**Gershom Scholem**

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**1.**

Giorgio Agamben’s earliest encounter with Gershom Scholem concerns an essay from 1972 entitled ‘Walter Benjamin and his Angel’,[[1]](#endnote-2) Scholem’s first attempt at providing a definitive account of Benjamin’s legacy. At its center was a short text entitled ‘Agesilaus Santander’, which Benjamin composed on 12 and 13 August 1933 as a gift for the Dutch painter Anna Maria Blaupot ten Cate. In the text, the narrator is first given a ‘secret’ Jewish name, which is then revealed to contain an image of the ‘New Angel’ as well as a ‘female’ and ‘male’ form. Before naming himself as such, the ‘new angel’ presents himself as one of a host of angels that God creates at every given moment, whose only task, according to the Kabbalah, is to sing God’s praises at His throne before returning to the void. By sending his ‘feminine aspect’ to the masculine one, however, the angel has only strengthened the narrator’s ‘ability to wait’; even when face to face with the woman he awaits he does not fall upon her *because* ‘he wants happiness: […] the conflict in which the rapture of that which happens just once [*des Einmaligen*], the new, the as-yet-unlived is combined with the bliss of experiencing something once more [*des Nocheinmal*], of possessing once again, of having lived’. Thus, the narrator continues, ‘he has nothing new to hope for on any road other than the road home’ to the future whence he came, where the as-yet-unlived will have been lived. [[2]](#endnote-3)

In his reading, Scholem makes much of a letter from 1933[[3]](#endnote-4) in which Benjamin describes Blaupot ten Cate as the ‘female counterpart’ of Paul Klee’s drawing *Angelus Novus.* The figure it depicts, an ‘angel’ with claws and wings much like the ‘razor-sharp pinions’ of the ‘new angel’ in ‘Agesilaus Santander’, makes another, significant appearance in the Ninth Thesis on the Concept of History as the angel of history that is blown forward by the storm of progress while turned toward the ruins of the past.[[4]](#endnote-5) To explain these associations Scholem insists that *Agesilaus Santander* is an anagram of *Der Angelus Satanas* – the satanic angel who, adorned with claws and sharp wings,[[5]](#endnote-6) sends his ‘female form’ to ‘destroy’ the narrator, a reading that Scholem corroborates with Benjamin’s history of unrequited love and eluded happiness.[[6]](#endnote-7) Moreover, as its Hebrew name suggests, the satanic angel is an ‘accuser’ who sings songs of lament, not praise.[[7]](#endnote-8) Thus, Scholem concludes, the paradoxical formula Benjamin gives for ‘happiness’ is an index of the dialectician’s despondency at a historical process in which ‘happiness’ is situated at the origin and utopian future of man’s redemption, never its present. Correspondingly, the angel of the Ninth Thesis is a fundamentally melancholic figure turned toward the unredeemed world whose pieces he is prevented from ever putting back together by the ‘storm’ of progress. Only a leap into transcendence, a messianic ‘now-time’ [*Jetztzeit*], can overcome history; imagining the melancholic *Angelus Satanas* allows Scholem to argue that Benjamin splits the messianic function of historical time between that of the angel who necessarily fails in his task *in* history, and the messiah who alone can fulfil it *as* the completion of history.[[8]](#endnote-9)

Or, as Agamben writes, ‘this unexpected metamorphosis casts a melancholic light on the entire horizon of Benjamin’s reflections on the philosophy of history’, obfuscating the ‘properly redemptive role’ that the angel plays in it (*PO* 138). His essay ‘Walter Benjamin and the Demonic’ thus sets out to complicate Scholem’s account in order to trace ‘the fundamental […] lines of Benjamin’s ethics’, inasmuch as an ethics is impossible to establish without also adopting the context from which ethics first emerged as a doctrine: the alignment of the *daimonion* (the demonic) with *eudaimonia* (happiness). Agamben’s first disagreement with Scholem, which sets the stage for many subsequent encounters up to and including the completion of the *Homo Sacer* project, thus seeks to establish the primacy of Benjamin’s theory of happiness for his concept of redemption, such that the ‘historical order’ might be allowed to ‘reach its own fulfilment’ and transformation might be imaginable as a category of history and of ‘world politics’ (*PO* 154). In order to grasp what Scholem *per se* has to do with Agamben’s recovery of redemption as *immanent* to history, however, it is helpful to revisit Scholem’s role in a singular struggle over the interpretation of Benjamin’s legacy.

**2.**

Agamben’s essay originally appeared in 1982, the same year as Jacob Taubes published a paper he had first submitted to the 1979 World Congress of Jewish Studies in Jerusalem, and which was accepted only after a ‘neutralization’ of its title.[[9]](#endnote-10) The paper, ‘The Price of Messianism’, was considered ‘the most radical critique’ Scholem encountered in his lifetime.[[10]](#endnote-11) Though Agamben never discusses Taubes extensively, he dedicates *The Time That Remains* to Taubes and is evidently indebted to Taubes’s final lectures on Paul for his own discussion of the Letter to the Romans (*TR* 3). Indeed, Agamben’s entire encounter with Scholem is tempered by Taube's disagreement with Scholem, the crux of which circles around a letter that Benjamin wrote to Carl Schmitt on 9 December 1930. In this letter, Benjamin announces the shipment of his 1925 *Origin of the German Baroque Mourning Play* and remarks on its indebtedness to Schmitt’s presentation of sovereignty in the seventeenth century.[[11]](#endnote-12) Gradually making itself known after Schmitt referred to it in *Hamlet or Hecuba* in 1956[[12]](#endnote-13), though controversially omitted from the 1966 edition of Benjamin’s correspondence,[[13]](#endnote-14) the letter’s impact on German-Jewish intellectual history gained traction largely due to Taubes.

In fact, it was soon after meeting Scholem in Jerusalem in 1949 that Taubes became convinced of Schmitt’s importance for understanding the apocalyptic character of juridical forms. For Taubes, Schmitt’s anti-liberalism enabled him to see the world as a state of international civil war, which, far from being the end of constitutional law (as liberalism argued), revealed that even dictatorship can be a form of law. In Schmitt’s view, juridical forms are created to hold back the chaos threatening the continuation of the present age; Christian Rome’s enforcement of orthodoxy by police and military means was legitimated by the idea that it, like the *katechon*, was a historical power capable of ‘restraining’ the coming of the Antichrist.[[14]](#endnote-15) By a similar logic, the Catholic Church was premised on a ‘constitutive anti-Judaism’, the idea that Jews are God’s chosen people who nevertheless do not believe in God. In a 1978 letter to Schmitt, Taubes refers to this friend-enemy status of the Jewish people, the ‘Mysterium Judaicum’, as a ‘“katechontic” form of existence’ proper to the ‘kairotic’ time of emergency between the death of Christ and the end of time, which Romans 11 presents as the transformation of the chosen people into the people of the exception.[[15]](#endnote-16) Like its Christian counterpart, Jewish messianism was therefore inseparable from the political forces that shape history. Moreover, Benjamin’s letter to Schmitt proves that Benjamin was in agreement with these historico-philosophical consequences of Schmitt’s anti-liberalism.

Initially personal in nature – in a letter of 7 October 1951[[16]](#endnote-17) Scholem refers to an act of indiscretion that he still regarded as unforgivable twenty-five years later[[17]](#endnote-18) – Taubes’s break with Scholem developed into a disagreement over messianism’s *historical* force and, by extension, Scholem’s interpretation of Benjamin. Scholem’s position, in ‘Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, derived from his dichotomization of Christian *interiorized* messianism and Jewish *history-oriented* messianism. Christianity, he argued, ‘conceives of redemption as an event in the spiritual and unseen realm’ that can operate as ‘the true center of the historical process’ because it need not correspond to anything in the external world. Judaism, by contrast, conceives of redemption as ‘an event that takes place publicly, on the stage of history’ that, being indissociable from an external event, remains strictly *anticipated*; Judaism flees from any ‘illegitimate’ attempt to verify the messianic claim on the historical stage.[[18]](#endnote-19) Indeed, Scholem argued, it is the ‘lack of transition between history and the redemption’ that apocalypticists stress when imagining messianism as ‘transcendence’ that ‘break[s] in’ to ‘transform’ and ‘liberate’ history ‘in its ruin’.[[19]](#endnote-20) Associated with messianism is therefore a ‘price’ that corresponds to ‘the endless powerlessness in Jewish history during all the centuries of exile, when it was unprepared to come forward onto the plane of world history’. This ‘price’ is a ‘life lived in deferment, in which nothing can be done definitively, nothing can be irrevocably accomplished’ by the unredeemed, and which makes for messianism’s ‘constitutional weakness’.[[20]](#endnote-21)

For Taubes, Scholem’s ‘dividing the Messianic cake’ entirely ignored the internal dynamics of messianism in its historical efficacy.[[21]](#endnote-22) In fact, as Romans shows, Paul’s interiorization of the messianic idea was a response to the failure of prophecy, of the messianic mission of God’s servant. Thus, whereas Scholem saw (Pauline) Christianity as a crisis *for* the Jewish people, Taubes saw in Paulinism a crisis within Jewish eschatology itself, a turning point at which the failure of the Messiah to redeem the external world that nonetheless continues to exist provokes an ‘interiorization’ *qua* intensification of the messianic idea in protest against the failure of politics to bring about redemption. If ever Jewish life took the form of a ‘life lived in deferment’, this was attributable to the branding of all manner of messianic movements as ‘pseudo-messianic’ by the rabbinic tradition, who used its ‘katechontic form of existence’ to consolidate its own political power. Paul’s antinomianism is thus not an index of despondency at the non-fulfilment of the messianic promise on the historical-political plane (a ‘lack of transition between history and the redemption’, as Scholem says), but a strategy that calls all established law into question without attempting to realize another historical order. Crucially, for Taubes, Paul’s concept of the insuperable nullity of worldly institutions in proximity of redemption (Romans 13) finds a parallel in another of Benjamin’s writings, the ‘Theologico-Political Fragment’,[[22]](#endnote-23) in which the concept of creation’s suffering is coupled with the proposal that nihilism be the ‘method’ of ‘world politics’.

Insofar as, like Taubes, he insists on the messianic idea’s *historical operativity*, Agamben positions himself in *palintropos harmoniê* (counterstriving jointure) with Scholem. In ‘Walter Benjamin and the Demonic’, Agamben points out that according to Scholem’s own description, Benjamin’s clawed and sharp-winged angel iconographically aligns not with Satan but with Eros, a *daimon* in the Greek sense. Moreover, Benjamin likened the claws of Klee’s *Angelus Novus* to those of ‘the angel-thief who would rather free humans by taking from them than make them happy by giving to them’ – whose destructive power is ‘simultaneously liberating’ and *overcomes* the demon ‘at the point where origin and destruction meet’ (*PO* 141-42). What Scholem should have exploited, Agamben argues, is the mystical source of the angel’s double figure: the concept of the *Shekhinah*, which Agamben glosses as the ‘feminine moment of divinity and of divine presence’ that relates to the world ‘in its judging role’ (*PO* 143). As judgment, the feminine presence of the divine designates the ‘sphere of redemption’, which in the Kabbalah however *coincides* with the ‘proper dimension of happiness’ represented by the angel’s masculine aspect (*PO* 143).[[23]](#endnote-24) Furthermore, the angel of history is modelled after the personal angel, the *Tselem* or astral body, which denotes a ‘celestial double and originary image’ that links the prehistory of man with his salvation (*PO* 146). Derived from Jewish (onanistic) demonology, the astral body is a figure of indistinction between pleasure and spirit, where the very legal order by which distinctions are drawn and sentences passed is put into question by the ambiguous solidarity of origin and destruction (*PO* 150).

Finally, Agamben, like Taubes, draws on the ‘Theologico-Political Fragment’ to argue that it is ‘the idea of happiness [that] allows the historical order to reach its own fulfilment’; unlike melancholy, whose gaze transfixes upon historical works too horrific to bring to completion, happiness is the rhythm of worldly restitution and the eternity of its downfall, which constitutes *historical* redemption proper and the task of world politics. Whereas Scholem sees in Benjamin’s paradoxical formulation of happiness the coincidence of the ‘as-yet-unlived’ and ‘having lived’ deferred to the coming messianic age[[24]](#endnote-25), Agamben, following Taubes and Schmitt, intensifies the messianism in the ‘now-time’ of the paradox itself, magnifying the ‘conflict’ that alone remains as the historical force that brings history to an end.

**3.**

What relation, if any, the law of the unredeemed world has to law at the time of redemption is the question Agamben poses in ‘The Messiah and the Sovereign’ (1992). Scholem had posed a similar question in ‘The Meaning of the Torah in Jewish Mysticism’: in fact, the authors of the *Zohar* drew a distinction between the law of the unredeemed world (Torah of Beriah), and the law in its original fullness (Torah of Aziluth). Each corresponds to one of the two trees of Paradise, each of which rules the world before and after the fall respectively, thus dividing the world into sacred and profane. What purpose will the law of the world that contains both good and evil have once the world is again subject to the law of the tree of life?[[25]](#endnote-26) In ‘Towards an Understanding’, Scholem answers that the Messianic age will imply profound changes in the very nature of commandments and prohibitions, since they were first called into existence by the division between good and evil. The new source of the law in the Messianic age would instead be the spontaneity of human freedom. At this point, it would be possible to turn from the restorative conception of a re-establishment of the rule of law to a utopian view ‘in which restrictive traits will no longer be determinative’ and instead be replaced by as yet ‘totally unpredictable traits’ that ‘reveal entirely new aspects of free fulfilment’. Thus, says Scholem, ‘an anarchic element enters Messianic utopianism’.[[26]](#endnote-27)

For Agamben, however, the notion of a law of ‘free fulfilment’ merely perpetuates the ‘Nothing of revelation’, that is, the continued, yet empty, validity of the law. Revisiting the same medieval Kabbalists Scholem discusses in ‘The Meaning of the Torah’, Agamben argues that Scholem depicts the original Torah as an *ars combinatoria* of the letters of the Hebrew alphabet, thus taking ‘a decisive step in [the] progressive desemanticization of the law’ that envisioned profane Law as a jumble of letters awaiting a messianic event to assemble them into meaningful words (*PO* 164). This view engenders the surprising insight that ‘the original form of the law is not a signifying proposition, but […] a commandment that commands nothing’ (*PO* 166). Scholem, however, was unable to grasp its significance, instead maintaining that messianism ‘possesses a tension that never finds true release’,[[27]](#endnote-28) as though it nullified the law but maintained it as a perpetual state of exception (*PO* 171). Even when remarking to Benjamin that the law in Kafka’s novels has ‘validity without significance [*Geltung ohne Bedeutung*]’ (a phrase that three years later would gain traction in the first of the *Homo Sacer* volumes), Scholem believed a secret key was needed for its actualization. By contrast, Agamben finds ‘validity without significance’ in the Kabbalah’s conception of the original Torah as a medley of letters without order or meaning *and* in Benjamin’s ‘absolutization’ of the (Schmittian) ‘state of exception’ in the Eighth Thesis on the Concept of History, in the hope of retrieving, *contra* Scholem, a *strategy* against the Law *per se*.

It is in *The Time That Remains*, finally, that Agamben’s search for a paradigm with which to conceive of the *eschaton* as belonging to historical time and existing law, and at the same time putting an end to both, comes to a head. Following Taubes, Agamben locates the time in which salvation is fulfilled in the ‘now’; this ‘now-time’ of fulfilment, however, must be supplementary to the messianic event (of the resurrection) that has already happened according to believers. Scholem’s notion of a ‘life lived in deferment […] in which nothing can be achieved’[[28]](#endnote-29) captures this antinomy, but risks delaying fulfilment until the point of unreachability (*TR* 70). Instead, Agamben proposes, the Jewish exilic condition should be considered from within chronological time, as providing the opportunity to decouple messianism from eschatology in order to rethink messianic time as ‘operational time’: the supplementary ‘time that is left us’ to bring (historical) time to an end in the kairotic ‘now-time’, in which resurrection and full messianic presence are ‘contracted’ and the Jewish people’s state of exception to the time of salvation’s ‘having been fulfilled’ is uniquely absolutizable as a revolutionary force directed against the law that failed to be the site of redemption. To illustrate this, Agamben turns to Benjamin’s description of each instant as ‘the small door through which the Messiah enters’ (*TR* 71).

Here, too, Agamben suggests that Scholem might have grasped the political significance of Jewish messianism – and of Benjamin’s concept of the messianic instant – had he exploited the right resources in the mystical tradition: in this case, the 83rd of the theses Scholem presented to Benjamin on his birthday in 1918, in which he wrote that ‘messianic time is the time of inversive *waw*’.[[29]](#endnote-30) The *waw* is a Hebrew letter which, when added to a verb, ‘inverts’ it from future to past and vice versa. According to Scholem, messianic time is thus neither complete nor incomplete in itself, but the time of inversion of *both*, and as such, an ‘area of tension’ in which the past can regain an ‘unfulfilled’ character *as* actuality. From this Agamben extracts an analogy to the inversion Paul enacts on the Greek opposition between potentiality and act, and to the conception of messianic time as the time of *de-*activation – in line with the notion, in 2 Corinthians 12:9, that ‘power realizes itself in weakness’, which Taubes had previously connected to Benjamin’s idea of ‘weak messianism’ in his Second Thesis on the Concept of History. Similarly, Agamben interprets 2 Corinthians 12:9 as indication of a *strategic* consequence to the messianic ‘inversion’ of the potentiality-act relation: the rendering inoperative of the law *per se*, into whose ‘unworking’ the law itself had transposed the promise of redemption (*TR* 97).

**4.**

Agamben’s *palintropos harmoniê* with Scholem thus comes full circle in *The Time That Remains*, where he suggests that *der Angelus Satanas* refers to the ‘thorn in the flesh’ in 2 Corinthians, which Paul describes as *aggelos satana* – and that in spite of himself Scholem establishes a proximity between Benjamin and Paul and therefore a ‘messianic’ theory of the undoing of power (*TR* 141). It is worth noting, however, that Scholem did in fact ‘apply’ his idea of the inversive *waw* to the realm of ‘ethics’ in an essay from 1918, which sheds light on some difficulties in Agamben’s argument. In Scholem’s account, the name of God, ‘I will be who I will become’, signifies ‘eternal presence’ that unfolds as temporal modulation in the ‘*waw-hippukh* of narration’. To illustrate Scholem uses the ‘inversive’ story of Jonah, in which God’s judgment transforms from being unheeded by Jonah to being commuted by God into ‘justice’ after the city of Nineveh repents. The story, says Scholem, was only ever about teaching Jonah about the nature of prophecy and its incommensurability with justice – and opens up the potential for the law to be overcome and justice to prevail in the name of God. Referring to the ‘deferment on the part of the executive power’ that results in the arrival of justice, the *waw-hippukh* of narration thus gives unique shape to the ‘ethics’ giving shape to the ‘spiritual continuum of Judaism’: infinite ‘inversions’ holding judgment and execution at a distance from one another in order to make space for the transformability of executive power, and hence for justice. As Scholem writes, justice is ‘the idea of the historical annihilation of divine judgment’, brought about by the deferral of one executive power by another.[[30]](#endnote-31)

Absent the event of the resurrection, and therefore the exigency to produce a theory of the ‘now’ bookended by origin and destruction, the ‘now’ is at leisure to undergo continuous ‘deferrals’ and transformations. For Agamben, who invests everything in the ‘katechontic form of existence’ of this world, such a possibility of a non-emergent theory of action, or indeed any action other than wholesale annihilation of ‘the Law’, is impermissible. For Scholem, however, justice is the present tense of transformation of past and future into one another resulting from holding apart history and redemption by the (multiple) act of ‘deferral’; only as such is it possible to imagine ethics as consisting in ‘ethically different actions’, multiple ethical actions, or even ‘a steady stream of transformations’ to existing executive power. By holding apart history and redemption, Scholem’s text on Jonah suggests a way to imagine ethical or political action divested from the deed of the ‘singular’ and ‘unsteady’ actor. Finally, Scholem’s text also recalls that the realm of the active life is still one of a differential relation, however small, between transformation and the self-same. As one footnote suggests, the active life – in the Torah, in politics – requires an examination of the relation between a hidden essence of power and the forms of its presence in the world: for instance the *Shekhinah*, the presence of the divine in the world, which as the other name for ‘transformation’ suggests that an ontology of transformation might yet be worked out.[[31]](#endnote-32)

**Notes**

1. Gershom Scholem, ‘Walter Benjamin und sein Engel’ [1972], in Scholem, *Walter Benjamin und sein Engel*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1983), pp. 35-72. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
2. Walter Benjamin, ‘Agesilaus Santander (First and Second Versions)’, trans. Rodney Livingstone, in *Selected Writings*, eds. Howard Eiland and Michael W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1999), vol. 2, pp. 712-16, here p. 715, translation modified. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
3. Walter Benjamin, letter to Scholem of 1.9.1933, in *Gesammelte Briefe*, eds. Christoph Gödde and Henri Lonitz (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1998), vol. 4, p. 287. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
4. Walter Benjamin, ‘On the Concept of History’, trans. Harry Zohn, in *Selected Writings*, vol. 4, p. 392. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
5. Scholem, ‘Walter Benjamin und sein Engel’, p. 50. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
6. Scholem, ‘Walter Benjamin und sein Engel’, p. 55. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
7. Scholem, ‘Walter Benjamin und sein Engel’, p. 63. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
8. Scholem, ‘Walter Benjamin und sein Engel’, pp. 66-67. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
9. Jacob Taubes, ‘The Price of Messianism’, *Journal of Jewish Studies* 33.1-2 (1982): 595-600. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
10. Thomas Macho, ‘On the Price of Messianism: The Intellectual Rift between Gershom Scholem and Jacob Taubes’, in Anna Glazova and Paul North (eds.), *Messianic Thought Outside Theology* (New York: Fordham, 2014), p. 29. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
11. Walter Benjamin, letter to Carl Schmitt of 9.12.1930, in *Gesammelte Briefe*, vol. 3, p. 558. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
12. Carl Schmitt, *Hamlet oder Hekuba* (Düsseldorf/Köln, Eugen Diederichs Verlag: 1956/1985), p. 64. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
13. Walter Benjamin, *Briefe*, 2 vols., eds. Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1966). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
14. Jacob Taubes, *Ad Carl Schmitt: Gegenstrebige Fügung* (Berlin: Merve, 1987), pp. 18f., 67, 73, 76. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
15. Bruce Rosenstock, ‘Palintropos Harmoniê: Jacob Taubes and Carl Schmitt “*im liebenden Streit*”’, *New German Critique* 121.41 (2014): 55-92; esp. 56-59. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
16. Gershom Scholem, letter to Taubes of 7.10.1951, in *Briefe*, ed. Itta Shedletzky (München: Beck, 1995), vol. 2, pp. 25-28. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
17. Gershom Scholem, letter to Taubes of 24.3.1977, in *Briefe*, vol. 3, p. 154. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
18. Gershom Scholem, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, in *The Messianic Idea in Judaism* (New York: Schocken, 1971), pp. 1-2. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
19. Scholem, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, p. 10. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
20. Scholem, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, p. 35. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
21. Jacob Taubes, ‘Der Preis des Messianismus’, in Elettra Stimilli, ed., *Der Preis des Messianismus. Briefe von Jacob Taubes an Gershom Scholem und andere Materialien* (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2006), pp. 33-40. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
22. Walter Benjamin, ‘Theologico-Political Fragment’, trans. Harry Zohn, in *Selected Writings*, vol. 3, pp. 305-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
23. Agamben draws here on Scholem’s ‘Shekhinah: The Feminine Element in Divinity’, in *On the Mystical Shape of the Godhead* (New York: Shocken, 1991), pp. 140-96, esp. p. 186. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
24. Benjamin, ‘Agesilaus Santander’, p. 716. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
25. Gershom Scholem, ‘The Meaning of the Torah in Jewish Mysticism’, in *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Schocken, 1965), pp. 32-86. Cf. *PO* 163. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
26. Scholem, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, p. 21. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
27. Scholem, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, p. 21. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
28. Scholem, ‘Towards an Understanding of the Messianic Idea in Judaism’, p. 35. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
29. Gershom Scholem, ‘95 Thesen über Judentum und Zionismus’, in *Tagebücher* (Frankfurt a.M.: Jüdischer Verlag, 2000), vol. 2, pp. 300-6. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
30. Gershom Scholem, ‘On Jonah and the Concept of Justice’, trans. Eric Schwab, *Critical Inquiry* 25.2 (1999): 353-61. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
31. Scholem, ‘On Jonah and the Concept of Justice’, p. 359. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)