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**Critical Companions: Derrida, Haraway and other animals**

*The “question of animality” is not one question among others […] it also represents the limit upon which all the great questions are formed and determined, […] all the concepts that attempt to delimit what is “proper to man,” the essence and future of humanity, ethics, politics, law, “human rights,” “crimes against humanity,” “genocide,” etc*.

* Jacques Derrida[[1]](#endnote-1)

They are here. We are there. Prick up your ears. This chapter reckons with the way that critical voices in the 21st Century are engaged with the animal question. Without the inordinate amount of space now due to the burgeoning field now naming animals as its focus, I will cut a path particular to the shattering frames of thought exposed by Jacques Derrida and Donna Haraway. I choose this path for several reasons. One is that both thinkers make available entirely different modes of enquiry or types of question than did the discourse of ‘animal rights’ of Peter Singer and Tom Regan, important as that has been and continues to be in making a difference to animals’ lives.[[2]](#endnote-2) In so doing they have both massively reshaped contemporary critical thought such that the animal question cannot be set aside under the ruse of a specific lobby. The shift from rights to ethics that Derrida and Haraway enable is at the heart of this chapter. While they stem from different disciplinary training – philosophy and biology respectively, as non-dialectical thinkers with their ears to the ground, alert to the myriad non-human species with whom we are obliged to share space, grounds, conditions of possibility, they are, in Haraway’s parlance, good to ‘think with’. Working with the notion of ‘critical companions’ I draw out the crises of companionship on which both thinkers insist. ‘*We are, constitutively, companion species’* Haraway underscores, even as many of our companions face extinction at an ever escalating rate indexing the emergency in our everyday.[[3]](#endnote-3) Without assimilating Derrida and Haraway to each other, I frame their work as a critical companionship through the commensal practices of the meal. Rather than the primal scene of the ritual transformation of nature into culture - the raw into the cooked - in the name of a transcendent human subject, the meal becomes a complex environment where, as Haraway puts it, ‘all of the actors are not human and all of the humans are not ‘us,’ however defined.’[[4]](#endnote-4) This is not strictly a question of ‘who comes after the subject?’ to use the title of the journal issue that prompted Derrida to charge the frame of the ‘who’ as that which cleanly maintains the subject in opposition to an effaced ‘what’.[[5]](#endnote-5) Rather, through the ethics of encounters with others that cannot not include non-human others, it dismantles ‘the fictions of *either* being subjects *or* objects.’[[6]](#endnote-6) In his own critical insistence on a posthumanism that ceases to centre upon the subject and that moves away from the discourse of rights that again supposes a subject as bearer of such rights, Cary Wolfe provocatively translates Derrida’s investment as ‘*what* comes after the subject’.[[7]](#endnote-7)

The way in which renewed attention to the work of Derrida revises critical understanding of deconstruction as a consequence of the publication of *The Animal That Therefore I Am* is pertinent for the tenor of this volume.[[8]](#endnote-8) Wolfe is a major figure in this renewal, both through making available the first English translation of Derrida’s ‘And Say the Animal Responded’ in his important collection *Zoontologies*, and in terms of showing how the deconstructive ethics of infinite hospitality ranges beyond the subject of rights in his equally influential *Animal Rites* and *What is Posthumanism?*[[9]](#endnote-9)Scholars such as Susan Fraiman find this redescription of the critical work of animal studies one that also happens to substantially bypass work by ecofeminists to effect a kind of masculinization of the field through both the politics of citation and by eschewing ‘feminine’ sentimentality.[[10]](#endnote-10) Regarding the latter she serves notice on Wolfe’s oft-cited tenet that the reworked ethics of critical animal studies ‘*has nothing to do with whether you like animals’*.[[11]](#endnote-11) For this reader, Wolfe’s clause is lodged in the strategy of getting the widest audience possible politically engaged with non-human others. Indeed Haraway herself – one whose admission of sentimental attachment is well known – is ‘rankle[d] when folks assume that deep-in-the-flesh relationship [with animals] isn’t driving a good bit of what’s going on in [Wolfe’s] work’.[[12]](#endnote-12)

Framing this chapter through Derrida and Haraway in some sense addresses the question of citation, not least since Haraway’s most recent book *When Species Meet* does name Derrida, while his scant acknowledgement of less anthropocentric work in contemporary scientific endeavour is the poorer for lack of any reciprocal engagement with Haraway.[[13]](#endnote-13) Giving emphasis to the theoretical work of deconstruction is not to dodge the question of the animal but rather to recall the matter of the text as a wider condition than the specific instance of ‘language’, human or otherwise. In recalling this matter, the field in which we are engaged changes shape; who - or what - we are addressing or addressed by becomes unsettled. Though many have sought to correct a ‘linguisticistic’ misreading of the remit of deconstruction, it has doggedly persisted. The generalized frame of ‘writing’ expounded in Derrida’s early landmark *Of Grammatology* already implicated ‘the entire field of the living’ as he reminds us in the ‘Violence Against Animals’ interview with Elizabeth Roudinesco.[[14]](#endnote-14)Yet this implication has been resisted. As recently as 2013, Rosi Braidotti remarked that her ‘great respect for deconstruction’ is marred by ‘some impatience with its linguistic frame of reference’.[[15]](#endnote-15) Even Haraway, in her enthusiasm for the philosophical urgency regarding animals that Derrida’s work has marshaled, criticizes what she regards as his failure to examine ‘the practices of communication outside the writing technologies he did know how to talk about’ when faced with a certain little cat, one morning, in his bathroom.[[16]](#endnote-16)

**For Starters: we are not alone**

*L’Animal Autobiographique,* the themed colloquium in Derrida’s honour at Cerisy-la-Salle held in 1997, convened a prestigious philosophical audience: other speakers included, among others: Mireille Calle-Gruber; Laurent Milesi; Jean Luc Nancy; Nicholas Royle. Derrida made it as plain as possible that his long address was not simply an update on his research that year but was intimately directed at them, saying: ‘For everything I am about to confide to you no doubt comes back to asking you to *respond* to me, you, to me concerning what it is to *respond*. If you can.’[[17]](#endnote-17) The resulting posthumously published book, *The Animal that Therefore I Am* (including the titular essay, first published in English in 2002, as well as ‘And Say the Animal Responded’ first published in 2003), has provided inspiration for a wide range of thinkers. These works have energized those already working in animal studies as well as those newly awoken to the root and branch revision of the humanities – and the sciences – that the animal question provokes, some already engaged with deconstruction, others only tangentially. Some of the earliest engagements express surprise at the domestic scene that Derrida, now famously, narrates regarding the little cat regarding him outside of the automaticity of reaction.[[18]](#endnote-18) Some recognize the strategic political value in the gravitas lent to the cause by ‘a great French philosopher’.[[19]](#endnote-19) Some demonstrate that Derrida was always thinking about animals.[[20]](#endnote-20)

In Derrida’s questioning as to whether his audience could respond, quoted above, the short, blunt, second sentence casts doubt on human exceptionalism, even there in the refined environment of a colloquium and even here as I relay the question to the reader of this volume. However it does so in a particular manner, in line with the deconstructive ‘method’ of reverse and displace at work in this text. I freeze ‘method’ in scare-quotes to index Derrida’s resistance to formulating a classical method as such. The latter, in aiming for an ordered regularity and ideality untouched by that to which it is merely applied, would blunt his hope for particularity, for the this-ness of *this* text, *this* question. It would close off the possibility of welcoming the other without qualification. In the closing paragraphs of ‘Signature Event Context’, Derrida comes closest to what we might better call a process than a method when he advocates the double gesture, writing: ‘Deconstruction […] must, by means of a double gesture, a double science, a double writing, practice an *overturning* of the classical opposition *and* a general *displacement* of the system’.[[21]](#endnote-21)

The classical opposition at stake in *The Animal that Therefore I Am* is that between response and reaction, it underwrites but also propels the performative division of the one who calls himself ‘man’ from the one he calls ‘the animal.’[[22]](#endnote-22) Neatly severed in this way, our Cartesian legacy continues to present the human as the one who is able to respond while the animal can merely react.[[23]](#endnote-23) Vouched for by a philosophical pedigree, the cant of this division nevertheless surfaces in every class introducing the question of the animal when students initially and commonsensically ‘respond’ by saying ‘But surely animals *can’t*…’. In refuting any one of the abilities classically attributed to man – to speak, to lie, to laugh, to grieve, to give, to point, to dress, to die – in such a way, I mean to draw ironic attention to the automaticity of their response. The cleavage is all the more ludicrous, as Derrida points out, by the supposed catch-all name of ‘the animal’, incorporating everything from cockroaches to squid to eagles to horses. It is not his purpose or frame to simply re-measure species such that each would be allotted its own, proper, domain, thus producing a new identity politics of due representation.

However, it is worth remarking here that current scientific research increasingly features discoveries regarding the intelligence of particular animals – especially the great apes, elephants and cetaceans, all shown to be able to recognize themselves in a mirror, all characterized by complex brains with spindle cells.[[24]](#endnote-24) Alone, this would dislodge Descartes’s faith in the segregation of ‘the animal’. Such research supports campaigns such as the Great Ape Project or the recent declaration of non-human personhood for cetaceans by the Indian government.[[25]](#endnote-25) Both award basic protections modeled on ‘human rights’ - such as the rights not to be imprisoned, not to be tortured and not to be killed - for particular species based on relative intelligence. Scholars such as Wolfe have endorsed gains such as these for their strategic value in ending animal suffering, while rightly pointing to their provisionality and to their inadequacy for thinking through the ‘ethics of *the question of the human as well as the nonhuman animal’*.[[26]](#endnote-26) In the interview ‘Violence Against Animals’ Derrida voices sympathy towards campaigns for animal rights, but raises concerns regarding both the maintenance of the Cartesian subject of ‘rights’ - that offers no critical revision of either ‘the subject’ or of ‘rights’ - and its basis in an implicitly eugenic taxonomy (this framing of the limitations of ‘animal rights’ is in relation to the work of Peter Singer and Paola Cavalieri, at the prompt of Derrida’s interlocutor, Roudinesco).[[27]](#endnote-27) In her lucid ‘introduction’ to Critical Animal Studies, Dawne McCance explicitly sets out the ways in which Singer’s utilitarian animal advocacy repeats the speciesism of which he is critical when he refers to ‘defective [human] infants’ as a single category that may be judged and found wanting in comparison to particular animals (echoing the erasures performed by ‘the animal’).[[28]](#endnote-28) There is a greater radicality to Derrida’s double gesture. For him, it is not a matter of re-ordering species such that more gain recognition for the capacity to respond. This would only duplicate the problem of bypassing any examination of the supposed autonomy of the responding subject and maintain a eugenic hierarchy that pre-approves those ‘most like us’. Nor is it a matter of holding at bay the automaticity of reaction. Rather the ‘displacement of the system’ is at work when Derrida asks his illustrious audience whether they are *able* to respond. After Derrida, the conditions of response have changed: it is no longer a capacity possessed by an autonomous subject. Without dissolving differences into biological continuism, our fantasy of autonomy is nevertheless disseminated through what he names a ‘limitrophic’ relation with others. That is to say, the limits between species are sites of cultivation, sites of growth and of complication, dramatically revising how we understand difference.[[29]](#endnote-29) As Derrida remarks, this ‘is co-implication itself’.[[30]](#endnote-30) We are not untouched by others – including animal others! – we are not alone.

The question of ability again comes to the fore, albeit in a transfigured sense, when Derrida insists on the importance of Jeremy Bentham’s question ‘can they suffer?’ rather than ‘can they think?’ as a means of re-orienting our relation to non-human others.[[31]](#endnote-31) Counter-intuitively, this does not immediately, or primarily, operate as a call to empathy. For Derrida it is the *ability to suffer* that both modifies ‘ability’ which is now ‘no longer a power’, and also places vulnerability and mortality as that which we all have in common. It gives ‘the most radical means of thinking the finitude that we share with animals.’[[32]](#endnote-32) It is in light of this deconstruction of the opposition of ability and privation that Wolfe proposes an ingenious new theoretical compatibility between animal studies and disability studies.[[33]](#endnote-33) Rather than continue Singer’s calculus of rights and the relativism of ‘mental capacity’ or measurable ability to suffer (minus Derrida’s transformation of ‘ability’), Wolfe disarms the framework of rights that would disenfranchise ‘defectives’. He does this not through following familiar lines of thinking in disability studies which might simply invert disability into a new kind of ability, but through appealing to Derrida’s shared ‘non-power at the heart of power’.[[34]](#endnote-34) Diminishing power or ability in this way also displaces the dialectical pattern that habitually understands humans as initially weak and requiring a long maturity yet destined to subsequently grasp or overcome the world in technological mastery (in distinction to the counter-myth situating animals as always and already in perfect adaptation to their environment and hence having no need to sublate it to better serve their own ends). In so doing, this displacement profoundly undermines the conceptual succession from nature towards history.

Following ‘the animal’ through the pages of *The Animal that Therefore I Am* is a readerly exercise worth taking literally. The French play on the coincidence of ‘I am’ and ‘I follow’ has generated much commentary that expands upon Derrida’s dislodging of presence as affirmed by Descartes’s well known ‘I think therefore I am’.[[35]](#endnote-35) Yet so entrenched is the conceptual hierarchy of man versus animal that readers can mistake the problem that is under review for the future that Derrida himself affirms. ‘The animal’ named in the very title, dogging the subject’s every move, does not address any given animal in particular but marks the *concept* that the linked fiction, ‘man’, organizes in support of the metaphysical edifice indexed in my opening epigraph.

Like the scene with the little cat in the bathroom that doubles the quotidian with the philosophical such that they uncannily share ground rather than remain barred to each other,[[36]](#endnote-36) a supplementary opposition follows that of response and reaction. This is the layered sense of nudity that veers between both Derrida’s banal situation before his cat and the metaphysical figure of Truth as unveiling.[[37]](#endnote-37) Out of the seeming obviousness of clothing as distinctively human - even as a primary distinctively human technology motivated by the dialectical overcoming of weakness, versus the seeming obviousness of the absence of clothing as such on other species authorized by their perfect adaptation to nature, a nature that is categorically ahistorical, Derrida refashions the stakes. ‘Clothing’ becomes a particular instance of a wider condition. This wider condition is that of hiding.[[38]](#endnote-38) We none of us step into the naked truth of presence. Our hiding is always addressed to the other. Thus, when Derrida writes ‘The animal, therefore, is not naked because it is naked. There is no nudity ‘in nature,” he indicts our terrible *conceptual* heritage that blights thought even today.[[39]](#endnote-39) And when he begins, in the biblical evocation of the opening sentence ‘In the beginning, I would like to trust myself to words that, *were it possible*, would be naked’ we gather that he does not affirm any condition of original nudity.[[40]](#endnote-40)

In the more improvisational style of the second essay in *The Animal that Therefore I Am*, ‘But as for me, who am I?’ Derrida muses at length on his dream of animals dreaming and adjusts his own phrasing and framing. He shifts from condemning the foreclosure in the question ‘Does the animal dream?’ - foreclosed by the opposition the animal versus the human, reaction versus response – to imagining, as if he ‘were dreaming […] in all innocence, of *an animal* that doesn’t intend harm to *the animal’*.[[41]](#endnote-41) Derrida’s phrasing here is subtle. *If* he were innocent he would rule out any harm through the cut of the homogenizing concept ‘the animal’. Derrida, we know, is one who assiduously refrains from endorsing any absolutes: he would not affirm ‘friendship’ as such for example, since it would make a claim upon the reliability of the concept, but rather advocate ‘the most friendship possible’, thus speaking to the contingencies of context.[[42]](#endnote-42) The sheer difficulty of devising a formula that would erase every trace of violence is brought into focus through his earlier consideration of sacrifice in the interview with Jean Luc Nancy “Eating Well’ or the Calculation of the Subject’.[[43]](#endnote-43) There, Derrida voices a strong critique of our common failure to ‘sacrifice sacrifice’ such that there is implicitly a space left open for a ‘non-criminal putting to death’ typically directed as those we call animal. Yet in his implicit use of the psychoanalysis of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok and thus a metonymic complication of eating and identification, Derrida frames symbolic anthropophagy as the contaminant situating ingestion and violence as what Haraway might name ‘messmates’. Indeed the linked notions that violence can never be excluded from eating and that in so eating, one never does so alone, marks a contact zone of broad agreement between Derrida and Haraway.

**And for the Main: the assault course**

*No one agreed. Everyone made worlds grow from their figure of the meal.*

- Donna Haraway[[44]](#endnote-44)

In 2003, to a hungry audience scenting the broader zeitgeist of the ‘animal turn’, Haraway’s *Companion Species Manifesto* named ‘dog writing to be a branch of feminist theory, or the other way around.’[[45]](#endnote-45) For her established readers this came as no surprise since a section of *Primate Visions* from 1989 had alreadydared to name and explore primatology as a genre of feminist theory.[[46]](#endnote-46) Companionship was already in a critical state: both crucial and in crisis. With her custom irony, Haraway had narrated at length the consequences of a commission inviting her to write the definition for the term ‘gender’ in a dictionary of Marxism (to be issued in six languages!).[[47]](#endnote-47) There she was not only compelled to point out the awkward insertion of a term that could make no sense within a system of thought that naturalized sex through a division of labour, but also exposed the contingent association of the ‘sex/gender’ distinction influential in Anglo-American feminism rather than, say, ‘race/gender’ through digging into the diverging translations of her given word: ‘Geschlecht’. Coincidentally, while Haraway was asking awkward questions regarding the consolidation of the term ‘gender’ as the cultural successor to an imagined ground of ‘sex’, Derrida too was unearthing room for maneuver in several essays on this generative term ‘Geschlecht’[[48]](#endnote-48) similarly finding “sex’ ‘race’ ‘species’ ‘genus’ ‘stock’ ‘family’ ‘generation’ or ‘genealogy’ or ‘community” within the term before Heidegger entrenched it within the terrain of ‘humankind’ as such.[[49]](#endnote-49) Leaving ‘gender’ behind in the ‘post-gender’ gestures of Haraway’s celebrated ‘Cyborg Manifesto’, did not point to a disengagement from, or the completion of the task of feminism, far from it.[[50]](#endnote-50) Rather it indexed the non-dialectical character of her thought and refusal to persist in thinking of nature or sex as the inert ground from which culture or history or gender would spring. Moreover, it indexed her manifesto claim for ‘pleasure in the confusion of boundaries’, itself a willfully provocative step away from the abject revulsion that psychoanalysis maintains and the clean grasp of the concept that speculative thought endorses.[[51]](#endnote-51)

In her most recent work Haraway returns to companionship to flesh out its constitutive quality. Not only are we always already in relation with others – whether we know this or not or acknowledge this or not, but relation, for Haraway is the minimal unit: ‘Beings do not preexist their relatings’.[[52]](#endnote-52) Relating, in this light, does not fall prone to the erasure of the body that the psychoanalytic embrace of the signifier endorses. This remains the case even if such relations challenge the limits of our perception. While her most well known storied analyses concern companion animals such as dogs shifted away from the instrumentalising exceptional discourse of the pet, Haraway is clear that the wider term ‘companion species’ incorporates a host of organisms whose companionship may well be troubling, excessive or downright unwelcome. Anna Tsing has compellingly demonstrated, in light of Haraway’s work, that we inhabit a long-term and conflicted companionship with fungi, from yeast to *Candida* to the imperial imprint of *Serpula lacrymans* (dry rot) as the British military inadvertently disseminated its spores from the Himalayas to wherever their wooden vessels - and subsequently wooden railway ties -landed.[[53]](#endnote-53) A tropology of ingestion comes to figure prominently in Haraway’s meditations upon companionship. She reminds readers in the opening pages of *When Species Meet* that the Latin roots of ‘companion’ immediately expose us to the ethics of a shared meal, ‘*cum panis’* or ‘with bread’.[[54]](#endnote-54) Towards the end of this extensive book Haraway recalls two specific meals: both cause consternation amongst the colleagues for whom these meals were or would have been prepared. She finds this consternation not to be an obstacle that must be surmounted or overcome, but rather as a condition for what she names ‘nourishing indigestion’ as the ‘necessary physiological state for eating well together’.[[55]](#endnote-55) Haraway’s explicit nod to Derrida’s ethics of infinite hospitality affirms her seeming oxymoron not as a concept but as a process that does not result in a new ground, that is to say, it again affirms Haraway’s thought as non-dialectical. Haraway’s stance here is all the more remarkable in this context since the meals that she proffers continue to invoke heated arguments regarding who or what we eat.[[56]](#endnote-56)

The first invitation to dine that Haraway recalls takes place on the day of her interview in 1980, in the Department of the History of Consciousness at the University of California. On that day, interest in the appointment of a new member of staff was singularly displaced by the news heralded by two of the department’s then graduate students: they were about to attend a ‘birth celebration’ in the ‘feminist, anarchist pagan cyberwitch mountains’ replete with the consumption of the placenta.[[57]](#endnote-57) This is the meal referenced in my epigraph. Haraway recounts the story with characteristic generosity, refraining from judgment or the proposition of a better outcome, or applying an omniscient grid of intelligibility. Instead and with an acuity directed at herself as well as others she speaks to the ensuing critical negotiation regarding ‘who could, should, must or must not, eat the placenta.’[[58]](#endnote-58) We learn that the ‘radical feminist vegan’ present felt that *only* vegans should partake of the meal since it derived from life rather than the death of appropriated animals, and that others invoked ancient matriarchal placentophagy as inspiration for a ‘return to nature’ – to the disapproval of still others diagnosing a romantic primitivisation at work in such desires. However we do not learn who actually ate this meal, whether anyone could not stomach it, or which improvised rules held sway. Haraway confirms only that it *was* eaten, cooked, with onions. In respect of this scene, Fraiman remarks, ‘if everyone was once inside a placenta, now every guest, male and female, ha[d] placenta inside them.’[[59]](#endnote-59) Though she does not dwell on the thought, it is clearly resonant with the totemic fantasy of consanguinity with the consumed totem (and all the more ironic since kinship in the time of totemism, according to Freud, was formed through the joining of literal and symbolic in the totem meal coincident with the imagined patriarchal origin of culture, rather than through birth and the transmission of genetic material).[[60]](#endnote-60) Haraway finds her own ironic consanguinity in Santa Cruz among those who ‘refuse[d] to assimilate to each other even as they drew nourishment from one another.’[[61]](#endnote-61)

The second meal that Haraway sketches produces sufficient disagreement between colleagues that the menu for future departmental feasts was radically revised: the feral pig roast, to be killed and cooked by an environmentalist colleague who was also a hunter, was supplanted by packaged cuts of meat from a delicatessen. In sketching this scene, Haraway peoples it with the spectre of the invasive ‘alien’ pig as pest; the more sympathetic respect for the intelligent and emotional pig; the complex interplay between hunters and hunted and the discrepancy between personally hunted and slaughtered meat versus industrially produced product.[[62]](#endnote-62) That she narrates the conflict regarding whether this was permissible as insurmountable in that instance does not mean she affirms the decision not to repeat the confrontation with a whole roast pig as necessarily the correct one (indeed she refers to ‘foreclosed cosmopolitics’).[[63]](#endnote-63) Neither meal produces a recipe for solving the question of how to eat well, even as both are world-forming. Haraway’s affirmation that we must ‘cohabit without a final peace’ expresses a reciprocity with Derrida’s ethics of eating well which similarly refuses to provide *the* answer, including that of vegetarianism, even as he repeats with emphasis the question ‘*how* for goodness sake should one *eat well*?’ (echoing my discussion of method above).[[64]](#endnote-64)

Haraway, in particular, continues to draw fire from vegan critics and not least since her emphasis in what she re-terms ‘killing well’ engages in much more detail than Derrida with our daily connections with the deaths of non-human animal others.[[65]](#endnote-65) Derrida indicts the

farming and regimentalisation at a demographic level unknown in the past, by means of genetic experimentation, the industrialization of what can be called the production for consumption of animal meat, artificial insemination on a massive scale, more and more audacious manipulation of the genome, the reduction of the animal not only to production and overactive reproduction (hormones, genetics, crossbreeding, cloning, etc.) of meat for consumption, but also of all sorts of other end products, and all of that in the service of a certain being and the putative human well-being of man.[[66]](#endnote-66)

Between this quotation and my opening epigraph it is clear just how fundamental the question of the animal is for Derrida. His emphasis on the impossibility of absolutely repealing the violence of ‘eating the other’ also registers on a psychoanalytic and thus unconscious plane that Haraway rarely invokes. Yet Haraway’s in depth engagement with the situated biological, physical, economic, and relational particularities of numerous critters brings us to the vexatious minutiae in which our daily lives are thickly embedded, from stray dog adoption (the Save-a-Sato Foundation shipping strays from the streets of Puerto Rico to their ‘forever homes’ in the US) to the lives and deaths of chickens amid the avian flu outbreak of 2004, to laboratory experimentation on animals including the engineered production of patented animals such as ‘OncoMouse’ *for* cancer research.[[67]](#endnote-67) It also leads to the heightened rhetoric and challenge of her term ‘killing well’. Haraway arrives at this phrasing in light of Derrida’s critique of Levinasian ethics. Levinas’s ethical command ‘Thou shalt not kill’ falls to the failure to ‘sacrifice sacrifice’ for Derrida, meaning that it implicitly refers to a human community and implies the ‘non-criminal putting to death’ of those positioned outside of its remit. Yet rather than replace it with a comprehensive ‘Thou shalt not put to death the living in general’ Derrida maintains an ethics of infinite hospitality with the injunction that one must eat well (such comprehensive ambition would both prove truly unwieldy should such entities as Ebola virus assume the claims of the living in general, and also block the insight of infinite hospitality which cannot decide in advance from who or from what an ethical demand may arise).[[68]](#endnote-68) Haraway phrases it thus:

*The problem is to live responsibly within the multiplicitous necessity and labor of killing*, so as to be in the open, in quest of the capacity to respond in relentless historical, nonteleological multispecies contingency. Perhaps the commandment should read, “Thou shalt not make killable”.[[69]](#endnote-69)

She goes on to say that she ‘do[es] not think we can nurture living until we get better at facing killing’.[[70]](#endnote-70) In light of Haraway’s ‘quest’ - and not possession - of ‘the capacity to respond’, this does not equate to a general advocacy of slaughter or submission to the *status quo*, far from it. Rather she asks us to insistently risk our curiosity in asking after the networks of relations in which we dwell with other animals. After Haraway, we want to know what forces of global capital conspire when three quarters of the world’s production of soy is destined not as an alternative protein for vegetarians but for animal feed (thus depleting the likelihood of animals being pasture raised) and is fast-tracking the monocultural destruction of environments, particularly in Latin America, in order to produce cheap meat for the West and increasingly for China; we ask how a natural and non-animal-based clothing such as cotton still contributes to the monocultural destruction of habitats and pesticidal decimation of insect life when not grown organically; we question whether the paper of the book in our hands was delivered through sustainable forestry practices, whether the energy used to power our computers is ‘clean’ or under what circumstances its components were assembled and by whom.[[71]](#endnote-71) All these instances touch on our quotidian proximity to practices that kill, even if we refuse its most obvious evidence in the consumption of meat, and underline Haraway’s plea that we learn to kill well.

In the previous section I drew attention to Wolfe’s putting to work of deconstruction in his important revision of the relation between animal studies and disability studies. Quite how persuasively his contentious case study – that of Temple Grandin - supports his argument however, is a vexed matter. Anat Pick, in critical counterpoint to Wolfe, does not view Grandin’s autobiography of autism as an opening to a new and non-anthropocentric conception of thought. Rather she sees it as an ‘avowedly Cartesian story, which quickly turns into a tale of betrayal’ when her experience of ‘thinking in pictures’ like – as Grandin claims – animals do, leads her to design ‘better’ abattoirs.[[72]](#endnote-72) Through organizing the path from holding pens to slaughter for cattle without what they may perceive as visual intimidation such as bright light (altering the orientation of the slaughterhouse to the sun) and devising a circular route in mimicry of the ways that cattle move together (rather than the brutal instrumentation of the quickest progression from field to plate) amongst many other techniques, might it be said that Grandin’s ambition is to kill well?[[73]](#endnote-73) Returning to Derrida and Haraway’s refusal to provide a masterplan regarding how exactly to eat or kill well is not to avoid saying yes or no to this question. Rather it leads us to ask wider questions excavating the contingencies of life and death in the slaughterhouse and reminds us that ‘Beings do not preexist their relatings.’ While such multinationals as McDonalds take pride in having consulted Grandin in order to better design their production of burgers, issues of sheer scale, environment depletion, quality and source of feed remain extremely troubling.[[74]](#endnote-74) Following Haraway, however, we would not fetishise the machine, the technology of killing (her famous ‘cyborg’ drew ironic distance from techno-fetishism). A model slaughterhouse cannot guarantee killing well. As Kelly Oliver points out, following Derrida and the notion of limitrophy as the cultivation of limits that grow, ‘there is always the danger of trophe become trophy, of nourishment becoming a monument to status or victory.’[[75]](#endnote-75) This is effectively the accusation that Pick levels at Grandin: instead of entering into ‘communion with other lives’, Grandin’s reflections on the restraining chute for kosher slaughter that she designed, for Pick, ‘celebrate the body-made-docile by a feat of technology.’[[76]](#endnote-76) Grandin herself subsequently revises her views: ‘At first I thought engineering could make all the improvements happen, but later in my career I learned that good engineering and design must be coupled with good management.’[[77]](#endnote-77) While that still emphasizes the application of a model, merely expanding it to management, it does step in the direction of the wider network at stake. Slaughterhouses, Haraway reminds us, are not filled only with non-human animals. Who is it that we imagine to people them? In an interview Haraway is quick to remind us that

The overwhelming workforce now in animal agriculture are parolees, immigrants, and women of color, legal and illegal, and the attack on labor is deeply tied to the industrialization of animals and the production of cheap food. Cheap food has been an imperial strategy since before Rome.[[78]](#endnote-78)

This is hardly limited to the United States. At the time of writing this chapter the Australian Agricultural Company has explicit plans to provide training and experience of work for inmates from a Darwin prison in an abattoir.[[79]](#endnote-79) That is a long way from the negotiated meals Haraway affirms.

**Something for Afters: trauma trouble**

*It is time to theorize an “unfamiliar” unconscious, a different primal scene, where everything does not stem from*

*the dramas of identity and reproduction. Ties through blood – including blood recast in the coin of genes and information – have been bloody enough already. I believe*

*there will be no racial or sexual peace, no livable nature, until we learn to produce humanity through*

*something more and less than kinship.*

- Donna Haraway[[80]](#endnote-80)

The last section of this chapter closes imperfectly in light of a certain kind of repetition. Thus far repetition has been located through its Cartesian expulsion from human response and subsequent reframing as a condition of all experience through Derrida. The subtle work of the latter bears some reiteration in connection with psychoanalysis and specifically in terms of the sophisticated engagement with the animal question by John Mowitt. Known for his broad-ranging disciplinary acuity and innovation with particular regard to sonic experience, in his study on the whisper Mowitt remarks that ‘animal studies has reached so intimately into the concept of the subject that its preoccupations have been made to resonate, as madness did half a century ago, in every corner of Western thought’.[[81]](#endnote-81) While acknowledging the impact of Derrida and Wolfe in demanding this shakedown of the subject, Mowitt frames the problem in this manner in light of Michel Foucault. He specifically invokes Foucault’s history of the expulsion of those we call mad from the category claimed by the subject, that of reason, the implication being that the subject has similarly banished the animal.[[82]](#endnote-82) For Mowitt, moving from the discourse analysis of Foucault to the psychoanalytic frame of trauma, what then comes to attention is the way in which the animal returns – traumatically, even *as* trauma as such – within the subject. However, in my reading, it is hard to shake off the risk of the containment of the radicality affirmed by both Derrida and Haraway, by the language of trauma studies in its conceptual attachment to the subject, the animal and to language as the privileged field of the signifier.

Sensitive to acoustic meters in excess of ‘the voice,’ Mowitt works the difficult to grasp ground of the whisper as the means by which to catch wind of traumatic repetition. Whispering becomes this means through what it does rather than what it is (rather as if Foucault were listening in on a psychoanalytic session). For Mowitt, whispers channel the archaic pain of the domestication of animals and those humans who enjoin ‘the capacity to heal with the capacity to train’.[[83]](#endnote-83) I phrase it in this way since across Mowitt’s case studies, from the film named *The Horse Whisperer* to a hybrid television episode combining two series – *The Ghost Whisperer* and *The Dog Whisperer*, whispering both convenes non-human sounds *and* settles on the traumatic suffering of human subjects.[[84]](#endnote-84) While the non-human whispers include a brief and highly suggestive reference to Pilgrim, the traumatised horse of the first example ‘telling […] secrets to himself, or picking them up from the insects, the wind the thud of his own hooves’ in explicit if fleeting reference to Derrida’s recasting of autoaffection as constitutively open to the outside in *Voice and Phenomenon*, the question of trauma becomes increasingly aligned with human subjects…[[85]](#endnote-85) This tendency may well arise from the dominant conception of trauma as the site of the failure of words; traumatic experience is precisely unvoiced. Psychoanalysis spent its early years finding the means for hysterical patients to speak of rather than symptomatize their reminiscences, after all.

Reading Mowitt after Haraway however, I want to double back on elements from his field of enquiry that might retrieve other communicative processes from their psychoanalytic eclipse. For example, in name-checking Paul Patton’s essay on competing models of power in the training of horses, Mowitt alights on the putting of ‘linguistic knowledge back on the table’.[[86]](#endnote-86) Yet there are other ingredients also served up on this table. What strikes me as crucial in Patton’s own rather Foucauldian exegesis is his invocation of Monty Roberts’ method of ‘horse whispering’. In distinction to methods of ‘breaking’ horses both widely used and as specifically used by Roberts’ own brutal father (since, yes, there is a story of traumatised humans also shadowing this narrative) he aims for a non-violent method of ‘starting’ horses. Crucially, Roberts gleaned that horses were communicative participants in domestication and not simply its oppressed object. Moreover he learns this by, and develops his ‘join-up’ language on the basis of, observing herds of wild mustangs in which mares discipline errant young horses.[[87]](#endnote-87) Discipline in and as communication does not arrive when horses met humans. Like writing for the Nambikwara, which did not commence with the contaminating arrival of Europe in the form of Claude Levi-Strauss, discipline was already there.[[88]](#endnote-88) While perhaps working through psychic processes in producing the figure of the father by means of a totemic animal, Roberts *also* opens a companionate relation between humans and horses that exceeds that familiar scene.[[89]](#endnote-89)

Returning to Derrida, however, we can also return to the scene of psychoanalysis such that it need not legislate language, narrowly construed, as the privileged site for the working through of trauma. Thinking between the implicit recourse to Abraham and Torok in the ‘Eating Well’ interview and Derrida’s explicit engagement with their work in his ostensible introduction to their book *The Wolf Man’s Magic Word*, we can open the path to a non-linguistic eating well.[[90]](#endnote-90) That is to say, while the interview displaces ethics as an encounter based on a ‘face-to-face’ meeting with the other that assumes a human community retaining the sacrifice or ‘non-criminal putting to death’ of the other named animal, the introduction consolidates Derrida’s move beyond the mouth as the speaking telos of the subject.[[91]](#endnote-91) Within this telos as Abraham and Torok articulate it, the human mouth is haunted by the loss of the object, the breast, while the word steps in to fill ‘the communion of empty mouths’.[[92]](#endnote-92) In shifting beyond the mouth as the privileged orifice functioning as the ‘metonymy of introjection’, Derrida implies the possibility of other identifications taking place at the ‘edge of [all] the orifices (of orality, but also of the ear, the eye-and all the ‘senses’ in general)’.[[93]](#endnote-93)

He thus opens the possibility of thinking of identification and even an unconscious that is not governed by language in its strict sense, and thus to the possibility of psychic lives in other animals. In ‘Say the Animal Responded’, the section of *The Animal That Therefore I Am* explicitly directed at the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan, Derrida restates the case of the trace as a wider category than the signifier and explicitly links this to animals:

the structure of the trace presupposes that *to trace* amounts to *erasing a trace* as much as to imprinting it, all sorts of sometimes ritual animal practices, for example, in burial and mourning, associate the experience of the trace with that of the erasure of the trace.[[94]](#endnote-94)

‘Burial and mourning’ both take us to the territory that ‘the animal’ is not supposed to traverse and return us to the question of traumatic experience. While Derrida acknowledges some progress with the animal question in Lacan, he also notes its repetition in the *Ecrits*, through Lacan’s recruitment of the ability to erase one’s tracks or lie as the defining proper of the human. Insisting on the vulnerability of all our traces of whatever kind, Derrida ironically reminds Lacan of the Unconscious and widens the latter so that again, a constitutive non-presence affects the living in general. In a peculiar way this thought returns us to the ability to suffer. In this case suffering as the condition of experience out of joint with itself, in other words as traumatic.

In calling for an ‘unfamiliar unconscious’ Haraway knowingly demands the unfamiliar: that which is not of ‘the family’, even as the logic of the uncanny yokes the familiar and unfamiliar together, as ‘that which was once repressed but has come to light’.[[95]](#endnote-95) Neither out of the blue, nor anti-psychoanalytic *per se*, Thryza Nichols Goodeve names Haraway’s call as indicative of her project at large.[[96]](#endnote-96) Always and already we are ‘blindsided’ in our relatings with others including non-human others.[[97]](#endnote-97) Now is the time to theorise this community less exclusively and with the least pain possible.

1. Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence Against Animals’ in Derrida and Elizabeth Roudinesco, *For What Tomorrow*…, trans. Jeff Fort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004) p.62-3. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Peter Singer, [1975] *Animal Liberation: Second Edition* (London: Pimlico, 1995), Tom Regan [1983] *The Case for Animal Rights: Updated with a New Preface* (California: University of California Press, 2004). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Donna Haraway, *The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People & Significant Otherness* (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2003) p.2, italics original. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Donna Haraway, ‘Otherworldly Conversations: Terran Topics, Local Terms’ in *Material Feminisms*, Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman (eds.) (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008) p. 159 [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Jacques Derrida, “Eating Well' or the Calculation of the Subject,’ Peter Connor and Avital Ronell (trans.) *Points*…*Interviews 1974-1994,* Elizabeth Weber (ed.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) p. 272. ‘Who Comes After the Subject?’ was the title of the special issue of *Topoi* for which ‘Eating Well’ took place, 7.2 (1988). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Haraway, ‘Otherworldly Conversations’ p. 158, emphasis added. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Cary Wolfe ‘Learning from Temple Grandin, or, Animal Studies, Disability Studies and Who Comes After the Subject’ in *New Formations*, 64: 2008, pp.110, emphasis added. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Jacques Derrida, *The Animal that Therefore I Am,* trans*.* David Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008). The titular essay was first published in *Critical Inquiry* 28, 2002, pp.369-418. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Jacques Derrida, ‘And Say the Animal Responded’ David Wills (trans.) in *Zoontologies: the Question of the Animal* Cary Wolfe (ed.) (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2003) pp. 121-146, Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture and the Discourse of Species* (Chicago University Press, 2003); *What is Posthumanism?* (Minnesota University Press, 2010).See also the influential *Posthumanities* series Wolfe edits for Minnesota University Press in which was published Haraway’s *When Species Meet*. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Susan Fraiman ‘Pussy Panic versus Liking Animals: Tracking Gender in Animal Studies’ in *Critical Inquiry* 39, 2012 89-115. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Wolfe, *Animal Rites*, p.7, italics original, qtd in Fraiman, p.102. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Donna Haraway, interviewed by Jeffrey Williams:

    <http://theconversant.org/?p=2522> [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Donna Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2008) pp. 19-26. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Derrida, ‘Violence Against Animals’ p. 63. For a good early-ish corrective to this misreading see Eva Płonowska Ziarek, *The Rhetoric of Failure: Deconstruction of Skepticism, Reinvention of Modernism* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1995). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Rosi Braidotti, *The Posthuman* (Cambridge: Polity, 2013) p.30. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Donna Haraway, *When Species Meet* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press) p.21. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Derrida, *The Animal,* p.8, italics original. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. See Steve Baker, *The Postmodern Animal* (London: Reaktion, 2000), p.185. Writing prior to any English translations, Baker cites the French original ‘L’Animal que donc Je suis’ in Marie-Louise Mallet, ed. *L’Animal Autobiographique* (Paris: Des Femmes, 1999). [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. See Carol Adams, ‘Preface to the Twentieth Anniversary Edition of *The Sexual Politics of Meat’* in *The Sexual Politics of Meat* (London: Continuum, 2010) p.5. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. See Leonard Lawlor, *This Is Not Sufficient: An Essay on Animality and Human Nature in Derrida* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature Event Context’ in *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Read (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982) p.329, italics original. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Derrida, *Animal*, pp.30-32. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. See René Descartes, *A Discourse on the Method* [1637] trans. Ian Maclean (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) pp. 47-48. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. See for example, this report: <http://news.discovery.com/animals/whales-dolphins/dolphins-human-brain-120626.htm> [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. For the Great Ape Project, see <http://www.projetogap.org.br/en/> and for cetacean non-personhood see: <http://www.dw.de/dolphins-gain-unprecedented-protection-in-india/a-16834519> [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites,* p.192, italics original. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Derrida, ‘Violence Against Animals’ pp.64-68. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Dawne McCance, *Critical Animal Studies: An Introduction* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2013) p. 29. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. See Derrida, *Animal*, pp.29-30. I discuss Derrida’s invocation of limitrophy in texts as early as *Margins of Philosophy* in my ‘Insect Asides’ in *The Animal Question in Deconstruction* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013). [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Derrida, ‘Violence Against Animals’ p. 66. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Derrida, *Animal*, p.28. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. Derrida, *Animal*, p.28. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. See Cary Wolfe ‘Learning from Temple Grandin, or, Animal Studies, Disability Studies and Who Comes After the Subject’ in *New Formations*, 64: 2008, pp.110-123. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. Derrida, *Animal*, p.28. [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. See the translator’s note regarding ‘Je suis’ in Derrida, *Animal*, p.162. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. See David Wood, [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. The notion of veering has been dramatically reimagined as ‘not only human’ in Nicholas Royle’s recent *Veering: A Theory of Literature* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011). [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Derrida, *Animal*, p. 61. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Derrida, *Animal*, p. 5. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Derrida, *Animal*, p.1, emphasis added. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Derrida, *Animal*, p. 62-4, emphasis added. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Derrida, *Politics of Friendship*, FIND REF [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. Jacques Derrida, “Eating Well' or the Calculation of the Subject,’ [1988] Peter Connor and Avital Ronell (trans.) *Points*…*Interviews 1974-1994,* Elizabeth Weber (ed.) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) pp. 255-287. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. Donna Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p.293. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. Donna Haraway, *Companion Species* p.3. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. See Part Three, ‘The Politics of Being Female: Primatology Is a Genre of Feminist Theory’ in Donna Haraway, *Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science* (New York: Routledge, 1989) pp.279-382. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. Donna Haraway, ‘‘Gender’ for a Marxist Dictionary’ [1987] in *Simians, Cyborgs & Women: the Reinvention of Nature* (London: Free Association Books, 1991) pp. 127-148. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Jacques Derrida, ‘*Geschlecht* I: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference’ [1983] and ‘Heidegger’s Hand (*Geschlecht* II)’ [1987] in *Psyche: Inventions of the Other* Vol. II, eds. Peggy Kamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) pp.7-26, 27-62. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Derrida, ‘Heidegger’s Hand’ p.28 [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Donna Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism in the Late Twentieth Century’ 1985] in *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (London: Free Association Books, 1991) p.150. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Haraway, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ p.150. Julia Kristeva’s classic account of abjection is given in her *Powers of Horror: an essay on abjection* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Haraway, *Companion Species*, p.6. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. Anna Tsing, ‘Unruly Edges: Mushrooms as Companion Species’ in *Environmental Humanities*, Vol. 1 (2012): 141–54. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p. 17. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p.300. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. See for example, Eva Giraud, ‘Veganism as Affirmative Biopolitics: Moving Towards a Posthumanist Ethics?’ in *PhaenEx*, 8:2, 2013, 47-79. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p.293. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p.293. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Fraiman, ‘Pussy Panic’ p.114. Fraiman sketches Haraway’s tale of placentophagy in relation to Carol Adams’ vegan-feminist renunciation of meat. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. See Sigmund Freud, *Totem and Taboo* – FIND REF [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p.294. [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. She does not note whether anyone objected to the eating of a pig on grounds that it was not kosher. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p.299. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. Haraway, Ibid. Derrida, ‘Eating Well’ p.282, emphasis original. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p. 296. [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Derrida, *Animal*, p. 25. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. Haraway, *Companion Species, When Species Meet, Modest\_Witness*, REFS [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Derrida, ‘Eating Well’ p.279. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p.80, emphasis added. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. Haraway, *When Species Meet*, p.81. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. See the World Wildlife Fund’s report on Soy: <http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/footprint/agriculture/soy/soyreport/>. For information on cotton production see:

    <http://www.cottonedon.org/> [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. Anat Pick, *Creaturely Poetics: Animality and Vulnerability in Literature and Film* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) p.66. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. Temple Grandin’s websites archive her publications and designs for ‘humane slaughter’: <http://www.templegrandin.com/> <http://www.grandinlivestockhandlingsystems.com/>

    In contrast, the explicit instrumentation of early US slaughterhouse design as a Taylorist ‘disassembly line’ is chillingly detailed in perverse complicity with a proto-cinematic logic of animation in Nicole Shukin’s *Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. McDonalds site includes interviews with Canadian Moms called as witnesses to the safety of beef and welfare of cattle: they cite Grandin as one of the welfare experts ensuring humane slaughter: <http://www.mcdonalds.ca/ca/en/food/all-access_moms/heres_the_beef.html>. The Canadian Coalition for Farm Animals posts rather different interpretation of conditions on Canadian farms (from whence McDonalds states it sources all its beef):

    <http://www.humanefood.ca/beefcattle.html> [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. Kelly Oliver, *Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) p.127. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. Pick, *Creaturely Poetics*, p.70. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. Temple Grandin, in Grandin and Catherine Johnson, *Animals Make Us Human: Creating the Best Life for Animals* (Orlando, Fl: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing, 2010) p.296. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. Donna Haraway, interviewed by Jeffrey Williams:

    <http://theconversant.org/?p=2522> [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. See this article on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation’s website, first posted on Monday 6 Jan 2014, ‘Concerns over abattoir work on NT prisoners’:

    <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-01-06/abattoir-prionsers-darwin/5186434> [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. Donna Haraway, *Modest\_Witness@Second\_Millenium.FemaleMan©*

    *\_Meets\_OncoMouseTM* (New York & London: Routledge, 1997) p. 265. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. John Mowitt, ‘Like a Whisper’ in *differences: a journal of feminist cultural studies* 22.2-3, 2011, p. 172. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. Derrida discusses the conceptual and historical overlap between the asylum and the zoo in *The Beast & The Sovereign Volume 1,* Geoffrey Bennington (trans.)(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009) pp. 395-402. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. Mowitt, p. 174. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. *The Horse Whisperer* (dir. Robert Redford, US, 1998), *The Ghost Whisperer* and *The Dog Whisperer* (National Geographic). REFS [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. Mowitt, p. 178. See Derrida, *Voice and Phenomenon*, Leonard Lawlor (trans.) (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011). [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. Mowitt, p. 172. Paul Patton, ‘Language, Power and the Training of Horses’ in Cary Wolfe (ed.) *Zoontologies: the Question of the Animal* (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 2003) pp. 83-99. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. Patton, p. 89. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. Derrida famously discusses Levi-Strauss in this context in, *Of Grammatology*, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (trans.) (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976) pp. 135-136. [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. Feminist scholars such as Kelly Oliver have remarked that Freud’s *Totem and Taboo* glosses over both modes of kinship that predate the nuclear family as well as the scattered incoherent references to feminine fancies and maternal deities in the rush to render the father original, necessary and human. See Kelly Oliver, *Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) 248-257. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. Jacques Derrida, ‘Foreword: *Fors*: The Anglish Words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’ in *The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonomy* Nicholas Rand (trans.) (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1986) xi-xlviii. I say ‘ostensible’ since it rather cryptically contains this transformation of their work. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
91. Derrida, ‘Eating Well’ p. 282. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
92. Nicolas Abraham & Maria Torok, ‘Mourning *or* Melancholia: Introjection *versus* Incorporation’ [1972] in *The Shell and The Kernel* trans. Nicholas T. Rand (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994) p. 128. [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
93. Derrida, ‘Eating Well’ p. 282. [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
94. Derrida, *Animal*, p.135, italics original. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
95. Sigmund Freud, ‘The Uncanny’ REF [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
96. Thryza Nichols Goodeve in Donna Haraway, *How Like A Leaf* (New York & London: Routledge, 2000) p.124. [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
97. Haraway, Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-97)