes were taken from the production of arak and *pekmez*. This not only indicates that alcohol was produced from grapes, and that it was consumed across the Ottoman Empire. The distinctive tax groups categorizing the different fermented and alcoholic products derived from grapes also implies a complex system of production. While *sura*, rather than *hamar* (sweet wine) was taxed in Crimea, Halenko further argues that the reasons for this may have to do with the presence of Muslim farmers who also appear to be producing *sura*. Given that no other grape derived product was taxed in Crimea, levels of productivity for *sura* were high. Moreover, the fact that it is possible for grape juice to naturally start fermenting after only one day suggests that *sura* was actually wine.

Although some aspects of the conclusions drawn from Halenko are somewhat speculative, her analysis does provide a useful starting point for further examination of viti-viniculture in Ottoman times. Crucially, Halenko elucidates how, contrary to the general assumption that wine and viticulture declined during Ottoman reign, there was in fact continuity in Crimea connecting it to its earlier Byzantine and Genoese periods and also afterwards in its annexation to the Russian Empire. Indeed, it is true that the Ottoman tax documents from the region, following the implementation of the *iltizām* in the sixteenth century might not provide any information pertaining to local wine production. However, both imported and regional wines are classified as *tamga-I hamr*, and taxes are also imposed upon "saloons" in the city of Kefe (ibid).

While rule and administration were not uniform across the Ottoman Empire, it does appear that, in Crimea and certain islands on the Aegean, the production of grape derived alcoholic substances was also carried out across Mount Lebanon. After all, Mount Lebanon did, to an extent, follow the confessional-based millet system. This was similar to how the Ottoman administration governed the Christians of the Balkan regions; and the production of wine was thus permitted at least on Christian ‘*waqf*’ lands. Indeed, we also find the consumption of wine was not restricted to the monks and priests at the monasteries. A prominent figure in the 1860 *fellahin* uprisings of the Kisrawan region of Mount Lebanon, Tanius Shaheen, who himself was part of the Maronite ‘*ahali*’ (community), writes to the clergy of the village in ‘Aramun, concerning the consequences for those in the village who might have had a little too much wine and arak:

Then we inform Your Reverences what must already be known to you, concerning the incidents that occur on festival days as a result of drinking ‘*araq*’ and wine. The Council agreed that it was necessary to announce in all places that whoever drinks ‘*araq*’ or wine outside his house and there results from it any mischief, unseemly talk, cursing or quarrelling, etc. this is in itself a very vile thing. Then may God—be He exalted!—the faithful of the Church, and the leaders all proclaim this. We hope that Your Reverences will announce this in church to all the populace. Whoever transgresses after the announcement is made, and does the slightest mischief, will be punished by one month’s (imprisonment) or several times that much. (Makdisi, 2000: 109)

There is also evidence for a similar sense of continuity to that observed by Halenko, which comes by way of Braudel, who writes of the visit to the cedars of Lebanon by the ambassador of Breves with his travelling companions. On the 26th of June, 1605, the ambassador wrote of his surprise regarding the varying effects of altitude: “Here [on the mountains of Lebanon] the vines were only just beginning to flower, as were the olive trees, and the wheat was just turning yellow; and at Tripoli [on the coast] the grapes were

growing, the olives were already big, the wheat had been harvested, and all the other fruits were 'well advanced'" (Braudel, 1995: 60).

Nevertheless, it is apparent that significant changes in viticulture and winemaking began following the return of the Jesuit Mission in 1831. Having set up their first mission during the mid-seventeenth-century, the Society of Jesuits left the region, following their Suppression in 1773. According to Makdisi, after hearing "of the resurrection of the Company of Jesus," the Greek Catholic and Maronite Churches were delighted to invite them back in 1831. Upon arriving on the shores of Beirut, according to Paul Riccadonna, one of the three Jesuits sent on the new mission, the group was "surrounded by a mass of turbans, staffs and pistols" (quote taken from Makdisi, 2000:25). Fortunately for the three Jesuits, "a native Christian" spoke up and invited them to his home (ibid). Yet the Jesuits were about to encounter a reality they had not expected: "the confusing similarity of Christian to Muslim in manners, dress and habits" (ibid: 25). At the home of the "native Christian," the Jesuits found it hard to forget their instructions to practice restraint and grace that were given to them in Rome, for the "discomfort of sitting crossed legged on the Damascene carpets and the strength of pipe tobacco" was perhaps almost too much to bear (ibid: 26). That this was followed by a long night of sleeping on a hard floor, plagued by insects, does not appear to have appeased the weary monks, and Riccadonna was eventually to declare with frustration that the inhabitants of the city lived "twenty centuries behind European culture" (ibid).

Makdisi has argued that the Jesuits and American Protestant Missionaries (amongst others) were eventually able to apply "their own sectarian vision of Mount Lebanon" that "bypassed the political exigencies" of Ottoman governance (ibid: 88). They provided elites with seemingly viable and modern sectarian paths of development; cultivating them as modern leaders of their sectarian communities and offered them the support and

protection of Europe. In return, local elites protected and gave land to the missionaries (ibid). This “total independence”, as declared by Père Planchet declares, allowed foreign missionaries to engage in practices of “civilizing” and educating the locals of Mount Lebanon. In what Makdisi calls “the gentle crusade,” the *mission civilisatrice*, entailed a systematic education of local inhabitants, of which many of the *Nahda* scholars in Beirut had, at least initially, advocated (2000). The new crusade was gentle in this regard because it was not directly a military expedition, but was instead “actively courted by native elites, and it advanced itself primarily through the pen and paintbrush rather than sword and musket” (ibid: 16). Newly established universities offered courses such as history (including the Levant), law, and agricultural engineering—mostly for members of the urban aristocrats and the bourgeoisie (Kassir, 2010). This also involved developing missionary schools in towns such as Ghazir in Kisrawan and Mallacat in the Bekaa Valley (ibid). The technologies of modern science were also invaluable to their missions, and in 1857 Père Billotet complained that the Jesuits were losing popularity because Protestants were offering medical care in the southern coastal city of Sidon (Makdisi, 2000: 89).

Yet medicine was not the only interest of Billotet. According to Carayon's biographical chronicle of the austere monk, despite never quite mastering the Arabic language, Billotet rose through the Jesuit ranks, eventually becoming the *Supérieur* of the Zahle monastery (1865). It was during his administration that 23 hectares of land was acquired in Ksara, located a few kilometres south of Zahle (ibid). According to Torrend's account entitled *Ksara, Son Histoire*, Père Billotet, “*le Supérieur de la Mission*” bought the land in December 1858 from Emir Bechir Ahmad Bellama (1913). Both Carayon and Torrend note that Billotet was involved in the agricultural exploitation which followed. Moreover, it is possible that Billotet oversaw the beginning of a process where plantations, mainly of the *Cinsault* and *Alicante* grape varieties, replaced a collection of

small parcels of mulberries and cereals, as well as “Arab vines, cultivated since time immemorial” (Torrend, 1913: 406). Some years later, a winery and observatory were constructed. Indeed, by the end of the nineteenth century, the Ksara Monastery was a hub for more than just advancements in the agronomic and oenological sciences. The observatory built amongst the vineyards was fitted with the first refracted telescope in the region. The mapping of the stars by the scientifically minded Père Berloty would later serve the French cadastral surveyors who took to mapping the Lebanese mandate based upon the azimuth system he had already established.

However, Billotet would bear no witness to the construction of the winery and observatory. For, despite the “total independence” enjoyed by the Missionaries in the Orient, he was amongst five Jesuit priests killed during the uprisings of 1860. According to the Jesuit records at Tanayil, in compensation for their deaths, the Ottoman administration gave a plot of land to the French government in the region of Tanayil, only a few kilometres from Ksara. The French government also allowed the Jesuits to open an orphanage for the Christian victims of the 1860 clashes. According to informants I spoke with during fieldwork, the Tanayil property continues to be under French ownership as long as one member of the Jesuit Order remains on the premises. While further research is required to explore the anthropological implications of such a legal contract, there are still other ways to explore the legacy of Billotet in Lebanon’s history of winegrowing.

Visions of the Land

According to the Jesuit records, the 230 hectares of land acquired in Tanayil was mainly composed of swamps. It was thus deemed unsuitable for the agricultural exploitation. Nevertheless, the property was drained, and plots of vineyards were planted alongside apricot and apple orchards. Apparently, it was Père Kirn who, in the latter part of the

nineteenth century, decided to plant vines not only on the slopes on the Ksara property, but also on the some of the flatter plains situated in the Tanayil properties. According to Torrend, “after noting the *potential* for the soil and climate, as well as for developing the economy of the country,” Kirn decided to plant vines imported from their monastery in Algeria in order to replace “the Arab vines, cultivated since time immemorial” (1913: 406):

The arrivals of the cuttings to Ksara caused quite a commotion in the region. What were these foreign plants that the Fathers had brought to the region? Could they spread diseases to the local vines of this country? The jealousy of the certain land proprietors fuelled these rumours. The Fathers had to hide the cuttings for many weeks and then after the plantations, guard the vines day and night so that no one would tear them out of the ground. Little by little the vines began to expand and eventually replaced the mulberries. The squares of Arab vines were broken a part in order to place these new vines. These new vines, from then on were known throughout the region of Syria as the "*vigne française*". (ibid: 407 my translation)

With the arrival of the *vigne française*, different planting methods were required, and these began in terms of how much space had to be maintained between each vine. This included pruning and then fashioned the wine grapes into a goblet style. Such techniques were, apparently, in sharp contrast to what the Jesuits perceived as the chaotic methods practiced by the locals. Torrend writes about the aesthetically pleasing arrangement of the Ksara vines that were distinctive from the Jesuits' neighbours:

Different voyagers who wander down the paths admiring the vines with their tidy stems that is—well pruned and perfectly aligned. These visitors ask us why the neighbours do not also replace their Arab vines with these French vines . . . The vine farmers of Zahle and neighbours of this region don't see anything else but these table grapes. They are considered with great esteem everywhere. Even in Beirut, where wagons travel (from Zahle) full of these grapes from previous seasons. Why would they want to replace their vines with something so unfamiliar? (ibid: 407)

Significantly, the Jesuits' "neighbours" also started to grow these "French" vines. The reasons for such a shift in preference remain unclear, although phylloxera might have been one motivation. However, Torrend notes that many of his neighbours continued to use methods for plantation and grape maintenance that they were familiar with, albeit with disappointing results.⁶ When they "tore out [the] vines of the Arab variety," the neighbours carried on using the method of "long pruning" which resulted in harvests with lower yields and grapes with low sugar content (ibid: 408). It is debatable whether these "French vines" were actually unable to reach optimum productivity levels with the techniques used by local residents around Zahle at the time (see Naff, 1981 for Zahle historical background). It is somewhat more likely, however, that a combination of such methods used with these "French vines" did not achieve the levels of which Torrend considered as the required standard for producing wine. That is, although the land and climate of the Bekaa Valley was perceived to possess the positive qualities for the development of viticulture, its transformative potential could only successfully materialise through a recombination with the right kinds of human and non-human factors (e.g. Sperber, 2007).

In this regard, Torrend's remarks concerning the unsuccessful attempts by locals looking after their "French" vines with older techniques can also, perhaps, reflect endeavours to validate the Jesuits' efforts in assisting in the development of the country. That is not to say that Torrend wrote his account as part of a calculative attempt to

⁶ It is important to point out however that there were other European and American agronomists who actually saw the potential of Lebanese grape varieties for wine-making. Here an acknowledgement is due to Dr Eugene Rogan for drawing my attention to this and sending me copies of letter exchanges between the American Agricultural Department (in the US) and the American Consul in Beirut dated to the nineteenth century. The content of the letters concern the shipping of vine cuttings of grape varieties from the region that could possibly be used to make wine in California. Further research would be required to see what came of these cuttings.

legitimize and justify the socio-economic advantages of the Jesuits' viticulture projects over other kinds of grape production. Rather, the language used by Torrend reflects the way the use of seemingly neutral terms such as "potential" and even "fertile" to describe the agricultural properties of a particular place can—perhaps even unintentionally—conceal long histories of dynamic social process (Purcell & Horden, 2000) In other words, the region is believed to be naturally fertile rather than because of the human capacity to alter it. Yet, or at least in the case of the Bekaa Valley, Purcell and Horden have demonstrated how the region's agricultural potential derives from continuous activity, spanning thousands of years. This activity has transformed land that was otherwise quite difficult to farm.

With this in mind, Mundy has pointed out how Ottoman conquests were based on different ideological grounds to European commercial expansion, and that they belonged to a distinctive but equally long and complex economic history (2004:144; Mundy & Smith, 2007). While property rights within Ottoman Islamic law allowed for the occupation and cultivation of land—even wastelands—the basis for this not "European notions of civilizing a state of nature". Rather, there was "the conceptualisation of rights over the 'potentiality' and not of labour *per se* but of the fruits of cultivation land" (Mundy, 2004: 147). In the use of terms such as "fertile", but also "Arab vines, cultivated since time immemorial", and "*vigne française*", there appears to be an inherent method of "time-keeping" that belongs to a particular European "historiographical consciousness" (Goody, 2012: 26). This was a vision of modernity that Makdisi argues sought to reclaim "the history of this region from the morass of decline and the stagnation of time" (Makdisi, 2000: 16). Importantly, this opposition that was established between a dynamic "western" society and the static ahistorical societies of "rest" also has parallels to methods Ulin points out are so vital for

the legitimization process of an invented tradition of historical authenticity by elite winegrowers within contemporary wine production. Indeed, he argues that a fundamental aspect in the cultural production of wine in France regards an entanglement of a concept of rootedness to the soil and of a particular sense of blood ties, bound together through vine and wine (1996). Significantly, this validation process might also be observed when one speaks of indigenous grapes or of *la vigne française*. Yet in the context of historical Lebanon however, while there is an apparent similarity here to the hierarchical sense of rootedness to the soil as observed by Ulin, it appears that this connection was initially forged between a locality in Lebanon to vines and people perceived to come from *outside* the region—and in particular, Europe.

Les Chateaux du Liban

Yet we can also see that this naturalisation of a hierarchical connection between place, people and grapes began to extend beyond the Jesuit vineyards of Ksara and Tanayil. Indeed by the time Chateau Kefraya was established in 1979, in his memoirs entitled, *D'Haute d'une Breteche*, Michael de Bustros states his reasons for planting vines on his family lands in Kefraya:

Thus, after noting the inadequacy the *traditional* usages of the soil and land in Kefraya, the first vineyard was planted in 1951. It was 9 hectares—that is to say 90,000 square feet! (de Bustros, 2001: 16, my emphasis)





Eventually, de Bustros hired a viticulture expert from France to oversee the vineyard plantations and supervise the viticulture maintenance. Yet it is also clear that the de Bustros family was not the only large landholding family from Beirut that had taken the decision to plant vines. The Domaine de Tourelle winery, established in 1868, by a French man named Pierre Brun, relied upon vineyard growers across the Bekaa Valley. According to the

current owners, he regularly bought *Cinsault* and *Alicante* grapes grown on lands owned by members of the Sursuq and Eddé families in the Ammiq region of the West Bekaa.⁷

Thus while the introduction and promotion of new techniques of viticulture and winemaking by the Jesuits belonged to their much broader vision of the *mission civilisatrice*, there remains to be explored in the final two sections, the issue pertaining to why wine might have eventually become a significant agro-industry for urban elites. Indeed following the establishment of Greater Lebanon in 1920, and then the French mandate of Lebanon in 1923, wine production appears to have taken a significant turn, perhaps best reflected by the eventual passing of a wine law in 1939 is suggestive of at least a small thriving industry.⁸

⁷ This information was given to me by the current owners of Domaine de Tourelles. I have been informed that there are documents with information such as the quantity and also the price of grapes bought. It has, however, proved difficult to obtain permission to access these documents. The reason given was that Michael Karam had priority to look at these documents given his extensive publications on Lebanese wine—a topic I have discussed in the introduction. It is also important to point out that the establishment of Domaine Tourelle by Pierre Brun, followed the passing of the 1867 property law, allowing “foreigners” the right to buy and own land across the Ottoman Empire (Lutsky, 1969).

⁸ I would like to express my gratitude to Mr James Palgé, the oenologist working at Chateau Ksara at the time, for providing me with a photocopy of the 1939 wine law and for sharing his own research into the history of Lebanese wine production.



Source: Table for Alcohol production in Lebanon between 1939-1945 reproduced from Gates, 1998: 73.

Thus it is notable that despite the limited amount of information obtained pertaining to the number of wineries established during the French mandate, some of the wineries that continue to produce wine in contemporary Lebanon can still be traced to the mid-twentieth-century. We are already aware of Selim Nakad's father, who established his winery in 1924, naming it Chateau Nakad. Another well-known winery today that was also established in 1930 (during the French mandate) is Chateau Musar. The winery was established by Gaston Hochar, the son of the founder of the Banque Hochar. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the bank had gone bankrupt, which surely contributed to the simultaneous sericulture decline (Karam, 2005). However, the family was already part of the urban elite: Gaston Hochar had attended school with a relative of Michel de Bustros called Nicolas Ibrahim Sursuq (ibid). The family did not own a significant amount of land,

and instead rented from the Eddé family from the Ammiq region of the West Bekaa. There, the Hochar enterprise began to plant grape varieties and build a reputation for their rather unique wines. It appears that the main consumers of their wines were the French administrators, officers, and businessmen and their families.

Arguably, and as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the passing of the 1939 wine law can serve to reflect a process of reification where the relationship that is defined between people and “things” within a particular legal institution can have the effect of naturalising particular ideas (e.g. Pottage, 2004a & Luckacs, 1971). Yet while the wine legislation is able to offer some indication concerning the formalization of the discourse of wine growing, the usage of the term “chateau” to describe the Lebanese wineries is also of interest. While there is no apparent chateau on the premises of the Chateau Nakad winery, the name prevailed until after the civil war era when, in attempts to restructure both production and marketing strategies, the name was changed to Vin Nakad—although Chateau Nakad is still frequently used by the Nakads and also in many newspaper articles. Chateau Musar does however have a castle on site. The winery was built in an old seventeenth-century castle that the Hochar family had bought in Ghazir of the Kiserwan region of Mount Lebanon (Karam, 2005). The trend in the use of the chateau appears to have continued following the establishment of the independent Lebanese state. Perhaps the most significant is the Chateau Kefraya estate, which was founded in 1979 by Michael de Bustros, who had commenced his viticulture enterprise some decades earlier.

As noted in the previous chapter, Ulin suggests that, in the case of France, the construction of this chateau during the late- eighteenth and nineteenth centuries replicated those from the Middle Ages. This created an “invented connection” to an aristocratic past, thus supplying “elite growers with sufficient cultural capital to insure their commercial

success” (Ulin, 1996: 54). The “invention of tradition” by these elite winegrowers was a strategy to establish or maintain “their role as leaders in local winegrowing associations central to the construction of French winegrowing discourse and knowledge” (ibid). In the case of Lebanon, I would suggest similar sorts of strategies were being used in that this replication represents a kind of “selective tradition;” an inherently political social process through which an “effective dominant culture, is always passed off as tradition” (Williams, 1973: 9). However, I would add that the use of the “chateau” within Lebanese wine production might also reflect the emergence of new spatial relations of power. This would be particularly so between the urban and rural, much like of Gilson’s argument brought up in the previous chapter, concerning a sense of *histoire mentalités* and the role of status-honour within that process, in the case of the Akkar region (1984). In other words, the usage of the term chateau and the production of wine allowed for certain types of elites to continue to display their affluence and exert their influence, following the increasing French influence in the region.

Yet it is important to point out that in the case of wine production in France, Ulin argues that the construction in the nineteenth century of the chateaux, replicating the Neo-classical architectural models of the pre-revolution era, while in itself a method of validation to evoke aristocratic roots to the past, and also to the land, was one specifically tied to sentiments of heritage and nationalism. Parallels emerge once more and it was during the *Nahda* (The Arab Renaissance) of the nineteenth century, Beirut and Cairo were both centres where the intelligentsia met, exchanged ideas, and participated in what Kassir calls the “cultural revolution”. The *episteme* of the age was characterized by the progression and dissemination of new interdisciplinary ideas, alongside the rise of different kinds of nationalist sentiment (2010). The *Nahda* in Arab history, Kassir writes, “. . . was

at once an era and an attitude” (ibid: 168). For it was also during the *Nahda* that the term *watan* (homeland) took on the modern meaning⁹.

It is significant therefore that this “awakening to the world,” was encouraged by European—mainly Jesuit—and also American (Protestant) missionaries in the Levant (Kassir, 2010). In what Makdisi calls “the gentle crusade,” the *mission civilisatrice*, entailed a systematic education of local inhabitants, of which many of the *Nahda* scholars in Beirut had, at least initially, advocated (2000). The new crusade was gentle in this regard because it was not directly a military expedition, but was instead “actively courted by native elites, and it advanced itself primarily through the pen and paintbrush rather than sword and musket” (ibid: 16). Newly established universities offered courses such as history (including the Levant), law, and agricultural engineering—mostly for members of the urban aristocrats and the bourgeoisie (Kassir, 2010). Significantly, the history of the Levant, taught at the Saint Joseph University, came from research conducted by French orientalist who were studying and excavating archaeological sites at key areas of the region’s ancient civilizations. Notably, however, and as Kaufman puts it, “as with the muted archaeological sites,” the indigenous populations also came under scrutiny as well (2004: 23). The populations were perceived as the progenies for different ancient

⁹ Such ways of perceiving the world resonate broadly with Anderson’s “imagined community”, which resides within a nation where members might not know each other personally, but still share a similar sense of spatio-temporality (1991). In this regard, the essence of this sense of time is one of building a fixed and stable referential system for capitalist production. Indeed, E.P. Thompson argues for the imposition of a synchronic sense of time necessary for capitalist work-discipline, which is nicely illustrated in the construction of a *Hamidiye* clock tower in downtown Beirut during 1897 (Kassir, 2010; Thompson, 1967).⁹ A *Hamidiye* clock, named after Sultan Abdulhamid II, provided *alla Franca* or “European time”, following the Gregorian calendar, and *alla turca*, “Ottoman time”, which followed the Ottoman Islamic calendar. These clocks (and watches) were built by Swiss clockmaker Johann Meyer, and entered into the Ottoman market during the mid-nineteenth-century (Bir, Acar, & Kacar, 2010).

civilizations; and thus different contemporary physical features and social behaviour were attributed, for example, to the Egyptians, Assyrians and Phoenicians.

One particularly influential study of this kind was by the prominent French philosopher and orientalist, Ernest Renan. Upon receiving the mission from Napoleon III to visit the Mount Lebanon region and research its Phoenician history, Renan set sail from France in 1860, arriving in Beirut in October of the same year. His subsequent book, *Mission de Phénicie*, was the first of its kind, providing a modern analysis of the Phoenician civilization (Renan, 1864 & Kaufman, 2001 & 2004). The book is an account of his travels, observations, and historic findings regarding the Phoenicians, who are depicted as a trading civilisation residing in coastal regions such as Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli, and the mountainous areas of Kiserwan. Renan's research was frequently referred to by French administrators in their descriptions of Lebanon, and also by the French foreign minister to Mount Lebanon, Gabriel Hanotaux, who served in the region between 1894 and 1898. Hanotaux's remarks, in particular, linked Mount Lebanon to France (through the Bible and Renan) and forged strong historical links between French cultural heritage and the rest of Mediterranean, encompassing Lebanon:

The Mountains of Lebanon may not be the highest, but the summits are the highest in the history of the world. From Salomon to Renan, the wisdom of humanity sits in the shadow of the Cedars.

(quoted in Kaufman, 2001: 176).

Similarly, in 1902, the Jesuit orientalists, Henri Lammens and Pierre Martin, working at the newly inaugurated Oriental Faculty of the University Saint Joseph, set out to research the history of the people of Syria. Lammens and Martin argued that the region was a land for ethnic and religious minorities in an Arab/Muslim dominated world, and wrote extensively on the legacy of the Phoenicians, who, they argued, were the ancestors to the

“Maronite minority” residing in Beirut (Firro, 2003). They believed that the Phoenician civilisations consisted of non-Semite people, of Indo-European genealogy, and sea-faring traders was also taught this at schools in Lebanon and France (ibid & Kaufman, 2004). Notably, the intellectual group that proclaimed themselves the “New Phoenicians” were all graduates of the Oriental Faculty of the University of Saint Joseph. Significantly, “Phoenicianism” retains an emphasis upon the merchant-like character of the Phoenicians, whose ancestors continue to dwell in the city of Beirut. Their political visions are well documented in *“La Revue Phénicienne”*, founded in 1919 by the poet and writer Charles, which covered issues concerning the economy, agriculture, and industry. Writers included the politician Michel Chiha, who was also the financial director of his family’s bank, the Banque Pharaon-Chiha, and contributed articles promoting the idea that the Lebanese—or perhaps more specifically the Beirutis—had inherited their business-like characteristics from their mercantile, sea-faring ancestors (Chiha, 1949).

In this light, discourses of nationalism (such as Phoenicianism) that promoted a sense of geographical determinism clearly articulated and sought to naturalise notions of market and trade. The most notable thing about Phoenicianism, perhaps, is the way the emphasis placed upon Beirut and the important role of its silk merchant and traders also inadvertently shaped notions regarding the city’s hinterlands and, subsequently, forged a particular type of urban-rural relationship. Thus, while Beirut may have been the cosmopolitan centre for many “ancient races,” Mount Lebanon was perceived by many urban elites and Europeans as a “Biblical landscape;” “a stunning beauty of the mountain chain overlooking Beirut, which appeared to be an inviolate sanctuary” (Makdisi, 2000: 15).

Ritualistic Displays of Hospitality

While we can see that “chateau” appeared during the French mandate, it is apparent that, much like other symbolic and agricultural practices used in wine production, it also belonged to the same political vision of the world that began its hegemonic ascent during a period, Kassir defines as the “Great Transformation” of Beirut during the nineteenth century (2010). This was not only marked by the return of the Jesuit Mission into the Orient but also when Ottoman markets were opened for European trade and Beirut became an important trading centre. Kassir notes that this was an era of significant price fluctuations, where products such as Egyptian sugar had to compete with Caribbean sugar (refined in Marseilles), as did Yemen mocha with Brazilian coffee. Meanwhile other goods, such as silk from Lebanon and Syria and cotton from Egypt and Palestine actually gained value. In this light, it is important to point out that this period of Beirut’s transformation does not only represent a particularly important part of the region’s history within the world-system, but is also indicative of a process of accelerated change (Hann, 1994).

The rebuilding of the city to make way for increased trade, as a result of the expanding world-system, did not necessarily occur overnight. Nevertheless, these measures still reflect the rapid changes occurring at the time. More pertinently, this transitional phase was also one of social crisis. For example, the increased circulation of “European” commodities at an affordable price (ranging from coffee and coffee grinders to cutlery, beds, and mattresses) made such items available to larger numbers of consumers across Beirut and Mount Lebanon (Makdisi, 2000). In so doing, the social value of such products, which were otherwise utilized in the “rituals of hospitality” and were thus so vital for the patron in expressing his power, honour, influence, and reputation, was put into question

(ibid: 44 see also Nerval, 2012 for an account of such rituals of hospitality). Yet to what extent did such rapid changes come about due to increasing European influence in the region?¹⁰ After all, the increasing presence of, and *desire* for, European commodities in Beirut and Mount Lebanon is suggestive of a growing prominence of European tastes in the region. Kassir's remarks concerning the term *al-tafarnuf* are evocative here:

the spirit of Beirut that was being formed under the influence of the *al-tafarnuf* (from *Franj*, meaning Franks—a term that denoted not only the French but, since the time of the Crusades, Europeans in general), which is to say the Westernization that went hand in hand with the city's economic development. The *imitation* of the West was not always conscious. And if the term “*tafarnuf*” was applied at first to an indigenous social elite having personal contact with Europeans, its subsequent extension suggests that the *urge to imitate* foreign models soon became irresistible, affecting all classes and all areas of social activity. (Kassir, 2010: 207, my emphasis)

Also highlighted in Kassir's account however is the symbolic significance of Beirut in perpetuating this sense of *al-tafarnuf*. This regards the way in which the very idea of the Beirut metropolis brought forth elitist qualities such as affluence, wealth, and high culture. What, then, was the role of the urban elites in accelerating the socio-economic changes that were characteristic of Beirut's Great Transformation?

Significantly, during this period of Ottoman Beirut, urban elites, such as the Sursock and de Bustros forged particularly strong political ties with Europe during their roles as the *dragoman*. As hosts, these families received European officials into their lavish palaces and villas, performing “rituals of hospitality”. These established ties were not only articulated through political and economic links, but also through social bonds. For

¹⁰ This crisis of value also manifested in more violent forms of conflict. Indeed, the rise of a religious sectarianism akin to more contemporary practices emerged in the form of rebellions across Mount Lebanon in 1860.

example, daughters of families such as the Sursock were married to European aristocrats; a legacy that continued well into the twentieth century. Lady Cochrane Sursock, a philanthropist and public figure in Lebanon today, married Sir Desmond Cochrane in 1946. Her mother was Donna Maria Theresa Serra di Cassano, the daughter of Francesco Serra, seventh Duke of Cassano. In his memoirs, Nicolas de Bustros, the father of Michel de Bustros (founder of Chateau Kefraya) writes of his family's relationship with Tsar Alexander III of Russia. It was because of the Grand Duke Serge of Russia, who used to call his forefather, Habib Bustros, 'Habib El-Kebir' (Habib the Great), that the 'de' was added in front of the name Bustros (1983).

At the same time, it appears that a new form of "broker capitalism" emerged, where such urban elites began to develop extensive social networks in rural regions (Burke III, 1988). Rather than the Sicilian *gabelloto* and *campiere*, it was the *zaim* and *qabadayat* who controlled (or at least attempted to control) the peasantry populations (Burke III, 1988 & Schneider & Schneider, 1976). We could also extend such similarities, as Burke III observes, by drawing attention to the distinction made by Schneider and Schneider between the processes of *modernization* and the processes of *development* (1976: 3). Although both sets of processes entail growth and change, the former tends to lack "economic development", and they "are vulnerable to the ideologies and life-styles of industrial metropolitan centres" (ibid). Modernizing societies, therefore, are not characterised by increasing productive capacity, and usually remain dependent upon more advanced centres. Significantly, *dependence* elites within such societies have a "vested interest" in maintaining some sort of compliance to the demands of foreign powers, and therefore also

have little interest in economic diversification.¹¹ Indeed, as Burke III suggests, the contemporary characteristics of Lebanese agriculture, as in Sicily, appear to have resulted from a long history of monoculture and dependence upon world-systems.

In the process of Ottoman decentralisation, there was also a clear shift in the conceptualisation of place, and of property relations based more explicitly on the transformative potential of labour. While these types of property (and labour) relations might be universal to capitalist production, their specific manifestation during the “Great Transformation” of Beirut appears to have been shaped by the economic interests of the elite merchants, who had developed strong ties with business elites of Britain and France. Given that the prominence of Beirut’s elites had started to extend well into the region’s hinterlands and as far as the Bekaa plains, significant social and economic value began to derive from the ability and capacity to generate capital through commerce, trade, and other forms of service-based labour. In many respects the crisis of value highlighted by the *fellahin* uprisings of 1860, and the issue of increased circulation of commodities originally used exclusively in hospitality rituals by elites, reflects the broader struggles of shifting labour and class relations. Notably, many elite mercantile families were also owned land in parts of Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley, and their affluence was thus quite clearly visible in these rural areas.¹²

¹¹ The Schneiders also point out that both types of elites (dependence and development elites) can be present in the same place, competing for control (1976).

¹² While religious sectarianism is not a central focus of this thesis, it is notable that, despite the growing affluence of urban merchants during the nineteenth century, the Christian *fellahin* uprisings of 1860 were directed against their Druze lords. While I cannot provide further analysis here, such observations are parallel to Makdisi in the way that the rise of religious sectarianism during Lebanon’s modernity served to conceal the political agenda of European hegemony (2000).

It is significant, therefore, that the widespread use of European commodities grew at this time, with consumers replicating the activity of the elites. I would also argue that, along with the increasing circulation of such goods, there was also an acquirement of new ideas of taste that was similar to European notions of quality. In this regard, the prestige value placed upon wine by urban elites and their attempts to control production reflects such a process. Indeed, the usage of wine in such rituals of hospitality can also be reflected in the travel diary, ‘Voyage en Orient,’ of the 19th century traveller, Gerard de Nerval, who writes of a prestigious “vin d’or” served by a prince (2012: 14).

By the time of the French mandate, the administration encouraged an outward looking economic model for Greater Lebanon, where its capital, Beirut became the principle port for greater Lebanon’s rural hinterlands; suggesting the enduring influential social and economic prominence of these elite families (Gates, 1998: 91). *La Belle Epoque*, as Kassir describes the mandate period, was one of transformation reminiscent of the mid-nineteenth-century, and a new dock and an airport were also built (2010). Beirut underwent further urban (re)planning, replicating the designs of the Palace d’Etoile in Paris. A growing number of cafes and restaurants were established, as well as a number of hotels such as the Grand Hotel, built on the summit of the Broumanna slopes. Traboulsi observes that one aspect of the economic interests of these elite families were turning towards developing the Lebanese tourist industry (2007). With many owning shares in prestigious hotels such as the Bristol Hotel and St. George Hotel, as well eventually the having command over major land and air transport companies, for example with shares in Air Liban and Middle Eastern Airlines. These elite families also invested “in modern

agricultural projects” in the Bekaa (ibid)¹³. Indeed it is of significance that, by 1925, most of the Bekaa Valley had become collectively owned by a few Beirut—mercantile families—while religious institutions owned one third of the fertile lands (Hoshmand & Doueiri, 1998).

Concluding Remarks

In tracing the emergence of certain visions that articulate particular hierarchical connections between land and people as conveyed in written and oral histories, this chapter has attempted to explore how these visions have come to permeate practices within Lebanese wine production. In so doing, I have attempted to demonstrate that the replication of “modern” wine production in Lebanon, with features such as French grape varieties, a wine law first established during the French mandate, and winery estates that utilize the term “chateau”, have made it possible for some level of symmetry with wine production globally (and especially in regards to France). Yet, as Sahlins has argued, these social transformations were not part of a “universal march of reason proclaimed by the eighteenth century” in that those residing in the region at the time are represented as “neo-historyless peoples whose own agency disappeared more or less with their culture, the moment Europeans erupted on the scene” (Sahlins, 1999: 45 & 58).

The making of the “Merchant Republic”, as Gates argues, was not, then, founded on a *tabula rasa* (1998). Rather, the emergence of Lebanon’s open economy was part of an on-going

¹³ It might of further interest to note that, in his memoirs, de Bustros expresses his commitment to the development of the Lebanese agricultural sector. During the early years of vineyard plantation on the family lands in Kefraya, de Bustros also planted other crops such as tomatoes, cucumbers and melons. Some of these crops earned widespread recognition for their quality and size. He explains that in 1957, he received the first prize in the annual Zahle agricultural competition for the watermelons grown within the de Bustros domain at Kefraya. The seeds for these watermelons, which were imported from the United States, were known as the ‘Black Giant.’ However, the winning giant seedless watermelon, weighing at 32 kilograms, became known in Kefraya, from then on ‘simply as Bustros’ (de Bustros, 2001).

process whereby local actors continuously respond and adapt to “movements in the international, regional and local arenas” (Gates, 1998: 2). The emergence of a “modern” wine industry in Lebanon thus expresses cultural hegemony and the ways in which elites, aspiring or otherwise, sought to maintain or gain social prominent positions as the Lebanese nation-state slowly edged towards independence. In this light, the emergence of a wine law in Lebanon draws our attention to the reification process that forged a particular relationship between the realms of viticulture and viniculture. Meanwhile, the significance of the chateau as utilized by certain elites served as a means through which to assert a hierarchical connection to both land and labour.

4: Along the Watch Tower: Narrating the Kefraya Landscape¹⁴

There is a well-known story in Kefraya about the formation of the region's viticulture landscape. The events in the story however, pre-date the first vine plantations to a time when everyone looked after goats and tended to their fields of legumes and wheat. As the story goes, it was during the French mandate that land surveyors arrived by car and started putting markers along the side of the road, on the outskirts of Kefraya. They became thirsty and stopped to ask a *fellahi* shepherd for some water. The shepherd could only offer them milk from one of his goats as they were quite far from any source of water. In return for his hospitality, the administrators offered him the land they were surveying. The shepherd, initially (politely) refused because he was worried about paying land taxes. Eventually the land surveyors convinced him that he could use the land to grow crops to sell, and the shepherd accepted. As a result of this exchange, the shepherd and his family were among the first and largest vineyard owners in the region.

On one level, the story speaks of the emergence of a new method of categorizing property that stands in sharp contrast to the Ottoman administrative tax system (Smith, 2004)¹⁵. Maps were barely used to categorize and tax private property

¹⁴ Parts of this chapter have been used in Saleh, 2013a.

¹⁵ The cadastre surveying project of Lebanon began in 1926 and carried on into the 1940s (Firro, 2003). It was entrusted to French engineer Duraffourd (El Hibri, 2009). The cadastral survey could not, however, have taken place without the accomplishments of the Jesuit Père Berloty in using innovative surveying techniques such as the triangulation and the azimuth across Syria and Lebanon. Berloty is recognised for the construction of the observatory in Ksara, and according to his obituary in the Jesuits' Order's 1934 publication of *Relations d'Orient*, he acquisitioned a 'lunette equatoriale'; known in English as a refracting telescope during 1913–1914 (Combiér, 1934). After World War I, Berloty turned his attention to rebuilding what had been destroyed in Ksara and in 1921 was appointed by the French General Gourand as the director of the meteorological service in the Syrian and Lebanese mandates. Liaising with the Geographic and Navigation Services of the French Army, Pere Berloty determined the longitude and latitude coordinates of the region. The data that emerged from this research is still referred to by scientists across the world, including those working for NASA. He also installed a seismograph that was able to read and log the 1927

during the Ottoman period, in sharp contrast to European administrative strategies such as those deployed by the English bureaucrats in colonial India (ibid). In the case of colonial Egypt, Mitchell argues that these new forms of measurement used in the cadastral survey gave rise to “a new regime” of calculation and representation (2002:90). Unlike older mapping systems, this new surveying system displayed both the size of the plot of land and its relation to other plots within the same area (ibid). The cadastral survey compelled those attempting to avoid taxation—either by failing to register their land or by claiming lower taxes due to the quality or potential of the land—to abide by the new regulations for private property. At the same time, people were represented as numbers associated with particular plots of land, while coordinates established a referential system within the village, which extended across the country as a whole (ibid). Villages were therefore situated, “contained and organized” within a new spatial order in the emerging nation, characterised by urban centres and rural peripheries (ibid). In turn, this nation was situated within the broader spatial order of the global market economy. Mitchell’s observations resonate strongly, particularly when studying the map of the Kefraya region that was based on the cadastral survey in 1933. Not only are all plots of owned land numbered, but the size of each plot is also clearly depicted, and the names associated with the numbers are held at a land registry office situated in Zahle, a town further north in the Bekaa¹⁶.

While the account given by the shepherd of Kefraya speaks of broader political and economic transformations, the story simultaneously serves as a foundational

catastrophic earthquake. The epicentre of the earthquake was in Jericho, but it had disastrous effects to the West Bekaa. In 1928 Berloty received a cross of recognition from General Weygand for his dedication to the development of the “*la science francaise*”.

¹⁶ This is the only map of Kefraya I have been able access that contains information pertaining to property. It has, however, proven impossible to obtain information concerning which families owned the lands.

myth—it is frequently told in conjunction with narratives about the arrival of the *Cinsault* vines in Kefraya, which began a couple of decades later, and also the prominent role of de Bustros in instigating these plantations. The myth of the good shepherd speaks of how the emergence of these new types of property relations was intimately linked to the rise of commodity production. For with the advent of the plantations of *Cinsault kouroum*, led by de Bustros on his lands, Kefraya was quite literally placed onto the wine map of the world. Kefraya became an important winegrowing centre, where wineries from across Lebanon converged during harvest time to buy grapes. Once Kefraya residents agreed to de Bustros' proposals to plant their own *Cinsault* vines, contractual agreements were set up and wineries began to buy grapes from Kefraya village. Those who owned larger amounts of land, such as the shepherd and his family, would have benefited the most from this contractual system.

In the most general sense of Malinowski's myth of origin, the story of the shepherd offers a sense of continuity, allowing those narrating and listening to interpret the changes that were taking place across the Lebanese wine industry, and which continued to affect the lives of Kefraya residents (Malinowski, 2004). There is, however, also an element of cosmic irony in the story of the exchange of land for a cup of milk that seems to convey that the hospitable and somewhat innocent shepherd was not really aware what he was getting himself and his family into—or the rest of Kefraya for that matter. On the one hand, in accepting the land, the shepherd was agreeing—albeit unwittingly—to a new social contract based upon the expectations of absolute and individual property relations (Pottage, 2004b).

The promise of commodity production by the surveyors would potentially have allowed the shepherd to break from an older social contract, where the *fellahin* of

Kefraya were subject to taxes collected in the form of produce from the land by certain members of Beirut's elite, who also owned lands in Kefraya. In registering the land as his own, and subsequently selling his produce directly to the market, the shepherd seemingly had the opportunity to break away from his previous obligations to the urban lords of Kefraya. Yet little did he realise that once the vineyard plantations began to expand across Kefraya, residents would now be subject to the demands of urban wine elites, such as de Bustros, who had a vested interest in the Kefraya region. And coterminous to this patronage system was the apparent emergence of a new hierarchical system within the village, reproduced through the unequal distribution of land. After all, within the new wine market economy, those who acquired land in the village were seemingly in a more advantageous position than those who had not.

This chapter seeks to unpack the elements of the foundational myth and related irony concerned with the emergence of a new social contract, which is evoked in the tale of the shepherd of Kefraya. Broadly speaking, I share the view of Ortiz: that the emergence of these new contractual agreements, such as those between a vineyard owner and winery, is indicative of the presence of a market driven economy, and thus also of a flux or shift in power relations—generally to an imbalanced exchange that asserts and maintains capitalist monopoly privileges (Ortiz, 1992). It is useful to bear in mind that, similarly to Ortiz's observations, such contracts in Kefraya were not always written but were instead implicit agreements characterised by custom and social relations of power, forged over time. For example, some contracts between wineries and vineyard owners in Kefraya were characterised by relationships that continued on to the next generation through acts of gift-giving and reciprocal exchange, extending beyond the commoditized realm of production. In doing so, such personalised relations

encouraged further commitment, while attempting to ensure a degree of control over resources.

Yet while there was a sense of continuity in such relations, there were also attempts to shift these social relations of power through narratives of the history of viticulture landscape in Kefraya. In this regard,—and a central point in this chapter—is that, in agreeing to participate in this new social contract, residents of Kefraya were subsequently also able to see themselves as active participants in the history of Lebanese wine production. Of importance here are the narratives that sought to emphasize the active roles of Kefraya residents in forming and continuously shaping *their* landscape.

Given that recognition of de Bustros' role in Kefraya was not limited to the village, the chapter begins by exploring narratives from outside of the region that spoke of his accomplishment of transforming Kefraya into a viticulture landscape. An examination of such narratives provides a useful lens from which to explore another important form of irony emerging from the tale of the good shepherd. Namely, the tale also conveys a sense of dramatic irony in that, unbeknown to the shepherd, but also to the surveyors, the exchange of a simple cup of milk for land raised three rather significant contradictory questions. First, how can the value of the land be measured? Second, who decided the value of the land? Third, was it not paradoxical that the French surveyors were giving land from Kefraya to someone from Kefraya?

In raising these questions, the tale of the good shepherd thus draws attention to the intimate awareness that people of Kefraya had of the paradoxes of ownership of such “fictitious commodities” (c.f. Polanyi, 1957). For, more often than not, when the story was told by residents of Kefraya there was usually an emphasis on the fact that

the shepherd did not initially seem to understand the implications of owning a plot of land. His fear of paying taxes had to do with his lack of knowledge about the potential of the land as a valuable commodity. That is, the significance of acquiring the land and conforming to the market economy was intimately connected to the possibility of autonomy—that is, freedom from subservience to the lords of Kefraya. Yet while the surveyors might have bestowed the land on the shepherd for his hospitality, unlike the narrators and audience of this tale, they were unaware of the contradiction they participated in by giving the land to someone already *from* that land.

In this light, the usage of terms such as “landscape” in the narratives by Kefraya residents, which will also be explored in the proceeding sections, speak of the emergence of a particular sense of place-making that is linked to the incorporation of the region into a market economy, and which has significant parallels to observations made by Gudeman and Rivera concerning “conversational communities”. It is also linked to the relationship between shifting economic models and focal metaphors of economic process (1990 and more broadly: Hirsch, 1995). While these narratives echo broader economic and agricultural epistemologies, they also convey a certain shift, where we see the way the emergence of a boundary between the realms of production and reproduction in which the landscape, the *kouroum*, and the *Cinsault* vines were intimately entangled within the spheres of work, home, and kinship. I argue that narratives of the landscape, such as that of the shepherd, portray an enduring sense of the *longue memoire* of family events that appear autonomous from the unfolding of broader (and external) historical events (Zonabend, 1984).

The Kefraya Landscape as a Model for Lebanese Wine Production

The media overflows with articles about distinguished businessmen who have invested in wine production in Lebanon, with rather successful results—despite the potential hazards of a country in continuous political and economic instability. Perhaps the most prominent story is that of de Bustros, the founder of the Chateau Kefraya winery. Accounts of de Bustros' successful wine enterprise are often seen in newspaper articles in local and international media, as well as images of the Kefraya region regularly featuring in tourism campaigns to promote Lebanon's cultural traditions. Lebanon is depicted as a place of rural beauty, where tourists can escape to taste wine and eat at *Le Relais de Dionysius*, which overlooks the vineyards and chateau of Kefraya. Credit is also given to de Bustros for the successful establishment of the Chateau Kefraya winery in 1979, when the conflict in Lebanon intensified dramatically. Equally important, however, were his viticulture initiatives that transformed a whole region into a landscape of vineyards. De Bustros began modifying family lands in Kefraya as early as 1951. Even then his business pursuits were considered extraordinary. In the excerpt below, from his memoirs, published in 2002, entitled *D'Haute d'une Breteche*, de Bustros speaks of his early days in Kefraya:

I was regarded as an outsider by my entourage. Not impressed thus far, I proceeded to extend this vineyard in 1953: 15 acres of land were cleared with dynamite and more vines were planted. I was devoted to my project and in a succession of waves from 1958 until 1978 I cleared land and created 300 hectares of vineyards; the grapes were sold to different wineries. (de Bustros, 2001: 16; my translation)

Following the transformation of his family lands in Kefraya, de Bustros turned to local residents in the Kefraya village, offering to pay upfront if they would plant vines—mainly of the *Cinsault* varieties. By the time of my fieldwork, the Kefraya region, with over 700 hectares of vines, had become the winegrowing hub of Lebanon and the most important source of grapes for most of the country’s wineries. Some wineries rely upon the region’s grapes as a back-up during low-yielding harvests, while others return annually. There were, at the time, two other wineries in Kefraya: Cave Kouroum and Chateau Marsyas. Cave Kouroum is owned by Bassim Rahal from the Kefraya village. The Chateau Marsyas winery was under construction, and is located on the outskirts of the Kefraya municipality. The major investors are from the Saade family—a mercantile family involved in wider networks of trade and banking. Yet the uniqueness of Chateau Kefraya remains, perhaps because it is eponymous with the region from which grapes were sourced exclusively for its wines. No other winery in Lebanon could lay such a claim.

The prestige of de Bustros, as featured within the narratives of those I met during fieldwork, is based upon his accomplishments and success in his contribution to the establishment of a wine enterprise in Lebanon; one that traverses different layers of the local and global wine markets. Indeed the Comte de M 1996 vintage, which received a 91 (outstanding) rating in Robert Parker’s *Wine Advocate*, was a trailblazer for the entry of Lebanese wines into the international high-end wine market.

Many informants from outside the Kefraya village described de Bustros as the “original aristocrat”, referring to his family’s historical ties to the Beirut mercantile classes. He was recognised as one of the few early “pioneers” of the Bekaa Valley, for he saw the potential of the land. Mr Ramzi Ghosn, of the Massaya winery, spoke of de

Bustros' strategies as "geopolitical manoeuvres". As I followed him up one of the *coteaux* of Kefraya during an early summer afternoon, Ghosn asked what would be more pleasing to the eye, fields of potatoes or a landscape of vines planted geometrically so that they trace and enunciate the hills on which they were planted? Making wine, he explained, was better for the economy of Lebanon. After all, what is best for a country to be known for—wine or potatoes? De Bustros, Ghosn concluded, was the man who started such a tradition for Lebanon. Indeed de Bustros shared a similar view, informing me during an interview that "Kefraya was from my parents", and until he had started planting vines, "Kefraya was not anything that they looked after, it was just somewhere in Lebanon—a property of land". With the plantation of the vines, Kefraya was no longer just a "property" of land that the family had acquired by way of a maternal aunt at the beginning of twentieth century; it was transformed into a landscape: a distinctive place that invoked—or demanded—a certain kind of aesthetic appreciation.

Such narratives of de Bustros' were suggestive of the qualities attributed to successful wine producers in Lebanon. After all, these accounts highlight not only his charisma and foresight in identifying the potential of his family's lands in Kefraya, but also his initiative in identifying wine as an appropriate product for Lebanon to export to international markets. All the more notable here however, was the absence of the vineyard owners of Kefraya in these narratives. When I asked informants for their thoughts on the contribution of residents of Kefraya to the landscape, on a number of occasions winery owners from across the country explained that while the village was full of vines, "there was no culture of vines *per se*", and nobody from the region fully appreciated "the beauty of the *paysage* (French for landscape)", or for that matter drank

the wines of Kefraya. As one informant asked me, “Do you see them celebrating the harvest like they do in Bordeaux?” When I suggested that the Kefraya vineyard owners might appreciate their vines differently, my informant responded that no one from the region was really interested in working to create a landscape of vines, “they just come out during the harvest to oversee the Bedouins who pick the grapes”.

In conjunction with these explanations, de Bustros was described as someone who loved Kefraya “because he loves the vines as well”. Indeed, during an interview expressed such sentiments by telling me of his desire for his burial site to be perched on top of the Ramatani hill that overlooks the vineyards of Kefraya. Notably, such accounts led to a discussion about a rather important topic: the majority of people from Kefraya were unwilling to comply with demands to replace their *Cinsault* vines with noble varieties deemed to produce better quality wines for international markets. It was suggested that de Bustros was more willing to change the types of varieties he had initially planted to ensure the augmentation of Chateau Kefraya’s wines; and significantly this was even after the winery opened to other investors such as Walid Junblatt, who own up to 70% of the company’s shares.



Vineyards leading towards the Ramatani Hill, in the distance.

Such a manner of representation resonates with Ulin's observations of the cooperatives of table wine producers in the Aquitaine region of southwest France (1987 & 1996). That is, the strong historical focus and emphasis on Bordeaux merchants and elite wine growers reified their cultural capital and provided legitimacy for their recognition as the rightful possessors of (authentic) knowledge about the production of high-quality wines. Other parallels also surface. Similarly to these cooperatives, the Kefraya vineyard owners were notably absent from media sources and historical and scientific records of wine production in Lebanon. Indeed, from newspaper articles to books, the vineyard owners of Kefraya remained in the background and almost invisible, while de Bustros and Chateau Kefraya were usually brought to the fore of the viticulture landscape (see, for example, Karam, 2005).

In this light, usage of the term landscape takes on more significant connotations, especially in regard to a geographical study of the viticulture landscape of the Bekaa Valley. The author of this study begins by offering a definition of the term *paysage* (landscape) as conceptualised by the European Council in 2000: “Article 1 defines landscape as an area, (as perceived by people,) whose character is the result of the actions and interactions of natural and/or human factors” (Bel, 2009: 19 my translation). Bel suggests that viticulture landscapes are unique because of their ability to bring forth the distinguishing features of a place through their wines. He argues that despite the fact that viticulture is subject to regulations imposed by the state and international organizations such as the OIV, it is the particular *cultural* history of the region that shapes the viticulture landscape. In the case of Lebanon, he observes that there are very few regions that fit with this definition of a viticulture landscape.

Vineyards (for wine) cover about 14,000 hectares of Lebanon, with a few scattered across the slopes of Mount Lebanon and the northern coastal regions of Jbeil. These, however, are merely small patches of vines planted alongside other agricultural produce such as olive trees. The area that fits most closely with Bel’s definition is the Bekaa Valley, which he calls Lebanon’s “viticulture corridor”. Yet even within the Bekaa, Bel could find few regions with an extensive viticulture system. In the north of the Bekaa, the Coteaux Heliopolis Cooperative’s members were vineyard owners from the villages of Ainata, Yamouneh, and Boucheit. The cooperative was founded in 1999 by the current manager, Dr Sami Rahme, from Ainata, as an initiative to replace the growth of illicit crops such as hashish and opium poppies, and with financial and technical support from the French government. According to Bel’s figures, these vineyards cover approximately 136.3 hectares and are considerable in comparison to

the minute five hectares of vines belonging to Mr Sebastien Khoury of Domaine de Baal, over in Zahle in Central Bekaa. Yet the vineyards of the cooperative are irregularly spread out and thus, visually speaking, lack consistency. This is a similar situation to the owners of larger vineyards across the Bekaa Valley who sell their grapes to Chateau Ksara, where the viticulture landscape is broken up across the plains and slopes.

The sheer uniformity of Kefraya's viticulture, however, makes the region the most "dynamic" landscape in Lebanon. "Dynamic", as Bel notes hastily in a footnote, does not refer to the quality of the vines; for as he points out later on, the Kefraya region is covered with approximately 60% of *Cinsault*. The term "dynamic" refers specifically to the surface region covered by vines and in the "true sense of the term, a monoculture of vines" (ibid: 82). While describing Kefraya as *dynamic*, Bel does not speak of the *viticulteurs* of Kefraya as he does the *viticulteurs* of the Bekaa. In fact he opens his discussion of Kefraya by stating that "with 752 hectares of vines" *Chateau Kefraya* constitutes the largest region of vines in Lebanon (ibid). Bel fails to mention that only approximately 300 hectares of these vines actually belong to the Chateau Kefraya estate. The other 400 hectares or so belong predominantly to Kefraya villagers. He continues to write that if the Jesuits can be recognised as the founding fathers of the modern wine industry, it is de Bustros who should be acknowledged as a key figure in the expansion of the viticulture landscape of Lebanon. Since then, the region has been of interest to other wine producers such as Cave Kouroum (whose owner, he fails to mention, is from Kefraya village) and more recently, Chateau Marsyas, who Bel reports holds 55 hectares with 6,000 vines per hectare.

In many respects, the absence of Kefraya's vineyard owners from Bel's analysis reflects the less formal narratives told to me by many of the winery owners across the country. The similar usages of the term "landscape", or "*paysage*", by Bel and the winery owners is suggestive of the reproduction—or replication—of a particular model of place that is contingent on other strategies in the production of wine (Gudeman and Rivera, 1990). Significantly, landscapes of wine production have a tendency to produce certain aesthetic values such as notions of authenticity and history. Narratives featuring a chateau, an aristocrat, and his vineyards thus speak of an aesthetic disposition and subsequently of what Bourdieu terms a sense of "legitimate superiority" (1984). Here, the perpetuation and celebration "of the essence by virtue of which they are accomplished" generate the value of the viticulture landscape as one that is unique and distinctive; and it attains even more singularity through its attachment to one particular man (1984: 24). That is, a sense of *historicity* emerges, whereby credit is given to de Bustros in forming a landscape of vineyards and a chateau that can easily be categorized alongside other exclusive viticulture regions across the world, but especially perhaps in relation to France. At the same time and within this sense of historicity, the vineyard owners of Kefraya seemingly lack a sense of wine culture, or so they appear, and thus their roles in viticulture have quite literally been written out of the history of wine production in Kefraya and, subsequently, Lebanon as well.



Vineyards during the harvest with seasonal workers carrying crates on their shoulders—in the background Chateau Kefraya is concealed by trees.

The Landscape as a Metaphor for Changing Models in Kefraya

The absence of Kefraya residents from even the most official narratives potentially evokes how silences within historical records, as Ulin points out, elucidate what Wolf considers a broader reflection on the social relations of power (1987 & Wolf, 2010). Yet Ulin demonstrates that the Aquitaine table wine producers were hardly passive actors, as they continued to deploy strategies in order to assert power, and at times counter their subjugation. Exploring the ways table wine producers actively sought to ensure a position within the wine market not only contributes towards balancing the

perspective but can also shed light on how elite structures and models are culturally reproduced by table wine growers.

With this in mind, Kefraya, I was frequently told by its residents, had the “the most beautiful *munzar* (landscape) in the whole country”. The etymology of the word *munzar* is of significance here, as it derives from the word *nazar* and can refer to different ways of perceiving an object. These include: “to glance” and “to gaze”, as well as more explicit forms of surveillance such as “to oversee” or “to supervise.” *Munzar* in this regard is already suggestive of a way of “seeing” that can perhaps imply a particular position where one is able “to supervise, see, or look from above.” To speak of the Kefraya *munzar* thus resonates somewhat with Cosgrove’s definition of landscape as a particular cultural representation of the world where one adopts “the role of observer rather than participant” (1984: 18). In this way, and contrary to the views expressed by many wine owners and managers, such narratives of the beautiful Kefraya *munzar* were indicative of a shared appreciation for the aesthetic values portrayed in the accounts in the preceding section.

Notably, explanations about the Kefraya landscape by local residents often begin by emphasizing its tranquillity. As the owner of a fast food restaurant in Kefraya explained to me, “The *munzar* of the *karam* (vineyard) and chateau of Kefraya is beautiful and calming”.¹⁷ He went to explain, “This is what we have here in Kefraya, and everything is peaceful. It is calm—so different from all the chaos and noise in the rest of Lebanon”. He had a point: there was something very different about Kefraya. With a population of approximately 1,200 residents, the region was quite distinct in

¹⁷ Conversations with most Kefraya residents were in Arabic. Unless otherwise stated, I have translated all quotes and narratives from our discussions.

comparison to the hustle and bustle of urbanised areas across the plains or even the neighbouring villages where fields of agricultural crops were a broken-up patchwork of plots surrounding peoples' homes. Kefraya was, as Bel describes, "a sea of vines". There was the occasional fig tree, a small cluster of olive trees, and a group of miniature pine trees growing on a sloping plot of land further up into the village. Many of the villagers' homes were quite ornate with rustic red roofs. In the plains below, Chateau Kefraya added to the pastoral character of the scenery.

At a glance, the greenery and foliage that covers vast amounts of the region appears both static and unchanging. There is always a sense of tranquillity in Kefraya village, especially during the early summer months. Families, out on their verandas and balconies, shout out to invite those strolling by. The scent of freshly made mulberry cordial intermingles with the *kahwa* aroma and drifts on the breeze across the plains. Crickets sing, while cars driven by young men zoom along the village roads. During fieldwork, I often took the opportunity to go for a leisurely walk at this time. After the cold winter nights stuck indoors and sleeping next to the hot stove, I appreciated the warm sun and fresh air. Most of the village is situated up in the hills, and sometimes my walk would take me down towards the flatter plains near the area known locally as the *Herj* (wooded area), which is covered in vines. Other times my stroll took me across the hills to the region known as the Mound of Sand, also covered in vines.

I was usually fortunate to have received invitations earlier in the day, so following my late afternoon walks I would arrive at the house of my host. During visits, my hosts were keen to hear about recent findings and my adventures across the Bekaa Valley. Who had I visited in the north of the Bekaa and what grapes did they grow? There were some awkward moments when I felt that saying too much would leave me

in a compromising position. Topics of conversations would then usually change and more coffee was poured. Despite this momentary discomfort, I really enjoyed my evening visits in Kefraya. It was a relaxing time and as we placed our empty coffee cups back on their saucers; there would often be a collective sigh as everyone gazed out onto the landscape. I would then be told, usually with a great deal of pride, that Kefraya had the most beautiful landscape. When pressed for an explanation about why it was beautiful, many residents would recount the narrative of de Bustros and his role in transforming the region.

In these narratives, people from Kefraya, of different generations and families, referred to de Bustros as *Khawaja*, a word with Ottoman roots, meaning “esteemed sir.” I was told that by the 1950s, the *Khawaja* had encouraged residents to grow vines and offered many interest-free loans to people to buy *Cinsault* vines. These vines were from France, thus ensuring that phylloxera resistant rootstock was grafted onto the vine. Repayment usually began three years later, once the vines yielded grapes, which were then sold off to wineries such as Chateaux Musar, Ksara and Nakad. Residents explained that when de Bustros transformed the landscape—and the vineyards were extended out onto the lands owned by the villagers—he made the region “known” (*ma’r ūf*). This was because before de Bustros decided to plant vines, there was *nothing* in Kefraya to see. Nobody knew where Kefraya was—or that it even existed. Here, “nothing” implied that Kefraya was a place where only lentils and chickpeas were cultivated, primarily for personal consumption. Following the transformation of the *munzar* (landscape), people started to come from all over the world to visit and “see” Kefraya.

Such narratives of the beautiful landscape featured what Gilson describes as a “new quality deriving from changing times” (1996: 59). These stories after all recounted the roles of elites “in articulating” spatial divides between “periphery and centre” during the modernization of Lebanon, and in this way spoke of a history pertaining to changing social relations of power (Gilson, 1984: 460). For when residents narrated the emergence of the *munzar* in Kefraya, because of the *kouroum*, they were also telling a story about the changes of a rural region—from one located on the peripheries of a newly independent state, to one fully integrated into the Lebanese political economy, as well as a centre for wine production and a marketplace for grapes.

Yet, as with many of the wineries in Lebanon where direct or indirect financial capital flowed from other investors, the Chateau Kefraya winery is no longer predominantly owned by de Bustros and his family. By the late 1980s, the winery was opened to other investors, including Junblatt and members of the Fattal family, who owned the giant distributing company, Fattal et Fils. A somewhat defiant de Bustros told me during an interview that, “it was and is only me in Kefraya”. However, while de Bustros may have been quick to assert his autonomy in response to my query about how the company had changed in the transition from a family run enterprise to something more corporate, he later explained with a sigh that, “for a company to grow and expand, one must make it open to outside investors”.

When residents discussed the management restructuring of Chateau Kefraya, it was usually with reference to their changing relationship with the *Khawaja* and the landscape. Many explained that unlike in earlier times, they were never sure when the *Khawaja* had arrived from Beirut to stay in the chateau. It was only the estate guards who had this knowledge; and many of them were not from the Kefraya region. The

guards, I am told, were hired by Junblatt. Narratives of the *munzar al karam* thus changed, and in this way, positions on the landscape also shifted, signifying the emergence of new relations of power. The *Khawaja* was described as a different person, and people said they rarely saw de Bustros because he had lost interest in Kefraya. When pressed for further explanation, some residents explained that during the harvest there was usually a degree of uncertainty as to who would be buying their grapes—and more importantly, how much they would be sold for. This is highlighted in many of the conversations I had during my visits to peoples' homes; there was a vested interest in obtaining information about the wineries' plans in Kefraya in the coming harvest. I was told that continuing pressure from wineries such as Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara to plant grape varieties other than *Cinsault* meant that the price for these grapes remained volatile.

One informant explained that up until the 1990s—just after the war—de Bustros had offered vineyard owners financial support to buy vines. De Bustros would organize soil analysis to ensure the best rootstock was grafted on the vines that were brought over from France in his name. So, for example, my informant's father had asked for 5000 saplings between 1975 and 1995. More recently, when my informant had requested financial support to purchase the *Cabernet Sauvignon* vines that were more in demand by the wineries, de Bustros was, apparently, no longer willing—or able—to help. I was told, and as we shall see in the following section, that as de Bustros' direct control over production weakened, so too did his ties with particular residents in Kefraya.

The Landscape as a Source of Status-Honour

The role of the *Khawaja* in the narratives of the *munzar* of Kefraya thus conformed “to practical aesthetic expectation”, speaking of the “virtues” and qualities that a man of respect and honour should possess (Gilsenan, 1996: 60). For in bequeathing to Kefraya residents the landscape, de Bustros participated in a particular gift-exchange relationship. That is, the source of his honour as the patron of the *kouroum* was largely founded upon the indebtedness of local residents, where repayment was not only monetary but also in preserving and commemorating his important role in making history in Kefraya (Davis, 1973).

In this light, it is useful to recall that in Chapter Two, I discussed Gilsenan’s notion of “status-honour” and how such ideas were reinforced through elaborate performances in “the chateau or villa in the countryside” (1984: 462). In Kefraya, evidence of early forms of display of status-honour come by way of the autobiographies written (in French) by de Bustros and his father, the late Nicholas de Bustros. In his memoirs, Nicholas de Bustros refers to his “villa” in Kefraya, and of the shame brought upon his family by President Chamoun, who in 1956 failed to stop at the chateau when he was en route to inaugurate the newly constructed dam further south in the Bekaa (1983). This was despite the reception organized by Nicholas de Bustros and the villagers of Kefraya—whom, he writes, potentially lost honour and dignity due to the disrespect shown by the president in not attending the reception. In the memoirs of his son, Michel de Bustros, the story of President Chamoun’s discourteous dismissal of the invitation to the “chateau” is discussed with the same disdain as in his father’s account. The chateau is also mentioned frequently as a place where heads of state, ambassadors, and other powerful figures visit for wine-tasting soirees and meals in the gardens.

It is interesting, however, that I did not encounter such displays during my stay in Kefraya. While this may have been because I was simply not invited to such events, there is some significance in the way that narratives of the beautiful landscape of Kefraya, and the sense of status-honour associated with it, were frequently spoken about in relation to the past actions of the *Khawaja*. Also of relevance was that many in Kefraya acknowledged that narratives about preserving the *Khawaja*'s sense of status-honour were especially important to the Nabhane family. The patriarch, Mr Nabhane Nabhane was the *wakil* at Chateau Kefraya, and was recognised by many in the village for the intimate knowledge he had of the Kefraya landscape; knowledge deriving mainly from his experience working with his father, a couple of decades or so ago. It was also his father, Abdel-Helim Nabhane, who has long since passed away, who planted the first vines in Kefraya with de Bustros—and encouraged others in the village to accept the *Khawaja*'s propositions in the then newly-established Lebanese state.

Following the death of Abdel-Helim, his son, Nabhane, carried on the task of beautifying the Kefraya landscape. Like his father, Nabhane continued to act as a *wakil*, a role that appeared to hold some similarities to the social category of the *wakil* mentioned in Gilsenan's ethnography and described as "deputies in charge of managing landholdings for *beys*" (ibid: 49). Yet we shall see, the role of *wakil* extended beyond the management of the Chateau Kefraya estate, and there were some parallels with the Schneiders' description of the "estate superintendents" of Sicily, who played central roles not only in the economic but also social organization of the large landowners' *latifunda*" (1976: 7).

After taking over the position of *wakil*, Nabhane worked with a number of French (and one Spanish) oenologists hired by Chateau Kefraya. He had assisted many

in gaining familiarity with the landscape of Kefraya and especially with the climate, and this allowed one winemaker to produce the celebrated 1996 Comte de M. Nabhane was also responsible for ensuring that Kefraya residents were aware of the amount of grapes the winery was expecting to buy from the village in each harvest. Nabhane therefore knew as much about the vineyards in the village as he did about the Chateau Kefraya estate. Indeed, he often advised other wineries coming from outside Kefraya about the vineyards in the village that might be most suitable for their needs. It was quite common to meet an owner or manager from one of the small-scale wineries as they sat with Nabhane on the veranda of his villa, commanding a view of the *sahel* (plains) and Chateau Kefraya.

Nabhane's influence extended beyond the *kouroum* of Kefraya. According to Nabhane, when de Bustros began to renovate the Chateau and winery at the end of the civil war, he asked Nabhane "to speak with everyone in the village who wanted to build new homes". Nabhane explained that "We must try and make them with red roofs—to make the *mnuzar* (landscape) beautiful". The timing of de Bustros' request was quite interesting however, because it was made at the time when the winery had been opened to outside investors such as Junblatt. It appears that Junblatt had initially banned de Bustros from entering the chateau. While Junblatt's reasons remained obscure it was Nabhane who negotiated with the politician and his guards at the chateau to allow the *Khawaja* to return. As the story goes:

The Khawaja was in Beirut and Junblatt came to visit the winery. He was standing outside the winery with his shebab (young men). He waved and greeted me, before inviting me to join him and his men for lunch at that restaurant down by the lake. I was at first willing. Then he asked me 'So where is the "Comte" today? In the Chateau?' He started laughing and everyone else did as well. I would not take this, I turned around and left. Just like that.

Nabhane emphasized the words “Comte” and “Chateau” so to indicate that Junblatt was mocking the Khawaja. Given Junblatt’s reputation in politics and also in war, Nabhane’s actions were really quite brave. When I asked Nabhane why he felt obliged to defend the *Khawaja*’s honour, he pointed his index finger towards his chest, “Ana (I am) Nabhane Abdel-Helim Nabhane.” It was made clear that his loyalty to de Bustros had to do with maintaining the honour of his father—whose actions were an important source of Nabhane’s own influential position in Kefraya’s viticulture landscape. For in maintaining the reputation of the Nabhane family as influential and knowledgeable actors in Kefraya’s *kouroum*, Nabhane was able to uphold the family’s “good name” that had started with the arrival of the landscape (Davis, 1973: 22). In preserving the memory of de Bustros’ role in beautifying the landscape, it appeared that there was, for Nabhane, a clear sense of carrying on the legacy his father had started so many years ago.

A reminder of how important it was to continue the legacy of the landscape came to the fore at the entrance to Nabhane’s house, where a framed black and white photograph of the late Abdel Helim hung as the centre piece. Dressed in a gentleman’s jacket and head scarf, the patriarch stood regal, with his arm extended to rest on a table. To the right was a photo-portrait of his son, Nabhane’s brother, who died from a heart attack. On the left of Abdel Helim was a framed article from the Lebanese newspaper *An-Nahar*, dated from 1979. The photograph depicted the Chateau of Kefraya surrounded by fields of wheat. In the distance, a woman held a sickle in her upraised arm as she cut the ripe grain. This was one of Nabhane’s sisters, who had since married and lived in the villa just below Nabhane’s house.

Nabhane's relationship with de Bustros was, however, not as close as his father's had been. One afternoon we were sitting in his jeep, parked at a strategic viewpoint that allowed Nabhane to oversee the pruners below. He pointed in the distance towards a pile of limestone rocks on the perimeter of one of Chateau Kefraya's vineyards. While these rocks did not appear out of place to me, they were actually rubble from the days when de Bustros had used dynamite to make way for the vineyards. According to Nabhane, it was Abdel Helim who had organized the dynamiting and bulldozing of those rocks. Following these events, Abdel Helim ensured the vines were planted geometrically and that each vineyard appeared symmetrical to the other. Nabhane concluded by asking me somewhat rhetorically, "who was it to convince the other villages to accept de Bustros' offer of loans for the vines?"

There seemed to be little public recognition for the role of father and son by de Bustros and the winery. Still, in de Bustros' memoirs, Abdel Helim is one of very few people from the village who are mentioned; he is described as de Bustros' *homme de confiance* in Kefraya. Even then, Abdel Helim's character is usually present only to emphasize the stronger character of de Bustros. I had also discussed de Bustros' memoirs with Nabhane's maternal uncle, who was the *Mukhtar* of the village. Although I did not purposefully instigate the discussion, I was reading de Bustros' memoirs one evening as I sat with the *Mukhtar* and his wife in their salon. The *Mukhtar* did not read French and was interested to hear whether Abdel Helim was mentioned in de Bustros' autobiography. I explained the discussion of Adel Helim's role in protecting the *Khawaja* during the civil war. The *Mukhtar* nodded his head and then insisted that I

speak with Nabhane to hear more of what his father had done to assist the *Khawaja* during the war.

When I finally had the opportunity to ask Nabhane, we were once more out in his jeep but this time next to the rocks he had pointed out weeks earlier. Nabhane stopped the jeep rather abruptly and nodded towards a rock he had once called the “guitar rock” because of its distinctive shape. The “guitar rock” was perched next to a larger pile of rocks where the Syrian army had camped. Nabhane explained that there had been considerable concern the army might occupy the chateau and in so doing, eventually take over the whole of Kefraya. It was his father who had convinced them to stay away from the chateau. Once again Nabhane appeared upset that de Bustros had not publically recognised the actions of his father. When I asked Nabhane what sort of acknowledgement he expected, he explained that following the management restructuring of the winery, de Bustros had started to distance himself from the Nabhane family and consequently the village as whole. There were, according to Nabhane, currently “too many managers” at the winery and the Beirut office who were paid considerably larger salaries than those who pruned the vineyards or worked in the winery. He felt that these managers, including the oenologist who held the title of “technical manager” and who had come to be entrusted with important decisions that affected many in Kefraya, were largely responsible for the breakdown of the relationship between the region’s vineyard owners and the winery. This had to do with the issue that many in Kefraya were unable (or unwilling) to comply with the demand to plant new vines. That the *Khawaja* no longer provided financial assistance for purchasing these vines meant the future of Kefraya’s viticulture landscape was full of uncertainty.

Given that many managers at Chateau Kefraya did not seem to share or value the contribution of the Nabhane family to the formation of the landscape, potential future developments were also quite important to Nabhane. For as the *Khawaja* aged and the authority he apparently once wielded was weakened by new management structures, the winery and the village grew increasingly estranged. Nabhane also reminded me that there did not appear to be any son willing to take the place of the *Khawaja*. Once Nabhane's teenage son had finished his studies, the likelihood of inheriting Nabhane's role as *wakil* was quite slim. On being asked about his son's future work prospects, Nabhane made clear that the best road for Abdo was one where he learnt how to "become a man of the pen and not of the land". In other words, there was no real value in working the land, and prosperity for the family lay in the type of work that had come to be valued at the Chateau Kefraya winery. Thus even if Abdo did end up working at Chateau Kefraya, his position would be quite different to the one held by his father. Nevertheless, he still believed that the important role played by his family in transforming the landscape of Kefraya into a *munzar al karam* would not be completely forgotten by future generations—because the sentiment to preserve and maintain its beauty would remain.

The Landscape Incarnate

The singular of *kouroum* is *karam*, which, in Arabic, spelt the same way, can also mean bountiful and generous (Wehr, 1976). It is interesting that when residents presented the narrative of the *munzar*, *karam* and not *kouroum* was used to describe the arrival of the vineyards. *Karam* in the sense of bountiful was thus perhaps implied through narratives that spoke of the *munzar* that arrived with the *kouroum*. A notable narrative of this kind

was that articulated through certain types of exchanges that occurred between the Nabhane family and de Bustros.

While the relationship between Nabhane and the winery had become somewhat strained in the last decade or so, there was still some level of care taken by de Bustros to maintain bonds with the Nabhane family. On a couple of occasions during the summer months, the *Khawaja* sent his driver to the Nabhane household to deliver some freshly caught and cooked fish. During these occasions, Abdel Helim's widow, Hajjeh Nabhane, who at the time rarely joined everyone for lunch, would also sit down to share the meal with the rest of the family. Such fish was apparently her favourite dish, and it would take precedence on the table, being served solely with the rice that was delivered with it, without any other accompaniments. Gifts also flowed in the opposite direction, and the Nabhane household made sure to send foodstuffs to the *Khawaja*.

Significantly, all the produce sent came from the Nabhanes' *kouroum*. During springtime, delicately stuffed vines leaves, made from the smallest of leaves, were wrapped by Hajjeh Nabhane's youngest daughter, Dunya, who also lives at the Nabhane household. These exchanges were seasonal, and thus both cyclical and continuous, evoking a sense of "food generosity"—the produce from the *kouroum* spoke of a long history of *karam* (generosity). In this way these reciprocal exchanges were much like those food exchanges observed by Sutton in Kalymnian that articulated ideals of personhood through sustaining a shared sense of historical continuity (2001: 16). This process also resonates with Palmer's work on the Bedouin and *fellahin* in Jordan, where she identifies the way that food relations are embedded historically within hierarchical relations (2002). The commensality of sitting at the table with only the food sent over by the *Khawaja* can be seen, therefore, to not only symbolize his social status, but his

political and economic influence, with his gifts informing the way “his” food is eaten in his employee’s home. The *Khawaja’s* influence, then, was not confined to the productive sphere of the winery, but rather entered into the domestic domain.

Yet these acts of remembrance that lay claim to status and honour, while of strong symbolic importance, seemed to be predominantly metaphorical—precisely because de Bustros did not appear to be as influential in affecting what would unfold across the Kefraya landscape as he once had been. Nevertheless, he still held the honorary title of *Khawaja*, and this, the villagers said, was because of Hajjeh Nabhane’s husband, the late Abdel Helim. “Food generosity” therefore collapsed space and time as it called forth previous actors such as the late Abdel Helim. The ways in which commensality was practiced in the home commemorated the memory, life, and honour of Abdel Helim Nabhane, and reinforced inter-household relations across generations.

Thus, for Nabhane, and indeed for many of the people of Kefraya, the landscape did not imply a complete and finished narrative but rather an unfolding—or telling—of a *particular* story of and by those who had physically worked to carve out that landscape. That is, the social significance of the landscape in Kefraya could be understood as “an enduring record of—and testimony to—the lives and works of past generations who dwelt within it, and in so doing have left there something for themselves” (Ingold, 2000: 204). Such importance of the landscape came to the fore during the intimate everyday engagement residents in Kefraya had with certain types of *kouroum*. I say “types” because the word *kouroum* in Arabic and its singular, *karam*, can also be used to refer to an olive grove, a fig orchard, or a vineyard. An olive grove is known as *karam al zaitoun* and its plural is *kouroum al zaitoun*. A fig orchard is

karam al teen and the plural, *kouroum al teen*, while *kouroum al 'anab* signifies vineyards. While the number of olive and fig trees was minute in comparison to the vineyards, and were at times hard to see across the landscape, these plants were still important to Kefraya residents.

In Kefraya the *Cinsault* variety was known locally as *Zaitouniy*.¹⁸ The *Zaitouniy* grapes, I was told, have been in the *kouroum* since the *karam* arrived in Kefraya. In late summer, with the harvest around the corner, the plump *Cinsault* grape berries, with their deep purple hues, became olivish in character—hence the name *Zaitouniy*. It was not uncommon for the men of Kefraya to pick some of these grapes from the family's *kouroum*; at home the women would set some aside under the sun to dry into raisins. The *Cinsault* grapes are full of juice and sugar, and, I was informed are the best for making *Zbīb* (raisins) and grape juice.

Encounters with the *Zaitouniy* grapes appeared to be part of the everyday consciousness of Kefraya residents: apparently mundane daily activities, such as picking grape leaves or drying certain kinds under the summer sun, (re)created and sustained a seasonal connection to the landscape of the *karam*. In this way, *al karam al Zaitouniy*, or the vineyard of the olivish, belonged to an ontological account that, although attached to the historical narrative of wine in Kefraya, diverged from more contemporary viticulture. It spoke of a genealogy of kinship and relatedness, and of the spaces where it was nurtured within Kefraya (c.f. Carsten, 2000). Here the intimacies of the *kouroum*, where grapes were connected to olives through etymological terminology, brought forth other senses of production and consumption related to the embodied act of eating. It evoked a similar sense of sociality and forging of bonds known as *'ishra*,

¹⁸ In Arabic grammar *Zaitouniyy* is a form of an-nisbah: a suffix is added to a noun in order to form an adjective. The suffix *iy* is masculine and *iya(t)* is feminine.

because these foods were never sold, but rather shared and exchanged through acts of kindness and generosity that allowed for a sense of reciprocity (Obeid, 2010 & Abu-Lughod, 1999). Yet *karam al Zaitouniy* also evoked a seasonal association of the olive harvest to come, perhaps in a manner not too dissimilar to what Sutton describes as “prospective memory” (2001: 19). Autumn was thus as busy a time in the *kouroum*, as the grape harvest had been a month or so earlier.

These olive trees appeared for the first time in Kefraya a couple of decades before the *Zaitouniy* grapes and, like the grapes, the olive saplings were imported from Europe. But this time the plants came from Italy instead of France, and some residents in Kefraya still kept the wooden crates with the date of the olive saplings’ import—1934—stamped on the side. The reasons why Italian olives were chosen or favoured over local varieties remain unclear¹⁹. Nevertheless the narrative of the olives describes the hands that planted these saplings as those same hands that planted the *Zaitouniy* grapes—Kefraya’s forefathers. Despite this patriarchal legacy, much of the work that took place in the *kouroum al zaitoun* was done by the women of Kefraya. Apart from driving the olives to the *makbis* (press), the women were usually the ones out in the *kouroum*, rustling the trees. They were also the ones at home plucking olive pods from the stems, before allowing the olives to soak in cold water for a period of time, usually up to a month. For, unlike the grapes, most (if not all) of the olives reaped from the *kouroum* were kept for consumption within the home. The villagers of Kefraya ate olives mainly in the form of olive oil. *Al zait zaitoun* (olive oil) was poured into jars full of cured olives or strained *labneh* (yoghurt), the latter being rolled into

¹⁹ It is possible that the importation of these olive saplings might have been part of a larger agricultural project at the time facilitated by the investment by Lebanese entrepreneurs and coupled with the “aggressive Italian marketing of fruit trees” (Gates, 1998:133).

balls. These jars were stored in the kitchen throughout the year and spoonful of the stored foods were scooped out into little bowls, commonly placed on the kitchen table or a large round tray carried out to the living room or balcony.

These practices did not only mean that foods were available throughout the seasons, they also left traces of the *karam al zaitoun* and *Zaitouniy*—merged together as they seeped across the seasons and entered into daily life; the olive oil soaked into the vine leaves that were stuffed with rice and meat. That the *karam* of the landscape was predominantly associated with activities that began in the *kouroum*, but were finished within the home, is suggestive of the ways in which the continuity of narratives was practiced.

The olive harvest was quite different to that of the grapes in this respect. It was the men of Kefraya, out in their *kouroum* supervising the seasonal workers cutting the grapes that were then sent off to the wineries. There, only some of the grapes brought in by the men were kept for raisins or grape juice. In the autumn, when women entered the *kouroum* and commenced the gathering process, the produce was once more kept and preserved entirely for eating in the home. I was told that the men were more involved in the olive harvest, and elder residents in Kefraya recalled memories of their fathers working in the olive groves. The elder residents lamented times gone by and the disconnection of the younger men from the *kouroum*.

On a number of occasions, many parents and elder residents of Kefraya told me that there was no future in type of *kouroum* for the young men. Nabhane explained that the reason for this sentiment was that the Chateau Kefraya winery's policy did not allow minors to be hired to work during the grape harvest and many youngsters were left idle in the summer, when they could be earning from the *kouroum* of Chateau

Kefraya. Migrant workers were hired instead, yet many of these workers were in fact minors. More skilled adult workers such as his nephew Omar, for example, had expressed a desire to work in the *kouroum* and trained as an agricultural engineer at university—but was unable to find employment. There was also little income to be made by looking after his family's *kouroum* or others in Kefraya.

With socio-economic and material transformations taking place in the *kouroum* of Kefraya, the narratives of *karam* (generosity) seemed to be increasingly reproduced in practices carried out by women. Such narratives had become an engendered form of knowledge, and a type of affective labour that was increasingly transmitted and reproduced through time by grandmothers, mothers, and daughters (c.f. Lem, 1999). Yet, as these practices shifted into the domestic realm, they were concealed by narratives of the landscape that spoke of commodity production of wine.

Notably, however, changes did not only emerge from the strategies deployed by the wineries. Other, more dramatic events, such as the occupation of the region by the Israeli and Syrian armies during the 1980s also left a distinct impression within the minds of local residents. Many people left; some migrating to urban areas such as Beirut, while others went abroad. These accounts of the war period carried more weight given that wild edible plants were picked from the *kouroum* and sent to relatives in Beirut or abroad as reminders of home. Again, it was the women of Kefraya who were active in weaving and (re)binding these ties. Each year in spring, many of the women went out to the *kouroum* to pick the *ħindb'*, one of the many wild edible plants that grew seasonally in small clusters among the vines (Edgecombe, 1970). The women would make sure that some of the plants were parboiled and frozen immediately. These would be set aside, awaiting the next person who might be making a trip abroad.

The landscape of the *kouroum* of Kefraya thus spoke continuously throughout the seasons of life genealogies and of the types of social relations involved in the preservation of that landscape. These social relations were formed through notions of kinship that allowed for a sense of family time to structure, or even at times perhaps take precedence over, “History” (Zonabend, 1984 & Goddard, 1996). Yet in the (re)production of a sense of place through “historical and social reflexivity”, Kefraya residents seeking to ensure the continuity of the landscape of *karam* also sought to forge a communal identity based upon a *shared* sense of family time, evoked through the cyclical temporality of the changing seasons (Seremetakis, 1996, Zonabend, 1984 & Goddard, 1996). In keeping of family time, a sense of family history was produced, which provided structure to broader historical events (ibid).

The Materiality of the Landscape

As the landscape moved towards the familial realm, there were significant shifts in the perception of de Bustros. These shifts were highlighted in explanations from residents about how de Bustros had obtained land in Kefraya. The significance of these accounts was not in the way de Bustros inherited the lands from his father, who had in turn received the lands from his maternal aunt, Mary Sursock. Rather, of interest was the fact that de Bustros was not from Kefraya. The reason why de Bustros was not from Kefraya was because neither he, nor any members of his family, had *worked* the land, as had the villagers and their fore-fathers. One vineyard owner, who was also a pruner employed by the Chateau Ksara winery, provided one such response:

These lands can be given to one by a *Khalto* (maternal aunt), a brother or a father. Bustros is not from here and the land was given to his father from *Khalto* (maternal aunt) Mary Sursock who had

married someone from the Tueni family. No! They are not from here either. They had no children so they gave the land to other relatives. So you know how some work all their lives to get land and continue to live from the land until they die. . . . Then there are those who inherit big pieces of land and others the *fellah* like us from Kefraya, will also work in their land until we die! It is like this.

Familial attachments to place that were brought forth in narratives of the Kefraya landscape also belonged therefore, to broader historical narratives of labour relations, as is suggested by the term *fellah*. The term *fellah* here has parallels with the way that Gilsenan suggests the term categorized agricultural labourers and sharecroppers in Berqayl (1996). Indeed, Kefraya residents constantly spoke of the link to agricultural labour by pointing out the similarity of this word to that of tilling the soil (*felaha*). The main difference is that, unlike Berqayl's *fellah* (of the 1970s), most Kefraya residents were landowners. In Berqayl the term also referred to one particular category of social class within the village. In Kefraya however, *fellahin* (plural) was used both by those who owned lands and those who did not, to suggest their collective origin and difference from those who owned wineries and did not work directly in the tilling or working of the earth. At other times, the term was used to describe their rural background in contrast to those (like myself) who came from the city. *Fellah*, on one hand, referred to types of labour, such as the pruning that most Kefraya (male) residents did (and were doing less of). On the other hand, the term evoked a shared sense of belonging that also invoked a process of "othering". In this way, *fellah* linked the domain of material labour used in carving out the landscape to the shared communal sense of family time. While seasonal interactions with the *kouroum* provided a continuity of kinship that was situated outside of, or concealed from, market production, narratives of *fellah* identity actively sought to lay claim to that history of

wine production. In so doing, residents were able to exercise some authority over more recent changes in labour and property relations.

Notably, the process of “othering” shaped by this shared sense of *fellahin* identity did not only exclude those elites who had not worked on the land but also certain labourers who actually did. This was especially the case for seasonal migrant workers who came from Syria and beyond. While many of the winery managers referred to these workers as “Bedouins”, villagers pointed out that the term did not accurately represent all of those who came to Kefraya. Residents made a difference between the *bedawy* (Bedouin) and the *shaghaly* (deriving from the word for work). This distinction was also made by many of the migrant workers: those who fell under the category of “*shaghaly*” were Kurdish and/or Syrian. A few of these Syrian workers returned during the winter to continue working in the vineyards and some had set up semi-permanent campsites on the outskirts of the village. Interestingly, it was these workers—as opposed to those perceived as the Bedouin—who were more actively excluded from this shared sense of belonging to Kefraya. Yet that is not to say that the Bedouin were included within this shared perception of social identity. Indeed, when I suggested to some residents that perhaps all migrant workers might be referred to as *fellahin*, it was explained that this would be impossible, because the Bedouin were nomadic and the *shaghaly* came from somewhere else.

Still, many in Kefraya appeared to hold a romanticized view of the Bedouin. Bedouin women, for example, who were usually out picking grapes during the harvest while the men of Kefraya oversaw their work, were often described by the latter as sexually desirable, because of their exotic qualities. As one young man who drove the pick-up truck around the vineyards explained, “these *Bedawiyya* know and understand

pleasure”. While an exploration of representations of the noble (and seductive) “Bedouin savage” is a tempting route of analysis to follow, for our purposes here it is sufficient to point out that the Bedouin workers were often perceived with less disdain (c.f. Lavie, 1988: 41). Indeed the term *shaghaly* was somewhat derogatory, and many from Kefraya described these workers as completely opposite in character to the Bedouin. The *shaghaly* were not to be trusted and this was even the case with those such as Ahmed and his family, who had been in Kefraya for nearly two decades and had set up camp on the side of the main road not far from the chateau and village.

Ahmed’s story has similarities with those recounted by Syrian migrant workers to Chalcraft (2009). Ahmed was a landowner in the north of Syria who grew crops and raised some cattle. According to him, he could not earn enough (if any) money farming his land.²⁰ In an attempt to sustain the family’s farm and lands, Ahmed decided to seek work in Lebanon, sending remittances to his family. While he returned to Syria regularly, Ahmed and his brother, Mohammed, had over the years developed strong economic ties to Kefraya. During the early winter months, Ahmed and Mohammed arrived with their wives and younger children to carry and set fire to heavy bunches of vines pruned by vineyard owners in Kefraya and the pruners of Chateau Kefraya. If they were unable to finish before the heavy snow began, one of the brothers would return home to recruit other family members to help with the work. In the summer, Ahmed supervised Syrian workers as they picked grapes. While in the winter a majority

²⁰ Chalcraft points out that until the 1970s wage labour was non-existent in Syrian family farming economies. While food production might have been sustainable, money was still required to buy other necessary commodities. As marketization expanded, money was increasing important for consumption and production. Chalcraft suggests that this was an important factor contributing to the influx of Syrian workers into Lebanon’s labour market, most of whom were predominantly smaller landowners trying to find the economic means to keep their lands (2009).

of men worked in the vineyards, most of the harvest workers were women, young girls, and children who were on summer vacation.

It seemed that Ahmed had put into place a fruitful strategy that provided extended family with sufficient capital to keep their lands in Syria. Ahmed was proud of his accomplishments and hoped that I would visit his farm and village. There was also, apparently, a beautiful *munzar* to be seen there, which stretched over many mountains. Even when days were especially laborious in Kefraya, and perhaps especially so, Ahmed recounted stories of the delicious milk and cheese that came from his cows. Yet in spite of such achievements, life in Kefraya was not always easy and comfortable. One on-going problem was the positioning of his family tent, because it was susceptible to flooding during heavy rainfall and consequently to mosquitos.

One afternoon, after another hard day's work carrying crates of grapes through the vineyards of Kefraya, Ahmed invited me to join him, his wife, and three children to break the Ramadan fast later on that evening. I was happy to accept the invitation for the *iftar*, and went off in search of some dessert that I could take to his family. Following *iftar*, Ahmed expressed his intention to make his living conditions more comfortable in Kefraya. However, renting a home was out of the question as prices were too high, and besides, he doubted that people in Kefraya would accept the "*shaghaly*" in one of their homes. But Ahmed hoped the family could move their tent out of the *sahel* and further up onto an empty plot of flat land located at the foot of Mount Lebanon. He explained that the soil was drier there, and water drained away quite effectively, and hence there were fewer bugs and mosquitos. Yet nobody in the village accepted his request to move. Given that I had become close to certain residents

of the village who were quite influential in swaying collective decisions, Ahmed asked if I would speak in his favour.

I was reluctant to get involved; I did not know who the land belonged to and I really did not feel that it was my place to give an opinion. Curiosity, however, had got the better of me, and prior to my visit to Ahmed I had already heard some discussion about the topic at the local fast food restaurant. “Did you hear that Ahmed wants to move his tent up?” asked one man in his late forties to another. “Yes, and I know where”, said the other. “Well he can’t move it there, this will not be”. I began to wonder who owned the land. There was, however, something peculiar about the drama that was unfolding, because it was only really after it began that I noticed an “*anamolie*” in the landscape. For despite the aesthetically pleasing “sea of vines”, there was one plot of land that remained fallow—and this was the land where Ahmed hoped to set up his tent. My initial assumption was that there might be some family dispute over the ownership of the land.

What I unearthed, however, was rather unexpected. The following day, after my visit to Ahmed, I paid a visit to an (anonymous) friend in the village. We were sitting in the kitchen, and her young sons were running in and out laughing and shouting at each other. I asked her why people did not want Ahmed to move there, and she shrugged and said, “The land is not good”. The conversation was left for some time, until I finally asked her, “How does one decide that land cannot be good?” She looked at me and shook her head, “You want to know everything!” I was embarrassed and decided to change the subject. Her eldest son overheard our discussion and came in to say “I know why Ahmed can’t put his tent there”. His mother glared at him, “You think you know? Go outside and play”. He started to leave but turned to me and said quickly, “The land

is not good!” I was still embarrassed and so remained quiet, trying to think of something to say to change the subject. Finally my friend began to talk, “You know that in the war, there was a lot of fighting here. No, we did not really fight, just tried to make sure that nobody took our land. But the Syrian and Israeli armies were here for a while and they would fight each other”. I nodded, and wondered where this was going. She continued:

Well the Israelis had set up camp on top of the mountain that overlooks Kefraya, and the Syrians were below—here on the plains. One day, the Israelis started throwing missiles and there were a lot of body parts of the soldiers on the land. We could not leave them lying around. So we had to go out and dig up the earth with spades and knives and bury them. That is what we had to do.

The conversation ended and the topic was never alluded to again. When I bumped into Ahmed a few days later, I asked of his progress in moving. He avoided the topic of the fallow land and instead said that he had decided not to move as there were several advantages to residing adjacent to the patches of aubergine and melons kept by some of the villagers on the periphery of the *sahel*. There are many aspects of these events that require a much more extensive discussion than is possible here.²¹ Some parallels, however, emerge with the observations made by Collard in the case of village histories in the Evritania province in Greece (1989). Collard suggests that the choice not to remember the “disintegrating effects of the ‘recent’ Civil war”, but instead to emphasize a notion of an enduring past that predates these events, largely have to do with providing a sense of permanence that is shared exclusively by those from these villages. There are similarities here with the case of Kefraya, in that the story of this

²¹ I believe that aspects of these events have to do with issues of collective memory and traumatic events, selective memory, and the transmission of memory from one generation to the next. I have started to explore these issues in a paper presented at the Anthropology Departmental Seminar in Goldsmiths. The working title of the paper is *War and Wine in Lebanon: Carving out the Landscape*.

fallow plot of land was one that seemed to be known only by the adults in the village. Yet there was also strong symbolic significance in the events that unfolded in the war story, where villagers were once more represented as guardians of the land, working to break open the soil and bury things that could potentially break up the beauty of their landscape. Not to have experienced the events in the story, and, perhaps more pertinently, not to know about this narrative situated people such as Ahmed on the outside of Kefraya's history.

Yet there is something to be said about how the story of the fallow land was used to prevent Ahmed from setting down roots in Kefraya. While Ahmed and his family had been known by many Kefraya residents for a number of years, clear social boundaries had been put into place. For example, Ahmed's wife did not visit the women of Kefraya to drink coffee, nor did she engage in the activities of the *kouroum*. When I asked my friend about this, she looked at me with disbelief before explaining, "But she is not from Kefraya!" I pointed out that I too was not from Kefraya, but had received numerous invitations to go out to the *kouroum*. "Yes," my friend replied, "but you are a guest and want to know about our life in Kefraya". She continued to explain that Ahmed and his wife had come here to work, and as they did not own any land in Kefraya, they had to ask permission before going out to pick vine leaves and the like. I then pointed out that there were a couple of landless families in Kefraya who did not seem to ask permission to go out into the *kouroum*. My friend started to get irritated: "They are still from Kefraya and maybe the family does not own land directly but someone like a wife might own some land". She explained that allowing Ahmed to get too comfortable in Kefraya might encourage them to stay for good. That wouldn't do and this was especially important now that many Kefraya were struggling to keep their

land because they could not afford to replace their grape varieties with those that the wineries demanded. She exclaimed what many had already said to me many times before, “Kefraya was for Kefraya”. My friend finally concluded, “Besides, Ahmed and his family own land in Syria where they can go and settle”. In this respect, the tensions that were brought to the fore when Ahmed expressed his interest in settling more comfortably into the Kefraya landscape also had to do with how labour and property relations in Kefraya were changing due to the more recent strategies deployed by the wineries.

During a conversation with Nabhane, I was told that as relations changed with the wineries, especially Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara, many residents in Kefraya were unable to comply with the new required standards. As a result, there were fewer vineyard owners because many were selling their lands to those in Kefraya who had the enough capital to plant and maintain the types of vines the wineries demanded. Nabhane also explained that many people who were selling their lands in Kefraya were interested in building new villas. As very little profit could be made from selling their grape vines to the wineries, many preferred to sell some of their land and use the extra money to construct a new house, surrounded with a few vines—usually of the *Cinsault* variety. It is perhaps of significance that some younger teenagers worked in these vineyards during the harvest for a bit of pocket money. Their roles, however, remained distinct from the migrant workers in that they usually oversaw the harvest, counting the crates of grapes stacked near the trucks. Yet many of these young men did not know how to prune the vines and did not appear to be interested in learning. As Nabhane once asked me, somewhat rhetorically, “Everybody now wants to live in a chateau surrounded by

vineyards, even if they do not sell many grapes to the winery. How many castles do you think there can be in Kefraya?”



A vineyard owner who also works as an “overseer” or supervisor of the harvest supervising seasonal workers.

The Castles of Kefraya: Ruptures in the Narrative

While the Chateau Kefraya winery had offered to buy vineyards from residents who wanted to sell their land, many (if not all) had refused to sell to the winery or to any “outsiders”; a sentiment that was expressed through another well-known story about the history of Kefraya. The story of the the *naqāshe*, or inscriber, was recounted to me quite frequently throughout my stay in the village:

A long time ago there was a man, a *naqāshe* that would go around from village to village. He would stay for a while observing the villagers. Then he would write about what he saw. In the village of Rawda, the people were described to have big bellies because they drank too much water from the nearby river. In Balool, they are like cows. . . . and in Kefraya people are like wolves. Why? Because they fight amongst each other but when an outsider comes the villagers will unite and fight the outsider.

The story of the *naqāshe* can of course be interpreted in many ways. Perhaps the narrative is a polite way of conveying to an overly inquisitive anthropologist a warning to not to get involved in village politics. However, after relaying the story of the *naqāsh* to the *Mukhtar*, and asking him for further information, it became apparent that the story was also told for other reasons. While the *Mukhtar* confirmed that this was an important story about Kefraya, he seemed startled to hear it, and wanted to know who had told me about the *naqāsh*. The story was initially told to me by Mr Hassan Rahal, from Kefraya village—an agricultural engineer for the Cave Kouroum winery. Rahal recounted the story during a conversation about vineyard owners in Kefraya starting to sell their lands. While land in Kefraya was considerably more expensive than in other parts of the Bekaa, locals were willing “to put their differences aside” and sell their land only to “insiders”. In the process, the Rahal family had appropriated a considerable

amount of land, as had the Didi family. Hassan suggested I ask the *Mukhtar* for further information about the *naqāsh*. I explained all of this to the *Mukhtar*, who responded:

People in Kefraya don't make money from staying here. People leave to make money and then come back to use this money. Take *Bayt* (House) Didi. Dr Didi has the most number of *kouroum* in Kefraya and perhaps more than *Bayt* Rahal. Didi lives in Senegal where he works as medical doctor throughout the year. But every summer he comes back for the harvest.

The *Mukhtar* failed to mention, however, that he too was in the process of selling some of his vineyards. While the identity of the buyer remained unclear, it was implied by others that Didi had expressed an interest in the *Mukhtar's* vineyards. In this regard, the story of the *naqāshe* perhaps spoke of shifting ideas of autonomy for a sustainable future for the Kefraya landscape. For, as some residents explained, it might be a useful strategy if a few larger landowners in Kefraya were able to negotiate more beneficial contractual arrangements with the wineries. Yet I did wonder to whom such a strategy would be beneficial—and how could others in the village losing land believe that such a move could be advantageous for them?

I met with Dr Didi on several occasions during the harvest in Kefraya. Throughout the harvest, the doctor wore jeans with a t-shirt that depicted the Dakar rally, and a black and white *kaffiyeh*. His Arabic accent was somewhat different to other Kefraya residents—he pronounced his words with more articulation and appeared to be more fluent in Wolof, having spent most of his life in Senegal. Didi was enthusiastic about my visit to his vineyards and wanted to me to taste the olives and figs that came from his *kouroum*. These were the olives from last year's harvest and his mother, the aging *Hajjeh*, had salted them, adding garlic and lemon. We sat on the ground with his cousin Kassem Makki, and ate some breakfast. We were in his vineyards near the *sahel*,

and behind us construction was underway on Didi's new villa, which was near completion. It was an exquisite villa, with marble balconies, and an ornate set of stairs at the entrance. I asked him if he missed Lebanon when he was in Senegal. Didi preferred speaking in English and responded, "Not really, I was born in Senegal. I only come here for my mother in the summer to see her and make sure the harvest goes well".

He then spoke about the history of his viticulture enterprise. Didi and his half-brother had started out with "nearly nothing": fifty hectares of vineyards inherited from their father. The brothers started to buy land, developing nearly 300 hectares of vines across Kefraya. Didi was also proud that he and his brother were the first in Kefraya to train their grapes onto wires; a technique that both Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya favoured. Through training the vines on wire, production had doubled and profits were considerably higher. There was, however, not much else that Didi was prepared to do in order to increase production. He explained, "If we were to pump water in, like Chateau Ksara do in some of their vineyards, then we would be producing double again. By not providing water, we are looking to ensure quality and the taste of the wine is better." In contrast to many of the vineyard owners in Kefraya, Didi's knowledge of viticulture maintenance echoed the discourses of quality utilized by the oenologists working at Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara—which I will focus on in Chapter Seven. Didi, however, also made it clear that he was not simply following what the wineries required but instead his expertise was grounded in his intimate understanding of the soil, due to his familial connection to the region. He said, "The *terroir* in Kefraya is the best. . . . the earth, soil, and rocks are the best in Lebanon". By linking sentiments of place to the logic of *terroir*, Didi once more showed how locality is perceived in Kefraya within

these wider discourses, discourses that express a similar valuation of distinctive aesthetic features to some of the winery managers and owners.

Didi, however, refused to sell to Chateau Kefraya because “de Bustros is not from here and the winery is not interested in working with Kefraya in a good way. They do not respect us”. He was happy to work with Chateau Ksara as they had interests across the Bekaa Valley and not just Kefraya, “they (Ksara) do not get “so involved with the village”. For the last few years, Didi had sold his grapes to the Massaya winery, but as of the current harvest he would start selling to Chateau Ksara. Up until 1996, Didi had in fact sold his grapes to Chateau Ksara. However, following the winery’s change in strategy they sourced grapes elsewhere, and the subsequent reduction in price of *Cinsault* in Kefraya had caused problems between the Didi and the winery. Apparently this was because certain members of Chateau Ksara had found it problematic that they not been directly involved in the plantation of Didi’s vines, despite the fact that most vines were not *Cinsault* vines. Nevertheless, the problem was solved and Didi eventually returned to Chateau Ksara, where an on-going contract was finally set up. Didi was quite knowledgeable about the types of long-term contracts Chateau Ksara had with other larger landowners in the Bekaa Valley. He pointed out that long-term contractual agreements usually implied that the price would remain stable each year. Entering into such a contract would be the most favourable, as being away for most of the year made it a challenge to constantly negotiate with the wineries for the best price.



The Doctor's vineyards and in the distance the Chateau Kefraya.

Yet was it economically viable for Didi to maintain vines? What were the costs involved? Wineries usually bought Didi's (noble) grapes at approximately 1,000 Lebanese Liras (LL) (about 80 cents) per kilogram, and the price remained constant throughout each harvest. The price of workers and pesticides, however, increased every year. Didi pointed out that "a bottle of wine is sold for \$10+, but it costs about LL 4,000 to produce a bottle and then it is sold for a higher price". Yet despite the high costs involved, Didi was adamant that he would continue with his viticulture enterprise. He stressed that nothing else could really grow in Kefraya, as the soil and environment were only really suitable for grapes—besides, he enjoyed growing grapes. When I suggested that he could have bought more land elsewhere in the Bekaa, where land prices were substantially lower, Didi responded:

Because it is *our* region and it is better than strangers buying it. If someone wants money and needs to sell his land, it is better that someone from the village buys it. . . . better to have fifty houses than 200 houses. By keeping the land in the village, it keeps the peace.

When Didi was away, family members were entrusted with the care of the vines. For his cousin, Kassim Makki, the caretaker of the vines, this was his only job. Didi and his brother provided the capital to invest in the necessary equipment, while also paying Kassim's salary. Kassim was usually to be found driving his truck across the vineyards, fixing his tractors, or on some mission to get goods necessary for the upkeep of the vines. Kassim did most of the pruning across the 300 hectares during early winter months. During the harvest, Kassim was one of the tractor drivers taking the grapes from Kefraya to the Ksara winery. The normal half-hour journey in a car took nearly two hours by tractor.

Kassim seemed to be content with his work, although at times he spoke of his thoughts about leaving Kefraya. His mother was Brazilian and he expressed a desire to emigrate to South America, where there might be more prospects for him and his family. When I asked him for his thoughts about working for his cousin, Kassim explained that it was better than working for a non-family member, such as Chateau Kefraya, and at least he was able to voice his opinions during decision-making processes. On the whole, however, Kassim was still subject to decisions made by Didi and his brother. Significantly, this also included the maintenance of Kassim's vineyards. Nevertheless, it was clear that Kassim trusted his cousins' choices. Other Kefraya residents expressed similar sentiments, stating their preference to sell their vineyards to Didi over "outsiders who don't understand what it means to be from Kefraya who did not understand its beauty." They were concerned that Kefraya village

could become more of a district or zone (*mantaqa*) for the winery, telling me “We need to keep the vineyards in Kefraya within the village”.



A view of Dr Didi’s vineyards from his vineyards on the *sahel*. Some of Kefraya village is visible in the distance; the Ramatani hill is to the top left.

Didi’s viticulture enterprise was not the only attempt to safeguard the Kefraya region from external investors, and which also sought to preserve the viticulture landscape. I learnt of a cooperative set up by twenty-eight of the vineyard owners in the village to produce *db*s, (molasses) from grapes. Support came from the *Support to Fund Farmer Groups*, part of the collaborative Agriculture Development Project between the Lebanese Ministry of Agriculture and the European Commission. In 2006 the cooperative was granted €88,000 to cover costs, ranging from fuel to telephone bills and governmental taxes. Members of the cooperatives told me that residents in Kefraya had been producing *db*s for personal consumption, transporting some of their grapes to a processing plant in a nearby town. Yet the motivation to establish the cooperative had to do with the aim of reducing dependence upon the wineries. One cooperative member

explained that people from across the world knew of the good quality grapes from Kefraya, so *db's* made from these grapes would have a competitive edge in the market. Such a prospect however, remains to be seen. During my visit in 2012, any significant developments in the cooperative were yet to be seen. Indeed one member had sold a vineyard to Didi to fund his grandchildren's university education. The member had mixed feelings about his decision. University education was important, but the risk in owning less land was that future generations of his family might not have a vested interest in Kefraya. He concluded our discussion by exclaiming, "my son's children will not even know the difference between *Zaitouniy* and *Cabernet!*"

In her study of a Turkish village, Delaney noted two types of social relations affecting the village economy (1993 & 1991). The first was the relations of authority where interferences from external force implicitly put into question the ability of villagers to manage themselves. Such intrusions emerged in the form of agricultural experts who were given more power to facilitate change in the village and were dismissive of the more intimate forms of knowledge the villagers possessed. The destructive forces of such relations of authority manifested itself in sentiments of distrust that impeded the forging of relations of cooperation (the second type of social relations). Delaney argues that while a collective sentiment of belonging might ensue, as long as village residents continued to feel a sense of disempowerment and were subject to socio-economic changes beyond their will, social relations of authority would eventually supersede actions of cooperation.

Similar conclusions can be drawn in the case of Kefraya. Vineyard owners looking to sell felt that the only option left was to sell to Didi. Didi, in turn, had accepted the responsibility of safeguarding the village from outsiders who could

potentially rupture historicized connections to place. There was also some significance in the way Didi spoke of his (and his brother's) viticulture enterprise as emerging from "nothing". Didi was quick to draw attention to his entrepreneurial accomplishments that made him stand out from others in Kefraya. This expression of autonomy, however, was not performed in the purest sense of economic individualism, but was entangled with notions of relatedness connected to place. After all, Didi appeared to have little interest in buying land outside Kefraya and nor did he believe that anything other than grapes could be grown in Kefraya. Yet there were ramifications for this stance, in that seemingly Didi could make certain decisions without the consent of others in Kefraya, and this was indicative of changing hierarchical relations across the viticulture landscape. How such relations of power might unfold in the future remains to be seen—particularly in light of the possible rupture between the *kouroum* and the younger generations of Kefraya.

Yet it was also significant that Didi had no desire to sell his grapes to Chateau Kefraya because he felt that de Bustros had become too involved in the village. Such a sentiment initially appears contradictory, as it was de Bustros who instigated the very first plantations in Kefraya. However, it was perhaps because of de Bustros' enterprising vision that the village had arrived at such a tense juncture of change. For in transforming their fields of legumes and wheat into a viticulture landscape, Kefraya's forefathers had accepted the conditions of a contract that had significant ramifications on the possible choices and decisions of future generations. The desire and power that now lay in the hands of Didi and other large landowners was thus similar to the aspirations of autonomy expressed in the story of the good shepherd.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have tried to show how narratives of Kefraya reflect the types of social relations that emerged alongside the viticulture landscape in the region. I have argued that in some ways narratives of the Kefraya viticulture landscape speak of reproduction and production not as distinct domains but rather as entangled and woven together through the embodied experiences and social relations of Kefraya's residents and workers. By exploring such entanglements I have shed light on how notions of relatedness are constantly reconceived and reconfigured to assert some degree of autonomy over production, while also serving to forge continuous links between the past and (continuous) present.

Keeping the *kouroum* “inside” Kefraya allowed experiences of *karam* to continue. However, in the process, residents who decided to sell their vineyards appeared to forgo a sense of autonomy or a notion of independence in the pursuit of economic success for Kefraya as a whole. Instead, a “mirage of independence”, for many men of Kefraya emerged that was expressed through their pride in the aesthetic beauty of the region, and a desire to construct villas on their remaining land (Goddard, 1996). Yet it was through such allegorical practices of economic superiority that the reality of power struggles over autonomy were again brought to the fore. The usage of visual imagery, such as an elaborate villas surrounded by neatly-aligned vineyards, served to evoke a sense of cultural continuity, while also naturalising ties to the land that are specific to the production of high-quality wines.

It is also important to note that it was beyond the scope of this chapter to consider in full certain cultural factors relating to village life in Kefraya. These have to do with my observations—similar to Pratt's observations—concerning the education

system in the Bekaa Valley (1994). I saw that it was increasingly common for young people in Kefraya to study business-related subjects. Another important issue has to do with the continuing migration of many of these young people abroad in order to find work. I believe that such transformations in labour relations are tangential with shifts in economic rationality across the Bekaa region as a whole, due to entrepreneurial strategies deployed by the agro-industries in general. Exploring such general shifts in detail remains beyond the scope of this chapter—and the thesis as a whole.

5: A House with Many Vineyards: Changing Ideas of House and Family in Kefraya

Just before the sign-post welcoming visitors to the Kefraya region comes into sight, an enclosure appears on the right hand side of the Bekaa's main highway, where deer roam freely. A red London double decker bus is also parked within this enclosure: it is a number nine bus, and draped along its sides are posters of the former Prime Ministers Rafik Hariri and (his son) Saad Hariri. I am told that the land (and perhaps even the deer), once belonged to the Edde family, before it was sold onto the Hariris—another family that has become deeply entrenched in politics as well as business, trade, and finance. The grassy slopes roll upwards to the Mount Lebanon ranges, and also west towards Kefraya—until a fence marks the boundary for the roaming deer.

On the other side of this fence, lush verdant vineyards have been planted in neat rows, indicating the edge of the Kefraya region. A white sign proudly states that these vines are part of the estate of the Cave Kouroum winery. In the background, the geometrical composition of the tower of Cave Kouroum is the first building of Kefraya to come into view. The tall rectangular tower, made of limestone and concrete, is a relatively new feature on the Kefraya landscape. As with Chateau Kefraya, it is perched on a small hill, panoptical in character, and sources its grapes solely from the Kefraya region. Unlike Chateau Kefraya, however, the Cave Kouroum tower is not surrounded by a group of trees that allows it to be concealed—or to create a private domain, distinct from the village. Such visibility across the Kefraya landscape illustrates the type of relationship the winery has

with vineyard owners in the region—in that Cave Kouroum appears to be as much a part of the village and vineyards as these features of the landscape are part of the winery.

The Cave Kouroum winery was founded in 1998 by *Bayt* (house) Rahal, who is from the Kefraya region itself. The establishment of the winery came about due to the 700 tonnes of surplus grapes left unsold in Kefraya following Chateau Ksara's decision to source grapes elsewhere. The Rahal family was—and continues—to act as a mediator between Kefraya vineyard owners and wineries across Lebanon. Unable to shift the *Cinsault* grapes in 1997, the Rahals made their first vintage and officially opened the winery the following year. However (and in contrast to their vineyard enterprise), while many members of *Bayt* Rahal were involved in the establishment of the winery—and continue to participate in the everyday running of the business—Cave Kouroum remains under the ownership of Mr Bassim Rahal. Significantly, Monsieur Rahal (as he is called by his employees) also owns another winery—the Chateau Mauvanne, which is situated in the Languedoc region of France, where he resides for most of the year. While final decisions concerning the winery are made by Bassim Rahal, the overseeing and daily running of the winery has been entrusted to his brother, Mr Sami (as he is called by the winery's employees) as well as his nephew, Mr Hassan Rahal—who is a trained agricultural engineer. Notably, while special recognition in Kefraya is given to Bassim Rahal for establishing Cave Kouroum, the winery is simultaneously considered an extension of *Bayt* Rahal.

Although the winery remains under the auspice of Bassim Rahal, it also became apparent during fieldwork that the winery was deeply entangled in village politics. This is because Bassim Rahal's brother, Mr Bahij Rahal, had been elected as head of the municipality in 1997. Thus, as with the Edde and Hariri families, certain members of *Bayt*

Rahal held influential positions in both politics and business. Yet most strategies to assert and maintain political and economic power deployed by *Bayt* Rahal were done across a much smaller space, so that the Kefraya region is at once a site for business (and political) enterprise, while also a private and domestic, or a place for home-making.

This chapter explores how the concept of *bayt* is understood and experienced amongst members of the Rahal family, especially following the establishment of Cave Kouroum. It is important to point out that this chapter is less focused on exploring the notion of *bayt* in terms of household organization and architectural arrangements. Instead, the aim is to consider how *bayt* refers to the productive and reproductive powers of the Rahal family. In so doing, this chapter considers how certain types of relations, activities, and decisions in the domains of family, business (and politics) conversely inform, shape, and affect each other (Yanagisako, 2002). Due to the fact that Mr Bassim Rahal spends most of his time in France, I did not have the opportunity to meet him during my time in Kefraya. I initially felt that his material absence in my ethnographic data might present gaps in my analysis. Yet on further consideration, I realised that despite the lack of overall physical appearance during fieldwork, Rahal still maintained a presence throughout my visits to the Cave Kouroum winery and during discussions with other family members as well as employees. I thus began to explore the significance of his immaterial presence in terms of the patriarchal role he has obtained in *Bayt* Rahal, as well the elite status he had gained in Kefraya.

I will shed light upon the resourcefulness of the Rahal family, by which they have extended their (re)productive powers beyond the vineyard and into wine—as well as into political endeavours. Kin obligation has, however, constrained, or at least limited, political and economic ventures for certain members of the family who are inadvertently restricted

in exerting much influence over the production processes or in pursuing other types of business interests. Once more, kin-related sentiment is spatially bound to place, and attempts are made to ensure that the Kefraya region remains in the possession of residents—including the name ‘Kefraya’ itself. A consideration of such perspectives of *bayt* can thus serve to highlight how “the category of house represents the wider social and political system” (Huwelmeir, 2000: 100).



Photo: The Cave Kouroum Winery

Thinking About Houses in Transition

The importance of *bayt* in Kefraya appears to contrast the observations made by Obeid concerning kinship genealogies in the town of Aarsal, in the eastern region of the Bekaa. Kinship models in Aarsal indicate the persistence of “classical models,” where accounts often began with the notion *`a`'ila* (lineage)—viewed as the largest form of familial relatedness; the smallest being the *bayt*. *Jubb* (branch) on the other hand, appears to sit

somewhere in the middle, and refers to the son of an ancestor and his descendants (2010: 108). Broadly speaking, all three terms appear to have similar meanings in Kefraya. In Kefraya however, the social prominence of *bayt* is one of the most important features of accounts of patrilineal descent.

I rarely (if ever) heard the term *jubb* mentioned when residents discussed kinship genealogies. Also, the term *`a`'ila* (lineage) was often used interchangeably with *bayt*. Residents explained that due to Kefraya's small population, there were actually very few differences between the terms *`a`'ila* and *bayt*. They also added that, at times, *`a`'ila* could be used to refer to broader genealogies in order to forge connections with others from outside Kefraya who shared the same family name, regardless of religion; this was even when there might not be any prior relation. So, for example, while there was a *Bayt Saleh* in Kefraya this did not imply that *I* was from that *bayt*, but implied instead that we all came from the same *`a`'ila*. While we might not share a common ancestor, an idea of relatedness came about through our shared name. The absence of a shared ancestor does not, however, suggest that such an ancestor doesn't exist. Instead, the implication is that our patrilineal ancestor existed so far back in time that they would be virtually impossible to trace.

However, this temporal dimension of the concept of *`a`'ila* made it distinctive from *bayt*, and this also seemed to reduce its social currency in Kefraya. That is to say, in creating ties across larger spaces and longer periods of time, the notion of *`a`'ila* could not speak accurately—or, more specifically—about kin and work relations in Kefraya. Still, it is important to point out that, as with the term *`a`'ila*, the notion of *bayt* was also associated with family names. Yet in the case of *bayt*, the lineage of the name was often traceable to forefathers who lived in Kefraya during the French mandate—the era of the

cadastral survey. Indeed it was quite common to find a framed faded black and white photograph of a family's forefather in many homes in Kefraya, which hung at the entrance or in the living room. Like the photograph of Abdel-Helim Nabhane I was discussed in the previous chapter, these images also portrayed patriarchs who stood upright and stern as they stared straight into the camera lens; more often than not, the person's *masbaha* (prayer beads) also hung on the corner of frame. Significantly, many of the material homes built by Kefraya's forefathers are barely visible on the Kefraya landscape. While some have been built upon, or expanded to accommodate a growing *bayt*, others no longer exist as the family have rebuilt elsewhere in the village, or constructed separate households for brothers and cousins and their wives and children. For some of the *bayt* of Kefraya, there was thus more than one physical house. Nevertheless, great-grandfathers are still recognised for laying the foundations for this transmission of both immaterial and material layers the *bayt's* name (Carsten & Hugh-Jones, 1995; Pine, 1996 & Levis-Strauss, 1999).

Similarly to the landscape of Kefraya, the notion of *bayt* thus implies a continuous and unfolding narrative from one generation to the next. It is also significant, therefore, that this perception of *bayt*—both in terms of its material and immaterial properties—seems to have come about at a similar time as the emergence of the modern Kefraya landscape, following the reorganization of private property. We saw this in the story of the good shepherd that we discussed in the previous chapter. That is not to say however, that prior to the cadastral survey and the subsequent vine plantations a notion of *bayt* did not exist. Rather, it is interesting how the importance given to this form of familial relatedness over other broader kinship models appears to be tangential to the development of a wine market economy in the region. While both the house and landscape might reflect an extension of the self, it is the social significance of the former that has facilitated the shaping and

maintenance of the latter. Indeed, it is useful to recall the words of Nabhane when he pointed out that everyone in Kefraya had a desire to live in a chateau, and to think about the physical construction of ornate homes such as Dr Didi's elaborately designed villa, which also potentially reflects such strategies. These attempts are suggestive of how a patriarchal desire for succession might somehow motivate capitalist action (Yanagisako, 2002). In this regard, the social significance of the smallest form of familial relatedness, that is, *bayt*, arguably shows us how kin-related sentiment—associated with house and place—is able to reflect certain prominent individuals (mostly men) who have facilitated the successful transmission of the family name.

House and Work in the Kouroum

Broadly speaking, the social significance of associating a house with a family name and the traceability of each *bayt* to a similar period of time reproduced a shared understanding of place (Huwelmeir, 2000). Yet in this forging of a particular temporal connection between *bayt* and place, there also emerged a hierarchical classification system that was attached to a legacy of the type of work that was done in the *kouroum* of Kefraya, associated with the different families—and thus also to labour relations that extended outside of the village. For example, in the case of *Bayt Nabhane*, the legacy of the late Abdel-Helim and his relationship with the *Khawaja* facilitated the successful transmission of the family name to the next generation. Yet while Abdel-Helim had secured both material and immaterial wealth for *Bayt Nabhane*, his son, Nabhane, had arrived at a crossroads, and there was some uncertainty concerning the future of the family. Although the family name retained social value in Kefraya, the future transmission remained uncertain, not least because of the weakening relationship between Nabhane and Chateau Kefraya. Notably, *Bayt Rahal* had

recently arrived at a crossroads—in 1997, its role as a grape distributor extended into wine-making.

The men of *Bayt* Rahal have been selling grapes to wineries across Lebanon since at least the 1960s and acting as grape distributors since the 1970s. Mr Sami Rahal explained that his father had started to sell grapes to Chateau Musar as early as 1964. The family worked directly with Chateau Musar until around 1974, when they began collecting grapes from around the Kefraya, selling them on to other wineries. But when his father died a year later in a tractor accident in the *kouroum* this had quite an impact upon the business. As Mr Sami and the others were fairly young at the time, it was Bassim Rahal who took charge of overseeing the viticulture business. Significantly, the Rahal's viticulture enterprise became more lucrative after the end of the civil war, because established wineries such as Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar began to focus on increasing wine production—while at the same time new wineries emerged across Lebanon. The Rahal sons took their distributive role quite seriously, and I am told that before long they had set up longstanding agreements with many vineyard owners in the village. The Rahals acted as mediators between the wineries and vineyard owners, negotiating the price (per kilo) and the quantities required by the wineries. While it is not clear what specific roles each of the brothers might have had in these business transactions, it is apparent that these were informed by a certain understanding of grape production.

On more than one occasion during the harvest, I followed Sami Rahal around the vineyards of Kefraya. These were early morning starts—around four-thirty a.m., when the sun was barely up—and neither was I. Sami Rahal always looked fresh, wearing casual jeans, pale pastel shirts, and a khaki vest. As I asked him questions, Mr Sami would eye up the crates of grapes about to be loaded into the truck. If a crate was half full, Mr Sami

would shout out to the grape-pickers to fill up the crates, informing them that a full crate of these *Grenache* grapes would weigh just over 25 kilograms—slightly less than *Cinsault* grapes. These were just estimates, but were a good indication of how many crates should be sent off to the winery that had requested the grapes in question. Mr Sami was also always on the move—driving or walking across the vineyards. At one point he would be overseeing grape-pickers, while at another speaking with Selim Nakad, who might be looking to buy some grapes or change his initial order. It was during the harvest when the Rahals were at their most active, and it was also the only time that I saw Bassim Rahal. Mr Sami waved at his brother, who stood in an adjacent vineyard, and Bassim Rahal smiled and waved back before wandering off into another vineyard.

Despite this apparent intimacy with the *kouroum* of Kefraya, the Rahal viticulture enterprise was not initially a full-time commitment. Until 1974, Mr Sami's father was based in Beirut and working in engineering, returning to Kefraya during the weekends to visit his wife and children and then for an extended stay during the summer to oversee the harvest. Similarly, the sons stayed in Kefraya until they were old enough to attend school in Beirut and eventually universities abroad. Mr Sami, for example, left to study for a business degree in Canada between 1984 and 1985, with a full scholarship from the Hariri foundation. I am also told that during the civil war, Bassim Rahal remained mostly in Beirut, and like his father, worked in engineering.

It was only after the grapes harvests of 1997 and 1998 that viticulture and wine-making became a full-time endeavour for the Rahal brothers. During that time, Chateau Ksara stopped buying *Cinsault* grapes from Kefraya villagers, and other wineries saw a chance to buy these grapes at a much lower price. Mr Sami explained that “the price of *Cinsault* (per kilogram) shot down from 33 cents to about 25 cents”. While some Kefraya residents accepted private offers from certain wineries, many had relied upon the Rahal

family—who worked on their behalf—to find better deals elsewhere. Mr Sami explained that the family were obliged to ensure that other villagers' grapes were sold onto the wineries. As Mr Sami put it, “selling grapes had become pointless” and with nearly 700 tonnes of grapes left on their vines, “we were left with no choice but to make wine and (some) arak”. In 1998, the first vintage was made in collaboration with the Vin Nakad winery in the Jdeita region of the Central Bekaa. In Kefraya, the Rahals fermented approximately 450 tonnes of grapes in steel tanks that had been made in Lebanon, while the rest was sent off to the Nakad winery. The construction of the Cave Kouroum winery was completed the following year, to officially include 100 hectares of vineyard estates in its surroundings.

Changing Perceptions of House

While Mr Sami described the transition from viticulture to viniculture with the pronoun “we”, it is significant that the establishment of the winery was mostly, if not entirely, funded by Bassim Rahal. Although it remains unclear as to how (or where) Bassim Rahal had managed to come by the fortune that allowed him to purchase a winery in Languedoc and construct a winery in Kefraya, rumours suggest that the wealth did not come solely from selling grapes—or from his engineering job in Beirut. I don't think it's necessary to go into more detail here, but it is worth considering briefly the implications of extending production in Kefraya from viticulture into wine-making. Simply put, the phenomenon of a man from Kefraya village opening his own winery and taking control of production speaks of shifts in power relations and changing social structures. In this way, the establishment of the Cave Kouroum winery thus also has the potential to change the course of history, in that autonomy from other wineries implies the possibility of no longer being (fully)

compliant with and accepting the demands of the other wineries—and especially Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara. The expansion of the viticulture enterprise, to include wine production, inevitably had an impact upon how other Kefraya residents, as well the management and owners of other Lebanese wineries, perceived, spoke of, and interacted with the Rahal family. Significantly, there was a degree of ambiguity regarding the status and social position of *Bayt* Rahal, due to the economic ascendance of Bassim Rahal.

Unlike the *Khawaja* de Bustros, there was no distinctive title associated with Bassim Rahal in the village—nor was he described, like Michel de Bustros, in terms of giving Kefraya an aesthetic legacy of landscapes and views. Yet talk of Bassim Rahal was not disapproving, for he was recognised as a successful entrepreneur by many in the village. He was known to be sharp-minded and intelligent when it came to business; elderly residents who could recall Bassim Rahal in his youth described him as a strong-willed person. While many residents spoke of his accomplishments with admiration, there was however, also an aura of mystery surrounding Monsieur Rahal, for he had succeeded where others in the village had been unable to, or had not even thought such a manoeuvre was possible; people would often talk about him in hushed tones. Yet local residents also reminded me of his “*fellah*” origins when speaking of his transition from running a viticulture enterprise to owning a winery:

The father of Bassim Rahal was just a *fellah*. But when Bassim bought more land from the village . . . five dunnum here and then another ten . . . so that eventually it was 100 *dunnum* of *kouroum* to make a *khamara* (winery). *Bayt* Rahal even owns offices in Hazmeye now! It is made of dark glass. They can see out but no one can see in. Just like the tower of the Cave Kouroum winery—Bassim Rahal can look out to us, but we can’t see him. The brothers have all become important men—even half-brothers and cousins. You know there is one [half-brother] who used to be a school bus driver—and a *fellah*—who is now a businessman.

In the case of such narratives about *Bayt Rahal's fellahin* origins, the development of the winery business beyond viticulture, to include offices outside of Kefraya, speaks of the blurred line between the insider and outsider, and also evokes a relationship between material and immaterial labour. Talk about the establishment of Cave Kouroum and the construction of its tall stern tower, as well as the opening of the Beirut office in the capital's suburb of Hazmeyeh (with its dark windows), highlights the break from their *fellahin* origins: increasingly, the work of the men of *Bayt Rahal* resembled the role of the *Khawaja*. There was, in this respect, the possibility of being removed from a sense of collective belonging in the village of Kefraya, and thus also of disassociation from a particular collective consciousness. It is interesting in this regard to see that, despite one of his brothers being described as once being a *fellah*, Bassim Rahal was never called a *fellah*. Bassim Rahal was therefore not only distinguished from others in the village but also from the other brothers of the Rahal family.

Significantly, owners of other wineries (who had at one point or another relied upon the grapes sold by *Bayt Rahal*) also attempted to make sense of the transition from selling grapes to producing wine in our conversations. Many described the Rahals with a term that also comes from a history of rural property and labour relations, which also allows for a distinction between different social classes. The Rahal family were described by these wineries with the word *wakil*. Similarities to Gilsenan's ethnographic research in Berqayl once more surface, in that the use of the term evokes a particular hierarchical relationship between two different social groups (1996). Also noteworthy here is that the term was also present in Nabhane's job title at Chateau Kefraya, where *wakil al zir'a* refers to his role as the chief of agricultural affairs. While with Nabhane the title was formal, official, and

widely-used by those working at wineries as well as Kefraya villagers, when the term was used for the Rahal family it was outside of official business discussions. Rather, it *wakil* was used by (a majority) of the winery owners when they explained to me (directly) the historical role the Rahals had in the wine industry:

You see *Bayt* Rahal? Yes, including Bassim . . . [they] are only good at being *wakils*. They know the region for grapes and how to get the amount we want. If we need extra (grapes) then we go to them. We know that they will deliver.

In fact, when I asked Mr Sami Rahal about the family's role as *wakil*, I was quickly corrected. In the viticulture side of the enterprise, the family have been, and continue to be, *mowaz'a* (distributors). Yet it is interesting that by using the term *wakil*, winery owners and managers implied that the Rahals were guarding or taking care of the grapes that really belonged to these wineries. Now, with Bassim Rahal as a winery owner, and thus fully in the realm of the "vini", he was a competitor in the wine—but also grape—markets. It is also significant that within these narratives of *Bayt* Rahal, Bassim Rahal ceased to be an individual separate from his family. Instead such descriptions made clear the role family members were supposed to fulfil and deliver. On another note, it was Mr Sami who attended most of the Union Vinicole du Liban (UVL) meetings and maintained contact with the other wineries on behalf of his brother; this might be interpreted as Monsieur Bassim being too preoccupied with his larger (and more successful) winery in France. Indeed, I had heard from other attendees at the UVL meetings that this was often how his absence was interpreted.

In both instances, between the village—with its extensive viticulture—and the wineries, the changing roles of members of *Bayt* Rahal, especially after the establishment of Cave Kouroum, brought to the fore new market actors as a result of the strategies

deployed by the Chateau Ksara winery to source grapes elsewhere. Yet the ways in which these newly-acquired positions were perceived, namely with some sort ambivalence, suggests that such changes were not just economic, but also part of the relations of production constituted by “social and historical processes *within* a class” as much as amongst different classes (Sider, 1988: 8). Although in many ways circumstantial—or at least represented as such—the choice to open a winery in Kefraya, and purchase another abroad, highlights the historical aspect of the relationship between intentionality, domination, and class formation (Sider, 1988). Indeed both Yanagisako and Ulin have suggested on separate occasions that in the process of the extraction and valuation of labour, workers’ choices and decisions are continuously shaped by particularly historically-situated contexts (Yanagisako, 2002 & Ulin 2002). What is especially significant about the case of *Bayt* Rahal, therefore, is that the notion of house served to bind the sentimentalities of family and work. *Bayt* thus served to establish a sense of continuity in the sorts of work Rahal men performed in the vineyards.

While certain wineries might not have appreciated the establishment of a winery by someone from Kefraya, *bayt* was still used to refer to the type of work that was associated with that family— even if this was an attempt to reduce the growing importance of the Rahals in the production of wine. In the case of narratives by Kefraya residents, it is interesting that, although *bayt* was still important in signifying the type of work that the Rahals performed, there was strong emphasis upon Bassim Rahal’s departure from his *fellahin* roots. Thus it was implied that, despite the fact that the family’s role as grape distributors was instigated by Rahal brothers’ father, it was the accomplishments of Bassim Rahal in successfully extending production to wine that bestowed the *bayt* and all its

members—brothers and cousins included—with further wealth—both material and immaterial.

Brotherly Labour

While *bayt* names persist in Kefraya, along with the notion of kinship, concepts of house also shift in perception and experience from one generation to the next (Pine, 1996 & Carsten & Hugh-Jones, 1995). And it is precisely such changes and the struggles to understand them that generate processes of class-formation and self-making (Yanagisako, 2002; Yanagisako & Collier, 1990). In the case of *Bayt* Rahal, significant changes seem to have occurred following the establishment of the winery, when the brothers each took on distinctive managerial roles in order to supervise the activities related to and surrounding grape and wine production. Monsieur (Bassim) Rahal is recognised as the owner and patron of the winery, while his younger brother Mr Sami holds the position of general manager. His other brother, M Bahij, is the head of the municipality. The son of Bahij Rahal, Hassan, who trained as an agricultural engineer at the American University of Beirut, took on the responsibility of being viticulture manager, overseeing the maintenance of the *kouroum*.

Along with these clearly-defined positions, there were certain characteristics associated with each of the roles. Bassim Rahal remained distant from the everyday running of the winery as he spent most of his time at his other winery in Languedoc. Yet despite his elusiveness, Bassim Rahal retained his influential position, in that Cave

Kouroum employees²² regarded him with respect. Unlike Chateau Kefraya, most of the employees at Cave Kouroum were from Kefraya, and Monsieur Rahal was also held in great esteem because of his loyalty to the region. Thus, despite Monsieur Bassim appearing to be more directly involved in other business enterprises, such as his investment of 2.5 million Euros in Chateau Mauvanne, he was described by workers as “not forgetting Kefraya”. Interestingly, employees were usually unaware when Monsieur Rahal had returned to Kefraya. Yet when there was knowledge of his imminent arrival, work became more intense, and there was less clattering of coffee cups.

Mr Sami arrived at work every morning at around nine a.m. His home, like the winery, was on the outskirts of the village—less than 100 meters away from the winery. During the afternoon, Mr Sami would often drive home for a lunch prepared for him by his wife. Like Monsieur Rahal, Mr Sami was highly respected by the winery’s employees. He was, however, considered to be less stern, and some described him as kind and approachable. Mr Sami was usually the person who liaised with the other wineries and attended UVL meetings, acting as the representative for Cave Kouroum. Also present on a daily basis at the winery was Hassan, the agricultural engineer, who lived on-site in a modern apartment with his wife and children. Hassan usually arrived at his office late morning, carrying his Starbucks coffee mug and trailing the aroma of imported coffee, from France. While it was clear that employees also held him in high regard, he was much closer in age to the majority of the staff. A lot of joking and laughter was common amongst the staff when Hassan arrived, and he would socialise outside of work with most of the other men working at the winery.

²² I am informed that the winery employees approximately 15 employees.

Hassan's father, Mr Bahij, did not work at the winery, and nor did he visit the winery during work hours; although it is probable he visited his son and family from time to time. Nevertheless his role as the head of the municipality since 1997 has helped to legitimize the presence of the Cave Kouroum winery on the Kefraya landscape. The grape harvests of 1997 and 1998 had caused quite a stir in Kefraya village, so much so that villagers continued to discuss the events with each other while I was there. Since 1997, and once Chateau Ksara had ceased sourcing grapes from the region, many vineyard owners have had to deal with a greater degree of unpredictability in selling their grapes. At the same time, the opening of Cave Kouroum has had important ramifications on the relationship between Chateau Kefraya and Kefraya residents; especially because some of the employees at Chateau Kefraya who are from Kefraya, including the French oenologist Mr Yves Morard, went to work at the Cave Kouroum winery. These actions created considerable tension, because there were concerns that Chateau Kefraya would no longer hire new workers from Kefraya. I was informed that as part of Mr Bahij's electoral campaign, villagers—especially young men—were guaranteed relatively well paid-jobs in the newly-established Cave Kouroum winery. Vineyard owners were also told that they would no longer need to worry about where (or if) their grapes were to be sold during each harvest: if *Bayt Rahal* couldn't sell the grapes onto other wineries, then Cave Kouroum would buy the grapes instead.

Notably, unlike the other two brothers, Mr Bahij's was much more frequently seen around in the village—daily making his way along the main road up towards the municipality offices, which are situated at one of the highest points in the village. Mr Bahij and his wife also engaged more than his brothers and their wives in the custom of making official *ziyarat* (visits) to peoples' homes, either to offer condolences for a recently passed-

away relative or congratulatory greetings for a wedding or birth. The passing-away of a member of the village would often be marked by communal mourning at the deceased person's home, where the drinking of bitter coffee from a shared cup marked the shared sentiment of loss. Or, in order to welcome a new-born to the village, the women would visit the mother and child, with newly-purchased baby clothes. Missing such official visits could potentially break down social ties and bonds, as well as the trust and allegiance that had developed over time amongst (and also within) the *bayt* of Kefraya. Attending these *ziyarat*, however, is also suggestive of certain "pretensions to status" and honour, particularly because of the sense of obligation to attend these events, even when one may not actually want to make such official visits (Gilsenan, 1996). While they were considered social visits, there was always an implicit sense of official duty attached to the *ziyarat*. Keeping up appearances was thus an important responsibility that Mr Bahij (and his wife) had taken on behalf of *Bayt* Rahal. In attending such events, Mr Bahij provided a sociality that others—in particular Monsieur Bassim—were unable to offer because they did not spend as much time in the village. Indeed, it was almost as if Mr Bahij were acting on behalf of Bassim Rahal.

While this division of labour might not be strictly fraternal in that the nephew, Hassan Rahal, had also appropriated a managerial role, there are some similarities to Yanagisako's observations of "fraternal division of management" amongst the family firms of Como (2002). That is, such practices allowed the family to work efficiently to ensure that both the reputation and its material source were continuously reproduced. At the same, the transferral of certain responsibilities from Bassim Rahal to his brothers is of significance, in that it is suggestive of a *hierarchical* division of labour amongst the brothers. It is interesting that on the one hand, although it appears that Bassim Rahal had

invested the funds for the establishment and running of the winery, it was his physical absence that seemed to add a certain aura of importance to his entrepreneurial persona. On the other hand, however, while Bassim Rahal had become an important patriarch of *Bayt* Rahal, cooperation with the other brothers was essential to secure the material and immaterial wealth of the house. Interestingly, while this type of familial cooperation appears to have assisted the development of the *Bayt* Rahal enterprise, it also presented some limitations to economic development. That is, the decisions made by Monsieur Rahal were potentially constrained by kin-related sentiment and obligation, and at the same time they constrained and shaped the future of other family members. Such issues came to the fore when I learnt that the productivity of Cave Kouroum was not at the optimum level.

Controlling the Distributive Powers of the Bayt

Despite employees at Cave Kouroum being quick to look busy as soon as the word got out that Monsieur Rahal had returned to Kefraya, the reality was that there not much work to do. The scene was unlike Chateau Kefraya or Chateau Ksara, where employees were constantly busy throughout the seasons, with staff racking, overseeing the filtration, or pumping over the wine. The reason for the minimal amount of work done by Cave Kouroum employees was never directly made clear to me. Notably, after my visits to Cave Kouroum became more regular, I was approached by individuals from the larger wineries and asked for my observations on the winery. Were the employees actually making wine, they would ask? Who was in charge of the whole wine-making process? Do you know if Yves Morard still works there?²³ Someone even asked if I had heard the sound of

²³ While Yves Morard remained in France for the duration of fieldwork, he continued to be the consultant for the Cave Kouroum winery.

machinery in use. As usual, when asked about another winery's business, I would simply say that I wasn't sure. These individuals however, were already well-informed about the financial situation of Cave Kouroum, and told me that it was clear that business at the winery was not going well. During one discussion that took place during the harvest, it was pointed out that the Rahals "were keeping very few grapes for themselves". It appeared to my informant that *Bayt* Rahal had returned to their previous role as mediators and distributors between wineries and vineyard owners. How accurate these observations actually were remains unclear. During one visit when I asked Mr Sami directly if the winery business was indeed facing troubles, he responded simply by saying that business was "as well as to be expected".

On one occasion, an informant who worked at one of the larger wineries told me that the Cave Kouroum winery had an account at Fransabank, whose chairman, Mr Adel Kasser, is one of the main investors in Chateau Ksara. Rumour had it that Cave Kouroum was not doing very well because very little money had been deposited into their Fransabank account for quite some time. While my informant agreed with me that the Cave Kouroum winery might hold another account elsewhere, he pointed out that productivity remained low at the winery. "Business does not look good," he continued, "and guess who is interested in buying Cave Kouroum?" My informant was referring to Mr Adel Kasser, and the other investors in Chateau Ksara. As Cave Kouroum remains under the ownership of Bassim Rahal, and to the best of my knowledge the two parties had not met to discuss any potential deal, it is still difficult to verify this information. However, it appears that Bassim Rahal remained strong, and no outside investors were made welcome. Another well-informed individual suggested that what was missing from Bassim Rahal's enterprise was a better and wider business network that included the right contacts. This particular informant was quite well-connected, and told me he had made it clear to Monsieur Rahal

that his contacts could be exchanged for a price. The price was not cash, and nor was it shares in the company. The type of transaction proposed to Bassim Rahal was that of a business sales option, where in exchange for selling a certain amount of Cave Kouroum's wine, my informant would receive an equivalent amount of bottles to sell privately. When I asked this informant a few months later if his proposal had been successful, the answer was negative—Bassim Rahal had expressed no interest. “How could this be the case?” my informant wondered.

When I asked Mr Sami and Hassan for their thoughts on such business exchanges, both explained that the winery was not open to non-family investors. Mr Sami explained that Cave Kouroum was a “Rahal family enterprise,” where “the owner is Bassim Rahal and we (the rest of the family) take care of running the business”. He explained that an outside investor who might take a majority of shares (as had happened at Chateau Kefraya) would limit “the choices we can make”. There was, however, some ambivalence from both Mr Sami and Hassan concerning the decision-making process. When I asked Mr Sami for his personal thoughts concerning the choices his brother had made, he shrugged, explaining that, “We have no choice, but to fulfil to our family obligations”. Hassan expressed his opinions more metaphorically: “The owner of our winery deserves a lot of credit, because Cave Kouroum is one man on a big ship. Whatever gets into my uncle's mind, he does”. Yet despite the respect he had for his uncle's adamant determination, Hassan also had his own opinion on the types of business decisions that should have been made. He felt that there were perhaps better opportunities to invest in wine production outside of Lebanon. Although his uncle had already invested in a winery in France, Hassan felt that more investment should have been made outside of Lebanon:

I tell my uncle that he is mad to have made this investment. The winery in France cost about 2.5 million Euros. Now it is worth 3–3.5 million Euros. Cave Kouroum was a \$12–15 million investment. Instead of investing here, we could have invested into three or four wineries abroad . . . perhaps in Australia or France.

We were sitting in his office, and he paused for a moment before looking out of his office window. Hassan's office looks onto the vineyards of the east, and onto the lands belonging to the Hariri dynasty. On the wall facing the window is a framed photograph of Rafik Hariri, who appears to be looking out the window as well. Next to the photograph is a cabinet holding thin piles of wine and viticulture magazines—these were well read. Whenever I interviewed Hassan in the office, he would always offer me an array of teas and coffees, and on this occasion, after accepting some coffee, I asked him how he came to study and work as agricultural engineer. He told me:

My family were eager for me to stay; to do business here and work here. I had to make a choice when I was studying agriculture. I had to major on a particular aspect. Being from Kefraya, and seeing all those vineyards, I decided to become a specialist in grapes. When I was younger I wanted to study mechanical engineering. But my uncle pointed out that we had all this land, and suggested I try agricultural engineering. So I had no choice. I studied agricultural engineering and environmental sciences. When I started, I didn't like it. I felt obliged. But I realised that we have a large amount of independence . . . not having to abide by others. So I got to know the vines and I am still learning. My uncle wanted to pull out some vineyards and grow olives. I do not want to pull out a single vine! I love what I am doing. After the harvest, people from Kefraya say they have yielded a large amount. But I ask about the quality. Is it good quality? However, if I had the choice to go back then I would rewind. I would not choose this domain. 90% of my friends from my days at the American University of Beirut are outside of Lebanon or working in big companies. They are becoming salesmen—successful ones.

Hassan's response was somewhat conflicting, in that on the one hand he felt that there were limitations in terms of the choices he made, due to family pressure—especially from his

uncle. On the other, Hassan also had great respect for his uncle, and felt that it was important to listen to his advice because it was his uncle's choices that had allowed the family some degree of independence and less pressure overall to "abide by others". "Others" for Hassan included both wineries, but also non-family members from Kefraya. Ultimately, Hassan felt that he had had to compromise on certain personal choices to ensure the economic security of the family as a whole. Notably, Mr Sami expressed a similar sentiment when he told me that it was "family ties and traditions" that had prevented him from returning to Canada, and it was this sense of duty that had held him back in pursuing new business ventures abroad—and outside of the wine sector.

While both Hassan and Mr Sami believed it important for their sons to learn about the significance of the *kouroum* in Kefraya, and the work that went on in the winery, they both made it clear that there were better opportunities for their sons abroad, where they would be allowed to develop their own businesses interests with some degree of independence; perhaps, after which, they might return to Kefraya for their retirement. While there was still a desire for the sons to remain "close" to Kefraya, and perhaps even to marry someone from the village, the sentiments of both fathers was clear in that they hoped the sons would have a future with less pressure to *work* in Kefraya. The winery was, after all, as Hassan had aptly put it, like "one man on a ship". It was also implied that Bassim Rahal's children would inherit most—if not all—of the shares of the Cave Kouroum winery. Should the sons of Hassan and Mr Sami not find their own paths outside of Kefraya, then the hierarchy in the division of labour, which began with the Rahal brothers, would potentially manifest amongst family member of the next generation. I briefly encountered the son and daughter of Bassim Rahal during harvest time, when both had come to gain work experience at the winery and in the vineyards. Whether they will take over the executive side of the business however, remains to be seen. Although during

a post-fieldwork visit, it appeared that the daughter had acquired a position in international sales and distribution, working at both Cave Kouroum and Chateau Mauvanne—unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to meet with her.

While obtaining any official property documents concerning the winery proved to be impossible, I was informed that the ownership of the winery was arranged similarly to the way in which the Rahal family managed their lands in Kefraya. That is, the lands of *Bayt* Rahal were a joint stock company; the grapes from the vineyards on these lands were sold to wineries and the profits were split proportionally amongst the shareholders. Significantly, important decisions—such as whether to sell shares to outsiders, namely non *Bayt* Rahal members—required unanimous agreement. As there were up to thirty shareholders in the company, such a possibility was near-impossible—unless the whole of *Bayt* Rahal “wanted out of Kefraya”.²⁴ Hassan explained this to me in further detail:

The profit is separated amongst family members. So, for example, my father has a one-sixth share. If we were to sell the shares, then my father would gain one sixth of the profit. Also in this way, after, for example, two generations, inheritance is not the land itself, but the shares. So value is less likely to decrease and we can also bypass hereditary laws that are part of the personal status law. This is what Rafiq Hariri did with his land. So when he was assassinated, no one [particular member] could take all of his lands, as it was in the form of a company. It is important to do this in Kefraya, because the value of the land is much higher than in other parts of the Bekaa Valley.

In adopting a corporate model for running *Bayt* Rahal, family members were thus linked to Kefraya through both economic organization and familial relations. That is, the obligation to ensure that the companies were successful profitable ventures was simultaneously

²⁴ It is unclear what type of joint stock company the Rahal family have established for the management of their lands. However, if, for example, it is registered as a limited liability joint stock company—SARL (Société à Responsabilité Limitée)—then following inheritance, the company is only eligible to have up to thirty share-holders. Above this, another company would have to be established.

perceived as a form of kin-related sentiment. In the fraternal division of labour, *Bayt Rahal* as a whole had a vested interest in the land in Kefraya—but in the reputation of the Kefraya region for producing high quality grapes and wines more generally. Indeed, any member of the family, like Hassan, who had specialised in viticulture maintenance, was an important asset to *Bayt Rahal*. Significantly, in the years following the establishment of the Cave Kouroum, *Bayt Rahal* decided to reduce the amount of *Cinsault* vines planted on their land—and Hassan’s role became all the more important in the project to plant new grape varieties on both winery’s estates and *Bayt Rahal* lands. It was also brought to my attention that included in their project were lands that belonged to the Kefraya municipality. Hassan explained:

In 1997, we had a municipality of four hectares of vineyards. This had been more or less the case since the 1970s. The former municipality was unable to plant more vineyards on the rest of the municipal lands. I mean that no one was eager to plant more vineyards. After the 1997 elections, my father, the Mayor decided to invest money from the four hectares in wine-grape production to plant vines on the other common land. This was, in effect, reclamation of the land. We reached up to twenty-five hectares. Yes, there was opposition from some of the villagers. They said that we [the Rahals] did not own this land. Also, that if we extended the vineyards onto municipal lands, then the prices of grapes would go down. The logic was that the 200–300 tonnes produced on the municipal land would increase supply and lower demand. But many did not want to grow anything else but *Zaitouny (Cinsault)*. We continued [nevertheless], piece by piece. After one year, we moved to the other side of Kefraya, until we reached twenty-five hectares. We are getting better . . . selling grapes from the vineyards gives us double the amount of funds provided to the Kefraya municipality from the internal ministers. The village of Kefraya is the only one that has a positive balance on its account

sheets!

While “reclaiming” unused municipal land in order to use the profits for the general maintenance and upkeep of the village was an innovative strategy, there had been some

concern in the village about the possibility of losing buyers. In response to my query about such concerns, one of the Rahals explained that these vineyard owners would only lose buyers if they didn't grow the grapes in demand by the wineries. On another occasion, a Rahal family member pointed out while the family might continue to act as distributors, villagers had to start growing "better grapes . . . —if they don't then we can't sell them". In this light, it is also significant that, along with Dr. Didi, *Bayt* Rahal continued to acquire more land in the region. In the process, the corporatization of Kefraya's viticulture—and viniculture—had thus become an extension of *Bayt* Rahal.

Yet given that the winery really belonged only to Bassim and his children, this suggests that the diversification of business interests could potentially result in the breaking down of the larger collective interests of the Rahal household. This is not to say that, if the winery was not the most successful of ventures, other related wine related enterprises would be directly affected. Rather, what is at stake is the way Bassim Rahal had managed to centre all of *Bayt* Rahal's economic activity at the winery. So, for example, if the Rahals were unable to sell everything from one particular harvest, then the grapes were sent over to Cave Kouroum and made into wine. While it is unclear how family members were paid for such transactions, it is of significance that such an exchange reinforces the patriarchal role of Bassim Rahal. In other words, if he had not established the winery then unsold grapes would mean a loss of profits. Even if the wine was not sold immediately, unlike the grapes, it could be aged for a few years before entering the market—thus making it a more durable surplus-product. In this regard, in possessing the resources to make wine, Bassim Rahal had also managed to extend control of the distributive powers of *Bayt* Rahal (Yanagisako, 2002). In so doing, he secured the work-legacy of *Bayt* Rahal, while also appropriating the role of the *bayt's* most prominent patriarch.

The Reproductive Powers of Bayt Rahal

It is significant that, in many respects, the notion of *bayt* in Kefraya refers to the social importance of a kind of household economy. While the notion of a household economy can be conceptually loaded with ideas of pre-capitalist societies, ethnographic studies have demonstrated their persistence even after the marketization of societies (e.g. Pine, 1996 & Sabeen, 1990 & Bourdieu, 1979). It is thus also useful to recall here the discussion in Chapter Two concerning Gudeman and Rivera's distinction between house and corporate economic models, and the increasing displacement of the former. Also recall Pratt's critique that the former can exist under the forces of market production (Gudeman & River, 1990; Pratt, 1994). That is, although *Bayt* Rahal's corporate model of ownership might imply a marginalization of household economies, I would argue that such forms of economic organization portrays an attempt to sustain autonomous units of production as well as patrilineal succession, following further changes in market production.

In this light, a significant feature of discussions concerning transforming house-societies and household economies is the impact of broader political and economic forces upon gendered relations—especially in terms of how such forces are interpreted and incorporated into the house (e.g. Sabeen, 1990; Lem, 1999 & 2013; Mundy & Smith, 2003 & 2007). In the case of modern Lebanon, Joseph has argued that the reproduction of gendered subjectivities within the home has a particularly important role in the construction of the self (1994). For example, the sense of obligation and duty of fathers to protect women allows for the construction and development of certain masculine subjectivities: in preserving the honour of their women kin they ensure that particular notions of respect and the reputation of the family are upheld.

While Joseph does not clarify the historical legacy of the notion of home in terms of shaping gendered subjectivities, she does extend her argument to suggest that the metaphorical use of familial terms—such as uncle or sister—outside of the house might imply that household familial relations act as the basis for all other forms of social relations—including those that occur in places of work and business (1993, 1994, 1997, 1999). She also argues that due to the weakness of the Lebanese state, people in all social classes and religious communities frequently build up trust in both long- and short-term relationships through the use of kin-terms in places of work and more domesticated spheres. The line between the public and the private is in this way porous and undefined, where “fictive kinship” acts as an anchor for social cohesion and security across these spheres. In developing this line of reasoning, Joseph also challenges “Western constructs” of the state and citizenship, and in so doing so develops a critique of gender-making constructed through the public-private nexus (1997).

The idiomatic use of family ties, as suggested by Joseph, also implies that there are two (or more) forms of kinship occurring. Such a supposition inadvertently infers a spatial demarcation, where the first form of kinship is considered real, and situated within the household; while the latter is unreal and acts a metaphor for relatedness across the public sphere. Joseph therefore (perhaps unintentionally) makes a clear differentiation between the public and private, and in doing so only ratifies the “Western traditions” she intends to challenge. Indeed, the actual use of kin-titles within work and political domains, at least to the extent suggested by Joseph, is questionable in the case of Kefraya—or the wine industry as a whole. I rarely (if ever) heard terms such as “sister”, “brother”, or “uncle” used within such areas or in social activity. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the *kouroum* is a site with different gendered temporalities, but this does not have to imply the “blurring” of the public and private. Instead, there is an implicit understanding as to how,

when, and *the way* in which the two spheres of the *kouroum* should inform and complement each other. The breaking down of this understanding of the *kouroum* has obscured particular ways of forging ties and conceptualising ways of relating.

Nevertheless, Joseph's concept of "patriarchal connectivity" provides a useful lens through which to explore the process of relatedness within and amongst the different *bayt* in Kefraya—and might help us understand how gendered subjectivities are reproduced within that process. To add to her perspective, however, I would suggest that such gendered discourses of patriarchy do not necessarily imply that a woman's role is limited to the domestic sphere (Goddard, 2000). Indeed, in the case of Kefraya, many women also worked outside the home in professions such as teaching and nursing. These jobs, however, were often described as supplementary to—rather than constituting—a household's finances.

Yet despite the reduction in the social importance of such types of work done by women outside the home, in Kefraya these roles were still perceived as important. This was not only in terms of providing sustenance and nourishment from the *kouroum*—both physical and symbolic. The women of Kefraya often had an active role in ensuring the continuation of patriarchal succession. Significantly, these roles were intricately intertwined with attempts to forge kin relations and increase social mobility (Collier & Yanagisako, 1990). Yanagisako's observations, made during her fieldwork in northern Italy, are a case in point, where the wives of many of the Como entrepreneurs are extremely knowledgeable about kin-genealogies in relation to the family firms established across the region. Such knowledge is invaluable when judging the suitability of potential business-partners for the family firm, but also when considering marriage suitors for their sons and daughters. Likewise, it was apparent that the women of *Bayt* Rahal also actively engage in shaping their family's future.

For example, during one discussion with Mr Sami about his decision to work at Cave Kouroum, he explained to me that he had initially felt obliged to stay in Kefraya because of his mother. Had it not been for her pleading, Mr Sami explained that he would have happily left for Michigan to “start a new life other there”. After all, his father had once left Kefraya, and so had his older brother Bassim. Indeed, Bassim Rahal’s wife and their grown-up children remained, for most of the time, outside Kefraya. Mr Sami, however, felt compelled and obliged to remain close, in order to care for his aging mother and “make a life in Kefraya”. It was “these ties”, he explained, that can “hold you back”. Not long after, and much to the relief of his mother, Mr Sami married a woman from Kefraya. Significantly, it was Mr Sami’s new wife who, in 1997, acquired an important role in the family business during the transition of the Rahal family from *muwaza* to wine producers.

One evening, late in the summer of 1997, Mr Brahim Serhal paid a visit to the Nabhane household. Serhal saw Nabhane on a daily basis at Chateau Kefraya, where both worked. He was the *chef d’atelier* (head of the workshop and laboratory), while Nabhane was in charge of the agricultural affairs out in the vineyards. Both knew, however, that this important meeting could not take place at the winery, and given the social status of *Bayt* Nabhane, it was expected that Serhal would make the visit—and not the other way around. Serhal only lived across the road, and it was just a matter of crossing the road and climbing up the steps onto the Nabhane family’s long veranda. As the story goes, Serhal proceeded towards the other end of the veranda, where Nabhane reclined on his favourite summer day-bed, Hana, Nabhane’s wife, got up and went inside to prepare some coffee. Their daughters greeted Serhal before also going inside. Nabhane’s son, who was only around ten years old at the time, stood up to greet Serhal before sitting back down on one of the chairs that faced the *sahal* (plains) and, in the distance, the Chateau of Kefraya. It is likely that

Nabhane's two nephews, Abdel Helim and Omar, were also present. Serhal would have greeted Nabhane before sitting on a red plastic chair, giving his back to the *sahal* and Chateau.

This was not a social call, but a business meeting: Serhal had come to inform Nabhane of his plan to leave Chateau Kefraya. He may have glanced and gestured in front of him and into the distance, where a new winery was under construction. Nabhane would have listened intently as Serhal spoke about his intentions. It was not just Serhal who was planning to leave Chateau Kefraya in order to work at the newly-established winery. There was also Yves Murard, the French oenologist, as well as some others from the Kefraya village. Although the figures fluctuate, there were up to ten people who planned on leaving Chateau Kefraya to work at the newly-established Cave Kouroum. This was a rather large number of workers, and the move would obviously have an impact upon Chateau Kefraya's productivity. Serhal emphasized once more that the French oenologist, Yves Murard, was also going. With both Serhal and Murard gone, who would be in charge of making the wine?

While Nabhane was well aware of the events taking place, he had already made his decision. Nabhane, of course, would—could—not leave Chateau Kefraya. There was the legacy of his father to preserve, and, as he would constantly remind me, “there would be no Chateau Kefraya without Abdel Helim Nabhane”. Leaving Chateau Kefraya, at least while the *Khawaja* was still alive, would dishonour the memory of his father. However, when it came to informing Serhal of his decision to stay on at Chateau Kefraya, Nabhane chose his words carefully, as there were also the familial ties between *Bayt* Nabhane and *Bayt* Rahal to consider. Whenever this story was told to me by Nabhane, he would usually point towards the house of Sami Rahal, situated on the *sahal* along the main road and just across

from Cave Kouroum, reminding me that his sister, Hayat, lived there too. Nabhane would often conclude his narration of this story by exclaiming the term *suhur* (brother in law), and as he did, put his two index fingers close together so that they were aligned equally. It was predominantly because of respect and love for his sister that the decision had been so difficult. In refusing the offer, there was the potential of breaking down the relations between the families and repercussions that might have put his sister in a difficult situation. There was also the chance that collaboration between the two families would have been beneficial for his sister and husband—perhaps even for *Bayt* Nabhane. And finally, there was the risk of creating a rift in the village itself. In his conversation with Serhal, Nabhane would thus bring to the table a reminder of his duty to honour the memory of his father. Serhal had expected such an outcome—and, as he told me himself, Nabhane’s decision was completely understandable.

It is also significant that while Hayat is a regular visitor to the Nabhane household, I only saw her husband (Mr Sami) at the Nabhane house on one occasion, upon the marriage of Nabhane’s eldest daughter. When I mentioned my observations to Mr Sami and Nabhane, both were quick to explain that there was no bad feeling between the families—even after Nabhane’s decision to remain at Chateau Kefraya. Working at different wineries, however, presented some difficulties in socialising, apparently because of their busy hours. Still, both Mr Sami and Nabhane were welcome to visit the other. Nevertheless, Sami Rahal rarely (if ever) made an appearance and it was significant that Hayat would usually visit during the day in order to help out with kitchen activities, such as stuffing vine leaves. If she came during the late afternoon or early evening with her two young sons, when Nabhane was in, then she would greet him and occasionally join him for a cup of coffee before entering the house or moving down to the other side of the veranda

where Hana and her friends would be sitting. Yet it was during these late afternoon visits, when Nabhane was home, that Hayat would speak with her brother on behalf of the Rahals. There would often be an exchange of information pertaining to the wineries looking for grapes in the upcoming harvest and the amount that was in demand.

Despite the influential positions of people like Hayat and Mr Sami's mother, there were limitations upon the roles the women were able to acquire within some aspects of *Bayt* Rahal's business. As we saw earlier, the management of the Rahal family lands in Kefraya was done through share-holding companies—significantly; daughters and sisters were provided with their own shares. In fact, one of the major advantages of establishing the Rahal “land” company was that it allowed some aspects of inheritance to bypass the personal status law in Lebanon. In line with Sunni inheritance laws, Rahal sons are (each) entitled to a full share of both of their parents' estate; while daughters only receive a third of the shares. As Hassan explained, the transformation of land ownership into shares prevented such a division of the Rahal lands, which would thus divide into even smaller parcels from generation to generation. At the same time, the value of the shares only differed in the amount of shares each member held, and this (arguably) meant that the Rahal daughters and sisters were personally motivated (to some degree) to augment the value of these shares. However, as we saw, the shares could only be sold within the family, and this is indicative of the types of restrictions imposed upon women within the business. Thus, despite the active involvement of Bassim Rahal's daughter, the chances of her children owning any shares in the company remain uncertain.

In this regard, it is clear that ideas of patrilineal succession and the continuation of the business were entangled within gendered discourses of the self, where most of the activity of the women remained within the realm of the home. Yet despite their prevailing “invisibility” within officially demarcated workplaces, these women still held influence in

decisions relating to business. They played “a fundamental part in building up the male entrepreneur and particular masculinities” (Mulholland, 1996: 123). The “invisible resource” of the work of the women in the domestic serves also to guarantee the connection of men to the home, and in this way constitutes “sets of relationships which are mutually reproducing” (ibid). This is precisely how these invisible or “silent” resources are deployed in order to contribute towards the construction of entrepreneurial masculinities. These are, as we have seen, significant, and speak of the active and powerful roles that these women have in directing and shaping the futures of their sons, brothers, and husbands.

Thus, if Mr Sami had moved to Michigan, he would not only be leaving his mother for someone else, but in the process he would become disconnected and detached from Kefraya: a place of home and also of work. In this way, marrying someone from the village indicates the importance of collaboration with others from the village. However, the decision to marry does not of course emerges solely from economic motivations. Rather, it merges social and cultural aspects that must both be taken into account. As my conversation with Mr Sami revealed, the decision to stay had less to do with business, but more to do with his sense of duty to respect and care for his mother. As our discussion drew to an end, Mr Sami told me that Kefraya was his “home”, and that there were some things that he just had to accept.

There are two final, pertinent things I would like to add here. The first has to do with my access to the homes of *Bayt Rahal*, which was limited to those in Kefraya. In this regard, I did not have the opportunity to meet either Bassim Rahal or his wife, and thus was unable to fully understanding her role in the family. Indeed I was unable to obtain who she was, or if she even came from Kefraya—a question that I asked in vain. The question, however, leads on to my second point, which is to do with the importance of marriage alliances made by *Bayt Rahal* with members of elite families from outside of Kefraya.

While Mr Sami might have married someone from Kefraya, it is significant that Hassan Rahal's wife came from a village nearby and was the daughter of a prominent patriarch. Once more, there are questions that remain unanswered. Was there an historical relationship between the two families—and if so what types? After spending some time with Hassan's wife, and developing a friendship with her, it was apparent that despite coming from a nearby village, her connections extended to Beirut and further abroad. Indeed, she and Hassan enjoyed taking their children on holiday abroad, to visit relatives—including Bassim Rahal.

The Hands of Raya

Pine has observed that in the case of the Górales in Poland, the social significance of naming the house could also be extended to the land (1996). There are some similarities to the case of Kefraya, where different vineyards were referred to as being (for example) “*Kouroum Bayt Saleh*”. That is, it was common for villagers not to say that these vineyards belonged to a particular house, but rather, imply that the vineyards *were* a particular house. Notably, if the ownership of the land became increasingly fragmented from one generation to the next, then villagers would often add a first name in order to designate more specifically which house the land was associated with, e.g. *Bayt Mohammed Saleh*. Interestingly, in the case of the Rahals, the vineyards usually remained *Bayt Rahal*; perhaps reflecting their adoption of a corporate model for landownership. Still, in all instances, and just as in linking *bayt* with a family name, the *kouroum* also entered into the realm of kinship genealogies, while at the same time consolidating the familial bond to land as well as place.

By establishing a link to place, names have the power to evoke identities, and different family and work histories become entangled within the process. Such identities are strongly attached to the *kouroum*, and not confined just to the houses of Kefraya. The name of the village itself is part of the politics of names associated with the *kouroum*; after all the arrival of the *kouroum* is what made the Kefraya region prominent as the wine-growing hub of Lebanon. Thus while the village of Kefraya might pre-date the arrival of the *kouroum*, it is the work of the *Khawaja* that has made the name of the region known—and transformed it from a place of “nothing”. Notably, there are stories in the village that the name “Kefraya” was derived from the Arabic word for stop or (*qaf*) or enough (*kaf*) and the name of a heroine called Raya, who lived long before the *Cinsault* vines arrived. There are two variations of Raya’s story, which were told to me by Kefraya residents:

Raya was a shepherdess and spiritual woman in this region. You know where the old wall is? You walked there once with Iman’s children. That is where she is buried. That is where the old village of Kefraya used to be. No, I can’t remember the name of the village. But Raya was a good woman who helped people. She lived a simple life. But there was a lot of fighting and many wars at that time. One day the village was attacked and Raya was trying to stop the fighting. Raya was killed but no one could find her body. All that was left was her hand.

Kefraya? Raya was the shepherdess who went up the mountains from her village. She was following the water source up the mountain to find more water . . . when wolves got her. All that was left was her hand.

It is interesting that another important character in a narrative about the origins of Kefraya is described as a shepherd. It is significant that both variations of the story were known to most of the younger generation in Kefraya, and when I asked elder residents about the story, many knew of Raya a wise sage and shepherdess, but “kef” was considered as an old word for village: so Kefraya referred to the village of Raya. It is not that such

inconsistencies make the story of Raya untrue, or of less importance for us to consider analytically as narrative; nor will I dismiss the possibility that the story of Raya's hand was told with someone like me in mind—someone not fluent in Arabic. I was, however, intrigued that the story seemed so recent—or perhaps to have undergone some modifications.²⁵ The narrative had caught my attention because, first, the story appears to pre-date the arrival of the *kouroum* into Kefraya, and contradicts those narratives that speak of a time when there was “nothing” in Kefraya. Second, the wall where Raya is supposedly buried is located just below the Cave Kouroum winery. Finally, there had been, over the last decade, some contention over the use of the name of Kefraya in wine production, and this began when Cave Kouroum had named its then newly-established winery Kouroum de Kefraya.

The name however, was short-lived, and this was not due to protest or expression of disapproval from the Kefraya villagers. Objection came, instead, from the winery not far down the road: Chateau Kefraya. Pre-fieldwork research had already uncovered an article published in *Decanter* wine magazine on the 16th of June 2003, confirming that four years of legal dispute had finally ended between the “longer-established Chateau Kefraya” and their rival “Kouroum de Kefraya” (vineyards of Kefraya). The outcome was that the Chateau Kefraya winery would retain the “sole use of the name” Kefraya, and Kouroum de Kefraya would henceforth be called Cave Kouroum:

Château Kefraya's proprietor, Michel de Bustros, told *decanter.com*, 'We now have a deal with Rahal, and he's going to observe it from the end of this month'. De Bustros argues his estate has

²⁵ For example, stories of the *khamsa* hand are commonplace across the eastern Mediterranean. *Khamsa* means five in Arabic and the *khamsa* hand can represent peace, protection from evil and/or prosperity. The *khamsa* hand is also associated with the hand of Miriam and the hand of Fatima—depending upon the religion. Significantly, an amulet of the *khamsa* is also said to prevent the effects of the evil eye—such as envy. (González-Wippler, 1991)

established a right to the village name. Rahal counter-claimed that the name was the common property of the village's farmers, who supply grapes to most of the country's wineries. Before founding Koroum Kefraya in 1997 Rahal was the local agent sourcing grapes for the well-known producer Château Musar. With this agreement, the way is now clear for Rahal's company to join the joint industry body, the Union Viticole Libanaise, from which it was previously barred. (Matthews, 2003)

In fact, it was Chateau Kefraya who had initially pursued court action back in 1999, and *Decanter* mentions that Chateau Kefraya had won the case at the first hearing, but the following two appeals had “subsequently gone the other way.” However, it appeared that an important part of the deal struck between Michel de Bustros and Bassim Rahal was an agreement concerning Cave Kouroum’s membership of the wineries business association, the Union Vinicole du Liban. I had hoped that upon arrival in Kefraya I would have the chance to learn more about the different perspectives on this legal dispute. In particular, I wanted to find out why Bassim Rahal might have accepted such a deal, despite his apparent legal “win”. However, (and understandably), it was not a popular subject of discussion. Gaining access to legal documents related to these events has also been (thus far) an impossible task. When I asked members of the wineries involved for these documents, I was informed that I would have to speak with their lawyers—who were unavailable to meet with me. Despite the lack of further information about the court case between Chateau Kefraya and Cave Kouroum, it is clear that the dispute marked an important juncture in terms of the politics behind the emergence of an appellation system in Lebanon—the focus of the following chapter—and the ensuing (or resultant) struggle over legacy and succession.

Ostensibly, for Michel de Bustros, this legacy was one of heritage and recognition for his enterprising vision of the Kefraya landscape. It was, as he reminded me during an interview, “him and always him” in Kefraya; there had been nobody else. When I asked

him about the role of the people living in Kefraya, he informed me of his hopes that they continue to look after and care for their vines, ensuring that his vision carries on long after his death. I asked him about the Cave Kouroum winery, only a few hundred meters down the road—were they continuing his vision? De Bustros explained diplomatically that if they make good wines then that was a good thing—not just for Kefraya but for wine production in Lebanon as a whole. But what of the court case between Chateau Kefraya and Cave Kouroum some years back? I was told by de Bustros that “Kefraya” belonged to the Chateau Kefraya winery because this was where wine (and wine grape) production began. It was because of this belief that de Bustros had taken the step of trademarking the name so that it could not be put on the labels of wine bottles produced in other wineries. It is of significance as well that for de Bustros, the name Kefraya had no meaning other than signifying the plural (in Arabic), namely a cluster or group of small villages: *kfar*. The name Kefraya was therefore unique only in the respect that it has a distinctive history related to wine production evoked through an association with term “chateau.” There was, for de Bustros, no notable history of Kefraya other than that of wine-production.

The story of Raya, as told by certain Kefraya residents, is thus the antithesis of the historical representation of Kefraya recounted by Michel de Bustros. The heroic status of Raya suggests attempts made to reconfigure a history of Kefraya, linking its present inhabitants with a period that pre-dates the *kouroum*—and perhaps more importantly the establishment of Chateau Kefraya and the prominent role of Michel de Bustros. The gendering of Raya and the absence of a (patrilineal) surname is an interesting aspect of the story in this regard, because it makes it practically impossible for any particular *bayt* in Kefraya to lay claim to this ancestry. In this light, the original name for the Cave Kouroum winery (Kouroum de Kefraya) adds another interesting dimension in that the choice of the name was, according to Mr Sami, “because we are from Kefraya, the grapes are from

Kefraya and the winery is in Kefraya! It makes sense for us to call it that!” In this way, the first name for Cave Kouroum carried significant value, both within the village and as part of a wine label. The name Kouroum de Kefraya was once associated with a renowned place for making wine while also speaking of the accomplishments of Bassim Rahal in beginning a new legacy for *Bayt* Rahal, one that was an extension of the viticulture enterprise his father had initiated a few decades earlier.

Yet Bassim Rahal’s consenting, not long after the establishment of his winery, to the demands of Chateau Kefraya, even—and perhaps especially—after his legal success, suggests that the dynamics of power relations are relative, in that they must be constituted within certain broader contexts. Indeed, as implied by an anonymous informant, in contrast to Chateau Kefraya—where Walid Junblatt and a member of the Fattal family were also shareholders—Cave Kouroum was severely limited in both its political and economic connections. It was suggested that refusing the demands of its adversary meant that Cave Kouroum could face challenges in selling its wines locally, where goods distributed by the Fattal family dominated the market. By the same token, exporting abroad could also be difficult given the extensive networks of the shareholders of Chateau Kefraya. It is, in this way, apparent that in both cases the original choice of name of the Cave Kouroum winery and the decision to trademark “Kefraya” by de Bustros are overlapping perspectives of the region, which speaks of a “representational economy” (vom Bruck & Bodenhorn, 2009:11 & see also West, 2012). The name “Kefraya” (and the rights to it) is thus an important resource that belongs to converging and diverging historical processes; where in both instances the name allows for succession and the continuity of a certain patriarchal attachment to place, while also possessing commodity value (ibid).

Yet sentiments expressed by Rahal family members—as well as other residents—brought to the fore how the trade-marking of the village name by Chateau Kefraya was a contradiction, in that it could potentially break up the interrelatedness of *bayt* and *kouroum* and both of their associations with work and kin. One Rahal family member explained, “Now no one from Kefraya village can use the name Kefraya to make wine! Even though we have all been supplying grapes to wineries across Lebanon since at least the 1960s!” In being prevented from access to the name Kefraya when making wine, residents of Kefraya also faced a limited future role in wine production. In the case of *Bayt* Rahal, there was, quite possibly, little aspiration in the younger generation to expand and develop the business that Bassim Rahal had started.

Concluding Remarks

It seems that in some ways the predicaments faced by Cave Kouroum reflect the broader dilemmas faced by many in Kefraya. That is, as the region continues to be an important centre for wine grapes, those who seek to extend production into wine-making are restrained by other wineries competing to secure an important attachment to the region. The limitations imposed upon Cave Kouroum are illustrated clearly through the court case with Chateau Kefraya over the usage of the name Kefraya. While the trade-marking of the name Kefraya demonstrates a version of quality discourses that are utilized within wine production, it also elucidates the types of power relations that are involved in such strategies. In other words, the political and economic networks and alliances amongst Chateau Kefraya’s upper management, that extend beyond the relations forged in Kefraya, have offered several advantages in influencing and steering decisions towards favourable outcomes for Chateau Kefraya’s enterprise.

There are more subtle ways to illustrate the constraints that Kefraya residents such as Bassim Rahal experienced when attempting to develop their own independent wine enterprises. For example, we have mentioned enterprising strategies that seek to buy out Cave Kouroum from Bassim Rahal. It might not be a coincidence that those entrepreneurial actors offering Mr Bassim potential deals are also quick to point out that winery appears to be facing financial difficulty. Such challenges faced by Bassim Rahal might be because the winery is of interest to those who are already well connected in Lebanese viniculture, and are interested in extending their influence by securing economic ties to the Kefraya region. Yet his decision to keep the winery “inside” reflects, more broadly, the observations made by Yanagisako concerning the *urban* entrepreneurs in Como, Italy, where patriarchal desire for succession is crucial in motivating capitalist action.

In this regard, there is something to be said about how the concept of *bayt* in Kefraya continues to reinforce attachments to place. In taking precedence over broader forms of familial relatedness, *bayt* embodies a sense of historical reflexivity, paying homage to the legacy of the forefathers of Kefraya who registered their land following the cadastral survey and consequently created the space for the creation of *kouroum*. Yet given that this idea of *bayt* appears to have emerged at a similar time to changes in the regulation of private property and the development of the region’s market economy, this suggests how notions of kin—and other senses of relatedness—began to shift as well. Indeed, more recent changes in the notion of *bayt*, as reflected in the familial relations of the Rahals, demonstrate the continuity of such forms of economic rationality. The use of categories such as *fellah* and *wakil* to describe Bassim Rahal, and, more generally, *Bayt* Rahal, can thus be understood as a way of explaining such historical continuity while also portraying changes in the social stratification of Kefraya. Yet the tensions and sense of ambiguity that emerged from such narratives also reflect how the transition of members of the Rahal

family from grape distributors to wine producers challenged accepted norms of the types of work that are associated with urban and rural spaces.

6: Patrons of Production: The Role of the UVL

One late morning in the middle of the harvest, Nabhane and I were sitting in his jeep sipping coffee and looking out the dusty windows at the workers in the vineyards of Chateau Kefraya. I had spent the last week harvesting with the workers, and while feeling somewhat guilty that I was able to take respite from the arduous labour, I also felt thankful for the rest. I had yet to become accustomed to waking before sunrise, and even after the copious amounts of coffee I consumed that day, the lack of sleep—coupled with the unbearable heat—meant that even though I had the opportunity for some respite in driving around with Nabhane, this respite was only relative to working outside under the hot sun.

Nabhane had picked up on my exhaustion and suggested dropping me off at his home to spend some time with his wife Hana'. Although the offer was tempting, I declined, saying that if it was okay with him, I'd prefer to follow him as he oversaw the harvest across Chateau Kefraya and Kefraya more widely. Nabhane didn't mind, and as we downed the last drops of coffee from our cups, he started the jeep and lit a Winston Red cigarette. He offered me a cigarette from his pack before reversing out of the *kouroum* of the Chateau Kefraya estate. We headed towards some of the vineyards not too far away from the Cave Kouroum winery. These vineyards belonged to a resident in Kefraya, and consisted mainly of the *Cinsault* variety of grapes—but also had some *Cabernet-Sauvignon*. When we arrived, the owner of the vineyard was already there, counting the crates of grapes that were being hurled onto a truck. When the owner saw us, he approached Nabhane, and after going through the formal greetings, began to speak quite openly of his frustration over the current grape prices—for both *Cinsault* and noble varieties.

The owner wanted to know why the prices had remained the same as in previous years. Surely prices should increase annually? After all, the cost of labour had increased, and so had petrol for the tractor²⁶. Nabhane shrugged, before explaining to the owner that such decisions were beyond his control, and it was the upper management of Chateau Kefraya, as well as other members of the business association known as Union Vinicole du Liban (henceforth UVL) who agreed upon the prices of the grapes. The owner also shrugged before changing the subject to discuss the hot weather and the prospect of fasting under such conditions in the upcoming Ramadan. When we finally left the rather irate owner, I turned to ask Nabhane for further information about the UVL's role in fixing the prices of the grapes. Surely the vineyard owners could disagree with the UVL, and refuse to sell their grapes? Nabhane laughed, "Yes they could, if people decided to come together. But as I told you before, everyone wants a chateau."

While Nabhane was able to offer a somewhat simple explanation, he, and indeed many others, had made clear over my months of fieldwork that the situation was far more complex. Indeed he also pointed out that day that members of the UVL were in competition with each other throughout the year—with the exception of the harvest time in Kefraya, when all UVL members came together and agreed upon a set price for the grapes. In this regard, Nabhane's comments reverberate with the discussion in the previous chapter about the predicaments faced by the Cave Kouroum winery that surfaced due to pressure coming from Chateau Kefraya—but also from the UVL—to remove the name Kefraya from its label. For in order to gain UVL membership, Cave Kouroum had to be willing to

²⁶While it is apparent that the cost of petrol had indeed increased since the previous year, it is not all together clear as to what sort of labour the vineyard owner was speaking of. Harvesters (mostly from Syria) working during the 2007 were apparently paid the same amount as in 2005. Due to the Israeli war in 2006, there were apparently very few migrant workers from Syria. Yet the cost of this type of agricultural work remained the same.

comply with their demands. Yet why was UVL membership so important to the Cave Kouroum winery—and indeed many other wineries in Lebanon?

This chapter shifts the focus away from the Kefraya region to explore more broadly how the UVL may have been influential in shaping the more recent changes in the region. I begin the chapter by providing some historical background about the impact of the civil war upon wine production, which arguably led to the establishment of the UVL in Lebanon's post-war era. That Chateaux Kefraya, Ksara, and Musar were able to maintain relatively steady levels of production and export is indicative of their well-connected positions across both local and international arenas. Yet it is also important to bear in mind the discussion in Chapter Three, here we saw that these types of networks are hardly recent, and have to do with European—more specifically, French—economic interests in the region. Thus, on one hand there is an issue concerning the role of the urban mercantile elite, whose interests appear diversified, extending across agro-businesses, industries, trade, and finance. On the other hand, the instability of the Lebanese state, particularly during and following the civil war, must also be taken into account. While some of this instability may have to do with geopolitical conflict, other aspects appear to be more symptomatic of the general characteristics of global capitalism in the age of neoliberalism. Indeed, as elucidated during interviews with members of the upper management of Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya, the state's precarious infrastructure cannot be ignored, because global organizations such as the OIV and WTO operate *through* state infrastructure. Thus the UVL serves as an alliance to facilitate further negotiation with different sorts of institutions and organizations that would be conducive for the development of private business interests. It is at this particular juncture, however, that the UVL's influential position is perhaps the most cogent. For in establishing the mechanisms

to ensure that international guidelines and standards were met, the UVL was able to mandate wine production processes—from vineyard to winery—in alignment with the founding members of the organization. To add another layer, the UVL was in fact established by Chateaux Kefraya, Ksara, and Musar in 1997, which was just a year after Lebanon became a member of the OIV. Following these events, the UVL became instrumental in campaigning and lobbying for the wine legislation that was passed in 2000.

Wine Production in the Post-War era

As noted in the introduction to this thesis, wine production was heavily curtailed during the civil war period (1975–1990). In fact, Mr Serge Hochar tells wine writer and journalist Michel Karam that Chateau Musar was not able to produce any wine at all in 1976. This was because the winery is located in Ghazir, of the Kisrawan region in north Lebanon, and its workers were unable to gain access to grapes from the Kefraya region of West Bekaa. Yet in spite of these setbacks, Chateau Musar attended the 1979 Bristol wines fair—an important event that marked the entry of Lebanese wine into the British market:

By chance I had an old friend who worked at Young and Rubicam, the ad agency and he came down to Bristol to see how we were getting on. He went to the press box and spun a line about this great wine from Lebanon. The next day, Christopher Tatham, the president of the Wine society, which was already carrying Musar, came to our stand, where we were tasting the '67. We were talking and he suddenly shouts, "Michael! Michael! Come here and taste this wine." The gentleman was called Michael Broadbent, from Christies, but I had no idea who he was. He asked me if this was really Lebanese wine. I said yes. He asked, "We are 1979 and you are showing 1959. Is it possible?" I told him, "My youngest release is 1967. Sure, I have a 1972 but it is not yet drinkable. It is oxidized and acidic; impossible to drink. (Karam, 2005: 105)

As the story goes, Broadbent was so taken by the wines of Chateau Musar that he invited Mr Serge Hochar to hold a tasting at Christies. Also—and in spite of the war—the

prominent wine critic, Jancis Robinson, visited the Chateau Musar winery in 1980, praising their wines in subsequent articles. Then, in 1981, the company known as Chateau Musar UK was established in London's Sloane Street. Apparently central to Chateau Musar's strategy was to age their wines before selling them. By selling aged and matured wines, Chateau Musar also had a constant supply that could also be a back-up for years where heavy fighting made production impossible. Thus, even in 1984, when the grapes had fermented en route to the winery, there were vintages from previous years readily available to be shipped.

Chateau Musar was not the only winery to continue production during war-time. Chateau Ksara took to transporting wines across the Syrian border located only a few kilometres away in Anjar. The Chateau Kefraya winery was established in 1979 by Michel de Bustros, and when I asked him about his decision to open the winery at such a difficult time in Lebanese history, he responded, "Nobody believed that the war was going to last for long. Nor did we believe that it would spread across the whole of Lebanon." Spread across the whole of Lebanon it did. In 1982, the Israeli army returned in full force and invaded the country all the way up to Beirut, at the same time encompassing all of the West Bekaa. The Kefraya region was taken. Tanks drove over the vines and fruit trees and soldiers set up camp near the winery. In his memoirs, Michel de Bustros expresses disbelief about the extent of the bombing, and disappointment that wine production had become heavily compromised (2001).

Chateau Kefraya did, however, continue production, and its 1982 red vintage was granted a silver medal award at the Blaye Bourg competition in Bordeaux in 1989. Like Chateaux Musar and Ksara, alternative methods of transportation were sought during periods of heavy fighting or when road blockades were put in place by the different militia.

Bottles and corks were shipped from Jounieh to Sidon and then driven across to Kefraya. Once bottled, the wines were then sent back over the same route through which the bottles had arrived. I was informed that during this time, export for Chateau Kefraya was at approximately 10,000 bottles. It is significant that while other wineries, such as Vin Nakad, attempted to continue production during war-time, it was predominantly Chateaux Ksara, Musar, and Kefraya who managed to not only continue a relatively steady flow of production, but also—and perhaps more pertinently—remain consistent in their distribution. Indeed, a striking feature of their accomplishments was their ability to export their wines abroad. As I was informed during an interview at the winery, Chateau Musar exported at least 90% of their wines during the war.

Such efforts to maintain adequate levels of productivity, while also managing to increase exports at the time of the civil war, were hardly limited to the wine industry. The industrial sector during the civil war period, as Gaspard notes, was characterized by “flexibility and viability” and the development of business networks were essential in upholding but also monopolizing production and distribution (2004: 191). Yet when the war finally drew to a close, many Lebanese industries—and perhaps especially the agro-industries—have had to deal with new kinds of challenges surrounding production and distribution. For example, local competition arose as older firms sought to increase their outputs, while simultaneously the establishment of new firms could lead to a potential crisis in overproduction. External competition, as a result of an influx of imports due to reduced tariffs, also had an impact upon the distribution of local goods (Gaspard, 2004). Connected to this, local industries also faced difficulties when seeking to export their products because of the high tariffs imposed by the state. Finally, Lebanese industries were at times faced with increased regulation in quality control within production—particularly

when businesses were seeking to export their products abroad. Indeed, the wine industry was no exception, in that the post-civil war era saw a significant number of wineries open across Lebanon, while at the same time there was an ever-larger quantity of wine imported from abroad and, notably, export has remained an important part of the agenda. Thus, as the war was drawing to a close, issues concerning quality control were high on the agenda for Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar.

Urban Entrepreneurs, the Agro-Industries and Trading Policies

Quality control required financial investment, and in the case of the Lebanese wine industry, capital came from the private sector. At Chateau Ksara, for instance, there has been an annual investment from one share-holder of at least \$1million since 1991. It is significant that a majority of those investing such sums of money were also major shareholders of larger distributing and sales companies. For example, Mr Zafer Chaoui, who was appointed as chairman of the Chateau Ksara winery in 1991, is also a managing partner of the Chaoui Group, a transnational company with offices in Beirut, Amman, and Stockholm, specializing in the manufacturing and distribution of paper pulp and pharmaceuticals. While Chaoui's father had bought shares into the Chateau Ksara Company in 1973, Zafer Chaoui did not, at the time, have any direct involvement in the winery (Karam, 2008). Nevertheless, he did visit the winery regularly. As he explained to Karam during an interview:

This was just as the war broke out and sadly, many of the original shareholders lost interest as fighting dragged on. I was lucky. I was one of the shareholders that regularly visited the winery and I became very attached to the company. This led me to increase my family's involvement at every opportunity. I always believed that there would be an end to the war, and I was very aware of Ksara's potential. Among all my investments, Ksara is the closest to my heart. (Quoted in Karam, 2008: 5)

Similarly, at Chateau Kefraya, where the Israeli and Syrian occupations of the chateau, winery, vineyards, and village had taken its toll on all aspects of production, a management shift was underway. As we saw in the previous chapters, one of the new investors was Waïd Junblatt; the other main investor to join not long after was a member of the Fattal family, who also owns the Khalil Fattal et Fils Distributings Company in Lebanon, distributing commodities ranging from pharmaceuticals to toothbrushes and whisky.

In some ways, the presence of these new actors, as a result of management shifts within these wineries, resonates with Gate's observations concerning the early "merchant republic," where it was at times be difficult to distinguish between the industrial and trading sectors of the period (1998). That is, it appears that there was a similar type of discourse of merging the spheres of finance, trade, and industry, which also characterised policy-making in the early Lebanese *laissez-faire* state in an attempt by an urban oligarchy to retain their market power (Gates, 1998: 96). Indeed the likes of Baroudi and Gates have argued that in working towards the establishment of Lebanon's *laissez-faire* political economy, the choice by Lebanon's early policy makers to invest little in sustainable growth led to the economic ascendancy of urban merchants and financiers (Gates, 1998 & Baroudi, 2001 & 2005; Gaspard, 2004). Notably, Baroudi suggests that the trade liberalization policies of the post-civil war era have also had a direct impact upon Lebanon's agro-industries—and once more on the role of an urban entrepreneurial elite within that process.

According to Baroudi, the post-war period in Lebanon saw the revival of a process of forging trade treaties that had commenced prior to the civil war—with the aim of opening and freeing trade at both regional and international levels (2005). With regards to Syria, Lebanon signed a new Brotherhood Treaty in 1991, followed by a further 22

agreements, 26 protocols, and 11 memorandums concerned with “liberalization of the cross-border movement of goods and people” (Baroudi, 2005: 5). With Arab neighbours further afield, Lebanon sought to re-establish economic ties that had commenced in the 1953 “Agreement to Facilitate Trade Exchange and Transit Trade among Arab League States” (ibid). Significantly, it was the 1981 agreement (that had superseded the 1953 agreement) that provided the basis for the treaty between Egypt and Lebanon in 1995. This trade agreement was finalised in 1998 and lifted duties from certain agricultural exports from each country, while also paving the way for the broader Greater Arab Free Trade Area agreement (GAFTA). The motivation behind such agreements were explained by the president at the time, Emile Lahoud, who stated that, “Arab countries need to create an Arab common market that eliminates all barriers and economic constraints and facilitates the implementation of new strategies to revitalize our economies and enable us to enter the international market from a position of strength” (ibid: 8).

The motivation for the revitalization of these kind of trade liberalisation strategies, so to be able to compete in the international markets, cannot, however, be understood outside of Lebanon’s long history of trade relations with Europe. While these ties go back at least as far as the nineteenth century, it was during the French mandate that these links were consolidated, through the country’s reliance on Europe for a broad range of services and products—but with the exception of periods during WWI and II where there was some encouragement of certain import substituting industries (ibid: 11). It is also significant that in the years directly following independence, Lebanese policy-makers were faced with a choice between strengthening the existing ties with Europe or restricting them “so to promote local import-substituting industries” (ibid & see also Gates, 1998). While there might not have been a unanimous consensus to forgo the development of local industry, it

is apparent that the move towards pursuing economic ties with Europe continued to gain strength.

Moves to strengthen these ties, however, were not always advantageous for Lebanese industry; trade arrangements forged between Lebanon and the EU saw protective measures put into place for the latter's industrial and agricultural outputs. Thus for example, the limitations placed upon agricultural imports to Europe due to strict quality guidelines outlined in the EU's CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) thwarted Lebanese agricultural trade with the continent. While such an arrangement might have been of minimal importance to Lebanese agriculturalists in the pre-civil war era, mainly because other Arab countries (such as Saudi Arabia) were the main interest in terms of agricultural export, several issues arose following the end of the Lebanese civil war. On the one hand these problems had to do with the EU Neighbourhood Policy Plan (ENP) and Association Agreement with Lebanon that sought to reduce tariffs on imports and exports flowing from both regions. Given that (historically speaking) industry and agriculture in Lebanon have been the poorest performing sectors in the region, the influx of EU (thus cheaper) goods into the country only hindered further development in these sectors (Baroudi, 2005).

Baroudi argues that while the early post-war policies implemented by Prime Minister Selim Hoss' government (1998–2000) attempted to reduce high production costs in order to encourage agricultural exports, the urban mercantile sector retained their dominance in the development of the industrial and agricultural sectors (Baroudi, 2005: 205). Indeed this was still the case when further attempts were made to re-address such issues, at the start of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri's return to office (2000–2004). During that period, the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture was raised, and farmers were offered

access to subsidized loans. However, the number of beneficiaries remained limited—despite plans made to support the export of agricultural production (Baroudi, 2005: 208). Baroudi points out that, given the speculative nature of the trade of not just commodities but also shares and investments, the agro-industries were subject to higher forms of instability and therefore higher risk in rates of return. At the same time, higher production costs in farming and agro-industries resulted in unfair competition, heavy losses for farmers, and an increase in agricultural firms going bankrupt.

Although there has been public outcry against such policies, such as the protests in August 2001 in the Hermel region of the north Bekaa and also in Tripoli, the “agriculturalist lobby” in Lebanon remained quite weak (2005: 8). Baroudi suggests that the reasons for this minimal backing of farmers are twofold. On the one hand, there are very few organizations representing the agro-industries in Lebanon. On the other, it would appear that minimal mobilization amongst farmers has to do with a general “contempt” for one another; only those with sufficient capital and well established networks appeared to be able to continue to invest in agricultural production (ibid).

In this light, the significance of certain kinds of private investors in the wine industry, such as urban entrepreneurs (and politicians), in facilitating the industry’s development reflects a continuation of the process that marginalizes petty commodity farmers. Notably, the capital held and invested by these urban elites was not only monetary, but was also underpinned by their agreement with at least some of policies implemented by the Lebanese state.

The Interests in Supranational Regulatory Organizations

When I began to explore the relationship between the state and the wine industry in post-war Lebanon, it became apparent that wineries were not only working closely with certain state members but also with supranational regulatory organizations, in order to ensure that standardisation and quality control measures adhered to global guidelines. Indeed, it appeared that networking with members of these types of organizations was more often than not of greater significance for wineries than maintaining ties with the relevant state departments. On one hand, the reasons for such a preference may have to do with the precariousness of the Lebanese state—which I will discuss in the proceeding sections. On the other hand, however, the importance of working with “supranational” regulatory organizations is reminiscent of the relationship between neo-liberal governance and trade arrangements in the context of non-Western states (Gupta & Sharma, 2006, Gupta & Ferguson, 2002 & Harvey, 2007). Broadly speaking, such characteristics of neo-liberalism have to do with how “institutions of global governance such as the IMF and the WTO,” are considered as “being simply ‘above’ national states” (Gupta & Ferguson, 2002: 990). At the same time, however, such supra-state-like entities still required state infrastructure in order to operate and ensure—or at best make official—the materialization of production and trade arrangements through the drafting of legislation proposals and the like.

In the case of Lebanon and wine, such issues came to the fore during my interview with Mr Charles Ghostine, the Managing Director and a board member of Chateau Ksara. Mr Ghostine explained that, following the end of the civil war, the wine industry faced new challenges when seeking to export their wines to markets outside of the Arab world—especially with regard to the EU. Since there had been no wine legislation in Lebanon prior to 2000, wineries looking to send their wines to Europe were finding it

increasingly difficult to follow the guidelines put into place for imports into the EU. Ghostine informed me that wineries were unable to create high-quality vintage labels that could be sent to the EU because, without a certificate of origin, their wines were considered as only table wines. Notably, not only the EU required a certificate of origin; it was also a pre-requisite for the United States. The requirements of the United States were not as strict, however, and all that was required was an official document from the Lebanese government confirming that the Bekaa Valley “had a well-known reputation for producing grapes and mainly wines grapes.”²⁷ The only way to obtain a certificate of origin that would be recognised by the EU was to pass a wine law containing articles that at the very least demonstrated that measures were being put into place for a classification system of origins. Given that the wine law preceding the legislation of 2000 was passed during the French mandate and thrown out in 1983, there was very little history of wine legislation in Lebanon with which the wineries could work.

In his attempts to understand and keep up to date with the “international affairs of wine”, through attending international wine exhibitions and fairs, Ghostine had the opportunity to liaise with people who had the relevant expertise to create legislation that could standardise Lebanon’s wines and make them exportable to Europe. During our interview, Ghostine spoke of his visit to Canada in 1992, where the Société des Accord du Quebec were organizing their annual wine contest. It was during this visit that he had the opportunity to meet with the management of the *Office Internationale de la Vigne et du Vin* (OIV), who urged Ghostine to take the necessary measures for membership. When Ghostine returned to Lebanon, he contacted Hochar (of Chateau Musar) and de Bustros (Chateau Kefraya), asking for a meeting to discuss the required steps for joining the OIV.

²⁷ All quotes by Ghostine are taken from excerpts of the transcript from interview with him in August 2007.

Ghostine explained to me that when he met with Hochar and de Bustros he convinced them to join, “I told them, it’s very important to join the OIV. The OIV is different (to other wine organizations): it is the *United Nations* of the wine world” (my emphasis).

Ghostine’s metaphor is perhaps apt one—especially given that the OIV has maintained special ties with the United Nation’s FAO since at least 1948. In an official statement made by the FAO, the OIV is recognised as holding the role of “the intergovernmental organization specialized in the wine sector” (Hannin, 2006: 76). During the early and mid-1990s, the alliance between the OIV and the FAO was further strengthened so as to regulate the quantity of wine produced across the globe (ibid). Strategies for quality control largely dealt with misrepresentation in the marketing of wine, where it was implied that production originated in more prestigious regions known for wine making.²⁸ Significantly, the OIV’s influential role also extended to other supranational organizations. Following GATT’s agreement in 1994, WTO members agreed to follow and apply the principles of the *Standard Codes* of sanitary and phytosanitary practices to wine production (Spahni, 1995). Once more, previous work done by the OIV on such issues was drawn upon heavily; indeed Spahni notes that not adhering to such measures would “have the greatest potential to restrict international wine exchanges” (Spahni, 1995: 293).

There were, therefore, several advantages to Lebanon’s joining the OIV. For example, the joint FAO-OIV secretariat is responsible for compiling statistics and information about the wine sector, as well as organizing scientific meetings and

²⁸ For example are semi-generic wines such as Californian Chablis and Australian Lambrusco. Although interestingly and in spite of the protectionism within TRIPPS treaty of certain Geographical Indicators, these two wines have been allowed to continue with such titles as they have been in use for over ten years (Spahni, 1995).

workshops. Once Lebanon had become an OIV member, the country's wineries would have access to such meetings, workshops, and various other networks.²⁹ Also, given the Lebanese state's desire to gain WTO status, the recognition by the OIV of Lebanese wineries was thus very important. Finally, and perhaps more pertinently for the wineries, OIV membership would ease problems with the export of Lebanese wines abroad. These sentiments were echoed during my interview with de Bustros over at Chateau Kefraya, where he informed me that when Lebanon joined the OIV in 1996, it was important "all" Lebanese wineries "obey the OIV laws" so that "all of Lebanon's wines" could be exported to other countries and "without problems."³⁰ Similarly, Ghostine explained that adhering to such internationalised standards was essential for Lebanese winemakers if they were to enter and compete equally in the global wine market(s).

Notably, one of the important requisites for countries seeking OIV membership was the existence of a wine legislation—or at best a realistic plan for the future passing of a law. During my interviews with de Bustros and Ghostine, both explained that the 2000 wine legislation was written following OIV guidelines, and that the secretariat of the OIV had offered invaluable advice and support to the UVL when they were writing the law. Ghostine explains:

They helped us to have a flexible law and to avoid provisions that are useless, and this is the story. . . . if we make our laws correspond to them (the EU) . . . There are rules in the EU that follow the guidelines of the OIV- as a technical organization as well as for regulation. And I think that the EU laws are inspired by the OIV so this made them international. (taken from transcript of interview conducted in July 2007 with Mr Ghostine)

²⁹ There had also been plans to hold the OIV Congress in Lebanon during 2005. However I am informed that this was not possible as the Israeli representative to the OIV would have been unable to attend.

³⁰ All quotes by de Bustros are taken from the transcript of my interview conducted in August 2007.

While it is apparent that complying with OIV regulations would have certain benefits for Lebanese winemakers, it is also interesting that for Ghostine, “international” quite clearly implied European, in the sense that the OIV standards and guidelines overlapped with the European Union’s wine laws and regulations. Given that the European Union is Lebanon’s biggest financial donor, Ghostine’s comments can be quite clearly situated within the broader framework of reciprocal trade arrangements in post-war Lebanon (Baroudi, 2005). Yet Ghostine’s remarks also echo Spahni’s observations concerning the important place the wine industry has in European protectionist policy-making (Spahni, 1988). Indeed, while debate—and dissidence—occurs amongst different wine producers concerning biased legislation and trade arrangements within the European Union, the Common Wine Policy has the overall aim of safeguarding against a potential influx of cheaper wines from the rest of the world (ibid; Lem, 1999).

The EU’s involvement in the Lebanese wine industry through such channels as the OIV is part of a larger framework—one that is highlighted by the fact that until 2013, European customs protection agreements allow Lebanese wines to enter the EU without any import duty. Meanwhile, European high-quality wines entering Lebanon will have their import duties reduced from between 70% and 30%. After 2013, European wines will be exempt from all import duties when entering Lebanon. As both Ghostine and de Bustros informed me, it was essential for Lebanese wines to follow EU production guidelines so as to have some chance at fair competition.

Local Business Associations and Global Organizations

The remarks made by Ghostine and de Bustros about the importance of adhering to EU guidelines resonate with comments made by the head of the business association of Lebanese Industrialists (ALI), Mr Fadi Abboud, in an interview published by the Lebanese magazine, *Executive*, in December 2005. Abboud reminded *Executive* readers that part of the agreement signed between Lebanon and the European Union was that laws relating to industrial production in Lebanon would correspond with European laws. He also spoke of the many benefits of Lebanon strengthening its ties with the European markets, stating that “the future of the Lebanese industry lies with Europe.”

In light of this, it is important to draw attention to the way business associations such as the ALI and the BTA (Beirut Trading Association) in the post-war era have contributed to changes in the balances of power between the public and private sectors in Lebanon, particularly the way that they often act as important points of contact for subsidiary groups of supra-national organizations such as the EU (Baroudi, 2005). Adding to this, Baroudi suggests that prominent members from the ALI and BTA business associations tend to share common interests and monopolize both trade and industrial networks—at both local and global levels.³¹ That business associations such as the ALI and BTA were able to exert economic (and political) influence was not necessarily only due to the weakening effects of the civil war on Lebanese governance, but was also due to more recent trends in global capitalism that saw increasing flows of private capital into developing countries as a result of privatisation policies and open trade agreements (2005 & 2001). Indeed, while certain individual industrialists might have voiced criticism of the

³¹ Both these business associations were established before the civil war. The ALI was formed in 1942 and the BTA in 1921.

liberalisation of trade, particularly during Hariri's government, on the whole the ALI remained silent—or at best moderate in their criticism (2005: 208). Baroudi observes that this was because most shared “Hariri's optimism” concerning the opening of trade to other countries (ibid). The role of ALI and BTA business associations in Lebanon can thus be seen as an attempt to officialise networks of individuals who share similar economic interests (ibid). That some members belonged to both these business associations implied certain advantages, like widening business networks and providing a sharper competitive edge in the production and distribution of their products. Indeed this is a trait that can also be seen amongst the wineries, where for example, share-holders at Chateau Kefraya from the Fattal family are also members of the BTA.

Business associations also serve as an important platform for alliances with larger supranational organizations (ibid). Indeed since the end of the civil war, one of the objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Lebanon has been to develop programmes offering funding and assistance to businesses to help them bring production in line with European standards. One of the major institutes, the Euro-Lebanese Centre for Industrial Modernization (ELCIM), has collaborated on more than one occasion with ALI. Notably, the OIV also required that a similar sort of organization was established by the wineries.

There was, in this regard, a need for cooperation amongst the wineries in Lebanon, so as to create a stronger and more coherent platform for developing networks. De Bustros explained during our interview that creating an alliance with the two other “big wineries” in Lebanon (Chateaux Ksara and Musar) would facilitate the overall regulation of wine production in Lebanon, while also serving as a base to work with other international

organizations that would help promote the reputation and image of Lebanese wines abroad. One year following OIV membership, the UVL was officially established.

Also significant was that ELCIM worked directly with wineries—and it did so through cooperation with the UVL. According to the director of ECLIM, Mr Raja Haber, the organization aims to support wine producers in Lebanon by means of legal support, technical support, augmenting the quality and quantity of production, and offering marketing assistance services (Darmency, 2010). Such support would enable Lebanese wines to enter into high-end markets and thus, according to Darmency’s article in the *Eurojar* newsletter, “Help Lebanon to be a member of WTO.” The head of the Economic Development Unit at the EU delegation in Lebanon, Mr Francisco Lopez-Menchero, told Darmency that assisting Lebanon would allow for the facilitation of exchanges under “*one unified international system*” which would “help ensure high quality wines” (ibid; my italics).

In many ways the UVL became a mediator between international and supranational organizations and local wineries. While the establishment of the UVL appears to have been instigated by networks forged in a global arena, it is significant that many of these supranational organizations operated through state infrastructure. This means that the UVL also had to work with the Lebanese state. Yet given that states are themselves dynamic and, as Gupta and Sharma note, have a rather troubled place within neoliberal (or advanced liberal) market-driven policies, they present a challenge for private business ventures and interests (2006). The especially unstable characteristics of the Lebanese state came to the fore during lobbying for the passing of 2000 legislation, and once again when the UVL met in 2007 to discuss Article 17 of the wine law stipulating the formation of the National Wine Institute.

1996: Lebanon Joins the OIV with Mr Serge Hochar as Lebanon’s representative.	
1997: The UVL is formed by Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya and Musar	
UVL members in 2008:	
Cave Kouroum	Domaine Wardy
Chateau Ka	Heritage
Chateau Kefraya	Karam Winery
Chateau Ksara	Clos St Thomas
Chateau Musar	Ixsir
Domaine de Tourelles	Coteaux du Liban
Nakad Winery	Domaine de Baal

UVL Members (data collected from fieldwork but more recent updates can be found on the UVL website, at <http://www.lebanonwines.com/members.php>)

Regulation in the Absence of the State

Following the formation of the UVL, its founding members immediately began to campaign for the creation of a wine legislation in Lebanon. The process, however, was not straightforward—the UVL had to seek out ministries in the government willing to collaborate on the project. While during the drafting of the law there doesn’t seem to have

been a great deal of a liaison with state members, finding people in the different ministries who would offer support in *lobbying* for this law appears to have required some strategic networking. Ghostine explains:

When we (finally) sent the law I translated it into French and I gave it to the late Basil Fuleihan. He was the Minister of Economy and more interested in helping the then Ministry of Agriculture at the time.

It is significant that UVL members chose to contact Mr Basil Fuleihan, an economist recognised for his extensive experience working at the IMF. Upon his return to Lebanon at the end of the civil war, Fuleihan acted as economic advisor to the government before eventually taking up a position as Minister of Economy and Commerce. While Fuleihan endorsed the idea of a free and open market, he was also critical of the Arab region's position within trade liberalization strategies. In an article published posthumously in 2006, Fuleihan expresses these ideas, arguing for more balanced reciprocal trade arrangements between Northern and Southern countries. He was also was a friend and political ally to former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri—in fact both were assassinated during 2005 in the same explosion, just outside of the St George Hotel in Beirut. Significantly, it was this event that contributed to the political instability of the Lebanese government, and to the subsequent challenges faced by the UVL that surfaced at the time of my fieldwork.

The wine legislation was successfully passed in 2000, but this was only the start of a process to augment the standard of wine-making in Lebanon, and to bring it in line with international guidelines for high-quality wines. Ghostine explains that further steps were needed in order to implement a system of *appellation d'origine contrôlée*. While developing the 2000 wine law in Lebanon, further investigation was required to construct a more specialised type of AOC system, and Article 13 states that, until further agricultural

research was undertaken, wine producers could adopt the administrative division at the *Mohafazat* as a basis for defining the appellation of origin. I will discuss some aspects of this AOC in the following chapter. Ghostine explained that he proposed the *Mohafazat* as a certified place of origin because the Bekaa Valley was one of its administrative units. Given that most grapes—and indeed most wines—from Lebanon are from the Bekaa Valley, the system had certain advantages. Further steps were required, however, in order to create a more refined Lebanese AOC that was based upon solid scientific research into the soils, geography, and climate—at a micro-level. Indeed these steps are stated in Article 17 of the wine law, stipulating that a National Wine and Vine Institute must be in place by 2007. This institute would initially oversee scientific projects, such as an agricultural consensus and geological survey required for a Lebanese AOC. Following its completion, but perhaps also during these projects, the institute would be responsible for overseeing production and ensuring that standards were met.

The consultative committee of the institute required representatives from the UVL and from certain ministries of the government—including the Ministries of Agriculture, Industry, and Economy and Commerce. Other expected members of the committee included five experts specialising in viticulture and wine-making, who couldn't be employees of the civil offices or of the local viti/vini-enterprises. At the time of my fieldwork, the National Wine and Vine Institute still required one final approval from the government, which had remained pending since 2007. Ghostine's response to my question about this process provides an insightful overview:

It happened on the 21st of May of this year (2007): the government approved the creation of the institute of wine in Lebanon. It has not appeared in the official newspapers yet, because we need the signature of the minister of industry. And you know that Pierre Gemayel died, and the minister that

should replace him belongs to the Shi'ia. And he is not signing anything related to the ministry of industry. The institute should have five signatures: economy, agriculture, industry, social affairs, and finance. This is why it has not appeared officially yet. But all is approved and that is irreversible—it is finished. The government approved the creation of the institute, and the institute is under the private law and not a public service. We tried not to create it under the public sector because we would lose flexibility. But the board consists of four from the private sector, suggested by the minister of agriculture, and three from the public sector, representing the ministries of economy, industry, and agriculture. The director of the institute belongs to the public sector, and will be chosen by the minister of agriculture. He will be contracted for three years.

Despite numerous meetings held by UVL during 2007, the final signature required for the formation of the institute did not arrive. Indeed at the time of writing this chapter (2012), the institute has yet to be established. Thus, in spite of the initial success in the passing of the wine law, it was clear that the UVL continued to face major challenges when working with ministries of the state. When I had asked both de Bustros and Ghostine why they had encountered such problems, I was never given a clear or direct response. It was suggested by others that the disinterest of the state ministers could be politically motivated.

The Lebanese parliament was going through a particularly unstable period at the time of my fieldwork. As I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, following the assassination of Hariri and Fuliehan in 2004, the two oppositional political factions, the 8th March and 14th March political alliances were formed, where the former took a pro-Syrian stance. The 2006 war fought between Israel and (pro-Syrian) Hezbollah would complicate the situation even more. Tensions were high following the end of the 2006 war. Indeed, not long after my arrival in Lebanon, Pierre Amine Gemayel, who was the Minister of Industry and part of the 14th March movement, was assassinated—on November 2006. In December 2006, the 8th March parties organized a sit-in outside the Lebanese parliament in

downtown Beirut, demanding the resignation of the Siniora (14th March affiliated) led government. Early the following year, 8th March parliament members had stepped down from their positions in an unsuccessful attempt to veto the Siniora government and protest against the organization and arrangements for the Hariri tribunal. The president of Lebanon, Emile Lahoud (8th March), resigned in late 2007 with no successor, and there was no head of state at the point of my departure from fieldwork in early 2008. There had also been a further two assassinations of MPs who appeared to have taken an anti-Syrian stance.

The precariousness of the Lebanese government at the time (which continues to be the case) was a serious problem for the UVL to say the least, especially in their attempts to form a National Wine and Vine Institute. Yet to add to this complex situation, an (anonymous) informant suggested that the presence of certain shareholders, such as the politician Walid Junblatt, involved with both the 8th and 14 March, might be another reason the Lebanese state had become (more) difficult to work with. Pursuing this line of inquiry, however, proved quite difficult, and thus any conclusions that might be drawn from my informants' remarks remain purely speculative.

Nevertheless, while Ghostine and de Bustros were both unwilling to discuss these issues with me, it was apparent that the UVL were seeking other ways to independently develop the points mentioned in Article 17 of the wine law. Collaborating with the EU (via ELCIM), the UVL were able to gain assistance from the OIV's former managing director. Mr Robert Tinlot, who, by then, had become an independent and highly regarded wine and vineyard expert, initially assisted the UVL in the logistical side of creating the National Wine and Vine Institute. Ghostine explained that, as Tinlot had extensive experiences working in wine industries across the globe—including China and France—he was able to

support the UVL in “internal organization of the institute.” Tinlot offered advice upon how “the board should act”, on the profiles of members of the board, and on the types of relations that could be expected to be forged.

As time went by, and official formation of the institute was still pending, Tinlot was privately hired by Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar, as well as a more recent member to the UVL, Domaine Wardy. This time his support was for another project. The UVL recognised that an AOC classification was inevitable for the entry of Lebanese wines into higher-level international markets, and Tinlot’s assistance in such matters was seen to be invaluable. Given the importance of a Lebanese AOC system in both creating and exporting high quality wines, it was seen important to seek support—once more from outside of Lebanon. Mr Selim Wardy, the General Manager of Domaine Wardy (and Minister of Culture from 2009 until 2011) explained to me that as the Lebanese state was taking so long and in any case was unlikely to offer such support to wine producers, it was necessary to act independently. Ghostine explained that the three wineries had asked Tinlot to join them on another task that was related to geographical indications and the formation of a Lebanese AOC system. He told me that the Ministry of Economy had drafted laws on geographical indicators concerned with “all products in the country, excluding wines.”

The project was initially funded (2005–2006) by the Swiss State Secretariat of Economic Affairs to train local Lebanese experts in the field, as well as to assist in drafting the aforementioned legislation proposals.³² It is purely speculative as to why the Ministry of Economy excluded wines from this project, however according to statements on the

³² At the time of fieldwork I was unable to gain access to those working in the project. Also given the limitations of fieldwork in the sense that I spent most of my time in the Bekaa Valley, logistically speaking, it was quite challenging to develop the relevant contacts.

website of the project's implementing agency, IDEAS, the aim of setting up a GI classification system was that it could "offer to producers a useful marketing tool as their products" and obtain market recognition and often a higher price".³³ In this light, one possible reason why wine was excluded might be the private capital that was available to these wineries to independently undertake the relevant enquiries for the advancement of a geographical classification system.

Such observations are based on remarks made Gupta and Ferguson concerning the increasing trend towards an enterprise model of the state (2002). They argue that such types of neoliberal reforms, where new modalities of government function through methods of decentralization, displace the "risk" factor of economic transactions onto the (sovereign) citizen/individual who is "now construed as the entrepreneur of his or her own firm" (2002: 989). If individuals are unable to enter into such modes of entrepreneurial behaviour, then they must be trained and educated to work within such a model (ibid). Gupta and Ferguson also observe that, when extended to "governmentality" within non-Western states, such trends for transnational governance bring the issue of state sovereignty into question. Indeed non-Western state sovereignty often functions within the larger frameworks of supranational governance.

With this in mind, it is apparent that despite the lack of support from the state, some UVL members were still actively involved in creating standards and finding ways to regulate wine production across Lebanon—and this was due to collaboration with members of supranational regulatory organizations. Yet UVL members are still subject to the effects of state instability. Indeed, as I was told on a number of occasions, because the

³³ http://www.ideascentre.ch/lebanon_geo_indication.html

National Wine and Vine Institute was yet to be established this hindered competing equally with other high-quality wines in the international market. Nevertheless, the UVL continued to work towards finalizing certain points set out in Article 17 that were concerned with establishing an AOC system. Still, there were some strategic advantages for the UVL when they worked independently for the attainment of their agenda.

As I was repeatedly informed, it was important that the UVL were seen by supranational organizations to be at least *working towards* meeting international guidelines. Yet in attempting to meet these international standards, the UVL were also inadvertently shaping the local form of the Lebanese wine industry. The repercussions appear to be twofold. On the one hand it seems that the central role of the UVL, and especially perhaps for its founding wineries, allowed pre-emptive measures to be taken that ensured that they retained their prominent position in the future Lebanese wine industry. After all, through having a hand in the design of the AOC system, the UVL's legacy would endure not simply as recognition of having initiated such an important project. In acting as the representative for the wine industry, the UVL also provided the information required for these endeavours. It was quite clear that the founding UVL members were aware of the long-term implications of their goals. For example, during my interview de Bustros he explained:

But this process [of regulating] will take time. You see we [the UVL] are taking unilateral decisions. That is why perhaps after only 28 years, we [Chateau Kefraya] are so well known in the markets. I think it is because we stick to some principles. We [the UVL] decided ourselves—unilaterally—to observe them. Not because there was an organization or institute who obliged us.

In taking unilateral decisions to regulate production in Lebanon, the founding members of the UVL drew from their own experience in the wine industry. Having been trained as a lawyer, Ghostine informed me that he hadn't waited for a law to oblige him to follow international production guidelines, but had already ensured that Chateau Ksara followed such standards. De Bustros made similar comments, stating that the law was an "officialised continuity of what we are always doing". While this striving to control the future of the wine industry came about largely due to a weak state, coupled with supranational governance, it had another significant advantage. That is, in the absence of the state, the UVL also became the mechanism for regulating and supervising wine production in Lebanon.

The Ambiguities of Membership

The competitive nature of the free market, as Shore and Haller suggest, can leave regulation—and the interpretation thereof—to entrepreneurs and those who have specific profit-related interests (2005). The importance of business associations is thus not only in the way they are able to create links with broader networks connected to the state and beyond. Their significance is also in the way they are able to control the resources necessary for augmenting profit by influencing and shaping production. Yet this objective of profit accumulation is paradoxical, because on the one hand by controlling resources one must also to some extent exploit others in the process. On the other hand, there is the issue of "moralities" involved in attempts to reduce corruption and provide some sense of transparency. Indeed as Sanders and West put it, "Modernity, paradoxically, generates the very opacity of power that it claims to obviate" (2003: 16).

One important strategy for such networks and business associations is to be strategic when it comes to revealing the full scope of members' privileged positions

(2002). In so doing however, these types of elite networks can also promote ambiguity in understandings of the boundaries of such networks, and also of their membership (ibid). It surfaced during fieldwork that UVL membership was similarly based upon a series of interpersonal networks which entered “into a complex construction of identity on multiple and supra-local levels” (Zinn, 2005: 234). Significantly, when it came to joining the UVL, there appeared to be no official membership application process. Rather, wineries were accepted if current members believed that they followed the right “philosophy”. When I asked for further elaboration on this policy, it was implied that wineries were expected to follow the quality standards employed by UVL wineries. At the time of fieldwork, Sebastien Khoury, of the Domaine de Baal winery, was in the process of applying to join the UVL. While the actual construction of his winery was months from completion, he believed it necessary to start taking steps to join the UVL. He explains to me that:

The UVL suggests standard and a benchmark for quality wines, not just here in Lebanon but abroad too. Also, it is important to join the UVL because then you can be part of the meetings and the decisions. You know?

Khoury was well aware of the advantages of joining the UVL—especially in terms of legitimising the standards of Domaine de Baal’s wines. Indeed, when I asked him for his thoughts on the wine law in Lebanon, he reiterated the importance of being associated with the UVL. It was not that he did not think the law was unhelpful, but rather UVL membership validated his wines in more ways than one. After all, the reputation of the UVL carried more weight, both locally and across borders, because members were known to keep up to date with global standards. Yet Khoury was unable to provide me with a clear answer as to *how* he was applying to the UVL. When I asked him about his uncertainties concerning future sales of his wines, his response drew my attention to his relationship with those working in Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara. While he was aware of the challenges

in selling his wines abroad, he felt that as he had good relations with certain employees at Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya, there would be some support when it came to exporting abroad. Khoury also had strong ties with wine merchants in France, and he thus hoped that his contacts would support his endeavours.

I was present when Khoury met with Palge (the oenologist at Chateau Ksara) and Fabrice Guiberteau (oenologist of Chateau Kefraya). Khoury had made a point of visiting these oenologists during their working hours for some technical advice. At times he would bring samples of his wines that were maturing in the oak barrels stored in a temporary building next to the winery under construction. Both oenologists were more than happy to assist, offering him advice and suggestions as to how to augment the quality of his wines. The oenologists regarded Khoury as a promising young Lebanese wine maker. Khoury also invited these two oenologists to visit the site and taste the wines directly from the barrels on more than one occasion, and this usually took place outside of working hours—sometimes even at weekends.

On a couple of occasions I was invited to join such visits, which included a meal and wine tasting. There was a clear sense that the visit went beyond solely providing technical advice. Indeed both oenologists socialised with Khoury outside such “official” visits and it emerged later on in fieldwork that Palge was a long-term friend of the Khoury family. With a French mother, and having lived in Bordeaux for some time, Khoury had also obtained several certificates in vineyard maintenance. It was during this time that the Khourys and Palges had met. In fact, it was Palge who encouraged Khoury to start planting vines on the small family land located in the valley above Zahleh; prior to establishing a winery, Khoury sold (and continued to sell) his grapes to the Chateau Ksara winery.

The seemingly informal ways in which members of the UVL went about overseeing and regulating production did, however, have several more formal implications. Joining the UVL was advantageous not least because membership at the very least implied high standards in production and therefore good quality wine. Indeed it is significant that at the time of writing the company's wines are distributed internationally. The winery has also collaborated with UVL ventures such as the global promotional campaign known as "Wines of Lebanon". Not all wineries however, have had similar opportunities to join such networks. Another vineyard owner I met was also in the process of setting up in his own winery, and he informed me that he had also spoken with members of the UVL about the possibility of joining the union. However, despite having established his own winery in 2010, he had yet to obtain membership. His winery was not exporting any wine, and very little can be found in local markets.

Another noteworthy case is of course that of Cave Kouroum, owned by Mr Bassim Rahal. Cave Kouroum was initially banned from joining the UVL because of its initial name—Cave de Kefraya. Following several court cases brought against the winery by Chateau Kefraya, the name was eventually changed to Cave Kouroum. Chateau Kefraya claims are that the name "Kefraya" is trademarked by the company, and therefore other wineries are prohibited from using the name "Kefraya" on their labels. As discussed in the previous chapter, Cave Kouroum was prevented from joining the UVL until it changed its name. Also as noted in the previous chapter, I have been unable to obtain formal documents for the court case. However, I was told by an anonymous informant that Cave Kouroum had won the first round of legal proceedings. These hearings took place in the courts of Zahle, the administrative town of the Bekaa Valley. Chateau Kefraya did not accept the verdict, and had taken the case to a Beirut court, where the outcome was in their

favour. I was also informed that Junblatt and Fattal wielded more influence in the Beirut courtroom. It remains unclear as to why Mr Bassim of Cave Kouroum accepted the agreement and changed the name of his winery, subsequently joining the UVL. Given the important role the UVL has in forging networks across different arenas, it would appear, however, that there were several advantages in creating an alliance.

It is significant, however, that not all wineries sought to join the UVL—and one winery even decided to leave the association. In 2005, the Massaya winery took the decision to end their UVL membership, and it was suggested that they saw the dominating presence of the Chateaux Kefraya, Ksara, and Musar wineries as a problem. I was informed that while Ramzi and Sami Ghosn of Massaya both had profound respect for, and had even taken inspiration from, the long-term vision of de Bustros, there was very little room for the newer wineries to voice their opinions. Yet it is significant that while the Massaya winery is a Ghosn family venture that was established in 1998, there was also French investment from the Brunier family of Vieux Telegraphe Wines and the Herbrard-owners of Chateau Angelus. I was told by an anonymous informant that due to these “important” French investors, the winery had several advantages over smaller-scale wineries with little or no investment from outside (non-familial) sources.

Still, regardless whether Massaya was able to work independently from other wineries, by being obliged to abide to the regulations as set out in the 2000 wine law, the winery was in some ways subject to the decisions of the UVL. That is, even if the National Wine and Vine Institute has yet to be established, the fact that certain UVL members are active in working to establish an AOC system suggests that wineries unwilling to accept the association’s conditions might be excluded from future development in the wine industry. This is especially visible if we consider that one employee from a founding winery of the UVL had already begun trade-marking other regions in the Bekaa Valley, where there is

potential for a new wine-growing hub to emerge. One particularly important name that was trade-marked was Baalbek, in the north Bekaa, where an increase in viticulture coupled with its ancient history, which remains vivid due to many remains of Roman temples of Bacchus, made the region a promising new enterprise.

Producing Honestly

Yet there were other more subtle ways that the UVL extended influence beyond its members, which broadly evoke Pardo's concern with the at times ambivalent relationship between morality, legality, and corruption (2004). Of particular relevance here are types of actions that are not necessarily defined as corrupt or abusive of positions of power, but still have certain implications when it comes to morality. With this in mind, one important task for the UVL was to prevent what de Bustros described "as attempts to be tricky or dishonest in production". Indeed, during fieldwork I heard numerous rumours of fraudulent methods used by some of the lesser-known small-scale wineries. There were stories of these wineries using oak chips instead of actual oak barrels. Such a technique is actually legally acceptable in global markets; allowing wines to acquire the taste of being aged through a process that costs considerably less. Yet this method is generally thought to produce lesser-quality wines. It was problematic that these wineries allegedly claimed on their labels that the wines had been matured in oak barrels. It is of course unclear how true these rumours were,-and this not a discussion I intend to go into here.

Alongside these accounts however, other narratives spoke proudly of how businesses such as Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar were following globally-recognized procedures in the production of high-quality wines prior to passing of the wine legislation. These accounts, which attempt to define the boundaries between those lowering and corrupting the quality and image of Lebanese wines and those who weren't,

are thus perhaps as much about relations of power as they are about quality wine. Indeed, as Parado has suggested, an understanding of how ideas of morality materialise largely stems from identifying those who have the ability to define what is legal, and thus also what is outside the law and hence corrupt (2004). Yet the line between legality and illegality can be rather nebulous, in that defining such a boundary can require some abuse of power. As de Bustros explained, “There is a danger that many more (wineries) are coming into business . . . and as usual in Lebanon, they like to make some “tips” (bribes) and we (the UVL) want to prevent that”.

In appropriating the position of regulators of production, the UVL had perhaps unintentionally (and quite undemocratically) also excluded those wineries that were producing wines acceptable in international wine markets, albeit at a lower standard. Thus those that did not have the sufficient capital, or well-established networks, such as Massaya, were faced with challenges keeping up with those who did. Indeed, these were the reasons implied by the owner of the aforementioned winery, established in 2010, that has yet to be accepted by the UVL. Significantly, the UVL did not only appear to be solely interested in regulating the technical side of production. Members of the business association also thought it necessary that the newly established wineries also follow conventions for naming their wineries. De Bustro’s response to my query about the importance of winery name illustrates these sentiments quite succinctly:

Now, even in their way of naming them (smaller wineries), they are using their own names instead of using the names of the domestic region. You know something like Chateau Nakad, what does it

mean? What does Chateau Khoury mean?³⁴ When you say Ksara, it's a region, it's a village . . . its something and it's a place . . . when you say Kefraya too. But those people are putting their own names on the label. I don't know but for me I don't see it . . . It has to be related to the soil, to the land, to the place, to the name of the village—and not related to the family name.

It is significant, therefore, that the owners of the more favourable wineries, such as Domaine de Baal, expressed a similar rhetoric. When I asked Sebastien Khoury about his choice of a rather unusual name for the winery, he explained that the term *domaine* was French for the surrounding area of a castle or an estate. The word “Baal,” a pre-monotheistic word for a deity, also evoked the Baalbek ruins located further north of the Bekaa. Khoury explained that in using such a name he hoped to articulate a sense of authenticity that was as intriguing as it was familiar. In this way, such decisions by recently established wineries were strategic but also influenced by Chateaux Kefraya, Ksara, and Musar, perhaps because of their increasing monopoly in all aspects of the industry. Indeed, as was made clear to me by both de Bustros and Ghostine, officialising their strategies through local legislation was only one aspect of the legitimization process. For despite the slow advancement of the stipulations set out in Articles 13 and 17 of the wine law, the UVL are independently designing the infrastructure required for entering into high-end wine markets. The initial founders of the UVL have, after all, created an exclusive association where potential members are required to follow the required standards before they are awarded entry to the association. As de Bustros concluded:

³⁴ Chateau Khoury is owned by Jean-Paul Khoury who is the cousin of Sebastien Khoury of Domaine de Baal. It proved difficult to meet with Jean-Paul Khoury during fieldwork because there were tensions between the two cousins. My initial meeting with Sebastien was by chance and I was highly discouraged to meet with his cousin. While I still hoped to have the chance, it appeared that in working with Sebastien, I had lost the opportunity to meet with his cousin.

Other wineries are now trying to do as Kefraya and Ksara. This is because Ksara and Kefraya represent 65% of the market. This is really something you know? So they [the other wineries] will say that if it succeeds for them [Ksara and Kefraya] then why not imitate them?

Finally, the UVL's influence also extends to viticulture. While I will explore certain features of monopolizing viticulture in the next and final chapter, it is important to point out here that viticulture remains a significant aspect of the UVL's agenda, and one which overlaps with its interests in viniculture. It also appeared that Kefraya's viticulture was an especially important focus; the UVL continued to decide upon the price of grapes sourced from Kefraya, and there are meetings held annually to discuss the issue. When I asked about the importance of these meetings, de Bustros indicated that it was necessity to regulate grape production by villagers to ensure that the wineries produced good quality wines. He explained that it was not just *how* the grapes were maintained the what *kinds* of grapes that were grown. In order to standardize production, the UVL decided to lower the price of *Cinsault* grapes from its standard average price of 35 cents per kilo to something closer to 23 cents per kilo. This decision to decrease the price was part of an attempt to motivate local vineyard owners in Kefraya to pull out their vines and plant more noble varieties. The lower price for *Cinsault* may have been tempting for those wineries looking to reduce the cost of production. Given that many of the wineries seeking UVL association were expected to avoid *Cinsault*, lower-scale wineries were once more faced with difficult decisions. It is of interest, however, that Chateau Musar remained an ardent supporter of *Cinsault*. Yet so long as this winery remains a prominent Lebanese label abroad, its choice does not appear to have any significant repercussions.

Significantly, at the time of my fieldwork, there was no viticulture counterpart to the UVL that would negotiate grape prices. During my last visit to the Bekaa Valley in early 2012, I was informed about the beginnings of a viticulture union. While nothing has yet

materialised, there has been negotiation between the NGO, Arc En Ciel, and vineyards in the Central Bekaa region—including the Jesuit-run Taanayel properties. Part of the initiative is to establish a fair price-plan, whereby vineyard owners are paid a sum that is proportionally related to the price for which the winery sells a bottle of wine.

However, when I spoke with vineyard owners in other parts of the Bekaa Valley, many appeared sceptical about such an organization. Informants explained that wineries would simply buy their grapes elsewhere. When I asked where the wineries could go to buy their grapes, responses were as ambivalent as they were ambiguous. Some suggested that new vineyard plantations would emerge in the furthest hinterlands of the Bekaa Valley, while others spoke of the possibility of wineries buying their grapes from outside of Lebanon. While I am unable to verify these claims, the apparent reluctance of some vineyard owners to participate in such a union perhaps illustrates the extent of the wineries' influential positions. It therefore remains to be seen if such a plan can be materialised—and, indeed, if other vineyards owners across Lebanon will be willing to join.

Concluding Remarks

In diverting the focus away from Kefraya, this chapter has attempted to shed some light upon the types of relations that exist outside of the region, which might have contributed to the recent changes experienced by those living within. In so doing, this chapter also aimed to shed some light upon the broader and more complex issues surrounding wine production within the context of global capitalism. I refer particularly to the way that supranational regulatory organizations such as the OIV appear to have been influential in creating “harmony” in wine production for seemingly “fair and equal competition” in the market. In

this regard, I also asserted that new developments—since the end of civil war—are connected to broader political and economic changes, in turn related to new trade arrangements concerned with promoting an open and “free” economy. Such economic policies appear to have only reinforced mercantile and entrepreneurial influences across the industrial and agricultural sectors—the wine industry notwithstanding. The precariousness of the post-war Lebanese state does, however, provide another layer of complexity in the quest a free-trade economy. Regional conflict, and Lebanon’s remaining a battleground for many, means that investment into its industries remains a risky affair. Nevertheless, given that regional urban entrepreneurs still seem to retain at least some of their business interests, this may be suggestive of their political goals for the country as a whole.

In this light, I have also attempted to demonstrate how, despite the challenges faced when working with members of the Lebanese state, the UVL business association has been influential in shaping the production processes for wine in Lebanon. Significantly, their success in asserting, maintaining, and exercising economic (and political) power are due to the diverse ways in which their strategies are deployed—particularly perhaps those of Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara. After all, even if a winery decided against (or prevented) UVL membership, the wine-maker would still be subject to articles of the Lebanese wine legislation. Given that Article 17 requires the establishment of a National Wine and Vine Institute, this suggests that there is vested interest for non UVL members to maintain relations with those who are members.

The chapter has also considered the influential roles of the Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara wineries in shaping the relationship between the viticulture and viniculture processes in Lebanon. The continuing growth of wine production and its viticulture, so that it

outperforms a number of other agri-businesses—despite the absence of state subsidises—perhaps serves to illustrate the continuing (and successful) attempts of the mercantile oligarchies to shape and monopolize the agricultural sphere. Noteworthy here is more recent (and post-fieldwork) establishment of wineries by other elite urban entrepreneurs. This includes IXSIR, located in north Lebanon, with the Nissan-Renault tycoon, Carlos Ghosn, as a passive investor, and in Kefraya the Chateau Marsyas, founded by members of the philanthropic Saade family—who are also influential in the tourism and real estate industries, as well as holding financial and real estate investments.

7: In Pursuit of Quality: French Oenologists at Work in Lebanon³⁵

The sun shines relentlessly down upon the vineyards of Kefraya. It is the peak of summer and within weeks, or perhaps even just days, the grape harvest will begin in the country's largest winegrowing region. Starting in the winter months and continuing into spring, the vines have been pruned and their canes trained. During late spring and early summer, excess leaves are removed and branches are cut. By the early summer months, pesticide is applied to some of the vineyards, and the vines are then more or less left to their own devices until the start of the harvest. Given that the vineyards are a hub of activity until this point, it seemed that this brief respite, shaded from the sweltering heat, was welcomed by all who were anticipating the hard work of the coming harvest. On one such afternoon, I made a visit to the home of the head of agricultural affairs of Chateau Kefraya. I asked Nabhane when the harvest would begin. We were sitting on his family's veranda in Kefraya village, and Nabhane reclined back into his summer chair as he looked out beyond the villagers' *kouroum* (vineyards), mainly of the *Cinsault* varietal, before finally resting his gaze upon the vineyards of the noble varietals such as *Cabernet-Sauvignon* and *Chardonnay* on the winery estates surrounding Chateau Kefraya.

Nabhane picked at some grapes from the fruit bowl that had been placed by his wife on the table next to him, then proceeded to tell me that the harvest would begin very soon. However, he could not confirm exactly when. This would be up to Fabrice Guiberteau, the Bordeaux-trained oenologist, or *muhandis al khamara* (literal

³⁵ Parts of this chapter have been used in Saleh, 2013b.

translation from Arabic is wine engineer) who originated from the Cognac region and is employed by the Chateau Kefraya winery. It is Guiberteau who decides upon the exact time of the harvest, and many of the vineyard owners in Kefraya are dependent upon his decision. I asked Nabhane how Guiberteau would decide when he wanted the harvest to begin. Nabhane smiled, and informed me that the time of the harvest was subject to how Guiberteau wanted the wines to taste. Yet as this was only Guiberteau's second harvest in Lebanon, I wondered what knowledge he would draw upon in order to decide when the grapes were ready to be reaped. Surely, as he had not experienced all the different possible weather conditions in the Bekaa Valley, he could face challenges and perhaps may even require advice and support from locals such as Nabhane. Nabhane tells me that Guiberteau will look at the sugar content of the different types of grapes (growing on different plots of land); this is all the knowledge he needs in order to make the style of wines he desires.

In some respects, Nabhane's comments draw attention to the way viticulture is the "social construction of nature" (Ulin, 1996:55). In other words, while non-human or natural factors, such as the kind of grape, the location, and the weather conditions hold significance because their natural traits create specific types of wine, it is the capacity to continuously reproduce a combination of these natural features in different settings that point to the social significance of these natural artefacts (e.g. Sperber, 2007). In Chapter Three, I suggested that the materialisation of a particular combination of these non-human and human factors in the Lebanese wine industry could be traced to the mid-nineteenth century and the first plantations of *Cinsault* vines by the Jesuits. I also argued that such a combination belonged to a hierarchy of quality

in winegrowing, where elite growers in France have come (and continue) to monopolize production and the market in diverse ways, at both local and global levels.

In Chapter Six, I observed that contemporary strategies belonging to this historical trajectory came to the fore through quality regulations set out by supra-national organizations associated with the EU and OIV. While the previous chapter also explored the patronage of the founding UVL members (especially Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara) in (re)organizing and controlling production across Lebanon so that it could adhere to such quality regulations, there was, however, minimal discussion of the importance of technical expertise within that process—and its specific role in transforming certain features of Kefraya’s social and viticulture landscape. It is of significance, therefore, that the type of specialised knowledge regarded as most valuable in transforming particular non-human factors—located not just in the winery estate, but also in the Kefraya village—into high-quality wine was associated with a French oenologist working at Chateau Kefraya. In many respects, Guiberteau’s position thus reflects that of the “flying winemakers,” who gain expertise in wine-renowned regions such as Bordeaux, and have become “quality and marketing symbols,” instrumental in universalising French methods of production (Legendjik, 2004:13). That is, the value of Guiberteau labour derives not only from his oenological knowledge, but also from the social and cultural capital connected to his heritage (from Cognac) and qualifications (from Bordeaux).

This chapter will examine the apparent ongoing replication—where French oenologists strive to transform grapes into high-end retail wines for international markets, with skills, expertise, and values that emerge from their extensive experience working in wine production outside of Lebanon. While there were in fact other French

oenologists employed either on a full-time basis at other wineries, or acting as consultants, at the time, both Chateau Kefraya and Chateau Ksara are the largest wine producers in Lebanon, and as the previous chapter suggests, their influential roles in shaping wine production—particularly though the establishment of the UVL, and through campaigning and lobbying for the passing of the wine law—had become very clear.

Thus, while I provide some historical background to the growing prominence of experts in the following section, this chapter focuses specifically on the roles of Guiberteau from Chateau Kefraya and Mr James Palgé from Chateau Ksara. Palgé originates from the Champagne region of France and has been employed by Chateau Ksara since 1994. Given that Palgé was instrumental in the decision by Chateau Ksara to cease buying *Cinsault* vines from Kefraya in the mid-1990s, and to plant new plantations elsewhere in the Bekaa Valley, consideration of his strategies can shed light upon the long-term effects of attempts to transform and extend the viticulture landscape in Kefraya. In so doing, Palgé facilitated the process of (re)combining non-human and human factors outside of Kefraya to effectively produce high-quality wines.

While reading this chapter, it will be useful to bear in mind aspects of the wine law mentioned in the previous chapter—concerned with creating a hierarchical spatial classification system of high-quality wines. This is especially important in terms of how the techniques and strategies deployed by the French oenologists are aimed at controlling and pre-empting the potential outcomes of their endeavours. To this effect, this chapter explores nuances in how quality is perceived in their respective practices, and how attempts to extend this discourse of quality into the contracts forged with

vineyard owners in Kefraya and beyond, who were willing to comply with demands to maintain certain types of grape varieties, also aimed to exclude those who were unwilling to follow their guidelines for the market production of wine.



Guiberteau and Nabhane discussing the quality of the vines.

The Blending of Quality and Quantity

In Chapter Three, I drew attention to how the application of scientific methods in the production of wine had particular socio-economic ramifications during the phylloxera blight that spread from Europe to Lebanon, which subsequently resulted in a selective process of grafting louse-resistant root-stock to specific types of grapes varieties (e.g. Paul, 2002 & Ulin, 2002). In spite of these successful endeavours, scientific methods that extend into vineyard maintenance and the transformation of grapes into wine did not gain full ascendance in France, or Lebanon, until almost a century later. An especially prominent proponent of this oenological knowledge at the time was Émile Peynaud, a professor of oenology at the University of Bordeaux, who, between the

1950s and 1970s, increasingly advocated the quality maintenance of vineyards. One such method for quality control that was endorsed by Peynaud was to set the date for the harvesting of grapes based upon the optimum sugar-content associated with a particular variety (Peynaud, 1984). Not only could such a method exclude grapes that were either too ripe or unripe, it also belonged to broader wine model that sought to establish a basis for the standardization of wines entering into local and global markets (Paul, 2002 & Ulin, 2002). The popularity of oenology as a means for the capitalist production of wine grew, not least because of the way that such scientific endeavours worked to consolidate—and thus to control—an all important relationship for many French elite wine growers: that between quality and quantity (ibid).

This quality-quantity nexus in the production of wine has of course both symbolic and material dimensions. On the one hand, the idea of quality is articulated through the notion of limited quantities, signified, for example, through an exclusive selection of certain types of grapes grown on a particular plot of land—where representational usage of the chateau also adds to this sense of distinction and exclusivity. On the other hand, however, the quality-quantity nexus implies specific types of economic efforts involved in controlling agricultural production to ensure minimal costs and higher profit margins (Pratt, 1994). That is, it points to attempts to ensure that each year's harvest can be successfully fermented and transformed into wine cost-effectively. Significantly, oenology involves both aspects of the quality-quantity nexus. Indeed, not only can scientific developments such as adding specific types of yeast to aid the fermentation of wines demonstrate a method of industrial appropriationism; that such types of yeast are supposedly able to create styles of wines associated with those of elite *grands crus* illustrates the symbolic power of this quality-

quantity nexus. Given such capabilities, the use of oenological knowledge—and thus the use of oenologists—has also become a marker of distinction in the making of wine—one that extends beyond France. Notably, Mr Serge Hochar of Chateau Musar studied oenology under Peynaud at the University of Bordeaux during the 1950s (Karam, 2005).

The increasing importance of “scientific wine-makers,” not just amongst producers in France but across the globe, can perhaps be best illustrated by the events surrounding the wine tasting organized in 1976 by the British wine merchant Steven Spurrier (Taber, 2005). Also known as the “Judgement of Paris,” the competition entailed two blind tastings of top quality reds and whites from France and California by a panel of wine experts: nine from France, one from Britain, and another from the U.S.A. Significantly, the judges (including Spurrier) unknowingly ranked the Californian wines higher than French wines in all of the tasting categories (ibid). While the event was practically ignored by the French press, the only journalist attending the event, Taber, notes that the judges’ decision was a landmark event because it signified that emerging “New World” wines were able to compete with established “Old World” wines. The subsequent repositioning of New World high-quality wines in the global market also suggested a shift in the perception of these wines, which no longer seemed inferior in quality in comparison with the robust and stellar European wines. Taber highlights two significant changes in the production and marketing of wines following “the Judgement of Paris”.

First, the wine competition challenged the idea that high-quality wines could not be produced outside “the hallowed *terroir* of France” (Taber, 2005:23). Technological advances, such as the cloning of renowned grape varieties like

Bordeaux *Cabernet-Sauvignon* and Burgundy *Chardonnays*, as well as the development of drip irrigation, meant that high-quality wines (using the *grand cru* French wines as a benchmark) could be produced across the globe in varying environmental conditions. Significantly, the move to produce these particular types of quality wines saw the overall volume of wine made across the world decrease dramatically (ibid & c.f. Archibugi, 2007). That is, in the process of replicating specific styles of wines, producers also began to adhere more closely to the French *grand cru* standards of the quality-quantity nexus.

Notably, although *terroir* continues to be heavily debated amongst wine experts, Vaudour suggests that a central aspect to the concept is that of a notion of origins (2002 & see also Van Leeuwen & Seguin, 2006). While an understanding of *terroir* can be extended from more familial senses of place and belonging to more scientific aspects concerning the agricultural properties of the land, there remains a shared perception based upon a specific combination of natural factors and the continuous interaction of humans with that environment. In this regard, although the notion of the “hallowed” *terroir*, in terms of the significance of the place where the grapes are grown, might have altered, the knowledge possessed by those who *originated* from regions recognised for the production of high-quality wines appears to have become increasingly valuable.

Indeed, the second change Taber identifies as having occurred across the international wine industry as a whole is a growing market for winemakers who have gained skills and techniques in countries such as “France, California and Australia” (ibid:232). Taber argues that the “Judgement of Paris” Paris Tasting demonstrated to producers across the world that “a long heritage” of wine-making associated with

particular regions was not necessarily required for the production of “great wine,” and instead more recently established producers could simply follow “French and now Californian procedures” for successful results (ibid: 230). And, as Langendik points out, wine produced in countries that have a relatively recent history of wine-making and/or have little presence across international wine markets, were often judged less upon the reputation of the *terroir* of their region than on the status of the internationally renowned winemakers involved in their production (2004).

Similar observations can be made in the case of Lebanon, where one of the first French oenologists hired was Mr Noel Rabot at Chateau Ksara in 1972. Rabot, however, was forced to evacuate and return to France once heavy fighting broke out in the neighbouring town of Zahle. His role became that of a consultant, making visits when the situation allowed him to do so. Two years after his departure from the company in 1992, Mr James Palgé began working for Chateau Ksara. Following the establishment of the Chateau Kefraya winery in 1979, Mr Yves Murard, from the Rhone region, was employed as oenologist. Murard left in 1995 to work with Cave Kouroum, where he remained until 2005. After Murard’s departure, two other oenologists were subsequently hired; the first of these came from France, and the second from Spain. They both left for reasons that remain unclear. Significantly, the oenologist employed directly after Murard, Mr Jean-Michel Fernandez, is recognized for creating Chateau Kefraya’s Comte de M label—a wine designed for connoisseurs. The first of its vintage, the 1996 Comte de M was produced by Fernandez and described by Robert Parker in a well-circulated quote that serves to draw attention to the blending of different layers of the quality-quantity nexus:

A blend of 60% Cabernet Sauvignon (from yields of 28 hectolitres per hectare), 20% Syrah (32 hectolitres per hectare), and 20% Mourvèdre (32 hectolitres per hectare), from a non-irrigated vineyard that was manually harvested, this wine, which I tasted three times earlier this year in Bordeaux and once again in September, exhibits an opaque purple colour, and a sweet nose of cedar, blackberries, and cassis with nicely integrated smoky, toasty oak. The wine is full-bodied and rich, with adequate acidity, and ripe tannin. It possesses layers of concentration, and should prove uncommonly long-lived—up to 20 years. The architect behind the wine is none other than Jean-Michel Fernandez, the man behind the renaissance of Château Citran in the Medoc. This wine has been made with no compromises, and will be bottled without any fining or filtration, in order, as Fernandez says, “to guard the maximum of purity and authenticity of Château Kefraya.” In addition to the lofty price, production of Château Kefraya's Comte de M is limited to just over 1600 cases (sic Parker, 1997) quote taken from: <http://www.selectivewinesandspirits.com/index2.html>.

While the foundations of modern wine production in Lebanon might have been shaped by the scientific advancements of the nineteenth century, it is thus also clear that recent developments are linked to attempts to align production to contemporary global trends in the production and consumption of high-quality wines. The importance of expert knowledge in maintaining quality standards was highlighted by Ghostine of Chateau Ksara when he explained during our interview that wine production in Lebanon required “specialised people and not just amateurs.” Significantly however, oenology qualifications cannot be obtained at Lebanese universities, so students interested in specialising in winemaking must travel abroad for further training.

Notably, between the departure of his predecessor and Guiberteau's arrival in 2006, Ms Diala Younes, who had trained as an agricultural engineer at a Lebanese university and worked as an apprentice under the previous oenologist, was temporarily employed Chateau Kefraya. I met with Younes during my pilot study in December 2005, and remained in contact with her after she obtained a scholarship to study oenology in France, where she would eventually marry and settle. During one of our discussions, when I asked for her thoughts about returning to work at a Lebanese

winery, she explained that heavy competition for high-profile positions at wineries like Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara made her chances very slim. In some respects, Younes' circumstances also seemed similar to Mrs Paulette Chlela, who worked as an agricultural engineer at Chateau Ksara but had trained in oenology in France.³⁶ Also, although other wineries might be willing to employ a Lebanese oenologist, such positions were temporary or based upon familial ties. Thus while there was an apparent labour market for Lebanese oenologists, decisions to hire and pay substantially high salaries to French oenologist by the likes of Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara had to do with their experience and skills—to not only make wine efficiently but to create distinctive labels that would also generate sufficient symbolic value in terms of the quality-quantity nexus.

Lebanese Quality Wine Models

Although a qualification in oenology might provide a basis for producing wines to a particular benchmark, also essential is an intimate comprehension of the long- and short-term effects of changing trends in the global market on the wine models that are designed by the oenologist (2009). Oenologists had to develop wine models that could effectively utilize the quality-quantity nexus—perhaps best illustrated through the words of Fernandez in a conversation with Robert Parker, where he described his motivation for creating Chateau Kefraya's Comte de M label: “to guard the maximum of purity and authenticity of Chateau Kefraya” (Parker, 1997). In other words, products

³⁶ While I do not extend the analysis in this chapter to the issue of gender and work, it is interesting to point out that I met with a number of Lebanese women who had either trained as oenologists in France or were in the process of training as agricultural engineers with a speciality in viticulture and with the hope of obtaining a scholarship to study for a Masters qualification in oenology at either Bordeaux or Montpellier. I have chosen to limit the discussion of such women in an attempt to maintain the focus on the roles of oenologists such as Palgé and Guiberteau.

such as the Comte de M had to evoke a sense of historical continuity and integrity—which is, in effect, the symbolic aspect of the quality-quantity nexus that was already associated with Chateau Kefraya. At the same time, however, the label had to undergo a (re)qualification process to enable symmetry once the goods began to circulate across international markets (Callon, Me'adel & Rabehariso, 2008).

The importance, for both Guiberteau and Palgé, of this kind of understanding of the market was evident during our meetings. For, Guiberteau, who also has an MBA in Wine Marketing Management from the Insec business school in Bordeaux, keeping up to date with contemporary global wine events appeared to be a regular part of his routine. His office, adjacent to the winery's laboratory, contained stacks of wine magazines, and during some of his coffee breaks Guiberteau would sit at his desk absorbed in one of these or in an online article. Guiberteau was also well-connected in the wine world. He came from a long line of Cognac makers in France, and his time working with elite growers in Bordeaux, as well as acting as head oenologist at a winery in Morocco, suggested that Guiberteau was as experienced in wine (and Cognac) making as he was in the marketing of these products. Indeed, prior to his employment at Chateau Kefraya, Guiberteau was already well-acquainted with a number of French wine merchants who visited the winery on a number of occasions.

While Palgé does not have an MBA, his experience is fairly similar to Guiberteau's. Palgé is from Champagne and has worked for many years in Bordeaux and Australia. Incidentally, during his time in Bordeaux, Palgé gained recognition as a major proponent of adding prepared yeast to aid the fermentation process. He explained that although some producers were against the use of such methods, a majority appreciated the end results. His networks were also extended through his

wife, who had worked as a winemaker in Saint-Émilion, France, prior to their arrival in Lebanon. I did not have the opportunity to meet Mrs Palgé during fieldwork, yet it was apparent that her work experience remained a useful source of market insights. Finally, like Guiberteau, Palgé's office had stacks of well-thumbed wine magazines and books.

Maintaining contacts and reading up on the latest wine events, such as the crisis of overproduction in Australia, or further developments on the debate on heavy regulation in France, assisted both oenologists in designing their wine models for each winery. Guiberteau and Palgé's decisions were informed by their identification of wine styles and grape varieties (and combinations thereof) that were excessively produced in other countries (such as Australia), as well as understanding their potential impact upon the market for Lebanese wine. Indeed both oenologists drew attention to the fact that production levels were minute in comparison to the likes of Australia, which meant that it was even more important to make high-quality wines. During one interview, Palgé illustrated this point by recalling a conversation with a former director of the OIV:

. . . he said that the Lebanese wine industry was so small that producers should not even think about selling table wine. They must sell high-quality wines. If people start to make table wines, as an international brand, it won't be good for Lebanon. Production is, after all, only very small, and so the focus should remain on producing high-quality wines³⁷.

Palgé went on to explain that Lebanon was at an interesting stage: given that production levels remained stagnant during the civil war, and that there had been only precarious access to vineyards in some regions of the Bekaa, such as Kefraya and Taanayel Monastery, it had been a challenge to plant new grape varieties as well increase the volume and quality of the wine produced. Arriving at the end of the civil

³⁷ My translation from French.

war, Palgé identified Chateau Ksara's potential to increase overall production while also establishing only high-quality brands of wine. Palgé saw the importance of developing "classic" labels, which were described as wines made with well-known and "reliable" grape varieties such as *Cabernet-Sauvignon* and *Chardonnay*, which could produce wines reliably similar in style to those of Bordeaux and Burgundy—a strategy that Guiberteau also endorsed. Along with classic labels, Palgé believed it was important to develop more exclusive vintages.

At the time of my fieldwork, his most recent endeavour had been the preparation of the 2007 Chateau Ksara Le Souverain, to celebrate the winery's 150th anniversary. The vintage was made with 50% *Arinarnoa* grapes and 50% *Cabernet-Sauvignon*. A significant feature of that vintage was the use of the obscure *Arinarnoa*, a crossing of two Bordeaux varieties, *Merlot* and *Petit Verdot* that was bred in 1956. While recognised for producing "complex" wines, vineyards of *Arinarnoa* remain limited across the globe. According to Palgé, thirteen years ago (from the time of my fieldwork) "there were five hectares in the world"—now Chateau Ksara had twelve hectares. The use of such a rare grape variety, combined with the wine's limited edition, inevitably put this vintage in a higher category than classic labels. Indeed, as Palgé explained, such a blend of wine can "speak for itself," and make people want to know more about Chateau Ksara's wines.

Yet Palgé's comments about the importance of Lebanese producers making only high-quality wines also reflects the broader and more collaborative efforts of the founding UVL members, Chateaux Ksara, Kefraya, and Musar, to control the process of augmenting the quality and quantity across Lebanon as a whole. It is significant, therefore, that Palgé and Guiberteau shared similar ideas about the kinds of high-

quality wines to focus on and the types of grapes to plant. While it did not seem as if the two oenologists were particularly close friends, there appeared to be a common understanding concerning the relationship between quality and quantity. Echoing Palgé's earlier remarks, Guiberteau explained that the niche for Lebanese wines was only a small segment of the global wine market and that even one winery making "bad wines" would have a negative impact on the reputation of other wine producers. Once more the importance of understanding the long- and short-term impact of the market came to the fore. For example, Palgé highlighted the importance of not planting grape varieties that might be fashionable momentarily:

If the director of the winery comes to me and says; "Listen, consumers are demanding *Malbec* wines," I will ask him, "How long might this demand last—ten years?" And in ten years people will want another kind of grape. It is a system of fashion. Fashion for wine, it lasts ten years. If I plant *Malbec*, I will start to harvest in three years, I have a vine, not necessarily very good. In ten years, my *Malbec* grape variety would have reached its optimum quality level. But it will no longer be fashionable.

Palgé explained that the effects of planting such varieties were not only problematic for Chateau Ksara, but also for other wineries in Lebanon who might decide to produce similar wine styles. Instead, Palgé preferred other wineries—and vineyard owners—to plant more obscure grape varieties such as *Arinarnoa*, stating that "it is here where we (the wineries) have to work together, 'the wines of Lebanon.'" While such objectives demonstrate the importance of collaboration, they also, however, reflect the strategies of the founding UVL members and their attempts to regulate the quality-quantity nexus.

Similarly, Guiberteau stressed that it was important for Palgé and him to make sure that not just the wines of Chateaux Kefraya and Ksara maintained good standards, but also that they encouraged smaller wineries to do the same. As Guiberteau

explained, the smaller wineries were important in this respect because they were able to produce limited quantities, thereby pointing to higher standards and more exclusive quality. Yet Guiberteau's comments were also indicative of the UVL's aims to control quantity, because of concerns about overproduction and a possible decrease in the perception of quality. Supporting smaller wineries would allow for the overall augmentation of quality and quantity, while ensuring that the two largest producing wineries (Ksara and Kefraya) would continue to increase their production levels and consequentially their profits. In designing quality wine models for each of the wineries they worked for, both oenologists thus also had in mind a broader plan for Lebanese wine production as a whole. There was, in this regard, a shared objective: to establish a sense of symmetry across the Lebanese wine industry; one that demonstrated an understanding of changes in the local market where there were a growing number of wineries, and that guarded the international prestige of the wineries they worked for. Such observations are clearly stated in further comments made by Palgé during our discussion: "We need everyone to do well so that it sells. This is a good model for Lebanon. You know the saying in French, that you start a train and the rest of its wagons will follow."

Implementing Lebanese Wine Models

Understanding the dynamics of the wine market was not only important for designing an agenda to produce high range wines, but was also important for the process of implementation. At the same time, however, while the models designed to produce high quality wines for the market is suggestive of the expertise of Guiberteau and Palgé, their ability to implement such strategies demonstrates the real extent of their competency. After all, the effectiveness of market models is measured not on what it

sets out to do (and thus what it says) but rather in how it is applied and whether the expected outcomes are reached (Mitchell, 2007:245). In this regard, by aiming to establish a particular form of symmetry in the production of Lebanese wine, Guiberteau and Palgé actively sought to influence the way the symbolic and/or representational marketing aspects of wine and the relations of production were (re)combined (MacKenzie, Muniesa, Siu, 2007: 3).

We might say that the implementation of their new models required changes in the qualification process and thus a renegotiation in local networks—and also in how they were represented. In other words, the qualification process for the new styles of wine required a (re)breaking down of production that entailed a *rite of passage*, allowing these goods to be endowed with new “special qualities” and consequentially attached to new intimate biographies (Callon *et al.*, 2008 & Van Gennepe, 2011). Within that process of attaching new biographies, representations and relations were consequently (re)combined; non-human as well as human components were thus re-assembled and readjusted to comply with the expected standards of quality wines. In effect, the successful implementation of the oenologists’ quality wine models simultaneously required the forcible detachment of older biographies that were in conflict with the quality-quantity nexus that they both sought to establish. Significantly, strategies to remove these old biographies also entailed a rite of passage that this time aimed to dissolve and exclude particular non-desirable qualities. Thus, while the process of reconceptualising the quality-quantity nexus began (as we saw Palgé explain in the previous section) with decisions pertaining to the wine style, the implementation of these changes had to begin in the vineyard.

In more practical terms, given that improving the quality of grapes used to make their wines was an important feature of Guiberteau and Palgé's strategy, and that both Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya relied upon grapes from vineyard owners, a significant method of implementing their models was through the use of contracts. Yet in the process of creating and upholding these contracts, Palgé and Guiberteau had to terminate, or at best renegotiate, older contracts so that they could once more be reincorporated into the new relations of production. Notably, these older contracts were usually with vineyard owners in Kefraya who grew *Cinsault* vines—a grape varietal that both oenologists disliked.

It is interesting that this contempt for *Cinsault* was described in terms of its displeasing qualities and problematic quantities for making high-quality wines. One of the main problems for Guiberteau was that *Cinsault* berries are bigger in size than other grapes, resulting in a higher volume of wine but a weaker colour and aroma. Palgé thought that the sugar content of these grapes was too high, resulting in large volumes of wine unsuitable for ageing. In some respects these perspectives evoke what Mansfield (2003) observes quality techniques that can be perceived as subjective and judged through the senses, while they are also in some sense objective and made “real” through measuring quantities. The somewhat intangible properties of a “weak” aroma and apparent inability to age are validated through tangible properties such as size and volume. The *Cinsault* grapes were thus also thought to be counter-intuitive when it came to the (re)qualification process that sought to (re)combine natural factors. It was a politics of the aesthetic, so to speak, that also extended to the way the vines look and the way they are maintained; elucidating further the properties of singularity associated with the wine. Guiberteau explains:

The vines must be looked after properly. You must make sure that the grapes are planted in the right manner: either trained along a wire or planted in a goblet style. These must be planted at a certain distance apart and pruned in the correct way. The vines must yield a certain volume of grapes, too. Here, the relationship between quantity and quality is crucial. Limited amounts of grapes will make a good wine. You see all of this is important. If you stand at any point in the vineyard, all the vines should line up equally. This is a good indicator—a basic one, but a start. And it looks beautiful!

The use of aesthetic properties to describe the positive attributes of vineyards also illustrates the quality discourses that occur within enterprising strategies across agro-food production, where the use of visual imagery engages with a materiality of nature in order to classify distinctive features and characteristics of a good—and in doing so, creates intimate links to the origin of the produce (c.f. Murdoch, Marsden & Banks, 2000 & Goodman, 2003). Yet what perhaps distinguishes wine from other agro-food industries is that not only that the aesthetic traits of the grapes have to be retained following transformation into wine (so as to maintain an intimacy with the origin of the grape), but intimate ties must be forged that link grapes, vineyards (land), and human actors. Given that the praxis of the oenologist is grounded within such practices, the process of creating harmony between viticulture and viniculture production also encompassed the vineyard owners—or as Guiberteau and Palgé described them: *viticulteurs*—a French term that can be loosely translated as winegrower or viticulturist. That is, someone who knows how to grow grapes for the production of wine, but does not necessarily possess vinification knowledge.

In my discussions with Guiberteau, the term *balance égale*, which can be roughly translated as symmetry or harmony, was frequently used to describe the aesthetic properties of the way that the vineyards should be planted and pruned, and also to describe the perfect colour of the leaves. These were important factors in the

maintenance of the vines, the subsequent quality of the grapes, and finally the wines. Significantly, *balance égale* was also used in the process of judging whether a *viticulteur* in Kefraya shared a similar philosophy to Guiberteau:

What do I see when I look out to the vineyards in the village of Kefraya? Of course I am looking at quality. How do I do this? Well I must see if there is an attempt to look after the grapes. Even if it is *Cinsault* that they are growing, then I must therefore also know the farmer (*viticulteurs*) and see if he is like me, and also willing to look to the future. If not, then I must assume that the quality of his grapes will never be good and there is no harmony.

Such attempts to create symmetry within agriculturally commodified chains of production, as Busch and Tanaka suggest in the case of the Canadian rapeseed oil industry, requires the symmetrical treatment of facts and values that become interdependent upon one another (1996). Busch and Tanaka provide a number of examples, such as “the good farmer” and “the good crusher,” where both are judged by what they can yield: the former, the crop, and the latter, the oil. I propose similar examples, where the right grape varieties and the right kind of *viticulteurs* are simultaneously represented as both values and facts, and are suggestive of how certain ideal qualities are attached to both human and non-human actors:

The right grape varietal must be those that yield berries with the right amount of sugar content to make the desired wine styles. These grape varietals must also be on demand across the international wine markets, but are also unique in that some of their qualities might be associated with a distinctive Lebanese identity—and not *Cinsault*.

Viticulteurs are judged by their willingness to accept and comply with the terms and conditions set out by Palgé and Guiberteau. They are expected to maintain their vines according to the required standards, allowing the oenologists and their team to intervene (including in the harvest) when it is deemed necessary,

so to ensure that the quality-quantity nexus is maintained. A good vineyard owner is also willing to grow and produce the types of grape varieties demanded by the oenologist.

In this regard, the interchangeable qualities associated with the vineyard owner and the *viticulteurs* speaks of a particular reciprocal construction of value where it is the “transformative potential” of these qualities that are valorised by both oenologists (Munn 1986; Graeber 2001:47). Nature and people are thus subjected to the same rites of passage—and with equal intensity and force (Busch & Tanaka, 1996). Symmetry subsequently occurs following the successful completion of this rite of passage, where nonhuman bodies undergo a transformative process so that they, and the human actors involved, are simultaneously attributed with corresponding positive qualities, setting the standard for the production of good quality wines (ibid:5). There are two significant effects that arise from such a process. First, by attempting to create homogeneity and uniformity in the representation of “the behaviour of both people and things,” Guiberteau and Palgé aim to extend the control of production of quality wines to the vineyards that are not owned directly by Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya. Indeed, the use of the French term *viticulteurs* potentially conceals the reality, which is that these vineyards were actually owned by the *viticulteurs*. After all, and as I have already suggested in Chapter Four, the term does not necessarily refer to or imply that the winegrower owns the vineyards he or she is maintaining. In this regard, diverting attention away from the real ownership of the vineyards—and land—demonstrates a strategy to normalise control over grape production—prior to the selling of those grapes to Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya.

One important aspect of what constitutes a “good” *viticulteur* is, therefore, compliance and willingness not only to plant and grow what are deemed “good grapes,” but also to allow the oenologists to control all aspects of grape production. This was something that Palgé discussed when explaining the decision, taken in 1994, to plant vineyards outside of Kefraya. I had asked Palgé if there had been any form of contractual agreement between Chateau Ksara and vineyard owners in Kefraya. He told me:

It was not contracts but agreements. There were written contracts but these were more like contracts of sale. That is to say that the person agrees to sell, for three or five years, all or part of their production. But Chateau Ksara had no right to say “I want to monitor your treatment.” Now, with new contracts (outside of Kefraya), we manage everything. It is us who are planting what we want. This starts from the choice of the grape varieties, to the planting, pruning, and so on. Everything is controlled.

Yet the use of the term *viticulteurs* evokes other more immaterial dimensions, where an implicit connection is forged between Lebanese vineyard-owners and French *viticulteurs*, and this adds to the symbolic layer of the quality-quantity nexus in Lebanon. The successful creation of such symmetry also contributes towards a standardisation process that will allow Lebanese wines to be ranked in similar categories with French quality wines. Such endeavours draw attention to the second effect of successfully establishing standards for quality wines. That is, within this standardisation process of Lebanese wine, a hierarchy of quality also emerges that corresponds to French quality wine models. Significantly, this hierarchical qualification process not only entails the successful transformation of the right kinds of grapes into quality wines, but also extends to the location of the vineyards. Thus, while Palgé and Guibertau shared similar objectives—to terminate the use of the *Cinsault*

varietal and to monitor quality control in the vineyards—their strategies began to diverge due to differing articulations of locality by the different wineries.

Chateau Kefraya only sources grapes from the Kefraya region, and within Guiberteau's quality rhetoric there was a clear emphasis upon the natural properties of the land, where he believed that the right conditions were readily available for making good quality wines. While Guiberteau, like Palgé, may also be interested in diversifying the types of grapes used to make wines, limitations in the ability to manipulate certain aspects of the production process are set apart—through what Guiberteau described rather explicitly as “natural” features of Kefraya's *terroir*. This was in contrast to Palgé, who was less inclined to defining and demarcating particular regions in Lebanon as having a higher potential (or *terroir*) for producing high-quality wines. In this respect, nuances in the perspectives of both oenologists as to the way in which quality was—or was not—spatially attached to the Kefraya region began to emerge. This was evident in terms of how the application of their expertise and the conceptualisation of quality was discursive and contingent on a specific set of parameters. Significantly, various conditions influenced the way in which practices of quality control could be materialised in the contract agreements set up with vineyard owners across the Bekaa Valley. Yet it was at this stage of the qualification process where the transformation of grapes into high quality wines emerged, in a rite of passage which took the form of an ambiguous intermingling of objects and people and overlapped processes of social transition and shifts in economic rationality—both in Kefraya and across the Bekaa Valley.

Making Grapes in Kefraya Taste like Teacakes

For Guiberteau, the land in Kefraya was the basis from which to establish quality standards for Chateau Kefraya's winery. Notably, the particular constraints faced by Guiberteau in extending viticulture relations beyond the Kefraya region were situated within discourses that naturalised a distinctive locality—one which had been brought about through the construction of a specialised relationship between chateaux and surrounding vineyards (Ulin, 1996). Thus, while *Cinsault* varieties and unwilling *viticulteurs* remained a problem for Guiberteau, one that could not be solved by sourcing grapes from outside Kefraya, he also had the advantage of being able to implement strategies that made the most of the available conditions, for example the presence of limited resources—such as the exclusivity of grapes from a limited region—was used to evoke a more refined hierarchy of quality in comparison to Chateau Ksara. Indeed Guiberteau constantly spoke of how the “natural environment,” such as dry and rocky soils and extreme cold and hot weather conditions, allowed the vines to “suffer”—ensuring that the grapes were not full of juice and sugar, and the flavour therefore just right to produce the styles of wines he desired. He explained:

There are several factors that are expected in the production of good quality wines. First of all you must have good land and a good grape. Here in Kefraya, the land can produce good vines that will yield a good quality. But it is important that the right kinds of grapes are grown to make good wines. You cannot make a good wine from grapes such as *Cinsault*. You need noble varieties such as *Cabernet-Sauvignon*, or for a white wine, my favourite grape—which is *Viognier*.

Yet while Guiberteau was enthusiastic about the qualities of the land from where the grapes were sourced, he still faced the issue that Chateau Kefraya relied heavily upon grapes bought from vineyard owners in Kefraya—many of who continued to grow

Cinsault despite many attempts by the likes of Guiberteau and Palgé to discourage them. During one discussion on the topic of *Cinsault*, I asked Guiberteau how he envisioned buying grapes from Kefraya residents in future, where agreements continued to be based on the volume of grapes bought from the vineyard. *Cinsault* grapes were bought at approximately 30–34 cents per kilogram, while the noble varieties, such as *Chardonnay* and *Cabernet-Sauvignon*, were bought at 54 cents per kilogram. Interestingly, Guiberteau believed that the basis of such contracts was adequate, but that further steps could be taken to further decrease the price of *Cinsault*. He hoped that the *Cinsault* grape would eventually be pointless to grow, thereby forcing people to change variety.

I pointed out to Guiberteau that even if his plans did work, the grapes were still priced per kilogram and price varied dependent upon the type of grape rather on the quality. Given that vineyard owners in Kefraya could at any point sell their grapes to other wineries, Guiberteau was not keen to put too much effort into the maintenance of their vines. There was also no intention to develop long-term contracts with Kefraya vineyard owners until the first steps had been taken to plant the types of grape varieties that Guiberteau required. He believed that following such changes, if contracts were eventually made with individual vineyard owners then quality for those particular vineyard owners could be controlled further. However, the main challenge he saw was that all the vineyards were adjacent, and anonymity in this regard was not possible. Nevertheless, Guiberteau believed it important to speak directly with vineyard owners, who, based upon the maintenance of their vineyards, appeared to understand or have some sense of the importance of quality. He concluded our conversation, “In

the meantime, we will continue to buy from Kefraya but reduce the price dramatically.”

Upon my return from the harvest of 2008, it was clear that many in Kefraya had not heeded Guiberteau’s advice. During a visit to Kefraya in the early months of 2012, I was informed by Nabhane that this was still in fact the case. As I suggested in Chapter Four, given that the amount of capital required to pull out the *Cinsault* vines and plant new ones was substantial, vineyard owners required support from the wineries to do so, perhaps in a similar manner to the agreements instigated by de Bustros during the initial stages of viticulture in Kefraya. Yet there was no indication that such an arrangement would be made. Second, Chateau Kefraya continued to make offers to buy land from villagers—to no avail. At the same time, the emergence of enterprising individuals such as Didi, who were willing to accept changes implemented by the wineries but refused to sell their grapes to Chateau Kefraya, added another complex dimension to the situation. While such changes across the Kefraya landscape might have seemed gradual, they are indicative of changes in social relations amongst local residents in Kefraya that might also have an impact upon future strategies deployed by Chateau Kefraya. Nevertheless, and as Guiberteau pointed out during my fieldwork, given that Chateau Kefraya purchases the highest amount of grapes from the village, it was highly unlikely that vineyard owners would completely turn away from the winery.

It was also evident during fieldwork that Guiberteau was looking for ways to dissuade vineyard owners in Kefraya from growing any amount of *Cinsault* at all. Such objectives materialised through the encouragement of smaller wineries such as Vin Nakad, to reduce the amount of *Cinsault* purchased from Kefraya. Guiberteau went so

far as to suggest that such small-scale wineries sought grapes from other emerging viticulture regions across the Bekaa Valley that grow other sorts of varieties. In so doing, Guiberteau hoped that as less wineries across Lebanon would buy grapes from Kefraya, and its vineyard owners would eventually have no choice but grow other varieties. Another noteworthy attempt by Guiberteau to renegotiate networks and contracts came to the fore during a discussion where he explained that, during the early months of employment at Chateau Kefraya, he had approached de Bustros to discuss the possibility of replacing Nabhane. According to Guiberteau, de Bustros was completely opposed to the idea, exclaiming that such an act would place the whole village of Kefraya against the Chateau. Although Guiberteau heeded de Bustros' advice and continued to work with Nabhane, Guiberteau was not clear on who he had hoped would replace Nabhane and nor the reasons behind such a seemingly odd request.

In fact, it appeared that Guiberteau and Nabhane had developed a rapport with each other, so much so that the former hoped Nabhane could negotiate with others from Kefraya to change their varieties. Yet it is significant that not long after approaching de Bustros with the proposal to replace Nabhane, Guiberteau began to encourage his assistant *maitre de chai* (winemaker), also from Kefraya, to consider the prospect of working for the Chateau Marsyas winery, which was undergoing construction across the road from Chateau Kefraya. While the outcome of such a proposition remains unclear, it is significant that Guiberteau had already established strong ties with the two Saade brothers who owned Chateau Marsyas, offering them informal oenological advice until they hired the most definitive of the “flying winemakers,” Stéphane Derenoncourt. Given that Chateau Marsyas is committed to

producing quality wines from noble varieties, Guiberteau believed that such an opportunity for his assistant winemaker, where he could only endorse the right kind of grape varieties, would encourage Kefraya residents to grow other varieties. Yet it is also significant that Guiberteau wanted to employ another assistant who did not come from Kefraya. While Guiberteau was unwilling to explain how he had met this particular young man, it was apparent that he thought it important that his assistant was not from Kefraya. Indeed, this appeared to be part of Guiberteau's overall objective, which he summarized by explaining, "We, Chateau Kefraya, should not need Kefraya, it is Kefraya who should need us."

Indeed, Guiberteau's main aim began to slowly surface during the harvest I spent in Kefraya. Before the harvest, Chateau Kefraya had assessed the amount of grapes needed, organizing agreements with some of the vineyard owners. Once harvesting was underway, local vineyard owners from Kefraya visited their vines regularly in order to check up on the number of crates being thrown into the trucks; villagers paid per kilogram, where each crate of *Cinsault* was approximately 25 kilograms. Counting the number of crates was thus a way for vineyard owners to work out a rough estimate of the amount of money that they would receive for their grapes.

Every so often, Nabhane would pass by in his jeep to check that the whole process was running smoothly. At times, however, he came across vineyard owners who wanted to find out when their grapes would be harvested and felt that it was important that this was done soon. After all, once the grapes began to shrivel and reduce in weight, the vineyard owners would be losing money. Nabhane would assure them that this would not happen. One day I joined Nabhane on his travels across the vineyards of the Kefraya village, and one vineyard owner stopped him to express these

same concerns. When Nabhane tried to reassure him, the vineyard owner pointed in the direction of the vines dotted on the slopes of the Chateau Kefraya estates. He asked:

Ya Nabhane! How can you be sure? Look at what the *muhandis* is doing out there. I went walking up around the winery's vines and there are some grapes shrivelling under the hot sun. What is he doing? Does he not want his grapes?

Nabhane reassured the vineyard owner that the *Muhandis* Guiberteau does know what he is doing and that he would not be doing the same to the grapes of vineyard owners in Kefraya. With that, Nabhane bade the worried man farewell and moved on to the next vineyard. When I asked Nabhane for further information, he informed me that Guiberteau wanted to make a "special" and "important" wine with the grapes that had been left shrivelling on the vines at the Chateau Kefraya estate. The next day I paid a visit to Guiberteau in his office adjacent to the winery's laboratory, to ask him about these grapes. Rather than explaining straight away, Guiberteau invited me to join him in the vineyards along with his agricultural engineer interns from Lebanese universities. I accepted and a few minutes later we arrived at the sloping vines that had been pointed out by the disconcerted vineyard owner only the day before. As we all jumped down from the jeep, Guiberteau handed us plastic bags in order to collect some of the grapes for sugar testing. He shouted out to us that we should also taste some of the grapes. He explained later that it was important to taste these grapes in order to assess the sugar and possible styles of wines that could be produced.

The grape variety was *Ugni Blanc*, a grape that was, incidentally, grown in Cognac, where Guiberteau grew up. The *Ugni Blanc* berries were no longer full and robust, and to me they look shrivelled and brown. Nevertheless, I tasted some of the

berries along with the interns, who also appeared somewhat suspicious. We were all surprised. One of the interns suggested that the berries tasted like cake. I, perhaps due to my somewhat anglicised taste buds, couldn't help but think of tea-cakes. The following day the grapes were ready to be harvested, and to be sent to make Chateau Kefraya's *Mistelle*—called *Nectar Chateau Kefraya*. Guiberteau informed me that he had found a lot of problems in the quality of this wine. It would take another two years before the wine was ready to be bottled and consumed, so hopefully in the coming years the quality would be augmented by decreasing the quantity of the grapes. Significantly, the reduction in quantity referred here not only to amount of grape per vine but also to the size of the grape berries.

At the time of fieldwork Chateau Kefraya paid vineyard owners by the kilogram, and as such Guiberteau did not intend to create this style of wine with grapes bought from Kefraya. Yet this somewhat meticulous attention given to the winery's own vineyards betrayed another dimension of Guiberteau's wine model. Since his arrival in 2006, Guiberteau had overseen plantations of different types of vines on lands belonging to the Chateau Kefraya estate further down in the flatter plains of the region. Significantly, one aspect of this plan was related to the issue of control over the viticulture maintenance of the vineyards in the Kefraya village:

At the moment our lowest quality wine is *Les Breteches*, which is made up of *Cinsault* with *Carrington* and *Mouverde*. Then there is the Chateau of Kefraya range and finally *Comte de M*, which is the highest quality—we blend *Cabernet-Sauvignon* and *Syrah* for this wine. You see, to make the higher quality wines we still have the potential to increase production by using grapes from our estates. This means that I can oversee directly what goes on in the vineyard. With wines such as *Les Breteches*, it would be better for us to blend noble varieties rather than *Cinsault*. However, it is not necessary to control the quantity (in terms of quality) of the grapes that will be used for these kinds of wines. So long as they are grapes known and recognised as consistent, then the wines can be produced.

By developing different specifications for each category of wine, Guiberteau began to establish a hierarchy of qualities that extended to the specific location of each vineyard. In so doing, he started to implement a wine model that aimed to augment both the quality and quantity of Chateau Kefraya wines. Within that qualification process, Guiberteau also facilitated the standardisation of Lebanese wine, to adhere to the benchmark set by Chateau Kefraya—and also Chateau Ksara. After all, the monopsony power held by both wineries over the vineyard owners of Kefraya suggests a strong possibility that many will eventually comply to the demand to grow specific types of grape varieties.

Ksara's Wheels of Commerce

While the history of viticulture in Kefraya is long in comparison to other regions, it is apparent that the transformations that have occurred in the region have to some extent been a response to changes taking place across the rest of Bekaa Valley, mainly as a consequence of strategies to diversify grape plantations deployed by Palgé at the Chateau Ksara winery. Significantly, Palgé still had an interest in improving the quality of vines grown in Kefraya, and this was to ensure a shared and unified understanding of quality across the Bekaa Valley. Here, Palgé speaks of his relationship with one of the enterprising and largest vineyard owners in Kefraya:

Dr Didi was the first to plant *Sauvignon Blanc* in 1988, and when I arrived in 1994 he grew both *Sauvignon Blanc* and *Cinsault*. And my advice was to give up on the *Cinsault*, to pull it out and replant other grape varieties. I said to him, “If you do this, then, I am still with you.” And he agreed. So we planted *Chardonnay* and *Syrah*. Thus, he restructured. He is someone who has 20 hectares of these vines as well as the *Sauvignon-Blanc*, and all vines are now

young. So you see here, the process of augmenting quality and quantity begins to slowly spread across the Bekaa Valley.

Palgé's plan to vary the types of grape varieties also extends to diversifying regions across the Bekaa Valley, where these grapes are planted, and branching out means that greater control of quality is possible. On several occasions during my visits to Chateau Ksara at harvest time, Palgé was present with his *chef d'atelier* to physically examine grapes about to be released from their crates down into the press. With six different ranges or grades of red wines, all made from noble grape varieties, from different vineyards recognised for their quality, Palgé made clear the importance that each vineyard plot is managed separately:

Everything is separated. Even during the harvest, I receive grapes by variety, per vineyard and per *domaine* (parcel of land). So I can check the grapes, and after a few months taste each of the wines. We even have committees for tasting.

This process also allows for flexibility, so the best quality grapes can be used for the higher categories of wines and so forth. In order to create a symmetry between the vini- and viticulture spheres, there were two types of contractual agreement set up with vineyard owners across the Bekaa Valley. Long-term contracts were characterised by vineyard owners who rented their lands outright to Chateau Ksara, where viticulture maintenance was the full responsibility of the winery. The prices for the grapes also remained stable throughout each harvest. Palgé defined these contracts as reliable because there was less room for price negotiation. It is significant that longer term contracts are predominantly with large land owners who own property in the West Bekaa; this includes lands owned by elite Beirut families such as the Itani family in Mansourah and the Rizk in Tal Ed Noub, but also includes the lands of the Ludwig Schneller School situated in Kherbet Kanafar. There appears to be little

communication with these landowners and Chateau Ksara had direct control over vineyard maintenance.

During my visits to all of these vineyards with Mrs Paulette Chlela, the agricultural engineer employed by Chateau Ksara, none of the landowners were ever present. Instead, their *wakils*, who come from surrounding villages, were there, and there appeared to be very little communication between the landowners and Palgé or Chlela. Given the owners' absence in their vineyards, it also proved quite difficult for me to request an interview with them. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that when I became acquainted with members of these families upon my return to Beirut, few had ever visited their property in the West Bekaa. While this might be an interesting area for research, it is perhaps sufficient here to acknowledge their detachment from much of the wine production process.

With the shorter-term agreements, vineyard owners looked after their own vines but were also expected to heed the advice of Chateau Ksara. Prices varied from harvest to harvest and were dependent upon the quality of the grapes. The differences between the long- and short-term contracts set up by Chateau Ksara with vineyard owners across the Bekaa Valley highlight the winery's methods of quality control. While the longer-term contracts offered more stability, in the sense that grapes are more or less guaranteed in each harvest, the shorter-term contracts allowed Palgé the room to manoeuvre during years when the harvest didn't turn out as well as had been hoped. Interestingly, these vineyards mainly belonged to smaller landowners predominantly scattered across Central Bekaa. I had the opportunity to meet with a number of these landowners and hear their perspectives on the contracts set up with Chateau Ksara.

Most managed the viticulture maintenance directly, hiring seasonal workers to support them in pruning and harvest periods. All had acquired enough capital to invest in new vines, either through their own private funds or bank loans. Significantly, these short-term agreements enabled vineyard owners to develop contracts with other wineries seeking to buy noble varieties. Such contracts could run simultaneously, so that Chateau Ksara might buy one type of grape and then another winery might buy other kinds. Yet the grapes were not, however, their main source of income. One vineyard owner (who wishes to remain nameless) owned lands on the slopes behind the Central Bekaa town of Qb Elias, and he informed me that the profit for 700 tonnes of grapes was approximately \$35,000. He had started planting vines such as *Cabernet-Sauvignon* in 1994, following Palgé's advice. By 1997, he tells me, his vines were ready to be sold:

First Ksara told us that we will give you this to plant . . . then Domaine Wardy asked me to grow Syrah and it is now the Kssatly family (owners of Chateau Ka) who are buying from me. All the wineries know I have a very good quality. They have battles over my grapes. All the vineyards get the sun and wind. In the summer I have wind and in the winter there is no wind. There is no humidity as there is on the plains. I have no oidium³⁸ and not a lot of insects. There are a lot of ladybirds though. I have eight hectares of vineyards but fifteen hectares of land in total.

The vineyard owner had good relations with Chateau Ksara, and often received advice and support. He felt, however, that at times he had very little choice about the way he maintained his vineyards or even the types of grapes he could grow. As the grapes are intended to produce wines with characteristics distinctive to the respective wineries, his control over the grapes grown upon his land was limited. Sometimes, this would have impact upon production:

³⁸ Oidium is a fungal disease resulting in a layer of powdery mildew that surrounds the berries.

One of the wineries, for example, wanted bio-grapes without any chemicals. They were putting chemicals on their own vines but wanted me to remain bio. So I did that and my vines got oidium . . . and then there was barely a harvest.

This vineyard owner continued to sell his grapes to the wineries, stating his intention to expand his vineyards onto adjacent lands that belong to other family members. He hoped to develop a longer-term contract with Chateau Ksara, or establish his own winery. The latter was in fact what another small landowner had decided upon a year before I arrived to do my fieldwork. This is the Domaine de Baal winery run by Sebastien Khoury. Domaine de Baal is situated on the slopes of Zahle. Khoury produces noble varieties such as *Cabernet-Sauvignon* and *Shiraz*, which he has planted along narrow terraces that descend down onto a little *wadi*. During the winter, water can be seen to run down between the deep crevices of the *wadi*. The land has been in Khoury's family for some time, and he tells me that before the civil war his father had made this land into a kind of nature reserve for local plant life. It had apparently been a well-known spot for hiking. Still inspired to work with nature, Khoury became interested in cultivating the land. He had not been alone in this venture and other members of his family, such as his brother, also played a part in the re-development of this landscape. They started out by selling their grapes to Chateau Ksara, and their family friend, Palgé advised them about which grapes to grow:

For the reds we grow 50% Cabernet-Sauvignon, 45% Merlot and 5% Shiraz. For the whites, 60% is Chardonnay and 40% is Sauvignon Blanc. In 1995 we began with five hectares of vines and expanded onwards from there.

It is significant that Palgé made a point of befriending the smaller vineyard owners such as Sebastien Khoury of Zahle and Dr Didi from Kefraya, and continued to offer them the expert advice required to grow the expected vines. Notable is that these relations are defined as good, once there is compliance to the terms set out by Chateau

Ksara—not just for their production of wine but also for the rest of the wineries in Lebanon:

It is important to have contracts with only the vineyard owners who share the same view as Chateau Ksara. We want to make good wines, so they must grow the good grapes as we expect. This is good not just for us, but for Lebanon.

Indeed, at times Palgé even extended his role as the patron of wine expertise to viticulture when a couple of these smaller vineyard owners took the decision to start producing their own wines. It is therefore important to point out that some of these small-scale wineries were able to join the UVL, which demonstrates the strategic efforts made by Chateau Ksara—and also Chateau Kefraya—to extend the discourses of quality, and to subsequently control production across the rest of the Lebanese wine industry.

Finally, it is interesting to note that Palgé made a point of keeping private the prices Chateau Ksara paid to the different vineyard owners. It was made clear that the prices varied depending upon quality and also on contract type. It is also intriguing that the vineyard owners I spoke with were unsure of what other vineyards owners received. In fact the only vineyard owner willing to divulge the amount he received preferred to remain anonymous. When I had asked him why, he explained that he did not want to ‘upset’ anyone in Ksara. I questioned him further, and he suggested that perhaps some vineyard owners may receive more than others and, even if this is based upon the quality of the grapes, it might cause problems between Chateau Ksara and that vineyard owner. My informant explained that he preferred to not cause trouble—and thereby to lose support from Palgé and his team. The advice and support offered by James Palgé and his team to these vineyard owners thus assured some degree of loyalty in that other wineries—particularly those who had not employed

French oenologists—were unable to provide such professional and highly-valued advice. At the same time, such contractual agreements offered Chateau Ksara some room for market adaptability, while also reducing labour costs.

Conclusion

On one level, it was apparent that both Guiberteau and Palgé had a clear sense of how to classify regions, parcels of lands, grape varieties, and wines into a hierarchy of quality that drew strongly upon an understanding of the international wine markets. Linked to this is that the wine law passed in 2000 included discussion about an appellation-of-origin system dependent upon the geographical area of grapes: Article 12 concludes by stating that the “geographical area should be recognised for natural and human factors.” While an AOC system has yet to be put in place in Lebanon, the strategies deployed by Guiberteau and Palgé invoke ranking systems of quality that replicate global standards and guidelines.

It is also significant that their perspectives have come to permeate winegrowing practices in Lebanon. Thus while symmetry or *balance égale* indicated a harmonious—and successful—relationship with vineyard owners across the Bekaa, it also served to exclude those who were not willing to comply with standards of wine production or follow standardised and regulated procedures in line with how these two oenologists understood the international guidelines. The repercussions of such strategies have also led to further socio-economic changes where a winegrowing hierarchy has been regenerated across the Bekaa Valley. Most of the newer, small-scale wineries that started out selling grapes from their vineyards to Chateau Ksara are located in Central Bekaa, and this suggests the possibility of new emerging hierarchal

classifications of space across the valley's viticulture landscape, which once more reproduce spatial categorizations within discourses about high-quality wine. In this respect, and in much the same way that Kefraya emerged as the winegrowing hub of Lebanon, there is also an apparent replication of a winegrowing hierarchy that resembles more global forms of wine production.

Yet at the same time, the objective to completely remove *Cinsault* vines from Kefraya presents another layer of intrigue, where challenges were faced by both oenologists. These challenges had to do with ensuring that the discourse of quality could be effectively applied to the region. Reminiscent here are Pratt's observations that economic models have a tendency to become problematic due an assumption of homogeneity in the categorization of (for example) producers (1994). It is significant, therefore, that both oenologists—but especially Palgé—have forged more personal relations with important actors from Kefraya who are willing to comply with expected standards. Although these relations were not all together the essence of economic rationality—and could be calculated and impersonal—they were based on the motivation to ensure that symmetry was created in the relationship the wineries had with their viticultural counterparts. Indeed, Guiberteau, who had obtained an MBA on top of his oenological qualifications, was no stranger to the economic lessons taught at business schools, and would often draw a SWOT matrix when explaining his strategies.³⁹ For, as Guiberteau concluded one such interview, “in order to create something new, we have to destroy what was there before.” When I asked further what was implied by the terms “destroy” and “create,” Guiberteau explained that residents in

³⁹ The SWOT matrix or analysis is a method used in evaluating Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats that might arise in the application of a business plan. Once SWOTs are identified, the objectives of the business venture can be finalised and applied (Pershing, 2006).

Kefraya had to come to a “new way of thinking” about vines and wine. Perhaps developing some aspects of Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction, and also evoking Harvey’s notion of flexible accumulation, Guiberteau believed that *Cinsault* could only be banished from the earth once vineyard owners in Kefraya were left with no other choice than to plant new vines (Harvey, 2003 & Schumpeter, 1994 & 2004).

Yet Guiberteau did not see these changes happening in Kefraya without an alliance with other wineries—especially Chateau Ksara. Interestingly, Chateau Musar still continued to use *Cinsault* in their better-known labels; making their wines distinctive (Karam, 2005). Yet the winery also relies upon grapes from other regions in the Bekaa—and in comparison with Chateaux Kefraya (and Ksara), sourced a minute amount of grapes from Kefraya. While the terms “destroy” and “create” might imply power and the ability to control and monopolize the production and markets of Lebanese wines, there were therefore certain risks involved that Guiberteau had to take into account. Namely, the chance that as vineyard owners in Kefraya began to think differently about their vines and therefore, as Ortiz puts it, “power ebbs,” than there would have to be further negotiation between the two parties and perhaps even some compromises made by Chateau Kefraya in relation to other wineries (1992:44).

Guiberteau appears to have anticipated such a possibility by expanding and diversifying the plantations of vineyards across the Chateau Kefraya estate, seemingly to ensure that the highest quality grapes would remain under his direct supervision. Perhaps in this way, once, or if, a majority of Kefraya vineyard owners eventually comply and grow noble varieties such as *Cabernet-Sauvignon* for the production of “classic” wines, than contractual agreements could remain by and large in place—and grapes would continue to be priced by the kilogram. Terminating the use of *Cinsault*

continues to be an important project for Palgé, and this indicates a vested interest in transforming the viticulture landscape of Kefraya—which is suggestive of the importance the region has in terms of the strategies deployed to ensure monopoly privileges and market power.

Conclusion

In the introductory chapter I observed that a newsletter released by Lebanon's Investment Development Authority in 2003, featured the Lebanese wine industry as the country's most successful agro-industry. I also noted the minimal national subsidization made available for agriculture in general and connecting to this, the apparent significance that the Lebanese wine industry is, if not completely, privately funded by different political and economic elites. These observations draw us to the central question of this thesis: what can an anthropological study of wine contribute to our understanding of the role of elites in shaping and influencing the agricultural landscape in Lebanon?

In addressing this question, the thread of this thesis has entailed the exploration of features that shape the social relations of Lebanese wine production and are discussed especially in relation to the Kefraya region. I suggest that the materiality of wine (as a commodity) cannot be understood outside of the social relations of production. The central argument of the thesis emerges as one suggesting that the "local" emerges from a continuous process of interaction between local, national and global forces. It is therefore necessary to take into account local relations of production and property within the broader context of status and power in Lebanon. This is especially made visible in the thesis through an exploration of the deployment of elite strategies and the reproduction of particular elite positions of rank and status. I also demonstrate these social, political and economic ties are sustained and perhaps even strengthened through engagement with broader business networks. We find this especially in the valorization of expert knowledge through the recruitment of wine specialists from abroad, particularly from France. Yet it is

also equally evident in the ways in which other forms of labour, knowledge and activities are rendered invisible through this framework of expertise.

This thesis is thus also concerned with detailing these features while exploring the effects of these characteristics of the wine industry and the social structures that support it and that are in turn, supported by it. I also argue that in order to understand the specific characteristics of the Lebanese wine industry, it is essential to locate these features within historical processes that highlight Lebanon's place within a colonial and postcolonial context. For example, the 'beautiful landscape' of Kefraya, like that of Lebanon as a whole, is understood as a reflection of historical processes of intervention of different kinds, from the introduction of grapes varieties to new technologies that craft the physical environment and produce very particular landscapes.

This conclusion brings together these different themes that have been explored in the thesis in order to consider more thoroughly the implications of studying the social relations of wine production in Lebanon. The discussion will focus on three central themes of the thesis that contribute to the question of the local through historically specific local, national and global factors, the question of elite and the question of historical process, and the central role of different kinds of knowledge within that process. The first section outlines the discussion of the ways in which the social relations surrounding wine industry in Lebanon can be framed within a particular winemaking tradition that speaks of the capacity of elites to produce and reproduce cultural capital as they attempt to (re)assert their power and control over land and labour. The second section critically examines the possible components of labour that appear to be significant to Lebanese winemaking. In so doing, I also briefly consider the broader debates concerning labour relations. The second section also considers how the notion of *terroir* might enable a fuller exploration of the question of how people perceive the land-labour nexus and how they think about locality in

the context of the winemaking tradition in Lebanon. In the final section, we consider the viticulture landscape in relation to the issues of visibility and concealment.

The Establishment of the Winemaking Tradition from a Global Perspective

The production of wine takes place in a cyclical timeframe, which might be understood as part of a natural process. For example in relation to the annual harvest or the ageing process, is as Ulin argues so compellingly, quite strategic in concealing the fact that wine is a social invention (1996). From this perspective, the production of wine can be situated within a process that seeks to *naturalize* a particular understanding of what constitutes as wine and also, in effect, what is deemed to be natural. For example, the establishment of a strict definition of wine as a product deriving from *freshly harvested* grapes starts a rather strategic hierarchical classification system that can potentially demote and even dismiss other methods that might otherwise be perceived as belonging to the sphere of winemaking. We find evidence for the emergence of this hierarchical classification system in Lebanon in Chapter Three where the marginalization of wine made from raisins coincides with the growing presence of French actors. This has significant social, political and economic implications, not only in relation to Lebanon but more broadly given how the globalization of this particular definition of wine can be traced to elites growers in Europe, especially France.

The naturalization of criteria and of authenticity that are in fact the outcome of social, political and economic relationships, achieve such naturalization by highlighting the link between viticulture and viniculture. In so doing, the historical production of the industry is obscured as the relationship between viticulture and viniculture comes to be conceived as existing outside of history. Thus on the one hand, the cyclical rituals involved in winemaking such as the annual harvesting of grapes from a nearby vineyard and the ageing

of a particular vintage may be perceived as part of traditional customs practiced since the start of time. Yet on the other hand, the establishment of the winemaking tradition, as Ulin already shows us (see Chapter Two), is firmly located within the timeframe of modernity, a period that began around the sixteenth century and involves the shifting (and opening) of political and market relations orientated towards capital, surplus value and private property. Indeed, as Ulin argues, the arrival of Bordeaux's *grand crus* into the world market was actually part of a much broader and longer social process of transformation of wine production towards capitalist property relations⁴⁰.

Yet it was the Bourdeaux 1855 classification for *grand crus* that reinforced this particular winemaking tradition and was, arguably, a precursor to the globalization of a dominant system of classification of wine production, where superior quality wines are linked to notions of scarcity—a system that began at the very point of production, in the vineyard (Ulin, 1996) The Bordeaux 1855 classification system materialized through a ranked nomenclature of quality where wineries that were replicating the architectural designs of the chateaux of pre-revolution France and were surrounded by a limited number of vineyards, indicated the highest level of quality. That such claims to exclusivity and uniqueness were unobtainable for the likes of contemporary wine cooperatives such as those studied by Ulin in the Medoc region of France highlights some of the effects of the naturalization process associated within the winemaking tradition. Indeed Ulin's research demonstrates the legacy of this hierarchical classification, whereby, the *grand crus* are situated at the top of a scale of quality and are thereby able to maintain their economic privileges within national and international markets.

⁴⁰ Most notably, the *grand crus* were not the first classification system for wine; just over fifty years after the signing of Meuthen Treaty between the Portuguese and English in 1703, the Marquise of Pombal of the Douro Valley demarked the boundaries for the production of "authentic" port (ibid & see also Bohmrich, 1996).

This “invented tradition” of winemaking that reached its apogee in France in the nineteenth century has continued to shape the global wine industry and market, as demonstrated by Ulin’s research. This thesis also shows this winemaking tradition has shaped the organization of the Lebanese wine industry, revealing the ways in which notions of continuity are culturally shaped within particular visions of history, which are themselves moulded by particular perceptions of the market. Furthermore, we have seen how this notion of invented tradition addresses the claims of elites to own the past, and to a sense of continuity that legitimizes the material gains accrued over a certain historical trajectory, while also enabling successful elites to accumulate cultural capital. In the case of Lebanon, I suggest in Chapter Three, that Williams’ notion of “selective tradition” is particularly useful to understand the global processes involved in the establishment of the winemaking tradition in Lebanon (1973). As I explain in Chapter Three, the notion of selective tradition, (as opposed to invented tradition), implies a political process whereby it is the practices of the dominant culture that are perceived to belong to the sphere of tradition. In light of this, Chapter Three examined how the historical intertwining of the modern wine industry and the urban elite accounts for the complexity of social change across the viticulture and viniculture landscapes of what constitutes as modern day Lebanon. The important point here is that this social change reflects broader global shifts in market relations, and it is in this context of local and global transformation that we see the emergence of distinctive strategies within winemaking aimed at reinforcing particular social relations of power over land and labour. The effects of these changes extend beyond the grape growing regions of Lebanon, as the burgeoning mercantile elite of Beirut identified the industry as a viable investment opportunity and a means to build cultural capital.

In Chapter Three we thus also started to see the emergence of such strategies in Lebanon that constitute a winemaking tradition, beginning during the mid-nineteenth century with the early plantations of *la vigne française* by the Jesuit fathers of Ksara, whose winemaking practices were as enmeshed within shifting patterns of consumptions and taste to those in line with the growing French presence in the region, as they were with educating the burgeoning mercantile elite. And by the start of the twentieth century, the passing of a wine law in 1939 that defined wine as something that can only be made with fresh grapes along with the increasing usage of the term *chateau* to describe wineries represented a reification process that facilitated the consolidation of a certain relationship between the spheres of viticulture and viniculture. In short, the emerging social relations surrounding the production of wine were controlled and influenced by those who owned wineries and seemingly resided in *les chateaux du Liban*.

The Shaping of Social Hierarchies in Kefraya:

The winemaking tradition continues to be a useful concept through which to explore how social relations surrounding patronage (and contrary to the views of some social theorists) actually belong within the realm of capitalist relations and are shaped by local and global processes. We can find historical parallels that exist between the *beys* of Berqayl, who were able to access and influence the services provided by the state to the villagers, to that of the *Khawaja* de Bustros and his relationship with Kefraya (Gilsenan, 1984). Such types of power relations have clearly had enduring consequences and with specific implications in terms of the distribution of wealth and opportunities across different areas and different social groups. For example, as elite patrons such as Michael de Bustros assert control over land and labour (through the establishment of the winemaking tradition), local residents of

Kefraya have become “trapped” within imbalanced reciprocal relations. Chapter Four and Five show that residents were aware of their predicament, and attempted to secure a degree of autonomy. At the same time, there is also evidence of what Lem describes as the “paradoxes of modernity”, a residents tried to secure their presence in the Kefraya landscape and reconnect to the rest of the world, asserting their own control over land and labour (1999). It is in this light, that the winemaking tradition has had certain implications for the social hierarchies of Kefraya.

On the one hand, we can see in Chapter Four how the valorization of patrons of the wine industry such as the *Khawaja* through symbolic displays of historical continuity, evoke the ways in which the winemaking tradition allows for the (re)production of cultural capital for these elite actors. While on the other, there have been attempts by these elite patrons to exclude other up and coming elite actors from securing a prominent position in the Lebanese winemaking tradition. In this respect, it is most notable that despite acknowledgement from Kefraya residents, the owners and upper management of many of the wineries were not as willing to recognise Bassim Rahal’s achievements (Chapter Five). Indeed strategies of coercion such as the court case made by Chateau Kefraya over the original name of Cave Kouroum demonstrates the way the elite winery sought to secure its position in Kefraya—and thus weaken the power of the Rahal family. Reflecting and even emulating the processes of the winemaking tradition in France, we see that these strategies are about securing cultural and economic monopoly rights over the name of the wine and place, and the identity of the wine. The contrasting narratives about the origin of the Kefraya name as on the one hand alludes to the figure of the shepherdess names Raya and on the other hand, a name originating from the plural for the Arabic word for “village”, draws our attention to the attempts aimed at establishing a more firmly rooted and secure sense of historical trajectory in the region. It is in this light that the notion of the “trade-

marking tradition” emerges and alludes to this somewhat competitive process whereby significant cultural and material value derives from successfully evoking quality of distinction, authenticity and history in relation to place at local, national and international levels.

Yet there is an additional layer to the case that relates to the global hierarchies embodied in the structures of the industry, such as the UVL and its important connections with the influential supranational organization, the OIV. Membership of the UVL thus became a negotiating tool for Chateau Kefraya. Cave Kouroum could only join the UVL once the legal battle was over, and then given that Chateau Kefraya had won. The importance that Cave Kouroum attached to joining the UVL highlights the prominent position of this business association. The UVL’s founding wineries were also already quite well established members of business networks at both national and international levels. Most notably, a number of investors in these elite wineries were either prominent Beirut entrepreneurs or they were politicians who shared similar business interests. And as I demonstrate in Chapter Six, it is precisely such collaborative efforts of elite entrepreneurs and the political class such as the campaign for the wine law in 2000 that have characterised social relations in Kefraya.

Visions of the Future:

Equally important in the establishment of the winemaking tradition are visions of the future looking to continuously legitimize and normalize the strategies deployed by elite wine patrons. In Chapter Two, I referred to the remarks made by the historian Kamal Salibi concerning the difficulties of developing some sort of coherently unified historical narrative of Lebanon (2003 & 1988). The complexities of Lebanese history lie not only in the country’s complex past but also in the multitude of visions of that past expressed in

contemporary visions in order to portray visions of the country's future. Indeed, we can find a particular vision of the future shared by the narratives of different individuals and social groups discussed in this thesis that speak of the role of winemaking in facilitating the progress and development of the national economy.

This can especially be found in the accounts that spoke highly of the pioneering and entrepreneurial vision of Michael de Bustros and his foresight to create the beautiful landscape of Kefraya. Most notable perhaps are the comments by Ramzi Ghosn of the Massaya winery who described de Bustros as the man whose legacy was that of developing the tradition of winemaking in post independence Lebanon, an enterprise deemed as the best for the Lebanese economy (Chapter Four). A similar vision can also be found in the accounts of the Jesuit Torrend who writes in 1913 of the hope of *developing* the country's economy. Yet the way in which such visions of progress seeps into contemporary narratives such as those belonging to Ghosn appear to be very much entwined with a desire for the recovery of country's economy, a desire that is itself entangled with the hope of reviving certain ideas of the future from the conflict-ridden past. And within that process, the discussions of past conflicts are not usually deliberately made apparent but instead emerge as anecdotal fragments and traces on the landscape and in aspirations for the future. Indeed, it is this particular practice of historical reflexivity that cuts across many of the winemaking narratives that belong to the difference groups and individuals explored in this thesis.

In this respect, Saree Makdisi's observations also reverberate throughout this thesis in terms of how underlying wine-related practices, perhaps even in both the spheres of production and consumption, there appears to be a "fetishized desire" to narrate a history of Lebanon with a view to define a future absent of conflict and war (2006). This thesis has not focused on the consumption of wine *per se*. Nevertheless, "Lebanon in a glass", as one

lady attending Michael Karam's book launch in London described the wines as she breathed in the aromas of cedar and thyme, allows us to begin to think about this desire for a intimate connection to soil, land and place through acts of consuming (Chapter One).

This kind of "fetishized desire" is not necessarily limited to finding expression in the drinking of wine but can be extended to a range of products that are connected to the production of wine. This kind of nostalgic desire also surface in the seasonal narratives of *kouroum* of Kefraya, drawing our attention to the way a sense of historical duration has shaped the choices made by the villagers. In ways that recall Zonabend's work in rural France, while the *longue memoire* of family events were at times seemingly placed outside of the winemaking tradition established by elite wine patrons, the entanglement of spheres of home, work and kin through activities in the *kouroum* is suggestive of how the intimacies of place and history give meaning to the product (wine) and the social and economic relations that produce it (1984). Indeed my encounter with the man from Kefraya in 1993 can serve to illustrate this sentimental entanglement of the past and future, particularly in the way he described his hope for a return to a beauty of the past. This hope was perhaps not literally for the past, but rather a revival of past ideas about how the future might be perceived. And here, once again, the winemaking tradition seems to offer a space for such sentiments to surface because of its emphasis upon continuity and change through natural forces such as seasonal processes.

Yet we can also see how these visions of the future continue to be inextricably linked to Europe and the global markets. In Chapter Six, we saw this especially in terms of how the motivation to produce wine for high-end retail markets in the global arena was led by elite wineries with investors and owners who shared the objective of paving the road for Lebanon's economic recovery. In Chapter Seven, the complexity of this link to the global markets and the significant role of Europe in influencing Lebanon's economic agenda can

be observed in the choice by Chateaux Ksara and Kefraya to hire specialists whose knowledge derives from their long standing historical connection to winemaking regions in France.

The Land –Labour Nexus

It is apparent that a significant aspect of the land-labour nexus within the context of Lebanese winemaking is linked to changing property relations. In Chapter Four, the story told to me by residents of Kefraya about the *fellahi* shepherd who was given land by the French surveyors, spoke of a model of social relations of wine production. Specifically the story speaks of the entanglement of property and labour relations in Kefraya and how residents might have perceived this relationship. Indeed the kinds of ironies that can be found in the story of the good shepherd speak of how following the visit of the French surveyors, land became private property and was directed towards the production of surplus value.

It is also apparent that such “fictitious commodities” of the Kefraya viticulture landscape share broader properties of the capitalist market. Yet its materialization through labour and property relations has been facilitated and shaped by specific historical trajectories. We can see this in the case of French wine production for example, how in the changing viti-viniculture relations following the development of the *grand crus*, the required specialization of labour resulted in: “a differentiation in hierarchy among the work force and growers in general” (Ulin, 1996: 48). Marginalization occurred for those who had “limited resources” and were thus unable to participate on an equal basis with elites in the reproduction of “winegrowing discourse and knowledge” (ibid). While we are able to find similar characteristics amongst wine labour relations in Lebanon, what we also find

however, is that the enclosure of private property for capitalist production has been distinctly shaped by Ottoman and French historical interventions.

We know through Gilsenan for example, that the 1858 Ottoman land legislation and the “loosening” of collective land rights gave way to the emergence of a rentier class residing in the cities (1984). The cadastral survey conducted—during the French mandate—was aimed at regulating private property (ibid). As Gilsenan argues, rural and urban elites were well aware that the notion of land had permanently changed, and in the process so had the idea of labour. It is therefore highly possible that such changes can be understood as Burke III argues: a form of “broker capitalism” characterised by urban elites with networks that extended into rural regions, controlling peasantry population (Burke III, 1988; Schneider & Schneider, 1976: see Chapter Three). Indeed it is significant how the types of patron-client relations that appear to have emerged at a similar time to rise of broker capitalism, were configured along certain types of labour and land rights.

For example in the case of Berqayl, Gilsenan argues, the *aghas* managed the *bey's* lands as well as the landless agricultural labourers who were known as the *fellahin*. Notably the lower in rank a person was, the less social and cultural value there was placed on notions of individuality and autonomy, in that greater emphasis is placed upon the family household from which the *fellah* came from that on any of its individual patriarchs. In this regard, local categories can also be indicative of the way notions of kin and work are connected to various levels of the social hierarchy. The source of an individual's status and honour thus derives from how this intimate connection between kin and labour is perceived by others. Yet it is important to note that such local categories do not imply an overly rigid stratification system. Indeed Gilsenan points out that following the establishment of the French mandate during the early part of the twentieth century, some

*bey*s were unsuccessful in their attempts to ensure the continuity of their influence and were thus eventually stripped of such titles (1984).

Thus, as Davis' observations regarding Pisticci, sources of honour and status emerge from a patriarch's ability to continuously maintain and secure wealth from one generation to the next (1973 & more generally Pitt-Rivers, 1974). In this regard, and returning to the story of the good shepherd in Kefraya, we can find similarities with Gilsenan's observations, in that the tale shows us how and perhaps even why the residents of Kefraya perceived themselves to be bound over time and through a sense of obligation to certain hierarchical relations and work related practices and kinship networks. Indeed, this sense of obligation that emerges in the tale belonged to the broader narrative of patronage in Lebanese winemaking and was reinforced through kin-related sentiments and ideas of status and honour. For example, the source of honour for *Bayt Nabhane* originated from Nabhane's father, the late Abdel Helim, who had worked closely with the *Khawaja de Bustros*. Nabhane's bond to Chateau Kefraya was thus also an obligation to his father. In leaving the winery, Nabhane could potentially be dishonouring his father.

The Immaterial and Material Dimensions of Labour:

While Nabhane saw the potential tensions that could arise if he were to leave the Chateau Kefraya winery, there is also great significance that he has made attempts to provide his son with a chance to be released from this bond by encouraging him to become a "man of the pen." Such sentiments speak perhaps more pertinently of a process of valorisation, and shifting of relations between forms of immaterial and manual labour that are potentially distinctive to wine production, but also to Lebanon. This is especially in the way certain bodies of knowledge and expertise are not only hierarchically attached to different kinds of work, but how such kinds of work are not necessarily perceived as *labour per se*. In other

words, it is the way in which certain types of elites such as Mr de Bustros, Mr Bassim Rahal and Dr Didi displayed their knowledge as form of expertise bestowed the kinds of qualities that are often associated with men of power or what Cohen refers to as a “power mystique” (Cohen, 1981). So much so, that these skills not only reflected their ability to achieve success but also became the qualities that defined their identity and personhood.

It is perhaps no coincidence, that all of these prominent individuals were connected in one-way or another to a chateau, winery and/or ornately designed villa. Indeed the significance of this connection is that these powerful men have the capacity to transform a “villa” into a “chateau.” This is particularly clear in the case of Chateau Kefraya, where in the memoirs of Nicholas de Bustros, the father of Michael de Bustros, the chateau was referred to simply as a “villa.” Michael de Bustros was able to transform the villa into a chateau derives from the recognition by others of his successful enterprising accomplishments in planting vines and creating the viticulture landscape of Kefraya. De Bustros’ successes therefore reflect the type of value the type of value and are preferentially attributed to *entrepreneurial knowledge* in Lebanese wine production.

At the same time, the value placed on entrepreneurialism highlights how this kind of expertise is entangled with notions of personhood that were evoked through status-honour (e.g. Gilson, 1984). The case of Bassim Rahal illustrates this point well in that his achievements in Cave Kouroum were also an important source of sentimental value assisting in defining his role as the patriarch of *Bayt Rahal*. The notion of status-honour continues to prove a useful means through which to explore the way entrepreneurial knowledge devalued manual labour and simultaneously displaced other kinds of immaterial and affective but collective forms of the *kouroum*.

In a sense, this concept of the devaluation of manual work that is evoked through the notion of status-honour reverberates broadly with the works of Lazzarato, Hardt and

Negri concerning the valorization of immaterial labour within the context of capitalism's postmodernity. As with the notion of status-honour, certain forms of immaterial labour and especially affective labour includes activities that are not necessarily perceived as labour (Lazzarato, 1996; Hardt & Negri, 2001). Notably, while affective labour has been used historically to refer to what is usually perceived as "women's work," another sense of affective labour arises through activities that ultimately attempt to define and fix cultural tastes and norms by producing "social networks, forms of community, biopower" (Hardt & Negri, 2001: 293).

While such scholars might attribute the growing importance of the latter form of immaterial labour within capitalism's postmodernity, it is important to point out that in the context of Lebanon, there is also a case to be made that the valorization of this kind of immaterial labour is not a recent phenomenon. Indeed as my study of the wine industry and Gilsehan's ethno-historical analysis suggest the ascendancy of immaterial labour over manual labour started much earlier. It is important to highlight how this valorization of immaterial labour through ceremonial acts of status-honour appear separate from economic activity, whereas it is very much entangled with changing property and labour relations since at least the nineteenth century. Interestingly, it was at this time that we also note the emergence of the winemaking tradition in Lebanon. It is also of significance that Ulin's ethno-historical study of wine in France identifies the centrality of such forms of immaterial labour in reproducing social and cultural capital as early as the seventeenth century (1996).

Yet this thesis also shows how the contemporary valorization process of entrepreneurial and technopreneurial bodies of knowledge demonstrate that a somewhat simplistic dichotomy between the material and immaterial forms of labour, even during capitalism's postmodernity, is untenable. Indeed, Guiberteau and Palgé are valued

because of how their experiences accumulated in wine-growing regions in France bestowed an expertise that validated their work in the vineyards, while also potentially increasing the affective values of the (material) product itself. In this respect, their prominent positions also raise other important questions concerning the economic organization of agricultural labourers. This focus on the materiality of notions of quality as perceived by Guiberteau and Palgé thus draws our attention to the devaluation of other forms of practical knowledge as carried out by the seasonal migrant labourers who worked extremely long and arduous hours in the vineyards, collecting and burning vines, or harvesting the grapes.

Indeed the time spent with Ahmed and his extended family, who were mentioned in Chapter Four, offers some extremely invaluable insights into the precariousness of their lives. As I explained in the introduction, however, my decision to remain within Lebanon—and mostly in Kefraya—meant that it was difficult for me to keep in contact with many of the seasonal workers who passed through the region. Indeed, following the start of the “Syrian crisis” it has, sadly, become increasingly difficult to track the whereabouts and safety of many of the workers I met. Nevertheless, it is perhaps the manner in which such people as Ahmed and his family were simultaneously perceived as both transient and permanent features of the Kefraya landscape that elucidates at least some of the ways labour and work were once more linked to notions of social-standing and rank (e.g. Ortiz, 1999& 1992).

It is also important to point out that in focusing broadly on the valorisation of a certain form of immaterial labour, this thesis has paid little attention to other inputs of labour (such as the work of itinerant workers). In this sense, the analysis might appear to ignore or undermine the theoretical and methodological advancements made by the Subaltern Studies School in exploring subordinate and minority groups (Spivak, 1988;

Chakrabarty, 2002;). As Beinín has pointed out, there is an urgent need to study both the historical and contemporary experiences of subaltern group(s) in the Middle East (2001). The limited attention paid to subaltern perspective in the thesis does not reflect a lack of recognition of the value of such workers, nor is the intention to write them out of the history of the Bekaa valley. Rather, the aim is to explore a process of valorisation that legitimizes an elite group, their ideas, practices and the kinds of work they do, at the expense of the status, work and ideas of other groups. In making this decision however, I feel that we have also been better able to start thinking more critically about the valorisation process of certain forms of immaterial labour, and more broadly the concept of labour itself.

But where is the *Terroir*?

While the term *terroir* was only used by the French oenologists, it is still a useful notion to “think with”. The concept of *terroir* can shed further light on the establishment of a hierarchically organized winemaking tradition and the processes through which the naturalization of a particular vision of history, space and place, also reaffirms a particular link between land and labour. Here again, the notion of *terrior*, that I suggest expresses the material and ideological organization of winemaking and its association to place, and that can express the peculiar combination of qualities of Kefraya, has its roots elsewhere, in the wine producing districts of France.

Notably, we can find traces of this land-labour nexus in Europe during the seventeenth century, and strong evidence arises in the diary of John Locke who wrote in his short account about his visit to Chateau Haut-Brion in 1678, of the “vine de Pontac, so much so

esteemed in England, grown onto a rising open to the West, in a white chalk mixed with a little gravel, which one would think bear nothing; but there is particularity in the soil...” (Locke, 1953: 83). In emphasizing the “particularity” of the soil, Locke is implying that even within such a refined demarcation of space, there is the *natural* potential for a variety of quality due to the geographical location of the vine de Pontac—and man thus need only toil the earth to uncover such potentialities. While this may be the case, such diversity across the land and the different soils, also suggests a natural hierarchy of qualities, so vital for the legitimization of the winemaking tradition.

The significance here lies not just in a natural hierarchy of qualities of soils that exist on different plots of land, but also in how this discourse of qualities is extended to the hierarchical organization of labour. Simply put, not all men (and very rarely women) are able to toil the earth because not all men naturally possess the transformative capacities to do so (e.g. Glacken, 1976). And this is not only in that some men are physically able to toil the land, while others are not. More pertinently is that there are also those men who possess the capacities to *recognize* the soil’s peculiarities. The key point here is that while these kinds of men (and once more very rarely women) might also have the skills to physically toil the land, their value derives predominantly in their capabilities to realize the earth’s potentialities. Thus once more evoking Ulin’s argument that a fundamental aspect in the winemaking tradition regards a hierarchical sense of rootedness to the soil. The articulation of such sentiments within contemporary processes of wine production is done so through the notion of origins, where the very foundation of what is defined as wine is constructed through links forged not only with the seemingly natural *qualities* of the land where the grapes are grown, but to the type of grapes used and also the people who are perceived to be growing these vines.

In the case of Lebanon, we also find early examples of this particular land-labour nexus in the narratives of the Jesuits fathers. Torrend writes that Père Kirn's decision to import *Cinsault* vines and make wine was due to Kirn *recognizing* the potential of the soil. The significance here lies in the Jesuit fathers possessing the kind of knowledge required in order to identify its potential for a certain kind of viticulture and also in the importing of the right kind of vine, i.e. *la vigne française* from Algeria for the newly acquired property in Ksara and Tanayil. There is thus the value ascribed not only to a knowledge of land and vine which is acquired from outside of Lebanon, but also to the varieties of grape, and the import of these vines that all come from "outside." On the one hand, there are, in this regard some elements that suggest a priority of land over labour. In other words, we find little acknowledgment of the workers required in the clearing of the lands and the planting of these vines. On the other hand, the value given to Père Kirn's knowledge anticipates the division of knowledge and different forms of labour (immaterial and material) in contemporary wineries amongst the French experts and local and migrant workers.

Indeed, we see this clearly in Chapter Seven where *terroir* enables an understanding of how the value of the oenologists who *originate* from regions in France with long-standing winemaking traditions and who therefore seemingly have an inherent sense of knowledge about how to create the right kinds of combinations of vine and land so to produce a high quality wine. In this light, the comments of both the French oenologists, Guiberteau and Palgè about how they understood the potential different localities are particularly significant. Given that Palgè saw Lebanese *terroir's* potential as something that still required further scientific investigation and Guiberteau considered Kefraya's "natural features" already exhibited the right kind of quality, it is clear that expert knowledge is (also) situated, contextual and contested, highlighting, the social implications of such methods of ordering and delineating nature. This is perhaps especially clear in the

ways such methods are able to influence and shape social relations of wine production in Lebanon. Indeed, perhaps one of the most significant consequences of the strategies deployed by the likes of Guiberteau and Palgè are the emerging spatial categories of quality whereby most of the small-scale high quality wine producers are located in the Central Bekaa.

We started to see the materialization of this spatial hierarchy in Chapter Seven, where both French oenologists were willing to assist in the establishment of the smaller wineries located in the Central Bekaa by offering their expert advice. At the same time, these smaller scale wineries had to adhere to the standards of quality as set out by both the French oenologists. In this light, it is interesting that despite holding slightly different views of the *terroirs* of Lebanon, the emerging pattern of the spatial organization of these small-scale wineries appears to be quite beneficial for the long-term objectives of the respective wineries that the French oenologists worked for. Thus it is in the interests of Chateau Kefraya to encourage small-scale wineries to produce high quality wines through similar methods: from grapes that are located on the same plot of land as the wineries themselves. Meanwhile for Chateau Ksara, there are a number of advantages in the fact that a number of small-scale wineries (producing high quality wines) are located within close proximity.

As we see in Chapter Six, there are broader implications to such hierarchical spatial classifications that have to do with ensuring tradability of Lebanese wines abroad, and most especially in Europe. While the establishment of an AOC in Lebanon remains pending, the sense of urgency and the efforts of UVL members to ensure that the wine law passed in 2000 included an article regarding the correct measures to be taken to establish a nomenclature and to provide a temporary classification system, sheds some light on the significance of spatial classifications for the production of high end retail wines at a global

level. It thus appears once more, that the employment (and the employability) of the French oenologists is heavily influenced by their personal experience of long standing hierarchical spatial classification systems in countries with well-established winemaking traditions.

In this light, the concept of *terroir* enters into the discussion because of the ways in which it can elucidate how the value attributed to and (re)produced by the French oenologists at work in Lebanon belongs to a process of essentializing work-related identities (e.g. Demoissier, 2013). In other words, the form of commodity fetishism that is often associated with luxury wines, and is due to the way the hierarchical winemaking tradition renders qualities of authenticity and exclusivity as natural, results in the alienation of the industry's workers (e.g. Ulin, 2013). Thus, the value of the French oenologists is directly related to the value they can confer on the wine, the label and the district; this is because they are perceived as being attached to and intimately connected with the exclusive qualities that are evoked in the fetishization process of winemaking. We can also see this process in terms of how the important positions of the French oenologists often overshadowed and even concealed the equally vital role of other workers such as winery workers, the vineyard owners of Kefraya and migrant labourers.

Yet as Ulin cautiously suggests, in reclaiming the term of *terroir* from market-orientated objectives, the notion has the potential to break the anonymity of alienation and thus reveal more intimate and sentimental connections to land, place and locality (2013). In other words, because *terroir* can be used as a lens through which to explore the nuances of an enduring sense of entanglement of non-human and human factors involved in the production of wine, the understanding of this term can change slightly depending upon the ways in which the different factors are forged together. While this may be the case in settings where more intimate senses of *terroir* are embodied or imagined, in the context of

Lebanon however, or at least during my fieldwork period, where I rarely encountered the term, it seems somewhat problematic to apply so directly, this particular sentimental perception of *terroir*.

We do however find possible parallels in the way *terroir* can be a multi-faceted concept and a similar complexity in the notion of *kouroum* in Kefraya. This is especially in that different perceptions of the *kouroum* belong simultaneously to different temporal dimensions, visions and actors. Significantly, it is not only the same space—that is the vineyard—but also the same plant that has been, at times, multi-vocal. Thus while we see that the *Cinsault* vine was deemed by certain actors to produce unsuitable grapes for making high end quality wines, the same vine known intimately by Kefraya residents as “*Zaitouny*”, elicits other strong understandings and expectations of quality, as we see when the arrival of the *Zaitoun* (olive) season is spoken of. Indeed we see that this particularly understanding of the *kouroum* continued to act as an urgent sense of reminder of the importance for reproduction of a more intimate sense of locality. *Kouroum* thus expresses a particular forging of intimate connections to land, that is one of place-making—and also changing ideas of place-making. In this particular process, labour relations, property relations and the control of resources are intricately enmeshed. It is in this light, that the notion of *kouroum* also speaks to the dislocation of intimate knowledge about the land and the plants that are grown and the increasing difficulties of young men in obtaining work the vineyard and their subsequent alienation from *kouroum*. This is especially as the market-orientated notion of *terroir* permeates into the daily lives of Kefraya residents, most aptly evoked in the way Dr Didi describes the qualities of Kefraya’s viticulture landscape quite explicitly with the word *terroir*. And as this sense of term *terroir* appears to seep ever so slowly and subtly into the everyday language of Kefraya residents, it can perhaps eventually offer us a more sharpened lens (and perhaps how it merges with the

concept of *kouroum*) through which to explore the intersections of the land-labour nexus as it materializes across the Kefraya landscape.

Sentimental Views of the Viticulture Landscape

The concept of landscape speaks about how power relations are involved in portraying particular aspects of social life as static and unchanging, while others are shown to be more dynamic and transient (e.g. Hirsch, 1995). We see for example in Chapter Four, the narratives of the chateau and viticulture landscape can speak of a history of the enterprising visions of Michael de Bustros, that inadvertently writes out the active roles of many Kefraya residents in shaping that landscape—such as that of Abdel-Helim Nabhane.

Yet there is further complexity involved in this sense of the landscape, for while Kefraya residents such as Dr Didi and Bassim Rahal, were seeking to gain market ascendancy through applying similar techniques (like other wine elite patrons) aimed at asserting their rights over land and labour, like other elite wine patrons and oenologists, there was also an apparent sentimental connection to land. Indeed Dr Didi's choice to remain a vineyard owner and the challenges faced by Mr Rahal as demonstrated in the case of naming his winery, are indicative of how the possible kinds of sentimental value of vine (and wine) might have for residents of Kefraya are attached to work, kin and land. Simple put, there is no simply dichotomy between sentimental attachment and the market.

However, in undertaking the task of asserting the autonomy of their enterprises, while prominent individuals from Kefraya, such as Mr Bassim Rahal and Dr Didi, reproduced similar kinds of imbalanced relations to those other elite wine patrons, it was family members and other residents in Kefraya who became their immediate dependents. In other words, the impulse towards autonomy entailed the reproduction of hierarchies and

dependencies that inevitably reproduced the type of viticulture landscape as that facilitated by the likes of de Bustros. The notion of a viticulture landscape can in this regard, conceal, certain life and labour histories that are involved in its formation. Indeed, we find this in the foregrounding of the roles of Guiberteau and Palgé. It is thus from the perspective of the viticulture landscape that we are able to start understanding the strategies of legitimization through which elites are able to secure control over land and labour.

Households on the Landscape:

By exploring the concept of *bayt* (household) as the smallest form of familial relatedness and how it is perceived across the Kefraya landscape and particularly amongst Rahal family members, we considered some of the familial and work related implications of this contradictory relationship between the patriarchal quest for autonomy and the subordination of family members. For example, the notion of *bayt* in the case of the Rahal family demonstrates how the accomplishments of Bassim Rahal had provided his brothers and nephew with some opportunities for social mobility, while simultaneously restricting their individual capacities for autonomy in the production of wine. In this light, Nabhane's comments that everyone in Kefraya wanted to live in a castle are quite evocative, particularly because of how it speaks to the kinds of tensions that might emerge in the familial arrangement of production, and in particular, generational tensions, and more enduring gender divisions.

This has to do with the way in which quite a few Kefraya residents who were unable to plant the vines demanded by the wineries had decided to sell some of their lands to prominent individuals and/or families from the village—and that many went on to construct a villa surrounded by a vineyard or two. In this light, we can see how the reproduction of a landscape of a chateau and viticulture continues to speak of methods

of concealment, through attempts at displaying prominently, ideals of wealth and status on the landscape in the form of ornately designed villas that often suggested a particular (distorted) link between land and labour. This is especially in light of the fact that despite their ornately designed villas, many of the owners were unable to profit from selling their grapes. And once more, some vineyard owners but especially seasonal migrant workers are removed to the background or even at times completely absented from the landscape. Indeed, we can think about this in terms of the way Ahmed and his family were perceived to be outsiders (described in Chapter Four), not just from the Kefraya village and their *kouroum*, but also the landscape of winemaking in general.

This process of marginalization and reproduction of inequalities across the landscape is reminiscent of the practices carried out by the founders and investors amongst the urban elite. Indeed many of these urban elites also appear to have long-standing familial and/or work ties to the region. For an example that indicates the possibility of kin-related sentiment we can turn to the case of Zafer Chaoui, who took over his father's shares of Chateau Ksara. Also relevant here are de Bustros' expressions of the desire to be buried on the Ramatani hill that overlooks the Kefraya landscape.

Revealing the Hidden Forces on the Landscape:

This thesis considers the processes—both historical and contemporary—behind how a “rural economy became increasingly dependent on industry and subservient to it” (Pratt, 1994:1). The viticulture landscape is thus able to provide us with a lens through which we can start to think further about the real extent of such a process of dependency—and this is especially in connection with the analytical treatment of the economic organization of labour. Indeed I believe that it is through an examination of

the positioning of different features on the viticulture landscape that we can critically explore the establishment of a hierarchy of the material and immaterial forms of labour and work within the vineyards of the Bekaa Valley.

For example, while the “technopreneurial” roles of Guiberteau and Palgé, and this is especially in relation to their knowledge of the international wine markets, elucidates the value of immaterial labour associated with industrial production in the postmodernity of capitalism, their prominent positions also raises other important questions concerning the exploitation of agricultural labourers. In regional contexts such as the Middle East, where we can especially see a rapidly increasing number of displaced people, a majority of whom have reached beyond the brink of poverty, exploring these imbalances and inequalities have become increasingly urgent. The aim of this thesis is however not to fully address these questions of the hierarchical arrangement of labour and work relations within an agrarian landscape. Instead the exercise here is one of developing the framework from which to begin to think more critically about such issues by understanding the strategies of legitimization through which elites are able to secure control over land and labour.

Wine in this regard is an especially interesting agriculturally derived product. In both the consumption and production of wine, we can find qualities able to evoke ideas of prestige, rank and status. While such properties might be similar to other types of food and drink that can demarcate social and cultural boundaries, the way in which wine is able to forge an enduring intimate link between land and people continues to make it an extremely insightful site for the analysis of social relations and actions. Indeed the ways in which wine emphasizes locality against a backdrop of nationalist discourses, state building and global processes, one could go as far as to say that that wine is perhaps even seen by some, as something as of the utmost of *necessity* in the

process of establishing certain social identities. In the case of Lebanon, where the industry continues to grow, attracting elite entrepreneurs from across Lebanon's heterogeneous religious society, it is apparent that this link between land and labour (and work) continues to be a significant method for the creation of cultural and social norms. And as the itinerant subaltern masses also continue to grow, the increasing disparities between the rich and poor that are observed when using wine as a lens through which to critically study elitist strategies of legitimization, can no longer be concealed on the landscape.

Appendix I: Glossary

Appellation d'Origine Contrôlée:

The AOC designates high quality wines in France and is governed by legislation stipulating (for example) what types of grape varietal are allowed to be grown in particular regions to make distinctive wines. Variations of AOC classification systems based upon geographical denominations exist across the globe. While Lebanon has yet to officialise such as a system, it is considered by many as a crucial aspect of developing a niche market for high quality wines from the country.

Arak:

Arak (or *araq*) is an aniseed flavoured alcoholic spirit distilled in an alembic known in Arabic as a *karaki* and produced in countries such as Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Palestine and Iraq. Historically speaking, *araq* has been made from a variety of different fermented fruit juice, such as dates and grapes. However, there is a tendency for *arak* to currently be made mainly from grapes. *Arak* literally means sweat in Arabic.

Cinsault:

Cinsault is a red wine grape that grows well in warmer and dry climates such as in the Languedoc region of southern France, Algeria and Lebanon. In Languedoc, the *Cinsault* grapes were historically recognised for producing table wines. Yet this might be due to the region not acquiring AOC status until the late twentieth century (Torres, 2006). However, according to the ampelographer Pierre Galet, *Cinsault* vines yield large berries that can quite possibly reduce the quality of their wines (Galet, 1990). In this way, *Cinsault* is often blended with other grapes such as *Grenache*. Since its arrival to Lebanon during the mid-nineteenth century, *Cinsault* has become the most prevalent vine across the country.

Dunum:

Dunum is a unit of measurement for land area used during the Ottoman Empire. It is still in use by many countries once under Ottoman administration. One dunum originally was equal to 919.3 square meters but following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I, the metric dunum of 1000 square meters became the more widely accepted measurement across more countries. There are however still slight variations across different regions and countries. Nonetheless, one dunum when brought up during fieldwork always equated to 1000 square meters.

Grafting:

Grafting is an agricultural method with the aim of attaching one plant to another. In viticulture, the grafting of disease resistant rootstocks to grape vines such as *Cabernet-Sauvignon* has been widely practiced in Europe since the phylloxera blight of the nineteenth century. Historically, rootstocks of the vines native to America, such as *Vitis-aestivalis* were grafted onto the European wine grape (*Vitis vinifera*). Since then, rootstocks are usually genetically modified to suit particular grape varieties of *Vitis vinifera*, and also different soils and climates.

Kouroum:

Kouroum is the plural in Arabic for *karam*, and usually refers to a vineyard, olive grove and fig tree orchard.

Noble grape varieties:

Noble grape varieties are recognised for producing high quality wines. There are six noble grape varieties. For the whites, there are *Savignon Blanc*, *Riesling* and *Chardonnay*. Meanwhile, reds are *Pinot Noir*, *Cabernet Sauvignon* and *Merlot*. Using noble grape varieties as a benchmark for quality is frequently used by oenologists working within the Lebanese wine industry.

Oidium:

Oidium is a fungal disease, also known as powdery mildew that causes severe damage to vines. Like phylloxera, oidium is believed to have originated from America. Vines are

usually treated with sulphur powder or other pesticides. Oidium is present in Lebanon and a disease that proved to be a constant source of worry.

Phylloxera:

Phylloxera is a small louse that attacks the leaves and roots of the *Vitis vinifera* varieties, and was responsible for the plague that devastated the vineyards across most of Eurasia. The phylloxera blight started in the nineteenth century when the insect was accidentally imported from North America into Europe.

Société anonyme libanaise

Société anonyme libanaise (s.a.l.) is joint stock company in Lebanon that requires the minimum investment of LL 300,000 from at least three share-holders. The maximum number of share-holders in s.a.l. companies is twelve. Share-holders are entitled to the management of the company and thus also hold the right to vote in company matters. The extent of liability by each share-holder is however subject to the value of the number of shares held. Shares are also negotiable and transferable. While foreign investors are able to join s.a.l. companies, the Board of Directors must have at least three Lebanese members. An exception in foreign investment occurs in the companies involved in the trading of real estate in Lebanon, where at least 50% of members must be Lebanese nations. For further information please see: <http://infoprod.co.il/country/leban2b.htm>

Société à responsabilité limitée

Société à responsabilité limitée (s.a.r.l.) is a limited liability company formed between three to twenty members. The minimum investment required is LL5,000,000 (\$3334) and must in full upon the establishment of the s.a.r.l. company. Each share-holder's liability is subject to the value of the numbers of shares held. Share-holders are not allowed to participate in any management or on the company's behalf where a deal or transaction is of a solely personal interest. An exception is made where permission was granted prior to the deal and/or transaction.

For more information please see: <http://www.mattarlaw.com/Company-Formation-Incorporation-Lebanon,Companies-Corporate-Lawyer-Attorney.htm#2-Limited%20Liability%20Company>

Viniculture

Viniculture refers to all productive aspects relating to wine, including the science of growing the grapes, wine-making, and also trade and business surrounding wine.

Viticulture:

Viticulture refers to all productive aspects concerning grape-growing. The separation between viticulture and viniculture is of significance, in that the latter tends to encompass and both productive sides.

Vitis vinifera

“Vitis” is the genus, with at least forty species of species of grapes. Vinifera is the species responsible for almost all wine, and there are many varieties of *Vitis vinifera*.

Acronyms

AOC: Appellation d’Origine Contrôlée

ELCIM: Euro-Lebanese Centre for Industrial Modernization

ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy

s.a.l.: Société anonyme libanaise

s.a.r.l. : Société à responsabilité limitée

OIV: International Organization of Vine and Wine

UVL: Union Vinicole du Liban

Exchanges Rates:

1,500 Lebanese Liras (LL) = \$1

2,500 Lebanese Liras = £1

Governorates and Districts of Lebanon:

Government administration of Lebanon divides the country into six governorates known locally as *mohafazat*. These are Beirut, North Lebanon, South Lebanon, Nabatiyeh, Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa. The *mohafazat* are then divided into a further 25 districts known as *caza*. The *caza* are also subdivided into municipalities of at least one city or village.

The Bekaa *mohafazat* was split into two in 2003. The Baalbek-Hermel *mohafazat* is made up of two *caza* which are Baalbek and Hermel. The Bekaa *mohafazat* (as of 2003) includes the *caza* of the West Bekaa, Zahle, and Rachaya.

Appendix II: General overview of wineries visited between 2006-2008:

The information below was provided by managers and other employees during interviews and informal discussions.

Winery: Domaine de Baal

Company type: s.a.r.l.

Date of establishment: First vintage is from 2006

Current owners: Shared ownership by members of the Khoury family.

Location: Hills overlooking Zahle, Bekaa Valley

Sources grapes: There are 5 hectares of vineyards within its estates.

Contracts: None-however Domaine de Baal began as viticulture enterprise, selling grapes to Chateau Ksara.

Wine Production level: Yields never exceed 25hl/ hectares

Number of employees: less than 10 employees

Share Capital: 5000000 LBP

Registration number: 4000787 Zahleh

Winery: Domaine des Tourelles

Company type: s.a.r.l.

Date of establishment: The winery was founded by Frenchman Pierre Brun in 1868.

Current owners: The winery was bought by Nayla Kanaan Issa-el-Khoury and Elie F. Issa in 2000 from members of the Brun family.

Location: Chtaura, Bekaa Valley

Sources grapes: There are approximately 20 hectares of vineyards adjacent to the winery. The winery also purchases grapes from the Kefraya region.

Vineyard Estate: Approximately 20 hectares adjacent to the winery

Contracts: With vineyard owners in Kefraya-covering up to 80 hectares.

Wine Production levels: 350,000 bottles-this also includes araq and liqueurs

Number of employees: approximately 10 employees

Winery: Domaine Wardy

Company type: A trademark of Solified s.a.r.l.

Date of establishment: Domaine Wardy was established in 1997. Solified SARL was founded by Wardy, Gantous and Abou Raad families. The latter two families have been producing araq since the late nineteenth century. The Wardy family bought out the other partners in 1997.

Current owners: Wardy family, with Selim Wardy as General Manager

Location: Zahle, Bekaa Valley

Sources grapes: Across the Bekaa Valley-and including the Kefraya region

Contracts: During fieldwork, Domaine Wardy sourced a majority of their grapes from the Coteaux Heliopolis cooperative. The winery also bought some grapes from Kefraya. I have been informed that Domaine Wardy has since set up contracts with other landowners across the Bekaa Valley.

Wine Production level: up to 600,000 bottles

Number of employees: information not obtained

Winery: Cave Kouroum

Company type: s.a.l.

Date of establishment: 1998

Current owners: Bassim Rahal

Location: Kefraya, Bekaa Valley

Sources grapes: Kefraya vineyard owners-and including 100 hectares surrounding the winery

Contracts: Surplus grapes are bought from vineyard owners in Kefraya

Production level: information not obtained

Number of employees: approximately 10-12 employees

Winery: Chateau Ka

Company type: Trademark of Kassatly, Chtaura

Date of establishment: Chateau Ka trademark established in 2005. However, the Kassatly family have been producing fruit juice, syrup and jam since the early part of the twentieth century.

Current owners: Akram Kassatly

Location: Chtaura, Bekaa Valley

Sources grapes:

Contracts: Agreements have been set up with vineyard owners across the Bekaa Valley.

Production level: The winery's production capacity can reach up to 500,000 litres

Number of employees: information not obtained

Winery: Chateau Kefraya

Company type: s.a.l.

Date of establishment: 1979

Current owners: Chateau Kefraya consists of shareholders including Michel de Bustros,

Location: Kefraya, Bekaa Valley

Sources grapes: The estates of Chateau Kefraya include approximately 291 hectares of vineyards. As of 2012, Chateau Kefraya claims to source grapes from a total of 430 hectares across Kefraya; and also a small amount from Kherbet Khanafar:

Contracts: Surplus grapes are bought from Kefraya villagers and also landowners from neighbouring villages who bought some of the vineyards that had once belonged to Chateau Kefraya. Also uses grapes from a small vineyard in the farm estate of Bernard Fattal located in neighbouring town of Kherbet Kanafar.

Production level: up to 2 million bottles

Number of employees: varying from 50-110 employees (excluding the vineyards)

Winery: Chateau Ksara

Date of establishment: Wine production began at Ksara in 1857. The winery was bought out by Lebanese business elite in 1973.

Company type: s.a.l.

Current Owners: The current board of directors are Mr Zafer Chaoui, Mr Sara Khalil, Mr Georges Sayegh, Mr Adel Kassar and Mr Charles Ghostine

Location: Ksara, Bekaa Valley

Source grapes: Central and West Bekaa

Vineyards: Some vineyards are located in Ksara in central Bekaa. In West Bekaa, Chateau Ksara holds contracts in Mansourah, A'ana, Tal ed Noub, Kefraya and Kherbet Kanafar.

Contracts: Holds long and short term agreements.

Production level: 2 million bottles

Number of employees: up to 100 employees

Winery: Chateau Musar

Company type: s.a.l.

Date of establishment: 1930

Current owners: Hochar family

Location: Ghazir, north Lebanon

Sources grapes: Kefraya, A'na, Tal ed Noub and Mount Lebanon

Contracts: Kefraya, Edde family and church lands of Tal ed Noub

Production level: between 600,500- 700,000

Number of employees: Information not obtained

Winery: Clos St Thomas

Company type: s.a.l.

Date of establishment:

Current owners: Said Touma et fils

Location: Qb Elias

Sources grapes: Qb Elias and Kefraya

Contracts: Long standing contracts with family in Kefraya village

Production level: 500,500

Number of employees: information not provided

Winery: Coteaux du Liban

Company type: Liban Cave Trading and Industry s.a.r.l.

Date of establishment: 2000

Current owners: Abou Khater family

Location: Zahle, Bekaa Valley

Sources grapes: Kefraya-other locations are unknown

Contracts: No contracts known

Production level: 50,000 bottles

Number of employees: Information not obtained

Winery: Chateau Heritage

Company type: information not obtained

Date of establishment: 1997

Current owners: Dr Dargham Elias Touma and fils

Location: Qb Elias

Sources grapes: Qb Elias and Kefraya

Contracts: Long standing agreements with Kefraya vineyard owners

Production level: up to 500,000

Number of employees: information not obtained

Winery: Massaya

Company type: SAL

Date of establishment: 1998

Current owners: Ramzi and Sami Ghosn, including Ghada Ghosn as a silent partner-and French investment from the Brunier family of the Vieux Telegraphe Wines and the Herbrard-owners of Chateau Angelus

Location: Tanayil

Sources grapes: Kefraya in West Bekaa as well as regions in the north and centre of the Bekaa

Contracts: across the Bekaa Valley

Production level: 300,000

Number of employees: not obtained

Winery: Vin Nakad

Company type: SARL

Date of establishment: 1924

Current owners: The Nakad family

Location: Jdidta


Sources grapes: Kefraya and the north Bekaa

Contracts: unclear

Production level: Not obtained

Number of employees: Not obtained

Appendix III: Kinship Diagram of the Merging of Two Houses in Kefraya



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