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**Florian Hecker: Chimerization and Form**

**The Disappearance of Form from the Discussion of Art**

Practically no one discusses art in terms of form any more, as if the category itself has become obsolete or discredited. It’s been shredded from three directions. One is the strand running from Duchamp through conceptual art into relational art and on to art-as-service or as-education: here, to talk about form just seems to be irrelevant. Another is ‘de-arting’ (*Entkunstung*), as Adorno called it, one direction of which is of art into culture.[[1]](#footnote-1) With the transposition of art into culture, ‘form’ in the sense of ‘aesthetic form’ is replaced by structure, based on linguistics and anthropology. Applied back onto art, this becomes another way of dissolving any distinction between art and non-art, since both are analysed in the same way. The third is the move against form that occurs within art and art discourse itself: here one might speak of ‘anti-form’ in the American art of the 1960s; of the ‘informe’ borrowed from Georges Bataille by Rosalind Krauss and Yves-Alain Bois;[[2]](#footnote-2) and of the Real for psychoanalytically-inclined artists and writers.

The question that arises in the sound-work of Florian Hecker is not so much that of the relation of form to formlessness, or the other of structure, or matter, but rather that of how intensity is articulated in relation—what we might call the question of ‘formulation’—and how it is actualised in sensation and affect. An intensity may be understood as both internally and externally relational: it is differential in itself, and in relation to other intensities that correspond in generating spatiality and develop as duration. In this respect sound has a kinship with colour in painting, and even more with scents in perfume—Hecker has connected his work with both. One might also add cuisine to this list. A further dimension—which also parallels perfume and cuisine—is the relation of sound to synthesis, in two senses: synthesis as combination, and synthesis as the technological rather than ‘natural’ instrument-based production of sound. By ‘technological’ synthesis I mean the generation of sound by manipulation of its basic constituents and elements. Synthesis as combination raises the question of how an external relation of elements creates (or does not) a new ‘internal’ combination or identity, whether by merging, or through some other kind of relation. This in turn raises the question of what happens to intensities in the process. Do they diminish or disappear in the combination? How might they be sustained? It will be my claim that Hecker has invented, adapted, and explored ways of synthesizing and combining sounds in such a way as to dramatise the question of the relation of intensities and the intensity of relations, and that this marks a new step in the history of aesthetic form, where ‘aesthetic’ reverts to physiological sense, and form mutates, through the process of formulation, into a ‘chimeric’ synthesis. If Hecker’s work is uncomfortable if considered purely as ‘fine art’, it is paradoxically because of its articulation of form. As ‘formulation’ it both stands in a relation with un-form, as a preceding moment in art, running from anti-form though sensation and the ‘informe’ to the irrelevance of form in social art, and simultaneously cuts though the form/unform distinction insofar as it reconfigures the latter in terms of the spatio-temporal unfolding and recombination of intensities. In order to bear this out, we will need to briefly reconsider the vicissitudes of form in modernity.

**The Challenge of Sound**

If the idea in the twentieth century that the concern of art should primarily be with form was reinforced by a retrospective reading of art history from the standpoint of abstract art, it is with the end of the teleological dominance of Modernist abstract art that the notion of form seems to lose its relevance. It is maintained in different terms through Minimalism, and particularly in the writing of Donald Judd, where the idea of form as internal relations is rethought in terms of the phenomenological apprehension of a *Gestalt* in space and across time.[[3]](#footnote-3) Another way of cutting across the form/anti-form opposition is through reconceiving both in terms of sensation, working ‘below’ the Kantian formal synthesis of phenomenological intentionality, such that what had previously been conceived in formal terms (whether representational or not) is, in so far as it is organised to be received as sensation, already anti-form, while equally anti-form may involve the intrinsic structuring of sensation as a dynamic differential play of forces.

Early on, abstract art was sometimes legitimated by comparing it with music, since music seems plausibly to be abstract, given that it contains its own formal principles grounded in mathematical relations. But with Schoenberg’s atonality and serialism, musical structure, in relation to all qualities of sound, becomes a matter of the invention of a rule rather than a structure based on tonality that is naturally given. This issue this raises, though, is one of reception: What are the limits and possibilities of human perception, and what is the relation between the physiological and cultural dimensions? The very raising of this question is evidence of the fracture that occurred between music and the human relation to it. This leads to a situation with the following parameters, which are inconsistent with each other: human musical rules or laws become contingent; non-human music (for example bird song) may be understood as having its own formal principles; everything may be understood as music. These positions may be associated with Schoenberg/Boulez, Messiaen, and Cage respectively.

Cage developed his musical ideas in tandem with developments in the visual arts, from Duchamp’s readymades to Rauchenberg’s *White Paintings*. A key moment is of course the performance of his *4’33’’* at Woodstock in 1952. Not only does Cage’s piece refuse to impose any form other than a frame on the sonic material that happens to occur at the time, not only does it admit any sound (in that sense acting with something like the receptivity of a photograph), it also practically withdraws intentional formation except for the act of framing, including through minimal internal divisions, indicated in the score as ‘TACET’.[[4]](#footnote-4) It also considers the sound-event in space-time rather than in linear time, thus breaking down a distinction that goes back to Lessing and was reinforced by the critic of Modernism Clement Greenberg, between temporal and spatial arts. Above all, of course, it introduced chance into the work, which became a compositional principal for Cage.

The effect of the introduction of chance into the work goes in two directions. On the one hand, chance opens up a non-intentional potential for the work as a new event. On the other hand, chance can provide a new basis for composition, whether as score or as performance. This creates the possibility for chance to be recuperated as form, although this is not a necessary outcome. We see this most clearly in Pierre Boulez’s use of Mallarmé’s projected performance for the turn of the century (which he did not live to see) of *Le Livre* (*The Book*), where pages would be placed by the ‘operator’ in the shelves of a cabinet in an order that was not predetermined, as a principle of composition and performance.[[5]](#footnote-5) Giving chance the role of an ontological groundless ground means that, instead of there being a pre-existing set of rules for art, each work has to establish its own rule, which is the lesson that the Duchamp of *Three Standard Stoppages* learned from the Mallarmé of *Un Coup de dés* (the difference being that the result in the *Stoppages* is aleatory/formless, whereas Mallarmé’s poem still takes the form of pre-existing words). What it opens up is the question of the relation of the standard to the possibility of the new object (conceived as the stoppage of a continuum).

In experimental music and sound art this question re-emerges as that of the relation of formalisation to the generation of new sounds and combinations. A created or given sound as a waveform or sound sample is treated in various ways according to different steps, which may be formalised in an algorithm. This process may be described as a synthesis that generates the form of a sound. Once any kind of sound can be created or synthesized in the making of a work, the emphasis necessarily shifts from the internal order of the work, whether this is an autonomous or derived structure, to the conditions of its actualisation (this is an extension of the lesson of Cage’s4’33’’). Acoustics comes to the fore in two ways: the acoustics, including reverberation, resonance, and echo, of the place where the sound work is manifested; and the psychoacoustic capacities of the listener. Both will vary contingently: the work will sound different in each place where it is installed, and each listener’s capacity to hear will also vary. And in more general terms, we may become aware that only a limited range in the spectrum of sound is audible to humans, so the work may in fact include not only sounds that individuals might not be able to hear because of hearing loss or missing frequencies, but sounds that no human can hear, which throws into question whether the work of art is for us—a reflection questioning the human relation to the cosmos. Thus the extension of control in synthesis leads to the very opposite of autonomy, which in turn generates new kinds of pain and pleasure which involve a change in the relation between sensation and perception.

If in a Platonic model forms are given to be contemplated, and, as in the Pythagorean theory of music, may involve a mathematics intrinsic to being, for Kant forms—the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding—are operative in the very production of the experience of the subject. Experience is to be taken as the result of a synthesis, whether active or passive. This raises a set of questions concerning the relation of experience to an object, such as: How does the object constituted in experience relate to an object that the experience might be an ‘experience of’? What is the relation of the object to sensation? Is sensation always already ‘synthesized’, cooked, or is there also ‘raw’ sensation? Can such sensation, if we are to understand it as unprocessed, even be apprehended? Or is it felt at some pre-perceptive bodily level? Is raw sensation atomic, or is it relational, in the sense that it is only raw in relation to some kind of disruption or dismantling of synthesis? Rather than sensation being a phenomenon of the subject, is the subject an epiphenomenon of sensation, something like a relay or a hesitation (as in Bergson and Deleuze)?

**The Physiological Turn**

Robin Mackay has written of Hecker’s work in relation to a physiological turn in the thinking of perception, drawing on Éric Alliez’s book *The Brain-Eye*, and one might also mention here Jonathan Crary’s account of the shift from a model of perception based on the metaphor and Euclidean geometrics of the camera obscura, to one based on physiology.[[6]](#footnote-6) Here, perception is located in the physiological occurrence of a sensation. Rather than the object giving rise to a perception in the subject that is then inspected by consciousness, like the homunculus in the metaphorical model of the camera obscura, the object is a construct based on the sensation, which is ultimately a question of the nervous system. Form would then be concerned with the process, structure, and relation of the sensations themselves rather than with their role in the constitution of objects.

Now, while there is arguably a break in the field of the visual between a camera obscura model and a physiological one, it would be hard to locate a parallel break in the sonic, and particularly musical, field. This would be a question of the relation between the sound-object and the sound-sensation: Can we identify a sound-object in terms of its location in space and time and its source—as in: it comes from a trombone situated to the centre back of the orchestra following a passage from the violins on the right? In more extreme situations, or in horror films, the inability to identify the sound object and its location can be frightening.[[7]](#footnote-7) Could we argue that it is not only certain out of frame sounds that are ‘acousmatic’, without a source?[[8]](#footnote-8)

Given that music is almost always abstract, we would need to distinguish not between abstraction and representation, but between different relations to the formalisation of the sonic sensation. The focus can be on different ways of formalising sound—notes, harmony, melody, tones, duration, dynamics, timbre, and so on—emphasising and establishing a system in relation to one or the other; or there can be a reflection on the process of formalisation itself in the very manipulation of sound. This may arise out of experiments with transformations, as in the case of Xenakis, when he used quasi-architectural drawings as the basis for compositions using glissandi to approximate to continua, which were in fact scored using traditional notation. The composition arises out of the interface between two modes of formalisation. If the work is thus transdisciplinary between drawing and music, it is architecture, in the general sense of spatialisation as well as the specific one of installation, that becomes the site of their intersection. We might compare this with the role that architecture plays in the development of installation after Minimalism.

This meeting-point of Xenakis’s transdisciplinary sonic construction and post-minimalist installation provides one way of approaching Hecker’s works. However, there is a difference in his reflexive relation to formalisation, based on the dual moves of deconstruction and intensification. It is the sound object as origin of the experience that is deconstructed; and the character of the sound is intensified, by minimising, for example, the effect of compression on electronically produced sound. How to maintain such intensity in synthesis, where different sounds are in some sense ‘blended’?

The answer eventually takes the form of what, borrowing from a term from biology carried over into psychoacoustics, Hecker comes to call ‘chimerization’. By bringing chimerization into the gallery, and the field of art, Hecker brings about a turn in the conception of form in relation to contemporary media and the psycho-physiological understanding of the subject. Chimerization has an ambiguous relation to synthesis, in that it is a synthesis that is not a synthesis: for example, in a biological chimera within a single plant or animal, the genes do not combine to form a hybrid but remain distinct, resulting in the co-existence of features from the two sources. Perhaps one could say that in sonic terms this would be a lossless form of (non)synthesis. The sounds would not have to go one way or the other, or blend into an amalgam. This would be an answer to the problem of how to combine synthesis with intensity. The sensations would not be post-formed. Indeed, as monstrous, like the mythical chimera that combines a lioness with the head of a she-goat rising from its back and a tail ending in a snakes’ head, the result of the chimerization would be a combination that allows for a maximum of intensity.

The chimeric combination draws attention to the double nature of intensity: on the one hand, a certain intensive purity or attack; on the other, intensification through a play or strife of differences. If intensity lies in differences (including an internal or self-difference), as Deleuze, following Nietzsche, supposes,[[9]](#footnote-9) and if the intensity of differences is diminished in a final equilibrium state (homogenous synthesis or fusion into unity), then a chimerization would be an actualisation of difference-together or a becoming-in-difference without an equilibrium state.[[10]](#footnote-10). This is not a subjective but a real process of formation in which virtual intensities are actualised. We could therefore see chimerization as a further step in another tendency of thinking about form that runs through art, and which is distinct from both the Platonic and the subjective-constructive approaches.

**Sensation and the Undoing of Form**

For Kant, objective experience is the result of a synthesis of forms (forms of intuition and categories of the understanding) with sensations (the manifold as given), while things-in-themselves—that is to say, independent of what is given in experience—are a necessary supposition but are not knowable in experience. The key move here is to transfer the hylomorphism of being to synthesis as an act of the subject, resulting in both the dualism of phenomena and noumena, and a concomitant split between the affected and the rational subject, which Romantic ‘nature’ is supposed to heal.

What, though, if the synthesis were attributed to nature itself? We see this in D’Arcy Thompson’s *On Growth and Form*, which we could see as a development of Goethe’s thinking on *Urformen* and German Idealist *Naturphilosophie*.[[11]](#footnote-11) However, whereas Naturphilosophie tended to see *natura naturans* as a productive quasi-subject, form in *On Growth and Form* is entirely non-subjective, and resides in morphologies caused by forces. This assimilation with the formative processes of nature had enormous appeal to artists, from Henry Moore and Barbara Hepworth to Richard Hamilton.

Another approach to the Kantian phenomena/noumena dilemma goes by way of the distinctions virtual and actual, where both are real.[[12]](#footnote-12) A distinction needs to be made between the noumenon as that which the phenomenon is a manifestation of, as an X that is actualised, and the noumenon as the condition of possibility for the phenomenon-as-experience, where possibility is derived from actuality (if the phenomenon takes such a form, then its condition of possibility must be this). A potential is a potential for difference, for actuality not to follow necessarily, as in a causal relation but to be one way or another, or not to be at all. The relation of potential to actuality cannot be that of necessity, but must be contingent, otherwise the potential, by definition, cannot be potential. If contingency is built in to how actuality arises, how deep does that contingency go, and where is the value of what is to be found? Does contingency arise in the result (as an unpredictability or a degree of free play), or does it go all the way to what Kant would call the noumenal realm, or to the laws?[[13]](#footnote-13) If, for example, truth is dependent on the universe being determinable according to scientific laws, does contingency affect the latter? In Kant, deep-level contingency appears not in epistemology or science, but in art. The value of the artwork cannot derive from pre-existing rules or laws: that would be academicism (where form is based on con-formity to rule). The law of a particular artwork is hereafter understood to be contingent and may be singular. So, what validates it as a law? Here Kant takes two directions simultaneously: the judgment of the public, and the ‘following without imitation’ of successor artists.[[14]](#footnote-14) ‘Genius’ and ‘originality’ in this sense are not qualities of a subject, but a relation to the contingency of law. This opens up the possibility of a distinction between innovation within a set of rules (for example, new moves within painting, such as Cubism or abstraction), and the institution of new rules (for example, the readymade as designation rather than making). The possibility of the institution of a new law relativises previous ways of making art. But the possibility of institution, as Duchamp himself demonstrates, depends on a meta-framework, such as the art world (which is itself historical and contingent). Institution can’t control contingency, and indeed paradoxically demonstrates its necessity.

Form, then, splits into structure and law, into the organisation of the work and the rule on which it is based. If the rule is a given, then the emphasis falls on structure as organisation. However, once the very rule on which the work is based comes into question, the form which the work takes (which may of course not be that of an object, but could be social relations, a performance, or an event) derives from the instituting act or decision: it is a question not of adjustment but of choice, which might be a decision for the work not to be concerned with form but something else; or, to be less voluntaristic, the shift in rule may itself be the result of some non-individual or non-human force or contingency (although there would be a decision whether or not to accept this as a basis for procedure). Instead of the reconciliation of freedom and nature that Kant posited of genius, the result is that the split migrates into form itself, where a decisionist relation to the ‘law’ of the work of art (which develops between Mallarmé and Duchamp) is contrasted with the process of the creation of forms in nature. A hint of the dialectical relation between these two positions is given in the fact that a 1951 exhibition based on D’Arcy Thompson’s book *Growth and Form* was curated and designed by Richard Hamilton, who also made a facsimile of Duchamp’s *Large Glass*.[[15]](#footnote-15) Natural form and institution may come together when the institution is not a matter of the freedom of the subject but takes place in nature itself. Goethe, following Schelling, moves in that direction, seeing nature as a source of creative generation though *Urformen*, and aesthetic perception as having a physiological basis rather than a ‘geometric’ relation to the outside world. Nature’s generation of form from Goethe to D’Arcy Thompson is in our time displaced by technology that extends beyond human-centred instrumentality and decision, while technological prosthetics and computing power continue to expand what is apprehensible beyond physiological capacities. Aesthetic perception and creation are given a non-subjective ontological basis by Deleuze, and the implications of this for painting are fully developed by Eric Alliez in *The Brain*-*Eye*. The break with the modern variety of hylomorphism, where form is something that the subject does to matter, is complete. But does that mean that the question of form becomes irrelevant?

Where Hecker is concerned, this question could be approached through the relation between the psycho-physiological aesthetics of the experience of his sound work, and its staging in relation to speakers, and sometimes other elements in the gallery. The experience of a Hecker installation has two aspects: firstly, the visitor undergoes a set of bodily sound sensations over a period of time; and secondly, the ways in which sound objects are constituted in relation to these sensations is thrown into question through a consciousness of conditions (the positioning of speakers, other reflecting and absorbing materials etc.) created under specific institutional conditions of attention, such as the non-instrumental free-floating alertness in an art gallery that is a historical consequence of Minimalism. We are keyed to this by Hecker’s installations, where the speakers, whether suspended from the ceiling or on the floor, become like (a mimicry of?) Minimalist art objects. However, the sonic dimension becomes a disruption of the control that the visuality of the Minimalist object presupposes. This is because sound throws into question the relations between inside and outside, and spatiality and location, upon which a visual logic depends. (Here the effects of Hecker’s work could be compared with the spatialising achievements of Xenakis and Nono in music). This disruption opens up the possibility for the experience of intensities of sensation (because they are ‘deterritorialized’)—a break between intrinsic form-of-becoming and subjective form—which is also disturbing, perhaps because of its implications, connected with the sublime, for the dissolution of the subject. It is this pleasure/disturbance that connects Hecker’s work with electronica as well as with ‘classic’ experimental music and sound art, so it is not surprising that he does performances with a ‘disco’ *mise-en-scène*, while disrupting the regularity of beats and their role in the ecstatic integration of the audience into a mass (it is pretty well impossible to dance to—a sonic equivalent of a ‘prohibition of images’). There is a tendency here that we find throughout his work, which is to create instability and un-integration. Rather than being drawn in through form, the listener is left off-balance, or in a condition of unfulfilled expectation or frustration, in a way that is very different from the alienated pacification that seems to be the experience of much Minimalist art (so Hecker’s work is as much a critique of as an assimilation to Minimalism).[[16]](#footnote-16)

This could be called a ‘dramatisation’ in the sense of a spatial and temporal unfolding of what might be called sound-potentials or intensities.[[17]](#footnote-17) The installation as a site has a double dimension. On the one hand it provides a set of conditions for this unfolding, involving the type of speakers used, their placement, the use of other sound-reflecting and sound-absorbing elements, the characteristics concerning echo and absorption of the architecture, and so on. These elements are there whether the sound is on or off. But the generation of the sound is also both spatializing and temporalizing. In relation to the sound, space and time are not containers, but are *produced*. Form is not so much a condition as a result, and one that is not a synthesis, but rather remains divided and even multiple, unsettled and incomplete.

**Are Sounds Objects without Subjects?**

What kind of ‘object’ is a Hecker sound work? What is its ontology? Where does it occur? To what extent is it dependent upon the listener for its ontological status? Who is the listener? What is the relation between the site of its unfolding, the sensations produced, and the subject who hears? One approach which answers the question, if only in part, proceeds by way of the traditional category of ‘qualities’, where primary qualities are those independent of the observer, such as extension, and secondary qualities are those that produce sensations. Roger Scruton argues that sounds are ‘secondary objects’, by which he means objects made up entirely of secondary qualities which don’t (necessarily) refer to a source or an underlying ‘primary’ object. A sound is ‘an object all of whose properties are ways in which it appears.’[[18]](#footnote-18) These sound-objects are pure events (not epiphenomena or indexes of events). They have an interesting status: if they are not objective (according to a physicalist understanding—e.g., identical with an underlying wave form), yet although they are perceptual objects, they are not subjective (in the sense of private or inner experience) either. In this sense they are like colours (and even less susceptible to being identified with an underlying physical support, such as paint). Scruton writes:

I believe that we do not attribute the secondary qualities of sounds to the bodies that emit them, nor to events that occur in those bodies. We attribute them to the sounds themselves, conceived as independently existing events, located in a region of space.[[19]](#footnote-19)

He further considers that we experience streamed sounds as ‘acousmatic’, independently of their source, from which they can be completely detached by recording and broadcasting devices. We can add to Scruton’s argument that this means that sounds have a peculiar status. They ‘are’ only as heard, and so require listeners, and yet they are not ‘owned’ by those listeners. Sound objects are not comfortably placed in a subject-object dichotomy. Rather than say that sounds are either subjective impressions or physical beings, we might ask what a listener would need to be in order for there to be sound objects. If listening were to be conceived outside the subject-object dichotomy, then the sound could no longer be conceived as a kind of object with qualities, whether primary or secondary; nor could the listener be conceived as a subject, and perhaps not even as human. Indeed, to conceive sound as quality might be a way of restraining and containing what is radical in sensation. Hecker’s sound work may well involve the disruption of the listener’s attempt to assign it to ‘qualities’, which are after all universals, meaningless unless different objects share the same quality. Therefore we need to reintroduce a depth into the flattened schema of music as ‘secondary object’ or secondary qualities without reference to a primary ground. This ‘depth’ would comprise precisely the distinction between sound-quality and sound-intensity, where the intensity needs to be understood as singular while also multiple, and the quality as general and comparable. While both are real, they do not have the status that would be attributed to them by a realist ontology, which might see one—the intensity—as the ‘cause’ of the other—the quality. This is why Deleuze introduces the distinction between the actual and the virtual, where both are real.[[20]](#footnote-20) Singular intensities would have a real but virtual status; intensities would be actualised as qualities in listening. However, it would also possible to destabilise the synthetic and generalising character of qualities, to return to or sustain the intensities that constitute them.

In the case of Hecker’s work, we cannot presuppose that what we are listening to is music. On the one hand he draws on and associates himself with the traditions of experimental and electronic music, and performs in the contexts of electronica and dance. On the other hand, the presentation of his work in art galleries calls for a kind of attention that brackets this musical legacy and, particularly through his use and positioning of speakers, associates it with Minimalist art installation. But because of its articulation, it does not sit comfortably as ‘sound art’ either. Cage, who worked with artists at Black Mountain College and elsewhere, assimilated his work to ‘visual art’ by minimising its articulation (*4’33’’*) or making it the result of chance operations. Xenakis introduced stochastics into composition while remaining within music by turning the aleatory, through the mathematics of large numbers, into a way of generating form. (Which is why his work is on the whole transdisciplinary with architecture rather than visual art).

The relation of Hecker’s work to un-form goes in two directions. One is in the infra-thin interface between sound and tone. Tone is sound all the way through, but is not reducible to it: somehow the art gallery context, combined with the way in which Hecker produces and manipulates the sounds, places the two infinitesimally apart and in a state of differential becoming in relation to each other. This is reflected in the ambiguity of its status: Is it music, is it art? The point is not to decide which, but to consider the relation and the kind of attention that is opened up by the ambiguity—or better, undecidability—between the two. What we have here is an extremely interesting relation between the ontology of the object and the history of attention and its contexts. It is precisely sound as ‘secondary object’ in Scruton’s sense that opens up this possibility (and takes it in a critical-historical direction Scruton might not want to follow). The object is reducible neither to its context (whether physical, historical, political or discursive), however essential that may be to its actualisation, nor to the gesture of its presentation (in the sense of Michael Fried’s ‘theatricality’).[[21]](#footnote-21) It is no less of an object than a ‘primary’ object such as mathematically describable sound waves, yet it is not reducible to that kind of objectivity. It is manifest in or as its perceptual qualities, and yet it is reducible neither to them nor to a source or origin, insofar as it opens up the depth of intensity-in-sensations and their extension beyond the human. Which is why it has the same status as colour or perfume, and why Hecker would bring sound, colour, and perfume together in a performance, The 2013 performance *C.D.: A Script for Synthesis* included not only a sound component, but also coloured lighting and a perfume distributed to the audience in the form of a scent-infused rubber disc.

**Depth Without Ground**

It cannot make sense to describe music or sound work as the formation of a material that exist independently of it (the hylomorphic model). The sound object is the sound as it is heard (or as it would be heard should someone be listening) and not anything underlying it, such as wave patterns or streams of particles in the air, or the actions performed on an instrument, or the coding in a computer. If form has historically been understood as either hylomorphic or phenomenological, that is to say either as formed matter or as a structure of experience, then sound challenges both of these paradigms. There is no underlying substance other than the sound itself, and its effects are produced by a double differentiation, from noise and from other sounds, the pure event of the becoming of its pattern.

Schopenhauer, in *The World as Will and Representation* (1818/19), developed a distinction between ground and surface in terms of will and representation that continued to govern his thinking subsequently. If will is effectively formless, it is given form at the level of representation. Nietzsche took up this distinction in the relation between the Dionysian and the Apollonian in *The Birth of Tragedy from the Spirit of Music* (1872). But he went on to reject the dualism of levels inherited from Schopenhauer’s adaptation of the Kantian distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves. A consequence is that either all is play of forces, or all is representation (masks with other masks beneath): effectively there can be no conflict between form and forces. The idea of *expression* is the attempt to reintroduce into this situation the possibility of making a distinction between forms that express forces, and those that are inadequate to them or betray them, in terms of their power of becoming.[[22]](#footnote-22)

If we follow Scruton’s account of the ontology of music, we need to accept that we cannot think of the music-object, if there is such a thing, in terms of the distinction between matter and form. This would mean that we cannot draw any distinction between structures and some kind of material (forces, sounds) that is subject to being structured. One solution, followed by Deleuze, would be to replace the dual terms (matter/form; forces/structures etc.) with virtual intensities folded in on themselves, and which unfold in their actualisation. We still need to make a distinction of degree, and apply a value to that distinction, but it would be along a continuum rather than in terms of an opposition. It seems to me that the actualisation of intensities in continua is the basis for Xenakis’s innovations, particularly his use of glissandi in *Metastasis* (1953-54). Xenakis went to combine natural sounds with sounds generated by software on computers in order to extend music into new territories, but the sound is still composed or organised in rule-based ways, and overall the approach is structural as well as phenomenological both in the micro-level of sound particles, and the macro-level of temporal and spatial distribution,[[23]](#footnote-23) It was Cage who showed that this structural thinking was not unavoidable, even in a concert, and he did so through a transdisciplinary relation to art based on the examples of Duchamp, and Rauschenberg’s *White Paintings* (1951).

In Hecker, sound is groundless—it is nothing other than what it is—but, as I have suggested, this does not mean that it excludes ‘depth’. Rather, I mean that it does not refer to some more fundamental ground, either in the sense of a genetic origin such as an instrument or, for digital sound, coding. Even where he uses voice, the voice is an element rather than a reference to a source. The speakers allow for the spatialisation of the sounds, but they are not sources in the way that instruments are. The discernment of the listener may involve all kinds of qualities of the sounds, where the factor unifying the qualities is not something underlying (a ground or source or something describable in terms of primary qualities), but rather intensities that are at once intrinsic and differential. They are intrinsic in terms of the uncondensed or lossless character of the sound, and differential in terms of the intensification-effects of contrast. In that way, sound behaves exactly like colour and scent.

**Intensity in Relations**

 Sound, taste, scent, and colour all present the same problem of the relation of sensation to form. Unlike visual contours or shapes, they are all intrinsically non-representational, even if they can extrinsically represent, and may have powerful associations, whether to particular kinds of thing, or to memories. Indeed, descriptions of them, particularly of taste and scent, which are related, tend to break down into the technical, such as the naming of ingredients or scientific processes, the specialist, where precise colours or flavours might be named, and the associative or metaphorical, where the sensation is compared to something known. In the latter case, when it comes to perfume or wine, the metaphors tend to be multiple, and may include descriptions of changes over time. The question for a maker might be how to keep these aspects distinct while at the same time maintaining them in relation—how to ‘blend’ without making the result less than the sum of its parts, a nondescript amalgam. Another way of putting this is: How to maintain and indeed increase the intensity of sensation in combination?

One of Hecker’s works, *C.D.—A Script for Synthesis* (2013), which we could call a staged concert or installation-performance, and which includes a script by Reza Negarestani, vocals by Charlotte Rampling, and a perfume created by Frédéric Malle, contains an answer to this question.[[24]](#footnote-24) The later installation piece that developed from this work, *Hinge*, was produced for an exhibition at Sadie Coles HQ in London in 2012–13 and included in the *Formulations* show. For the performance, the commission for the ‘nose’ was to make a perfume that evoked a flavourless pink ice cube. An actual pink ice cube is also displayed on stage, in reference to the example used by philosopher Wilfred Sellars in his essay ‘Sensa or sensing’: ‘we see not only that the ice cube is pink, and see it as pink, we see the very pinkness of the object’. Sellars is wondering about the relation of sensing the object, between the object perceived and objectless sensing.[[25]](#footnote-25) This raises the possibility of an unowned sensing, a sensing that is not the intentional act of a subject, something that has been developed elsewhere, in relation to photography and the middle voice in fiction, by Ann Banfield.[[26]](#footnote-26) Rather than worrying about the truth and causation of sense data in relation to a referent, we could reframe the question, giving primacy to impersonal sensings to which subjects attach themselves, rather than the subject being the *hypokeimenon*, that which underlies or grounds the sense data. Previously in 2011, Hecker made a work in collaboration with the British artist Mark Leckey, *Hecker Leckey Sound Voice Chimera*, featuring a ‘chimerization’ of the sound from Leckey’s 2010 *GreenScreenRefrigeratorAction*, a piece that involved the artist intoning the supposed inner monologue of a black Samsung fridge—an enactment of an object-oriented ontology—with Hecker’s own *3 Channel Chronics* of the same year. If the sound-object is a heard object, what does it mean to displace the human from a centred and privileged relation to it? What would it mean for a sound-object to have agency and speak out, like the Samsung fridge in Leckey’s work? Would humans be the sensings of sound?

In the staging of *Formulations* at Culturgest, Porto, *Modulator* (2012), a one-channel work, was installed in the basement of what was a bank. The sound ricocheted around the space, outside of which were corridors with mirrors creating a disorienting reflection—whether inside or outside, the visitor was impelled to move restlessly, without a place of belonging, affected and affecting both sound and mirror image. The work is not directed perspectivally to a privileged subject who might be able to afford to sit in an ideal listening position, a kind of audio vanishing point.

Hecker also ‘chimerizes’ images of the installation of his sound works using an algorithmic programme SIFT Flow which he had specially adapted: treated according to the same operation, bodies are no longer privileged points in relation to which space is organised, but rather seem subject to the same set of shifts as the space.[[27]](#footnote-27) As with the sound works, there is no longer any way of distinguishing norm and artefact.

In ≤∑ (2004) things are happening as if from behind and in front, and, taking account of the movement of the visitor, there would be an infinite number of listening-events generated from a finite set of relations. Elsewhere, in a work such as *Affordance* (2013), the sound field is expanded without it necessarily being able to be internalised by the subject. This is linked to Hecker’s temporal organisation of the sound in such a way that it is hard if not impossible to remember: if memory as *Erinnerung,* ‘inwardising’, is the way in which for Hegel substance becomes subject,[[28]](#footnote-28) not being able to remember means that the sonic substance remains external, or neither internal nor external. In Hegel, substance becoming subject and the whole becoming inward involves the progressive rational mediation of that which, in the course of its history, appears external and opaque to the subject, where subject may be understood in a collective sense as Spirit (*Geist*). What seems external or other in a particular historical configuration of *Geist* is demonstrated through the contradictions in the opposition to be a reflection of or in an underlying identity with the subject, so that the dialectic takes the form of the identity of identity and otherness. At stake here is what remains of difference in the resulting identity. And if difference does remain, what is its relation both to other differences and to the underlying identity? It would be too crude to say that the result of the Hegelian dialectic is a ‘synthesis’—the ‘sublation’ is supposed not only to raise but also to preserve the externality or otherness in a new configuration. But if we take synthesis nonetheless as a possible horizon of relation, and take synthesis as verging towards a merging which, while not fusion, is in the direction of universality, we could then ask what would be a synthesis without synthesis, or a combining that did not result in fusion in the sense of generality. Why would we want to maintain this? There might be reasons concerning extension and intensiveness: a multiplicity in relation that does not lose its multiple character, or intensities in a relation that does not diminish them—or indeed might intensify them further (as in the case, for example, of colour contrasts). In each case the elements are in a relation and are affected by it, while also remaining distinct from the relation. This also requires a change in the direction of dialectic: from Hegel’s, which tends towards the identity of substance and subject as a ground that emerges from historical process, to something more like that of Schelling, which begins from a non-rational ground. According to Edward Beach, for the later Schelling ‘Concrete differentiation cannot arise out of any merely conceptual *Aufhebung* of absolute identity, because that would involve only a cancellation of the unity […]. Hence, the initial identity must undergo a “doubling” (*Doublierung*) or an “amplification” (*Steigerung*) through which it (re)produces itself as different in order thereby to enhance its own self-apprehension.’[[29]](#footnote-29) Similarly, ‘chimerization’ as Hecker employs it could be understood as a relation that does not diminish singularity and intensity but, as with the mythical monster, produces them through incongruity.

The connection of the sound-object with the subject does not take place primarily at the level of the subject’s intentionality or appropriation of the auditory field, but rather, as in psycho-acoustics, through neurological pathways and impulses from which spatial and temporal experiences are generated, like the spaces in the algorithmically chimerized images. The formulation of the sound gives rise to intense, visceral experiences, but also to an awareness that what is heard is at once produced and limited by the relation of the neurological-psychic-bodily apparatus to space as it transforms in time. The acousmatic indicates precisely the impossibility of dominating the sonic field. The painful, jarring sonic experiences presented by *Formulation DBM* (2015), in which the earlier *Formulation* (2014) is entirely resynthesized, take us to the edge of the range of sounds audible to the human ear, intimating the unheard beyond, continua that can no longer be subsumed as object, even sound-object. The title refers to the ‘formulation’ of a scent, or an alchemical mixture, and also to mathematical formulae, and to form. If experimental music and sound work tend in two contrary directions—on the one hand, to the acousmatic through openness and concrete music; on the other becoming subject to extreme formalisation or uses of structures of repetition—Hecker, cognisant of the situation, takes neither route; yet nor does he fall into some kind of happy medium. The formulation is not imposed on the sound, it is nothing other than the sound, and yet.... There is no place (at least in Euclidean terms) for the subject, nor is there an identity for the object. Chimerization means that the object is not one, but it is not simply multiple either.

**Excursus on Limits: James Coleman’s** ***Connemara Landscape* and *Documenta Project* as Models**

In order to understand both its artistic genealogy and its implications, I would like to compare Hecker’s work with two works by James Coleman. The first is *Connemara Landscape* (1980)*.* This is a slide projection of a white-on-black linear figure which has some hint of a building and a landscape in it, but not enough to be deciphered. It remains poised on the edge of intelligibility and unintelligibility. Denied an ideal viewing point and a vanishing point in the image, the viewer is induced to move around, to try to look at the image-figure from different positions, including from an angle in case the image is anamorphic. One is led to wonder whether it is a representation, a map, or some form of calligraphy.

Why did Coleman make this work in the form of a projection of a single slide, rather than, say, a wall drawing? By including the projector in the space, the viewer is decentred, cast out of the ideal viewing point of traditional perspective. Bear in mind also that the image is the negative of a drawing, so that rather than black on a white ground, we have white, or light, on a black ground. It is, quite literally, ‘photo-graphy’, writing with light, both as ‘with light’—the condition of visibility—and as ‘writing’, which is to say that which takes us beyond the limits of the visual. This gives the image or figure an ‘unframed’ character that draws attention to its role in the installation as a whole.

As with his other works, the brilliance of Coleman’s *Connemara Landscape* lies in the way in which the viewer’s interpretative appropriation of the work is rendered reflexive by means of the ‘apparatus’ of the work itself—in this case, the projective aspect of the image. The viewer is brought to reflect upon how representation per se involves projection, in both literal and metaphoric senses, and how these projections are bound up with relations of power and domination, including a quite specific, geographically and culturally located history of colonization. This is achieved not by ‘framing’ or contextualizing the image, for example with text, but by working on the relation of viewer and image in such a way that both are in a sense ‘unframed’, that is to say, displaced as much as located. This may be another reason for the ‘negative’ white-on-black structure of the image—since no light is projected outside the lines, this doesn’t create a ‘framed’ rectangular image, but rather a figure in light floating on the wall. The implication of allegorical ‘figura’ should not be ignored, as Coleman plays between landscape-to-be-seen and landscape-to-be-read: the landscape (representation) becomes an allegory of its own projection as landscape. The viewer simply cannot find a position from which the image-figure would make sense as the representation of a world. The image is there as a reproduction, without being a reproduction of anything, referring to an origin (Connemara, where supposedly the purest Irish is spoken) while at the same time rendering that origin inaccessible, since in this case the distinction between representation and construction is impossible to make. The material source, after all, is the projector, which stands in a position that the viewer of the work cannot occupy.

We might say something similar of Hecker’s sound installations. The source of the sound is nothing other than the speakers, but the place of the sound-object is elsewhere, and it moves as the listener does. Furthermore, the spatialization of the sound objects using multiple speakers results not in the construction of a Euclidean space, but rather in a folding and a topological dis-orientation. In this respect Hecker’s work can be compared with another by Coleman, *Documenta 11 Project (‘Video Installation’)* (1998–2002)—a title that is not a title, giving no hint of what the work is of, unlike the mis-cue that is ‘Connemara Landscape’. In fact, the work is a monochrome video image that seems to change, as if it is becoming sharper and blurrier, in a rhythm like a slow breath. What is it an image of? At one time I thought it might be a part of a skeleton, but if so, what kind of image is it? A CT scan? Is it representation or imaging? Is it indexical, or constructed? As George Didi-Huberman suggests, the very question ‘What exactly does this image show?’ is the answer to the problem posed by the image:[[30]](#footnote-30) the question itself as the answer that calls the viewer in question. What makes this work different from the abstract video experiments of the 1970s is what makes Hecker’s sound work different from the experimental music of the same period: the work does not offer the satisfaction of the plenitude of the presence of abstraction (where we would know what it is): rather, its internal being is composite and, rather than being composed in a formal sense, seems to be a composite of more than one modality. If in *Connemara Landscape* the question of position is also shown to be the question of world and therefore of modality of being, such that the modality of being of the work does not correspond to the vanishing point of the viewer, in *Documenta 11 Project* the temporalization of the image allows potential and trace, before and after, to be folded into one another so that the ‘what it is’ of the image, its quiddity, is totally destabilised even as it is nothing other than that. It does not allow itself to be fixed because it is itself and could be otherwise; it is and was and will be, at the same time.

**Closure:** **Reinscribing Openness**

The works we have discussed by James Coleman raise the question concerning what ‘not knowing’ might mean. Does it mean that we are not in a position to know, but that we could be in the future? Does it mean that we don’t know the causes of which the thing is an effect? Does it mean that we do not know under which category to subsume the thing as an object? These questions place knowing within the realm of possibility. If it is a possibility that we could know, then we know that the thing is not unknowable, where ‘unknowable’ is the negative deficient form ‘of knowable’. We also suppose that knowledge is a question addressed to an ontology based on possibility. Forms within such an ontology are structures of actualization. A painting may be original within a realm of possible formal structures opened up by the artist. Chance and the ‘open work’ appear to rebel against form, but arguably maintain the structure of possibility: the possibilities extended beyond those of which the artist as author is capable, or rendered unpredictable. Or subjected to chance, applied to a large terrain, as a way of producing a stochastic order, a law of form that goes beyond that conceived according to a hylomorphic model. In this respect we see an identity between formal and ‘open’ art: both presuppose an epistemological relation of knowledge, whether positive or negative, anticipatory or retrospective.

**Contingency and Formulation**

Contingency needs to be distinguished from openness to chance occurrence[[31]](#footnote-31)—as Robin Mackay writes, in a publication concerned with contingency and art, ‘a recognition that contingency cannot be thought through neo-Romantic concepts of openness, chance and process, it demands instead a special sort of discipline’.[[32]](#footnote-32) That discipline is elaborated in the same publication by Reza Negarestani, where he writes that, ‘the contingency of the artist’s materials cannot be the strict subject of the artist’s openness. Contingent materials cannot be directly embraced.’ What he asks for instead is ‘complicity’ which is a ‘twisted type of interaction with contingent materials […] that is built on the formidable ascesis of closure’. It is even a matter of degree: ‘the more closed the work, the more radically it is subjected to the interventions of its contingent materials’.[[33]](#footnote-33) What is required is a twist from possibility to contingency, which cannot of course itself be a possibility, in which case contingency would escape by being reduced: it would become a possibility and therefore no longer contingency. Openness presumes that contingency is ‘possible’ under the right framing conditions. Ultimately, anti-form presents an illusion of contingency as if it could be a production.

The problem with form is not its lack of openness as such. Rather it lies in what it does, as production, with intensities or singularities—in the way it identifies and relates them, whether this is understood as a rationalisation of the non-identical (as in Adorno), or as an unfolding, distribution, or territorialisation (as in Deleuze). The distribution that results in the work is presented in terms of a retroactive necessity. A formed work is necessarily what it is. Contingency occurs not at the level of the ‘what’ but rather the ‘that’. There is nothing intrinsic to the substance or materiality of the work that would render it contingent: rather, contingency is a modality of its existence. In that respect, it would only make sense to talk of ‘contingent materials’ if materiality were a question of the fact ‘that’ something is, rather than of ‘what’ it is. Therefore if form were to mutate to the side of contingency, it would need to be understood in terms of modality, rather than being a stamp, mould, pattern, or structure applied to matter. Considered in this way, substance and mode, the ‘what’ and the ‘that’, are inseparable. In relation to Hecker’s work, we could then regard form as the intensification of sound in its spatio-temporal existence. It would involve both relation as organised distribution in space and time and the sustaining of a non-relation, in which the distinctness of colour or flavour can be apprehended in the staging that is the installation or the ‘-scape’ of the sound, which etymologically from the Anglian ‘-*skip*’ would mean a state of being. The form/openness opposition depends on the idea that what is being avoided is a formed object in the name of possibilities. The idea of ‘formulation’ refers rather to the combination of intensities that are not possibilities retroactively derived from the actuality as result. The movement is not from a non-rational externality to a rationalised result, an organised distributed work, but from known and fully rationalised elements (as in the frequencies of sounds or the molecular structure of scents) to a result that, in its modal form, may be contingent and singular each time.

1. . T.W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory,* tr. R. Hullot-Kentor (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), 22. See also A. G. Düttmann, ‘Entkunstung’, *L’Esprit Créateur* 35:3, special issue ‘Beyond Aesthetics’ (Fall 1995), 53–56. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. . Y.-A. Bois and R. Krauss, *Formless: A User’s Guide* (New York: Zone Books, 1997). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. . See ‘Specific Objects’, in D. Judd, *Complete Writings 1959–1975* (Halifax and New York: Nova Scotia College of Art and Design/New York University Press, 1975), 181–9. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. . See J. Cage, *4’33”. Tacet, Any Instrument Or Combination of Instruments* (New York: C. F. Peters Corp., 1965). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. . J. Schérer, *Le « livre » De Mallarmé* (Paris: Gallimard, 1957). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. . R. Mackay, ‘These Broken Impressions’ in F. Hecker, *Event, Stream, Object* (Cologne: Walther Koenig, 2010), 10–22; see also É. Alliez, *The Brain-Eye: New Histories of Modern Painting,* tr. R. Mackay (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), particularly 90–98 from the discussion of colour in Delacroix; and J. Crary, ‘Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity in the Nineteenth Century’, *October* 45 (1988), 3–35. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. . M. Chion, *Audio-Vision: Sound on Screen* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. . See R. Scruton, *The Aesthetics of Music* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 2, and P. Schaeffer, *Traité des objets musicaux* (Paris: Seuil, 1966) [*Treatise on Musical Objects*, tr. C. North and J. Dack (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, forthcoming)]. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. . G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 222. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. . See M. DeLanda, ‘Deleuze and the Open-Ended Becoming of the World’, *Chaos/Control: Complexity Conference*, University of Bielefeld, Germany, 1998, <http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/delanda/pages/becoming.htm>. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. . D. Wentworth Thompson, *On Growth and Form* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1917, expanded ed. 1942). For a new approach to Naturphilosophie, see I. H. Grant, *Philosophies of Nature After Schelling* (London: Continuum, 2006). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. . See G. Deleuze and C. Parnet, *Dialogues II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 148–52. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. See Q. Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency* (London and New York: Continuum, 2008); and E. Ayache, *The Medium of Contingency: An Inverse View of the Market* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. See I. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, tr. W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 177 (§47): ‘the rule must be abstracted from what the artist has done, i.e., from the product, which others may use to test their own talent, letting it serve them as their model not to be copied [*Nachmachung*] but to be imitated [*Nachahmung*] How this is possible is difficult to explain.’ [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. A reconstruction by Victoria Walsh with Elena Cripp of Hamilton’s exhibition *Growth and Form* which he made at the ICA, London for the 1951 Festival of Britain was included in the exhibition *Richard Hamilton* at Tate Modern in 2014. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. . Perhaps in terms of the ways in which sensations of alienation are rendered enjoyable—see T.J. Demos, ‘Encountering the Unheard’, in Hecker, *Event, Stream, Object*, 54–60. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. In this characterization I am drawing on G. Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 222–61. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. . R. Scruton, ‘Sounds as Secondary Objects and Pure Events’ in M. Nudds and C. O’Callaghan (eds.), *Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 66. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. . Ibid*.*, 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 208–14 [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. . See M. Fried, *Art and Objecthood: Essays and Reviews* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 148–72. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. . Such a conception of expression is developed by Gilles Deleuze in *Spinoza: Expressionism in Philosophy*, tr. M. Joughin(New York: Zone Books, 1990) [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. See A. Georgaki, ‘The *grain* of Xenakis’ technological thought in the computer music research of our days’, in M. Solomos, A. Georgaki, G. Zervos (eds.), *‘International Symposium Iannis Xenakis’, Athens, May 2005: Definitive Proceedings*, http://cicm.mshparisnord.org/ColloqueXenakis/ (accessed 9 August 2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. . For a description, see M. Shen Goodman, ‘Demon in the Pink Ice Cube: Florian Hecker at Performa, *Art in America*, November 13, 2013, <http://www.artinamericamagazine.com/news-features/news/demon-in-the-pink-ice-cube-florian-hecker-at-performa/>. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. . W. Sellars, ‘Sensa Or Sensings: Reflections on the Ontology of Perception’, *Philosophical Studies* 41 (1982), 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. . See A. Banfield, ‘L’Imparfait De L’Objectif: The Imperfect of the Object Glass’, *Camera Obscura* 8, 3:24 (1990), and *The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell, and Epistemology of Modernism* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. . See F. Hecker *Chimerizations.* (New York: Primary Information, 2013). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. . See G.W.F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit,* tr. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. E. A. Beach, ‘The Later Schelling’s Conception of Dialectical Method, in Contradistinction to Hegel’s’, *The Owl of Minerva*, 22:1 (Fall 1009), 41. See also P. Dews, ‘Dialectics and the Transcendence of Dialectics: Adorno’s Relation to Schelling’, *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 22:6 (2014), 1180–1207 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. . G. Didi-Huberman, ‘“How Try Say” or the Experience for Seeing’, in *James Coleman* (Madrid: Reina Sofia, 2012), 56. See this catalogue also for excellent entries on Coleman’s works. [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Hecker addressed this problematic in *Speculative Solution* (2011) and *3 Channel Chronics* (2012) on the basis of an engagement with philosopher Quentin Meillassoux’s work on contingency. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. . R. Mackay, ‘Introduction: Three Figures of Contingency’, in R. Mackay (ed), *The Medium of Contingency* (Falmouth and London: Urbanomic/Ridinghouse, 2011), 1–10: 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. . R. Negarestani, ‘Contingency and Complicity’, in Mackay (ed), *The Medium of Contingency*, 11–18: 11, 13, 15. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)