**Individual Differences in the Intentionality Bias and its Association with Cognitive Empathy**

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**Abstract**

Previous research indicates that we tend to over-attribute intention when interpreting the actions of others. This ‘intentionality bias’ is explained by a dual-process model of intention attribution (Rosset, 2008). However, it is currently unclear whether individual differences exist in the intentionality bias, and specifically whether cognitive and/or affective empathy skills are associated with hyper-intentionality. In the current study, we adopted Rosset’s (2008) ambiguous sentence paradigm to test whether individual differences in the intentionality bias are associated with self-reported perspective taking, online simulation, emotion contagion, proximal responsivity and peripheral responsivity. Regression analyses revealed that cognitive empathy, but not affective empathy, significantly predicted the proportion of intentional judgements when participants were asked to interpret ambiguous sentences that were prototypically accidental. Moreover, greater perspective taking skills predicted a higher proportion of intentional over accidental judgements of ambiguous actions. The implications of these findings for understanding prosocial behaviour and ‘shared intentionality’ among humans are discussed.

Keywords:

Intentionality

Intention attribution

Cognitive bias

Social cognition

Empathy

Perspective taking

**1. Introduction**

Discerning intentional from unintentional actions is a cornerstone of social cognition and fundamental to our social lives (Baldwin & Baird, 2001; Tomasello et al., 2005a). We regularly need to interpret other people’s behaviour and make decisions to act according to judgements of intentionality. For example, we might respond differently if we thought someone spilt a drink on us on purpose or if we thought it was an accident. We may hold someone accountable for an action if we deemed it to be intentional, but may exculpate them if we thought the action was unintentional (Malle & Knobe, 1997).

*1.1 Intentionality bias*

Recent research has revealed a common cognitive bias, characterised by the tendency to over-attribute intention when presented with ambiguous actions that could be interpreted as either intentional or unintentional (Moore & Pope, 2014; Peyroux, Strickland, Tapiero & Franck, 2014; Rosset, 2008). It has been suggested that this *intentionality bias* is an adaptive cognitive heuristic as the risk of a false-positive error (reasoning that an action was intentional when it was in fact an accident) is lower than that of a false-negative error (reasoning that an action was accidental when it was in fact intentional), as the former allows us to act quickly in the case of an actual threat (Moore & Pope, 2014).

A dual-process model of intention attribution, proposed by Rosset (2008), helps explain the intentionality bias. According to this model, intentional explanations for actions represent our default interpretation of behaviour, activated automatically when perceiving the actions of others. Unintentional explanations for behaviour are reached only when higher-level cognitive processes override this automatic bias allowing us to reason that an action may be unintentional. This higher-level processing stream uses knowledge of behavioural cues, alternative unintentional causes of behaviour and social norms (Rosset, 2008).

Evidence for the dual-process model was presented by Rosset (2008) who found that participants were more likely to judge ambiguous actions such as “He hit the man with his car” to be carried out “on purpose” rather than “by accident” when making these judgements quickly compared with participants who had more time. Making an intentional judgement quickly meant that participants had less time to override their initial interpretation of the action (Rosset, 2008) (However, it should be noted here that one study has failed to find higher intentionality bias scores under speeded versus unspeeded conditions, Hughes, Sandry & Trafimow, 2012) Research has also demonstrated that alcohol intoxication magnifies the intentionality bias, presumably by disrupting effortful cognitive processing, such as inhibitory control, abstract reasoning and mental flexibility, that would typically be utilised to override the intentionality bias (Bègue, Bushman, Giancola, Subra & Rosset, 2010).

Current research supports the dual process model of intentional reasoning and the existence of the intentionality bias in adults, however less is known about individual differences in this cognitive bias. It is unclear whether the tendency to over-attribute intention when interpreting the actions of others varies among individuals, and whether other cognitive or affective traits relate to the intentionality bias.

Exploring the intentionality bias in the context of *empathy* is a logical first step in understanding the individual differences in this cognitive heuristic given the theoretical link between mental state attribution and empathy (e.g. Bird & Viding, 2014; Shamay-Tsoory, Harari, Peretz & Levkovitz, 2010). Specifically, discerning intentional from unintentional actions requires theory-of-mind (ToM) skills (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Baylé & Decety, 2000) and a recent theoretical model of empathy by Bird and Viding (2014) posits that ToM plays a necessary role in empathy by allowing individuals to process situational cues to infer affective states in others. For example, to understand how a person feels in a given situation, ToM skills may be utilised to draw inferences about the person’s desires and intentions to subsequently infer their affective state (Bird & Viding, 2014). Perspective taking skills are therefore likely used to attribute intentions to actions by way of predicting what a person might be feeling (Frith & Frith, 2006). In this way, the intentionality bias may reflect an overly sensitive intention attribution system, to which highly empathic individuals may be particularly prone.

The ability to empathise varies considerably among neurotypical individuals (Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987; Farrington & Jolliffe, 2001). Furthermore, the subcomponents of empathy, cognitive and affective empathy, are both clinically and neurally distinguished intra-individually (Cox et al., 2012). Therefore, the current study aimed to explore whether cognitive and affective empathy are related to individual differences in the intentionality bias using Rosset’s ambiguous sentence paradigm.

*1.2 Components of empathy*

Empathy is a multifaceted construct that can be defined as the capacity to comprehend and vicariously experience the emotional states of others (Gallese, 2003). There is general agreement within the literature that empathy comprises two dissociable neurocognitive components: cognitive and affective empathy (e.g. Decety & Jackson, 2006; Gini, Albiero, Benelli & Altoe, 2007; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2006; Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen & David, 2004; Rankin et al., 2005; Reniers, Corcoran, Drake, Shryane & Völlm, 2011; Young, Gudjonsson, Terry & Bramham, 2008). We use the definitions of cognitive and affective empathy adopted by the Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy (QCAE) devised by Reniers et al. (2011). The comprehension of other people’s emotional states (cognitive empathy) involves intuitive perspective taking as well as intentionally projecting how a person is feeling (Reniers et al., 2011). On the other hand, vicariously experiencing the emotions of others (affective empathy) requires the automatic mirroring of the emotional states of others and experiencing an affective response when witnessing the mood of others (Reniers et al., 2011).

Given the defining attributes of cognitive empathy, specifically the ability to effortfully infer another person’s intention, a strong prediction is that the intentionality bias will be more pronounced in those who score higher on measures of cognitive empathy. However, it is currently unclear how the subcomponents of cognitive empathy might relate to the intentionality bias. The current study therefore aims to investigate whether individual differences in the intentionality bias may be explained by variability in the capacity to empathize.

1. **Methodology**

*2.1 Participants*

A total of 78 participants took part in this study, 19 of which had over 25% missing data for one or more measures and so were excluded from the analysis. The final sample consisted of 59 participants aged 15 – 42 years (*M* = 22.95, *SD* = 6.08) with 38 females. Of this final sample, 30 were recruited through a research participation scheme for Psychology undergraduates and 29 were recruited online. No differences were observed between four participants who were under 18 years and the rest of the sample so they were included in the analysis.

* 1. *Stimuli*
		1. *Intentionality bias task*

The intentionality bias task used in this study was the same paradigm described by Rosset (2008) and consisted of short sentences describing an agent’s action. There were 34 test sentences that described ambiguous actions that could be either intentional or unintentional. Of the test sentences there were two conditions: 22 ambiguous sentences describing prototypically accidental actions (e.g. He broke the window) and 12 ambiguous sentences where three described neutral and nine described prototypically intentional actions (e.g. She cut him off driving). Additionally, 40 control sentences were included which described actions that were unambiguously accidental (e.g. She caught a cold) or unambiguously intentional (e.g. He buttoned his jacket). The control sentences examined participants’ reading ability and highlighted any indiscriminate responders. To compute the intentionality bias score, the total number of intentional judgements was divided by the total number of sentences for each condition and multiplied by 100 to give a percentage score.

*2.2.2 Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy* (QCAE)

The QCAE (Reniers, Corcoran, Drake, Shryane & Völlm, 2011) is a 31-item self-report questionnaire that examines the respondent’s ability to understand the emotional states of others (cognitive empathy) and their ability to vicariously experience what others are feeling (affective empathy). As part of the development of the QCAE, the authors combined items from other validated empathy scales that measured affective or cognitive empathy (e.g. Interpersonal reactivity index; Davis, 1983 and the Empathy Quotient; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) to form a multidimensional measure of empathy. Principal Component Analysis indicated five components of the QCAE (Reniers et al, 2011), two of which pertained to cognitive empathy including perspective taking (e.g. “I am good at predicting how someone will feel”) and online simulation (e.g. “I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes”). Three components were related to affective empathy including emotion contagion (e.g. It worries me when others are worrying and panicky”), proximal responsivity (e.g. It affects me very much when one of my friends seems upset”) and peripheral responsivity (e.g. I often get deeply involved with the feelings of a character in a film, play or novel”). Respondents rate on a 4-point scale how much they agree or disagree with each statement. The QCAE has been shown to have good validity and internal consistency (Reniers et al, 2011). In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha for the cognitive empathy subscale was .94 and the affective empathy subscale was .79.

2.3 *Procedure*

The experiment was completed online using Qualtrics Survey Software and participants were instructed to complete the experiment using either a laptop or desktop. The intentionality bias task was completed first, followed by the empathy measure. Instructions for the task indicated that a series of sentences describing an action would appear one at a time on the screen. Participants were asked to judge whether the action described was carried out “on purpose” or “by accident” and to indicate their judgement by ticking the appropriate box on the screen. Each sentence remained on the screen for 5000ms, after this time the next sentence was presented automatically. The timing adopted in the current study mirrors that of the unspeeded control condition in Rosset’s (2008) study. Sentences were presented in a fixed randomised order in 10 blocks with a 3000ms pause between blocks to allow participants a short rest. Subjects completed eight practice sentences before starting the task.

1. **Results**

*3.1 Intentionality bias*

The mean intentionality bias score was 65.95% (*SD* = 23.00) for the Neutral/Prototypically Intentional sentences and 20.12% (*SD* = 11.87) for Prototypically Accidental test sentences. These means are comparable to those reported by Rosset (2008). Gender differences were investigated using a nonparametric test as data were not normal. There were no significant gender differences in the intentionality bias scores in the Prototypically Accidental (Mann-Whitney *U* = 292.0, *p* = .378) or Neutral/Prototypically Intentional condition(Mann-Whitney *U* = 268.5, *p* = .194).

*3.2 Intentionality bias and empathy components*

Multiple linear regression analyses using the enter method were conducted to assess the independent contribution of cognitive and affective empathy to the prediction of intentional judgements in both the Prototypically Accidental and Neutral/Prototypically Intentional conditions. In the first step, cognitive empathy and affective empathy scores were added as predictor variables with the intentionality bias score from the Prototypically Accidental condition added as the outcome variable. The model was statistically significant [*F*(2,56) = 5.06, *p* = .010, *R2* = .15, *R2*Adjusted = .12], with cognitive empathy significantly predicting intentionality bias scores (*β* = 0.40; *p* = .012), while the independent prediction of affective empathy was non-significant (*β* = -0.01; *p* = .941).

To further explore the relation between cognitive empathy and individual differences in the intentionality bias scores a second regression analysis was conducted with the two cognitive empathy subscales, perspective taking and online simulation, as predictor variables and intentionality bias score as the outcome variable. The model was statistically significant [*F*(2,56) = 6.01, *p* = .004, *R2* = .18, *R2*Adjusted = .15], with perspective taking (*β* = 0.41; *p* = .008), but not online simulation (*β* = 0.02; *p* = .885), independently predicting intentionality bias scores. Scatterplots depicting the relationship between the two cognitive empathy subscales and the intentionality bias scores (in the Prototypically Accidental condition) can be found in Figure 1.

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*Figure 1*. Scatterplots showing the relationship between the intentionality bias (in the prototypically accidental condition) and a) perspective taking scores (QCAE) and b) online simulation scores (QCAE).

The same analysis was carried out with the intentionality bias score derived from the Neutral/Prototypically Intentional condition as the outcome variable. Cognitive empathy and affective empathy scores were added as predictor variables with the intentionality bias score from the Neutral/Prototypically Intentional condition added as the outcome variable. The model was non-significant [*F*(2,56) = 2.13, *p* = .128, *R2* = .07, *R2*Adjusted = .04], with neither cognitive empathy (*β* = 0.19; *p* = .239) or affective empathy (*β* = 0.11; *p* = .511) significantly predicting intentionality bias scores in the Neutral/Prototypically Intentional condition. Table 1 displays the regression analysis results assessing the relationship between cognitive and affective empathy and the intentionality bias in both Prototypically Accidental and Neutral/Prototypically Intentional conditions, and the follow up analyses testing the relationship between cognitive empathy subcomponents (perspective taking and online simulation) and the intentionality bias in the Prototypically Accidental condition.

*Table 1*

Multiple regression analyses assessing the relationship between empathy components and the intentionality bias.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | Prototypically Accidental  |  | Neutral/Prototypically Intentional  |
| Predictors | *B* | *SE B* | *β* | *R2* | *F* |  | *B* | *SE B* | *β* | *R2* | *F* |
| QCAE components |  |  |  | .15 | 5.06\* |  |  |  |  | .07 | 2.13 |
|  Constant  | -4.62 | 9.72 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  CE |  0.43\* | 0.17 | 0.40 |  |  |  | 0.40 | 0.34 | 0.19 |  |  |
|  AE | -0.02 | 0.33 | -0.01 |  |  |  | 0.44 | 0.67 | 0.11 |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| CE components  |  |  |  | .18 | 6.01\*\* |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Constant | -2.86 | 8.11 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Perspective taking |  0.71\*\* | 0.26 | 0.41 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  Online simulation | 0.05 | 0.33 | 0.02 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

*Note*. QCAE = Questionnaire of Cognitive and Affective Empathy, CE = Cognitive empathy, AE = Affective empathy, \**p* < .05, \*\**p* < .01.

1. **Discussion**

The aim of this study was to assess whether individual differences in the intentionality bias, which is characterised by the tendency to over-attribute intention, is related to cognitive and/ or affective empathy and their subcomponents. Using Rosset’s (2008) ambiguous sentence paradigm, the present study found that cognitive empathy, but not affective empathy, accounted for a significant amount of variance (18%) in intentionality bias scores when interpreting prototypically accidental actions. Follow-up analyses revealed that perspective taking ability accounted for the majority of this variance in intentionality bias scores and predicted a higher proportion of intentional over unintentional judgements.

The prediction that individual differences in cognitive empathy is related to higher intentionality bias scores was supported in the current study, although this was only the case for perspective taking ability and not online simulation. Perspective taking involves intuitively putting oneself in another person’s position, while online simulation refers to imagining that person’s emotional states. Therefore, it follows that individuals who are adept at considering the position of others might also over-attribute intention in situations where the agent’s actions are typically accidental. While the link between perspective taking and inferring intentions have previously been established within the literature, this study is the first to demonstrate that greater perspective taking ability is related to *biased* intentional reasoning, specifically hyper-intentionality. The current findings indicate that individual differences in self-reported perspective taking ability, a subcomponent of cognitive empathy, is related to the intentionality bias rather than general empathic capacity.

Interestingly, cognitive empathy was not related to the intentionality bias scores in the condition where prototypically intentional or neutral sentences (e.g. She cut him off driving) were used. The reasons why the same pattern of results was not observed when participants were presented with sentences depicting prototypically intentional or neutral actions is unclear. One possible explanation is that a higher proportion of intentional judgements in the Prototypically Accidental condition may indicate a more profound bias compared with the proportion of intentional judgements in the Neutral/Prototypically Intentional condition. When interpreting actions that are ambiguous but typically intentional (e.g. He deleted the email), it seems that most people will exhibit a bias towards intentional explanations for such actions, as was the case in the current study where the average proportion of intentional judgements were 66%. Whereas attributing intention where you might not expect it, as in the case of ambiguous yet prototypically accidental actions (e.g. She left the water running), may indicate a more profound bias towards over-attributing intent. The association between the intentionality bias and greater perspective taking ability may only be evident in the context of ambiguous yet prototypically accidental actions because it may be in this context that certain individuals’ hyper-intentionality are revealed.

The current findings indicate that the intentionality bias may have an upside, perhaps being linked to prosocial behaviour (of which empathy is a key determinant, e.g. Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Lockwood, Seara-Cardoso & Viding, 2014). Considering the current findings, the intentionality bias could also be associated with prosocial behaviour. It would be interesting to explore whether individuals who are adept at perspective taking are more likely to arrive at fewer *hostile* attributions of intent and if this leads to prosocial responses to other people’s behaviour. Furthermore, perspective taking skills and hyper-intentionality together may facilitate ‘shared intentionality’ among humans, whereby people participate in collaborative activities involving shared goals and intentions (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne & Moll, 2005a). Future research could test these hypotheses.

It should be noted that the sole use of self-report measures of cognitive and affective empathy is a possible limitation of the current study. Future research should aim to corroborate the current findings using experimental measures of cognitive and affective empathy. For example, tasks assessing emotion recognition, perspective taking and affective responsiveness (e.g. Derntl et al., 2012b) could be used to further explore the relationship between the intentionality bias and empathy.

Overall our results indicate that individual differences in the intentionality bias are related to greater self-reported perspective taking ability in neurotypical individuals. We have shown that the intentionality bias may have an upside, being related to greater perspective taking abilities in the general population and therefore we suggest that this cognitive heuristic may be linked to prosocial behaviour and shared intentionality among individuals. Individuals who are adept at perspective taking may be primed to view behaviour as intentional and as a result have a higher intentionality bias than those who are less adept at intuitively considering another person’s perspective.

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