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1 Towards Greater Computational Modeling

2 in Neurocognitive Creativity Research

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11 **ABSTRACT**:

12 Creative cognition is the driving force behind all cultural and scientific progress. In recent years, the field of neurocognitive creativity research (NCR) has made considerable 13 progress in revealing the neural and psychological correlates of creative cognition. 14 However, a detailed understanding of how cognitive processes produce creative ideas, 15 and how these processes interact differently across tasks and individuals, remains elusive. 16 In this article, we argue that the increased adoption of computational modeling can help 17 18 greatly in achieving this goal. While the verbal theories guiding NCR have evolved from 19 broader accounts into more specific descriptions of neurocognitive processes, they remain more open to interpretation and harder to falsify than formal models. Translating theories 20 21 into computational models can make them more concrete, accessible, and easier to compare, and helps researchers to develop causal hypotheses for how variation in 22 23 cognitive factors leads to variation in creative outcomes. Currently, however, 24 computational modeling of creativity is conducted almost entirely separately from NCR, and few attempts have been made to embody the cognitive theories of NCR in models 25 that can simulate performance on common lab-based tasks. In this paper, we discuss 26 27 theories of creative cognition and how they might benefit from the wider adoption of 28 formal modeling. We also examine recent computational models of creativity and how 29 these might be improved and better integrated with NCR. Finally, we describe a pathway toward a mechanistic understanding of creative cognition through the integration of 30 31 computational modeling, psychological theory, and empirical research, outlining an 32 example model based on dual-process accounts.

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34 **KEYWORDS**: Creativity; theory; psychology; neuroscience; computational modeling

- PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: This review argues that creativity research would
 benefit greatly from the wider adoption of computational modeling. We discuss how
 translating verbal theories of creative cognition into formal computational models can
 make them more rigorous, accessible, and communicable, and can highlight questions for
 future research. We examine previous models of creativity and explain how these can be
 improved to benefit our understanding of human creative cognition and the development
- 41 of artificial creative systems.
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Creativity, a hallmark of human cognition, has traditionally been considered an elusive 45 target for scientific investigation (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Iger, 2019), and even 46 47 today, there exists considerable variation in how creativity is conceived, operationalized, and assessed across fields (Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Plucker, 2022; Plucker, Beghetto, 48 49 & Dow, 2004; Puryear & Lamb, 2020). However, recent decades have witnessed 50 tremendous growth in neurocognitive creativity research (NCR) – research that aims to 51 uncover the neural and cognitive basis of creative thought. While definitions of creativity vary (e.g., Acar, Burnett, & Cabra, 2017; Simonton, 2018), most NCR defines creative 52 53 cognition as the production of novel and useful ideas (Diedrich, Benedek, Jauk, & 54 Neubauer, 2015; Runco & Jaeger, 2012; Stein, 1953). 55 Presently, NCR covers a diverse range of research areas, and has begun to uncover how 56 creative cognition relates to cognitive and psychological factors including attention (Frith 57 et al., 2021b; Liu & Peng, 2020; Zabelina, 2018), memory (Benedek, Beaty, Schacter, & 58 Kenett, 2023; Kenett et al., 2018; Madore, Addis, & Schacter, 2016; Storm, Angello, & 59 Bjork, 2011), executive control (Benedek, Jauk, Sommer, Arendasy, & Neubauer, 2014b; Camarda et al., 2018a; Chrysikou, 2019; Lebuda & Benedek, 2023), personality (Bonetto, 60 Pichot, Pavani, & Adam-Troïan, 2021; Kaufman et al., 2016; Oleynick et al., 2017), and 61 62 reward processing (Beversdorf, 2019; Boot, Baas, van Gaal, Cools, & de Dreu, 2017; Lin & 63 Vartanian, 2018). NCR has also made considerable progress in identifying the neural 64 correlates of creative cognition, for example finding that greater creative performance relates to enhanced EEG alpha waves (Agnoli, Zanon, Mastria, Avenanti, & Corazza, 2020; 65

66 Fink et al., 2018; Rominger et al., 2019; Stevens & Zabelina, 2020), and greater fMRI

67 connectivity between large-scale brain networks (Beaty, Cortes, Zeitlen, Weinberger, &

68 Green, 2021; Chen, Beaty, & Qiu, 2020; Mayseless, Eran, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2015;

69 Sunavsky & Poppenk, 2020).

70 However, it remains unclear how exactly these neural and psychological correlates lead to

the production of creative ideas (see Beaty, Seli, & Schacter, 2018b for an overview of

72 cognitive processes that may relate to the neural connectivity patterns observed during

73 creative cognition). Despite the remarkable progress of NCR, our theoretical

74 understanding of creative cognition is still in its infancy. Over recent decades, the

cognitive theories that guide NCR have evolved from more abstract accounts, such as the

76 distinction between convergent and divergent thinking (Guilford, 1959, 1967), to more

specific accounts that describe how creative ideas can emerge from, for example,

78 spontaneous and controlled processes (Benedek et al., 2023; Benedek & Jauk, 2018; Volle,

79 2018) and flexible and persistent meta-control states (Nijstad, de Dreu, Rietzschel, & Baas,

80 2010; Zhang, Sjoerds, & Hommel, 2020). In addition, significant efforts have been made to

81 formalize and standardize the ontology used by NCR researchers (Gabora, 2018; Kenett et

al., 2020; Simonton, 2013, 2022; Sowden, Pringle, & Gabora, 2015). However,

83 considerable work remains to move the field away from loosely defined verbal accounts

84 toward mechanistic theories of creative cognition, complete with causal hypotheses

85 regarding the cognitive operations that produce creative ideas.

86 We argue that the wider adoption of computational modeling can help greatly in achieving this aim. Computational modeling involves formalizing a theory into a set of 87 algorithmic operations (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2015; Maia, Huys, & Frank, 2017). This 88 89 process requires the theory to be fully described in explicit terms, which can expose 90 assumptions that might otherwise remain hidden, and lends considerable clarity, rigor, and reproducibility to the development of theories and hypotheses (Farrell & 91 92 Lewandowsky, 2015; Guest & Martin, 2021). Computational models also allow causal hypotheses to be formulated and tested, helping researchers to establish relationships 93 94 between neurocognitive factors and creative behavior (Blohm, Kording, & Schrater, 2020; 95 Wiggins & Bhattacharya, 2014). Indeed, calls for greater modeling within psychology as a whole are growing (Blohm et al., 2020; Guest & Martin, 2021; Smaldino, 2020), yet 96 97 modeling is rarely used in NCR. Meanwhile, though computational creativity is itself a 98 growing field (e.g., Carnovalini & Rodà, 2020; Gatti, Stock, & Strapparava, 2021; Mekern, 99 Hommel, & Sjoerds, 2019a) with its own annual conference (the International Conference 100 on Computational Creativity), it has developed in relative isolation from NCR, with little 101 cross-pollination between the two fields. Increased collaboration could lead to both a 102 clearer understanding of human creativity and more human-like artificial creative systems 103 (Chateau-Laurent & Alexandre, 2021; Dipaola, Gabora, & McCaig, 2018; Gobet & Sala, 104 2019). Critically, however, very few computational models exist that both embody a 105 theoretical account from NCR and can perform (and thus, be validated on) common lab-106 based creativity tasks.

First, we provide an overview of NCR and recent cognitive theories of creativity. We then 107 108 consider some limitations of purely verbal theories and how NCR would benefit from the 109 increased adoption of computational modeling. Next, we discuss recent computational models of creativity, exploring several models that aim to account for performance in 110 common lab-based creative tasks. Finally, we outline a pathway toward greater 111 112 computational modeling within NCR, considering ways in which existing models might be 113 improved (including a greater focus on modeling multiple creative tasks) and examining an example of model development. 114

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Neurocognitive creativity research (NCR)

117 NCR aims to uncover the neural and cognitive processes that underlie creative cognition

118 (Benedek & Fink, 2019). To this end, NCR researchers have explored how creative

119 performance relates to numerous cognitive and psychological factors. Here, we briefly

120 review some of this work. For example, attention research suggests that while real-world

creative achievement may relate to leaky attention (Zabelina, 2018), in-lab creative 121 122 performance may relate to selective (Vartanian, 2009) or flexible attention (Zabelina, O'Leary, Pornpattananangkul, Nusslock, & Beeman, 2015; Zabelina, Saporta, & Beeman, 123 2016). Meanwhile, research into the link between creative cognition and intelligence has 124 125 found considerable overlap between the two in terms of lab-based performance (Frith et 126 al., 2021a; Karwowski et al., 2016; Karwowski, Czerwonka, & Kaufman, 2020), and 127 suggests that they may depend on shared neural regions (Benedek, Jung, & Vartanian, 2018; Frith et al., 2021a). Research has also examined relationships between creativity 128 and executive functions, finding that switching (Krumm, Arán Filippetti, & Gutierrez, 2018; 129 130 Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Pan & Yu, 2018; Zabelina & Ganis, 2018), updating (Benedek et al., 2014b; Stolte, García, van Luit, Oranje, & Kroesbergen, 2020; Zabelina, Friedman, & 131 132 Andrews-Hanna, 2019), and inhibition (Camarda et al., 2018a; Kaur, Weiss, Zhou, Fischer, & Hildebrandt, 2021; Zabelina et al., 2019) all relate to aspects of creative performance. 133 Considering the relationship between creative cognition and memory, some studies report 134 that creative cognition may benefit from greater working memory (WM) abilities 135 136 (Benedek et al., 2014b; de Dreu, Nijstad, Baas, Wolsink, & Roskes, 2012; Stolte et al., 2020), while other studies report mixed findings (de Vink, Willemsen, Lazonder, & 137 138 Kroesbergen, 2021; Krumm et al., 2018) indicating that the role of WM in creative 139 cognition may be task-dependent (Krumm et al., 2018). Meanwhile, studies using network 140 science methods have indicated that more creative individuals may have more flexible and 141 interconnected semantic memory structures (He et al., 2020; Kenett, Anaki, & Faust, 2014; 142 Kenett et al., 2018; Ovando-Tellez et al., 2022). Research has also probed less direct links 143 between creativity and neurocognitive processes, examining how creativity relates to variation in personality traits such as risk-taking (Dewett, 2007; Harada, 2020; Shen, 144 145 Hommel, Yuan, Chang, & Zhang, 2018) and openness to experience (Batey & Furnham, 146 2006; Kaufman et al., 2016; Lloyd-Cox, Pickering, & Bhattacharya, 2022b; Oleynick et al., 2017), and how neurodevelopmental conditions including ADHD (Fugate, Zentall, & 147 148 Gentry, 2013; Hoogman, Stolte, Baas, & Kroesbergen, 2020) and schizophrenia (Sampedro 149 et al., 2020a, 2020b) impact creative cognition.

Further research has explored how creative performance relates to motivation (Benedek, 150 151 Bruckdorfer, & Jauk, 2020; Xue et al., 2020) and the activities of the dopaminergic (Lin & Vartanian, 2018; Zhang et al., 2020), and noradrenergic systems (Beversdorf, 2019; Boot 152 153 et al., 2017; Flaherty, 2005). Considering other neural correlates of creativity, fMRI research has consistently found that creative cognition involves increased cooperation 154 155 between the default mode (DMN), executive control (ECN), and salience networks (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016; Green, Cohen, Raab, Yedibalian, & Gray, 2015; Lloyd-156 Cox, Chen, & Beaty, 2022a; Mayseless et al., 2015). In addition, EEG research has found 157 158 that greater creative performance relates to greater cortical alpha synchronization (Agnoli et al., 2020; Camarda et al., 2018b; Fink et al., 2018; Rominger et al., 2019; Stevens & 159 160 Zabelina, 2020), while research using transcranial brain stimulation has found that

161 increasing alpha power over the prefrontal cortex can improve the creative quality of

162 ideas (Lustenberger, Boyle, Foulser, Mellin, & Fröhlich, 2015), while stimulation over

163 temporal sites supports the inhibition of non-creative ideas (Luft, Zioga, Thompson,

164 Banissy, & Bhattacharya, 2018).

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The theories that guide NCR

Guiding this research is a range of theoretical accounts, providing a conceptual scaffold forresearchers to interpret data and develop further hypotheses. These accounts range from

169 being relatively abstract to quite specific in terms of the cognitive processes they describe.

170 For example, an older but highly influential account is Wallas' (1926) four-stage model,

171 which describes the creative process as involving distinct stages of preparation,

incubation, inspiration, and verification. This account is broadly suggestive of the

173 processes that might produce creative ideas and can be seen as a precursor to more

174 recent and specific theories.

175 Another older account (and one that still retains tremendous popularity among NCR researchers) is the distinction between convergent and divergent thinking. These terms 176 177 were first coined by Guilford (1950, 1959) as two of the (initially) five major intellectual abilities in his Structure of the Intellect model (Guilford, 1967). Guilford defined both kinds 178 of thinking in terms of the number of solutions they produce, with divergent thinking 179 180 defined as "thinking in different directions" to produce a "variety of responses", and convergent thinking defined as producing "one right answer" (Guilford, 1959). While both 181 182 modes of thought were described as ways to generate new information from old 183 information, Guilford linked divergent thinking to creativity and convergent thinking to the 184 ability to solve intelligence tests (but see more recent evidence linking divergent thinking 185 to intelligence; Frith et al., 2021a; Karwowski et al., 2016). It is worth noting that the 186 Structure of Intellect model was later criticized due to issues with the factor analytic evidence used to support it, and the model has little support today (Jensen, 1998; 187 Mackintosh, 1998; Undheim & Horn, 1977). 188

In the years since Guilford, the divergent and convergent thinking constructs have 189 gradually evolved and been reinterpreted, with researchers now arguing that both play 190 important roles in creative cognition (Basadur, 1995; Brophy, 2001; Caughron, Peterson, & 191 Mumford, 2011; Cropley, 2006; Jung, Mead, Carrasco, & Flores, 2013; Runco, 2012, 2014). 192 193 Indeed, many researchers have shifted away from defining divergent and convergent 194 thinking in terms of the number of solutions they produce, toward defining divergent 195 thinking as a generative process that produces novel ideas, and convergent thinking as an evaluative process that selects and refines ideas (Basadur, 1995; Brophy, 2001; Cropley, 196 197 2006; Lee & Therriault, 2013). These generation-evaluation definitions of divergent and convergent thinking can be seen in numerous recent NCR articles (e.g., de Vink et al., 198

2021; Eskine, Anderson, Sullivan, & Golob, 2020; Gabora, 2018; Jung et al., 2013; 199 Kleinmintz, Ivancovsky, & Shamay-Tsoory, 2019; Lee & Therriault, 2013), although 200 201 Guilford's original definitions (many solutions vs. a single solution) also remain popular (e.g., Gilhooly, Fioratou, Anthony, & Wynn, 2007; Lu, Akinola, & Mason, 2017; Radel, 202 203 Davranche, Fournier, & Dietrich, 2015; Runco, 2010; Shamay-Tsoory, Adler, Aharon-204 Peretz, Perry, & Mayseless, 2011; Volle, 2018). This reinterpretation of divergent and 205 convergent thinking has its roots in another common framework for conceptualizing 206 creativity, which suggests that creative ideas arise from iterative cycles of generation and evaluation (Basadur, 1995; Ellamil, Dobson, Beeman, & Christoff, 2012; Finke, Ward, & 207 Smith, 1992; Jung et al., 2013; Kleinmintz et al., 2019). A prominent theory of this kind is 208 the blind variation and selective retention (BVSR) model, first suggested by Campbell 209 210 (1960) and later expanded upon by Simonton (2013, 2022). BVSR argues that creative cognition involves cycles of relatively undirected (or partially sighted; Simonton, 2013) 211 processes to produce multiple ideas, and directed processes that select the best idea to 212 213 develop further.

214 Among the most popular frameworks for understanding creative cognition that have emerged in recent decades is the dual-process account. This argues that creative cognition 215 216 emerges from the interactions of spontaneous, associative processes and controlled, 217 analytic processes (Allen & Thomas, 2011; Barr, 2018; Benedek et al., 2023; Benedek & Jauk, 2018; Sowden et al., 2015; Tubb & Dixon, 2014; Volle, 2018). The account is based 218 219 on wider dual-process theories of cognition (e.g., Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 220 Kahneman, 2011), which describe two broad categories of processes which might be 221 termed Type 1 and Type 2 (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Type 1 processes are typically described as associative, fast, unconscious, and implicit, while Type 2 processes are 222 described as controlled, slow, conscious, explicit, and dependent on WM (Evans, 2008; 223 224 Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Tubb & Dixon, 2014). NCR researchers have discussed the 225 overlaps between dual-process associative and controlled processes, divergent and 226 convergent thinking, and generation and evaluation (Benedek & Jauk, 2018; Goldschmidt, 227 2016; Lloyd-Cox et al., 2022a; Sowden et al., 2015), with some highlighting differences between the accounts (e.g., Sowden et al., 2015; Tubb & Dixon, 2014), and others 228 concluding that they are broadly synonymous (e.g., Benedek & Jauk, 2018; Goldschmidt, 229 230 2016). Indeed, many NCR articles now define divergent and convergent thinking in terms of associative and controlled processes (e.g., Augello et al., 2016; Cortes, Weinberger, 231 Daker, & Green, 2019; Drago & Heilman, 2012), producing a third interpretation of 232 Guilford's original constructs. 233

The accounts discussed so far are, for the most part, relatively imprecise, leaving
considerable room for interpretation. For example, describing creative cognition as
involving divergent and convergent thinking, or cycles of generation and evaluation, does
not greatly constrain the space of possible cognitive mechanisms that might underlie
creativity. However, as the findings of NCR have grown, more specific theories of creative

cognition have emerged. One example is the BVSR theory (Simonton, 2013, 2022), which 239 240 defines its variational and selective processes in formal mathematical terms. Another is 241 the contextual focus theory (Gabora, 2010, 2018) which builds on suggestions that creative cognition involves switching between narrow and broad attentional states (Bristol 242 243 & Viskontas, 2006; Dorfman, Martindale, Gassimova, & Vartanian, 2008; Gabora, 2010; 244 Herz, Baror, & Bar, 2020; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010) to define divergent thinking as the 245 broadening of conceptual representations to include more abstract and associative 246 information, and convergent thinking as the narrowing of representations to only the

247 most relevant information (Gabora, 2010, 2018).

248 Researchers have also suggested more specific cognitive mechanisms corresponding to 249 the associative and controlled processes described by the dual-process account of creative 250 cognition (Benedek et al., 2023; Barr, 2018; Benedek & Jauk, 2018; Volle, 2018). Drawing 251 on evidence linking creative cognition to performance on free-association and verbal fluency paradigms, researchers have suggested that associative creative processes may 252 253 include the automatic spreading of activation through semantic memory (Kenett et al., 254 2018; Volle, 2018). Meanwhile, evidence linking creative cognition to intelligence and executive functions has led to suggestions that controlled creative processes may include 255 256 strategic search processes (Avitia & Kaufman, 2014; Benedek & Neubauer, 2013; 257 Forthmann, Bürkner, Szardenings, Benedek, & Holling, 2019a; Lebuda & Benedek, 2023; 258 Silvia, Beaty, & Nusbaum, 2013), and the inhibition of distracting or unoriginal thoughts (Beaty, Christensen, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2017a; Camarda et al., 2018a; Volle, 259 260 2018). The increased DMN-ECN cooperation observed during creative cognition is also suggestive of interacting associative and controlled processes, and may signify the DMN 261 spontaneously activating ideas (Beaty et al., 2020; Beaty & Lloyd-Cox, 2020), while the 262 executive control network inhibits prepotent ideas (Beaty et al., 2017a; Christensen, 263 264 Benedek, Silvia, & Beaty, 2021; Lloyd-Cox, Christensen, Silvia, & Beaty, 2021) and implements creative strategies (Benedek & Jauk, 2018). Indeed, DMN-ECN cooperation 265 266 during creative cognition appears to increase when there is a need for inhibition (Beaty et 267 al., 2017a; Christensen et al., 2021).

268 Another more specific account distinguishes between two opposing strategies for 269 producing creative ideas: flexibility and persistence. The former involves switching between conceptual spaces to attain more diverse ideas and may depend on striatal 270 dopamine pathways, while the latter involves the persistent exploration of one conceptual 271 space and may depend on prefrontal dopamine pathways (Mekern, Sjoerds, & Hommel, 272 273 2019b; Nijstad et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2020). The account has strong similarities to the 274 distinction between exploration and exploitation in creative cognition (Hart et al., 2017; 275 Lin & Vartanian, 2018), and is primarily supported by measures of clustering (i.e., the 276 generation of similar ideas) and switching (i.e., the generation of ideas from different 277 conceptual categories) in divergent thinking and cognitive search tasks (Mekern et al., 278 2019b).

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How NCR can benefit from the wider adoption of computational modeling

282 NCR has made considerable progress in uncovering a broad range of cognitive, 283 psychological, and neural correlates of creative cognition, guided by theories ranging from 284 older, broader accounts to more recent and specific accounts. However, a precise, mechanistic understanding of creative cognition remains elusive. We believe that the 285 increased adoption of computational modeling can help greatly towards this goal. While 286 verbal theories are a useful and necessary part of science, they are more ambiguous and 287 288 open to interpretation than formal computational models, which require all elements of a 289 theory to be explicitly defined (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2015; Fried, 2020; Guest & Martin, 2021; Smaldino, 2020). Defining theories in explicit and formal terms makes them more 290 291 falsifiable and easier to compare in terms of their predictions and assumptions. We argue that NCR should continue to move towards more specific cognitive theories supported by 292 293 computational models.

For clarity, by "computational model", we refer to dynamic computational models that 294 295 aim to embody a particular cognitive theory of creativity by representing how creative ideas arise from cognitive processes. As such, we are not referring to statistical models of 296 297 human fMRI (e.g., Beaty et al., 2018a; Sunavsky & Poppenk, 2020), EEG (e.g., Rosen et al., 298 2020; Stevens & Zabelina, 2020) or behavioral data (Beaty & Johnson, 2021; Harada, 2020; 299 He et al., 2020; Zioga, Harrison, Pearce, Bhattacharya, & di Bernardi Luft, 2020). Equally, 300 we do not include machine learning models that generate novel or interesting products 301 but in ways that do not seek to emulate human cognition, such as Google DeepDream 302 (Suzuki, Roseboom, Schwartzman, & Seth, 2017), and GPT3 (Floridi & Chiriatti, 2020). Here 303 we examine in more detail the issues that can affect purely verbal accounts, including 304 more recent and specific accounts, and how computational modeling can provide greater clarity, rigor, and reproducibility to the development of cognitive theories (Farrell & 305 Lewandowsky, 2015; Guest & Martin, 2021). 306

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308 The limitations of verbal theories

At the less specific end of the spectrum of theoretical accounts of creative cognition is the distinction between convergent and divergent thinking. Researchers have defined these constructs in several distinct ways since they first appeared. The first definition separates the two constructs based on the number of ideas or solutions they produce (Guilford,

1959) (i.e., one solution in convergent thinking, but multiple solutions in divergent

- thinking). A later definition focused on divergent thinking as idea generation and
- 315 convergent thinking as idea evaluation (Basadur, 1995; Brophy, 2001; Cropley, 2006; Lee

& Therriault, 2013). Finally, a third definition draws on dual process theories of cognition
to define divergent thinking as an unconscious, associative process and convergent
thinking as a conscious, analytic process (Augello et al., 2016; Cortes et al., 2019; Drago &

319 Heilman, 2012; Gabora, 2010).

The existence of multiple definitions of divergent and convergent thinking suggests that 320 321 they are likely to be conceptualized very differently across NCR researchers. Indeed, 322 previous researchers have commented on the apparent contradictions that can emerge 323 due to these varying definitions (e.g., Cortes et al., 2019; Dietrich, 2019; Gabora, 2018; Lee & Therriault, 2013). Moreover, none of these definitions are particularly precise. This can 324 325 make it difficult to develop specific process-level hypotheses regarding these constructs, such as how divergent and convergent thinking might be differentially impacted by WM 326 327 capacity. The definitional ambiguity of these constructs also makes it difficult to model 328 them computationally, as to do so one would first have to translate one of their broad 329 definitions into a specific set of processes (e.g., Gabora, 2018; Zhang et al., 2020). Whichever processes are chosen could differ greatly from those chosen by another 330 331 researcher, so any conclusions drawn about these processes need not necessarily apply to the broader constructs. In essence, the reinterpretable nature of divergent and 332 333 convergent thinking makes them difficult to study or falsify since any specific hypothesis 334 can be easily dissociated from the construct.

335 Research into divergent and convergent thinking is also affected by inconsistencies 336 between the definitions of these constructs and the tasks used to assess them. For example, convergent thinking is commonly assessed with the Remote Associates Test 337 (RAT; e.g., de Vink et al., 2021; Nielsen, Pickett, & Simonton, 2008; Shang, Little, Webb, 338 Eidels, & Yang, 2021; Zhang et al., 2020), in which participants are shown three unrelated 339 words and must generate a response word that relates to all three. While RAT problems 340 341 have one correct solution (consistent with the original conception of convergent thinking), 342 they require generating numerous candidate solutions in an associative manner (Cortes et al., 2019), contrary to later definitions of convergent thinking as an analytic, evaluative 343 344 process (Cropley, 2006; Runco, 2014). Indeed, the RAT was originally developed as a 345 measure of associative processes (Mednick, 1962) and continues to be used as a measure 346 of unconscious insight (e.g., Kounios & Beeman, 2014; Tik et al., 2018; see also Barr, 2018; Benedek & Jauk, 2018). 347

Meanwhile, divergent thinking is typically assessed with the Alternative Uses Task (AUT; Guilford, 1959, 1967), which requires participants to think of unusual uses for a given object. Since the AUT involves producing multiple ideas, and undoubtedly involves generative and associative thinking, it might appear to satisfy all three definitions of divergent thinking. However, the AUT is also widely considered to engage evaluative and analytic processes to ensure that the ideas generated are task-relevant and original (Beaty, Silvia, Nusbaum, Jauk, & Benedek, 2014; Cortes et al., 2019; Gilhooly et al., 2007;

Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011; Volle, 2018), processes commonly associated with convergent 355 thinking (Cropley, 2006; Sowden et al., 2015). Indeed, both the AUT and RAT are now 356 357 thought to involve a mixture of associative and controlled processes (Cortes et al., 2019). Given the difficulties in assessing divergent and convergent thinking, their varying 358 359 definitions, and the fact that they must be translated into more specific accounts when 360 researchers attempt to model or hypothesize about their underlying processes, NCR might 361 seek to replace these constructs with more precise subtypes of creativity defined in terms of more established cognitive processes, such as memory, attention, and cognitive control 362 (Barbot, Hass, & Reiter-Palmon, 2019; Benedek & Fink, 2019; Chrysikou, 2018; Farrell & 363 Lewandowsky, 2015; Kaufman et al., 2016; Plucker, 2022; Wiggins & Bhattacharya, 2014). 364 As noted, more recent theoretical accounts of creative cognition go much further in

365 366 suggesting specific mechanisms that might produce creative ideas. Besides BVSR 367 (Simonton, 2022), another recent extension of the generation-evaluation account describes several possible neural and cognitive mechanisms that may underlie both kinds 368 of process (Kleinmintz et al., 2019). Meanwhile, an extension of dual-process accounts has 369 370 suggested how creative ideas might arise from specific associative and controlled processes operating on a semantic network (Volle, 2018). In addition, several recent 371 372 review articles have provided in-depth descriptions of the roles of distinct associative 373 (Beaty & Kenett, 2023), memory (Benedek et al., 2023), and metacognitive processes (Lebuda & Benedek, 2023) in creative cognition. Researchers have also proposed 374 neurocognitive mechanisms that might underlie new conceptions of convergent and 375 376 divergent thinking, relating them to focused and defocused mental representations 377 (Gabora, 2010, 2018) and flexible and persistent meta-control states (Hommel & Wiers, 2017; Nijstad et al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2020). The latter account may soon form the basis 378 of a computational model. Finally, a recent review of the neural underpinnings of 379 380 divergent thinking, abstraction, and improvisation has argued that all three can arise from 381 dopaminergic novelty-seeking processes, in a framework that may soon be implemented 382 computationally (Khalil & Moustafa, 2022).

383 For the most part, however, these are still verbal accounts, and thus they retain a degree 384 of ambiguity that can make them difficult to falsify and leaves them open to 385 reinterpretation. Another key issue for verbal theories is that they can be difficult to compare in terms of their predictions or internal consistency. Despite recent efforts 386 (Kenett et al., 2020), there is no commonly accepted ontology for conceptualizing 387 creativity (Kenett et al., 2020; Puryear & Lamb, 2020; Saggar, Volle, Uddin, Chrysikou, & 388 389 Green, 2021). Researchers tend to employ different accounts to guide their research (Abraham, 2013; Hennessey & Amabile, 2010; Wiggins & Bhattacharya, 2014), and it is not 390 391 always clear to what extent these accounts are synonymous or overlapping. For example, 392 it is unclear whether associative and controlled processes are synonyms for constructs like 393 generation and evaluation and implicit and explicit thought, or in fact underlie them. Another example is the overlap between theories of flexibility vs. persistence (Nijstad et 394

al., 2010; Zhang et al., 2020) and exploration vs. exploitation (Hart et al., 2017; Lin &
Vartanian, 2018), which both distinguish between the tendency to shift between
conceptual spaces and the tendency to exploit a single conceptual space. Similarities also
exist between accounts linking different forms of creativity to different forms of attention
(Gabora, 2010, 2018; Zabelina et al., 2016; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010). However, without
formal models, it is difficult to say whether these theories are broadly equivalent or
describe fundamentally different kinds of operation.

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404 The benefits of modeling

405 The benefits that computational modeling can bring to psychology and neuroscience have 406 been discussed at length in several excellent recent articles (Blohm et al., 2020; 407 Borsboom, van der Maas, Dalege, Kievit, & Haig, 2021; Fried, 2020; Guest & Martin, 2021; 408 Maia et al., 2017). A computational model is the explicit formalization of a theory in 409 equations and algorithms (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2015; Maia et al., 2017), and therefore requires that every aspect of a theory be precisely defined. More precise theories, that 410 411 describe more specific cognitive processes or operations, are more easily communicated and testable since they make clearer predictions about what should be observed under 412 413 certain conditions. By contrast, imprecise or ambiguous theories provide no clear mapping to empirical research questions and can be redefined continually, potentially leading 414 different researchers to have very different interpretations of the theory. While NCR is 415 416 already working toward more rigorous and specific theories (Benedek & Fink, 2019; 417 Gabora, 2018; Volle, 2018; Zhang et al., 2020), the process of translating a theory into a 418 computational model is an excellent way to make it more precise. For example, building a 419 model based on the dual process account would force researchers to be extremely specific 420 about what associative and controlled processes are, how they produce creative ideas, and how they might vary in different creative contexts. 421

The detail required by computational modeling can also reveal weak points, dubious 422 assumptions, or outstanding questions in theories (Blohm et al., 2020), which can then 423 424 direct empirical work. For example, modeling creative cognition as involving cycles of generation and evaluation would involve deciding how frequently the model should 425 switch between the two modes. Researchers might also consider whether movement 426 427 along a continuum between generation and evaluation (or even simultaneous generation 428 and evaluation) is preferable to a binary switch. These decisions might inform, and be 429 informed by, empirical research (e.g., Goldschmidt, 2016; Kleinmintz et al., 2019; Lloyd-Cox et al., 2022a). 430

In addition, modeling provides a way to demonstrate and test hypotheses for how
variation in a neurocognitive factor leads to variation in behavioral outcomes. Indeed,

creative cognition is a particularly high-level construct, and there are likely to be a large 433 434 number of factors that can impact creative outcomes, including a person's attention, 435 memory, cognitive control, and personality (Beaty et al., 2014; Benedek & Fink, 2019; Oleynick et al., 2017). With modeling, these factors can be represented as sets of 436 437 operations within a computational system, enabling researchers to examine the causal 438 pathways by which they can impact creative performance. For example, researchers might 439 hypothesize that individuals higher in the personality trait openness to experience 440 produce more creative ideas by engaging in broader attentional states (Gabora, 2010, 2018). This hypothesis might then be embodied in a computational model by defining 441 "openness" as a set of parameters governing the propensity to use broad instead of 442 443 narrow conceptual representations. The hypothesis can then be tested by adjusting the 444 parameters reflecting openness and observing whether the changes in simulated creative 445 outcomes are in line with those observed among human participants with varying openness scores. 446

447 Moreover, modeling several contrasting theories can provide researchers with a more 448 concrete basis for comparing their empirical predictions, internal consistency, and 449 theoretical complexity (with less complex models being favorable; Farrell & Lewandowsky, 450 2015), allowing researchers to combine similar theories and select or reject opposing 451 theories. As noted, there appear to be strong similarities between several accounts of 452 creative cognition, such as those that describe generative and evaluative states (Jung et 453 al., 2013; Kleinmintz et al., 2019), and those that describe associative and controlled 454 processes (Benedek & Jauk, 2018; Volle, 2018), but it is hard to say whether these accounts are equivalent. Translating each account into a computational model could 455 reveal opposing predictions about the role of a particular factor in creative cognition, or 456 might instead indicate that the two accounts are referring to the same underlying 457 458 mechanisms.

459 Ultimately, modeling results in more fleshed-out, transparent, and comparable theories (Guest & Martin, 2021). For a more specific example of how computational modeling can 460 461 bring clarity to verbal theories, consider a creative search task in which participants must 462 think of unusual members of a category (e.g., "uses for a brick", or simply "fruits"). Researchers might debate the processes that govern performance on this task, such as 463 spontaneous association-making, attention, and cognitive control. To provide a concrete 464 foundation for this debate, the task could be modeled as an iterative search through an n-465 dimensional space, with dimensions representing properties that vary across concepts 466 467 (e.g., the size or exoticness of fruits). Concepts (i.e., fruits or possible task solutions) could 468 be distributed across this space, with the strength of associations between concepts 469 defined by the Euclidean distance between them (smaller distance = stronger association). 470 Common items (e.g., apple, pear) could be clustered around the center, with more 471 unusual items nearer the periphery of the space. Cognitive processes could then be 472 modeled as operations on this space, such as spontaneous processes spreading activation

from the center outward and controlled processes strategically pushing activation along
one dimension (e.g., thinking of exotic locations to access more unusual fruits; Benedek &
Neubauer, 2013).

476 To further demonstrate how a creative task can be modeled computationally, we have included an implementation of this simple model in MATLAB code in the Supplementary 477 478 Material, together with a detailed overview. We have made the code accessible to 479 researchers with minimal modeling experience, implementing a major recommendation 480 made by Barton et al. (2022) to enhance the usability of computational models. Of note, 481 this toy model is by no means intended as a definitive model of creativity, but simply as an 482 example of how verbal theories of creative task performance can be translated into formal 483 models for researchers who may have limited or no prior experience in computational 484 modeling.

485 Once a basic model of a task is implemented, it can serve as a starting point for further 486 models embodying different theories. In the current example, researchers who emphasize 487 associative processes in creative search might adjust certain parameters of the model to 488 reflect this. Others might simulate WM by limiting the number of concepts able to activate at once, or simulate processing speed, attention, or mind-wandering by adding other 489 features. Examining and comparing how these different models fit empirical human data 490 491 could then help to improve our understanding of the processes underlying creative search 492 (Wilson & Collins, 2019). Of course, evaluating model performance against human data 493 requires reliable and valid measures of the underlying construct, and even then, alternative models may be equally supported by empirical data. As such, models of 494 495 creative performance might also be compared in terms of their internal consistency and complexity, while researchers continue to develop more fine-tuned assessments of 496 497 creativity (e.g., Barbot, 2018; Hart et al., 2017, 2022).

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Varieties of computational model

501 Computational models can come in a large variety of forms. However, as noted, we 502 primarily focus on computational models embodying specific theories of human cognition. These are distinct from statistical models used to analyze empirical data, and 503 504 mathematical models that outline algorithmic hypotheses concerning human cognition, 505 but which are not implemented computationally (though these also help increase the 506 specificity and falsifiability of theories; e.g., MacGregor, Ormerod, & Chronicle, 2001; 507 Simonton, 2013; 2022). Indeed, recent years have seen numerous computational creative 508 systems being developed (see Carnovalini & Rodà, 2020; Gatti et al., 2021; Mekern et al., 509 2019a), but many of these primarily aim to create products or behaviors that humans 510 would consider creative, such as stories (Concepción, Gervás, & Méndez, 2020), paintings

(Colton, 2012; Yalcin, Abukhodair, & DiPaola, 2020), and music (Anderson, Eigenfeldt, &
Pasquier, 2013; Todd & Miranda, 2006; Yang, Choi, & Yang, 2017), without necessarily
creating these in a human-like way. By contrast, the models we refer to focus on
emulating human cognition, with less regard for the creative quality of the products that
are generated (Hélie & Sun, 2010; Olteţeanu & Falomir, 2016; Schatz, Jones, & Laird, 2018;
Wiggins, 2020).

517 Even among computational models of human cognition, however, there is considerable 518 variation in terms of the goals and levels of representation pursued by modelers (Kording, Blohm, Schrater, Kendrick, & Kay, 2020; Palminteri, Wyart, & Koechlin, 2017). Different 519 520 modelers may have very different aims, leading to considerable variation in how models 521 are evaluated (Kording et al., 2020). For example, some modelers may primarily aim to 522 inspire new empirical research, but could equally be most interested in the efficiency of a 523 model, or how clear and interpretable its predictions are. An important distinction can 524 also be drawn between descriptive and normative computational models. Descriptive models aim to represent our best guess at what the brain is doing, while normative 525 526 models aim to represent an optimal way to solve a problem based on assumptions of 527 rationality. Existing models of creative cognition arguably fall into both camps, and both 528 are useful to NCR. While descriptive models are crucial for a precise understanding of 529 human creative cognition, normative models can demonstrate how a particular creative 530 task could be optimally performed, inspiring the development of descriptive models and guiding empirical research efforts (Veale & Perez y Perez, 2020). 531

532 Models can also vary in their level of representation (Palminteri et al., 2017). Cognitive-533 level models operate at a high level of abstraction, illustrating how cognitive factors such as attention, inhibition, and associative thought might produce creative ideas (e.g., Lopez-534 Persem et al., 2022; Schatz, Jones, & Laird, 2018). By contrast, neural models operate at 535 536 the level of neurons, demonstrating how neuronal populations can give rise to the 537 processes underlying creative cognition (e.g., Kajic et al., 2017). Both levels of representation are important for NCR. However, neural models face greater 538 539 computational challenges and may not be as useful for making specific predictions about 540 creative cognition, due to the high-level nature of creativity as a construct. Among cognitive-level models, a further distinction can be made between broader models that 541 542 encompass creativity as well as other cognitive features (e.g., Hélie & Sun, 2010; Wiggins, 2020), and narrower models that focus on how humans perform a single creative task 543 (e.g., Olteteanu & Falomir, 2016; Schatz, Jones, & Laird, 2018). Again, both types of 544 545 models are useful. Broader models provide a holistic understanding of how creativity fits together with more general cognition, while narrower models of specific tasks provide an 546 547 effective means to test cognitive theories of creativity since their performance can be 548 readily compared to human data. While few middle-ground models of creative cognition 549 exist currently (Mekern et al., 2019a), demonstrating how the same cognitive processes 550 can be employed in multiple distinct creative tasks would greatly contribute to our

- understanding of human creativity. We will consider some existing models of creativecognition in greater detail below.
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Challenges for computational models of creativity

555 One reason why computational modeling has yet to have a significant impact on NCR may be that models of creative cognition face key challenges not encountered by models in 556 other areas of cognitive science. For example, creative cognition is a high-level and 557 complex construct involving many cognitive and psychological factors (Benedek & Fink, 558 559 2019; Volle, 2018). While this complexity makes computational modeling all the more 560 important to NCR, simulating creative cognition effectively may be considerably more 561 difficult than modeling processes like memory retrieval. In addition, creative performance can be assessed with a wide range of tasks, across verbal, visual, and auditory domains 562 (Plucker, 2022; Puryear & Lamb, 2020). Consequently, a precise model of creative 563 processing in one specific task or domain may not easily generalize to others, making it 564

- 565 difficult to build a comprehensive and cohesive model of creative cognition as a whole.
- These challenges, while significant, need not deter NCR researchers from developing new 566 567 models. Models do not need to account for every factor that might affect creative cognition. All models are simplifications (Smaldino, 2018), and representing a few 568 processes effectively is often more useful than trying to simulate all possible relevant 569 570 factors, especially when the goal is to create models that are easily understandable and which generate clear predictions (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2015; Guest & Martin, 2021). 571 572 Likewise, the diversity of creative tasks implies that NCR may require a corresponding 573 diversity of models, at least initially (Poile & Safayeni, 2016; Wilson & Collins, 2019). While a single model capable of explaining performance across multiple tasks or domains would 574 be a significant advance for the field, models focusing on individual creative tasks have 575 576 proved highly useful to our understanding of how creative outcomes can arise from 577 cognitive processes (Lopez-Persem et al., 2022; Olteteanu & Falomir, 2016; Schatz, Jones, & Laird, 2018). 578

579 An additional challenge for modeling in NCR relates to the nature of creativity data, which 580 does not readily lend itself to simulation. Computational models of human cognition typically need to simulate data from participants to allow the model to be evaluated. 581 Models of perception or memory often aim to simulate data such as reaction time, 582 583 perceptual or recall accuracy, or patterns of neural activity (Kahana, 2020; Karimi-Rouzbahani, Bagheri, & Ebrahimpour, 2017; Pramod, & Arun, 2016; Rotaru, Vigliocco, & 584 585 Frank, 2018). Within NCR, however, the main measure of interest is often the subjective creativity rating of generated ideas, drawings, or musical sequences (Amabile, 1982; Cseh 586 & Jeffries, 2019). While models can be developed to generate such products, which can 587 then also be rated for creativity, this requires incorporating knowledge of sentence 588

construction, or artistic or musical composition into the model. These tasks posesignificant challenges even for highly skilled computational modelers.

One alternative for modelers is to simulate specific features of creative output without 591 592 simulating the output itself (e.g., response times, number of responses made, or number 593 of concepts included in a drawing). Researchers can also focus on simpler creative tasks. 594 For example, paradigms such as free association and the RAT have just single words as 595 input and output, removing the need to model sentence generation. Indeed, several 596 recent models of creative cognition have investigated the generation of single words using semantic networks, as an effective means to study creativity quantitatively (Lopez-Persem 597 598 et al., 2022; Olteteanu & Falomir, 2015; Schatz, Jones, & Laird, 2018). Semantic networks 599 are formed of nodes representing concepts, and edges representing associative links, and 600 can simulate how activation spreads from a cue to a response (Beaty & Kenett, 2023).

601 Fitting semantic networks to participant data can be done in various ways. One approach 602 is to divide participants into low and high creative groups, and then construct group-level 603 semantic networks based on participants' free association data (Kenett et al., 2018). By 604 comparing the properties of these networks, researchers can then identify differences in 605 semantic memory structure between the groups. Another approach is to construct networks from individual participant data, and explore their structural properties in 606 607 relation to measures of creative cognition (Benedek et al., 2017; He et al., 2021). A further 608 option for semantic network models is to build a single, standard network using free association data (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004) or distributional semantics methods 609 (Rotaru et al., 2018), and then fit the model to individual participants by modifying the 610 simulated processes that operate on this network (e.g., Lopez-Persem et al., 2022; see 611 also Benedek & Neubauer, 2013; Volle, 2018). This involves defining a set of processes 612 that determine how activation spreads through memory, such as associative and 613 614 controlled processes, and then adjusting the parameters governing these processes to fit 615 an individual participant's data and mimic their creative behavior. Semantic networks, thus, provide a promising means to examine the production of qualitative ideas as a 616 617 quantitative process (Beaty & Kenett, 2023; Kenett & Faust, 2019).

618 In summary, despite the challenges, computational modeling remains a useful and 619 enlightening approach for NCR. While creativity is a complex and multifaceted construct, 620 simple models focusing on specific instances of creativity can still be useful (Smaldino, 2018). Given the diversity of creative tasks, NCR will likely require numerous models to 621 explore how cognitive processes operate in different contexts. In addition, since any task 622 623 can be modeled in various ways, it is important to develop multiple models of each task and then compare their performance to human data (Poile & Safayeni, 2016; Wilson & 624 Collins, 2019). For example, semantic memory retrieval can be modeled as a random walk 625 626 (Kenett & Austerweil, 2016; Lopez-Persem et al., 2022) or as an exploratory process of 627 optimal foraging (Hills, Jones, & Todd, 2009). By comparing the goodness of fit of different

models to human data, we can determine which model and its underlying hypotheses are 628 more supported, leading to the development of further models and empirical research 629 questions. As models become more sophisticated, identifying commonalities across 630 models of distinct tasks might allow researchers to simulate multiple tasks using a single 631 632 model, demonstrating how the same cognitive processes operate in different creative 633 contexts. Finally, though creative outcomes are often qualitative in nature and 634 subjectively evaluated, there are methods available for simulating quantitative aspects of 635 creative performance.

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Existing computational models of creativity

639 Having discussed the theoretical accounts that guide NCR and how these might benefit from the increased adoption of computational modeling, we now consider some recent 640 641 computational models of creativity, and the steps that might be taken to improve these 642 and better integrate them with NCR. Computational models of human creative cognition come in two main forms: broader models and cognitive architectures that focus on 643 644 creativity as a general feature of cognition (e.g., Hélie & Sun, 2010; Wiggins, 2020), and narrower models that aim to simulate human performance in specific lab-based creative 645 646 tasks (e.g., Olteteanu & Falomir, 2016; Schatz, Jones, & Laird, 2018).

647 Examples of broader models include recent attempts to model conceptual blending - the creative association of ideas or features from two distinct conceptual spaces (Falomir & 648 Plaza, 2020; Schorlemmer & Plaza, 2021), and the simulation of both individual and 649 650 cultural creativity using autocatalytic networks (Gabora, Beckage, & Steel, 2022; Gabora & 651 Steel, 2020). Other examples include the Copycat (Hofstadter & Mitchell, 1994) and 652 Metacat systems (Marshall, 2006), which focus on simulating analogical thought. Meanwhile, the CLARION cognitive architecture draws on Type 1 and Type 2 processes 653 (Evans & Stanovich, 2013) to model creative thinking as the outcome of both associative, 654 655 implicit processes and rule-based, explicit processes (Hélie & Sun, 2010). Researchers have also adapted the ACT-R cognitive architecture to simulate aspects of creativity including 656 conceptual blending (Guhe, Smaill, & Peace, 2010). Finally, the IDyOT model, inspired by 657 theories of predictive intelligence (Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010) and global workspace theory 658 (Baars, 1988), focuses on cognition as the hierarchical prediction of perceptual input, with 659 660 creativity emerging from the system "free-wheeling" in the absence of an external stimulus (Wiggins, 2020). 661

Although informative, the generality of these broad-focus models means that they are not
 best placed to model the cognitive theories of NCR, which typically focus on how humans
 perform specific lab-based creative tasks. For example, Copycat and Metacat operate on a
 limited set of abstract symbolic concepts, far removed from a human-like associative

memory. Meanwhile, CLARION has only modeled elements of cognition relevant to
incubation and insight, and must be set up and trained in a specific way for each task.
Finally, IDyOT focuses on the perception and generation of sequential information such as
music. Critically, these models lack the specific input/output components needed to
simulate standard laboratory-based measures of creativity.

671 By contrast, narrow-focus models aim to simulate the cognitive processes that operate in 672 specific creative tasks (e.g., Kajić, Gosmann, Stewart, Wennekers, & Eliasmith, 2017; 673 Olteteanu & Falomir, 2016; Schatz et al., 2018). NCR would arguably benefit most from increased modeling of this kind, since NCR and the theories that guide it focus mainly on 674 675 lab-based creativity, and the performance of such narrow-focus models could be readily 676 compared to large amounts of human data. While such models lack the flexibility needed 677 to account for performance across multiple tasks, they have demonstrated how relatively 678 simple operations on associative memory structures can lead to human-like creative performance on tasks such as the AUT and RAT. 679

680 To consider the structure of these narrow-focus models in more depth, one example comes from Kajić et al. (2017), who developed a spiking neural network model of the RAT. 681 The model utilized a distributed memory architecture where each simulated neuron could 682 be part of several concept representations. Words were represented as vectors encoded 683 684 in neural activity, with word associations defined using the Free Association Norms 685 dataset (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004). When retrieving solutions, RAT cues were 686 activated in sequence, with only one cue able to activate associations at any one time. Competing associations inhibited each other, and activation gradually decayed over time 687 until a solution was reached. The model produced behavior comparable to human 688 participants in terms of the number of RAT problems it could solve, the number of 689 responses it generated, and the similarities between its responses. By examining the 690 691 model parameters most relevant to performance, the researchers concluded that two 692 main cognitive processes underlie RAT performance: one that generates potential responses and one that filters responses. 693

In contrast to the neural-level model of Kajić et al. (2017), Olteteanu and Falomir (2015) 694 695 developed a cognitive-level model of RAT performance in which concepts were 696 represented as sets of associations to other concepts. The model's memory was 697 constructed from a database of unique 2-word phrases (i.e., 2-grams), with the strengths 698 of associations between words (i.e., associative strength) defined by the frequency of their co-occurrence in 2-grams. When solving RAT problems, all three cues and their 699 700 associated concepts were activated in memory simultaneously (again in contrast with the 701 sequential activation employed by Kajić and colleagues, 2017). Solutions were then selected from the most strongly activated associated concepts. While the authors did not 702 703 directly compare the model to humans in terms of the number of RAT problems it could 704 solve, model performance suggested that the difficulty of RAT items relates to both the

strength of associations between cues and solutions, and the number of associations each
cue word has (known as "fan"). Since these properties impact how activation spreads
automatically between ideas in memory, these findings emphasize the role of automatic
associative processes in the RAT.

Building on this work, Schatz, Jones, and Laird (2018) developed a model of the RAT using 709 710 the Soar cognitive architecture. The authors tested two versions of the model. A baseline 711 model simply searched memory for words that linked to all three cue words. By contrast, 712 a second "free recall model" used spreading activation, which propagated through 713 memory from the three cue words according to both associative strength and fan. The 714 authors also tested two knowledge bases for the model: one formed of 2-grams (following Olteteanu & Falomir, 2015) and one based on a larger corpus not limited to 2-grams and 715 716 including several kinds of word association. The authors found that the "free-recall" model 717 and the more sophisticated knowledge base produced the most human-like performance 718 in terms of the number of RAT problems solved, highlighting the important roles of memory structure and associative processes in modeling RAT performance. 719

720 Models of the AUT are rare, but one attempt comes from Olteteanu and Falomir (2016). The model used a knowledge base of 70 objects, each composed of a set of features 721 (manually added by the authors), in a hierarchical memory. These features enabled the 722 723 simulation of several cognitive strategies that people are known to employ when thinking 724 of unusual uses for objects in the AUT (Gilhooly et al., 2007), including object replacement (matching the cue object to the typical uses of another object with similar features) and 725 object decomposition (breaking the object into components and generating uses for 726 727 these). The model did not aim to model memory retrieval processes such as spreading activation, but served as a proof-of-concept that matching features of cue objects (and 728 components of objects) to features of other objects can produce solutions to AUT 729 730 problems.

731 Another recent model of creative idea generation, this time focusing on free association, comes from Lopez-Persem et al. (2022). The model included separate modules for 732 exploration, valuation, and selection. The exploration module simulated activation 733 734 spreading through a semantic network using random walks biased by associative strength (defined using a database of word associations). The valuation module then calculated the 735 736 value of activated ideas based on their novelty and appropriateness (estimated as linear and quadratic functions of the associative strength between each idea and the cue word). 737 Finally, the selection module selected a word from among activated ideas according to 738 739 their value. The authors then adjusted parameters of the model, and compared the 740 resulting changes in performance to the performance of human participants. They found that certain model parameters were more relevant to the performance of individual 741 modules than others, indicating the processes that may underlie these different 742 743 components of creative cognition. For example, the exploration module performed well

(i.e., matched human performance well) using just associative strength, and was not 744 improved by considering the value of ideas, which only played a role in the subsequent 745 valuation stage. The performance of the exploration module was also unaffected by 746 whether human participants were asked to produce the first response that came to mind 747 748 or an original but still associated response. These findings indicate that the initial 749 activation of ideas during exploration does not depend on how valuable ideas are, and does not vary depending on the specific task being performed. By contrast, the selection 750 module performed better when considering appropriateness more among first responses, 751 and value more among original responses. 752

753 In each of these studies, the authors found evidence that particular computational model structures and parameters can mimic human performance on creative tasks, in some 754 cases finding that certain structures and parameters perform better than others. In this 755 756 way, models can provide considerable insight into the cognitive operations that underlie performance in creative tasks. However, despite the progress of these models, and the 757 benefits that models of this kind could bring to NCR, computational modeling of creativity 758 is currently conducted largely separately from empirical research. The researchers who 759 760 build models rarely overlap with those involved in empirical work, and models are rarely 761 mentioned by NCR. One method to increase integration between the two fields would be 762 to improve the value of models to empirical researchers. For example, with some exceptions (e.g., Lopez-Persem et al., 2022; see also Augello, 2016), the models discussed 763 have not explicitly aimed to embody a particular cognitive theory from NCR in a way that 764 765 would enable researchers to examine the theory's predictions or to test new hypotheses. Indeed, several clear steps could be taken to improve future models of creativity, to 766 increase their ability to simulate human cognition and maximize their explanatory value to 767 768 NCR.

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Future steps for computational models of creative cognition

We have argued that NCR would benefit greatly from the increased adoption of 772 773 computational modeling. To this end, the neurocognitive theories that guide NCR should, where possible, be formally defined in computational models that can simulate 774 performance in typical lab-based tasks. Hypotheses can then be developed with the aid of 775 776 computational models, with models adjusted on the basis of empirical data. This approach 777 would bring considerable clarity to our understanding of creative cognition, allowing 778 researchers to rigorously compare different theories and make inferences about 779 underlying processes. Such integration between NCR and computational modeling would, in turn, aid the development of artificial creative systems (Chateau-Laurent & Alexandre, 780 2021; Wiggins & Bhattacharya, 2014) since a more algorithmic understanding of human 781

782 creative cognition could inform models of autonomous creativity (Dipaola et al., 2018;
783 Veale & Pérez y Pérez, 2020).

In addition to a heavier focus on modeling theories from NCR, future models of specific 784 785 creative tasks should aim to meet several additional criteria (see also Mekern et al., 786 2019a). As already noted, it is highly important that computational models can simulate 787 performance on common creative tasks, to allow model output to be compared to human 788 data. This provides a means to evaluate the structure of the model, and the cognitive 789 theories and hypotheses that the model intends to represent. Different models of the 790 same task can also be compared in terms of how well they fit human data (Guest & 791 Martin, 2021; Wilson & Collins, 2019). We have suggested that smaller, narrow-focus models may be best placed to simulate creative performance on lab-based tasks, though 792 793 the option also exists to adapt larger cognitive architectures, such as Soar and ACT-R, for 794 this purpose (e.g., Schatz et al., 2018).

Indeed, future models should ideally aim to simulate performance on multiple creative 795 796 tasks. This is needed to explain how the same cognitive processes can produce creative 797 ideas in different contexts. The first step here would likely be to simulate performance 798 across different verbal tasks, since tasks in different modalities, such as musical 799 composition and drawing paradigms, would require modality-specific components (e.g., 800 memory with visual and auditory representations). Since there is considerable diversity 801 even amongst verbal tasks, which include free-association, metaphor tasks, insight 802 problem-solving in the RAT, and strategic search in the AUT, modeling performance in just some of these tasks would be a good starting point. 803

Models might also seek to adopt more complex and human-like memory structures. While 804 805 several studies have modeled human semantic memory as a static network (see, e.g., Kenett et al., 2018; Rotaru et al., 2018), with nodes representing concepts, and edges 806 807 representing associations, in reality, human memory is far more complex and dynamic. Building more complexity into a model's memory (or "knowledge base") provides it with 808 more information about concepts and their relationships, enabling more nuanced 809 810 cognitive processes to be simulated. For example, a simple network in which concepts are 811 represented in a single layer and linked by only a single kind of association does not allow the simulation of search processes that might restrict activation to only one type of 812 813 concept (e.g., objects), or to concepts that possess a particular property (e.g., roundness) rather than simply being associated with that property. 814

The benefits of more sophisticated memory structures have already been seen in a model of the RAT, in which a larger memory network with multiple kinds of association produced more human-like behavior than a smaller and simpler network (Schatz et al., 2018). Other examples of more complex memory structures include distributed and hierarchical memory. In distributed memory, concepts are represented as patterns of activity across multiple nodes, where each node can form part of multiple concept representations. This provides a more natural and biologically plausible basis for spreading activation, which
now moves between concepts that share nodes (Kajić et al., 2017). In hierarchical memory
(e.g., Olteţeanu & Falomir, 2016; Wiggins, 2020), concepts in each layer are represented
as sets of concepts in lower layers, which serve as features or properties of higher-level

- 825 concepts. In both cases, richer conceptual representations provide a basis for more
- 826 complex and flexible processes to operate on memory.
- 827 Other critical goals for future models include the simulation of individual differences and 828 context effects (see also Mekern et al., 2019a). While simulating creative performance allows models to be evaluated in relation to other models, the capacity to model 829 830 individual differences in a given psychological or cognitive factor (e.g., WM capacity or response inhibition) goes a step further, enabling researchers to develop and test causal 831 832 hypotheses for how variation in the factor leads to variation in creative performance. To 833 do this, the factor must first be embodied in the model as a set of parameters. These parameters can then be modified, leading to changes in simulated creative outcomes. If 834 835 these changes align with individual differences observed among human participants (who 836 also vary in the designated factor), then the modeled causal pathway is supported. Indeed, different versions of a model can be designed to reflect contrasting hypotheses 837 regarding how a factor affects creative outcomes. This gives researchers a powerful tool 838 839 to compare two or more causal hypotheses by examining which model set-up best fits 840 human data.

Finally, modeling context effects allows the conceptual representations stored in a model
to be adjusted in response to the current context or sensory input. Concepts in human
memory are not equally active at all times, but rather become more activated in certain
environments or after certain stimuli. Simulating context effects would thus lead to more
realistic models, and might involve allowing activated concepts (such as cue words in the
AUT and RAT) to modify the associations, weights, or features that define inactive
concepts, thus changing their representations.

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Towards greater integration between NCR and computational modeling

Progress toward a more precise, mechanistic understanding of creative cognition cannot 850 851 be made by modeling alone, but will require the cooperation of theorists, modelers, and experimenters (Dongen et al., 2022; Hitchcock, Fried, & Frank, 2022; Wiggins & 852 853 Bhattacharya, 2014). How might greater integration between NCR and computational modeling look? We would argue that any research group that proposes a theory of 854 855 creative cognition should aim to produce a computational model to demonstrate their thinking explicitly. Such models would make theories more rigorous and complete, and 856 could highlight questions for future research. Following the recommendations of Barton et 857 858 al. (2022), these models should be easily reproducible, with publicly available code that is

accessible to those with minimal modeling experience, allowing them to be adapted by 859 other researchers who wish to develop their own hypotheses. As noted, it is also 860 important that future models can simulate performance on common creative tasks, to 861 allow models to be readily compared to both human data and the performance of other 862 863 models. While we have focused on models of the AUT and RAT, NCR makes use of a large 864 number of other tasks, including metaphor tasks (Beaty, Silvia, & Benedek, 2017b; 865 Benedek et al., 2014a), drawing tasks (Ellamil et al., 2012; Rominger et al., 2018), musical improvisation (Pinho, de Manzano, Fransson, Eriksson, & Ullén, 2014; Rosen et al., 2020), 866 and story writing (Fink, Reim, Benedek, & Grabner, 2020; Prabhakaran, Green, & Gray, 867 2014). NCR should ideally aim to model all of these tasks computationally to improve our 868 understanding of the cognitive processes that enable creative performance in these 869 870 different contexts.

871 **Designing a model**

Above, we have briefly considered a simple model of creative search, but to show more 872 873 clearly how theories can be represented in formal models and how modeling can inform 874 empirical research and theoretical debate, we now outline how a more complex model 875 might be built, based on dual-process accounts (Figure 1). A simple starting point would be a semantic network, where nodes are words and edges are associative links, which 876 877 could be constructed from human free-association data (e.g., Kenett et al., 2018; Schatz et 878 al., 2018) or distributional semantics methods (e.g., Rotaru et al., 2018). The next step is 879 to examine the literature for theoretical processes that might be represented as operations on this network. For example, the spontaneous and deliberate processes 880 described by dual process theories might conceivably be modeled as collections of several 881 computational elements and mechanisms (Table 1). 882 Spontaneous processes are often described as propagating through memory, 883 reinterpreting information, and activating distant concepts (Benedek & Jauk, 2018; Volle, 884 2018), and so could be modeled via the structure of memory itself, the automatic 885 spreading of activation through memory, and the spontaneous activation of tangential 886 (i.e., non-task-relevant) ideas. Deliberate processes, meanwhile, are described as 887 888 inhibiting unoriginal or distracting ideas (Beaty et al., 2017a; Camarda et al., 2018a; Chrysikou, 2019) and directing thought to fulfill strategies (Forthmann et al., 2019b; 889 890 Gilhooly et al., 2007; Nusbaum & Silvia, 2011). As such, modeling deliberate processes

- might involve specifying mechanisms that can prevent certain ideas from activating and
- inhibit certain associative pathways to guide thought in particular directions (Volle, 2018).

Table 1. Summary of cognitive mechanisms that might feature in a computational model of verbal creativity

Broader cognitive	Specific feature or	Example from the literature	
construct	mechanism		

	Memory structure	Semantic memory structure relates to creative ability (Kenett et al., 2018).
	Automatic spreading of	Free association and verbal fluency relate to
Spontaneous	activation between	creative performance (Beaty et al., 2014;
Associative Processes	concepts	Marron et al., 2018).
	Spontaneous activation of tangential or task- unrelated ideas	In the absence of cognitive control, distraction and mind-wandering can occur (Fox & Beaty, 2018; Zabelina, 2018).
	Inhibition of unoriginal and distracting ideas	Less original and distracting ideas require suppression (Camarda et al., 2018a; Chrysikou, 2018; Lloyd-Cox et al., 2021). Inhibition relates to creative ability (Benedek, Franz, Heene, & Neubauer, 2012; Benedek et al., 2014b; Kaur et al., 2021).
Deliberate Control Processes	Strategic search processes	Strategic search occurs in the AUT (Gilhooly et al., 2007; Silvia et al., 2013). Search can vary between more flexible and persistent strategies (Lin & Vartanian, 2018; Nijstad et al., 2010).
	Control over WM input	Creativity relates to the breadth of attentional focus (Gabora, 2010; Zabelina, 2018), and WM updating and shifting (Benedek et al., 2014b; Krumm et al., 2018; Zabelina & Ganis, 2018).
Working Memory	A finite set of currently active concepts	WM capacity impacts creative thought (Fugate et al., 2013; Lee & Therriault, 2013). Context effects play a role in creative thought (Gabora, 2018).

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To be modeled effectively, these processes seem to require additional features. For 894 895 example, guiding thought to fulfill strategies suggests the existence of multiple kinds of 896 associative pathway, which could be modeled either with a hierarchical or distributed memory, or by defining the part-of-speech of words (e.g., verbs, nouns) and using these to 897 define different kinds of association. In the context of the AUT, this latter option could 898 allow the simulation of the strategy of object replacement (where the cue object performs 899 900 the typical use of another object; Gilhooly et al., 2007) by directing activation first along 901 noun-adjective-noun associative pathways (to find an object with similar properties; e.g., 902 brick -> heavy -> hammer) and then noun-verb pathways (to find uses; e.g., hammer -> pound a nail). More importantly, the notion that ideas can be distracting, and require 903 904 inhibition to allow more relevant or original ideas to activate, implies that active concepts 905 occupy a finite WM, access to which must be managed by cognitive control. Indeed, WM is not often discussed in significant depth by dual-process accounts of creative thought, 906 yet in the context of modeling appears central to the need for controlled mechanisms. 907

Modeling WM also provides a way to simulate attention. Researchers have suggested that 908 creative performance involves adjusting attention between narrower and broader states 909 910 (Dorfman et al., 2008; Gabora, 2010; Zabelina, 2018; Zabelina & Robinson, 2010) and shifting between exploratory and exploitative search strategies (Mekern et al., 2019b; 911 912 Nijstad et al., 2010). Such processes might be simulated by adjusting input to WM. For 913 example, broad or exploratory attentional states might be simulated as a wider input to WM, where activation flows more freely, and tangential ideas can activate spontaneously. 914 915 By contrast, narrow or exploitative attentional states might involve limiting WM input to only closely related ideas (see Figure 1). Embodying different attention-based theories of 916 creativity in models of this general sort would allow them to be more rigorously 917 compared. Alternatively, if a single model could simulate the behavioral outcomes 918 919 discussed by different theoretical accounts, that would strongly suggest that the theories are consistent and could be combined into one. Indeed, it is hypothetically possible that 920 all creativity-relevant control processes, including inhibition, adjustment of attentional 921 breadth, and switching between generative and evaluative modes, are based on adjusting 922 923 WM input, a possibility that could be investigated empirically.

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


Figure 1. Diagram of an example dual-process computational model of creative cognition. Semantic memory is represented as a network of concept nodes (yellow = active; blue = inactive). Creative performance depends on a combination of spontaneous processes (SP) and controlled processes (CP). Active concepts in working memory (WM) form the current context and can bias the representation of other concepts. Dashed lines indicate the breadth of WM input.

(a) In broad focus attentional states, associative processes, including spreading activation (1), and spontaneous activation of tangential concepts (2), combine with strategic controlled processes that can force activation in specific directions (3), to produce a broader input to WM.

(b) In narrow focus attentional states, cognitive control can suppress distracting concepts (4) and inhibit specific associative pathways (5) to constrain WM input to the most relevant ideas.
Different creative tasks may require different attentional states and different combinations of processes.

- 925 In principle, such a model could meet many of the requirements for future models noted
- 926 earlier. Active concepts in WM could form the current context, modifying conceptual
- 927 representations in memory by changing their associative weights. Individual differences
- 928 could be simulated by varying parameters governing specific features or operations in the
- model (e.g., WM capacity or the strength of inhibition). Finally, performance on multiple
- 930 creative tasks might be achieved using spreading activation to complete RAT problems
- 931 (e.g., Schatz et al., 2018) and the activation of specific associative pathways to perform
- 932 strategic idea generation in the AUT.

933 Implementing a model

Before such a model can actually simulate human data, it needs to be implemented 934 935 computationally. This process requires several additional steps, which we now describe in 936 more detail. The first step is to construct the memory base of the model, which in the 937 current example is the semantic network. Regardless of whether this is based on human 938 free association data or distributional semantics methods, researchers would have to 939 make several decisions, such as how many words to include, whether to exclude 940 prepositions, articles, and quantifiers, whether to combine singular and plural forms of 941 words, whether to exclude associations below a certain strength threshold, and so on. 942 Researchers also have the option to create multiple semantic networks and tailor each 943 one to an individual participant (e.g., Benedek et al., 2017; He et al., 2021).

944 Once a memory base is constructed, the next step is to choose which processes to model 945 and how to simulate them. For example, associative processes could be modeled as 946 spreading activation alone, or as both spreading activation and the spontaneous activation 947 of tangential concepts. Each approach requires specifying parameters that determine, for 948 example, how quickly or distantly activation should spread through memory, or how often 949 tangential ideas should activate. Similar decisions need to be made to simulate 950 components such as WM or cognitive control processes (e.g., how strongly inhibition 951 operates to suppress distracting ideas). These parameters can be selected based on 952 existing hypotheses or left open and later adjusted to fit participant data, as described 953 below.

954 In addition, researchers need to decide how to manage model input and output. For 955 example, in the verbal model described above, one option is to simulate input by 956 activating cue words strongly in memory (e.g., Kajic et al., 2017; Schatz et al., 2018). 957 Activation may then propagate outwards from these cue words to other concepts. The process of selecting concepts as responses for output also requires careful consideration. 958 959 In tasks like the RAT, this might involve selecting the most strongly activated concept (e.g., 960 Olteteanu & Falomir, 2015). However, tasks like the AUT may require more sophisticated 961 evaluation and selection processes, potentially based on a specified trade-off between 962 proximity to the cue word (which improves the usefulness of the response) and distance from the cue word (which improves the novelty). 963

964 Finally, researchers need to consider how the model will update over time to simulate 965 cognition. One approach is to update the model in discrete time steps. At each time step, 966 activation might spread to new concepts, while the activation of previous concepts 967 gradually decays. Further, each update might involve control processes switching to inhibit different concepts or pushing activation in a different direction. Once all these 968 factors and decision points have been implemented in the code, the model is ready to 969 970 simulate task performance. As discussed, spreading activation alone might be sufficient to 971 model performance on tasks such as chain association and the RAT (e.g., Lopez-Persem et

al., 2022; Schatz et al., 2017). However, simulating performance on the AUT might require
a slightly different model setup depending on the particular strategy used, such as object
replacement or object decomposition (Gilhooly et al., 2007).

975 Once the initial model is developed computationally, researchers can refine it and its parameters to fit human data better. One option is to build a model with a specific 976 977 structure (i.e., with certain components linked by causal pathways) based on theories and 978 hypotheses, and then fit the parameters governing model behavior to human data. For 979 example, the distance traveled by spreading activation processes could be set based on a certain weighting of participants' verbal fluency or chain association data. Researchers 980 981 could train the parameters of the model using data from one group of participants and then test its ability to predict the creative outcomes of another group. Different 982 983 hypotheses can then be tested by building different versions of the model with varying 984 causal structures, for example by modifying the process by which inhibition operates (as opposed to how strongly it operates). After testing and training, different model versions 985 986 can be compared in terms of how well their performance predicts human data. Another 987 option is to specify both the structure of the model and its parameters based on preexisting theories. Different hypotheses, for example regarding how much impact 988 989 inhibition should have on creative outcomes, can then be tested by defining several sets 990 of parameters and assessing their fit to human data (Lopez-Persem et al., 2022).

991 This brief sketch of model development clarifies how theories of creative cognition can be 992 translated into formal models. It also demonstrates the potential of modeling to identify new research avenues and the importance of cognitive factors, such as WM, that may 993 994 have been overlooked in verbal accounts. Importantly, this example highlights that modeling inevitably requires making many reasonable assumptions to "fill the gaps" left 995 by verbal accounts. Verbal theories rarely describe all the details necessary to implement 996 997 a computational model, leaving the modeler to decide factors such as how exactly to 998 structure semantic memory or simulate inhibition processes. For each of these decisions, 999 alternatives are possible, and so ideally multiple models should be constructed by 1000 different research groups and their performances compared (Poile & Safayeni, 2016; 1001 Wilson & Collins, 2019). It is crucial to note that the design and implementation of the 1002 model discussed here may differ substantially from models focused on the neural level or 1003 based on alternative theories of creative cognition, such as flexibility vs. persistence (Mekern et al., 2019b; Zhang et al., 2020). This also highlights the importance of building 1004 1005 and comparing multiple models of each creative task.

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Concluding remarks

NCR has greatly increased our understanding of creative cognition and its relations topsychological phenomena, including memory, attention, and cognitive control (Beaty et

al., 2021; Benedek & Fink, 2019; Chrysikou, 2019; Kenett et al., 2018; Kleinmintz et al., 1010 1011 2019; Volle, 2018). However, the field remains far from a mechanistic understanding of 1012 creativity complete with causal hypotheses for how cognitive processes produce creative ideas and how such processes interact differently in different tasks and individuals. We 1013 1014 believe that the increased adoption of computational modeling can significantly advance 1015 the field and bring it closer to this goal. The verbal theories that guide NCR (and 1016 psychology in general) are intrinsically more open to interpretation, more difficult to falsify, and less transparent than formal models (Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2015; Fried, 1017 2020; Guest & Martin, 2021; Smaldino, 2020). By contrast, embodying these theories in 1018 computational models can help make them more complete, accessible, and comparable. 1019 1020 Modeling forces researchers to exchange abstract constructs for concrete definitions of 1021 cognitive processes as operations in a computational system (Benedek & Fink, 2019; Wiggins & Bhattacharya, 2014). Moreover, computational modeling can allow the 1022 complex pathways that produce creative ideas to be predicted effectively. 1023

1024 For its part, though several computational models of creativity exist, they have been 1025 developed in relative isolation from empirical research, and surprisingly few are well-1026 suited to modeling the cognitive theories of NCR in a way that can be easily compared to 1027 human performance. Since a clearer understanding of human creativity could lead to 1028 more creative artificial systems, further integration and collaboration between computational modeling and NCR stands to benefit both fields greatly (Chateau-Laurent & 1029 1030 Alexandre, 2021; Dipaola et al., 2018; Veale & Pérez y Pérez, 2020; Wiggins & 1031 Bhattacharya, 2014).

Indeed, among all areas of cognitive neuroscience, NCR may benefit especially well from 1032 computational modeling. After all, creativity is a complex and heterogeneous construct, 1033 and its underlying processes undoubtedly vary greatly depending on the specific task, 1034 1035 domain, and other contextual and interpersonal factors. Ultimately, science seeks to 1036 establish cause and effect relationships, and so to truly advance, NCR needs clear hypotheses about how the same cognitive processes operate in different contexts, 1037 1038 explicitly demonstrated in computational models. Integrating NCR with computational 1039 modeling will require considerable time and coordination between fields. The stakes, 1040 however, are high, and we fervently hope this article will help stimulate the necessary dialogue across disciplines ("Theorists and experimentalists must join forces", 2021). 1041

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1742 Supplementary Information:

1743 1744	Towards Greater Computational Modeling in Neurocognitive Creativity Research
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1746	
1747 1748 1749 1750	¹ Department of Psychology, Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK ² Department of Psychology, The Pennsylvania State University, PA, USA [#] Correspondence: <u>j.bhattacharya@gold.ac.uk</u> (J. Bhattacharya)
1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760	The attached code (in MATLAB [®] ; see <u>https://github.com/Alan-Pickering/example-creativity-</u> model) implements a simple toy model of within-category search processes. We have left extensive comments in the code but this supplementary text explains in greater detail how the provided model code works and how one might experiment with it. In the spirit noted in the main article, our primary objective in this exercise is to demonstrate a simple but formal model related to creative cognition. We have tried to do this in the most accessible and transparent fashion. The hope is to enable those new to formal computational modeling to get a clearer insight into the modeling process, rather than making any major claims for the specific features of this particular model. It also makes transparent the process of making assumptions and modeling choices inherent in every formal model.
1761 1762 1763 1764 1765	This model was designed to simulate creativity tasks in which the instructions are to search a conceptual space for an unusual item or response (e.g., trying to come up with an unusual exemplar from the category of "fruit", where unusual is defined as a response that would have been suggested by very few people when asked to generate fruit exemplars).
1766	Concept network as a multidimensional space
1767 1768 1769 1770	The central idea in this model is to represent the concept network (e.g., fruits) as an <i>n</i> -dimensional space. In the code provided, we simplify this space to just two dimensions (in the code <i>ndims</i> =2). Our first assumption (A1) is that the number of dimensions will not affect the qualitative behavior of the model. We should investigate that assumption by running simulations using higher-

- dimensional models. In general, we recommend starting with simplifying assumptions but, wherepossible, one should test the impact of each assumption one makes.
- 1773 The model's key feature is that each exemplar is represented as a unique point in the space and 1774 the Euclidean distance¹ between any two exemplars reflects the overall strength of association

¹ See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euclidean_distance.

between the exemplars. Our second assumption (A2) is that the free-wheeling, undirected flow of
thought in this space will more likely move between exemplars strongly associated with one
another (e.g., apple and orange; these examples will have a small Euclidean distance between the
points they occupy). The construction of the model as outlined below ensures that the model

1779 generally behaves according to assumption A2.

1780 In this model space, the dimensions might be considered features over which items such as fruits 1781 might be associated. For example, one dimension might be "size", and because apple and orange 1782 are similar in size, the distance between them on the size dimension would be small; alternatively 1783 put, their association in terms of size would be strong. Consider another dimension, "citrus-ness"; 1784 here, we expect the distance to be larger as oranges are citrus fruits but apples are not. However, 1785 it seems likely that orange and apple would be close together on most of the model dimensions, 1786 so the overall Euclidean distance separating them (across dimensions) would be small in our 1787 model space. Thus, when one thinks of apple (as an example from the fruit category), one is likely 1788 to spontaneously think of orange, and vice versa.

- 1789 We have used a simple formal feature in our model (the Euclidean distance between items) to 1790 capture the relatedness of two items, which seems a "*reasonable*"² approach. In defense of this 1791 claim, we would argue that the associative strengths of a set of items should have "distance-like"
- 1792 properties. For example, if the associative strength between items apple and orange is 1
- (arbitrary) unit and the associative strength between orange and pear is 1.5 units, then the
- associative strength of apple and pear should be less than or equal to 2.5 units. We would
- 1795 refine/change this basic feature if the model based upon it was shown to be unable to simulate
- 1796 some aspects of observed behavior in creative tasks.
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1798 Simulating the concept network using multivariate normal distributions

1799 To generate the position of the items in the model space, we use a random number generation 1800 process. Specifically, we generated the exemplars using a multivariate normal (MVN) random³ 1801 generator (bivariate in this case as our space has two dimensions). This is a key mathematical 1802 choice which we have adopted because it is mathematically simple and well-understood. By doing 1803 so, we are not saying that the positions of items in a conceptual space always behave exactly as if 1804 they follow a MVN distribution but that it will usually be close enough to the true distribution so as 1805 to have little effect on the accuracy of the simulations we are going to perform. If the model 1806 simulations fail to capture observed behavior accurately, then we would revisit this choice for our model. 1807

Before explaining the simple implementation procedure to generate an MVN distribution inMATLAB (of note, the procedure will be similarly easy in most other coding languages), we need to

² The somewhat subjective notion of reasonableness will crop up more than once and so we will try to give a flavor of how one can justify something as reasonable.

³ See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multivariate_normal_distribution

1810 check the reasonableness of our decision to use an MVN distribution. Supplementary Figure 1


1811 (SF1) shows an example of a multivariate normal random sample of 100 items using 2 dimensions.

1812 One can see different samples by changing the *plot2show* control variable in the code provided.

1813 SF1 was generated using *plot2show*=1 and is the set of items used in simulation number 1.

SF1 shows that most items are clustered close to the center of the space, and the density of items gets less as we move outwards from 0 on either dimension. This implies that the sample items at the center of the space have lots of closely associated items and that as one moves towards the edge of the space, each item has fewer close associates. This seems to capture the associative properties of sets of items such as fruits in a reasonable way: there will be some items in the set with lots of strongly associated items (apple, pear, orange etc.), but others will be associated closely with only a small number of items (jackfruit for example).

1821



1822

1823 *Supplementary Figure 1*: A random sample of 100 items generated using a multivariate normal 1824 random number generation process in 2 dimensions. The distances along each dimension are 1825 arbitrary and standardized.

1826 We are trying to use our model to simulate the search for unusual items, where unusual items are 1827 those that few other people would think of in a limited period of time. Good answers will be items

that have few strong associates because people will generate candidate items by searching
associatively through the space. Thus, people will be less likely to come up with items towards the
periphery of the space.

1831 In Figure SF1 we used 100 items (in the code, *nitems*=100). Once again, we felt that this was 1832 reasonable: it should be roughly equal to the total number of fruits an adult human might be able 1833 to name given enough time. Our third assumption (A3) relates to this choice of number; namely, 1834 that the precise number chosen is not going to change the way the model would behave, so long 1835 as we avoid really small values (<10). Such small values are unreasonable for the sorts of sets of 1836 items we might use in the task we are simulating.

1837 The multivariate normal (MVN) random process means that, along each dimension, the 1838 distribution of item positions follows a univariate normal distribution. While a univariate random 1839 variable has a mean and a standard deviation (0 and 1 respectively, for a standard normal 1840 distribution), the MVN distribution has a mean vector and a variance-covariance matrix (mu and 1841 sigma, respectively, in the code). We set the means to be zero on each dimension and the item 1842 variances to be 1 (itemvar in the code). These are just standardized values and are not important. 1843 Nevertheless, they do allow us to scale other parameters in our model easily, given that we know, 1844 with these choices, that roughly 5% of our items will lie outside the values of -2 and 2 on each 1845 dimension.

1846 We also can choose whether there is any covariation between the values on the separate 1847 dimensions of our space. In the model code, this is specified via *itemcov*. Our next assumption (A4) 1848 is that these two dimensions are not related; therefore, we set *itemcov* = 0. This ensures that the 1849 cloud of points in our 2-d space is roughly circular; non-zero values for the covariance would 1850 stretch the cloud of points into an elliptical shape. This is, of course, an initial simplifying 1851 assumption which we believe is *almost certainly wrong* even if the other aspects of the model 1852 might be useful. Over all of the dimensions on which fruits can vary, we feel confident that the associative distance between pairs of items on some dimensions will be correlated with their 1853 1854 distances along some other dimensions (e.g., fruit size will be somewhat inversely correlated with 1855 the intensity of flavor, think melon vs blackcurrant or raspberry). Once again, tests of the impact of 1856 adopting assumption A4 should be made if the simpler model proves useful. We need to use >2 1857 dimensions to explore this assumption properly; with >2 dimensions, we can arrange it so that the 1858 degree of covariation between pairs of dimensions can vary over different pairs of dimensions.

As already noted, generating the MVN distributed items is simple: it is a single line of code once we have the parameters described above. In MATLAB, we use the *mvnrand* command and write (line 105):-

1862 itemvals=mvnrnd(mu, sigma, nitems);

1863

1864 It is important to note that we do not specify a precise set of fruits in this model or try to set their 1865 associative closeness to one another to reflect some objective reality. Our assumptions and model 1866 specification create a set of exemplars that we propose could represent any set of exemplars in a category of finite size that is broadly similar to the category of fruits. We could test this by seeing if
the real behavior on this task was similar irrespective of the specific set of items being employed
(e.g. fruits, or British Olympic gold medalists at London 2012).

1870 An obvious alternative approach would be to create an associative network for a specific category 1871 with the weights of association (distances) between items being set to "realistic" values. This could 1872 be done by evaluating the associative strength between exemplar pairs for real categories using 1873 lexical databases, or by collecting suitable experimental data from human participants. The 1874 weights used would then be set to be proportional to the measures of associative strength 1875 obtained. This sort of approach has been used in past computational models of creativity see 1876 section "Existing computational models of creativity" in the main text for examples. This is a more 1877 complex approach, and we could test whether our simplifying assumptions lead to a model which 1878 is capable of producing simulated behavior similar to that produced using a more elaborate model based on "real" associative weights. 1879 1880

1881

1882

Modeling free-wheeling associative thoughts 1883

1885 The next key aspect of the model is our choice for implementing the free association of thoughts. 1886 This is intended to capture one facet of the dual-process models discussed in the main text (see Box 1 in particular): the "spontaneous", or "generative", or "automatic" flow of ideas during the 1887 search for a creative response. We did this using a random walk⁴. Random walks have been used 1888 1889 quite extensively in modeling behavior in varied fields within psychology [1-5]. Once again, this is 1890 probably because their basic mathematical processes are well-understood. We leave it to the 1891 reader to decide if a random walk is a reasonable choice for this aspect of our model.

1892 1893 In the model, there is a loop of 200 simulations (*nsims*=200), and each simulation can be thought 1894 of as a different simulated participant attempting to generate an unusual fruit (one that would be 1895 thought of by as few other participants as possible). The choice of 200 is fairly arbitrary but, given 1896 the extensive use of random variables in the model, it needs to be large enough to give 1897 representative outcomes when aggregated across all simulations. Within each simulation, there is 1898 an inner loop of up to 10000 steps (nsteps=10000). Each step is one step of the random walk. The 1899 number of steps is initially set to be large, although we adjust this to a lower number (1500) for 1900 reasons explained below. The length of a timestep is arbitrary, but one could rescale the numbers 1901 of steps into response times (e.g., 100 steps equates to 1 second) so that the simulated response 1902 times are of the right magnitude. The walk has to start at an initial position. In the simplest version 1903 of the model, we assume (A5) that the walk starts at the center of the space: (0,0) in two 1904 dimensions (coded as mystart). This seems reasonable because, if we are asked to think of fruits, it 1905 is highly likely that we would first think of common exemplars at the center of our space. 1906

1907 Another feature is the walk step size, i.e., the amount that the walk might move in each direction 1908 on a single step. Bearing in mind that 95% of the items lie along values in the range -2 to 2 on each 1909 dimension (see above), we set the step size to 0.05 for each dimension (coded as stepsize). To 1910 make the walk random, we used a uniform random number generator to create a random move 1911 direction for each of the nsteps (=10000) steps of a simulation along each of the ndims (=2) 1912 dimensions. The direction for each step on each dimension was either -1, 0 or +1 (each occurring 1913 randomly with equal probability), generating 9 possible moves on each step (3*3 over the two 1914 dimensions). To do this, we used the randi command in MATLAB to create a matrix of values with 1915 10000 rows and 2 columns for each simulation (called *mymoves*):

```
1917
```

mymoves=randi([-1 1], nsteps, ndims); 1918

1919 The actual walk is thus a combination of the direction specified by mymoves multiplied by the 1920 amount moved in that direction, specified by *stepsize*. On the k-th step of the walk, the variable 1921 currpos keeps track of the current 2-d position of the walk iteratively, thus:-

```
1922
      currpos=currpos+stepsize.*(mymoves(k,:));
```

1923

1916

1884

⁴ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Random walk

1924 Clearly, the larger the values used for *stepsize, the more* space will be covered by the random 1925 walk. All other things being equal, our *model intuition*⁵ is that larger *stepsize* values will enable the 1926 simulated participant to encounter more unusual (peripheral) items more quickly.

- 1927
- 1928
- 1929 Retrieval of candidate items
- 1930

1931 The next aspect of the model is how we interrupt the free-associative process of the random walk 1932 with attempts to retrieve candidate items. The way we capture this in our model is that, every so 1933 often, the walk pauses and the simulated participant attempts to retrieve an example item from 1934 the current position of the random walk in our space of items. The frequency with which this 1935 attempt at retrieval occurs is controlled by a parameter in the code called walkfor (a default value 1936 of 50 steps). This means that after every *walkfor* random walk steps, an attempt at item retrieval is 1937 made. This feature of the model embeds another assumption (A6); namely, that the spontaneous 1938 free-association processes are in alternating phases with memory retrieval and subsequent 1939 evaluative processes. This is a feature present in some theoretical accounts in the literature (see 1940 [33] in the main article).

1941

1942 Which items might be retrieved at each attempt? Following the underpinning logic of the model – 1943 i.e., that the distance in the model space represents the closeness of the association of an item -1944 we implemented this using a competitive probabilistic retrieval process based on the relative 1945 distance of items from the current position of the walk. This means that the items nearest to the 1946 current position are compared in terms of their relative distances, and the probability of their 1947 retrieval is directly linked to those relative distances (closer items being more likely to be 1948 retrieved). The retrieval competition is limited to those items which are within a specific Euclidean 1949 distance of the current position. This selection of potential items for retrieval is controlled by a parameter, denoted *closeto* in the code (default =1 distance unit). This parameter is used by 1950 1951 computing the Euclidean distance between each item in the space and the current position 1952 (computed as *eucdist*, see line 140), and then computing a "logical filter" (*choicefilt* in the code) 1953 with value = 1 for those items with a Euclidean distance (ED) less than *closeto*, and 0 otherwise. 1954 The filter is used later on in the code to restrict the choice function to apply to only those items 1955 with values of *choicefilt*=1. In mathematical terms, we can define a set S of potentially retrievable 1956 items where the Euclidean distance of item *i* from the current walk position, ED_i is smaller than 1957 closeto for all items i in the set S.⁶

1958

1959 The default value of *closeto* represents a wide search radius given that 95% of the items are within 1960 a circle of radius 2 units from the center of the space. One might imagine that different individuals 1961 might vary in the value of *closeto* that they use. Our next model intuition is that someone with an 1962 ability to think more creatively might have a higher value of *closeto*, than their less creative 1963 counterpart, and so such a person would include more potential items in their retrieval searches.

⁵ A model intuition is what effect we think the model parameter will have. Even if these intuitions seem reasonable, it is important to test these out. Formal modeling allows one to move from intuitions to clear predictions when we run the simulations.

⁶ In mathematical notation if item *i* is a member of a set S, this can be written as $i \in S$

1964 The more creative person (based upon their higher value of *closeto*) would, according to the 1965 model, be more likely to alight upon a more creative (unusual) choice of fruit in a fixed amount of 1966 thinking time.

1967 The actual formula used to compute the probabilities of retrieval of the items lying within *closeto* 1968 distance units of the current position was based upon a widely adopted choice function in 1969 psychological modeling: the softmax function.⁷ Specifically, the softmax formula used to define the 1970 probability of retrieving item *i*, given that *i* is a member of the set S of competing potentially 1971 retrievable items, is as follows: -


$$p(R_i \mid i \in S) = \frac{e^{\tau/ED_i}}{\sum_{i \in S} e^{\tau/ED_j}}$$

1974

1975 The above formula suggests that the smaller the Euclidean distance of a candidate item *i* from the 1976 current position, the higher the probability that it is retrieved amongst all the competitor items in 1977 set *S*. In the code, it is computed across lines 157-159. The following lines of code (165-167) use a 1978 random number generator to retrieve a specific item in accordance with the probabilities returned 1979 by the softmax function.

1980 A key parameter in the softmax function is τ (in the code, this is *tau*), and it can take values of zero or greater. This parameter has different names in modeling contexts (e.g., inverse temperature, 1981 stochasticity or exploration-exploitation parameter), but it simply controls how noisy the choice 1982 process is. As τ gets larger then the closest item is more and more likely to be retrieved (i.e., a 1983 1984 more deterministic choice), even when it is only slightly closer than the next nearest competitor. By contrast, as τ approaches zero, all competitor items tend to be chosen with similar probabilities 1985 1986 irrespective of their relative distances (more random, noisy choice). We can see this effect of τ in 1987 Supplementary Figure 2 (SF2) during one retrieval decision during simulation number 1.

1988



⁷ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Softmax_function

1989

1990 Supplementary Figure 2: The effect of parameter τ on retrieval probabilities as a function of 1991 Euclidean distance (ED) from the current walk position. Note the difference in y-axis scale across 1992 the two panels. In the left panel ($\tau = 2$), there are 7 potentially retrievable items, but the closest 1993 two, with EDs < 0.3 have the greatest chance of being retrieved (0.55 and 0.35 approximately). 1994 Items with ED \ge 0.5 have virtually a zero probability of retrieval. In the right panel ($\tau = 0.2$) all 9 1995 potentially retrievable items have a similar probability of being retrieved (0.11996 irrespective of their EDs from the current position, even though the range of EDs goes from just 1997 below 0.5 to almost 1.

1998

1999 Once again, one has a strong model intuition that the parameter τ should directly affect the 2000 breadth of the search of the category space and thus the ability to generate more creative 2001 solutions. When τ is smaller, then more items can be retrieved at any position of the random walk 2002 than for higher values of τ . This means that, over a fixed period, the random walk has a greater 2003 chance of retrieving more peripheral items (i.e., more unusual, creative choices) for lower values 2004 of τ , all other things being equal. We can think of τ in conjunction with the value of *closeto* 2005 (already discussed) as opening up the retrieval process to a broader range of possible items. In 2006 terms that have been widely used in the creativity literature, one might view these two 2007 parameters as reflecting the degree of inhibition in memory retrieval; specifically, the combination 2008 of large *closeto* and low τ equates to weak inhibition.

2009

2010 Response selection as a controlled decision process

The final part of the model is the decision process used to decide if a retrieved item is "unusual
enough" to be worthy of being given as a response. This represents the other facet of dual-process
theories: the "deliberate", or "evaluative", or "controlled" process.

- If a retrieved item is considered unusual enough, then it will be given as a response (e.g., I have
 thought of the fruit "durian" and I am happy to give this as my example of an unusual fruit). If it is
 not deemed unusual enough, then the random walk resumes *from the position of the retrieved item*⁸ until a future retrieval attempt is made, *walkfor* random walk steps later. What decision rule
- 2018 might a participant use to decide that a retrieved item was unusual enough? We considered that it
- 2019 must be some simple property of the retrieved item that a simulated participant could use to
- 2020 decide upon unusualness. For example, perhaps after retrieving an item, the participant finds that

⁸ The position of the random walk is supposed to represent where one's thoughts currently are at within the category space. Thus, if one has retrieved an item then the position of that item seems a reasonable choice for the current "position" of your thoughts. In the code the current walk position is moved to the position of the retrieved item on line 177. So, strictly, the model is a random walk punctuated with jumps to retrieved items.

2021 it brings to mind very few close associates, then one might decide that it is worth offering as a 2022 creative response. As a simple proxy for this, we used an alternative related decision rule 2023 (controlled in the code by the parameter respmethod taking a value of 1; respmethod=2 has a 2024 different effect see below): the retrieved item has to be more than a threshold Euclidean distance 2025 from the center of the space. The threshold distance is specified by a parameter called respthresh 2026 in the code. At the start of each simulation, respthresh is set to respthreshbase (=2.0 by default). 2027 We chose this value in light of the parameters chosen for the multivariate normal distribution of 2028 the items (which force 95% of the items to lie between -2 and 2 on each dimension). If the 2029 retrieved item has an ED from the center which exceeds the value of *respthresh*, then the 2030 response is made and the current random walk stops (controlled in the code by setting endkflag to 2031 1). The simulation loop records the response information and then moves on to the next simulated 2032 participant.

To reflect the potential effect of time pressure on the task we assumed (A7) that participants might relax their decision threshold the longer they could not produce a suitable response. We simulated this by having a decrement to the value of *respthresh* (called *threshdrop* in the code, default value =0.01). The decrement is applied every 100 steps of the random walk if a response has not been made (in the code this is controlled by setting a parameter, *threshtime* = 100). This is

- a minor feature of the model and we can explore its effect by setting *threshdrop*=0 in the model.
- 2039

2040 Exploring the effects of parameters


It is relatively easy to explore the effect of the model parameters, which are likely to affect the
ability to give more creative responses. As noted above, for example, we have clear model
intuitions for the effects of *stepsize*, *closeto*, and *tau*. Thus, it is essential to test these model
intuitions, along with the effects of the assumptions listed above. For example, below, we show
the effect of changing the value of *tau*.

2046 It was noted above that the maximum number of time steps (*nsteps*) per simulation was set to 2047 10000. This large value was used to develop and set the values of the model parameters. This 2048 parameter setting was chosen because it allowed every simulated subject to retrieve an unusual 2049 item across the whole range of tau values used (0.2 to 2). To test the model, we inspected the 2050 response time distributions achieved when 10000 walk steps per simulation were permitted. 2051 Based on the mean response times over 200 simulations (generally around 1600-1700 steps), we 2052 set the maximum response time to 1500 timesteps in our test simulations. This change was made 2053 to reflect our assumption (A8) that, under a small amount of time pressure, not all subjects would 2054 be able to select a genuinely unusual response (using the *respthresh* decision rule). That is, they 2055 feel that all the candidate responses they thought of in the time allowed are likely to have been 2056 thought of by lots of other people as well. The model does not yet implement what response they 2057 offer in these circumstances. Perhaps they would give one of the less unusual items previously 2058 retrieved but still in their (working) memory. As the simulations below confirm, using the 1500

step maximum per simulation ensures that not every simulated participant can produce anunusual item (i.e., one that passes the decision threshold) in the time allowed.

2061 Supplementary Figure 3 (SF3) shows the simulation results for two very different tau values (0.2 2062 vs. 2.0). Our model intuition above was that a lower value of tau would lead to more creative 2063 responses. In our simulation, this intuition would be confirmed if a higher proportion of the 200 2064 simulated participants (with tau=0.2) can give a response that passes the respthresh decision rule 2065 compared with 200 simulated participants (with *tau*=2). The simulation confirmed our intuition: 88/200 simulated participants (with *tau=2*) were able to generate an unusual response. By 2066 2067 comparison, 123/200 simulated participants (with tau=0.2) were able to generate an unusual response. The responses made were generally in very similar average positions in the model space 2068 2069 see SF3) and were all towards the periphery of the space, in keeping with the nature of the 2070 respthresh decision rule. In addition to the greater number of responses in the low tau condition, 2071 SF3 shows that the responses were made more rapidly in the low *tau* simulations (an average of 2072 734 random walk steps, s.d.=358) compared with the high tau simulations (average= 878 2073 walksteps, s.d.=364). Thus, in respect of tau, our model intuitions are confirmed. We leave it as an 2074 exercise for the interested reader to explore the effects of stepsize and closeto in relation to the model intuitions offered above. 2075

2076



2077

2078 Supplementary Figure 3: The effect of parameter τ on the ability to make an unusual category 2079 response in the time allowed. The leftmost panels are for tau = 2.0, and the rightmost panels are 2080 for tau = 0.2. The upper row records the position of the response items made (note the greater 2081 number of responses made for the 200 simulations with tau = 0.2). The bottom row records the 2082 distribution of response times for the responses given.

2083

2084 Making new predictions with the model and testing them

It is an essential first step to show that the model behaves in the ways our intuitions suggested it would. As already noted, one must also explore, as fully as possible, the impact of the numerous assumptions and choices made in developing the model. However, for the model to be useful, it should lead to novel predictions for real creative behaviors that can be tested in actual human participants. Below we illustrate how even this simple model can generate testable predictions.

The model can easily be made to simulate a fluency task as well (where one has to name as many exemplars of the category as one can in a fixed time). In fact, the provided code already records

2092 the number of category exemplars retrieved during the "think of an unusual fruit" simulation. To 2093 simulate a fluency task, the "unusual response" decision process must be turned off. This can be 2094 achieved by setting *respmethod* to have a value of 2 (instead of the usual value of 1; 2095 respmethod=2 makes no decision about whether a retrieved item is unusual). Then one can run 2096 the code with *nsteps*=1500 (to represent the fixed amount of response time for the fluency task) 2097 with tau=0.2 vs 2.0. Across 200 simulations, the mean number of unique items retrieved for 2098 tau=0.2 was 22.1 (s.d.=2.5). For tau=2.0, the average number of unique items retrieved was 16.9 2099 (s.d.=3.5). The model thus shows that variation in parameter *tau* can underlie an ability to 2100 generate an unusual response more often and be more fluent in generating category exemplars. 2101 We leave it as an exercise for the interested reader to see if the same patterns over both tasks can 2102 be obtained using variation in the parameters *closeto* and *stepsize*.

2103 Of course, one might argue that by using verbal reasoning alone, one could have arrived at the 2104 prediction that more creative people would generate more unusual responses and also be more 2105 fluent (i.e., retrieving more exemplars from the category). Having a formal model allows one to 2106 explore this predicted effect more rigorously and thoroughly. In the main article, the idea was 2107 briefly noted that a strategic search along one dimension of the category might help find unusual 2108 items. For example, one might think of exotic locations that one has visited and thereby recall 2109 unusual fruits experienced specifically in those locations. A simple way to give dimensional 2110 directionality (of this kind) in the search could be to make the step sizes for the random walk 2111 different for each dimension. In the code provided, the step size along dimensions 1 and 2 was 2112 equal (0.05). With the same average stepsize, a more directed walk would be achieved with step 2113 sizes of 0.025 and 0.075 (or vice versa). For low tau settings (tau=0.2), this had little effect on the 2114 number of unusual responses made (in fact, they decreased slightly to 118/200 simulations c.f. 2115 123/200 simulations with equal step sizes). For high tau settings (tau=2.0), unequal stepsizes 2116 increased the number of unusual responses achieved to 103/200 (c.f. 88/200 with equal 2117 stepsizes). This is a novel prediction of the model: in the "find an unusual exemplar task", people 2118 with lower creativity (higher tau) are more likely than their more creative counterparts (low tau) 2119 to benefit from a suggestion to use a strategy of focusing their search along one/some specific 2120 feature dimension(s). This prediction could be tested with actual participants by testing them 2121 under conditions when provided with a dimensional search strategy by the experimenter and 2122 comparing the results with performance under a control condition where no such strategy was 2123 given. Strictly the prediction applies only to those whose high vs. low creativity stems from 2124 processes captured by the parameter tau (which controls the noisiness of the exemplar retrieval 2125 process).

2126

2127 Model limitations

2128 There are many limitations and unrealistic features of the current model. There is not space here

- to consider them all. Two striking illustrative examples of limitations are noted. First, the random
- 2130 walk phases in each simulation are of a fixed duration (controlled by the parameter *walkfor*). If

- 2131 these phases are intended to represent periods of mind-wandering around the conceptual space,
- then it seems unreasonable that these periods would all be of the same duration. An easy fix
- 2133 would be to use a Gaussian random variable (with mean and standard deviation) for *walkfor*, so
- 2134 that in a particular simulation, the number of steps of the random walk between each retrieval
- attempt would vary randomly about the mean value. The parameters of the random variable
- 2136 could vary across different simulated individuals.
- Secondly, and more importantly, the item retrieval process takes no time in the model. Therefore, the model should be extended to include a retrieval time component. Such a component should ensure that the pattern of Euclidean Distances (EDs) of potentially retrievable items influences the time taken for the retrieval in a principled way. For example, one would imagine that a pattern of EDs in the left panel of SF2 (two exemplars with small EDs and high probabilities of retrieval; the rest further away and with very low probabilities of retrieval) would lead to quite different
- 2143 retrieval times than the pattern in the right panel (no close exemplars and all exemplars have a
- similar probability of retrieval). A pervasive finding is that response times are slower for more
- 2145 difficult decisions [6]. It is relatively straightforward to incorporate retrieval times into the model
- in a realistic way; for example, one might use a so-called accumulator model [7].
- 2147

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