Anonymity Performance as Critical Practice in Electronic Pop Music: A Performance Ethnography

by

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Doctor of Philosophy
Declaration for PhD thesis

I, Stefanie Menrath, hereby certify that this thesis has been written by me, and that the material presented for examination is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged. Where other sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

No part of this thesis has been used previously in work related to an academic degree.

Signature:

Date:
Abstract

Through practices of anonymity electronic music culture has advanced a critique of the institution of star personality in pop music. This study investigates how academic research can learn from such pop music-related critical practices.

As it becomes an object of academic knowledge, the notoriously anti-representational electronic music culture calls for an experimental research methodology. This performance ethnography experiments, in the tradition of activist and performative anthropology, with research practice as performance.

Resisting the tendency to objectify culture as a factual research object, this study explores the processuality and performativity of cultural research matter: instead of substantial, post-personal anonymity states, the practice of fabricating anonymity in electronic pop music (in discourse and sound) is its starting point. From there, it focuses on anonymity performances – institution-critical practices of star personality that operate within the discursive and media institutions of pop music.

Adopting a symmetrical methodology, two personality-critical projects from the field of electronic pop music are addressed as laboratory cases and consulted for their tactical operations. Their anonymity performance practices – tactical persona performance, fake or collaborative imagination of a musical persona – take the form of immanent and particulate ‘critical practice’ (Butler, Foucault). Rather than distancing themselves from their ‘object’ of critique, these laboratory cases engage in concrete, affirmative or self-critical performances of pop stardom. Their resistance to the frameworks of identification and discursivity in pop both engages with and corrodes the epistemic-constitutional level of the field of pop music.

How can researchers learn from such musico-artistic knowledge practices? Guided by its laboratory cases, this study proceeds from a detached reading of an electronic pop music live performance as a (poststructuralist) study of persona construction in pop music to become an engaged performance ethnography. Performance is incorporated as critical academic practice through a reflexive and increasingly performative writing style. The study concludes with the advocation of an ethnographic research format derived from one laboratory case: the collaborative investigation of imaginary research objects as a radical implementation of the performative turn in the cultural studies of music.
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List of Abbreviations

AAA – American Anthropological Association
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
cf. – compare (from Latin confer)
DJ – Deejay
EDM – electronic dance music
e.g. – for example (from Latin exempli gratia)
et al. – and others (from Latin et alii)
fig. – figure
f. – and the following page (from Latin folio)
ff. – and the following pages or paragraphs (from Latin folio)
Fn – Footnote
HO – Hyphenation in Original
i.e. – that is (from Latin id est)
IHO – Italics & Hyphenation in Original
IM – Italics Menrath
IO – Italics in Original
MTV – television channel by MTV Networks
n.d. – no date of publication
USA – United States of America
UK – United Kingdom
VMA – Video Music Awards
vol. – volume
TM – Translations of German Original by Stefanie Menrath
Introduction

0.1 On anonymity performance, critical practice, electronic pop music, and performance ethnography

Field note 356 / First week of November 2011: The name Ursula Bogner appears on the German-language Wikipedia!¹

In the early years of the twenty-first century two compilation albums of German electronic music, released under the name ‘Ursula Bogner’ (Bogner 2008, 2011) were discussed in pop music media. Compiler Jan Jelinek, in the liner notes to the second compilation album (2011), alludes to a suspicion that has persisted since the first Bogner release (2008)²: ‘[W]hoever is looking for information about the “true” identity of Ursula Bogner in these opening remarks will be disappointed’ (Jelinek 2011:6).

Ursula Bogner is the name of the missing female link in German electronic music; a German Musique Concrète and electronic music enthusiast who would fit nicely into an international lineage of female electronic music composers such as Delia Derbyshire, Daphne Oram (both of the BBC Radiophonic Workshop) or Else Marie Pade (of Danmarks Radio) – all of whom have been re-discovered in the last decade. Is Ursula Bogner a historical person or a collective name for the countless (female) artists who remained unacknowledged by public media?

This study provides no answers concerning the ‘secret’ identity of Ursula Bogner, but instead investigates the critical potential of ‘naming the nameless’ and of anonymity as institutional critique of personality in pop music. While there are continuities with 20ᵗʰ-century avant-gardist critiques of the unitary artist-subject and with post-structuralist author-critiques, the critical practices of personality in

² The first Ursula Bogner album, compiled by Jan Jelinek, was released in November 2008, the second, compiled by Andrew Pekler, was released in Oct. 2011.
electronic pop music specifically target the institution of the *star* personality in pop music.

*Field note 1/ Aug. 2006: The Detroit dance music producer Moodymann, known for his obscurantist attitude, deejays at Berlin’s Cafe Moskau from behind a sheet. In his performance the sheet draws our attention to the physical absence of the sound sources that we listen to, while at the same time it grants Moodymann a special presence.*

Within electronic dance and pop music, practices of anonymity have been tested for their political and aesthetic⁢³ potential since the late 1980s. In electronic dance music (EDM) the acousmatic quality of recorded sounds (the source of the sound remains unidentifiable due to the separation of sound and image in recording) formed not only the basis for practices such as white-labelling (i.e. anonymizing) records and the faceless⁣⁴ (as opposed to star-centred) presentation of musical sounds in marketing and distribution channels, it also allowed for new hybrid musician roles such as the club DJ to develop and eventually attain central importance within the scene⁢⁵. While subcultural electronic dance music (EDM) agents have intensified the general a-personality created by acousmatic, electronic sounds and collectivized the distribution and reception scenarios of pop music, other (electronic pop music) projects (for example Moodymann) more spectacularly perform the process of de-personalization and articulate their ‘no’ to normative practices of identification in a theatrical manner. In its exploration of anonymity as a politically and aesthetically idealized scenario of creativity emerging from the crowd, electronic dance and pop music has become notorious for (either substantially or spectacularly) eluding discursive and visual

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⁢³ Mark Butler (2006:34) refers to an ‘aesthetics of anonymity’ in EDM.
⁣⁴ “When techno first emerged into mainstream British consciousness in the early nineties, it was disparagingly labelled “faceless techno bollocks”. The Rising High label appropriated this, turning it into a defiant pro-techno T-shirt slogan” (Monroe 2003).
⁢⁵ In mainstream media coverage DJs were the figureheads of techno.
representation – by refusing to give individual author or interpreter names and portrait images or, by literally hiding behind a curtain. In light of these circumstances, when researchers endeavour to drag such music cultures into the realm of (academic) discourse, an experimental methodology is called for.

Field note 275/ January 2010: Swedish singer and electronic pop musician Fever Ray appears on a Swedish Music Award Show to receive her award for ‘Best solo debut of 2009’. She ascends the stage wearing an upper body- and face covering red costume. Taking award and microphone in hand to deliver the requisite acceptance speech, she raises the upper head-masking part of her costume only to reveal a second mask of abstract alien-animal form – from which she merely exhales a deep, throaty wheeze.

Fever Ray’s TV performance helped me develop a significant differentiation: I am not interested in whether Karin Dreyer Andersson a.k.a. Fever Ray substantially practices anonymity on stage, but rather in how she performs it. Doing anonymity and performing anonymity are two different perspectives on the cultural practice of anonymity. A focus on ‘practices’ is a perspective that was revived during the performative turn in the cultural disciplines of the late 1990s. While cultural sociology has undergone a ‘practice turn’ (Schatzki/Knorr Cetina/Savgny 2001), cultural anthropology has seen a performance turn (Conquergood 1991, Schechner 1999) and both fields have increasingly focussed on the ‘act’ of culture while shifting their analysis towards practices (rather than structures, texts or ‘webs of significance’ (Geertz 1973:5)). In line with both these developments, this study concentrates on anonymity practices as strips of activity.

The practice-based approach has a significant impact here. Whereas Fever Ray uses a visual symbol, the mask, a scholar might use the linguistic term ‘anonymity’ – according to socio-cultural practice theory both these
representations, (visual) medium and (terminological) language, are not merely constructions (in supposed contrast to the social practice itself which is somehow ‘real’). Social practices are factual and fictional, practical and theoretical. Practice theory locates practices both in subjective agency and in objective structures and understands them as unpredictable and contingent. In this sense, knowledge production on social practices must also reflect this double logic and dispel the artificial epistemological positions of subjectivism and objectivism (Hörning/Reuter 2004:13f). The practical turn in (cultural) sociology has notably not only extended the unit of analysis to social actions but also to the practices of theorization and knowledge production themselves (Knorr-Cetina 1999, Lynch/Woolgar (1988)1990).

The culture-sociological notion of practice also comes close to the notion of performance as used in performance studies. Performances are also both generative and repetitive, but, crucially, performances also involve a ‘consciousness of doubleness according to which an actual execution of an action is placed in mental comparison with a potential, an ideal, or a remembered original model of that action’ (Carlson 1996:5 paraphrasing Baumann 1989). The difference between doing (practices) and performing (performances) therefore lies, firstly, in the location of this reflexivity. The reflexivity and the consciousness in performance are located primarily in the performer her/himself (and does not reside with the social analyst, as in the notion of practice that is used in practice theory). Secondly, ‘a performance stands in and of itself as an event’ (Roman 1998:xvii) and the methodology of performativity focuses on singular actions while practice theory is predominantly interested in routines and frequent, periodic actions (Hörning/Reuter 2004:12).

The music projects I have gathered in this study act out reflexive and singular practices, i.e. performances of anonymity. In the pop music field, anonymity is an
activity critical of individual-centred discourse and the institution of ‘star personalities’ in pop music, yet I am less interested in anonymity as a practice in the sense of a habitualized (sub)cultural routine (the substantial anonymity realized by EDM) than in singular performances and presentations of anonymity. My methodological anchor therefore lies in the paradigm of the performative, and I investigate anonymity practices as performances. These performances represent expert meta-engagements with anonymity enacted by electronic pop music agents, who have regularly positioned themselves rather on the fringes of EDM, as avant-garde projects, or as genre-crossers.

In the tradition of a ‘nomad’ (rather than a ‘royal’) science (Deleuze/Guattari (1980)2002:373), I ‘follow’ two such cultural expertise projects. In its original sense, ‘method’ (from Greek ‘methodos’, a composition of meta (after) and hodos (way, motion, journey), means nothing less than just such a ‘following’ (Deleuze/Guattari 2002:372). Nevertheless, a precision of methodology might be called for:

Field note 417. Nov. 2011. I finally read Jacques Derrida’s ‘Signature Event Context’ ((1972)1988) to its very end: at the end of this paper, in which he argues for the iterability and absence in writing, Derrida places his personal signature.

Fig. 1 Derrida’s signature in ‘Signature Event Context’ (Derrida 1988:23)

My notion of the ‘performative’ draws on Derrida’s ((1972)1988) deconstructive reading of John L. Austin’s speech act theory. Austin ((1962)1975) had called
specific forms of language usage ‘performatives’ and declared them productive due to the radical presence of their speaker, Derrida (1988) deconstructed Austin’s approach and instead positioned writing – a radical form of absence – as the basis of all forms of communication. Derrida locates the productive agency of language, which Austin had located in the presence of a speaker, in the general iterability of signs. Two elements of Derrida’s approach are of special importance to my project: firstly, by positioning the principle of repetition (in contrast to Austin’s principle of self-presence) as the condition of the possibility of any sign usage (Schumacher 2002:386), Derrida laid the ground for an extension of the concept of the ‘performative’ from the linguistic field to theatrical and social performances (cf. Butler 1988, 1990, 1993).

Secondly, Derrida notably applies the principle of the performative to his own writing. While Derrida had argued in his paper for radical absence, he doubles (and undermines) this statement at the end of the paper with an obverse flourish: the handwritten signature,\(^6\) which suggests that, contrary to his argument, Derrida also believes in an absolute presence in writing. With this paradoxical gesture Derrida enacts his approach to deconstruction: ‘Deconstruction does not consist in moving from one concept to another, but in reversing and displacing a conceptual order [...] with which it is articulated’; ‘it must, through a double gesture, a double science, a double writing – put into practice a reversal of the classical oppositions and a general displacement of the system’ (Derrida 1988:21).

Just as the engagement with the ‘performative’ has corrupted Derrida’s own academic writing, the ‘performative turn’ has infiltrated methods of research and writing in cultural anthropology and ethnography. Within music studies, I position

\(^6\) Of course, in Derrida’s book ((1972)1988) and here in this text, the handwritten signature is photographically and then digitally reproduced.
my work within the field of cultural studies and specifically in music ethnography. Ethnography is a method used in anthropology and ethnomusicology, yet since the Writing Culture debate (Clifford/Marcus 1986) ethnography has come to represent not only a distinct qualitative research method but also a specific text genre. In music studies, ethnography is applied to various music cultures – from traditional musics, to youth (sub)cultures and to the world of classical music (Cook 2008). In music ethnography, music is, in the tradition of ethnomusicology, understood as cultural practice (of a group of people, a culture, a field) to be analysed by an ethnographer in a period of fieldwork characterized by a multi-layered methodology and eventually represented in writing.

The area of my research, ‘electronic pop music’, hardly forms a geographically or socially circumscribable ‘field’ as it is produced and consumed in global contexts, by individuals and groups who are both socially and geographically disparate. Nevertheless, ‘electronic pop music’, insofar as it represents a pop music culture heavily determined by electronic modes of production, has a historical boundary: it grew out of the subculture of electronic dance music (EDM) in the late 1980s in Europe and the US and crossed over to the mainstream club culture of ‘electronic pop music’ in the mid 1990s. My methodology differs from a traditional fieldwork because, besides face-to-face interactions and participation in electronic dance music events and performances, I include archival material such as journalistic texts, videos, sound recordings and books on electronic dance and pop music along with theoretical texts and use them not as corrective materials but as a constitutive part of my data material (cf. Des Chenes 1997:76ff.). Therefore, I include video transcripts and theoretical excerpts in my fieldwork notebook. The performative turn, nevertheless, permeates my methodology also in a more radical sense:
Field note 418, Jan. 2012: Michael Taussig in his dOCUMENTA (13) publication on Fieldwork Notebooks (Taussig 2011:5): ‘[C]hance determines (what an odd phrase!) what goes into the collection, and chance determines how it is used. (Imagine a social science that not only admits to this principle but runs with it!)

This strikes me as an insightful way of portraying a fieldworker’s notebook’.

Running with the principle of chance postulates a model of socio-cultural science that is itself performative. ‘If the world is a performance, not a text’, and culture ‘a verb, a process, an ongoing performance’ (Denzin 2003:11f.), this calls for a radical ‘rethinking [of] ethnography’ (Conquergood 1991). Although I associate myself with ethnography, my aim is not to represent electronic pop music culture holistically. Ethnography has, with its crisis of representation, seen a ‘deep epistemological, methodological and ethical self-questioning’ (Conquergood 1991:179). Yet even in critical ethnography ‘reflexivity failed to generate new strategies, forms and norms of practice to encounter the more complex, parallel and fragmented worlds that many fieldwork projects must now negotiate’ (Marcus 2010:84). While the ‘field’ of Malinowskian ethnography was understood as a place of marginality and alterity, today’s fields resemble what George Marcus (2010:88) calls a ‘mise-en-scène’, a self-evidently dramaturgical product of ethnographer and ‘ethnographees’. Marcus’ concept of the ‘mise-en-scène’ reflects the fictional element that accompanies every topographical description (Bayard (2012)2013). Moreover, ethnographic practice and fieldwork turn into a ‘collaborative performance of an enabling fiction between observer and observed, knower and known’ (Conquergood 1991:190).

Deriving from critical ethnography, beginning in the 1990s performative anthropology established performance not only as a subject of study but as a method of research. A focus on performances lends itself well to my subject, since performance is ‘a fundamental dimension for music’s existence’ (Cook
2008:58). My ‘performance ethnography’ on anonymity in electronic pop music understands its subject/object as performance: musical practices, in my case, anonymity practices on musical and social stages, are analysed as performances. Yet performance, as a method of research, also affects my overall writing and my knowledge practice. I understand my field of research as the formation of discourses and practices of and on anonymity in electronic pop music. While anonymity is a widely spread and frequently commented upon practice in electronic pop music, it is, like any other ethnographic ‘field’, also always a ‘scene’ that I as a researcher construct and perform myself – in collaboration with my co-performers in the ‘ethnographed’ culture.

Performance ethnography experiments with performance as research practice – in both the senses of theatrical and processual performance. Performance as a theatrical, staging activity manifests itself in this study by the implementation of ‘performance texts’; new ‘texts that move beyond the purely representational and toward the presentational’ (Denzin 2003:xi). The effect on my writing is that my research protocol itself turns into a theatrical performance. In the tradition of performance writing, my text aims to ‘evoke […] what it names’ (Phelan 1998:13) and I use language in ways that ‘show […] rather than tell […]’ (Denzin 2003:93). My text includes visual material that not merely illustrates but performs an argument, and thus my text ‘looks distinctive on the page’ (Denzin 2003:94), – using special typefaces and graphical elements. In the later chapters, I also include other genres of writing, for example, borrowed from the encyclopaedia format, or, as in this introduction, from the fieldwork notebook. Furthermore, by use of the ‘I’ of the researcher and an ongoing research narrative my personal presence is woven into this text.
Performance as research practice further manifests itself in this study as a *processual* activity of the performance-researcher. The research matter of this study is processually transformed and re-perspectivized and this process begins with the delineation of my research matter: anonymity cannot be a transcendent object of investigation. On the one hand, anonymity ‘needs witnesses and relies on someone knowing that the proper name is being hidden or held in reserve’ (Gaston 2008:107 referring to Derrida 1987:46f.). On the other hand, one cannot know about someone anonymous without impairing her or his anonymity, without registering or making her or him known. Personal anonymity is ephemeral and ontologically precarious. Or put more generally, the knowledge of anonymity impairs its being. Nonetheless, like a secret, anonymity’s ephemerality exerts a potent attractive force on me as an observer. And as ‘[t]here is no such thing as a secret (Taussig 1999:7, IM), there also is no such thing as anonymity. A possible state of ‘being without name and identity’ would instead depend on an active not-knowing, existing only as a ‘public secret’ (Taussig 1999). Within linguistic discourse, anonymity ‘won’t stay still’; it puts forward a ‘chain of substitution’ (Caesar 2008:38) that helps one to realize the procedures of construction that are necessary to produce a factual, distinct (discursive) object. Rather than being a fully transcendental, universal object that can be acknowledged by the fully immanent (social) subject, anonymity can only be understood as what Michel Serres calls a ‘quasi-object’ (Serres (1981)2007:228) – both transcendent *and* immanent (Lash 1999). Following the deconstructivist interrogation of categorical oppositions, all cultural or anthropological things (including practices and material objects) can be understood as fabricated (albeit not arbitrary) things or as artefacts (of practices). But quasi-objects, such as ‘anonymity’, carry a specific, demonstrative hybridity with them, so that they inevitably corrupt all forms of distanced inquiry. Within the context of modernist, dualistic worldviews, which still
dominate scholarly inquiry, these quasi-objects create noise. The quasi-object of anonymity destabilizes the assumed transparency of theoretical language and displays the performativity of knowledge production. How does one investigate such a corruptive research object?

Having already stated that my research interest concerns anonymity performances (rather than anonymity practices), I can now provide the methodological rationale for this decision. The corruptive quasi-object of anonymity compels me to take a step back and to consider the fabrication rather than the (autonomous) fact of anonymity as research object, and to affirm the genuine performativity of cultural research objects: both present and represented, cultural research objects are substantial facts and fabrications of the researcher.

With Latour (1999:281, IO), one can argue that ‘scientists make autonomous facts’, but in the act of fabricating them they can be ‘slightly overtaken by the action’, ‘surprised’ and are ‘not in command’. As a theoretical object, anonymity unmistakably displays this performativity and therefore prompts one to consider the process of fabricating anonymity, namely anonymity practices and performances. While Latour’s shift towards actions and practices highlights the actions of researchers, when one shifts focus to consider academic practices, one finds anonymity to be a rare theme: few studies on the topic exist and in the academic field “anonymity” seems to be an instance of what it names’ (Natanson 1986:23).

For these reasons, I have expanded the circle of research agents to include musico-artistic agents from the ‘field’ as ‘researchers’ and ‘knowledge practitioners’. Electronic dance music (EDM) has experimented with anonymity, through practices such as white-labelling or faceless media-presentation of

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7 While Latour (1999:140) introduces (and then rejects) the metaphor of the (theatre) stage, I find the metaphor of the performance stage most appropriate to understand the ‘scene’ of research.
recordings, since it emerged as a subcultural movement in the late 1980s. With (personal) anonymity EDM itself, as a movement, aimed to go beyond dualisms of subjects and objects. Within EDM, the strategy of choice centred on the avoidance of discourse-centred forms of communication and classifying language, while within the music itself, non-organic sounds emphasized the aim of fully collapsing the ‘human and artificial’ (Loza 2001:350). This was meant to help ‘dissolve [...] all of the other dualities’ (Springer 1996:34) – those pertaining to identity with its binaries of gender, race and sexuality specifically, and the dualism of subject and object in general. Much has been written on EDM and I will not be joining the queue of those who seek to answer the question of this movement’s success in these endeavours. I will also not be investigating non-personality in the forms that pop music theory of the last 30 years has been immersed in – the approaches of theorizing sound and listening, describing non-personality as subject-less-ness theoretically or supporting the various motivations for anti-personality in EDM theoretically.

Instead I depart from an investigation of anonymity as a substantial fact, and understand it as a political or critical action. Anonymity practices in general are critical of pop music star personality and the identity-orientation of pop music discourse. In an ultimately science-centred (not field-centred) transdisciplinary endeavour I aim to make the field knowledge about anonymity productive for academic knowledge practice. Therefore, my interests centre on specific anonymity practices from the field: reflexive practices, which do not predominantly aim to achieve substantial anonymity, but rather perform anonymity itself.

Instead of theoretically speculating on how to bring a (corruptive) research object into (academic) discourse, I conducted a transdisciplinarily search for field projects that do not achieve full anonymity but perform anonymity – performing in
the sense of processing but also staging (in discourse). The chosen projects stem from electronic pop music and are critical of pop music star personality, yet they do not refuse identification and subject constitution in discourse altogether, but perform personality in a critical, des-integrating manner\(^8\). In their performance of anonymity, these projects find alternative, and discursive, ways of practicing a critical a-personality. They interfere with discourse, using written and spoken language and vocality in performances or engaging in public relations and journalistic discourse. Contrary to the majority of EDM, these projects deliberately engage in linguistic operations and reflect the theatricality of discourse and discursive critique; but they also engage in language’s processuality and release it from its representative functions. It is certainly clear that these musico-artistic ‘research’ projects have functions other than producing critical, discursive knowledge – however this is the aspect that is of most interest to me in this project.

In my transdisciplinary methodology these field projects serve as laboratory (not exemplary) cases of anonymity performance: learning transdisciplinarily from such non-academic practices and accepting these ‘other’ knowledge practices as equal is the first step towards expanding the academic archive and augmenting (not invalidating) the possibilities of scientific scholarship. But these projects offer more: in their very ephemerality and indeterminableness, in their resistance to becoming an object of knowledge, lies exactly their critical potential. Anonymity practices are critical of the fixation of subjectivity in identitary, denominating discourse and as practices they cut across the subject/object-divide while producing neither clear objects nor subjects.

\(^8\) Similar to institution-critical art, which criticizes the institutions of art while being displayed in galleries and museums (Fraser 2005), electronic pop music performances of anonymity use the discursive and media institutions of pop music while critiquing them.
My research question for this study is therefore centrally concerned with method: how can one practice critical knowledge about anonymity performances and not objectify the ephemerality of these practices?

Before embarking on a transdisciplinary search for answers from within the field (in order to eventually apply them as academic methods), the notion of ‘critical’ in this question must be clarified. Traditionally, ‘critique’ was linked to the position of distance between a subject of knowledge and its object(s); critical subjects delivered judgements about objects, they disclosed knowledge about objects. Yet due to major shifts in political and social power structures since the last decades of the 20th century this operation of ‘disclosure’ has become problematic. In today’s society of control (Deleuze (1990)1995), rather than enclosing rules, it is flexible modulations, which exert power. Traditional criticality that calls for transparency, ‘disclosure’ and distanced judgement has therefore undergone a crisis. In contrast to such contemplative, abstract operations of critical judgement, ‘critical practice’ (Butler (2000)2002) or ‘practical critique’ (Foucault (1984)2003:45) does not deliver critical knowledge ‘about’ but ‘with’ an object of critique (Huber et al. 2007:9). Critical practice as developed by Foucault and Butler does not investigate from a neutral and autonomous standpoint, but represents a knowledge practice that is self-transformational and ‘exposes the limits of [an] epistemological horizon’ (Butler 2002:217), while concentrating on the ‘invention of as many new practices as possible’ (Sonderegger 2008:673, TM). Critical practice is self-critical (i.e. it reflects the ‘knowledge-power nexus’ (Foucault (1978)2007:61) within every knowledge practice) and is delivered in a performative, artful form of practice.

With Foucault’s critical project and Derrida’s performative project in mind, critical practice will not only be an object of investigation in this study, but will itself be applied as research practice. A critical position – also towards one’s own work –
has to be taken permanently; research as critical practice has to self-critically acknowledge its very own reductions. Instead of setting up definitions and applying them subsequently, in the course of this study and in dialogue with my laboratory cases, I develop and apply concepts (such as ‘persona performance’ and ‘fake’, or ‘knowledge practice’) and discard some of them later in the text. My theoretical musings alternate with analyses of the laboratory cases.

The processual character of ‘performance’ manifests itself in this ‘performance ethnography’ as a continual transformation und re-perspectivation of its research matter. This text documents a process of research through various concepts, only delivers potential solutions to the research question (i.e. a thesis) in its final stretch. The structure of this study therefore more closely resembles a patchwork rather than a tree.

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Outline

After this basic introduction, Ch. 0.2 draws together the historical reference points of practices of anonymity and their utopian and dystopian potential. It also refines my basic differentiation between anonymity practices: those that in effect produce substantial anonymity, and those that knowingly and spectacularly perform a-personality in discourse without necessarily effecting full anonymity – discursive anonymity performance will be at the centre of this study. Chapter 0.3 points to three potential forms of critiquing pop music personality: the critical investigation of star personality (as in the various disciplines of academic star studies), the (distanced) refusal of pop music personality (as in the anonymity practices of EDM) and the critical practice of pop music personality (as in the anonymity performances of electronic pop music projects examined in this study).
Investigating an anonymity performance by electronic pop music artist Fever Ray, Ch. 0.3 distils characteristics of critical practice (against a backdrop of historical concepts of critique in theory), which is then itself taken up as the guiding knowledge production principle of this study and developed into a research design.

Chapter 1 represents the first laboratory case of this study. Here I analyse how dance music producer Moodymann studies the construction of persona and demonstrates the various (historical and medial) aspects of the ‘pop music persona’ in a live performance. Proceeding from Moodymann’s practice, in Ch. 2 I arrive at a summary of the approaches to practice and performance in (pop) music studies and their applicability to electronic dance music. An excursion following Ch. 2 then introduces approaches to persona, which I present in a deconstructive format, a fictive encyclopaedia entry. Chapter 3.1 again aims to work out a definition of one form of critical anonymity practice in electronic pop music – the fake. The terminological and practice history of fake, in pop music and elsewhere, which I develop in Ch. 3.1, will then in Ch. 3.2 be discarded in favour of a more self-critical practice, as applied by the musical project ‘Ursula Bogner’. With this second laboratory case I then arrive at a point where I tentatively name this practice ‘collaborative imagination’. Finally, rather than defining this practice, I argue for transforming this critical practice into a methodology for researching sensitive objects.

Broadly speaking, Chapters 1 and 2 can be summarized as dealing with ‘practice and performance’, the axis of ‘critical practice’ as put forth by Judith Butler, while Chapter 3 and the conclusion concern themselves with the self-critical aspect of critical knowledge practices – the axis of epistemological critique in critical practice put forth by Michel Foucault.
0.2 The enigmatic void: sonic anonymity practices vs.
discursive anonymity performances in electronic dance
and pop music

‘This is the enigmatic void of Acid House:
where the invisible hide and the mute prefer silence,
where the ecstasy of disappearance resists
the imperative to reveal one’s self’ (Melechi 1993:38)

Although anonymity has seldom been an autonomous research object, the term’s
discursive use and history are worthy of review. In lieu of a current state of
research on anonymity, this chapter presents the discursive history and
contemporary usage of ‘anonymity’. In today’s digital culture, personal anonymity
forms a political ideal while simultaneously harbouring dystopian notions of
irresponsibility and totalitarianism. Anonymity has accommodated this
ambivalence from the early years of the 20th century when it gained its two
distinct meanings. In the more recent past electronic dance music celebrated the
void created by anonymized sounds. The high degree of prestige accorded to
obscurity within dance culture not only encouraged an active audience seeking
out information about new styles and genres (rather than individual authors), but
also – through ‘[t]he “moral panic“ associated with early rave culture’
(Hesmondhalgh 1998:237) – served as an effective marketing tool
(McRobbie/Thornton 1995:565), ‘obviat[ing] the need for promotional skills and
marketing costs on the part of the incipient independent sector’ (Hesmondhalgh
1998:237). This chapter discusses the discursive conditions in which the sonic
anonymity practices of EDM operate and how self-critical projects from within the
scene engage with the ‘enigma’ of anonymity in discursive anonymity
performances.
History of the term ‘anonymity’

In its early 20th century sociological usage, anonymity figured as a cultural-historical and political diagnosis of urban culture, signifying the impersonality, estrangement and solitariness of the modern metropolis. Here the term was used for a critique of modern urban society in which agglomerations of individuals live in close proximity to one another while ‘sinking’ into anonymity (Canby 1926 as quoted in Natanson (1986:80)). Anonymity has also been used negatively in reference to the crowd, in the sense that, by ‘being anonymous’, the crowd is considered to be ‘in consequence irresponsible’ (Le Bon 1896:33).

This negative connotation of the term persists in the reputation that anonymity has today when it is used in contexts of liability (of speech) on the Internet. Furthermore, negative usage of anonymity persists in the sense of ‘sovereign or [externally] imposed anonymity’. This usage is frequently found in the context of contingent labour of blue collar jobs, of ‘anonymous adjuncts’ (O’Dair 2008:11) in academia, as well as of anonymity as the imposition of namelessness by a state for the purpose of exclusion; foreigners, ‘sans-papiers’, the undocumented aliens who, being ‘without a name’ are also without rights and without the right of human dignity (Derrida 2002:135).

By contrast, in early 20th century critical literary discourse anonymity gained a positive connotation as the aesthetically idealized practice of publishing a piece of writing ‘without a name’ (in the literal sense) or in the figurative sense of writing in an impersonal manner. Here, anonymity became used as a kind of antonym to personality (Ferry 2002:198) and its imposition (anonymous authorship or impersonal writing style) was highly valued as a strategy of ‘anti-personality’ amongst writers who disregarded individual expression and disdained a literary scene and publishing industry based on individual authorship claims and
personality cults. Of course, anonymous production and non-personal reception had been the norm in pre-modern oral, literary, musical and folk traditions and the term anonymity itself only gained usage in the 19th century (‘Anonymity’ 1989) – when ‘personality’ had become the standard model of literary and musical distribution.

**The term ‘anonymity’ as discursive act**

Both early 20th century usages of anonymity – cultural impersonality and aesthetic anti-personality – were developed in fields of (traditional) critique; the sociological critique of cultural anonymity and critical literary discourse. These two critical discourses valuate anonymity differently (negatively in the case of sociological critique, positively in literary critique) but both usages, albeit referring to concrete practices, are applied in order to judge and impose a critical distance to these practices. Thus, in critical modernist discourse, anonymity forms a ‘paradox’ (Ferry 2002:209); the utopia of aesthetic non-personality as opposed to the dystopia of cultural impersonality. Critical discourse aims to level this gap by the very use of the term anonymity. Interestingly, the Greek word ‘anonymos’ first appeared in the English language in an act of sovereign, epistemological distancing: when something was found to have ‘no name to be called by, [it] got thereupon the name Anonymos’ (Holland (1601:274) cited after Gaston 2008:107). ‘In other words, the birth of the ‘anonymos’ in English does not announce what is without name as much as the naming of the nameless’ and “Anonymous” becomes the proper name, the capitalization, the socially recognized form of the without name’ (Gaston 2008:107), thus making possible the imposition of the naming convention upon pre-modern (and subsequent 20th century anti-modern) practitioners of ‘writing without name’. Rather than (merely linguistically) representing an existing, circumscribed object, the word ‘Anonymos’

9 Philemon Holland (1601) was the translator of Pliny’s natural history (Gaston 2008:107).
itself executes the objectification. As a neologism in the 19th century, the term anonymity helped produce a differentiation between the private and the public and the use of the term today still invokes this difference between the public as ‘known by everyone’ and the private as ‘known by no one’ 10. Yet, in a poststructuralist perspective, the term also inserts a mediation: recognizing something as ‘known by no one, anonymous’ and thus fully private mediates this private entity to the public and thus ‘makes’ it public – that is, generally known.

This study is predicated on the poststructuralist view of language and knowledge that asserts that discourse is not merely descriptive but has consequences in the material world. Referring to the utopia of collectivity by the term anonymity is itself a discursive act that has consequences for the music scene in which anonymity is practiced. The self- or other stylization of EDM as ‘radically anonymous’ is an objectification of these practices. The discourse about musical anonymity – critical and distanced – is never fully able to close the gap between a utopia and a dystopia of anonymity and will always interfere in the realities of publicity and privacy, collectivity and individuality.

*Sonic anonymity practices in production, distribution, and reception*

Studies on the ‘aesthetics of anonymity’ (Butler 2006:43) in EDM have, until now, not considered such a poststructuralist take on language and discourse. Accounts of electronic dance music commonly focus on either the (bodily) experience of EDM sound or the new production apparatus of EDM in order to postulate EDM as a music that is *separate* from discourse.

In this first case, arguments are put forth that focus on the highly synthetic sound

10 Although anonymity as a term used in the literature of sociology and psychiatry might have helped producing this differentiation within the respective disciplines, the term is curiously absent from other scholarly fields. In 1986, philosopher Maurice Natanson (1986:23) writes: ‘The last time I looked, there was no entry for “anonymity” in the subject-card catalog of Yale’s Sterling Memorial Library. [...] “anonymity” seems to be an instance of what it names’.
and acousmatic properties of the music, the use of sampled fragments of other music and the rare use of vocals (see Eshun 1998, Reynolds 1998, Tagg 1994, Gilbert/Pearson 1999:38ff.) thereby directing attention to the music’s ‘surface’ rather than to its ‘sources’. If, despite the generally acousmatic quality of the sounds (the source of the sound remains unidentifiable), one hears (and can identify) a sound source, it is likely to be a machine (rather than a human body) invoking – if anything – the impersonal soundscape of a metropolitan or industrialized city. Along with this ‘depthlessness’ (Toynbee 2000:132), the sound of EDM is based on repetitive percussion patterns and rhythmic structures instead of narrative development and storytelling (Toynbee 2000:132, Gilbert 1997:18, Diederichsen 2008b:185). These intratextual, sonic features of EDM place listeners arguably in a state of ‘pure presence where time, and therefore subjectivity, threaten to disappear altogether’ (Toynbee 2000:145 referring to Melechi 1993 and Gilbert 1997) and where the music effects them ‘immediately’.\textsuperscript{11} A further transformation of subjectivity is facilitated by the experiencing of music in networked forms of club dancing and trance-like states induced by drug consumption (Collins 1997, Jackson 2004).\textsuperscript{12} In such experience-oriented readings, EDM sound – addressing a crowd with ‘a body [that] is a large brain that thinks and feels’ (Eshun 1998:22) in dance rather than a thinking, individually conscious audience – can put the subject in a liminal state.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} Immediacy is the much-vaunted feature of EDM, commentated to for example by Melechi (1993), Gilbert (1997), Reynolds (1998).

\textsuperscript{12} The role of dance and bodily experience in techno culture has been further conceptualized by Gabriele Klein ((1999)2004) as being not merely transformative but primarily constitutive of social reality.

\textsuperscript{13} Gilbert and Pearson present a divergent approach aiming to infuse the experience-oriented account with notions of music ‘discourse’ in their book Discographies (1999). Gilbert and Pearson notably differentiate the notion of discourse – utilizing Walser’s (1993) model of ‘music discourse’ and Butler’s (1993) notion of materiality as a function of discourse – as both physical and mental, material and ideal. Yet with their exclusionary focus on sound as the single medium of music, Gilbert and Pearson all too quickly foreclose further discussion on music discourse. They return to a notion of music as a ‘more physical type of discourse than others’ (1999:52) and treat this ‘physical,
Another strain of argument focuses on the specific production apparatus of EDM as dance music and as electronically produced music. EDM’s drive towards impersonality and dissolution of individual consciousness in a collective groove has historical predecessors. EDM – ‘formerly termed ‘rave’ and before that ‘acid house’ (Huq 2002:90) – has its origins in Black American music styles that emerged in the mid-1980s; Chicago ‘house’ music, Detroit ‘techno’ and New York ‘garage’ sounds. These were themselves ‘amalgams of post-disco dance music, and the electronic sounds of European avant-garde pop’ (Toynbee 2000:133) such as Kraftwerk (Eshun 1998:86). All of these styles feature the four-to-the-floor bass drum pattern inherited from disco, yet they differ from disco-style dance music in two ways: firstly, in their fully electronic mode of production, which utilizes drum machines, synthesizers and sequencers, and secondly, in its mode of presentation and distribution. In EDM, the DJ is positioned at crowd-level and flat networks are to be found not only on the dance floor but also in the broader scene structure (Straw 1993). Beginning in the disco era, access to new technologies of music production gradually became more widely affordable (Toop 1995:214-16) making possible a democratization of production, so that one can speak (with Toynbee 2000:148ff.) of ‘networks’ of production in EDM that challenged the forms of cultural production which had been dominant in the music industry until then: ‘Networks have changed the terms and conditions of entrepreneurship and the profit-making routines which developed in the rock era. In rock the album is the key commodity. It depends for its success on a complex and expensive marketing strategy consisting of more or less simultaneous radio play of a single taken from the album, media appearances and reporting, live tour by the band and national retail distribution of records in different formats.

In dance music, conversely, the club DJ alone initiates the dissemination of just material discourse’ as being just as separate from linguistic discourse as other experience-oriented approaches to EDM.
one sound carrier, the 12-inch single’ (Toynbee 2000:151). A new division of labour between music producer and DJ-performer was established, so that in EDM ‘the dance music producer tends to be anonymous’ (Toynbee 2000:131). The labour process in EDM clearly differs from rock styles, as the ‘DJ “finish[es]” dance music by inserting records into a continuous mix in the club’, and ‘leaves producers dependent on DJs as performers of their music […],’ which ‘limits [their] role […] and reduce[s] the potential for the ascription of auteur status to either role […].’ (“Live” performance by producers in concert or personal club appearance [being] exceptional’) (Toynbee 2000:161, IHO).

Due to both the collective experience of EDM sounds and their new production and distribution situation in a network with increased feedback between music makers and audiences, scholars diagnosed a (new) kind of networked sociality in EDM (see Toynbee 2000:161). The autonomy of this ‘networked sociality’ has since been a subject of intensive and far-reaching discussion. To most scholars the networking arrangements represent a far-reaching paradigm shift in popular musicianship (see Stahl 2004, Eshun 1998, Reynolds 1998) deviating from subjectivist approaches such as those prominent in rock music. These scholars follow a rhetoric present within the dance music scene, which is one of rapture, paradigm shift and a utopian view of the future. Here EDM ‘presents itself as an absolute music which has immediate effect on mind and body’ and by virtue of [its] very existence (Gilbert/Pearson 1999:179) claims to represent a challenge to the ‘representing’ function’ that music has in other, older genres such as rock where an individual author ‘sang for a better world on behalf of a community of youth’ (Toynbee 2000:131,162, IO) or represented the values of a community in her/his star figure.
To other scholars the networking arrangements characteristic to EDM represent a continuation of inherently collective principles of popular music production (see Toynbee 2000.130ff.). Indeed, popular music is characterized by collective modes of production as a consequence of its paradigmatically disintegrated form of production. Popular music has always been an adjunct to a larger industry; ‘historically cinema and radio, but more recently has included electronic hardware manufacturers’ (Toynbee 2000:19). Pop music is also characterized by a dispersed mode of reception as it is presented in a variety of media such as the phonograph, radio broadcast, digital music player, film soundtrack, music television, live concert, advertisement or internet stream. For musicians, this means working in a variety of contexts and medial forms.\textsuperscript{14} Due to the highly disintegrated production form of the pop music industry, every pop music production is, in fact, the result of a collective effort wherein it would be difficult to identify one single author (Middleton 2000). Collaboration with other musicians and intermediaries of the cultural industries\textsuperscript{15} is inevitable, especially since music made under studio conditions requires the cooperation of many individuals to manage the complex production processes. Seen from this perspective, the networked sociality of EDM, rather than representing a historically singular paradigm shift, is a continuation of principles, which were in place before the introduction of an ideology of the author into popular music by the star system.

Hesmondhalgh (1998:238f.) acknowledges that EDM favours networked socialities and elevated indifference towards artist’s authorship to an ideological goal, but concludes, ‘all of these innovations need to be set against the limited impact of dance music at the organization of musical creativity’ (1998:249).

Although EDM offered up utopian ‘discourses of collectivism’ (1998:248f.), it did

\textsuperscript{14} For the music reception, on the other hand, this provides a fertile ground for intertextual linkages.

\textsuperscript{15} I use the plural ‘cultural industries’ to indicate the complexity and differences within the various types of cultural production in industries as various as broadcasting and recording industry (see for a discussion Hesmondhalgh (2002:11ff.))
not effectively provide an alternative to the mainstream music industry, at any rate not to the degree of a counter-economy in the manner of the ‘politicized anti-corporatism’ (Hesmondhalgh 1998:249) of the independent record companies that emerged in the wake of punk. Here the question arises whether the agenda of the scholar is compatible with that of the musician. For while the music scholars claim to represent a transformation or even a historical shift in pop music production and experience, the EDM scene rarely presents itself as explicitly anti-capitalist or political. Apart from the ‘“heroic” period of British dance (1988-94)’ (Toynbee 2000:132), when British dance music came into conflict with the state and scene protagonists took part in direct action – a juncture that received a disproportionate amount of scholarly attention (Huq 2006:101) – politicization is evident only in parts of the (predominantly hedonistic) dance scene. Yet being politically non-explicit must not be equated with ‘political quietism’ (Middleton 2000:87) or nihilism.\textsuperscript{16} Its hedonism earned the dance scene a reputation for being apolitical, while within the scene its passivity was understood as an anti-enlightening subversion (Stöger 2001:5); subversion here meaning that political aims are advanced by the very fact that they are not articulated in language and discourse but in a speechless sounding (Marchart 2000)\textsuperscript{17} – a posture similar to the ‘no demands’ claims by the Occupy Movement since 2011\textsuperscript{18} or the strategies of anonymization and massification of so-called ‘black blocs’ in street demonstrations (Galloway 2011). In the self-conception of the EDM scene, it is this withdrawal from discourse and the corresponding

\textsuperscript{16} Middleton (2000:87) critiques the solipsistic effect of the ‘internally spiralling intertextual practice’ of recent electronic dance music culture and makes the author’s disappearance in EDMs radical intertextuality and the self-referencing circularities of the music accountable for its ‘political quietism’.

\textsuperscript{17} Some arguments about the politics of sound in EDM concentrate on its material qualities and production situation. Other, more contemporary theorisations argue that EDMs antagonism to discourse requires demonstration in a public forum (for example the volkstanz.net demonstrations with loud music, dancing and non-speaking crowds in the early 2000s in Austria) to be called an ‘actual sound politicization’ (Marchart 2000, TM).

\textsuperscript{18} With the Occupy movement of 2011, the practice of anonymity attained wide visibility and was frequently commented upon in mainstream media.
antagonism to explicit language that forms a voice that is outspoken without ever saying a word.

It seems that either/or approaches dominate. Outsiders oppose the non-explicitness of EDM as politically ineffective, inward-looking and nihilistic. Insiders (and with them many EDM scholars) celebrate its non-discursivity as a new form of politics in sound, with the sound material or its democratic production situation considered to be political in and of itself. It was with the emergence of EDM in the 1990s that pop music scholars discovered the sensory, non-semiotic qualities of pop music as sound and its capacity to stimulate and collectivize in self-organising, processual networks beyond an emblematic, linguistic communication. Since then, sound-centred perspectives have become the new horizon for analysis of pop musics and have triggered the large-scale abandonment of previous language-oriented research on pop music as a practice of reinterpretation of signs in a ‘semiological guerrilla war’ (Eco 1985) or as deconstructive play (Jauk 2009:126f.).19 The new focus on sound allowed pop music scholars to theorize EDM as existing outside discourse and lacking representing, identificatory functions such as ‘naming’ a person or ‘producing’ an author. Unfortunately, stressing the non-discursivity of music often leads to neglecting the importance of discourse altogether. Yet, for their theorizations scholars themselves rely on discourse, and critical, distanced language remains the medium for scholarly investigations into music – be it classical, pop or dance music. Here one faces a central problem of scholarly accounts of EDM: a position of critical distance is required of the modern academic as well as evaluative judgements and mutual preclusions of positions. Thus, a modernist, critical scholar is left with two opposed ways of reading anonymity in EDM – either

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19 Not only research on dance musics but also older, non dance-oriented genres of pop music have since been reformulated to focus on sound, using the vocabulary of emotion and stimulation, body music, event and immediacy.
utopian or pessimistic.

Instead of adding another form of evaluative reading of anonymity or attempting to resolve an alleged conflict between utopia and dystopia, I would instead like to expose the gap between these two readings. For me, ‘exposing the gap’ does not mean adopting the position scholars of EDM have sometimes claimed for themselves, namely that of a postmodern scholar who favours plurality and parallel world views and sees her/his job in describing the diversity of possible judgements in order to ultimately conclude that there is always more than one discourse about the cultural object of anonymity. Instead, I would like to address the practice of ‘naming’ and delineating an object within critical or theoretical discourse itself.

**Discursive acts about (musical) anonymity**

In a poststructuralist view a discursive term brings an object into being; ‘naming an object’ constructs our knowledge and experience of this ‘object’ rather than neutrally describing an autonomously existing object. For example, the designation ‘music’ is value-laden; it constructs an audio-visual phenomenon as valuable for listening and analysis and for being experienced as ‘music’ rather than mere ‘noise’. Our experience of the sound of music, sometimes called ‘the music itself’ or the ‘discourse of music’, cannot be separate from the discourse about music and from the discursive terminology. From here I would like to follow Horner (2008:30) in his conclusion that, rather than keeping with the idea of a discourse about music that is separate from the ‘music itself’, the scholar has to transgress her/his role as neutral observer: ‘we need to abandon the ideal of resolving conflicts among ways of talking about popular music and accept our role in participating in these conflicts. […] The terms we use in discoursing about popular music, and our inflections of these terms, matter’. Although I am in favour
of such a new role for the scholar, I wonder how exactly to grasp the dialectical relationship between the object of musical analysis and the terms of musical analysis. How can the relationship be apprehended without falling back on another absolutism, that of the ‘inescapable’ discourse (Horner 2008:27)? Horner (2008:32) suggests that ‘we can ask of any discursive acts (that of others and our own) what difference that way of talking about a particular instance of popular music might make, for whom, under what conditions, and how, and why we might want to perpetuate such effects or not’. This would constitute a rather extensive programme, and further-reaching questions of how to employ it methodologically would certainly remain. I doubt that a mere indication of plurality through the words of the scholar is the best way of engaging with the performativity of knowledge about music. Rather, I think that this performativity of knowledge urges the music scholar to dissolve the traditional subject-object dichotomy of critical scholarly inquiry – with consequences for the choice and definition of ‘objects’ and the medium of analysis.

Being that the aim of this study is a multi-dimensional investigation of the effects of discursive acts about anonymity in electronic pop music, I suggest combining the poststructuralist impetus with a transdisciplinary methodology that productively (not just nominally) transgresses the subject/object-divide. For this, Serres’ ((1981)2007:224-244) and Latour’s (1993:51) notions of the ‘quasi-object’ are useful to destabilize my own position (as a scholar of whom it is expected to decide between the positions of either constructivism or realism as her/his grounding episto-ontology). I assume, that as much as practices of anonymity in EDM have a factuality and substance beyond discourse, anonymity is also fictionalized and turned into an ‘object’ by scholarly, journalistic and scene-internal discourse. For me as a scholar, anonymity therefore forms a quasi-object; it is both factual (substantial) and fictional (discursive). Anonymity is an
aspect of EDM ‘music itself’ – the discourse of music – as well as of the discourse about music. In this study, indicating the gap between the dystopia and the utopia of anonymity will be done neither by simply naming (and thereby evaluating) anonymity, nor by merely displaying the full range of its connotations. Investigating the quasi-object of anonymity, a necessarily unstable particle influenced by the processes of its naming and prone to ephemerality, will be undertaken via a methodological tactic developed by Latour (for example 1999). I will report on the critical knowledge practice on anonymity developed by agents other than myself and follow pop music agents in their cultural ‘laboratories’ – projects in which they perform discourse on anonymity – and I will use the vocabulary of the ‘laboratory’ from Latour’s science and technology studies, despite the humanities background of this present study. This study is not scholarship-critical per se and I will not make scholarly discourse about anonymity as such the object of my investigation. Instead, I will engage with scene-internal discourse-centred performances of anonymity by musico-artistic ‘research’ agents. Beyond the fact that I follow anonymity as an object of other people’s investigations, what makes anonymity a quasi-object of this study is that I engage with (essentially two) projects from electronic pop music practice that self-critically and reflexively perform anonymity.

**Anonymity performance**

In these cases, self-critical performance does not mean self-theorization, i.e. engaging in theoretical discourse about one’s own (distinctly non-discursive and purely sonic) musical practice, as exemplified by Mille-Plateaux label head Achim Szepanski’s and Marcus S. Kleiner’s German book project *Soundcultures* from 2003. In contrast, the projects under investigation here engage with the ‘double-faced nature of anonymity within discourse’: since the mid 1990s, anonymity has become synonymous with collectivity within electronic dance and pop music,
while the mystique created by nameless tracks has helped to build esteem for records and DJs (Toynbee 2000:151) and in the case of ‘unmasked’ anonymous artists for individual artistic integrity. The projects selected here do not balance these paradoxical assessments of anonymity within discourse, they engage with anonymity on a meta-level, performing it with both an approving and a disapproving face. The direct action practices of sonically producing anonymity can no longer be seen as separate from their discursive representation. The projects selected for this study are not a mere doing of anonymity as in the case of *sonic anonymity practices*, but are engaged in performing anonymity as *discursive anonymity performances*. These artist critiques use practices of anonymity developed within electronic dance music in order to critique of the institution of pop personality but they do not take place outside of the (discursive and media) institutions of pop music.

**Discursive anonymity performance – two projects from electronic pop music**

Although broadly locatable within the tradition of EDM, the two field projects I focus on employ discursive representation and engage in public media. While it is their discursive aspects that are of most interest to my work, it is also clear that these musico-artistic ‘research’ projects have functions other than producing critical, discursive knowledge. Nevertheless, these projects’ inherent discursive focus is undeniable; they decidedly engage in autonymy and pseudonymy and do not exclusively rely on sonic abstraction (although they certainly also make use of it). Instead of disappearing into nameless sound and/or idolizing anonymity in discourse about music, they find alternative ways of critically performing ‘nymity’ and subjectivity in pop music. They do so by making use of the same horizontal and processual aspects of popular music that are regularly emphasized in dance musics, but they also utilize the theatrical and vertical
aspects of ‘pop music’ – for example, auto- or pseudonymous (star) personalities, live club appearances and the (album) record as commodity. While they are not limited to the horizontal aspects of dance music, their sonic aesthetic remains based in electronic sounds, and therefore I will call their music ‘electronic pop music’.

One of the electronic pop music projects chosen for this study comes from the USA and the other from Europe. Electronic pop music started as a transatlantic phenomenon of musical co-inspiration between the USA and Europe, initially as an outgrowth of the subcultural form of electronic dance music (EDM). The by now well-established origin story recounts that dance music producers from Detroit and Chicago, fascinated by European synthesizer music (the classical reference here is Kraftwerk), infused it with elements of Black American soul and disco and began exporting it back to Europe under the banner of house and techno in the mid-1980s.

While EDM was the subject of much theoretical inquiry in Europe from early on (its sound and its forms of production and reception were the focus of self-theorizations within the European EDM scene), in America, EDM remained a predominantly dance-oriented body music largely ignored by scholars of popular music. Moodymann emerged in a second flowering of the Chicago and Detroit house scenes and, taking the form of critical practice rather than theorization, his performances stand in contrast to the intellectualization of body-oriented dance music in Europe. Ursula Bogner is a European project and emerged in the late 2000s – some 15 years after Moodymann. In Europe, where electronic music has been more popular than in the US (at least, until relatively recently (Reynolds 2012)), subcultural spheres of EDM coexist with a broad spectrum of popular and commercially projected versions of the music. Ursula Bogner is situated within the subcultural stratum of European EDM and is specifically positioned as a
project in the tradition of avant-garde of European (academic) electronic music.

Frequently performed in art galleries and concert venues (rather than clubs), the Ursula Bogner project represents intellectual European electronic music and stands for a version of the music that is removed from dance- and body-orientation of the Detroit- and Chicago-styles and is more closely aligned with certain highbrow strata of cultural production.
0.3 The critique, the refusal, and the critical practice of pop music personality: conceptual and methodological considerations with Fever Ray

In January, 2010, the Swedish vocalist and electronic pop musician Fever Ray, a.k.a. Karin Dreijer Andersson, delivered an anonymity performance when appearing on Swedish television music award show ‘P3’ to receive an award for her 2009 debut solo album.²⁰ Wearing an upper body- and face-covering red costume, she took award and microphone in hand, yet instead of delivering the requisite acceptance speech, she raised the upper head-masking part of her costume only to reveal a second mask of abstract alien-animal form – evoking melting skin – from which she exhaled a deep, throaty wheeze.

In this chapter I will develop the methodology for investigating my quasi-object of anonymity via the musico-artistic practices of electronic pop musicians – practices that are critical of individualized pop music personality and celebrity. Personality and celebrity in pop music are the objects of critique of the musicians I choose to study, while anonymity performance is their strategy or tactic of critical investigation. Critiques of pop personality were part of an offensive on

²⁰Karin Dreijer Andersson and her brother Olof Dreijer formed the electronic music duo The Knife in 1999. The Knife have also appeared in public wearing masks and costumes (in the style of Venetian masks with bird beaks and ape costumes) and have boycotted award ceremonies of a number of industry and media awards. With the release of their 2013 album Shaking The Habitual they dropped the masks and in a teaser film entitled 'The Interview', released at the same time as the album, they explain: 'We felt too safe behind the masks. The mask has become an image of The Knife. Something that was meant to question identity and fame became a commercial product, ... an institution. [...] I think there are no real “us”. Behind the masks are other masks. [...] the process has become so important to us ... creating a space in which we want to exist' (The Knife. Shaking The Habitual – The Interview, HO. Published on youtube 9.4.2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4F37Yg17-JQ [20/08/2013])
institutional frameworks of subjectification in electronic pop music that has been taking place on many fronts since the 1990s. And although a variety of motives and ideologies intermingled here, I will concentrate exclusively on the resulting strategies and delineate three potential forms of critiquing pop music personality: EDM's *anonymity practice* as refusal of personality, *anonymity performance*, which I understand as a practical critique of pop music personality, and critical theoretical and academic *investigations* of pop music stardom.

Fever Ray's critical performance of a 'dual mask' will serve me in this chapter by directly exemplifying the critical knowledge practices of my 'laboratory case' projects, which are based on performance and from which I aim to learn in this study. The electronic pop music field projects chosen as laboratory cases for this study – unlike typical electronic dance musicians' anonymity practices – do not substantially effect anonymity (the name ‘Fever Ray’ is on the cover of her 2009 solo album and is of course featured prominently in the TV award show), but rather their critiques take the form of *performances*. Fever Ray's case will help me to develop my method of performance ethnography, which will be further elaborated and applied in the later chapters of this work.

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21 Among these were egalitarian-democratic ideals ('anyone can make music'), anti-imperialistic/anti-racist discourses ('pop music is an appropriation of minority positions'), socialist ideals ('music production can be a collective enterprise exemplified by the independent sector of electronic dance music') and genius- or author-critiques in the form of aesthetic productions. This broad coalition for anonymity also retained aspects of older subject critiques including remnants of methods of the historical avant-garde, which had criticised the unitary and rational artist-subject, and the critique of the author-subject from poststructuralist literary critique. Yet in pop music discourse it was the notion of the star, rather than the notion of the artist or author, that had been upholding the rhetoric of the autonomous subject. Since punk in the 1970s the main target of critiques of institutions of subjectivation in pop music has been the star – a subject concept established by the cultural industries perpetuating the private/public distinction of the bourgeois personality. One finds continuities with 20th-century avant-gardisms and post-structuralist author-critiques, but – as is typical in pop music – they are rarely drawn upon as explicit references. Rather, these references are mainly of formal significance and should not be over-interpreted. I will note them where they appear but do not base a full historical argument in them.
The critique of pop music personality

Revealing her face covering at the award show, Fever Ray's performance evokes the theme of pop music stardom.\(^{22}\) The culture-industrial figure of the pop music star is constructed as a subject that hides a private reality behind a public mask. After Fever Ray's appearance on the Swedish TV award show P3, fans compared her performance to pop music superstar Lady Gaga's performance a few months earlier at the MTV Video Music Awards show, one of the biggest international award shows in the music industry. Wearing an outfit of red fabric that included a crown and shrouded her face, Lady Gaga walked on stage to accept the ‘Best New Artist’ Award 2009. Ending her acceptance speech, she removed her veil and called: ‘It's for God and for the gays!’

Fig. 5&6: Lady Gaga on stage while accepting the Best New Artist Award at the 2009 MTV Video Music Awards

The question of whether Fever Ray’s P3-performance was a direct mockery of Lady Gaga's hyper-conventional VMA-performance or a stand-alone deconstruction of stardom has been discussed ardently on fan blogs. More

\(^{22}\) Fever Ray’s performance evokes many other themes which I will not touch on in my discussion as they are introduced to the scene iconographically rather than scenographically or processually; for example the issue of gender is indicated with the choice of a red headpiece and its mythical histories in the tale of the little red riding hood, or with the burqa-like style of the headpiece used in the performance.
interesting than the question of whether or not intertextuality was intended is, to my mind, the question of the negativity or positivity of the operation. There is a crucial difference between the two performances. Behind her veil Fever Ray reveals nothing of permanence, only a melting mask and pre-verbal grunts. Lady Gaga, by contrast, discloses, behind the surface and mere appearance of her star role, a (true) self that needed only to be unmasked. This self speaks in a self-present voice and invokes the highest and most sacred being (as well as her gay fan base). When watching Lady Gaga’s performance – and even more so when comparing it with Fever Ray’s performance – one realizes, that her disclosure and unmasking does not at all demystify. Rather it is precisely through unmasking that the magic of gods, stars and spirits operates in the first place; the unmasking that augments the mask is already part of the phenomena of stars or gods and spirits. The self-presencing performance of Lady Gaga at the VMA awards demonstrates, how much the finely tuned theatrical processes of revelation and unmasking are already built into the phenomenon of stardom. Michael Taussig (1999:249) has noted, that ‘[j]ust [the] attempt at erasure of mystery through unmasking’ creates mystique; and ‘[t]he slightest knowledge of rites of unmasking in so-called primitive societies [...] would [be] enough to raise doubts about [the] hubris of “enlightenment” and, what is more, about the older metaphors of biblical and Platonic “revelation” on which such enlightening depends’. Lady Gaga employs ‘unmasking’ exactly in this elevatory way – to enhance her fame.
The critique of pop music personality: star studies

How can one critique such a phenomenon if ‘unmasking’, which is also central to the ‘critical’ enlightening operation of ‘revealing the truth’, only adds to star power? Stardom and celebrity have been established ‘objects’ of academic investigation since at least the 1960s. However, the critical investigation of star personality within the various academic disciplines of star studies consistently failed to register this entanglement of critique in the production of star power.

Having long concentrated on cinema and film, the field of star studies established its premises on the basis of Hollywood actor stars of the 1930s and 1940s and comparatively little work has been done on the pop music star (Shuker 2008:70). Furthermore, music personalities of the 1990s and 2000s – with a few, scarcely sufficient exceptions (Büsser 1997, Jacke 2004, Holert 2005) including recent interest in stars of casting shows (Holmes 2004, Fairchild 2007, Helms/Phleps 2005) – remain largely uninvestigated.24 There exist a few accounts of stars of pre-1990s music genres (Negus 1992, Frith 1996, Leach 2001, Hawkins/Richardson 2007, Borgstedt 2008:237ff.) including many who achieved popularity through music television (Schwichtenberg 1993, Auslander 1999:61-111, Goodwin 1992, Mercer 1989). But only a handful of articles deal explicitly with the pop music star on a theoretical level (Faulstich 1997, Marshall (1997) 2006a, Auslander 2006a, Diederichsen 2008a:55-88) and it is remarkable that none of these authors are from the field of pop music studies or musicology.25 One cannot discern a clear field of research on stars in pop music – delineated neither by discipline nor by personnel. However, since star studies

23 With ‘star studies’ in the following I refer to studies on stars as well as celebrities.
24 The new music cultures of the 1990s/2000s largely disregarded the ‘personality’ on ideological grounds and therefore almost liquidated the star from both the scene-internal and scholarly vocabulary (Holert 2005:22).
25 In pop music studies itself the star appears only sporadically, commonly in discourses about music television (Goodwin 1992, Frith et al. 1993). Yet even there the star is dealt with as a mere side effect. Apart from these studies, accounts are largely confined to the biographies of individual pop music personalities (Shuker (2008:70), see Kruse (1988)1990, see also Carson (1979)1990), and lack theoretical elaboration of the pop music star as such.
have always been a multidisciplinary field, one also finds works of sociology and film studies that had significant impact on the study of pop music stars. While early on sociological and culture-pessimistic perspectives dominated the multidisciplinary field of star studies (see Boorstin (1961)), after film scholar Richard Dyer’s important cultural studies work on stars (Dyer 1979,1986) various aspects of stardom have been differentiated (Lowry 1997:11-13). Since then, star phenomena have been analysed through various aspects of their production and reception — a differentiation that can also be found among studies of pop music stars. Yet beyond this basic differentiation one detects a common tendency within pop music star studies; stars are understood as staged constructions that claim a reality behind the stage. Within theoretical works on the production of stars (as constructions of the cultural industries, media technology etc.) this claim to an off-stage reality is either criticized as an ideology (especially in economic argumentations of culture-industrial manipulation), – and thereby replaced by an even more ‘real’ realism – or perpetuated (especially in media-theoretical approach).

26 Although suspended between the two poles of production and reception, since the earliest theorization of Hollywood stardom, the scientific work on the subject has tended to fall into one or the other camp. On the production side, star images have been investigated in regard to their technology and/or the sociology of their media as well as their economics. On the reception side, stars’ effect on fans and their socio-cultural significance have also been analysed. Among the approaches to the star as phenomenon of reception one finds two main strands. The first group may be labelled ‘fan studies’. Fans, considered the ‘most visible and identifiable of audiences’ (Lewis 1992:1) have been the subject of research in various disciplines since the 1980s (Krischke-Ramaswamy 2007:37). Pop music fan studies were initially dominated by the works of Fiske (1991:95-113, 1993:94-123,181-89) and Grossberg (1992a, 1992b). Utilizing theories of intertextuality Fiske developed an expanded notion of ‘text’. For Fiske the text recipient is always a fan, a member of the audience actively engaging with the text. Parallel to Fiske, one finds the works of Grossberg, who analyses fan reception by means of theories of affect (Grossberg 1992b). Today pop music fans are a well-researched subject (see Cavicchi 1999).

27 The economic argument maintains that stars are either a tool of manipulation of the cultural industry – these approaches refer to theories of political economy and Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s theories on cultural industries (see Buxton (1983)1990) – or they follow a cultural industries approach that focuses specifically on the pop music industry (see Wicke 2001, Negus 1992), positing the star as a criterion for product differentiation or market risk minimization (see Garofalo 2000:142ff., Borgstedt 2008:41ff., Ryan 1992). A variant on this cultural industries approach follows the theories of organizational sociology and sees the star as a result of negotiation processes between media personnel active within a specific ‘culture of production’ (see Negus 1997).
argumentations about the ‘indexicality’ of star media\textsuperscript{28}). In theoretical studies on the reception of stars – as constructions by fans and recipients – the claim to a (non-representational) reality is located in recipient’s identifications with stars and their exemplary negotiation of notions of the ‘authentic person’. Nevertheless, beginning in the 1990s (Marshall 1997, (1997)2006a) ‘discourse’ became a favoured frame in star studies for integrating differing perspectives on stardom. This discursive approach may be described as the post-structuralist school of star studies. Integrating perspectives from ideology-critique to media theory, it posits the star as a system of discourses and thus locates her/him within ‘a field of production, representation and consumption’. Within such a post-structuralist perspective of stars as a ‘developing field of intertextual representation’ (Rojek 2001:44) the reference to a reality outside is no longer proven empirically (if at all, historically). The analytical frame of (social/media/industry or fan/recipient) construction versus a pre-representational reality is left behind thus opening up a new critical theoretical perspective on stars that is not from the first entangled in a process of critical ‘revelation’.

Boltansky and Chiapello (2003) have shown how critique also perpetuates what it criticizes – not only true for the critique of capitalism, which is easily absorbed

\textsuperscript{28} Among the media theories one can discern approaches that focus either on media as technology or media as social and aesthetic institutions (i.e. pop as a medium). The media-technological approach focuses attention primarily on the sound carrier itself, whereby the shift from sheet music to the single (Faulstich 1997:170) or record album (Corbett 1990) is understood as the development that triggered the rise of the star phenomenon in pop music. Here, it is argued that it is the indexical character of phonography (Diederichsen 2008a:73ff.) – supported by developments in close-up microphoning techniques (Marshall 2006:200) – which leaves us to search for the origin of the ‘disembodied’ voice and produces a ‘visual lack’ (Corbett 1990:84) plus a corresponding commodity fetish. In addition to phonography, Diederichsen (2008a:84,TM) also counts photography, television and radio – all media of proximity ‘that broadcast indexical traces of the physical presence of the stars’ – as the central, indexical media of pop music.

Among arguments that understand media as a primarily social and aesthetic institution, there are also two main strands. First, the literary criticism of pop music, emerging from the literature and English departments of the late 1960s and their reception of the work of Bob Dylan (see Honneth 2007, Frith/Goodwin 1990:426, Diederichsen 2008a:98). There one was interested in pop musicians as ‘auteurs’ (Frith/Goodwin 1990:426, Shuker 2008:68ff., Straw 1999, see Kruse (1988)1990:456, Frith 1983:53, Cavelti 1971:267) – a perspective arising from the perception of pop musicians as singer-songwriters. In this perspective, the artist is seen as an author ‘behind’ the cultural-industrial star, with the threads of text, visuals and performance firmly in hand and her/his creativity influencing the star-production process itself; all dependent not least on her/his stamina in upholding the image convincingly (see Negus 1995, Mathews 1999:2, Negus 1992:70).
and used by capitalism itself to correct and improve its course. There is a ‘curious flip-flop of power’ inherent in the act of critique itself, which ‘often adds to the power of the thing critiqued’ (Taussig 1999:43). This flip-flop might be understood as already implied and built into certain objects of critique such as stardom or capitalism. ‘[H]ow to react to this observation […] [and] the sobering conclusion that negation merely completes the object of critique and was its destiny?’ (Taussig 1999:43). How to provide an effective critique of stardom, if any revelation and unmasking adds to the power of stardom itself?

Due to major shifts in political and social power structures in the last decades of the 20th century the operation of critical negation is undergoing a crisis. In the control societies (Deleuze (1990(1995)) of today’s ‘age of transparency’ (Arns (2008)2011:256), where flexible modulations rather than enclosing rules exert power, permanent self-disclosure has become the norm. What new forms of analysis and critique have been developed since flexibility has become imperative and difference and critique have become commodified? It seems to me that the practices of electronic pop musicians provide an auspicious domain in which to seek out models for dealing with the current cultural situation. After all, electronic pop musicians have engaged with the problem of ‘consuming difference’ since the 1990s. Therefore a short excursion into the context of pop music stardom since the 1990s is in order.
The refusal of pop music personality: electronic dance music critiques

For a musician, conducting a critical discourse on stardom can itself lead to stardom. For example, the grunge stars of the 1990s, and before them the punks, turned rebellion and rule breaking into a marketable image. With the development of electronic dance music at the turn of the 1990s, a specific new mode of critique developed. In contrast to the marketing of rebellion in the cases of grunge, punk or indie, the critique of stardom from within electronic dance music did not operate at the level of text. For the most part, text and discourse were neglected in favour of practice-immanent critiques. The critique then was formulated not within the star figure role text, as may be expected in the case of the indie/grunge anti-hero, but in the manner of its own performance – with critical detachment reserved not for the content, the role text or social values represented by the star hero, but for the representational procedures of stardom themselves; the idea of re-presentation (as a process that grants appearance) itself was rejected. In practice, this critique was regularly carried out not through the use of critical discourse but by non-discourse and disappearance. In the 1990s, anonymity and authorial disappearance became much-lauded characteristics of electronic dance music, taking not only the form of ‘no photo, no interview’ (anti-)public relations strategy, but also looming in the production apparatus of pop music itself, whereby changeable nome de disques on record labels made it difficult to identify a series of releases as one author’s ‘oeuvre’, while tracks without vocals or with ludicrous lyrics denied any legibility of message.

This refusal of pop music personality on the level of the whole subculture of EDM nevertheless became itself the subject of another discourse: journalistic and academic discourse about EDM. Its radical ‘politics of anonymity’ mobilized audiences ‘attracted to obscurity, to secret knowledge about music’
Radical obscurity earned EDM prestige amongst youth audiences and the press, while glamorisations of radical secrecy were not long in coming and soon became the regular forms of articulating EDM to a wider public.

In August 2011 dubstep and grime producer Zomby appeared in a Guy Fawkes mask on the cover of experimental music magazine The Wire.\textsuperscript{29} The magazine announced the accompanying article about Zomby as ‘a rare in-person interview with UK bass’s mystery man’ (The Wire 330, Aug. 2011, p.3).

In October 2011 WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange attended the protest ‘Occupy London stock exchange’, wearing a Guy Fawkes mask\textsuperscript{30}.

During a process of becoming the subject of journalistic or academic discourse, the direct action strategies of anonymity in EDM were named and, in a further stage, visualized. Starting in the first decade of the new century, masks became an increasingly utilized material object in the public media appearances of musicians and producers from the field of electronic dance and pop music. With

\textsuperscript{29} Dubstep and grime are a contemporary British version of electronic dance music.

\textsuperscript{30} http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-15359735
the Occupy Movement of 2011 the state of being without a name and identity – anonymity – became a widely used and commented upon practice. While a material mask factually grants individual agents anonymity, the masking object of the Guy Fawkes mask (popularized by the Hollywood film V for Vendetta) of the 2011 Occupy Movement also objectified and iconized anonymity as a strategy of aesthetic and political criticism. Here again, critique – although acted out in refusing discursively produced pop music personality – became re-appropriated by discourse and represented via visual marks and the linguistic brand term 'anonymity'.

**Critical practices of pop music personality: electronic pop music critiques**

Beyond a negating critique of pop personality, one that perpetuates what it criticizes, and EDM’s anti-discursive refusal of personality (which became the subculture’s brand), one also finds a third form of critical engagement with pop personality. Electronic pop music projects such as Fever Ray engage in critical practices of pop music personality; rather than negating personality and discourse, they engage in mimesis and repetition. In his book *Defacement* Taussig (1999:43) developed such a notion of ‘critique as repetition of [a] phenomenon’. The critical operation of defacement engages in mimesis and repetition of the face and its ‘public secrecy’ (Taussig 1999:2). The face is a pragmatically lived and live figure of contingency, residing at the ‘crossroads of mask and window to the soul’ (Taussig 1999:3), of constructed self and ‘real’ self. Rather than merely deconstructing the face as a ‘mask’ from a neutral atotopical ground, *defacing* takes the contingency of the face seriously and attempts to

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31 The ‘icon’ of Guy Fawkes is well chosen as Fawkes, a member of a 17th century group that attempted but failed to blow up British Parliament, is traditionally remembered only for his ‘failure’ in the British cultural tradition of ‘Guy Fawkes night’, where in a reactionary cultural performance a Guy Fawkes effigy is burned. The Hollywood film V for Vendetta has (on the basis of a comic book) re-configured the cultural figure of Guy Fawkes and brought us the stylized object of the Guy Fawkes mask.
‘bring the otherwise obscure or concealed inner powers flooding forth’ (Taussig 1999:43). It is a form of critique that activates the object of critique and brings out its ‘inherent’ magic rather than leaving a ‘dissected corpse’ (Taussig 1999:5,43). As with defacing, critical practices of electronic pop music, which mimic stardom, take into account the fact that, under current conditions of neoliberalism, objectifying forms of negation can feed back into commercial opportunity. Instead, these critical practices have developed critical ‘no’s’ that are affirmative and productive.

Accordingly, the revelation of a ‘true, real’ self behind the ‘mere appearance’ of the mask is not an option for Karin Dreijer Andersson a.k.a. Fever Ray – to the contrary, it is the commodified practice used to market star figures as ‘authentic’ personalities. In her P3 performance Dreijer Andersson transforms the unveiling of a real self into a revelation of another disguise: she reveals another mask behind the mask of stardom. With this dual mask is she pointing to a genuine scepticism, not only of the realities of the entertainment industry, but of our critical faculties as such? An overview of the conceptual history of critique will help to discern the various layers of critique touched on by Fever Ray’s critical practice.

**Concepts of critique in theory**

Since the 18th century the notion of critique has not only referred to discerning thought and interpretation (such as judgemental opinion and the critical, emancipatory reading of clerical texts), but – according to Kant (1781) – also to a self-critique of ‘reason’. Does Fever Ray’s performance function as such a self-critique of our limited epistemic faculty? I argue that her performance does not leave us at such a rationality-critical *atopos*. From a practice of meta-critique, judging the critical faculty of reason from an even more critical standpoint could arise the problem of infinite regress, which could be represented by a regressive
or double mask (a mask revealing an identical mask behind). Fever Ray however
does not use two identical masks in her performance, but instead wears a dual
mask – a masking veil which when removed reveals a melting facial skin mask
from which non-human, grunting sounds emanate. Her critical performance of
pop music stardom is not conducted from a meta-standpoint but is intimately
bound to its object of critique – human soul and flesh as material of star
constructions. Such immanence is a quality of critique that Kant had already
proposed with his notion of the self-critique. Yet with its sole focus on thought
operations, Kant's ‘criticism’ turned the project of critique into a merely theoretical
operation – philosophical self-critique.

In contrast to a solipsistic notion of pure critique, later critical projects such as
those of Karl Marx’ or the Frankfurter Schule’s critical theory have brought forth a
notion of critique that concerns itself with practical transformation. Although these
latter day critical projects also take a theoretical form, they concern themselves
with concrete historical phenomena and not solely with the self-inspection of
reasoning. They too are capable of self-critique, but crucially not by
reconstructing rationality-internal conditions for critique but by reflecting on
conditionality within a concrete historical context. Nevertheless, in the critical
theory of the Frankfurt School critique is still an abstracting, and mostly negative
operation: it reflects the (social) structures as totalizing and repressive and aims
to overcome them.
Critical practice

Since the 1960s, British and Anglo-American cultural studies have brought forth a project of critique which mediates between the two notions of critique as a philosophical self-examination of reason and a phenomenon-specific intervention, and which accommodates a degree of positivity (Sonderegger 2008:671ff.). Michel Foucault’s re-evaluation of power as a positive force (one that generates social relations) is relevant in the Cultural studies project of critique: central to Foucault’s project of ‘discourse analysis’ is the thesis that the power of discourse is at the same time totalizing and subjectivizing (Husemann 2009:44). In Foucault’s approach the meta-analytical element of critique is neither grounded in reason’s self-reconstruction of its universal limits (Sonderegger 2008:669) nor in the autonomy of a (self-emancipating) subject (see Critical Theory), but rather in a ‘critical attitude as virtue’ (Foucault (1997)2007:43) of a subject who is reflectively intertwined in hegemonic constellations. And notably, Foucault is here not ‘referring to something that would be a fundamental anarchism [or] an originary freedom, absolutely and wholeheartedly resistant to any governmentalization’ (Foucault 2007:75), but to a ‘resistance to coercion [of a constrained subject, that] consists in the stylization of the self at the limits of established being’ (Butler (2002:221).

In her award show performance Karin Dreijer Andersson a.k.a. Fever Ray gives an instance of such a critical practice: arguably, she transcends a sweeping-philosophical, universal critique of reasoning in so far as she goes beyond a simplifying accusation of pop stardom as a repressive, totalizing system. Her critical performance is entirely specific to the particulars of pop stardom, and it avoids a simple identification of the criticized: at the end of her award acceptance performance, conforming to the protocol of the award ceremony, a voice is heard emanating from the melting skin-masked figure. This voice does not deliver a
speech – neither accepting nor denouncing the award, nor delivering a concrete argument about pop stardom. One certainly assigns this voice to Fever Ray, but Fever Ray speaks out without uttering words: a grunting, non-human sound emanates from the mask, which, while formally following the conventions of pop music stardom, does so in a decidedly transgressive manner. This voice is not a voice of a modern, self-assured critic – there is no argumentative content only pre-rational utterance: Fever Ray’s voice here provides a practical critique that does not fully dissociate itself from pop music stardom but rather makes its protocols concrete and discernible for the audience.

In the conceptualization of critique as practice by Butler and Foucault one finds a similar performative disassociation from the voice of a self-assured critic. Foucault’s critical project is to be found largely between the lines of his phenomena-specific and historical studies (Sonderegger 2008:672). However, in a lecture entitled ‘What is Critique?’ (1978) and in the resultant essay [(1990)2007] Foucault addressed the matter of critique itself. Interestingly, Foucault himself, as a theorizing subject, struggles here when defining critique and turns to a peculiar practice of verbal gesturing to tentatively circumscribe the matter:

Starting from a ‘very general and very vague or fluid’ preliminary definition of critique as ‘the art of not being governed quite so much’, Foucault (2007:45) then turns to further evasions:

‘If governmentalization is [...] this movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well, then! I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth. Well then!: critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critique would essentially
insure the de-subjugation of the subject in the context of what we could call, in a word, the politics of truth’ (Foucault (1990)2007:47).

Notable here is Foucault’s performative delivery of his circumscription of critique. Avoiding an unconditioned definition of critique and finally resorting to the subjunctive verb form, Foucault delivers – in the form of a speech act with a self-stylization of himself as the theorizing subject – an interrogation of critique (see also the ‘question form’ (Butler 2002:213) of his title ‘What is Critique?’). Judith Butler has pointed out that Foucault here ‘ask[s] us to rethink critique as a practice in which we pose the question of the limits of our most sure ways of knowing’ (Butler 2002:215). When Foucault, for example, proposes the operation of an ‘examination of eventualization’ (Foucault 2007:59) of conjunctions of discourses and practices, of knowledge and power, he does not refer to a merely descriptive, distanced reconstruction of the knowledge-power-nexus. Rather than a de-subjectivized, historical-philosophical analysis, in this lecture and text he presents – as Judith Butler (2002) has pointed out – instances of critical practice himself. And such a ‘critical practice does not well up from the innate freedom of the soul, but is formed instead in the crucible of a particular exchange between a set of rules or precepts (which are already there) and a stylization of acts (which extends and reformulates that prior set of rules and precepts). This stylization of the self in relation to the rules comes to count as a ‘practice” (Butler 2002:219).

While Foucault – via the practice of virtue – initially disengages critique from the theoretical and positions it within the practical, Butler develops the artistic and aesthetic elements of critical practice even further. She highlights the theatricality and performativity of this ‘art of not being governed quite so much’ and thereby provides (although not explicitly) a connection to her own theory of social performativity: it is the concrete act (usually the speech act, or the artistic act), that performs desubjugation – but without any presumption of a prior freedom.
If only for the sake of clarification I might now tentatively aim towards providing myself (with the help of Judith Butler) a heuristic definition of critical practice, and say that critical practice (in the field of cultural studies, following Foucault’s approach) engages in the two traditionally separated fields of criticality (self-criticality and object-field specificity) and ‘establish[es] critique as the very practice that exposes the limits of [the] epistemological horizon [of an object field] itself, making the contours of the horizon appear […] in relation to its own limits’ (Butler 2002:217). In addition to a reflexivity about the epistemological horizon of the object field, critical practice – moreover – includes a reflexivity about the formative horizon of the subject of critique, namely it ‘entails self-transformation in relation to a rule of conduct’ (Butler 2002:217). This means that critical practice implies an act or a performance of the self of the critic.

Critical practice establishes a particulate and immanent notion of critique, where – coherent with its provenance from cultural studies – subjects are not a priori opposed to (social) structures but engaged in them through their cultural practice. In critical practice subjects are therefore always involved with (rather than distanced from) the critical matter, but at the same time these subjects put themselves at risk: ‘To gain a critical distance from established authority means for Foucault not only to recognize the ways in which the coercive effects of knowledge are at work in subject-formation itself, but to risk one’s very formation as a subject’ (Butler 2002:225). The ethico-political project of critical practice is therefore not a de-subjectivized operation but might rather be understood as a de-subjectivizing or subject-desintegrating practice.
Anonymity performance in electronic pop music will be investigated in this study as such a critical practice.\textsuperscript{32} Fever Ray’s defacement of pop music stardom is a critical practice that engages at once in the disparate fields of criticality: self-criticality, phenomenon-specificity and positivity/affirmation.\textsuperscript{33} Against the everyday connotation of negativity in critique she upholds a certain positivity by mimetic affirmation of pop stardom; this concreteness and specificity to her object-field of pop stardom is amended by her reflexivity to the precarious subjectivity of the critic. While Fever Ray adopts an ‘attitude of critique’ towards stardom – just as Foucault identified critique ‘with an ethos, a way of acting and behaving’ (Butler 2012:21), ‘critique [here] is not merely, or only a sort of nay-saying’ (Butler 2012:20), entirely or per se negating stardom. Fever Ray’s concrete critical acts are both negative – ‘refusing subordination to an established authority’ (Butler 2012:21) such as the industry’s star system and productive in the sense that the “no” delineates and animates a new set of positions for [her as a] subject’ (Butler 2012:24), and that it results in a set of new practices (other than verbal dissent). Fever Ray’s performance concretizes what Foucault ((1978)2007) and Butler ((2000)2002) developed with the notion of critique as practice, and I would like to designate her critical performance my study’s guiding principle for knowledge production.

\textsuperscript{32} Foucault himself has proposed the ethico-political attitude of ‘having the enormous presumption of becoming anonymous one day’ ((1967)1998:290f.); he proclaimed anonymity as a long-term objective and ethical horizon: ‘Now it is a question of how an individual, a name, be the medium for an element [...] that, [...] effaces or at least renders vacuous and useless, that name, that individuality [...] ((1967)1998:291)’.

\textsuperscript{33} Following Foucault and Butler, I regard the three aspects of concreteness, positivity and self-criticality to be important for a discussion of critical practice; a similar (but not accordant) identification of three aspects in Butler’s delineation of critical practice can be found in Klein (2013:139ff.): ‘the concept of practice, the realm of critique and its framework’.
**Methodological considerations: transdisciplinarity, quasi-objectivist approaches, and performance ethnography**

Fever Ray’s approach – of being intimately bound to the object of critique – secures concreteness, self-reflexivity and a positivity of critique, all of which I would like to adopt as characteristics for my own transdisciplinary research project here. Over two decades of research, transdisciplinary projects have proven themselves to be problem-driven and action-oriented. Within the by now diversified field of transdisciplinary research, my project could be considered a transdisciplinary research centring on a scientific problem (cf. Jahn 2008:30). While there are numerous transdisciplinary research projects that approach real-world problems by consulting science or integrating scientific and non-scientific knowledge, this study emanates from a problem of scientific knowledge itself, namely: how does one produce discourse about a corruptive and resistant cultural phenomenon such as ‘anonymity’? Simultaneously, agents in the field of electronic dance and pop music also face this very problem, and I intend to ultimately integrate their solutions within my academic practice. The goal of this research is therefore a methodical-theoretical innovation.

One basic challenge in transdisciplinary research is the coordination of divergent research ideals and values in the scientific field and in the real world (Krohn 2008:369ff.). Searching for general solutions by exemplary cases, scientists ‘see a case as an exemplar of similar cases’, while non-scientific actors are interested in ‘solving their specific case, not a general problem’ (Krohn 2008:372). Wolfgang Krohn proposes a new type of learning in transdisciplinary research – one that is capable of ‘coordinating the two ideals’ and he finds this manifested in ‘expertise[,] a concept of knowledge’ that continues ‘both the singular and the general by the means of the typical’ (Krohn 2008:375).
Sorting through my chosen field of electronic dance and pop music I found such expertise knowledge in projects from the field; projects in which electronic pop musicians position themselves at the margins of electronic dance and pop music as genre-crossers and instigators of avant garde-projects. These ‘experts’ are neither interested in solving the problem of the precarity of anonymity in general nor in solving it only for their singular, individual cases of artist personality. Instead, they engage with the issue of precarious anonymity as such and provide anonymity performances as alternative procedures of a-personality, which are not singular but rather typical for the field. In my transdisciplinary methodology these expert field projects (musico-artistic ‘research’ projects) serve as laboratory (not exemplary) cases of anonymity performance; the expert knowledge produced in these laboratories can ultimately be made productive for the scientific field.

The potentials and pitfalls of such ‘expert knowledge’ gathered by transdisciplinary research processes navigating between the general-objective and the specific-subjective have been much discussed in anthropology, my field of training, since its ‘crisis of representation’ of the 1970s. Since the 1920s, when Malinowski (1922) introduced fieldwork as the discipline’s distinctive method, scholars had temporarily participated in ‘other, native’ cultural life and concurrently and subsequently ‘objectivated’ their temporarily ‘native’ yet necessarily subjective experiences through a textual transcription of the culture. It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the meta-standpoint of the scholar (Fuchs/Berg 1999:36f.) – purportedly objectivizing not only her/his own but also the cultural ‘native’s’ subjective experience, i.e. their ‘point of view’ – became the target of an epistemological (and ethical) critique. The subsequent ‘reflexive turn’ in anthropology – strengthened also by the postcolonial debates of the 1990s –

34 ... and ‘along with Radcliff-Brown in Australia and South Africa, and Franz Boas in the USA [...] established fieldwork as the modus operandi of anthropology departments throughout the world’ (Hutnyk 2006:352).
led to a re-evaluation of the discipline’s basic principles, notably its representational medium of text and the representational authority of the ethnographer (Clifford 1988). This crisis had repercussions in the broader field of the humanities and with the subsequent ‘cultural turn’ of the 1990s it became fashionable for scholars to ambiguously position themselves between an (understood as impossible) objectivity and a pure (individually arbitrary and plural) subjectivity. Neither the theoretical perspective of constructivism, which understands cultural realities as constructed and partial but still ‘objectively’ accessible to the scholar, nor the position of subjectivity, which understands the reality of culture as the mere aggregation of a plurality of individual realities, seemed adequate any longer (Bourdieu (1997)2000:188). This collapse of scholarly objectivity and critical distance often led to an ‘automatic reflexivity’ (Hutnyk 2006:353) on the respective methodological and theoretical basic assumptions often serving as nothing more than an addendum to the otherwise unchanged scholarly practice. The collapse of objectivity also provoked fatalism (see for example Baudrillard’s (1981)1999) notion of the implosion of meaning) and reactions that confronted the random nature of cultural constructs with reactionary theoretical re-materializations of an underlying reality, predicated for example on the body or on spirituality. Such post-objectivist approaches nonetheless leave the privileged position of the scholar untouched; although s/he might present her/his knowledge as only ‘partial truth’ (Clifford/Marcus 1986:1), it remains his/her job and privilege to speak and identify these (however partial) truths.

35 Toynbee (in Toynbee/Quirk 2005:404) describes these scholars in the field of music studies as ‘postmodern’ academics.
Yet there is another way of dealing with the collapsing of critical distance that I find more promising; the transdisciplinary endeavour that arose from performative cultural anthropology and developed into the field now known as performance studies – spanning anthropology and ethnography, sociology, psychology and linguistics, as well as theatre studies and theatre practice and pedagogy. Within anthropology, one important development stemming from the reflexive turn and its ‘crisis of representation’ has been an intensified focus on the ‘rhetorical practices’ within cultural productions – not only considering the media of self-construction within cultures themselves, but also considering the tropes and stylistic operations within the discipline of anthropology. After all, ethnography conducts a ‘textualisation’ of cultural processes and is therefore itself dependent on rhetorical means of representation (Clifford/Marcus 1986, Geertz 1988). One important advance has been the turn towards a performative cultural anthropology, which understands culture as a symbolical practice and consequently – unlike cultural semiotics – does not concentrate on the cultural meaning of the symbols but on the process of symbolisation itself. This new focus on the processual dynamics of culture rather than on a (centralised) system of meanings is also crucial for the position of the scholar her/himself. In performative cultural anthropology the scholar deals knowingly with more than one, objective ‘pluri- or meta-reality’ and neither simply agglomerates the plurality of subjective cultural realities in an (purportedly objective) academic text nor distils one objective meta-reality out of his/her research on individual subjective realities. Instead, the concept that culture ‘is’ performance and the concept of culture ‘as’ performance are allowed to collapse.
Performance ethnography

The concept of ‘culture is performance’ deals with culture as a collective and dynamic ‘reservoir’ of tropes and metaphors by which social practice is conducted. Here, the focus of analysis is on strips of social life that are evidently ‘performances’, for example rituals where ‘symbols in movement’ (Turner 1982:1989:33) can be grasped. While the concept that ‘culture is performance’ deals with the social reality of culture, the concept of ‘culture as performance’ concentrates on the scholarly reality of the ethnographer. Just like the social acteurs, the scholar also relies on metaphors and tropes as essential ethnographical tools for the representation of culture. Thereby the ethnographer’s engagement with culture itself becomes a ‘performance’ – maintaining both an objectivist concept of culture as objectively accessible subjective-individual, partial performances and a subjectivist concept of culture as the construction of the scholar. Instead of representing ‘the’ reality of culture, the scholar uses metaphorisations and tropes to eventually re-materialize ‘a’ reality of culture. In order to do so, the performance ethnographer has to believe in two (or more) cultural ‘truths’ at the same time and use a ‘dual, bifocal point of view’ (Bourdieu 1997:2000:191).

Notably, such a bi-focal perspective can be assumed not only by social acteurs; Latour argues that an attitude of ‘constructivist realism’ (Latour 1999:135) can also be engaged by an academic scholar. He maintains that it is a question of her/his textual rhetorics to uphold ‘two entirely unrelated epistemologies’ (Latour 1999:129) in approaching one ‘object’ of investigation. In his writings, Latour developed the rhetorical focus from ethnographic studies further into a critical toolbox for the study of science. Like bi-focality as a social vernacular practice, double epistemological situating is, according to Latour, a prevalent scientific practice. What makes Latour’s approach interesting is that in his critique of
scientific reasoning he does not position himself at a distance to the scientific practices, but is ‘symmetrical’ (Latour 1993:111). Rather than upholding objectivity and classical-critically showing that science violates its very own standards of objectivity, Latour develops a method that is ‘intimately bound to its object’. For this, he follows other (academic-scientific) agents’ practices in their double epistemological situating in constructivism and objectivist realism. In contrast to Krohn, who, for the principle of transdisciplinary research, upholds a general antagonism between the epistemologies of the scientific and the non-scientific field, Latour proposes a personal duplicity of epistemologies with the agents from both fields. Following Latour, a quasi-objectivist ethos can be assumed in both fields of knowledge production. I would like to uphold such a basic epistemic duplicity for my (musico-artistic) field projects and my own project. I thereby bypass those categorical discussions on artistic research that construct a dualism between the epistemes of artistic (sensual-experiential) and academic (intellectual-theoretical) practices.

Employing Latour’s quasi-objectivist, symmetrical methodology, I will concentrate on laboratory cases of pop musicians engaging bi-focality and double epistemologies. These laboratory cases all involve cultural acteurs from electronic pop music who ‘perform’ anonymity and thereby both critique and participate in pop music stardom36. Yet the question of my engagement as a scholar with these bi-focal, doubly ‘true’ pop musical performances remains. Here again it seems to me that the question of mediality is crucial.

**The media of symmetrical investigation – practical considerations**

When starting my research for this project, it quickly became apparent what it would actually mean to ‘follow the actors’ (Balke 2009:1): the electronic pop

36 which also entails the attempt to escape it
musicians I wanted to research were not willing to speak ‘officially’ or be interviewed by me. In hindsight it was perhaps to be expected that they would make no exception to EDM’s ‘no interview’-policies for me, despite my naïve promises of ‘full anonymity’. I had overlooked the classical methodological problem of researching phantoms and secrets – namely that ‘by their nature they elude empirical research’ (Westerbarkey 2000:14, TM). For myself as an anthropologist this meant a change of direction: because I take the practice of pop musicians seriously and moreover, because I do not want to jeopardize their anonymity through my research, I found myself taking detours (Westerbarkey 2000:12). One of these detours led me to the realization that these cultural acteurs also 'mediate' their analysis in non-linguistic form; they use images and performances to conduct their investigation. This brings me back to Fever Ray and the question of method: how does one put forth an argument in performance media?

Methodology and transcription of ‘critical practices’ of pop music stardom

In her P3 award reception performance, Fever Ray takes off a veil and draws attention to a melting mask behind it. She presents us with the revelation of a mask underneath resembling melting skin instead of a substantial, enveloping ‘cover’. She does not speak or employ the linguistic term ‘mask’. At the very moment of the possibility of being objectified in vision or language, the ‘mask behind’ melts and begins to disappear. How can such a ‘critical practice’ of pop music celebrity as Fever Ray’s performance be made useful for theoretical discourse and in verbal language?

A possible scenario for transcribing Fever Ray’s ‘critical practice’ would be to reproduce her performance here in a textual narration: ‘tearing off a mask and
revealing another mask beneath’. Fever Ray’s artistic investigation into pop music stardom uses a metaphor that seems to be easily transferable from the visual to the linguistic domain – the mask. For this reason her performance interested me as an ethnographically trained scholar; here the basic theoretical work, namely the metaphorizing of the cultural processes of stardom as ‘un/masking’, is done by a protagonist from within the ‘field’. A classic ethnorealistic conclusion here would be that one should import this ‘knowledge’ from the field by employing the field ‘tropes’ into theoretical writing in a one-to-one-translation. But ‘critical’ performances such as Fever Ray’s have one decisive advantage over academic descriptions of such critical practices: they are not legitimated by a maximal approximation to or ‘exposure’ of truth but by their efficacy within a sequential theatrical process. Therefore they do not merely drag a secret into the sheer light of terminological truth – as a realism-indebted, theoretical formulation such as ‘there lies a true self behind the image’ would do. In contrast, revelations such as Fever Ray’s aim to ‘do justice to [the secret]’ (Benjamin 1977:31) produced by masks; ascending the stage at an award ceremony in a head-masking costume and partaking in the enigmatic powers of secrecy, Fever Ray tactically repeats the mask of stardom and ‘gain[s] power in that very act of copying’ only to eventually disrupt her mimicry by ‘un-masking’ (Taussig 1999:44) the mask as a double-mask. Within her critique of pop music stardom one senses an intimate bond to her object and therefore the mask in Fever Ray’s performance is never materially fixed, it remains a non-material form, a process. But can I as a scholar grasp the flexibility and sequentiality of this tactical process by dressing it up in the term ‘mask’ and using it unequivocally in my theoretical writing? This rhetorical question takes on the subject of methodology of the prior pages but also leads me to concrete practical considerations.
Academic writing on ‘critical practice’ has to engage with its ‘object’ on a level beyond terminological ‘capture’ and question its methodologies. And as in critical practices, the *media* of ‘truth telling’ are crucial and academic practice has to reflect this quality in writing. What are the media through which cultural studies’ research and writing can mediate ‘a double epistemological situatedness’? Can a visual image making process, such as Fever Ray’s visual metaphor of the mask, be transcribed into a metaphorical language (that repeats with a difference instead of merely reproducing), and still be ‘academic’? Can the illusion of merely ‘reporting’ when describing a tactical performance such as Fever Ray’s be upheld? Or am I myself performing a critical practice when doing research and writing on this subject? But what comes after the practice, how do I present my research product?

Fever Ray seems to contradict a distinction between process and product. She does not objectify her practically critical process by finally presenting a material mask or totalizing symbol – instead she performs the perpetual process of disappearance. Therefore, in her performance it is the *process* of un/masking itself, not the declarative abstraction of a tactical practice within a term or visual symbol such as the ‘mask’ that edifies the audience. If Fever Ray’s critical performance should form the guiding knowledge production principle for my study, must I then reject a clear distinction between process and product myself?

In the fields of cultural anthropology and cultural studies, ‘ethnographical projects’ have recently been the subject of a transdisciplinary critique and with this, the process of fieldwork has seen a ‘reinvention and reimagination’ (Marcus 2010:88). In a fragmented, globalized world, ethnographical projects face the

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37 Pop music scholars still distinguish strictly between journalist approaches, where metaphors are good for ‘translating an aesthetic response’, and academic approaches, which ‘employ more abstract terms than those used in journalism’ (Toynbee in Quirk/Toynbee (2005:411)) to ‘rigorously analyz[e] those responses’ (Quirk in Quirk/Toynbee (2005:412)).
challenge of ‘multisitedness’ (Marcus 1995). Fieldwork can no longer be imagined as – temporally and spatially – distinct from its ethnographical ‘transcription’.

From the dates and places of my field notes reproduced in the introduction to this study one can deduce that the process of fieldwork was both temporally and spatially co-conducted with the writing of this text (and that the fieldwork may even continue after its publication). But how can I further transpose Fever Ray’s procedural approach into the chronotope of my text?

Like Foucault ((1978)2007), who in his lecture and text ‘What is Critique?’ transformed the task of defining ‘critique’ into a speech act of indecisiveness, one finds Fever Ray in an artistic performance of ambivalence. At the beginning of her P3 award performance Fever Ray initially visualizes pop music stardom as a veil. As long as she does not lift her face-cover, the cloth represents a veil, not a mask. Iconographically, the veil stands for, among other things, humility or grief. Yet in the way the material is used in this particular performance, the veil becomes a mask – hiding a secret, calling attention to that which is behind it. Iconographically the mask stands for semblance and deception as well as truth seeking. Regarding the effects of Fever Ray’s performance, a strictly iconographical decoding, drawing on social and historical references for explaining a visual text, seems to lead us nowhere. In her performance, Fever Ray effects a tactical transformation from veil to mask and upholds the connotations of both at once. Contexts collapse and such diverse (and even conflicting) ideas as humility and deception can be sustained simultaneously. For Fever Ray neither the ‘veil’ nor the ‘mask’ is the symbolic endpoint of her argumentation, rather it is their concurrent dialectical juxtaposition that comprises the argument. Producing such a ‘dialectical’, synchronous description is unquestionably a capacity of image making and artistic research.

How can I produce a depth of analysis equal to Fever Ray’s image making when
using linear, sequential language? Instead of copying Fever Ray’s visually
metaphorical model of knowledge production (presenting two equally convincing
explanations of a situation at the same time), I aim to translate it into an approach
adequate to my given medium of written language. Therefore I choose to provide
two differing transcriptions of the performances presented in the following study.
The first transcription avoids metaphors and may be somewhat dry – in the case
of Fever Ray this would read something like: ‘wearing a veil Fever Ray ascends
the stage to receive her award’. The second transcription translates (instead of
analogizing) Fever Ray’s visual metaphors into analytical reasoning – for
example, concluding a discussion of the cultural context of veils and masks with a
phrase such as ‘stardom functions like a mask’. The first description exhibits the
performance situation to the reader and draws attention to its formal aspects
while the second description references cultural context and social frames. The
first description also conveys my own aesthetic strategies as a scholar dealing
with the performance, while the second description discloses referential
strategies of making cultural and social sense that may appear objective. In my
analysis in the following chapters, neither of these two forms of presentations
should win ultimate favour and the gap between the two ‘descriptions’ should
remain unresolved. My intention is to help the reader ‘move’ back and forth
between the two (individually insufficient) descriptions and to confront her/him
with her/his own perceptions – in order to ultimately produce a non-decisive
description.

Yet my critical practice does not end in producing a written description that
aspires to the ‘thickness’ of (Fever Ray’s or any other performance artists’) visual
language. Neither the adequate description nor the inadequate description
contrastively produces knowledge, but rather the process of transcription itself
and one’s insight into the networks of knowledge production. What makes quasi-
Objectivism a valuable knowledge practice is its consideration of the tactics and time-based rhetorics of texts, performances and research processes – behind the scenes – being of equal significance as the ‘material’ these texts and processes engage with. It is exactly with her transformation of a veil into a mask, that Fever Ray lets us think about the specific tactics involved in knowledge production – in the same way that Foucault exposed these tactics by highlighting rhetorics and performative elements in his reflection on critique. Fever Ray effects knowledge not by showing an absolute, conceptual discrepancy between the (covering) veil and the (in its concealment uncovering) mask; she does not present them simultaneously in a paradoxical, yet ‘static’ image. Instead, it is the sequential and tactical aspects of the dramaturgy of knowledge production that are displayed in her time-based performance through the transformation of veil to mask to dual mask. By transforming one into the other and then turning it into a vanishing material object, she stages the provisional quality and situatedness of knowledge. She does not arrive at a-rational indifference but rather at a detailed reconstruction of knowledge production. Viability (Glasersfeld 1996:43) is the crucial constituent of performance that makes performance a quasi-objectifying medium: producing an object and showing the process of its objectification, i.e. retracing its knowledge networks or ‘milieu’. Quasi-objectivist approaches dissolve the subject/object-dichotomy by tactically objectifying – producing an object of knowledge – before the eyes of an audience. In this objectification and fetishisation do not stand in contrast to processuality. Fever Ray’s performance tactic (like the tactics of my laboratory cases) differs from radical techniques of negation and disappearance as practiced in performance art (e.g. Phelan 1993) and electronic dance music (e.g. Tagg 1994) in that she does not rely on absolute presence and the non-reproducibility of the performance event, but presents her continual performance of disappearance in the context of a well-
documented, reviewable televised award show. Ephemeral and disappearance are secured here not by the irretrievability of presence in the event but by continuous re-signification and tactical repetition.

For the following research report I have concluded that I have to make the dramaturgies of its knowledge production retraceable. However, this will take a form different from the ‘viability’ that artists apply to their performances. In my text I follow artists into their ‘laboratory’ and observe how they arrange a dramaturgy and tactic for their performances. I understand these performances to be themselves musico-artistic studies of star personality in pop music – the results of which reveal to the audience a viable network of knowledge that can be used to trace the production of the star subject in pop music. (These performances will at times objectify, and at other times sustain the circulation of their object.) These performative operations do not simply document stardom in pop music, but put this ‘object’ at a reachable distance and make the tactical objectification tangible before an audience’s eyes. This comes about through the artists reflecting on the position from which they speak and act within and during their performances. At a certain point – the last chapter of this study – I will ask whether the spectators of these performances also stand outside the event, or whether they can take differing perspectives within it. Whether they can also tactically position themselves against its presented topic, experience it and connect it to their own life experiences.

Similar to these performances, my text is neither a distanced critique nor a pure documentation, but is itself a chain of operations that establishes relations. The objects of investigation will be allowed to circulate therein and, as with my research, the backstage area and the ‘material’ of my investigation are allocated equal importance. Nevertheless, I will not present the production techniques, the tactics within the text itself, because although such a continuous reflexivity of my
speaking position and the deictic quality of language would make the text a true performance, it would render the text relatively unreadable for an academic audience. In this regard, my academic practice differs from the artistic practices I investigate: I will present the quasi-objectivist dramaturgy of my research by a processual transformation of my research ‘matter’ with the help of various concepts, and by the conspicuous discarding of concepts I developed in earlier chapters. At the level of the text this will be an illustration rather than an enactment of quasi-objectivism. For example, I will discuss and ‘name’ the researcher’s change of positioning – from performance as a subject to performance as the method of study (see infra ch. 2) – but not change positioning within my writing. Nevertheless, I hope that through the broader dramaturgy of the text one can follow, how this text was ‘made’ and how I experimented, failed and succeeded, as the case may be. The present text is the product of this success and failure of my experiment, but it documents this process in large part through reference and description – not by a parallel, poetic performance. While the laboratory cases experiment with pop music stardom through critical performances that ultimately take the place of a pop stardom performance, my text remains distinct from the underlying research event – distinct with the exception of its rhetorical linkages via the usage of the personal pronoun ‘I’, its narration by the chronology of research events and the deliberately ‘thick’ description of the researched performances.

**Dance and pop music writing**

Finally, I want to return to the matter of how the ‘concreteness’ of critical practice can be acknowledged in writing about music. Since its advent, the non-representative and tentative character of EDM has been widely debated and a ‘paradigm change’ for the study of pop music in general emanating from EDM has often been proclaimed. Against the background of this avowedly non-
representational dance music culture, the scholarly representation of music cultures as sites of alterity and marginality has come under vehement critique. Specifically, the ‘subculture’ paradigm descended from cultural studies and sociology was strongly attacked and subsequently abandoned (Huq 2006). What replaced it in pop music studies was a focus on sound and the body. Dance as a practice that ‘seems to retain at its centre a solid resistance to analysis’ (McRobbie 1984:131) provided a challenge to scholarly objectivity. Since the mid 1990s the difficulty of describing and historicizing the transience of dance music has been met by (persistently rationalistic) attempts to theorize its non-discursivity with new concepts and terminologies of the ‘sonic’ (see supra Ch. 0.2). The problem of scholars positioning themselves at a safe, rationalistic distance (Ward 1993) and ‘objectivizing’ transient dance practices has also been addressed by new strategies of writing. Some writers sought a solution by sticking to realist descriptions while prefacing their texts with (deconstructivist) disclaimers (Collin 1997:8). Others fully subjectivized cultural experience by delivering their text as personal, autobiographical testimony (Stone 1995:33). Others still de-subjectivized their texts by referring to a socio-cultural context only in the form of the imaginations of extra-textual agents (human and non-human (Eshun 1998)). These approaches, developed in the service of critical reflexivity as provoked by dance music, may be summarized by drawing an analogy to the crisis of representation in anthropology and its outcomes, namely the ‘automatic reflexivity’ precipitated by the collapse of scholarly objectivity in anthropology (Hutnyk 2006:353, see supra p. 57). The ‘writing culture’ critique as put forward in pop and dance music studies mostly reflected on basic theoretical assumptions and, less often, on forms of textual representation, while otherwise leaving the scholarly practice unchanged. Here, as in anthropology, reflexivity ‘failed to generate new strategies [and] forms [...] of practice’ (Marcus 2010:84) – which
could have integrated both writing and research/fieldwork. In order to develop this kind of productively transdisciplinary, quasi-objectivist account, I now suggest turning the attention to one particular early example of ‘dance music writing’.

In 1976 writer and journalist Nik Cohn suggested an interesting (and highly problematic) solution to the problem of transcribing the ephemeral and non-verbal practices of disco into verbal documentation. Nik Cohn, freshly relocated to New York from the UK, where he had been an influential commentator on British youth cultures, started to engage with the then thriving disco culture. In June 1976 he published a cover story in New York magazine on the emerging disco dance culture. His story was quickly picked up by Hollywood-screenwriter Norman Wexler and formed the basis for his screenplay for Saturday Night Fever (Goldman 1978:153) – which when released as a film became the representation of the disco phenomenon in popular media.

Cohn’s article was originally not written as a screenplay, taking instead the form of an ethnographic report. The article begins with a note claiming that ‘everything described in this article is factual and was either witnessed by me or told to me directly by the people involved. Only the names of the main character have been changed’ (Cohn 1976:1). After this indication of participant observation, the text tells the story of Vincent, and his gang of working-class Italian-Americans, who spend their weekends in disco excess – and occasionally recount their stories to a ‘man in a tweed suit, a journalist from Manhattan’ (Cohn 1976:2). In this way Nik Cohn wrote himself into the story as observing author, meeting his ‘informants’ on their occasional smoke breaks or car rides (Cohn 1976:2,15) – which always happened outside the club.

The significance of this ‘outside’ was only discovered two decades later when Cohn admitted, that his story was ‘a fraud’ (Cohn 1994:12). He had ‘allowed his
editors to believe that what they were getting was reportage, when what they were really reading contained a great deal more fiction than he would or could admit to at the time. The empirical foundations on which Cohn constructed his article were shallow – consisting of but two visits to the Bay Ridge discotheque’ (Gilbert/Pearson 1999:20). After he had told the Guardian that his ‘story was a fraud’ (Cohn 1994:12), in 1997 he admitted outright to New York magazine, that he ‘wrote it all up[; a]nd presented it as fact’ (Cohn 1997 cited after Gilbert/Pearson (1999:36)): ‘I knew nothing about this world […] [and] didn’t speak the language […]. So I faked it.’ Read in retrospect, one easily finds hints at the fictions that the story contains, but given Cohn’s standing as a journalist with intimate knowledge of pop music scenes, it is understandable that readers took the author’s ‘presence at the scene’ as fact. The sheer ‘monstrosit(y)’ of the story, the exuberant machismo of the portrayed ‘ethnic’ group of Italians that, as soon as the ‘disco scene ha[d] become […] familiar’ and crossed over to popular media with Saturday Night Fever, ‘sound[ed] a little fantasti (Goldman 1978:152). Yet when the story was originally published in 1976 it ‘made the reader feel that he had penetrated some strange submerged world where all sorts of grim and disturbing things were possible’; Cohn certainly took advantage of ‘the perceived truth value of journalism’ (Gilbert/Pearson 1999:21), but also of the reader’s appetite for exotic ethnography.

Although Cohn’s story contains contradictions, these were not apparent to most of his contemporary readers. Cohn’s case raises questions about the intellectual benefit of falsities and errors, but also about the obligations of ethnographers to their audiences and their research subjects. His account is rife with problems: among other things, he essentializes ethnicities and ignores disco’s origins in gay culture (Gilbert/Pearson 1999:8). He is also ‘dance-deaf’ (Goldman 1978:154) and ignores the sonic and concentrates on the spectacular aspects of disco
dance. Without excusing Cohn's essentialisms and ignorance of gay culture's role in disco's development, it might nevertheless be said that diachronically his fraud (unintentionally) provided an intellectual benefit: the exposure of the conventions of specific discourses such as music journalism and music ethnography. In Chapter 3 I will engage with contemporary tactical ‘fakes’ and their ethically less problematic version of ‘imaginary ethnography’ in ‘collaborative imagination’. Therein I will show that the theatrics of tactical ‘fakes’ are crucial to their efficacy as critical practices, and that collaborative imagination might provide a new scenography for ethnographical accounts of dance and pop music that can help develop new forms of practice, integrating critical reflexivity with fieldwork and writing.

38 In their introduction to Discographies (1999) Gilbert and Pearson point to Nik Cohn's article and especially show the fallacies of the ‘subculture’-approach, which Cohn allegedly falls prey to.
1. Laboratory Case I: Moodymann and the study of pop music persona construction

1.1 Unveiling the curtain: the study of pop music persona construction

Disclaimer: the practices described below were used by Moodymann until 2006/2007. My description nevertheless employs the form of the present tense.

Cafe Moskau, Berlin, June 2006. Moodymann has been booked to deejay at the after show party of a fashion week showcase in Berlin’s Cafe Moskau nightclub sponsored by a well-known beer brand. Some in the audience (including myself) find this fashion and branding context disturbing – will Moodymann, the house producer from Detroit and enfant terrible of electronic dance music, really show up? The artist, who during the 1990s refused visual depiction and media representation through interviews or photographs and has managed to establish an author-recluse star figure so enigmatic that he has been labelled an ‘outspoken voice’ (Resident Advisor (n.d.)) without even ever having publicly uttered a word (Rapp 2005). Moodymann seems incongruous in a sponsored context where images are meant to transfer (positive) values from a cultural icon to consumer commodities. What kind of transference can take place given his iconic status as critical historian of Black Techno? This seems to be an altogether too complicated proposition for a smooth transferal onto a mass-produced beer brand to come off. Nonetheless, the beer brands’ marketing managers seem to have found a reason to pay for Moodymann’s flight from Detroit to Berlin.
Moodymann arrives, escorted to the stage by members of a Berlin DJ-collective who have also been booked to play. He slips behind a curtain that has been hung at the front of the stage, prepared especially for this occasion and which now hides the DJ-equipment and Moodymann himself.

The curtain has been an object of discussion in music media since Moodymann started using it on European tours around 2000 and spawned a multitude of word-of-mouth myths and legends about Moodymann. According to the German music press, the ‘moody diva from Detroit’ (Elverfeld 1998:70) has been called everything from ‘misanthropic’, a ‘crazy man’ and an ‘arrogant ass’ (Sollmann 2003:55, Kedves 2003), and has had accusations of ‘reverse racism’ levelled at him (Tittel 2003:43).

The project ‘Moodymann’ by Detroit electronic music producer and DJ Kenny Dixon Jr. will be my first laboratory case of discursive anonymity performance as critical practice. How does Moodymann practice knowledge about anonymity and can this practice be understood as critical? Although Moodymann refused visual depiction and media representation, his records were not white-labelled and his name – the project name ‘Moodymann’ and his presumed real name ‘Kenny Dixon Jr.’ were present on records and in media discourse. Parallel to this music media performance of anonymity, Moodymann also developed a specific live performance routine involving a curtain to cover and block view of the stage. A live performance I attended in Berlin in 2006 will be the object of my investigation in this chapter.
Revealing a star’s ‘inner self’ in star studies

Understanding Moodymann’s performance as (musico-artistic) investigation I am mostly interested in its discursive-representative aspects – its linguistic, vocal and visual media, the cultural-discursive contents represented in this performance, and the way Moodymann represents them. I found Moodymann’s performance to be overtly concerned with the subject of pop music stardom, and will therefore transcribe the performance (as I experienced it in June 2006) as an investigation into the basic constituents of celebrity in pop music. Moodymann’s performance itself will be understood as an investigation of stardom, and positioned within a wider, already historically developed field of (mostly academic) star studies. The theoretical and conceptual elements brought into the discussion by me will be highlighted in the running text by square text fields; the transcription of Moodymann’s performance will be in Italics.

The historical differentiation between private and public in stardom

In the classic (Hollywood) star system, which established a notion of the star that, to the present day, forms the basis for theorization in star studies, the star figure is existentially bound to the existence of a ‘real’ or ‘private’ person behind the figure. Images are publicly accessible complexes of signs and utterances about a person. They are not to be confused with the real person, although the real person is a starting point for such image building processes. This difference between an image and a real person presumed to be behind the image makes up a central element of stardom (Lowry 1997:14f.): the enigma and extraordinariness of stars. To the public, the person behind the image is usually accessible in the mediated form only. Therefore in the classical star system two

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39 The Hollywood star system was firmly established by the 1920s through the confluence of the film industry and mass circulated news reporting.
images are to be managed: the star’s image as a professional (actor, athlete, politician, etc.) and her/his image as a private person, which is, in turn – though mediated through news and celebrity journalism – supposed to ‘reveal the truth’ about the professional. Stars are formations resulting from a constant differentiation between private and public existence (Marshall 2006b:501ff.), as they ‘enact ways of making sense of the experience of being a person in a particular kind of social production (capitalism), with its particular organisation of life into public and private spheres’ (Dyer 1986:17). Consistency (Harris 1991, Faulstich 1997) or ‘controllable’ discrepancies within the image (see Dyer 1998:142-49) were the goals of the image building process in the early star system, with an increasing tolerance for contradiction observable from the late 1920s onward (Evans 2005b:35ff.).

While film stardom has been the subject of much theorization, the impact of stardom in specific cultural industrial fields (other than film) still awaits analysis. A model for such analyses might be star typologies that differentiate stars according to their professions. For example, TV personalities are differentiated from film stars due to characteristics of the media such as permanent presence of television versus the distance-producing qualities of film (Ellis 1992:106ff., Langer 1981). But such media-based typologies tend to essentialize media characteristics (Holmes 2004:152) in a manner that muddies any real insight. More promising is a differentiation according to profession that includes cultural and historical factors other than mere media characteristics (e.g. Faulstich 1997).

While looking at the specificities of the pop music field, I will nevertheless in the following use a contemporary umbrella term ‘celebrity’ for stars of varying professions. “Celebrity” is a larger category than “star”, for it encompasses the huge range of people whose image circulates without being attached to their initial professional role […]’ (Evans

*star
*celebrity
*celebrity culture
I use both terms ‘celebrity’ and ‘star’ interchangeably, whereas the notion of ‘pop star’ or ‘pop music star’ indicates the particular sub-set of celebrities and stars in pop music. On the one hand, this is to ‘acknowledge the persistence of the term [star] in the public world where stars are defined in terms of their work in a specific medium (for example people are referred to as “film stars” or “pop stars” rather than film and pop celebrities’ (Evans 2005a:4). On the other hand, I want to indicate a certain continuity between the ‘stars of the past’ and celebrities ‘(the preferred term today)’ (Evans 2005a:4). When analysing historical developments, I prefer to use the term ‘celebrity culture’ (see infra Ch. 1.2) for this recent cultural phenomenon (instead of indicating a historical shift by a terminological distinction between star and celebrity). Historical transformation happens in small-scale changes and re-combinations rather than in epic shifts. Rather than investing in a more precise terminology (which is often pre-judging the phenomena under study) I think that a precise regard for specific formats (Ruchatz 2001) and historically specific analyses (rather than media or art ontologies) is called for. Such an approach would be especially useful for accounts on stars in pop music, which, according to Goodwin (1992:25), ‘is, and always has been, a multidiscursive form in which no one media site is privileged’.

The production of pop music has always been dispersed across a wide range of cultural industrial fields, through film soundtracks to concerts to social media (Toynbee 2000:19). Therefore any attempt to identify one specific ‘sound apparatus’ (Lastra 1992) that underlies pop music production would seem an inauspicious endeavour. In film star studies, the ‘close-up’ was singled out for

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40 Recent approaches to sound theory that focus on the media apparatus (e.g. Altman 1992, Lastra 2000, Sterne 2003) and question media ontologies through culturally and historically specific analyses of sound media are indeed a welcome extension to the visually centred approaches of film studies. Yet their exclusive emphasis on the auditory (stemming from the fact that sound media has tended to be neglected by media studies) limits their applicability to the study of pop music phenomena. In addition, their focus on the apparatus undervalues the media text itself (Smith 2008:4), and is arguably too determinative an approach for a cultural field as socially stratified as pop music.
discussion as a technological innovation that engendered new performance styles for film actors and as a pre-requisite for 20th century film stardom (Dyer 1998:16ff., Gamson 1994:221). In the musical field new performance styles also developed, here in tandem with sound technologies such as the microphone (Frith 1996:187ff.). This media-technological analogy has led some scholars to theoretically parallel film and music stardom (see Borgstedt 2008:36ff.), but how can one historico-specifically describe pop stardom without singling out singular media materialities in the argumentation? And although it has been a historical constant in stardom and celebrity of the 20th century that a star's image is produced by the differentiation between her/his public and private person, what is the historically nuanced, cultural role that media may have played when changes within this 'system' occurred?

**The curtain**

*Moodymann has produced numerous album and single releases since the early 1990s. Although refusing to give interviews and never voicing himself in the music press, he has made a name for himself and has established a fan base beyond his home in Detroit and the USA. Since the late 1990s he has played many (often highly touted) live shows in Europe, during which he performs and addresses the audience with the help of a microphone from behind a white sheet hanging at the front of the stage.*

In Moodymann’s live performance the performer is veiled. The sheet inhibits a face-to-face-relationship with the performer and thereby stages the physical presence of the performer as a ‘potentiality’ (Faulstich 2000:206). This brings to mind argumentations on celebrity such as Evans’ (2005b:19) statement that ‘as a general category […] celebrity and its charismatic effect are dependent on the lack of a face-to-face-relationship; […] celebrities depend for their status and
popularity on a larger group of people who observe them and their image from a distance’. Thereby the mediating work of a celebrity seems to be precisely the staging of a lack of face-to-face-encounters and of potential physical presence. One can argue that there are continuities between of heroes of the pre-modern era with modern mass media stars (Braudy 1986): they all rely on forms of media management which single them out from a larger group of people who know of them and speak of them from a distance. Yet while pre-modern celebrities were famous for their power and inherited social position, the modern celebrity in increasingly socially mobile societies since the 19th century, had to achieve fame through some form of accomplishment (Rojek 2001:18) or merit. Therefore, the modern drama of celebrity centres on the 'professional identity' of a celebrity. The modern celebrity's mechanisms of staging were developed in theatre and vaudeville (Gaines 1991:36, Marshall 1997:80, Hickethier 1997:31) and through the staging of musicians' virtuosity in the context of the concert performance (Borgstedt 2008). In the 19th century, focus shifted towards the 'labour' or 'performance of the self' and musicians began drawing attention to their sensual-corporeal presence as a hint to their personality (Blaukopf 1955:14) while stage actors' personalities were increasingly promoted along with their roles (Dyer (1979) 1998:102). All this was made possible by the emergence of the rotary press (Gamson 1994:20) and daily circulating newspapers that reported on stars and their escapades – among other things. In contrast to earlier, pre-print fame phenomena and the predecessors of stardom in the 19th century, the electronic, audiovisual mass media of the 20th century, by dissociating the celebrity from a large and dispersed audience via the screen, the record or some equivalent electronic media stage, introduced new dimensions of distance between producers and audience. Effectively, the individuality of the star is now distinguished by a media management which enlarges the tension of nearness
and distance beyond the scope of the literal stage of physically co-present, reciprocal individuals. This new degree of ‘social distance’ (Rojek 2001:12) and its corresponding potential for the new techniques of ‘closeness’ and intimacy is the precondition for a 20th century celebrity. Stardom proper arises with mass media positing the off-stage life of performers as equally important to their performed roles (deCordova (1990), Gledhill 1991:213) and managing their individuality against the background of the masses by electronically amplifying and perspectivizing their physical presence. Interaction between star and audience is now no longer a personal contact between two (present) I’s, but rather an unveiling of the (private, absent) I concealed behind the (public, present) me of the star on a stage in front of an audience.

By performing behind a sheet Moodymann draws attention to this first element of 20th century stardom in reverse: the physical absence and electronic presence of the artist dramatized as a clue to her/his private personality by a media management that employs electronic amplification (the intimacy-initiating techniques of filmic close-up or musical close-miking) and the promotion of off-stage life. Before speculating further on the role of absence and presence in star productions I would like to consider how Moodymann articulates his take on stardom within the wider context of star studies. Where within the spectrum of (pop music) star studies could one locate Moodymann’s performance as an investigation of pop stardom?

The dramaturgy of revelation in star studies

Although the existential bond of the star figure to a real person behind it is a historical constant of celebrity, it has been subject to differing evaluation in the spectrum of star studies. A differentiation can be made following Rojek’s (2001:29ff.) subdivision of star studies into three (successive) approaches:
subjectivist, structuralist and post-structuralist. In subjectivist approaches to stardom the star figure/real person link is interpreted as ‘natural’: it is the ‘innate’ talent or unique singular quality and charisma of an individual that causes her/his rise to publicity and stardom, merely – if at all – ‘catalysed’ (Rojek 2001:33) by cultural intermediaries. By contrast, in structuralist approaches this link is identified as ideological or otherwise socially constructed: star figures manufactured predominantly by cultural intermediaries are understood as a ‘total star text’ which has to be stripped away to reveal a truth behind it. The mechanism of ‘revelation’ – known also as the basic gesture of enlightening operations of ‘critique’ – is to be found in both those accounts. In subjectivist accounts the star figure ‘reveals’ a universal truth of individual talent and charisma, in structuralist accounts the total star text helps unveil an ideology of heroic or capitalist individualism or social typecasting. Yet in the first case, the process of ‘authenticating’ a star figure by ‘revealing’ a real person behind it is taken at face value, in the second case it is criticized as scripted by universal structural rules embedded in culture (see Rojek 2001). In Moodymann’s case, what is revealed is neither an overabundance of talent or charisma, as a subjectivist account on stardom would have it. Moodymann ostentatiously presents himself as a DJ with less than virtuosic mixing talents and prevents the audience from observing his corporeality by hanging a sheet in front of the stage. But Moodymann neither provides us with an intellectual investigation of the ‘celebrity-veil’ as something which needs to be stripped away as structuralist accounts would have it; nor does he investigate the dramaturgy of unveiling, no curtain is lifted, and no clarification is given. Moodymann simply confronts us with the veil of stardom and in his performance co-opts the authoritative effect of the

41 The referentiality of the star is produced by a continual process of authentication (Dyer 1991:135ff.). Already in 1986, Dyer (1986:2) noted that the ‘discourse of revelation is consonant with the construction of stardom’.
stardom-veil, elevating him above and separating him from an audience drawn to the scene by the currency of his name. At any rate, the idea of the curtain as a blind does not quite sit right in this performance, it does not ideologically bedazzle or fully overwhelm, but soberly displays its materiality and surface: it does not signify anything behind itself but closes off the stage and turns the audience’s attention back to itself on the dance floor.

In bringing himself thereby to floor level with the audience, Moodymann seems to imply a third approach to celebrity – one which may be in line with certain post-structuralist approaches to celebrity that have been encroaching on subjectivist and structuralist thinking since the 1980s. According to Rojek (2001:44) a post-structuralist perspective examines celebrity as ‘intertextually constructed’, while ‘[v]ariation derives from the different constructions and inflections vested in the celebrity by the participants in the field’. For assembling such variation in meaning, this approach routinely concentrates on the celebrity image and its intertextual construction. In the social sciences, where the term ‘image’ has become a terminus technicus in economic psychology and marketing research and has travelled from there into psycho-sociological and sociological theory (Kautt 2008:13), image refers to a meta-individual, collective imagination. ‘Image’ refers to a social construction linked to an object, such as a product in economic psychology, or an individual, group or institution in sociology. It is a social shorthand and of interest to sociological approaches mainly due to its function of reducing complexity in processes of communication and interaction.

From the realm of the social sciences the term ‘image’ has travelled to the field of academic interest that may be called ‘(film) star studies’. Here it refers to the reduction of a complex system of values, emotions and ideas linked to a star personality into a simple shorthand not dissimilar to a (social) stereotype.
The real person behind the star, with her/his personal character, psychology and physiognomy delivers the raw material for her/his transformation into an imagination – the ‘image’ (Heath 1975:356). While structuralist accounts ascribed the power for such transformation only to the cultural industries (i.e. the film industry) – either through the medium of the films themselves (Heath 1975) or by ‘subsidiary forms of circulation’ (Ellis 1982:91) such as marketing and promotion, post-structuralist explanations no longer rely on the notions of omnipotence of the culture industry or of social structures.

One influential post-structuralist approach developed by Richard Dyer integrates sociological and semiotic analysis within star studies. His basic assumption is that while stars may be artefacts of social typing, they do not only exist in the imagination of the audience but also in media texts, from which their signification spreads. Hereby Dyer redirected the focus of star studies to the understanding of image as text and to its materiality as a sign and thus, beside the ideological, typifying function of images their aesthetic, material basis – the star image as text – became an object of investigation. With this new argumentative ‘basis’ in the material texts of images, Dyer also opened the way for an important diversification within the field of star studies; the reception of images and their empirical effects became a legitimate research topic. Since then ‘image production’ stands not only for ideological typifications but also for a range of possible significations on the part of individual image recipients – from affirmations to deviations. Dyer (1979:72) argues for diversification when he maintains that star images as texts should be understood as ‘polysemical’, meaning that it is not what the star means ‘for the “average person” [that] is important but that there is a range of things that [the star] could be read as meaning by different audience members’; however, this ‘multiplicity’ of meanings does not mean that they ‘are endless’; there are a limited number of legitimate
readings of the star, each determined in part by the respective ideology of the audience member (out of a multiplicity of ideologies that exist within a dominant ideology or between dominant and oppositional ideologies of a society) and ‘in part by what the text makes available’. For Dyer (1979:72), the polysemy of the image is ‘structured’; on the one hand by the existing contradictions within the ideology of a society and on the other by the specific management of these contradictions within star images; Dyer conceptualizes the analysis of stars as images therefore as focussing on their ‘structured polysemy, that is, the finite multiplicity of meanings and affects they embody and the attempt to structure them so that some meanings and affects are foregrounded and others are masked or displaced’. To Dyer stars as texts are ideologies (1979:3), and just as there are various contradictions within and between ideologies in a society, stars as texts displace, or reconcile such contradictions (1979:30).

The construction of persona

But, can Moodymann’s bland curtain engage the audience in inflections and reappropriations of celebrity signs at all? Rather than diversification on the part of the audience’s image reception, Moodymann’s approach seems to parallel another version of post-structuralist star studies42 – one that concentrates less on the inter-textual connection (via the audience) and more on the material-historical connection between the celebrity and the audience. Regularly, the personnel linking these worlds are managers, publicists and PR agents from the cultural industries and their work can be understood as the ‘construction of persona’ of celebrity.

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42 According to Rojek (2001:44) a poststructuralist perspective ‘address[es] celebrity as a field of production, representation and consumption’ and a ‘developing field of intertextual representation in which meaning is variously assembled. Variation derives from the different constructions and inflections vested in the celebrity by the participants in the field, including agents, press officers, gossip columnists, producers and fans’. A post-structuralist approach portrays celebrity not as a universal but a relational field of power (Marshall 1997) and an ‘emerging property of interactions’ (Rojek 2001:45).
Although in celebrity studies the terms image and persona are regularly used interchangeably (see Hesmondhalgh 2005:120, Evans 2005b) in the following I would like to retain one differentiation: while both terms point to the mediatedness of celebrity, the term persona specifically emphasises the fact that celebrity is a product of the media and of acteurs of the cultural industries, while the term image specifically emphasises that, above all, it is a product of the audience’s imagination. The division of star studies that investigates celebrity by looking at media production understands agents of ‘persona construction’ generally as either: individual agents (organisational approach), as mere executives of strategies containing commercial uncertainty in a risk-prone media business (political economy and cultural industries approach) or, as themselves part of a wider system of discourses that historically developed around celebrity and specifically, celebrity in a particular entertainment industry (post-structuralist approach to persona construction) (see Hesmondhalgh 2005:97-133). The post-structuralist approach to persona construction is represented prominently by celebrity scholar David Marshall, whose detailed case studies of specific pop music stars paint a broad but historically contextualized picture of the construction of persona in the music entertainment industry (see Marshall 2006a:206-22, Marshall 2006b).
Constructing the ‘pop music persona’: four vehicles of persona investigated through Moodymann’s performance

I find Marshall’s post-structuralist, dispersed view of power in his critical analysis of pop music stardom paralleled in Moodymann’s critical performance. Moodymann does not deliver an image for the audience to decode and proliferate, but rather he performs the project of moulding and shaping a (his) persona in a dramatic way. As if sharing the post-structuralist assumptions of dispersed power, agency is neither located solely in the industry, societal structures or the audience – Moodymann positions himself in his live performance at floor level with his audience. In the following, I will try to read Marshall’s historically informed description of the construction of persona in pop music (with all its attention to the specific format of the pop song, the mediality effects of new technologies, the conceptions of collectivity and individuality in pop music and live vs. recorded performance codes (Marshall 2006a)) in parallel with Moodymann’s performative investigations of pop stardom. Analysing Moodymann’s performance as investigation of stardom will help me formulate four central contradictions, in accordance with Marshall’s delineation of the genealogy of the popular music celebrity (Marshall 2006a), that are employed in pop production as vehicles for the construction of the pop music persona. But while Moodymann engages with these constitutive ambiguities of pop music stardom, he does so in a playful manner. In the following I will present the four vehicles of persona construction as well as Moodymann's respective playful and refined defacements.
**Persona vehicle I: self and role – physiognomics of the pop song format**

And as the warm-up-DJ finishes his set in Cafe Moskau, Moodymann takes over. Before playing his first track, Moodymann can be heard – behind a curtain on a small, slightly elevated stage that extends onto the dance floor – tapping and testing his microphone rather loudly.

A microphone – the classical pop star instrument for affectively addressing an audience? The historical dramaturgy of distinguishing between private and public is conventionalized in pop music in the form it most commonly takes, the pop song – usually understood as the primal scene of pop stardom (Frith 1996:212ff., Marshall 2006a:196-99). Although pop songs are narratives in a strictly formal sense, they utilize the language of drama by scoring character and story musically and employing words in their sonic and symbolic functions. This ‘scoring’ of a pop song always occurs in an actual performance, as the transmission of ‘song material’ between pop musicians usually happens through recorded or live performances and not through notation (Middleton 2000:60). Each singer thereby ‘scores’ the character and story of the song in her/his individual performance anew. One also experiences the pop narrator physically – that is aurally and (in live situations) visually – performing a story and employing verbal and musical rhetoric.

In order to dissect the relationship between the private and the public within the song form one can ask: whose story is being performed? A similar question concerning the relationship between an author’s life and work has been debated in literary criticism. Most critics concluded this discussion by drawing a line between an author and her/his art in the domain of interpretation and reading.

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43 According to Frith (1996:212,158) ‘pop is primarily a song form’ and ‘[m]ost contemporary popular music takes the form of song (even acid house)’.
(Foucault (1969)2003), Barthes (1968)1977), while some argued that the author
is not fully outside his work but might be experienced as ‘implied author’ or
‘second self’ within the work (Booth 1961:71ff.). Wayne Booth (1961) argues that
this implied author of a literary work (her/his second self within the text) can be
distinguished from the real author of the work (the concrete person whose name
is on the book cover).

Booth’s work provides a model for the construction of persona in
literature on the narrative, intra-textual level. Utilizing his concept
of the ‘implied author’ one can include and denominate the
agency of the artist/author in the (intra-textual) construction of
persona. I will therefore refer to Booth’s category of the ‘implied author’ as
developed in reference to literary texts in the following as ‘intra-textual persona’.
The author does not necessarily speak in her/his own voice but can, as an
implied author, assume a role – an intra-textual persona, which may or may not
be a narrator or a character in a narrative. Apart from narrator or character, the
author can also assume this intra-textual persona by creating an ‘image of the
artist’ (Booth 1961:73) by a ‘style’, ‘technique’, or ‘tone’ (Booth 1961:74) of
writing, and by affectively producing an image of her/his person through verbal
rhetoric. Booth’s dramatistic view of literary expression – that literature depends
on an act of impersonation – clearly insists on a linkage between the text and its
producer and has, for this very reason, been dismissed in literary studies
(Jannidis 2000:20). Nonetheless, Booth’s rhetorical approach can be made
productive for pop music studies and indeed, his theory of the ‘implied author’
has already been applied in a study of the classical song by Edward Cone
(1974), which in turn was utilized in a study of the pop song by Simon Frith
(1996). For our purposes, the notion of the ‘implied author’ (or, in my terms the
intra-textual persona) – an assumed position of the author within her/his work – is
helpful in analysing the relationship between artist and life in the case of the pop song.

Pop songs are different from both non-dramatic narratives and from the classical song in this important respect: the line between author and work is blurred constantly and deliberately (Holmes 2004:159). In contrast to non-dramatic (and non-electronically mass-mediated) narratives, it is difficult for the audience of a pop song to make a clear distinction between the real author and the implicit persona (as fictional narrator/character or style). This is due to the physical presence of the narrator her/himself in a song performance (Goodwin 1992:75): ‘When a pop singer tells a first-person narrative in a song, he or she is simultaneously both the character in the song and the storyteller’. While in other forms of mass media storytelling the author of the text and the fictional narrator/character may be clearly distinct, the physical and/or electronically mediated aural presence in the voice of the singer and/or her/his visual presence on a stage enable the narrated character in the pop song to be easily conflated with the real person singing.

More complicated still are the differences between the pop song and the classical song. Although in classical song a dramatic impersonation also takes place through the physical presence of an interpreter, she or he remains clearly distinguishable from the song’s composer. In the performance of a classical song a ‘stylistic identity of the composer’ (Frith 1996:184), the ‘composer’s voice’ (Cone 1974) in the song text, is interpreted and personified by an other – the interpreter. The classic audience hears an interpretation of a composer’s work, which is merely an extension of the composer’s intra-textual persona. The vocal timbre of the interpreter is in the service of an aesthetic structure predetermined by the composer. In contrast, the central character of pop song narratives is not scored by a composer and then interpreted by a performer, but simultaneously
scripted and embodied by the singer-performer (Frith 1996:158ff.). Frith (1996:205) therefore likens the pop singer to the performance artist using her- or himself and her/his bodily presence as the site of the narrative. Unlike a classical interpreter, the pop singer-performer scripts the aesthetic structure of the song in the event of the performance. This leads to the effect that one hears pop singer performers to be more ‘personally expressive’ (Frith 1996:186, IO) than one hears the singer interpreters of classical music. The duplicity of playing and expressing a singer's self in a pop song frequently contributes to an existential star narrative for pop singers. The pop singer produces a song interpretation and a self-interpretation in one song performance. While this leads to a general blurring of the public (on-stage/fictional) self and the private (off-stage/factual) self of the pop singer (Holmes 2004:159), in order for the performance to work as a star production, the two poles are often set radically apart and developed into an existential dramaturgy (Diederichsen 2008a:83). Yet pop songs are not only personally expressive and self-revealing, they are also dramatic forms in which singers play ‘themselves’ or characters, – they not only ‘express emotion but also play it’ (Frith 1996:212). The singer also ‘plays’ her/himself by means of a performed intra-textual persona. Besides taking the form of a narrator or a character circumscribed through verbal rhetoric as a distinct ‘role’, the intra-textual persona is also potentially given form through ‘musical rhetoric’. According to Frith (1996:180,182), such musical rhetoric employs ‘sonic rather than semantic factors’ to affectively produce an image of the author, for example, via poetic or rhythmic use of language or by the use of the microphone ‘close-up’.

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44 All in all, the physical presence of the narrator in pop song has a different significance than in classical song as it points to the life of the performer and not of the composer. This does not mean that one cannot hear the classical voice as ‘multipliers [...] localized’ (Abbate 1991:13). Yet in general, ‘the classical concert performance is designed to draw attention to the work; the pop performance is designed to draw attention to the performer’ (Frith (1996:200) with reference to Cone (1974:119-21)).
Following Frith, Philip Auslander developed the notion of the ‘musical persona’ (Auslander 2004:6,2006a) or ‘performance persona’ (Auslander 2004:6) as the layer of musical performance or a musician’s presence before the audience that draws on the public or professional identity of a musician – the stage name or artist name such as for example ‘Moodymann’. What Booth had developed for literature with the concept of the ‘implied author’ – the intra-textual persona of a literary author in her/his work, that goes beyond an expression of the author’s real self and beyond a fictional character in the story – was developed by Auslander (2004,2006a,2006b) for the performing arts with the notion of the ‘persona’ (as performed presence in performance art) and ‘musical persona’ (as performed presence in musical performances). In Auslander’s ‘performer-centered’ approach (Auslander 2004:3), personae, although constrained by genre conventions (Auslander 2004:9ff.) and co-produced by the audience, are developed under the significant control of musicians as performers.

The physical enactment of the persona by the pop singer has narrative consequences. While there is a ‘conflation of the real/implied authorial voice’ occurring, this ‘double address’ is delivered to the audience of a live concert or a music video – significantly – in an embodied form: ‘from the mouths and musical instruments of narrators’ who are present as storytellers (Goodwin 1992:75f.). From this, scholars have derived the notion that the dramaturgy between the public and the private in pop songs has a discernable bias towards the private (e.g. Goodwin 1992). According to Goodwin (1992:76), in pop songs ‘the personality of the storyteller usually overwhelms characterization within the story’ as is the case in stand-up-comedy where characters performed by comedians are always subsumed in the comedian’s ‘personage’ (Graver 2003:164). The ‘stand-up comedian’ is also for Auslander the prototype in his conception of the
'persona' – ‘performance persona’ (2009:4) and ‘musical persona’ (2006a:102 Fn 5.) – which Auslander developed by reference to examples of popular musicians (but does not restrict to this popular domain (2006a:102ff.)). According to Auslander (2004a:6 Fn 14, 2009:4 Fn:3) a character emerges in pop music, as in stand-up-comedy, out of the ‘performed presence’, yet ‘with character emerging as a distinctly secondary effect’ (Auslander 2006b:5). The parallel with stand-up-comedy is appropriate as long as one adheres to a formalist mode of performance analysis. But if the further-reaching question of intertextuality is posed – ‘whose story do pop singers perform?’ – one has to explain how persona as ‘performed presence’ comes about. Why is the performed presence of the pop singer interpreted as her/his life story? At this point parallels with the stand-up-comedian break down. The stand-up-comedian walks onto the stage and produces a character and a ‘performance persona’ (his self-presentation (Auslander 2006b:4)) simultaneously with a character. Yet does the pop singer’s presence really only first emerge within the confines of the live event, as the ‘stand-up’ in the ‘stand-up-comedy’ indicates? One could argue for such an immediacy with the physicality of the voice as employed in Barthes’ concept of the geno-song (Barthes (1972)1977:182). This notion of the undomesticated voice of the body is frequently referred to in pop music studies (for example Frith 1996:191) and it describes the materiality of the voice as opposed to the cultural codes that slip into the voice (the pheno-song (Barthes (1972)1977:182)).

Yet what seems to be the most striking characteristic of the pop voice – and the one that is most significant in pop music’s aesthetics – is its radical disembodiment (Frith 1996:196). The pop voice has, from its beginnings, been medially charged; an audio-technical

*pop voice

creation, not inextricably bound to a body. Whether the disembodiment of the voice through modern sound technologies intensifies the physiognomic imperative in our listening culture (Meyer-Kalkus 2001:69,453) or instead causes a deep disruption of the relationship between voice and carrier (Zizek 1996) is still a matter of debate. On the one hand, sound technology disrupted this link, which on the other hand, has been compensated (some would say over-compensated) by socio-cultural changes in our capacity for voice recognition; as the disembodied voice has become the standard vocal reception mode, Reinhart Meyer-Kalkus (2001:69) argues that we are now constantly trained in a refined physiognomic listening. Pop stardom seems to be the perfect training ground for such refined physiognomic listening. Yet, according to Christian Bielefeldt (2008:207, TM), the pop fan hears the ‘idol’s voice […] physiognomically […] despite the technology’. The personal index of the pop voice can neither be easily explained by an immediate, physical-organic link to a body nor by the physiognomic standards of sound technology. As the link between pop voice and carrier is always broken to begin with, the presence of the pop musician in the performance arises not merely from a ‘stand-up’ body but also from a body already electronically mediated by audio and marketing technologies. Here the ‘pop music persona’ diverges from performance art’s ‘process of putting together and taking apart a persona’ (Frith 1996:205,211). While, on the one hand, the physical, immediate geno-‘body’ of the voice is employed, pop stars seem also to comply with a cultural materiality of the mediated voice as an ‘echo’ (Bielefeldt 2006:142) (rather than a direct trace) of a body. This echo is produced by sound technologies and by culturally specific marketing technologies – indicating that the persona is also staged by audio-technology or an ‘act’ of the industry46 – and, equally important, by cultural-historical experiences of the (real or imagined)

46 Bob Dylan, for example, eloquently caricatured the star persona as someone else’s (the industry’s) fiction (Lebold 2007).
voice carrier. A voice can also be a clue to a biographical body (Kolesch 2003), evoking a life story rather than immediate vitality itself. It is the vivacity of a concrete person (Diederichsen 2009:330) with a specific biography and cultural experience that the pop voice mediates.

In the persona of a pop singer, because of the event character of a song performance, there is a discernible bias towards the self (as opposed to the role). Yet on account of the electronic amplification and mediation technologies employed for the production and distribution of song performances, this self is never just a singular emergence of one concrete event of singing, but is dispersed across the entire technological apparatus. The bias towards the self, while it may be amplified by physiognomic tendencies in sound production technology, may be countered on the reception side by the experiencing of the voice as an echo of not merely personal, but also culturally and socially located biography. The pop singer persona emerges through a voice that oscillates between embodiment (physiognomic reception) and disembodiment, and the transitions between being in and out of character serve as its dramaturgy.

Besides this physiognomics of the microphoned pop voice discussed in this section, the dimensions of sonic and culture-industrial disembodiment and socio-cultural location of the pop voice and the reception and distribution technologies of pop music products will be discussed in the further sections as three separate constituents of the persona in pop music.
Persona vehicle II: self and act – technology, the pop voice, the radio voice, and the audio-visual politics of acousmatics

With the theory of the pop song format in mind, one may ask how Moodymann engages with the pop voice and its refined physiognomics? It must be taken into account that typically, dance music takes the form of the track rather than the song. Dance music tracks seldom feature voices, and when voices do appear they frequently signify by their affective function as sound texture rather than their linguistic function as words. Secondly, the dance music producer rarely appears on stage in person, instead a DJ presents her/his productions in a live situation. On account of these two factors (track format and the labour division between producer and DJ), dance music breaks with the pop song tradition of dramatic impersonation and self-confidence in the pop voice. Typically a DJ plays a track without any form of verbal characterization or narration, and for the audience at a dance event, the producer of any given track usually remains anonymous.

Moodymann however seems to be interested in a practice that differs from the generic electronic dance music approach, which omits representational functions of the voice.

In Berlin’s Café Moskau Moodymann takes the stage, addressing the audience invisibly with the aid of a microphone: ‘Hey, Berlin. How are you tonight?’

Scattered response from the audience. Even more disturbing than the sheet hanging at the front of the stage (the presence of which most of the audience might have expected) may be the call-and-response and direct form of address that Moodymann uses and for which this dance club audience seems unprepared. It is the voice of an MC, a master of ceremonies – a standard in rap and reggae/dancehall, but highly unusual in an electronic dance context.

Seconds of uncomfortable silence follow; Moodymann seems to search for the
play button on his record player. Finally he starts his set and continues with a commentary on and over the music informing the audience about title, author, release date and sometimes elaborating on the geocultural origin of the music he is playing. This is done in the manner of a radio disc jockey, dipping the volume of the music slightly to allow aural space for his commentary.

Moodymann boldly defies our expectations in regards to the physical presence of a live performer. We understand that he does not want to authenticate his work by the physical presence of his body on a stage. Rather, Moodymann reduces his corporeal presence to the minimum of just a voice and we do not experience him visually nor see the narrator behind the commenting voice. Nevertheless, we have witnessed Moodymann walk onto the stage and we suspect that it is he who is speaking. Therefore his voice, although disembodied, does not become spectral, instead its manner is inviting and we experience Moodymann as a friendly commentator helping us to localize the music and draw pop music references, beckoning us to join a community of competent listeners. In his commentary, Moodymann even refers to the recently deceased J Dilla, the producer of one of the tracks we dance to, dedicating his set to this late icon of Detroit hip hop music and including us in the ranks of the mourning.

Moodymann’s performance here highlights one important factor in the development of vocal performance styles of the pop voice: the close-up of the microphone on recordings or live performances which enabled new forms of emotional expression and personal conversation with audiences across space and time (Marshall 2006a:200). Moodymann here uses a performance style that draws on microphonically induced ‘intimacy’ which, from the 1920s onwards, was a hallmark and implement of popular music (singing) stars such as ‘the crooners’ and engendered the emergence of on-air-announcers as ‘radio personalities’. The microphone was an essential prerequisite for both – the pop voice as well as
the radio voice – and Moodymann’s performance here highlights their intimate connection.

The radio voice

Enabled by the electronic amplification of microphones, the transition from acoustic to electric recording in the 1920s had a considerable impact on styles of popular singing and public speaking on the radio (Smith 2008:82ff.): by the end of the 1920s, popular singers known as ‘crooners’ had established an intimate connection to listeners (McCracken 2001:105ff.) who received the sounds close to the loudspeakers ‘in groups in the privacy of the home or in pubs, clubs and cafes’ (Negus 1996:75).

Similarly, voices on the radio adopted a ‘conversational tone’ putting emphasis on ‘personal style’ and individuality (Smith 2008:86ff.). Yet the intimate register of both of these styles was not only an effect of the new microphone technology, but of its combination with the domestic mode of radio broadcast reception (Marshall 2006a:1999). Both the radio and pop voice are aspects of broad changes in the performance styles of popular musicians in the early 20th century that transformed the public speaking and singing of the stage to the radio and microphoned styles used in the recording and broadcast studio. In essence this change marked a movement away from presentational and towards representational vocal styles; more emotionally subtle, apparently effortless and more ‘natural’ than the declamatory voices of the pre-microphone and early broadcast era (Negus 1996:75-6). The crooner projected his intimate, seductive voice directly into the living room, while the radio announcer cultivated a conversational tone with a gloss of sincerity as if taking part in a dialogue with the audience.

Yet while the radio voice can project a presence, this closeness is also always
marked by the mediality of the radio (Adorno 2009:47,49,50) and suggests something behind itself. In the case of the radio voice, ‘behind’ might lie in the private person of the radio announcer. But since the radio personality is only ever accessible through aural means, the private image of the announcer has to be co-transported with her/his voice. Here one finds the beginnings of an intermedial potential of voice and image that will later be expanded further into the realm of cross-mediality by pop singers. In contrast to the radio personality, a pop (singer) personality is known by her/his visual appearance as much as by her/his sonic characteristics. Early popular music stars such as Bing Crosby were cross-media-stars, employing radio, recordings and film appearances (Toynbee 2000:21) to reciprocally bolster their fame (Siefert 1995:50).

In his performance, Moodymann retracts himself from the visual layer; his personal voice, like the radio voice, is only auditorily accessible. Moreover, he informs us about the music we are hearing and verbally helps us visualize the artists who sang on or produced the record we are hearing. Like the earliest radio announcers, Moodymann here combines the roles of announcer, DJ and music selector and demonstrates their manner of establishing the voice as a trusted companion through a mix of subjective and objective registers: sincerity in the tone of the voice that transports private ‘personality’ by affective rhetoric is combined with argumentative rhetoric and ‘objective’ reporting on ‘facts’ about the context of the music played.
The pop voice

While Moodymann’s aural performance reproduces the classical ‘radio voice’, employing solely sonic means to transport both the public and the private personality of a speaker, his visual performance engages somewhat more critically with the pop voice and its cross-medial exploitation of image fetishism, as enabled by the disembodiment of the voice in phonographic technology. Among the multiple ‘phonograph effects’ (Katz 2004:3), Moodymann’s performance concentrates on this one in particular: the separation of body and sound by the removal of visual clues – what Katz calls the ‘(in)visibility’ effect (Katz 2004:18-24). This effect of audio technology, dissolving the bond between a voice and its carrier, has been widely discussed with some theorists arguing that the physiognomic imperative has become entirely devaluated (Zizek 1996), while others take the position that the technology has only amplified the appellative effect of the voice and its index of the personal (Meyer-Kalkus 2001:453). ‘However listeners have responded – whether by compensating for it or exploiting it – the invisibility of performance is a fundamental part of the modern musical experience’ (Katz 2004:22).

In pop music culture the (in)visibility effect of phonography is generally framed in positive terms, for example, as having opened up a space for a broader register of artificialisation of voice (Frith 1996) and more refined notions of sound (Schwan 2003). This stands in stark contrast to the negative terms of alienation and hallucinatory effects in which phonography is discussed in the context of tele-technology and (sometimes) in the context of film (Bielefeld 2008:204f.). In the context of electronic dance music, (in)visibility-effects of sound reproduction have

47 ‘Phonograph effects’ are not only directly caused by technology itself but by human deployments of this technology (Katz 2004:3).
48 The separation of body from voice has enabled the performative play with roles and images in pop music, producing a variety of voice practices conventionalizing the disembodied voice (Frith 1996:196).
been discussed in critical, but generally positive terms, with sound reproduction generally understood as a means to fulfil the ideal of deflecting attention from the source of the sound.

This ideal, pervasive in electronic dance music and techno contexts, may be named the ‘acousmatic ideal’, after ‘acousmatic music’ – an avant garde form of music composition and performance spearheaded by French composer Pierre Schaeffer in the 1950s (Jordan 2007:124) – which enables ‘pure listening’ without seeing the source of the sound and visual distraction. In Schaeffer’s writings about acousmatics he refers to a metaphorical ‘curtain’, standing for reproduction and radio technologies⁴⁹ which enable ‘pure listening’ and attune ‘the modern listeners to an invisible voice’ (Schaeffer (1966) 2007:77). In contrast to our conventionally referential forms of listening, Schaeffer’s acousmatics explore the potential of phonography in order to make possible new sound and listening experiences. The experimental set-up of acousmatics is meant to enable pure sound experience by repeated listening with the help of recording technologies and requires a contemplative listening situation.⁵⁰

**Acousmatic sound and acousmatic music**

What is Moodymann signifying by the material curtain hanging in the middle of his live set-up? Judging from the low-key verbal performance style I suggest that he is not inducing any semiotic referentiality to Schaeffer’s particular theory but is instead testing the

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⁴⁹ In his *Treatise of Musical Objects* Schaeffer introduces the notion of ‘acousmatic’ by citing the Larousse dictionary, which refers ‘acousmatic’ to the ancient teaching practice of Pythagoras, whose disciples ‘for five years, listened to his teachings while he was hidden behind a curtain, without seeing him, while observing a strict silence’ (Schaeffer (1966)2007:76-7, IO). Schaeffer (2007:77) then parallels the effects of the ancient ‘apparatus’ of the curtain to the effects of contemporary ‘radio and recording’ technology, in that they both place the listener to an ‘invisible voice’.

⁵⁰ Schaeffer (2007:81) writes that, the suggestion of acousmatics is ‘to deny the instrument and cultural conditioning, to put in front of us the sonorous and its musical possibility’.
acousmatic ideal for its impact in a pop context. In pop music, recording
technology has undergone a radically different enculturation than in classical or
avant-garde settings; in pop music, non-contemplative forms of music reception
such as domestic, distracted or background listening have developed which do
not necessarily require the listener to register fine nuances or follow a piece of
music from beginning to the end. Heightened concentration, where ‘reductive
listening’ enables full entry into the ‘musical object’ (Schaeffer 2007:81), is
exceptional in pop music contexts. One area of pop music where it may be
claimed that contemplative listening has partly been realized is EDM – where an
audio-visual politics similar to Schaeffer’s ideal has been advocated and music
machines have been invested with liberatory power: ‘The tape recorder […]
creates new phenomena to observe, it creates above all new conditions of
observation’ (Schaeffer 2007: 81).

Schaeffer’s ideal concerned both composition and performance: compositions
recorded on a fixed medium should be presented through loudspeakers in a
contemplative setting. Yet while in pop music the tape recorder and the media
material strategies of the audio montage have been employed widely, the ideal of
the contemplative setting for presentation is not normally realized. Here it might
be useful to employ a distinction offered by Jordan (2007:124ff., IO) ‘between
acousmatic music and acousmatic sound; the former is about an intentional
removal of causal and semantic elements in a composition, while the latter simply
designates a sound which has been separated from its source’. While one is
confronted with acousmatic sound on a regular basis in pop music (walking with
an iPod on the street, listening to the radio or recordings at home or in a club),
acousmatic music can only be produced in highly specific contexts of music
presentation. EDM advocates such an ideal of acousmatic music in which the
media montage is automatized by music reproduction machines and presented in
the absence of a performer as part of a ritualized dance context meant to heighten auditory attention. Although ostensibly an EDM event, the live performance Moodymann presents us with cannot be described as a situation of heightened auditory sensation or acousmatic music. Although Moodymann has presented himself aurally in the voice of a radio disc jockey, his acousmatic sounds are delivered from behind a non-metaphorical, material curtain. Experienced as an audio-visual installation, the material of the curtain draws attention to (instead of deflecting from) the source of the sound. The attraction potential of the curtain becomes all the more apparent in the middle of Moodymann’s set, when he changes the aural dimension of the performance:

*Suddenly Moodymann disrupts the flow of his electronic, house and hip hop set and plays a rock song. The song features a heavy guitar riff and runs to 13 minutes, which Moodymann plays from beginning to end. Needless to say, the heavy guitars and unsyncopated plod of 1970s stadium rock have a disruptive effect on the dance floor. Some attendees are appalled by the sound and leave the dance floor, while others try to identify the track and discussions flare up. The question is murmured: why is Moodymann playing a rock song?*

Thus attention turns back to Moodymann as a co-present body behind the curtain. And here, Moodymann’s installation suggests another cultural-industrial setting in which acousmatic sounds are also employed, but to rather different ends than in EDM; namely the cinema, where acousmatic sound focuses attention towards the sound source instead of away from it. Michel Chion (1994,1999), who adopted Schaeffer’s acousmatic theory for the cinema, argued that in the cinema acousmatic sounds – sounds whose sources we can not see on the screen – are used precisely for ‘creating a desire in the listener [...] to seek out the cause of the sound’ (Jordan 2007:126). Acousmatic sounds and

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51 … or at most a DJ’s maximum non-visibility.
disembodied voices often propel the narration in films and in the intrinsically audiovisual medium of cinema acousmatic sound rarely becomes acousmatic music.

**Acousmatic voice**

The principle of deflecting attention from the source of a sound enabled Schaeffer to introduce sounds into music which did not follow the long-standing vocal principle of Western music (Riethmüller 2004), according to which sound is caused by an animated being. In contrast, Chion’s theory continues with this notion of willed sound. Although Chion applies it to all forms of sound in the cinema, his concept is based on the notion of sound as *voice* (Chion 1999) and from this he develops a theory of the effects of disembodied voices in the cinema in which the actual disembodiment is not an aim in itself. I suggest that Moodymann’s performances use disembodied voices to provoke intermedial effects (rather than to produce monosensual auditory space), and to thereby highlight the essentially audiovisual nature of pop music, which contrasts starkly with the proclaimed acousmatic ideals pervasive in the dance context of EDM.

Acousmatic sounds or unseen voices in cinema play with their own exposure and in this respect may parallel acousmatic voices in pop music. It is not rare for a voice-over narrator to develop into an *acousmêtre* (Chion (1982) 2003), an acousmatic being, a non-visualized character, leading the viewer to speculate that she/he is not the real narrator of the film at all, but a figure of someone else’s narration. One finds similar audiovisual effects employed in the star productions of pop music, and Corbett (1990:84) has even suggested that the ‘visual lack’ created by recordings is the origin of pop music stardom: ‘It is the lack of the visual, endemic to recorded sound, that initiates desire in relation to the popular music object.’ Therefore ‘we hear the latest pop stars singing through the sound
system in the local mall and we attach this voice to our knowledge of their being’ (Jordan 2007:14). Yet at the same time the ‘up-front star system’ in pop music (Frith 1996:185) leads one to suspect that the singer is not the real narrator in the (biographical) star narrative. The suspicion arises that pop performers are ‘acts’ (to use the music industry’s own jargon (Frith 1996:211f.)) and that the relationship between life and art in the biographical star narrative is the result of a fiction. Even when the supposition of a real person behind the star figure is induced by voices from the off, and even when the drama of their revelation is presented in the style of a documentary, the speculation that it is all a fiction persists (Goodwin 1992). Yet although one knows that the ‘fourth wall’ might be broken through at any moment, that the voice in pop music may turn out to be a voice-over, and that the voice one hears may be incongruent with the body one is presented with in the biographically framed star narrative, and that despite the fact that the voice in pop music is a performative voice taking on roles and images only to leave them again, the pop voice is nonetheless addressing the audience directly (Goodwin 1992:76). Unlike in film, the pop voice directly addresses the audience; ‘whether on record or in concert, the vocalist includes the audience […] as if it were another individual in the conversation’ (Marshall 2006a:202). How does Moodymann engage with these conflicting attraction modes of acousmatic, de-visualized sounds initiated by acousmetres and pop star figures? How does he present a playful deconstruction of this second constitutive ambiguity of pop music stars: the differentiation between self and act, sincere and manipulative voice?
Moodymann’s ventriloquism

In due course, the pop discursivists on the dance floor have concluded: Moodymann is playing rock musician Peter Frampton’s hit ‘Do you feel like we do’ from his 1976 live album ‘Frampton Comes Alive’. As this is a live recording, we hear the reaction of the live concert audience in the music that Moodymann re-plays for us. In ‘Do You Feel Like We Do’, soon after the guitar intro, Peter Frampton sings the question: ‘Do you feel – like we do?’ In the first instance this produces no extraordinary audience reaction, but further in the recording, Frampton elicits euphoric cheering from the concert audience when he repeats his question through a talk box – a piece of music technology which applies the sound of Frampton’s voice and words to the melody he plays on his guitar. The voice appears to emanate from technology – the guitar connected to the sound box – while still transmitting the characteristics of the physical production of vocal sound by the human thorax and larynx.

Moodymann here re-plays a pop music recording which exemplarily engages with pop music’s genuine ‘ventriloquism’ – the ‘art of producing the voice in such a manner that it shall appear to proceed from some place altogether distant from the speaker’ (Toynbee 1999:73-4). Pop music’s ventriloquism grew out of studio recording and microphoning techniques that made possible ‘the throwing of voices’ (Toynbee 1999:76) across the technosphere and that challenged the ‘norms of documentation’ that had previously been applied to sound recording. The talk box technology mocks such documentarisms as it openly demonstrates the technological transmission of the voice and its heightened appellative effect.

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52 Toynbee himself here cites the entry of ventriloquism in the Encyclopaedia Britannica from 1946.
53 Sound recording technology also advanced new styles of singing – such as the reflexive voice techniques of crooning and scat singing (Toynbee 1999:77) – and these styles helped strengthen pop music’s emphasis on nuanced sound rather than on a primary song structure (Chanan 1995:19).
The talk box can demonstrate the mediality of the pop voice. Yet in Frampton’s hands (and mouth), the talk box becomes more than a symbol for deconstruction. Instead, Frampton’s live recording of ‘Do You Feel Like We Do?’ transforms the moment of vexing, paradoxical revelation of technological encroachment (when the enactment of emotional roles is exposed as technologically reinforced) into a consecutive, temporal demonstration of the mediality of the pop voice. In the *Frampton Comes Alive* recording, Frampton first counters his line of ‘Do you feel?’ – delivered in a singing pop voice – by using a conversational radio voice to comment on the non-reaction of the audience: ‘I don’t blame you’. In the next section of the recording, with the help of the talk box, Frampton repeats his ‘Do you feel?’ line. This has the effect of simultaneously defusing both pop and radio voice, and disperses Frampton’s corporeality through the sound-technological apparatus. Finally, towards the end of the recording the emotive capacity of the performance is transferred to the audience, which can be heard expressing considerable pleasure. Frampton, now speaking solely ‘through his guitar’, gains proximity and substance through the auditive ‘reaction shot’ of the audience – of his fans ‘giving themselves over’ emotionally. The acousmetre Frampton is revealed as a staging developed by the audience.

Back on the dance floor in Berlin, the Frampton recording, taken from his multi-platinum 1976 live album *Frampton Comes Alive*, has turned into an audio drama about pop music stardom: the words spoken by the technologically mediated, unseen star Frampton – first in a pop and then in a radio voice – are finally ‘voiced’ by the body of the audience. Moodymann leaves us listening to this audio drama about the disembodied voice of the pop and radio personality re-embodied by the fans. Nevertheless, he does not allow us the comfort of merely

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54 This ‘stepping out’ of performance, the changeover from singing pop voice to commenting radio voice, displays a loss of control – a form of authentication common to radio and pop vocal styles by the mechanism of which the immediacy of the voice is broken up into a dramaturgy of authentication consisting of spontaneous expression and direct conversation with the audience.
eavesdropping. Instead, the event character of the recorded concert stands in stark contrast to the event we have been experiencing on the dancefloor in Berlin until this moment. Our dancing has been disrupted by the discrepancy in auditory space between the staged live rock concert contrasting with the dry, studio-produced dance tracks we were being played before. Subsequently the dance floor has turned into a discussion forum and then gradually into an auditorium as Moodymann begins to comment on the Frampton song. Attention is drawn to Moodymann’s co-presence behind the sheet as his voice-over to Frampton’s star performance now addresses us directly: ‘Do you feel like we do?’ No longer a remote commentator, Moodymann transforms himself into an acousmêtre – both outside and inside the sound. Rather than providing us with an aloof commentary on pop music stardom and acousmatic sound as pop music persona vehicle, Moodymann himself employs acousmetric appeal. His performance practice here employs the same technologies and mimetically repeats the sonic formats of the (historical) radio voice and the (contemporary) pop voice – both constitutive elements of the pop celebrity. Although using discursive language, the argumentative points about pop stardom Moodymann brings forth in his live performance are made not in the content but in the practiced ventriloquism and the enactment of the pop music rhetorics of direct address constructing ‘the relationship between performer and audience at a very personal level’ (Marshall 2006a:202).
Persona vehicle III: social and personal – collectivity vs. individuality of the pop music persona

After initially casting himself as reclusive radio disc jockey, then drawing our attention back to his co-presence through the Frampton talk box disruption, Moodymann now confronts us with yet another phenotype of voice-over, one, which is seldom heard in contexts of electronic dance music:

While continuing to introduce tracks with historical and scenographical anecdotes from behind the curtain, Moodymann’s speech now becomes increasingly passionate and gradually abandons the mode of call and response. Yet this ‘preaching’ style of address is less sermonizing than pedagogical.

A German music magazine commenting on a previous Moodymann performance, correctly pointed out that the curtain in his live performances serves to produce a situation of instruction and tutelage: ‘The audience is meant to be turned into listeners through training – while the adept remains invisible during the lesson, hidden behind a DJ-decks-covering cloth’ (Sollmann 2003:54, TM). Yet Moodymann uses (in)visibility and the schooling situation not to introduce new, non-indexical(ly heard) sounds into music (itself a standard trope in electronic dance music exploring acousmatic sound as acousmatic music55) but rather to further amplify the indexical character of the voice. He hereby carves out a figure of the disembodied voice, which has been conventionalized in other fields of pop music: the ‘collective voice of religious submission’ (Frith 1996:196) and the voice of the gospel-preacher through which we hear a sounding-through of the divine, of a higher power. Moodymann’s preaching use of the gospel voice, in its speaking rather than singing incarnation, suppresses the ecstatic element in favour of the voice’s function as a social commentator. With the ‘vocal narrative’

55 ... in a schooling situation similar to Pythagoras’ readings behind the curtain referenced by Schaeffer (see supra footnote 50).
(Bielefeld 2009) of the preacher voice, Moodymann references the social and ethnic context of African-Americans. Rather than inhabiting the ubiquitous figure of the disembodied voice in electronic dance music – what Frith has called the ‘computer voice’ (Frith 1996:196) – Moodymann instead directs our attention to the African American roots of the music genre. Moodymann’s DJ set turns into a lesson on Black Detroit and its pop music legacy, which in Moodymann’s depiction, is the direct predecessor and origin of electronic dance music.

Thus another level of hearing a voice comes into focus: a voice is always grained by a highly specified body with a certain sex, gender, age, race, ethnicity and social status (Frith 1996:196), and as Doris Kolesch (2003:269) has pointed out, we hear a voice as the trace of a biography. According to Bielefeldt (2006), this biographical trace amounts to more than a mere personal signature in the pop voice; in Bielefeldt’s (2006, 2008, 2009) model the pop voice evokes a biography that is subject to a stream of not only individual but also of cultural and social transformations. The voice is an echo of a personal biography but also of a cultural experience (Bielefeldt 2009:52) and this points to yet another characteristic of the persona in pop music: the personal voice becoming a collective one, mirroring practices of other voices and cultural patterns of singing and speaking. By the juxtaposition of personal with social voice the ideals of individuality and collectivity – both significant in pop music – are displayed.

_Moodymann’s Black Detroit_

In the case of Moodymann’s use of the gospel voice, the pop voice also becomes what Middleton (2000:74) calls a ‘network of complementary voices’. While Moodymann displays this significant collective aspect of pop music, he notably does so by dissociating himself from EDM conventions. In contrast to acousmatic
music ideals, which are prevalent in EDM contexts, Moodymann here highlights the human signature of the voice. The attraction mode of image fetishism of acousmatic, de-visualized sound is used here to *enhance* and not to deflect our focus from the collective, human (rather than technological) source of the sound. While EDM practitioners intentionally remove causal and semantic elements from the music and de-emphasize human agency, Moodymann decidedly engages the human voice. And during the course of his performance, through the transitions from radio-jockey narrator to gospel preacher, Moodymann substitutes the physical-organic traces of the physiognomic voice with the social traces of the biographical voice, the indexically heard pop voice with voice-over figures of African-American culture.

In Moodymann’s performance, the attraction mode of recordings as ‘necessarily incomplete pop music event[s]’ (Diederichsen 2011:128) is diverted; in a traditional star-fan communication, the experience of a lack (Corbett 1990) created by a de-visualized pop music sound (phonographed voices or indexical sounds of individual bodies (Diederichsen 2007a:331) implying the ‘existence of a person, who was not included with the sound’ (Diederichsen 2011:122)) is usually supplemented by body images of artists – stars purporting to be the physical and spiritual sound source. Moodymann here invokes images of an African-American Detroit and thereby follows a particular strategy: he does not predominantly mention Detroit’s well-known Motown music figures but he specifically names several rather ‘marginalized or forgotten figures’. This gesture of ‘insistent naming’ and imaging – confirming the existence of forgotten or excluded figures (Diederichsen 2011:133) (or figures that have otherwise not secured a place in the cultural archive) – is a gesture widely employed within hip hop to confirm a subject’s existence through representation and fictionalization and to earn factuality through the performative production of media presences (Menrath
2001:111ff.) – to essentially provide a ‘reconstruct[ion] of interrupted continuities of Afro-American history as musical history’ (Diederichsen 2006:402\textsuperscript{56}). By these means, the (visual) lack or deficit produced by phonographic transcription migrates ‘to the reality of the politically excluded or socially forgotten figure’ (Diederichsen 2011:133).

In addition, when Moodymann strategically represents the soul and hip hop history of Black Detroit he invokes Detroit as a city of dance music. Moodymann’s performance practice remains grounded in the functionality of the dance floor and notably in this point too, he differentiates himself from another of EDM’s traditions – namely that of sonic anonymity, most influentially developed by the second wave EDM project Underground Resistance (UR) from Detroit. The highly politicized UR operates with sonic secrecy and has, like Moodymann, developed an enigmatic image. Yet while UR embrace the media deficit of sound recording, bolstering the demand for images of the sound source by invoking decidedly fictional machinic and/or afro-futurist science fiction imagery, Moodymann inverts the allure of recorded sound by reintroducing historical and contemporary black voices from the dance music metropolis Detroit.

**Moodymann’s ‘research’ practice**

Moodymann’s reconstruction of a Black Detroit history is scrupulous; the voices he introduces in his music are not of the naturalistic soul-music variety prevalent in the humanist strand of African-American music styles, but ‘hypersoul’ (Weheliye 2002) voices that display their technological mediatedness, (such as the ‘black radio’ DJ voice talking over Peter Frampton’s technologically dispersed guitar voice). While UR reflect sonic anonymity in theoretical form in their artistic ‘Gesamtkonzept’ (Hoffmann 2002:107), presented in the tone of a military avant-

\textsuperscript{56} This translation of Diederichsen (2006) was provided by Rebecca van Dyck, see http://www.medienkunstnetz.de/themes/image-sound_relations/montage_sampling_morphing/scroll/
garde, Moodymann remains grounded in the history of body-oriented dance music. His engagement with anonymity serves a politics of self-historization rather than theorization – a popular, practically grounded, non-avant-garde form of ‘research’ practice. Moodymann combines an investigation of the pop stardom vehicle (the visual lack of recordings) with a strategical reconstruction of a (factual) music history of Black Detroit. With his voiceover strategies Moodymann, in the aural dimension of his performance, inverts the standard image fetishism of pop stardom and redirects it towards a representation of a ‘forgotten’ black EDM history. Yet with the curtain covering the stage, Moodymann also points towards the visual dimension of his performance. Schaeffer’s metaphor for sound reproduction technologies, the curtain, is here a real, material object and it functions not as a symbol, but effects our concrete interaction with Moodymann during the performance. The curtain not only represents recording technology ‘as such’, but also practically implements its effect on the audio-visual split in a concrete performance situation.

An analytical inquiry would at this point bring up the theoretical questions of whether image fetishism is already ‘endemic to recorded sound’ (Corbett 1990:84) and whether pop music stardom emerged with the mediahistorical development of sound recording technology as such, or whether it relies just as much on extra-textual elements imposed by a specific mediation system of the pop music industry. Sound reproduction and transmission technologies have split the integrated, temporally and spatially consistent, musical performance into the separate experiences of sound and visuals (Negus 1996:87), which are themselves juxtaposed to maximum aesthetic effect not only in the audio-visual pop music ‘text’ but also by extra-textual elements created by the wider music industry. For the audio-visual dramaturgy of pop stardom – an oscillation between indexical sounds and iconic images – one can find historical origins in the early
cross-medial formations of popular music: song transcriptions on sheet music were complemented by large imprints of the names of their popular performers on the cover page (Marshall 2006a: 197); later on (phonographically recorded) sounds were complemented by texts and publicity photographs of performers or advertisements in newspapers and magazines as well as by musicians’ appearances in films. Via the radio, the verbal representation of performers was added to the musician’s respective sounds.

Moodymann’s investigation practice draws on (historical) facts and includes both technological and human factors. During his DJ-set Moodymann has repeatedly demonstrated both the ‘(in) visibility’ effect of phonography and the close-up-effect of the microphone, but instead of presenting them as determinative media preconditions of pop music stardom he has complemented these technological ‘facts’ with human activities of cultural industries personnel. The personnel Moodymann is specifically interested in is not the marketing and A&R staff of the industry (who have often been the subjects of academic investigation into persona construction), but the music performer and interpreter her/himself.

Employing the close microphoning techniques, that crooners had developed since the 1930s as well as performance styles of black radio DJs (voice over), Moodymann emphatically points to the agency of the performing musicians. It was their performance styles, complemented by certain modes of reception and distribution that, since the 1950s, enabled the final significant characteristic of pop music stardom with which Moodymann engages in his live performance: the interaction of performance styles with the reception modes of pop music.
Persona vehicle IV: technology and performance –
live/recorded technologies of reception and
distribution

According to Michele Hilmes (1997:58) the development of a 'culture of personality' in the 20th century can be distinguished from a prior culture of character through performance aesthetics which do not convey essential qualities of a character with a stable structure, but instead portray the fleeting nuances of the self, the in and out of character; Tom Heatherly Pear (1931:38) has pointed out the role of sound technology and radio broadcasting in the development of such a culture of personality (Smith 2008:88). Sound technologies such as phonography developed into instruments of private use from the early 20th century onwards. Yet while in the first half of the 20th century these technologies were already enabling forms of 'listening alone together' (Sterne 2003), a significantly new degree of intimacy became possible starting in the 1950s through the new portable record players and the peer forms of listening to pop music they enabled, especially among teenagers (Marshall 2006a:199,202ff.). In the 1950s the vinyl record emerged as the sound carrier aimed at individual, mobile consumers and, equally important, the transistor radio – cheaper, smaller and lighter than its stationary predecessors – became the new individual medium of music consumption for youths (Negus 1996:76). The affordable, portable radio receiver and record player enabled the listening of pop sounds beyond the parentally supervised living rooms within an intimately private or subculturally shared peer situation (Diederichsen 2007a:330, Ackermann/Menrath 2007:80) and made possible a new level of intimacy for the experience of 'the private side' of the star (Marshall 2006a:202ff.). These intimate spaces allowed pop stars to

57 The notion of a 'culture of personality' has been developed by Warren Susman (1984). Susman (1984:282ff.) concentrates predominantly on the role of film and its visual technology as decisive technology.
become the vessels for a new, provisional identification of youth with a society to which they do not yet belong (Diederichsen 2007a:332); pop music’s mixture of truly intimate and public reception situations enables one to be radically ‘alone with society’ (Diederichsen 2007a:326, TM). For the construction of persona in pop music this paradox of intimacy and publicity is employed in a way unique to this cultural industry: with a fine atunement of ‘relations between the concert performance and the recording’ (Marshall 2006a:202). The record industry’s practice of coordinating record releases with live performances juxtaposes intimate, individual pop music experiences with public, staged presentations of the same musical ‘material’. This juxtaposition of the live and the recorded also heightens the dialectic of (non-visual) sounds and (visible) images.

(Political) economy of the live and the recorded

Pop music in the 20th century developed multiple interdependencies of live and recorded, electronically mediated forms towards aesthetic and economic ends. In terms of economical valuation in pop music in general, the live performance has become conventionalized in the sense that an audience expects ‘a live rendition or authenticating representation of recorded forms’; this can be a representation of an original performance or a ‘re-enactment’ of a recorded, already electronically mediated musical corpus (Kelly 2007:106).

Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno have discussed the cultural effects of electronic mediation in detail. While according to Benjamin ((1936)1969), under conditions of electronic mediation the cult value of the authentic original has ceased to exist and has been supplanted by the exhibition value, Adorno (2009:92) deems this latter ‘to be even more authoritarian than the former’. As the director of the music study division of the Princeton Radio Research Project, Adorno ‘examined the claims of Benjamin’s seminal essay with regard to the
reproduction of music’ (Hullot-Kentor 2009:16).\(^{58}\) Contrary to one of the standard interpretations of Benjamin, Adorno argues that the ubiquity of radio, which electronically reproduces musical sounds, does not abolish the value of authenticity – the ‘feeling [of] the listener [that s/he] is faced with the “genuine”’ (Adorno 2009:90 Fn W, HO)\(^{59}\) – but increases it instead (Adorno 2009:90f.). According to Adorno the value of authenticity survives in two aspects: the contextualisation of works by radio commentary which creates ‘festiv[e] and exceptional situations, presenting the work in an exaggerated, solemn way’, and a new valuation of ‘live reproductions’ (Adorno 2009:92,89). In summary, the aura of authenticity survived in the ‘talk about the fascinating conductor, the cult of the virtuoso, and all the well known “irrational“ features of people’s reactions to live music’ (Adorno 2009:89, HO). The ‘authenticity which Benjamin attributes in the visual arts to the original must be attributed to live reproduction in music’ (Adorno 2009:89, IO). For Adorno, radio broadcast transformed music into a relation between liveness and reproduction, with liveness being held in disproportionately great esteem – ‘nourished […] by the way radio functions’, maintaining the ‘illusion of the original’ while factually ‘in radio the authentic original has ceased to exist’ (Adorno 2009:90). Here Adorno denounces what one could today term a quasi-objectivist reception of reproduced music that developed with early 20\(^{th}\) century radio listeners: ‘The ubiquitous radio phenomenon has a subjective “here” for the listener although the objective lack of that “here” probably deeply affects this experience’ (Adorno (1940)2009:92, HO). Nevertheless, in 1940 Adorno foretold that ‘the remnants of the pre-technical concept of authenticity haunting an art technique basically opposed to it’ are finally going to be ‘driven

\(^{58}\) Because music ‘actually exists only in being reproduced’ Adorno (2009:89) argues that one should speak of authenticity rather than originality in musical contexts. See also Brandstetter (1998) who argues that in the performative field the notion of the original (as bound to the opposition genuine and false (1998:420)) is superseded by the notion of authenticity (as bound to the opposition authentic and fake/false (1998:433)).

\(^{59}\) Adorno (2009:89 ff. Footnote W) refers here to the listener’s subjective notion of ‘authenticity’ not the objective notion of authenticity as ‘the performance’s adequacy to given prescriptions’.
out [and] the “spook” in radio will be finished’ (Adorno (1940)2009:91, HO).

Adorno ((1940)2009:91) did not imagine that the ‘double’, ‘haunting’ experience of reproduced music – the new spell of radio reproduction – would stay with us. Yet as early as the 1950s, the subjective ‘here’ and the objective lack of that ‘here’ of reproduced sound became discursively re-arranged, and the notions of live and recorded were re-evaluated.

Until the 1950s live performance was for most musicians the main source of income and records and broadcasting were used as advertising tools to draw audiences to concerts. In the case of swing bands, the primary medium was the concert: ‘The relationship was precisely that way around: broadcasting and record sales boosted live performance’ (Toynbee 2000:24). Accordingly, records at this time were still considered ‘recordings’, a derivative of an (previously-held) event. But by the 1950s the record had become the medium of the music commodity market. Frith (1987:288) argues that it was radio itself that played the crucial role in shifting control away ‘from one set of institutions (music publishers, music hall and concert promoters, artists and agents) to another (record companies, broadcast radio, stars and managers)’. Other influential agents were performance rights organizations, such as the PPL (Phonographic Performance Limited) in the UK, set up by record companies in the 1930s (Thornton 1995:38ff.). These organizations were successful in claiming copyrights to sound recordings themselves (in addition to copyrights of musical works) and controlling the public performance of the records through licensing. In effect, by the mid 1950s the power relations in the music industry had shifted and performance became commodified in new ways. From this time on, live performance itself became an advertisement for recordings and, although it no longer had factual ‘primacy’ over recordings in economic terms (Gracyk 1996) in pop music, live
performance became discursively valued.\textsuperscript{60} It was at this moment that the differentiating notion of ‘liveness’ was at all \textit{introduced} into pop music. Sarah Thornton (1995:41ff.) has, for example, retraced the lobbying campaign in the UK, which successfully invested ‘liveness’ as a positive value in the discourse of the period. This time, it was a musician’s union which launched a ‘live music campaign’ in order to increase performance and employment opportunities for performing musicians whose incomes had dwindled because of the increasing popularity of recorded entertainment. In this campaign, recordings were attacked as morally and aesthetically inferior to live music by drawing on well-known older phonography discourses with their oppositions of ‘life-versus-death, human-versus-mechanical, creative-versus-imitative’ (Thornton 1995:42). Pop performance, now associated with the new label of ‘liveness’ and a sense of presence, could thereby contribute discursively in the struggle over property rights of music. Now explicitly distinguished from the reproduced forms in which music was also available on the market, pop music live performance gained the status of an ‘event’. The liveness of this performance ‘event’ stems neither solely from the immediacy of an absolute, unique performance situation (see Phelan 1993) nor solely from its relation to recordings (see Auslander 1999). Liveness and replication in pop music exist neither in a ‘binary dialectic’ within the world (Phelan’s (1993) position) nor within the event itself (Auslander’s (1999) position), instead both are engaged in ‘a far more complex network of relations’ (Pattie 2007:23ff.) and the pop performer is an important link in this network. With the primacy of the recording as a commodity in pop music and its implication of a momentary

\textsuperscript{60} Although the status of recording and audio reproduction technology within pop music has been the subject of many analyses, the majority of these studies register the recording as a self-evident artefact existing apart from its accompanying institutions. Instead, I follow Thornton (1995:349ff.) in her argument, that it was the enculturation of sound and broadcasting technology in pop music, in which cultural actors such as musicians, industrial organizations etc. played an important role and effected a turning point in the valuation of live versus recorded music in the 1950s.
absence, though theoretical ‘existence of a person who was not included with the sound’ (Diederichsen 2011:122), the figure of the performer became central to the practices of production and reception in pop music in the second half of the 20th century.61 This performer – in her/his double function as living person and as intentional originator of sounds – serves as the physical and virtual link between live performances and recordings, drawing together singular historical performance events and recordings into a unified dramaturgy of the ‘personality’. Physical appearances, i.e. visible presence in live performances, and virtual appearances, i.e. audible presence that the performer attains precisely through her/his (visual) absence on recordings, can be assembled into one (temporally elaborate) dramaturgy of a star personality.

Aesthetics of the live and the recorded

The interdependencies of live and recorded have also been explicitly and deliberately utilized for aesthetic effect in pop music. As a recording art form, pop music’s communication is premised on absence and its overcoming and a multitude of performance aesthetics have been developed in various genres and in the work of individual performers (Toynbee 2006:67) that deal with the ‘profound gap between performer and audience’ in the wider context of pop music’s general processuality and sociability and in the narrower context of staged performance. These performance aesthetics have been modelled by Jason Toynbee (2006:61ff.) as a set of ‘performance types’ that on the axis of staged performance range from direct62 to reflexive63 performance types 64 and

61 The figure of the performer becomes even more important in the early years of the 21st century with the shift within the music industry that is attempting to pivot away from over-dependence on recordings and towards a diversified business with an increased emphasis on revenue generation from live events. This shift, in all of its detailed consequences, can nevertheless not be taken into account in this study. Although currently widely discussed, there is as of yet little historical or empirical analysis of this recent phenomenon; Simon Frith, for example, only reluctantly extrapolates on his current research project about ‘The history of Live Music in Britain’.
62 … through ‘tropes of hyper-intimacy which involve(d) using technologies of spatial extension […] to pull the audience in “close”’ (Toynbee 2000:64).
63 … through the display of voice by accompanied announcement (Toynbee 2000:65) or the framing
on the axis of social performance range from expressionist to transformative performance types\textsuperscript{65}.

**Moodymann’s performance mode**

In his live performance, Moodymann encounters the diversity of aesthetic approaches to performance in pop (and their individual claims to validity) by positioning himself at a threshold.\textsuperscript{66}

*Moodymann’s live gigs do not follow any one particular performance aesthetic that could be associated with any one specific pop music genre. Neither do they follow the form of a ‘PA’ (Public Appearance) or a ‘track date’, popular with early electronic dance music, where a music producer appears on stage and mimes his own recording from a backing tape. Nor does Moodymann follow the performance aesthetic of DJ Culture – where a DJ arranges and selects music by other artists in order to produce a live composition on stage. DJ Moodymann plays both his own productions and music by other artists and from other genres.*

While the PA might be associated with expressionism (an individual author subject expressing her/himself), due to the playback situation the performance is conducted in a reflexive rather than direct manner and the DJ gig is generally associated with social authorship and the transformative mode of performance; previously recorded voices and sounds are re-played and transformed in variations (Toynbee 1999:63). The disc jockey has existed since the 1940s (Thornton 1995:60ff.), but starting in the 1970s the figure of the DJ evolved from record provider to active performer or even composer (Langlois 1992:236). For of the scene as openly performative by displaying the performer’s preparatory procedures (tuning guitars, sound check etc.) and dragging the phantom of the rehearsal process onto the stage.\textsuperscript{64} One could also address these staged performance types in Bolter and Grusin’s (2000) terminology as a continuum between immediacy and hypermediacy.\textsuperscript{65} See here also the helpful diagram in Toynbee (1999:62).

Toynbee (2000:58) claims that the diversity of approaches to performance in pop music is not ‘a matter of simple response to changing technology’, but that each performance aesthetic ‘makes exclusive claims to performative validity, each criticizes other modes of performance’.
her/his transformative activity in live situations the DJ was granted performative authorship. The emergence of rap and hip hop in the 1970s was crucial to the development of a DJ Culture. Nevertheless, the figure of the DJ plays an important role in other genres, and one finds significant differences in performance styles among them: in house music (Langlois 1992), as in hip hop, the spontaneity and creativity of an individual author is commonly attributed to the DJ, while in techno and even more so in explicitly rave-oriented music fields, the DJ is an orchestrator of communal experience and social sounds. Is Moodymann, as a producer strongly associated with the house tradition, claiming performative authorship in his live DJ set? Although Moodymann operates as a DJ in his live performances, he seems not to identify particularly strongly with the figure of the DJ-author:

*In an interview given after reappearing from media seclusion, Moodymann (2007) says: ‘If you’re looking for a hot DJ, I’m probably the wrong person to call’.*

*Neither artist-composer nor entertainer-DJ he states that ‘people pay too much attention to the damn DJ, the talent is sitting on the turntables, […] I’m not there to put on no little bit of dancing and poplocking behind no turntable. I’m there to present some talents on the turntable not the cat behind the turntable’.*

The dramaturgy between the live and the recorded – a central component in the star productions of pop music – has been complicated by the figure of the DJ, who is a live performer of records (Collin 1997:10-24) and a sophisticated type of ventriloquist. The DJ-ventriloquist projects not his own but other voices across the technosphere. DJs claiming performative authorships for their artistically advanced forms of ‘throwing (other) voices’ have gained star-like status, even

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67 The blog ~n2j3 provides a transcript of the interview (Moodymann 2007)), which I have amended or corrected in minor parts according to my listening comprehension, the transcript can be retrieved here [08/10/2013]: https://st0rage.org/~n2j3/?page_id=225716833. The audio file can be retrieved here: https://soundcloud.com/vinyljunkiesjames/moodymann-and-gilles-peterson-radio-mix-worldwide-11-oct-2007.
within the (non-representational) genres of techno and EDM (Huq 2002:97). To
come full circle, these star-DJs release their (live) DJ sets on records to establish
a live-recorded dramaturgy around their own person. How does Moodymann
engage with this? Practically, in his live performance, the curtain functions as a
visually obscuring barrier; we neither see nor hear a particularly exceptional
performer-DJ. But DJs can appear not only as skilled performers (Kealy 1979,
Langlois 1992) but also as connoisseurs (record collectors with discerning taste).
Neither fully expressionist performer nor fully transformative DJ, Moodymann
instead appears on stage as an eclectic; we hear the reclusive Moodymann
eclectically and authoritatively throwing other voices. For Moodymann’s
performance his reputation as a producer of house music records is used to draw
an audience, who then hears carefully selected works by other artists. After
slipping behind his curtain and having produced no grand display of performative,
technical mixing talent Moodymann selects ‘other talents’ to present on his record
players.

Moodymann not only has a reputation as house music producer, but via his
media policy of ‘no photos, no interviews’ he has also developed a media-based
‘trademark’ of alleged anonymity for himself. Thereby, the curtain in his live
performance does take the function of a symbolic object after all – not in the
primary sense of representing phonographical technology but in a secondary
sense attained specifically through Moodymann’s parallel media performances.
The curtain in the live performance forms a visual echo of his media ‘trademark’,
constantly reminding us of the media status of the performer as allegedly
‘anonymous’. This ‘replay’ of Moodymann’s anonymity by a material object
heightens the sense of presence in the live performance in a way that, in turn,
positively enhances the celebrity status of the performer (cf. Kelly 2007:110). The
visual domination of the stage by the curtain results in a persistent evocation of
Moodymann’s star status.

Yet during his set ‘the curtain’ – in the form of a crumpled white sheet – becomes gradually less impenetrable. Dancers, listeners and assorted partygoers repeatedly step behind the curtain to make a musical request of DJ Moodymann. Moodymann mentions these requests (favourably) in his running commentary and the requested tracks are played, contributing to the musical trajectory of the evening.

Although Moodymann does not actually come out from behind the curtain, he finally manages to establish a form of interaction with his audience. Moodymann steps back from his eclecticist, conceptual authorship and throws the voices selected by the audience. In the course of his live performance Moodymann has moved between an expressionist performance style – in his case, claiming a less performative and rather more conceptual authorship as a DJ – and a transformative style, where the DJ turns into the voice of her/his audience or fan base. Moodymann displays the profound absence within recordings with a curtain that is itself as much the functional material of his live performance as it is the symbolic reference of his celebrity. Wading through these variable live performance styles of dealing with the profound ‘lack’ engendered (intra-textually) in pop music sounds, Moodymann also engages in the diachronical dramaturgies of stardom constructed extra-textually and employed for economic ends.
**Conclusion Ch. 1.1: persona construction**

In this chapter I have developed a formal-aesthetic description of persona construction in pop music by following the artistic practice of Moodymann ‘investigating’ celebrity in pop music. I have read Moodymann’s performance practice – in parallel with a post-structuralist analysis of pop music stardom – as a discourse. In addition to Moodymann’s ‘discourse’ and the discourses provided by Marshall (1997, 2006a, 2006b) I have also drawn on further discourses about the historical development of the persona in pop music (indicated in this chapter by extra text fields). This post-structuralist approach helped me to provide a description of the various ‘agencies’ within persona construction – from technological developments, the development of performance styles by musicians, culture industrial changes to new reception styles – to avoid media determinisms. I aimed to provide a nuanced account of historical constants such as the narrative of a link between a mediated persona and a real person behind the persona – a constant in the subjectivist, the structuralist and the post-structuralist approaches to stardom, although subject to differing valuations. I also drew on historical changes, namely that the modern celebrity in an increasingly dynamic society is specifically a figure of individual achievements and merits (rather than ascribed or inherited power), and that the 20th century celebrity manages social distance by means of new electronic media-techniques of mediated closeness and intimacy. In order to highlight continuities between stars of past culture industrial star systems and today’s celebrities I used the terms ‘star’ and ‘celebrity’ interchangeably and accounted for the specificities of the cultural industrial field of pop music with the terms ‘pop star’ or ‘pop music star’. Focussing on the production perspective, I concentrated on the terminology of ‘persona’, which, like the term ‘image’, indicates the mediatedness of the celebrity. But while the ‘image’-perspective highlights the fact that a celebrity is a
product of an audience’s construction, the ‘persona’-perspective indicates that celebrity is a construction of the media and of agents of the cultural industries.

Attending a Moodymann performance in Berlin (2006) made the various persona vehicles in pop music tangible to me. Reading Moodymann’s performance practice in parallel to discourses employed in poststructuralist approaches of persona construction from pop music studies helped me develop the framework of four constituents of pop music persona construction: the physiognomics within the pop song format, the audio-visual technology of the acousmatic radio and pop voice, the negotiations of collectivity and individuality and the live/recorded dramaturgy of the pop music star. In concluding this chapter, I will now review these four constituents; the summary will first present the theoretical and conceptual input I used, and then discuss the contribution of Moodymann’s performance to my discussion.

Firstly, one important constituent of persona construction in pop music is that singers do not usually play fictional roles in pop songs (Diederichsen 2007b). The media format of the pop song transports both self-presentation and role as constructions by the performer. Due to the event character of a song performance, scholars have argued that there is a discernible bias towards the self (as opposed to the role) of pop singers. Yet although in the personally expressive format of the pop song performance, with its use of intimate vocal performance styles which developed as outgrowths of the microphone and broadcasting technology, there is a profound blurring of public and private states and the juxtaposition that creates attraction in the case of the pop music star is situated at the demarcation line between further domains – the first of which being the differentiation between a physical and sincere self-presentation of an artist and its reception – due to the socio-cultural location of specific pop musics – as a meta-narrative scripted by a social or cultural role.
The second pop music persona vehicle may be described as the specific (audio-visual) 'enculturation' (Thornton 1995:349) of recording technologies within pop music. The radical disembodiment of the voice through phonographic technology engendered a juxtaposition of the sonic presence and visual absence of a musician/artist. Pre-1950s popular music stars performed this juxtaposition cross-medially, for example by conveying a private persona aurally in radio and a public image visually in advertisements or film. But since the 1950s, with the rise of the long playing album format, the tendentially distance-producing image of the musician has also been co-conveyed with the sound carrier on the cover and in the liner notes of the album. Shortly thereafter, televisual media (TV, and later music video) brought together the (visual) images and sounds of a musician in one pop music media format (Diederichsen 2011). Since then, the acousmatic, de-visualized sound of the pop voice (formerly the radio voice) has been put to new uses in star persona constructions, for example highlighting the ambiguity between a sincere voice of the musician and a voice obviously manipulated by the cultural industry.

Thirdly, the negotiation of collectivity and individuality is a central constituent of the pop music persona. While the pop music star may invoke a historical moment, a geographical place, or address a concrete live audience as a collectivity, s/he mediates those collectivities in an individual performance. The third vehicle for the persona in pop music can therefore be a differentiation between socio-cultural narrative and personal signature of a voice or audio-visual differentiations between the collective and the individual.

It may be argued, that the blurring characteristics of the pop voice and the album format position the pop music celebrity further away from the classical (i.e. Hollywood) star construct (with its clear distinction between public and private narratives depicted in separate media units). Yet, a significant intensification of
intimacy in pop music enables the indeterminacy between role and person, between artistic intra-textual persona and ‘real’, extra-textual person, of the pop music star to be told as an existential metamorphosis (Diederichsen 2008a:83). In contrast to reality-TV celebrities, wafting between two (obviously fictional) images of the public and private life of the star (Diederichsen 2008a:90), the pop music star stages the crossing of an existential divide between art and life (Diederichsen 2006:400). Arguments about the development of a general 20th century ‘culture of personality’ (Hilmes 1997:58), within which fleeting nuances – rather than stable character structures – of the self are portrayed have been made and were bolstered by arguments about new developments in sound technology (Pear 1931:38). Following Diederichsen (2008a:83f.) I argue that only once these sound technologies became portable and developed into instruments of private and adolescent peer use, did a significant degree of intimacy emerge that made possible the narrative of the existential metamorphosis of the pop music star to be connected (symbolically) with the initiation of an adolescent recipient into society or the promise of social transformation. In addition to these reception technologies, beginning in the 1950s, pop music developed genuine distribution technologies, by which interdependencies of the live and the recorded were developed to serve economic and aesthetic ends. These reception and distribution technologies enabled the fourth pop music persona vehicle: of live/intimate vs. recorded/public presences (cf. Marshall 2006a:202ff.).

This chapter also drew on Moodymann’s performance practice as an investigation of pop music stardom. Notably, as the performing agent of this investigation, Moodymann is situated within a specific place and time. Unlike me, with my transcription of the four ‘persona vehicles’ in pop music, he did not investigate the ‘nature’ of stardom from a neutral standpoint. Instead, in his performance, Moodymann diverted the image fetishism of pop music stardom
towards an ‘insistent naming and imaging’ of figures from African-American Detroit. He used voice-over techniques to formulate a (factual) self-historization of Detroit dance music and included a number of under-acknowledged Detroit music figures. This gesture of insistent naming is uncommon in EDM music; while EDM tactics decontextualize hegemonic sound objects, Moodymann recontextualizes musical sounds and enriches them with traces of a forgotten African-American music history. Moodymann’s gesture of insistent naming reminds one instead of another pop music culture, hip-hop, where deliberate self-essentialisations serve to ‘reconstruct interrupted continuities’ (Diederichsen 2006:402).

The strategy of insistent naming has its own discursive history. The operation of self-essentialisation, in its form of ‘strategic essentialism’ (temporarily accepting an identity category and ‘acting “as if” identities were stable for specific political reasons’ (Barker 2003, HO)) has long been the subject of critical debate on account of its latent neglect of heterogeneity within the strategically adopted identity category (cf. Spivak 1993:3f.) and because of the questionable political efficacy of the strategy as such. In line with the approach taken in this subchapter 1.1, I will, in the next subchapter, discuss Moodymann’s introduction of the strategy of insistent naming into his performance as a discourse with its own specific background in the pop music field.

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68 Translation of Diederichsen (2006) see supra footnote 57.
1.2 Insistent naming: self-essentialisation, self-attributed vs. imposed anonymity, and the performative self in celebrity culture

The last chapter reflected on how Moodymann investigates the medial and historical vehicles in processes of star persona production in pop music in one of his live performances (Berlin 2006): in this performance practice of pop stardom he not only represented the four vehicles of persona construction but also included a supplementary identification with the music history of African-American Detroit.

Until the late 1980s, issues of identity were the locus of politics in pop music (Huq 2002). While since the 1990s, EDM had largely replaced identity politics with the direct action strategies of sound politics, Moodymann, in his performance, insists on identification with African-American Detroit. While the identification of a star figure with a certain community is also a tool of product differentiation for the industry (and as such was initially refused by EDM), identification as reflexive self-attribution (rather than type casting by others) remains a central component of the aesthetics and politics of pop musicians themselves. Moodymann’s insistence on identity politics is, nevertheless, atypical for electronic music genres, and it points out the possibility of (ethno-cultural) exclusions that can manifest themselves even in non-identitarian community formations of the kind that have been formulated in anonymity practices of EDM. This chapter will discuss the general efficacy of the strategy of self-attribution in the field of pop music and concentrate on the question of the commodification of the performative self in celebrity culture.
**Self-attributed anonymity**

As a dance music producer, Moodymann primarily uses the 12-inch-single for his releases on his own KDJ label. A standard 12-inch-single incorporates no elaborate visual design and reduces the contextualisation of the music to a minimum. By contrast, Moodymann’s KDJ 12-inch-records are far removed from a ‘white label’ aesthetic, instead the space on the vinyl label is filled with images and text.

The vinyl record, formerly – in the album format – a tool for building up a pop music star via initiating an image fetishism and creating interest in live performances, was in EDM stripped of its visual components and turned into a ‘white label’ 12inch record. While the music on a vinyl record might be described as ‘sandwiched between text and image’ (Cook 1998:105), the 12” sound carrier of electronic dance music is reduced to its audio components. In the form of the ‘white label’, no information about who made the record is given at all (other versions of the 12” format provide a minimal text component with only basic information on the issuing label and author/producer). These unadorned 12”s were cheap to produce (compared to the expenses of artwork, layout and printing associated with long play albums). This ‘white label’ production mode, together with the practice of ‘dance musicians often deliberately adopt[ing] a series of pseudonyms to create confusion over their identities’, fostered an audience that focused less on individual authorships than on the shifts in sonic styles of the genre and the development of various sub-genres (Hesmondhalgh 1998:238f.). Together with a lower cost of recording and electronic music instruments, this lower cost of vinyl production of the dance 12“ ‘encourage[d] flexible independent record companies and distributors with low fixed costs to enter the market’ (Toynbee 2000:133, accord Hesmondhalgh 1998), and the stage was set for an ‘independent’ sector of dance music production to emerge.
Insistent naming and imposed anonymity

In electronic dance music, the 12" record is a basic prerequisite for factually decentralizing music production (to a certain degree), but it has also become a (by now clichéd) symbol for the social and economic collectivism of the EDM scene. On his 12-inch record releases, Moodymann takes an ambivalent strategy:

Fig. 10: Moodymann ‘AMERIKA’ (KDJ 15) 1997, 12Inch

Moodymann’s KDJ 12-inch-records often display images and elaborate messages. On ‘AMERIKA’ (KDJ #15), released in 1997, for example he notes.69

‘its been proven in his tory
no matter what I do or what I become
I'll always be J.A.N. in this country ...
AMERIKA
(This planet's greatest thief)
SIGNED Just Anotha Nigga’

Moodymann turns liner notes, the standardized form of contextualizing music with artist biographies, into political messages. Liner notes have been historically

69 Moodymann’s communication strategy has similarities with the guerrilla strategies established by (second wave) Detroit techno musicians Underground Resistance (UR). Yet while UR plant secret messages in their music products (hidden in the lead-out groove or in the artwork), Moodymann states his political standpoint openly albeit sometimes mockingly.
important for establishing star personalities and are a basic component of the album format. Through Moodymann’s deliberate and particular use of liner notes on a 12” single he references the album format and its crucial role in enabling star personalities. Yet Moodymann’s liner notes, in contrast to classical album liner notes, divert the attention of the consumer away from an individual artist personality. Moodymann parodies the individualizing gesture of the artist signature and the star building function of artist photography, he disrupts these individualizing conventions by replacing them tactically with self-essentialisations: signing the record as ‘Just anotha n***a’ and visually representing himself as a figure with Afro hairstyle and darkened granny glasses (an emblem that appears on almost all Moodymann releases). While the pejorative attribution ‘J.A.N.’ represents an identification externally imposed on African Americans, the visual emblem refers to a strategically self-imposed identity: a visual representation of the civil rights movement in the US of the 1960s and 70s and a self-conscious symbol of its strategic essentialism. Initially a strategy for claiming the agency of marginalized groups by temporarily acting ‘as if’ their identity was stable for the further purpose of mobilizing visibility and attention, ‘strategic essentialism’ has come under criticism for arguably lending itself to practices of exclusion – through the omission of differences within the self-assumed identity category leading to for example ‘ethnic’ absolutisms (Barker 2004:189). Indeed, since emerging in the 1960s as a self-conscious symbol, the Afro hairstyle and granny glasses look has degenerated into a medial stereotype. But, rather than pointing towards neglected internal differences in strategic essentialisms, Moodymann seems to allude to another critical issue: the personal anonymity that ensues when the self-attributed group identity returns as an externally fetishized symbol. Such an externally imposed identity category involves, like any categorisation, a certain degree of anonymity. There is a crucial difference between possessing an
individual name and being designated by the no-name ‘J.A.N.’. Moodymann not only points out the crucial distinction within identity politics between externally imposed identities (‘J.A.N.’) and self-attributed identities (the visual emblem), he also points to a distinction within the politics of anonymity; he presents his emblem, a by now fetishized symbol of the agency of a marginalized ethnic group, on a 12" single which, in its ‘blank’ version, has become the symbol for the self-attributed anonymity in EDM, and thus overwrites it with symbols of the externally imposed anonymity on African-Americans. Moodymann juxtaposes the involuntary anonymity of African-America with the voluntary anonymity of EDM.

This is certainly, in part, a comment on the limited ability of the EDM genre and its dis-identificatory practices to realize its claims of collectivity, specifically in regard to the exclusion of marginalized ethnic groups. And with the title ‘AMERIKA’ Moodymann brings into his frame of reference the wider context of identity politics. One finds Moodymann, again, using the tactic of insistent naming or visibilization (see supra Ch. 1.1) – this time in the space of the lauded and clichéd symbol of EDM anonymity, the 12" single. Moodymann’s juxtapositions on the ‘AMERIKA’ 12" critically distinguish between self-attribution of identities and external imposition of identities, as well as between self-attributed anonymity and externally imposed anonymity. In this, Moodymann cites the central problematic question of the poststructuralist self, namely how can one argue for subjective agency within concrete political projects as part of an anti-foundationalist approach?

The anti-foundationalist approach of the poststructuralist self faces yet another, even more pressing problem: the commodification of self-transformation. In every specific case of pop stardom, the historically developed media, industry and

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70 There has been scant empirical research into such ethno-cultural exclusions within electronic music culture. There is however an observable segregation in the music press, which seldom depicts black clubbers yet frequently, covers black DJs and musicians.
performance style vehicles of the pop music persona investigated in the last chapter of this study (Ch. 1.1) all come into operation through the work of specific persona producers. One such producer is the star performer. Although only one among a group of co-agents, the star performer is the (visible) performer around which authority began to be consolidated to form new ‘kinds of authority figures’ (Gunkel 2012:75f.) from the 1950s on. At around this time, pop musicians began writing, recording and producing their own material (Diederichsen 2007b:13) whereas previously they had mainly performed the works of other composers. This shift from interpreter to performer consolidated in new auteur types of musician-performers; the singer-songwriter and the recording artist. In the 1960s, these first auteurs of pop music were able to import the intentionality of an individual creative author into pop music. Not only did these musician-auteurs inscribe themselves in the text of the record – to varying degrees in the lyrics, the sound, liner notes and art work of the record – there also emerged an accompanying mode of rock criticism which discussed musicians in auteurist terms of individual creativity and intentionality (see Cawelti 1971). The figure of the recording artist provides a proper name with which to identify a product line that is actually produced in a collaborative, industrialized process marked by a diffused authorship (Gunkel 2012:76). The figures of the recording artist and the singer-songwriter nevertheless credit authorship over the performance to the (most visible) pop performer within this collaborative process.

A theoretical persona model that is similarly ‘performer-centric’ (Auslander 2006a:103) is the ‘musical persona’ developed by Philip Auslander, based on examples from pop music. It positions the performer at the centre of the production – although not as a fully autonomous agent. In a graphical representation of his persona model the individual performer (or the personae interacting in a group/band) takes the centre, while ‘music industry input’, ‘song,
music, or other narrative’, ‘audience’ and the conventions of ‘performance of popular music’, ‘musical genre’ and ‘socio-cultural conventions’ are positioned in outer circles and constitute the co-agents (Auslander 2004:11). While the poststructuralist approach to persona construction is interested in (historically developing) discourses as forces that come together for the staging of a persona (with the agency lying not in an individual act but in the discourses), the performer-centric approach of persona performance is interested in concrete and singular stagings of personae. With the shift in discussion from (persona) construction to (persona) performance, i.e. from (historical) determination to individual agency, the notion of persona gains a component of generative performativity. Although the performance approach introduces the further aspects of subjectivity, singularity and processuality, I will for now concentrate on the ambiguous nature of the (autonomously) generative self of the performer.

**The performative self in pop music and celebrity culture**

The notion of the performative (autonomous) self has undergone widespread commodification in today’s celebrity culture. Celebrity culture, taken as the historical situation of ‘increased prominence of celebrity in culture as a whole’ (Hesmondhalgh/Evans 2005:14, IO), is understood to be a recent phenomenon and is evaluated, broadly speaking, both negatively and positively as a ‘condition [...] of decline or as popular self-expression’ (Hesmondhalgh/Evans 2005:16).

Assigning himself neither to the objectors nor to the apologists of celebrity culture, Diedrich Diederichsen (2008a) has strikingly shown how it was precisely pre-1990s pop music that provided celebrity culture’s historical precursor or motor. Within pop music, the cultur(industri)al field targeting an explicitly adolescent audience with new participatory forms of reception, there emerged a
cultural promise of social metamorphosis and transformation (Diederichsen 2008a:84,93). From this promise emerged the figure of a constantly transforming star personality that incorporates a ‘constitutive indeterminacy of its performative situation’; the performer always potentially speaks as her/himself or as a role (Diederichsen 2008a:96). In this way, pop music brought forth numerous playful modes of crossing between life and art (Diederichsen 2006:400) within the narrative of the musician’s persona and of crossing between the fields of cultural production and cultural reception. The aspects of (continual) self-transformation and (audience) participation are both found in celebrity culture, where they reappear as objectified and commodified ideals.

Celebrity culture is often associated with cultural democratisation – not only in apologetic academic approaches to celebrity culture, but also in rather more critical post-structuralist accounts. In a critical review of celebrity studies Jeremy Gilbert (2003) finds in two major studies by Rojek and Marshall (which fall into my register of post-structuralist approaches) phrases such as ‘celebrities are manifestations of the organization of culture in terms of democracy and capitalism’ (Marshall 1996:246-7) and ‘celebrity culture is the expression of a social form […] [, namely] democracy and capitalism’ (Rojek 2001:198). Gilbert (2003:101) correctly finds these (post-structuralist) writers conflating liberalism and capitalist individualism with democracy. This conflation is part of the mechanics of celebrity culture itself and is perhaps most readily evident in those quintessential reality TV formats which ‘adopt the techniques of formal democracy’ (Gilbert 2003:99). These popular elections have more in common with the competitive, neoliberalist individualism and its discourses of meritocracy (power should be vested in individuals according to their talents and merits (Litter
Self-transformation and flexibility also serve competitive, individualist ends in post-Fordist celebrity culture. Following the logic of late capitalism, in celebrity culture social opportunity is risky, only a few will achieve success and the increasing social insecurity is shouldered on an ‘increasingly individualized basis’ (Litter 2003:11). According to Jo Litter (2003:11) this ‘increasing disparity between rich an poor, the risky lottery of social opportunity and the lack of cultural validation for many people in our society goes some way to explaining the expansion of interest in celebrity culture and the eagerness with which opportunities to become one [a celebrity] are taken up and consumed’.

How did pop musicians and how does Moodymann engage with this commodification of individual agency? The critical stance taken by electronic dance music towards celebrity is partly a direct reaction to the superstar celebrity culture prevalent in the pop music of the 1980s but it also, in large part stems from a general refusal of this discourse or ideology of individualism. EDM’s rejection of individualism commonly led to a strategical denial of individualizing formats such as the artist interview, visual depiction in the media and so on. By contrast, Moodymann’s performance procedure does not dismiss the discourse of celebrity altogether; he does not himself escape the institution of the star in pop music. In his media appearances he produces a ‘name’ for himself, and with this celebratory status he draws a sizable audience to his live appearances. Rather than a strategical practice of substantializing dis-identificatory anonymity, Moodymann includes elements of identification into his practice, tactically

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71 The term ‘meritocracy’ was introduced in 1958 by sociologist Michael Young (with a pejorative connotation) in a satirical essay, and taken up by the likes of Tony Blair – with no satirical intent (http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2001/feb/14/features11.g21, [18/09/2013]).
enacting pop music persona construction, including its individualistic undercurrents.

Moodymann uses the system of individualistic celebritisation (building a currency of his name) in order to then tactically transport political issues in his live performances and media productions. He uses individualistic celebritisation to then de-emphasize individualism and instead to assert his own situatedness in the collective history of African-American dance music, thus positively articulating the significance of community. In contrast to a typical ‘independent star’\footnote{See here also the notions of the ‘Indie-Star’ by Martin Büsser (1997) and ‘Anti-Star-Star’ by Christoph Jacke (2004:284ff.).}, he does not transport these political issues via his personality; Moodymann does not act as a role model. Instead, he tactically uses celebritist individualisation and is complicit with stardom’s commodification of an autonomous agency of the performer; his performance is critical without fully committing to an ideologically circumscribed position of collectivism.

**Moodymann’s performance as study of the persona in pop music and as critical practice**

In its complicity with celebritisation in pop music, Moodymann’s musico-artistic practice has conservative and documentary tendencies, which, in hindsight, may have facilitated my (overly hasty) reading of his performance along the lines of post-structuralist studies of persona construction in pop music. Similarly to a scientific approach, Moodymann investigates the status quo and the habitualities of persona construction in pop music without showing any ultimate intention of disrupting these habitualized practices. In the end, Moodymann does not disrupt the institutionalized process of identification in pop stardom; instead he extends the possible identity positions (with further (factually possible) positions).
How is Moodymann’s performance a critical practice and what can the scholar learn from it? Although I have treated it as such, Moodymann’s musico-artistic practice turns out not to be a direct transcription of the texts or discourses that constitute persona in pop music. Enacting pop music persona construction is not the same thing as studying pop music persona construction. Moodymann’s medium is performance, and I must concede that I have instead treated it as if it were a scholarly study, discourse or text. Yet Moodymann’s performance notably breaks out of the analytical transcription model in several instances:

Firstly, the persona in pop music is not just the detached object of investigation in Moodymann’s performance, but also the medium by which Moodymann presents his investigation to the audience. Performance as critical practice makes use of mimesis and repetition; the critical ‘no’ to the persona in pop music presented by Moodymann’s performance affirmatively employs the construction of just such a persona. In this respect Moodymann’s performance meets the criterion of positivity in critical practice.

Secondly, performance simultaneously investigates and presents. By conflating that which in academic research would be called research process and presented research product, performance contradicts a distinction between process and product. Although Moodymann’s white sheet becomes at times an abstraction (of his individual celebrity status as an allegedly ‘anonymous’ star), he manages to establish a situation of collectively throwing the voices of his audience. Taking his particular medium of performance into account, which, like other artistic media, is capable of a synchronical, dialectical (rather than linear) argumentation, Moodymann’s double ideological positioning in individualism and collectivism might not be all that surprising. As a critical practice that is object-field-specific, his performance also aims to stay involved in and ‘intimately bound to its object’ of critique.
The qualities of positivity and object-field-specificity in Moodymann’s critical practice stem from his medium of performance. Performance is subjective and singular, and therein it differs from a (analytical) transcription, which aims to provide general abstractions. In contrast to traditional notions of scientific practice, the critiquing subjects in performance practice are involved with, rather than distanced from, the matter of critique. Thus, a double ideological positioning, contrary to the single epistemological positioning in scientific practice, can be taken up. Transferred to scientific practice, what would such an involvement look like?

Up to this point, any transference has not been possible due to my ignorance of the specificities of performance in Moodymann’s practice. I have been occupied with validating Moodymann’s practice as if it were a scholarly study, reading a live performance of his as a text, and furthermore reducing this performance-text to the mere function of illustrating a pre-existing theory. Moodymann’s performance helped me to describe the four vehicles of persona construction in pop music, but in my description of Moodymann’s practices I was interested only in which habitualities they represented. Therefore, I concentrated on the abstractions Moodymann’s performance provided me with, such as ‘microphone & sheet = physiognomics’, talk box standing in for the acousmatic voice, gospel voice representing the collectivity in pop music and the bypassing of the sheet representing the live/recorded-dialectic in pop. In ch. 1.1 I concentrated solely on these representative elements of his performance. Yet reading a performance like a text does not exhaust the potential of performance as an object of investigation. How else could one employ the potential of performance in scholarly investigation? The next chapter will more specifically engage with performance, not only as object of theoretical or empirical investigation, but also with performance as scholarly practice itself.
The singularity and subjectivity of Moodymann’s performance occurred to me when taking into account his strategy of insistent naming (Ch. 1.2). Here, Moodymann’s performance obviously differs from a scholarly investigation, namely in the situatedness of this knowledge practice. While academic knowledge, basically, builds on anonymous, non-situated, yet generalizable knowledge production, Moodymann presents us with his situated strategy of insistent naming. Does this situatedness converge with or contradict the third aspect of critical practice (along with object-field-specificity and positivity) – the aspect of reflexivity of the formative horizon of the subject of critique?

Moodymann’s performance does indeed imply a performance of the self, but this performance does not include a self-critique. Can a practice that lacks self-critique be considered a critical practice? I would like to dispense with this categorical question. For my purposes, this lack of self-critique is illuminating not as a deficiency in Moodymann’s practice, which would exclude it from the ‘category’ of critical practices, but as a signpost pointing out a limitation within the operation of critical practice itself: self-critique is largely a practice of privileged subjects. What scholars can learn from this is to reflect on the contingency and (privileged) situatedness of their own (critical) practice. Moodymann operates from a decidedly minority position. He specifically identifies with the hip-hop practice of insistent naming, which aims for an initial recognition within an identity or discursive system. By contrast, scholars using the operation of critical practice aim for the ultimate destruction or critical reflection of this system; they operate from a privileged position of a subject reflecting her/his authority critically or unlearning her/his subject-formation. While doing so may be an ethico-political project of critical practice of a (privileged) scholar subject, Moodymann insists on naming a minority as his (factual) source of identification. In turn, this points to the limits of critical practice as a project of privileged subjects aiming to unlearn
In the course of the unveilings in Chapter 1 I have shown that the persona of a pop musician is produced through an elaborate version of the historical dramaturgy of ‘uncovering the real person behind the public persona’ (Marshall 1997:4, see also Dyer 1991:136). Reading a Moodymann live performance (2006) in parallel with post-structuralist genealogical studies of pop stardom in this chapter brought about four (medial and historical) vehicles of the pop music persona: the audio-visual pop song format, the technology of the radio and pop voice, a negotiation of collectivism and individualism within pop music and a live vs. recorded dramaturgy of the pop music star.

In the course of the second part of this chapter (Ch. 1.2), the (pop music) persona has been discussed as the notion of a post-structuralist self between self-attribution and commodification. In his live and media performance Moodymann reflexively deals with this ‘performative self’ of pop musicians, whereby the persona as a self-attributed role serves less to provide a reflexivity about the business of being a ‘self’ than to positively provide a name for the nameless and reconstruct a music history of Black Detroit. Differentiating between self-attributed anonymity (as practiced in the genre of EDM) and imposed anonymity (such as namelessness and invisibility through exclusion), Moodymann also points to the possibly limited ability of dis-identificatory practices to realize a collectivity shared by not only privileged but also marginalized subjects.

Analysing Moodymann’s performance has been fruitful for demonstrating the various (historical) aspects of the ‘pop music persona’. However, in hindsight, treating his performance as a ‘study’ in this chapter, I have employed his
performance merely to illustrate a pre-existing theoretical project (the study of the construction of the pop music persona within post-structuralist star studies).

Moodymann’s performance practice illuminates two central elements of critical practice as developed by Butler and Foucault, positivity and object-field-specificity. However, up to this point of the study it remains unclear how one could implement positivity and object-field-specificity in a scholarly critical practice. Unlike these two elements of ‘critical practice’, the element of self-criticality was lacking in Moodymann’s performance. This is less a matter of a deficit within Moodymann’s practice than of his identification with a minority community and of the limits of the project of critical practice itself – at base, a project of privileged subjects aiming to unlearn their privileges. The next chapter will discuss applications of ‘performance’ in pop music scholarship as both a theoretical object and a method.
2. Performance in (electronic) pop music, tactical critical practice, and performance research

Although popular music is generally understood to be a ‘performing art’ (Frith 1996), the matter of musical performance has been strangely absent from studies of popular music (Quirk/Toynbee 2005:404). In the following, it will be argued that pop music studies have actually engaged with the issue of performance in both music making and music reception, although the term performance was seldom utilized. When it was invoked in popular music studies, performance was largely only applied to the notion of a ‘real-time event’ in the context of pre-1990s (subcultural) pop musics (for example Inglis 2006). Yet there is a more general theatricality to pop music: whether live or recorded, pop music is always decidedly produced for someone, for an audience; and has always included visual forms of action along with sonic-musical forms (Shumway 1999:189). Additionally, Toynbee (2000:53) has recognized a ‘theatricality’ in popular music making that stems from the ‘self-conscious awareness on the part of musicians and audience of the gap between them’. I follow Toynbee’s claim (2005:53,57), that ‘performance is central to the aesthetics of pop’ and his differentiation between the two partially contrastive and partially converging aspects of performance in pop music: ‘the theatrical and the processive’. In this chapter I attempt to widen the notion of performance in pop music beyond real-time performance in order to apply it to other pop music practices (including the practice of generating discourse on pop music). With the aid of a performance studies approach and the notion of the ‘performative’ taken from performance

74 Gracyk’s argument that for ‘the vast majority of time, the audience for rock music listens to speakers delivering recordings’ does not seem to me reason enough to indicate that these audiences therefore consider popular music essentially a ‘recording art’ and not a ‘performing art’ (Gracyk 1996:74f., see Auslander 1999:63). On a discussion of Gracyk see Toynbee (2000:55f.)
theory, discursive performance about pop music and electronic pop music will be formulated as tactical critical practice. The chapter concludes with a discussion of performance ethnography as the three-fold approach of the theory, analysis and activity of performance and the possible application of tactical critical practice in scholarly work.

Music as practice and performance

In the 1990s, when the prevailing concept of ‘music as text’ in studies of music drew criticism for being limited to authored works (Goehr 1992), and to the expertise of those who could ‘decode their semiotics’ (deNora 2000:21ff.), the linguistic and cognitive focus of music studies was challenged by approaches which focussed on musical ‘practices’ and musical ‘experiences’ (Finnegan 2003). While this focus on musical activities rather than works or texts manifested itself within music sociology in a terminology of musical ‘practices’, the music-oriented cultural studies centred on a terminology of ‘performance’ (see Cook 2003). Frith (1996) and Cook (1995-6, 2001,2003), focussing on popular and classical music respectively75, were at the forefront of a performance studies-inspired turn within music studies towards a conception of music as performance and crucially, not as the performance and reproduction ‘of something’ (Cook 2003:204-5) but as performance-oriented practice in and of itself. Here the emphasis lies on the performative act over the textual work and on process over product. With this performance art derived concept and its ontological transformation from text into event, the notion of performance in music is broadened to encompass ontogenetic76, self-constituting practices.

The performance approach suggests two perspectival transformations: from work

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75 See Nicholas Cook (2001) documenting this process of moving from treating music and performance as separate entities to studying music as performance (Auslander 2006:100,118).
76 Chris Salter used the term ‘ontogenetic’ in this context in his CTM (Club Transmediale) talk on ‘technology and the transformation of performance’ in Berlin, 30th Jan. 2010.
to event and from work to process. However, scholars engaging with performance in music tend to concentrate on performance as a practical activity and analyse discrete performance events in real time or recordings of performance events (see Cook 2003:204-210, Inglis 2006, Kelly 2007, Pattie 2007, Joöß-Bernau 2010). The emphasis on a concrete event – where music self-evidently is performance – entails a focus on performance as generative enactment rather than as an activity that restores or represents a given reality (a dimension that will be discussed later in this chapter with the notion of the ‘performative’). Performance-oriented music studies also emphasize the role of performing individuals, as when Philip Auslander (2004) professes a ‘performer-centric’ paradigm (Auslander 2006:103). When inverting the traditional musicological matrix of work and performance, Christopher Small (1998:8) also reduces ‘performance’ to the concrete activity of ‘performers’: ‘Performance does not exist in order to present musical works, but rather, musical works exist in order to give performers something to do’.

While understanding music as performance may be a radical new theoretical perspective when applied to classical or art music, pop music has long been understood as a processual form. Pop music is processive music – in the sense of its popular and everyday origin (Kleiner 2012:22f.) as well as of its consecutive production mode and distribution across different media (Toynbee 2000:55). Accordingly, pop music scholar Toynbee (2000) identifies performance’s relevance to pop music studies as ‘processive’ performance. He argues that performance in pop music may be found in ‘process, the on-going nature of musical production’, fitting to the ‘uncompleted nature of pop – the fact that there tend not to be great works so much as versions, mixes and shifting genres’ (Toynbee 2000:53). Yet for Toynbee, performance in pop music is twofold – having both productive and reductive aspects: Recording is a single stage of
inscribing sound, which can be reductively invested with the authority of an
individual author, but in a more general sense represents only one ‘part of a
continuous process of performance and creation’ (Toynbee 2000:56). Yet apart
from processivity Toynbee, with an eye towards both production and
reproduction, also addresses the other element of performance in pop: the event.
He identifies theatrical performance in pop music in instances of live performance
and recording in which ‘there is a self-conscious awareness on the part of
musicians and audience of the gap between them’ (Toynbee 2000:53). With
theatricality77 Toynbee (2000:53,57, IO) addresses the matter of representation in
pop music, which he locates in the ‘punctuation’ and objectification of the music
‘production-mediation-distribution’ process via recordings and staged events as
well as in the musician’s gesture of ‘get[ting] across to an audience’. ‘Making
music’ for Toynbee (2000:53-38) is as much a matter of ‘showing off’ as it is of
‘making up’. With this double notion of theatrical and processive performance
Toynbee introduces an important amendment to the standard application of the
performance studies paradigm in musicology, which often throws out the baby
(the reified musical work) with the performative bath water by concentrating on
the performance event and ignoring the question of iterability of musical
practices. Toynbee (2000:53) conceptualizes ‘performance as an orientation’ of
the cultural practice of pop music and detects the performative as a principle of
producing both sameness and difference in the general theatricality and
processuality of pop music. Derrida ((1972)1988) pointed out this double quality
of performance with his notion of the performative as a double force,
simultaneously constituting presence while disseminating it. I argue that a full

77 Theatricality as a discourse and concept has itself a long and diffuse history ranging from a
discourse of the mimetic aspects of representation (from ancient anti-theatricality to recent, mostly
Anglo-American usages of the term ‘theatrical’) to a contemporary concept that stresses theatrical
processes instead of their contents’ (mostly a German or French formulation, integrating the
performance studies perspective within European theatre studies) (Reinelt 2003). With ‘theatrical’ I
refer in the following to the theatrical-representative aspects of performance.
performance analysis of pop music must investigate both the constitutive, emergent potential and the reductive, sedimentary potential of the performative in pop music.

I would like to widen the performance-oriented approach in music studies in accordance with the thinking of scholars such as Small (1998) and Auslander (2003), and amend it – inspired by the duplicity of performance in Toynbee’s work (2000) – with a notion of the performative as not solely processive-generative but also theatrical-representational. To study music as performance must involve searching for possible agencies in the theatrical, mimetic and representational dimensions as much as in the presence-making and live dimensions of music. The performative, according to Judith Butler (1988:520f., HO) ‘carries the double meaning of “dramatic” and “non-referential”’ and contains the generative aspects of the performance event and its concrete materialities as well as their historicity and the prior inscriptions of performance spaces.

*Pop Music as Performance*

In order to widen the performance focus I will first ascertain which music study perspectives the ‘music as performance’ paradigm has been translated into, and how pop music studies specifically have made use of the various aspects of performance in music.

In contrast to a conventional musicological perspective, which focussed on the semiotic meaning of the musical text, the performance studies-inspired turn within cultural music studies, which introduced a perspective on music ‘as performance’, enabled a redirection of focus away from works and texts and towards the performers and their co-performers in the audience: ‘To music is to take part, in any capacity, in a musical performance, whether by performing, listening, by rehearsing, practicing, by providing material for performance (what is called
composing), or by dancing’ (Small 1998:9). This paradigm helps to redirect attention to basic qualities of music, which were often cast aside by musicology. Both the intermediality of music with its inherent irreducibility to the auditory realm (music consists of auditory and visceral, as well as visual and reflective-cognitive forms of communication) and its sociality (music enables and also sometimes opposes social relationships) were usually outsourced to a ‘sociology’ of music (Small 1998:8). And while the sociology of ‘musical practices’ is generally interested in the study of habitualized routines of music making, the sociological potential of the ‘music as performance’ paradigm is also usually constrained by a problematic, one-sided notion of performance as ‘immediate event’ between co-present individuals. This notion of performance evokes associations of an intersubjective territory of free exchange between co-present individuals, and is also reminiscent of notions, known from performance art, of performance as singular events (Shumway 1999:190). Herein lies the possible fallacy of essentialising music’s sociality: all too easily, such concepts fall back on a metaphysics of presence (Sterne 2003:20-22), which binds the condition of participation to physical co-presence and dismisses forms of mediated interaction (see Phelan 1993). Yet it is ‘recorded music [that] is the kind people are most likely to encounter these days’ (Shumway 1999:192) and its technical mediation introduces a gap between production and reception of music through which the category of an ‘audience’ emerges in the first place.

Within pop music studies the sociality of music has been an important subject particularly in accounts of subcultural pop music. Under the heading of an ‘active audience’ it has been the aim of a great number of cultural studies accounts since the 1980s to detect co-performers in the audience who actively consume and transgress the intended musical meanings. Although this ‘active audience’ approach took into consideration the technical mediation of pop music, accounts
of active subcultural ‘pro-sumers’ might be likened to the essentialising sociality paradigm in performance studies in as much as they equate activity with sociality. Cook (2003:206) argued that ‘[to] understand music as performance [...] means to see it as an irreducibly social phenomenon [...]’. Indeed, to produce aesthetic experiences music has to be performed, thereby establishing a minimum sociality between at least one performer and one (even virtual, implicit) audience member. The phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1964) even ascribed to the social phenomenon of ‘making music together’ (in the form of composing, playing or listening) the power to produce a situation of intersubjectivity. Yet can we hold on to such an irreducible sociality of music in a time where individuated listening on mobile devices seems to have become the regular mode of pop music experience? Clearly, music has become one of the common ‘technologies of self’, used for ‘emotional self-regulation’ (DeNora 2000) and as a personal tool to accompany dutiful fitness routines in lieu of pleasurable excesses (Frith 2003:98ff.). For Frith the good news about this is that ‘music now matters more than any other medium’ (Frith 2003:100, IO). On the other hand, one has to limit one’s optimism with regard to this stance; music matters predominantly to an individual user. More than ever, what one listens to contributes to one’s sense of the self and music is now so ‘deeply implicated in people’s personas’ (Frith 2003:100) that the space it creates has become a private territory.

**Subversive Pop Musics and Beyond**

From the mobilising quality of popular music and its potential to enlist the listener as co-producer, an inherent political character has often been deduced. Theories of subculture have often concentrated on an active, self-styled ‘underground’, a minority group of engaged, hip and rebellious listeners, and by doing so excluded the majority of casual, passive and undiscriminating listeners from their analyses (Negus 1996:12ff.). Subcultural strategies of cut’n’mix and cultural bricolage
were detected among mods, teds and punks, and the model of an activist-driven subculture was carried over to analyses of hip-hop, heavy metal and rock. This implicit politicisation of subcultural musics came to a halt in the 1990s as a mainstreaming of minorities and an extensive commodification of difference by the cultural industries took hold (Holert/Terkessidis 1996, Negus 1996, Hutnyk 2000, Muggleton/Weinzierl 2003) and popular music lost its self-evidently political potential. Since then, the tendency for popular music to be seen as a natural space for democratic renewal has declined markedly. Techno music, which emerged ‘at a time when proclamations of the demise of pop music abounded’ (Huq 2002:91, Beadle 1993), was singled out for criticism and accusations of being apolitical. Ever since the dissolution of acid house and rave in the mid-1990s into a mainstream ‘club culture’ (Thornton 1995) ‘spanning ad hoc illegal free parties and super clubs, not to mention a diverse range of musics’ (Huq 2002:90), the political efficacy of popular music beyond a cultural micro-politics (Fiske 1991) has been fervently discussed. While the music scene’s turn away from politics can be bemoaned as an effective disregard of ‘ordinary politics’ (Marchart 2003:83), the parallel theoretical shift away from politics is often seen as ‘liberation’ from a ‘rhetoric of rupture’ (Stahl 2003:38). Whether these theories adequately represent cultural developments or not, the advent of dance music culture has in fact caused pop music criticism and theory to revise its concepts and terminology.

While initially acid house was represented by the press as a continuation of previous subcultural ideas (1960s hippiedom and 1970s punk) (Huq 2006:91), contemporary academics used the emergence of this new music in order to distance themselves from the older Birmingham School of Cultural Studies and its focus on subcultures (see Redhead 1993, Tagg 1994, Thornton 1995, Muggleton/Weinzierl 2003). Broadly speaking, with the study of EDM one detects
a paradigm shift in pop music studies from subculture to club culture, from an interest in symbolical identity politics to direct action politics (Gilbert 1997), and a shift in vocabulary from signification to intensities and from musical meaning to bodily affect. Furthermore, in accounts that continue to engage with the question of a ‘politics’ of EDM, the possibilities for agency were no longer located in an essentially subversive subject, but in the physical materialities of the dancing body and in the material sound technologies themselves. Sound and body were understood as dynamic sites of resistance, and pop music scholars turned from a discussion of the sound of (identity) politics to the politics of sound (Reynolds 2000). Following on from the poststructural critique of the subject, the new coordinates for theorizing agency and resistance became the materialities of (real-time) performance.

Theatricality of EDM events

Without denying the importance of sonic presence and physical bodies, I posit another concern that fully adopts theories of the performative and applies them to an analysis of EDM: I suggest that the disruptive possibilities of performance in EDM are not limited to its emergent, eventual character but can also be located in its theatrical, representational character. EDM events are not only concrete, real-time events, but also specific events, that, with their transgressive, processual nature foregrounded, are as ‘clearly separated from the rest of life’ as they are ‘presented by performers and attended by audiences both of whom regard the experience as made up of material to be interpreted, to be reflected upon, to be engaged in [...]’ (Carlson 1996:198-9). Because such events target a specific public through advertising and media dissemination, scholars and journalists present them as specific events in their writing. EDM events are theatrical performances in the particular way the audience becomes involved in them as events discontinuous with the rest of life, and in the way analysts represent them
by a (by no means transparent) process of writing and discourse. Such reflective descriptions of a singular and immediate sound event prove (by their own method of description) that the ‘pure event’ cannot exist absolutely but appears only on the ‘backdrop of difference’ (Krämer 2004:18, TM, see also Auslander 1999) produced by its reproduction in writing and critical reflection. The acclaimed disruptive alterity of the EDM event relies not only on actual bodies and physical sound waves but also on the reflective attention given to it by an audience and by journalists and scholars representing EDM in the written word and in public media. I therefore call for a performance research that does not solely concentrate on the generativity of the sound event but on the theatricality of its very representation in discourse.

In order to engage with the phenomenon of EDM, music theory and journalism have produced a new processual vocabulary that centres on sonic and bodily materialities. One consequence of this development was a wider terminological shift in pop music studies which divided the study of dance and other pop musics into two groups: those that focus on sonic immediacy and those that focus on representational phenomena. The musical projects analysed in my study nevertheless demonstrate that the language of description is not transparent; with their focus on representational matters these projects disrupt the, by now, conventionalized narrative of EDM as an absolute music. I suggest that the division between sound- and identity-focussed approaches in cultural studies of pop music can be productively resolved through the integration of a performance studies approach that focuses on both processive and theatrical performance aspects of pop music.

**The performative in pop music discourse**

A consequence of terminology being limited to the notion of sonic immediacy is
dance music theorist's tendency to naturalize the radicalism of EDM practice. In fact, (subcultural) EDM practice commonly makes use of non-representational strategies, EDM producers precluding representations by releasing their music on non-identifiable white label records and DJs non-expressively playing these records. But with the growth of the audience for dance music and its shift in orientation from illegal rave to commercial club, an increased tendency towards representation became unavoidable. Despite this, insiders of the scene, theoreticians and journalists continued arguing with a rhetoric of rapture. As quoted from his interview with Gilles Peterson, Moodymann also sympathises with such a break of EDM with past pop music forms (Moodymann 2007):

‘I’m not there to put on no little bit of dancing and poplocking behind no turntable’.

Moodymann here expresses his disdain for and refusal to engage in staged forms of dance – as known from music cultures such as rock, pop or hip-hop (referred to by Moodymann with the term ‘poplocking’); these have been banished from electronic dance music. As Antonio Melechi, an early theoretician of EDM, observed of acid house there ensued ‘a collapse of the traditional field of spectacle and expression in pop, where the “user” sought self-expression through dance. Acid house celebrates the death of this scene of dance, for it is now the materiality of the musical signifier which forms the new space of oblivion, as the dancer implodes and disappears into a technological dreamscape of sound’ (Melechi 1993:34, IHO).

The opposition which Melechi sets up in this text excerpt of the words ‘scene’ (italicized by Melechi) and ‘sound’, is indicative; it links EDM’s anti-theatricality with a familiar anti-ocular trope within pop music criticism and theory that dates back all the way to rock criticism. Melechi links the scene (gr. skene) of the theatre to visuality and to the pacifying ‘spectacle’, while sound is reclaimed as
the activating and singular medium of pop music. Theatricality is reduced to the plane of the visual and both are dismissed as forms of public display controlled by commercialism. Grossberg (1993:204) explains that ‘the eye has always been suspect in rock culture’ because visual representation was seen as the domain of the entertainment industry and the visible was linked to superficiality in a manner reminiscent of classical '[a]ntitheatrical [p]rejudice' (Barish 1981). Ironically, contradictory to rock’s self-image as an un-theatrical and non-ocular subculture, the politics of rock have been understood by later generations as being in point of fact decidedly theatrical and exceptionally conducive to spectacle. Dance music protagonists’ dismissal of pre-1990s subcultural musics such as rock were made precisely on the grounds of being ‘spectacular’ (Melechi 1993:43) and for ‘attach[ing] great value to visual style’ (Huq 2002:97).

It was these earlier pop music’s politics of identity performance that had, by the 1990s, come under suspicion: identity performance, even if understood as constitutively performative and not expressive of an essential self, was surmised to be essentially linked to representation by its theatrical dimension. Strategic essentialism and performative identity strategies of disruptive citation and repetition – including those that celebrated the volatility of identity – were accused of perpetually re-invoking the identity imperative. As with any performance, identity performance can never fully escape representation (Derrida (1972)1988). By contrast, Melechi (1993:37-38) characterizes the culture of EDM as a ‘resistance to the scene of identity’ and ‘the imperative to reveal one’s self’. EDM's rejection of identity performance (of the kind that had previously been at the centre of pop music politics), constituted a rapturous breaking out towards immediate presence and the experience of the event: the coupling of presence (of the dancer’s bodies) with disappearance (of performers and self-present authors) in sound was meant to produce a negative operation of representation.
In Melechi’s quote above one can read how identity performance was associated – via the notion of (visual) theatricality – with visibility and how it was dismissed on account of its representational dimensions. Writing along similar lines, performance theorist Peggy Phelan (1993) argued for the singularity of the (live) event in performance art. In her 1993 book *Unmarked* she developed an ontology of performance that in part reads similarly to the celebration of the event and bodily experience one finds in theorizations of EDM. In her approach she repeats modernistic privilegings, common in theory on performance art, of presence and materiality and calls for a radical turn away from citational resignification – in particular away from the ‘representational visibility’ (Phelan 1993:6) that had become associated with the strain of feminist performance art that engages in performativity (Carlson 1996:180f.). Similar to the linkages made between theatricality and visibility in pop music studies, Phelan links in *Unmarked* (1993), citational performativity to visibility and to constraining, reproductive forms of mimetic representation which she condemns on ideological grounds.

The rejection of performativity on account of ‘representation’ is remarkable given the anti-representational impetus of the theoretical project of performativity as originally laid out by Judith Butler in the field of social and linguistic performance of gender. Beginning in the late 1980s, Butler developed a theory of gender performativity that critiqued earlier feminist representational politics, which had been based on phonocentric concepts of identity, and offered instead a concept of (identity) performance as a double operation between re-inscription and resistance to pre-existing (social, cultural and linguistic) models. While Phelan (1993:6) equates visibility with voyeurism, fetishism, fixity and reproduction, her (at least implicit) critique of performativity as a form of ‘visibility politics’ does not truly engage with the concept of the performative as a double orientation of
generation and reproduction. Instead her rejection of performativity is on ideological grounds.

Subsequent discussions of the concept of performativity provide a more nuanced critique of Judith Butler's position. In particular, her re-conception of identity as dramatic performance (rather than as an expression of natural essences familiar from phonocentric identity concepts) has come under criticism for only ever being illustrated in Butler's writing by the visible aspects of gender performances, as Annette Schlichter (2011) has noted. Indeed, even when referring to musical performances, Butler elaborates her critique of representational politics using examples of visual acts of identity; stressing the visible and legible body – never the sounding body – as site of resistance (Schlichter 2011: 31-33, 42ff., see Butler 1999:29f.,199 Fn34).  

Since both theatricality and performativity were obviously closely associated with visuality, it is no wonder that EDM studies, concerned with a sound-centred musical practice, did not initially turn to performance as a resource for conceptualization. Rupa Huq (2002, 2006), writing about a decade after acid house's appearance in the late 1980s, provides a detailed analysis of the British discourse on dance music politics. None of the positions in her summary (Huq 2002:93) engages with notions of performativity, except in order to reject them as the positions of older, representational politics, which must be transcended in order to find alternative political potential in the lack of meaning (Langlois 1992), immediacy (Gilbert 1997) and the theoretical foregrounding of the (non-sexualised) body (Reynolds 1997, Pini 1997).

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78 Schlichter (2011:42f.) notably understands Butler's theoretical writing itself as a representation of the performative, when she points to 'Butler's own performance of performativity' in her text and criticizes that here 'the analytic energy [is bound] to the intelligible'.

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The concept of the performative

Since 2000, theories of the performative have developed within art and media studies. The concept of the ‘performative’ had originally been developed by John L. Austin ((1962)1975) in his theory of the speech act; a specific form of utterance that does not describe but instead generates a social reality. This productive (in contrast to the constative) notion of linguistic acts has been developed further in various directions within philosophy, art, cultural and social studies. In a deconstructive reading with and against Austin, Derrida (1988) argued that the agency of performative utterances derives not from a self-present voice of the speaker but from the position of this voicing within a series of voicings and from the general iterability of language. This expanded concept of the performative was then applied by Judith Butler to reiterating practices within wider social and cultural discourses and developed into a notion of performativity in the context of social gender performance, which Sybille Krämer (2004:16, TM) has further identified as ‘iterabilising performativity’. Butler’s theory of gender performativity critiqued phonocentric concepts of identity and opposed earlier feminism’s representational politics, which had assumed a ‘natural’ relationship of the female voice to an essential, authentic female self that must be self-represented by women against patriarchal misrepresentations. Instead of taking the voice as undisputedly self-present, Butler concentrated – following Derrida ((1972)1988) and his deconstruction of Western phonocentrism that posits writing as cardinal (not derivative) aspect of language – on the general ‘iterability’ of utterances. With Derrida, Butler could identify what Carlson (1996:172) aptly paraphrased ‘the possibility of innovative agency’ in the ‘inevitable slippage arising from the enforced repetition and citation of social performances’.

Butler had developed her notion of performativity in order to apply it to social and everyday actions, but with a conceptual background in textual and linguistic acts.
With her conceptualization of speaking as a bodily act, Butler (1993) had brought into focus the physical bodies, which had always been at the centre of performance art studies. And it was precisely here, in the field of art studies, that performativity was developed into a general theory of the mediality (Mersch 2002) and corporeality of artistic acts (so called ‘corporealising performativity’ (Krämer 2004:17f, TM). Here, the materiality of artistic (and not only linguistic) performances, the aspects of eventfulness and ‘co-presence’ of performers and audience members (Fischer-Lichte ((2004)2008) became grounds for claims of the productivity and disruptivity of (live) performance and performatively oriented visual art. Although Butler had laid the groundwork for such a reconceptualization of matter as materialization (Schlichter 2011:41), and her notion of the ‘performativ’ as carrying ‘the double meaning of “dramatic” and “non-referential”’ (Butler 1988:520f., HO) had primed a linkage of dramatic ‘performances’ and linguistic speech acts, her conceptual focus remained on textual and linguistic performativity. This persistent association with linguistics might be a reason why the concept of performativity, even after its broadening in the field of art studies, has until now not been sufficiently incorporated into pop music studies – a field where both ‘questions of performativity and mediality play a considerable role’ (Binas-Preisendörfer 2013:103, TM).

EDM theory, absorbed as it was with EDM’s general focus on sound, was concentrated on the notion that sound signifies by means other than language. Emphasizing non-representationality, sonic culture approaches have at most dealt with corporealizing performativity (see Gilbert/Pearson 1999, Gilbert 2004) or concentrated on developing new models of subjectivity beyond visuality and linguistics (see Weheliye 2005:51). Without denying the importance of bodily presence in the EDM sound event and its potential for establishing a-subjectivity (Melechi 1993, Tagg 1994) or new subjectivities (Weheliye 2005), I suggest that it
may be more productive to refrain from making the singularity of the sound event absolute and to return to questions of linguistic performativity in the context of EDM.

I have already made the point that, from a poststructuralist perspective, an EDM event’s presence and immediacy actually depend upon a context for differentiation. Although the apparatus of EDM might de-reference sounds and, within the circumscribed time and place of the event, render the self as performative, the club situation acquires its exceptionality by its alterity to everyday life and the EDM apparatus given reflective attention in other spheres of pop music experience, namely in genre discourse of commercial music media and theoretical discourse. What Toynbee (2000:145) has argued for pop music in general is also valid for EDM, namely that all pop music is produced by ‘musician-agents’ for an audience anticipated in advance and ‘with a particular aesthetic in mind’. The EDM aesthetic, emphasizing the interactivity and ephemerality (non-fixability) of the dance event, itself developed partly as a reaction to the superstar-fixated, representational music culture of the 1980s. As a correlate to establishing a new ontology for the EDM event, the aesthetics of EDM can be viewed as one option a performer may exercise within a continuum of popular music performance options – its non-obligatory nature having become increasingly apparent since dance music’s move away from a specific subculture (rave) towards more heterogeneous reception scenarios. The rave and the club are only two of the possible scenarios in which electronic pop music may be experienced. Likewise, strictly subcultural EDM performers and audiences can be seen as parts of larger networks. Toynbee (2000:101,151) has acknowledged this by arguing that the DJ is not only a ‘facilitator’ within the flat, interactive, physical network of the club but is also a nodal point connecting the club network to a commercial macro network of record companies, record shops and other
secondary markets for dance music. Within this macro network electronic pop music continues to signify by linguistic means. I therefore posit this macro network in the following as also being a discourse: the commercial discourse of dance music magazines, websites and specialist radio shows, all of which are attended to and amended by academic and theoretical discourse.

EDM's retreat to within the confines of the rave or club event can thus be seen as an escape from discourse in two ways. On the one hand EDM aimed to leave behind the discourse of 'the music itself' (whatever exactly that may be) through a sound aesthetic that dismissed verbal discourse, narrativity and linguistically generated subjectivity. On the other hand, EDM aimed to remove itself from discourse about the music – the journalistic and theoretical discourse mentioned above – by anonymizing the music producer through changeable nomes-de-disques, through the DJ-remix and through a paucity of visual media. From a poststructuralist perspective it can be argued that it was exactly these reclusions from both music-immanent and commercial-journalistic discourse about music that generated yet another discourse in the journalistic and the academic field: the discourse of ‘EDM as separate from discourse’.\(^\text{79}\) This substitutive discursive construction, which enabled invocations of affect and bodily experience in EDM theory, has now found a prominent place within pop music studies. In its theoretical insights this paradigm has proven to be productive through its capability to conceptualize the transgression of linguistic signification within EDM.

But at the same time, within the linguistically dominated field of the macro network of journalism and theory, this substitutive discursive construction has itself become a new major ‘Discourse’. How could one, instead, generate a quasi-objectifying, nomadic, ‘minor’ discourse on electronic pop music?

\(^{79}\) See on such a poststructuralist perspective and on the distinction between discourse of music and discourse about music Horner (2008).
Representing the performative

Discursive representations of EDM necessarily reappeared when its audiences became increasingly heterogeneous and a more ‘mainstream’ club audience took up the music. Yet how can EDM’s performative presence and its radical processuality be represented beyond objectifying it through a term such as ‘anonymity’ or ‘ephemerality’? The electronic music projects analysed in Ch. 1 and Ch. 3 of this study provide practical answers for producing critical and explicit knowledge about anonymity, and at the centre of these projects resides a notion of discourse as performance (rather than as text). In the interview with the BBC cited earlier, Moodymann strongly supports a notion of discourse as performance. Contrary to the argumentative content of his interview responses (rejecting theatrical forms of dancing), Moodymann rhetorically explores theatricality. In this interview, Moodymann, for the first time, used his personal voice to talk in journalistic media about his musical practice, but this talk turns into a theatrical linguistic performance when Moodymann strongly positions himself by saying:

‘My attitude is: F*** the DJ. I’m not there to put on no little bit of dancing and poplocking behind no turntable […]’ (Moodymann 2007).

In substance, Moodymann criticizes the phenomenon of the star-DJ, who delivers recorded sound by an originary, authorial performance instead of simply playing the role of a facilitator. This statement in essence parallels how scholars have described a development within EDM, of the principle of the absence of a self-present author reverting to a hypostasis of presence of the presenting DJ: Although the EDM apparatus ‘limit[s] the role of the producer’ with the DJ ‘finishing’ her/his production process by ‘inserting records in a continuous mix in the club with the resulting reduction in the potential of the ascription of auteur
status to either role’ (Toynbee 2000:161, IO), the DJ nevertheless acquired ‘cult status’ (Toynbee 2000:169). Critiquing this cultic presence, the scholar regularly retreats to a neutral vantage point of omniscience.

Moodymann, in contrast, does not use language in order to detachedly observe a phenomenon from a neutral position and a central point of intelligibility; instead he himself puts the (positively connotated) figure of the DJ into a negative context. This is an unusual re-signification of the label ‘DJ’, and this speech act becomes all the more theatrical, as Moodymann himself is a well-known DJ. Furthermore, the utterance ‘F*** the DJ’ is a strong positioning not only by its semantical content. In fact, Moodymann frames his verbal language in the BBC interview as decidedly theatrical from the beginning: uttering the F-word on national radio (where it was bleeped out) highlights the theatricality and mediality of Moodymann's ‘live’ interview, reminding one that liveness in pop music is ‘mediatized liveness’ (Auslander 1999). This speech act becomes a theatrical performance as it is a singular utterance in the form of a creative iteration of the conventionalized label of the DJ, but at the same time its singularity and liveness is accessible only in its mediated form of the bleeped out F***. Moodymann, by employing the techno-social materiality of the radio voice, here disrupts claims to the transparency and neutrality of language.

Readers may note that Moodymann’s disruption is also effective in the written text they are presently reading (which documents the theatricality of Moodymann’s spoken F*** by using the typographical sign ‘***’). How does one account for the performativity and theatricality of discourse about pop music in theoretical writing? In his seminal text about the concept of the performative, Austin (1962) himself deliberately corrupted (Lechte 1990:27) in the course of his argumentation by rhetorical means his own claim of a substantial distinction between constative and performative utterances (Felman (1980)1983).
Anonymity and the performativity of discourse about pop music seem to be similarly corruptive topics and engaging with these radically performative factors collapses the clear distinction between what is spoken about and how it is spoken.

It has often been argued that pop music can only be understood in the context in which it occurs and with the knowledge of the people who participate in it. In the cultural field of pop music populated largely by autodidacts, aesthetics are tied to the social fields and not to theoretically confined systems (for example diatonic tonality (Wicke 2003)) from which they emerge. Therefore, music (and especially pop music) is understood not as a repertoire of works and authors, but as a ‘process’ (Antholz 1976) in which various musical actors from production, distribution to reception are engaged. Wicke and Shepard (1997) have detected the problems cultural theory, sociology, and especially musicology has with (pop) music’s process of generating meaning. While in musicology it is generally only the ‘text’ (i.e. the score) that is examined, scholars of cultural theory and sociology usually confine themselves to the study of the strictly contextual and extra-sonic (Wicke/Shepard 1997:14). Yet although music is ‘a form of human expression that does not obviously refer outside itself to the world of objects, events and linguistically encodable ideas’, it would be wrong to assume, as in fact the paradigm of autonomy in musicology dictates, that it ‘makes no appeal beyond itself in the process of generating and evoking meaning’ (Wicke/Shepard 1997:11f.). The musicological approach tends to make the non-referential quality of music into an absolute value, while in cultural and sociological accounts its abstract qualities are neglected in favour of its enmeshment within cultural and social discourses and practices. Rather than essentialising either the denotational, autonomous or the referential aspects of music, I suggest that a performance studies perspective can help engage with the corruptive subject of
the processuality of pop music and the performativity of discourse about (pop) music in a practical way.

**Performance studies**

Spanning the fields of theatre studies, anthropology and ethnography, sociology, psychology and linguistics, performance studies encompasses a wide variety of notions of performance (Carlson 1996:4f.) – including the display of skills in artistic performances, the display of coded behaviour in social performances and the display of self in linguistic performances. On account of its growth out of multiple disciplines, performance remains a contested concept (Carlson 1996:5). Since coming into wider usage in the 1990s (Carlson 1996:187) the term has, according to Schechner (2002:30-35), been delineated into two main categories: ‘is’- and ‘as’-performance. While the aesthetic disciplines study phenomena that ‘are’ self-evidently performances, the social and cultural sciences study phenomena ‘as’ performances – extending the category of performance ‘beyond the aesthetic realm into the social realm, and beyond genres of performance that employ fictional representation to those, such as ritual and social drama, that take place in the “real“ world’ (Auslander 2003:9, HO). Likewise, anthropologists such as Milton Singer (1972) extended the category of performance beyond the aesthetic realm to ‘cultural performances’. While social performances are everyday practices of individuals, and are only framed as performance by the scholar, cultural performances are ‘marked’; heightened, reflexive performances where we ‘show ourselves to ourselves’ (Madison 2005:154).

**Performance analysis**

What we in everyday language call ‘music’ includes aesthetic events that we can

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80 For an overview see Auslander (2003). Carlson (1996:5,189ff.) has reflexively dealt with performance as ‘contested concept’.
phenomenologically recognize as being ‘performances’ in the theatrical sense. Besides the fact that music often is performance, the other paradigm of ‘music as performance’ can be used to also understand music ‘as’ social and cultural (processual) performance. Auslander (2004) successfully applied this paradigm to the analysis of (not only) popular music and has brought together theatrical and socio-cultural performance in music most productively in his theorizations concerning the ‘musical persona’ (2004, 2006a, 2006b) – a term which fuses notions of musico-aesthetical and socio-cultural performance. By stressing that musical performance is itself an instance of social performance, insofar as ‘to be a musician is to perform an identity in a social realm’, Auslander (2006:101) serves to widen the notion of performance in music beyond real-time ‘interactions among musicians’ to include performance as the ‘doing’ of social and cultural behaviour. As a co-founder of performance studies he embraces a ‘notion of performance far broader than those found in the traditional performing arts’ (Auslander 2006:101).

Auslander (2004) provided a framework for the performance analysis of popular music, in which he models socio-cultural conventions and genre-conventions as the frames within which the performer can define her/his performance persona on a live or mediated/recording stage. Auslander grounds his concept of the persona in the social constructivist notion of the ‘self’ as effect (not the cause) of social interaction. Since the 1960s, social constructivism and ethnomethodology have stressed the constructive and productive quality of social actions as negotiating and constituting social life in the first place. Contrary to social determinisms, scholars of the social constructivist school came to understand social behaviour as essentially performative by stressing the emergent, constitutive quality of the ‘doing’ of the social world and by highlighting its dramatic quality. From this scholarly field, Erving Goffman emerged as the most influential social
constructivist for performance studies – in part because he used theatrical vocabulary to describe social actions (Carlson 1996:50).

The vocabulary of play and theatre in the context of social action nonetheless becomes problematic when, despite its originally metaphorical usage, it becomes naturalized and acquires a tendency to invoke real social transformation. I argue that such a naturalization of transformation is also at work in Aulander’s concept of the persona, which (surreptitiously) blends social performance with (marked) cultural performance. In his theorization of ‘musical personae’ Auslander (2006:114) cites the constructivist Goffman (1959:252f.):81 ‘A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a performed character, but this imputation – this self – is a product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it. The self, then […] is a dramatic effect arising from a scene that is presented […].’ Auslander also mentions the receptory side of performance when he deems audiences to be ‘cocreators of the musician’s persona’ (2006:115). However, what is missing here is a reflection on whether the conception of the performative and processual self, expressed in Aulander’s term ‘persona’, is a concept shared by the audience. The two schools of performance studies that Auslander attempts to bring together, the ‘is’-performance school concerned with aesthetic and cultural performance and the ‘as’ performance school concerned with social performance, diverge significantly on a central point. While the ‘aesthetic and cultural performance’ school claims a performance ‘reality’ for its objects of study by the fact that performers and audience themselves understand it as performance, the social performance school either neglects this question – by using naturalizing vocabulary – or claims that, in a mediatized world everyone has an insight into the mediatedness of the self and therefore social activities may always be considered ‘performances’.

Auslander (1999) himself has been active in such a reformulation of performance for a postmodern, mediatized culture. While he argues that in a mediatized culture events are always marked by their technical reproduction, in his arguments against the ‘immediacy’ of the event, Auslander nevertheless tends to make reproduction and mediatisation into an absolute (Schumacher 2002:398f.). And in his theorizations of pop music, Auslander assumes that knowing of pop music’s mediality must always have effects (see Auslander 1999).

Against such an ontologisation of the mediated, Toynbee (2000:61) has invoked Derrida’s postscript that amended his essay on the performative wherein Derrida ((1972)1988) acknowledges that against their better judgement, individuals may act as if they had no insight into iterability and processuality. For instance, individuals may know about the iterability of writing and nonetheless sign texts with their signature – an act that paradoxically rests on a belief in the immediacy of handwriting (see supra Ch. 0.1). When the performance scholar investigates the practices of aesthetic, cultural and social performance s/he has to admit that performers and audiences may or may not follow her or his analytical perspective; they may or may not see the marking and understand activity as performance and the self as mediated. Yet rather than searching for (objective) reasons for such a variability, as suggested by Bourdieu’s (2000:13,17) argument that social position determines whether insight into the performativity of social positions may be gained by individuals, I suggest that a poststructuralist intervention leads to another vantage point: For pop music, it can be said that in point of fact, aesthetic pleasure derives from the varying degrees of knowledge and acknowledgement of the mediatedness of the musical persona. Yet such marked deconstructions of the self should not be simply equated with transformation or even empowerment. While in the 1970s female so-called ‘persona performance artists’ displayed their autobiographical ‘[f]antasies’
(Traylor 1976, Elwes 1985:185) in performances that explored alternative and imaginary versions of their selves, their sheer self-assertion of ‘presence’ was seen as an ‘act of feminism’ (Elwes 1985:165). With the commercialization of performances of the self (particularly of feminist persona performances of media artists such as Madonna and her successors) in the 1980s through music videos and superstar culture, the political dimension of persona performance – especially in mediated contexts – became less self-evident. Although a persona performance might be individually enabling for the performer, it is not necessarily collectively enabling. Such postmodern performances play a double game of ‘complicity and critique’ (Auslander 1992:31), and run the risk of re-inscribing the structures they supposedly deconstruct. By the 1990s, the performative situation had already obviously become ‘involved in the operations of the dominant social systems’ (Carlson 1996:112).

The performance studies approach brings together various fields of human action under one cross-disciplinary paradigm. The perspective of the performative therein highlights the duplicity of (theatrical, social and linguistic) actions in general as partaking both of script and event, of structure and its rupture, of linguistic structure and ad hoc utterance – in Butler’s (1988: 520f.) words the duplicity of the ‘dramatic and non-referential’ and in Toynbee’s (2000:53) words of the ‘theatrical and processive’. A performance event is not in itself disruptive (only non-referential or processive) merely because its analyst uses the language of performance and marks the event as a performance. The transformative impact of the performative in concrete fields of action has to be evaluated anew in each instance.

**The performative in tactical critical practices**

After having provided a rather abstract analysis of (electronic) pop music with the
help of the concept of the performative and an extended vocabulary of processive and theatrical performance borrowed from performance theory, the remaining part of this chapter will discuss performance as method and activity of both musical agents and academic agents. I suggest that the theoretical principle of the performative can be converted into critical practices in the form of tactics.

Adopting the military language of ‘tactics’ Michel de Certeau (1988:xix,30) states: ‘[t]he place of the tactic belongs to the other. A tactic insinuates itself into the other’s place, fragmentarily, without taking it over in its entirety’. ‘[T]actics [...] use, manipulate and divert these spaces’ (de Certeau 1988:30). What reads, in military language, as ‘the place of the other’ can be likened to what in the vocabulary of cultural critique is called normalising structure or reductive discourse. In cultural critical practice a tactic is used to invert institutionalized structures in a live operation. Temporary navigations within and between identity categories, ideological positions or discursive formations are examples of tactical operations. Such tactical positioning may be evidence of the critical or resistant impetus of the agent of this performance, but again, the tactic's transformatory effect remains basically undetermined.

The pop musical performances investigated in this study are tactical critical practices insofar as they provide artful, improvisatory and resistant repetitions of musical (i.e. theatrical, sonic, social and linguistic) structures and insofar as this iterative engagement is concrete and involved rather than detached from the institutions of their object field. From the performance studies perspective, the principle of the performative – or its practical twin ‘tactics’ – can be understood as a transmedial feature of various fields of human action. However, as linguistics is the field in which the principle of the performative was first formulated (see Austin 1968), rhetorics is the discipline that first developed the parasitic principle of tactics which ‘describes the “turns” or tropes of which language can be both the
site and the object’ (de Certeau 1988:xx, HO). My analysis in this study is mainly concerned with the linguistic-discursive component of these performances; the linguistic, verbal, visual and rhetorical media applied in the multi-medial performance events of music.

According to de Certeau (1988:xix) a tactic ‘does not have a place, a tactic depends on time’. The criticality of tactical operations therefore does not manifest itself in a permanent positioning within a certain ideology or discourse formation. Instead, it is exactly the tactical changes and re-positionings – the manoeuvres between structural determinisms and singular events –, which make them critical.

While de Certeau concentrates on the tactical quality of (not necessarily conscious) everyday practices, I use ‘tactic’ in the sense of a ‘temporary’ and (in contrast to de Certeau) conscious, reflective action. Such conscious actions can be generally understood as performances since they include diachronically ‘twice-behaved’ behaviour (Schechner 1985:2), and specifically, as cultural performances because they involve a ‘consciousness of doubleness according to which an actual execution of an action is placed in mental comparison with a potential, an ideal, or a remembered original model of that action’ (Carlson 1996:5 paraphrasing Baumann 1989).

The reflexivity of what I call ‘tactic’ lies within the performer – and this reflexivity points to the third characteristic of critical practices next to object-field-specificity and positivity, namely self-criticality. How self-criticality is practically applied in anonymity performances of electronic pop musicians will be analysed with the help of my final chapter’s laboratory case. Inke Arns ((2008)2011:262f.) differentiates theoretically between two tactical routes: the route of displaying or mapping (conventionally invisible) power structures, and the route of overidentifying with these power structures (and hiding in their all-too-bright light).

As explicated in the last two chapters, Moodymann can be understood as taking
the first route: revealing the various parameters for the construction of the pop music persona in a defacing performance. Musical projects that take the route of overidentification will be described in more detail in the final part of this study.

While Moodymann or other electronic pop musicians might apply the principles of tactical performance to their elaborate discourse about pop music, how can a scholar elaborate on the subject of anonymity in EDM in a linguistic performance and how can s/he employ the tactical principle in her/his practice? The question of positionality, which tactical operations engage with in a predominantly temporal dramaturgy, will be addressed through a closer discussion of the ethics of the scholar in the field of critical ethnography in the next part of this chapter.

The performative in scholarly acts: performance ethnography as performance research and the tactics of scholarly representation

In order to discuss the scholarly performance of discursive representations of pop music I suggest re-assessing the roots of the performance studies perspective in ‘performative anthropology’, which, since the 1970s, has established performance not only as a subject of study but ‘as a method by which research [itself] would be conducted’ (Salter 2010: XXIV-V).

Descending from critical ethnography, performative anthropology lead to the development of a ‘performative science’ approach at the core of which is the assertion that science does not neutrally represent a pre-given reality but also enacts this reality by the very performance of scholarly practice. Reminiscent of both post-positivist and ethnomusicological disputes surrounding the possibility of detached observation (e.g. Cook 2008), the performative science approach is paralleled within music studies by performance research positions that question the possibility of a ‘central point of intelligibility’ or an undisputedly ‘privileged
position of the spectator’ (Korsyn 1999:65) or analyst. But approaches inspired by performative science ultimately differ from traditional ethnomusicological approaches in so far as they, instead of aiming for an ultimately objective understanding of musico-cultural practices, take into equal consideration the descriptive and prescriptive act of musical analysis (Bohlman 1993:432), and understand scholarly acts themselves (and not only the musicians’ acts) as performances. In spite of demands for music performance research inspired by post-positivist approaches, one hardly finds any studies of music that integrate performance into academic practice beyond simply providing a field of collaboration with artist practitioners in embodied live performance or merely exposing academic practices’ limitations (see Kisliuk 1998).

Since the 1980s, the performative science approach was further developed in science and technology studies, with sociologists and cultural analysts working in laboratories together alongside scientists, in what are now known as ‘laboratory studies’. These have also proven to be productive in the study of musical processes, especially those not limited to human agents. Laboratory studies take on the problem of omniscience, which had been alluded to by performance studies and its ontological transformation from text to event, and disrupt the privileged omniscient position by giving equal performative roles to both human and nonhuman agents (Salter 2010).

**Performance ethnography**

The paradigm of ‘performance as research method’, already widened to encompass human and non-human actors, may also be made to work towards

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82 Blacking (1987:3) for example points out the centrality of performance in the field of ethnomusicology when understanding it as ‘a method, rather than an area of study’ and ‘an approach to understanding all musics and music-making in the contexts of performance’. However, what interests him is not the performance of the analyst but what ‘composers, performers and listeners bring to what they define as musical situations’.

83 See for example the aims and objectives of ongoing research at the AHRC Research Centre for Musical Performance As Creative Practice: http://www.cmpcp.ac.uk/aims.html [20/03/2014].
an equalization of the knowledge production of (human) academic and non-academic agents in music ethnographies and thus challenge the prevailing view of the relationship between the analyst and the phenomena or subjects under study. Rather than providing a distanced, objective, authoritative analysis of musical practices, the analyst can stress her/his personal participation in the generation of meaning and thus collapse the binary opposition between ethnographer and ‘subjects under study’ into an understanding of ‘co-performers’ (Madison 2005:168). This ‘performance ethnography’ operation of co-performance as a method of cultural inquiry in cultural anthropology results not only in ‘dialogical performance’ (Conquergood 1982:9) as a dialogue-oriented research design for the conduct of field conversations and interviews, and in the imperative for the scholar to participate in (cultural) performance, but also in a specific ethics for her/his fieldwork. This is because in performance ethnography of anthropological provenance the scholar engages in a triad of theory, analysis and activity (Conquergood 2002:152): the development of abstract performance theory, the pragmatics of performance as method of inquiry, and the application of performance as event of activity or intervention by the researcher her/himself. The third element of activity and intervention – performed ethnographic research – remains missing in conceptions of performance ethnography that stem from music studies or ethnomusicology. ‘Performance ethnography’ in these musical performance studies incorporates (live) performance participation as method of analysis (for example, live music performance as research technique) but reduces the notion of performance to ‘real-time’ event (see supra my discussion in the beginning of this chapter) and therefore lacks deeper consideration pertaining to the ethical dimension of the researcher’s activity or intervention (see Krüger 2008, 2009). 84

84 In ethnomusicology and music studies the performance ethnography researcher’s activities may
With the aim of integrating performance more substantially into academic practice and developing performance ethnography as a full performance research, I want to re-assess the outcomes of the ethical self-questioning that emerged in the crisis of representation in cultural anthropology. For their research and its presentation anthropologists have developed codes of ethics, such as the code of ethics of the American Anthropological Association (AAA), in which ‘avoiding harm’ (AAA 2012:4) to the subjects under study, openness and transparency ‘regarding the purpose, methods, outcomes, and sponsors of their work’ (AAA 2012:5) and granting anonymity (if desired) to those ‘relevant parties affected by research’ (Madison 2005:111) rank among the highest tenets. While this code certainly only provides guidelines and anthropologists must often ‘weigh competing obligations’ in their fieldwork, according to the code (AAA 2012:9), amongst the obligations to ‘research participants, students, professional colleagues, employers and funders, among others […], obligations to research participants are usually primary’. The responsibility to the researched community notably outweighs the responsibility to the scholarly community. Of course, ‘[a]nthropologists are subject to the ethical principles guiding all scientific and scholarly conduct. They must not plagiarize, nor fabricate or falsify evidence, or knowingly misrepresent information or its source’ (AAA 2012:5), and should preserve opportunities for access to the field as well as to one’s own field data for other scholars. Yet when it comes to the matter of the scholar’s own position (affecting research presentation and other forms of staging fieldwork data in a scholarly performance for an audience) a ‘ventriloquist stance’ of neutral transmission of information (Madison 2005:6), of the kind still commonly practised in, for example, sociological ethnographic research, has been in decline among anthropologists at least since the writing culture debates of the 1980s.

include composing, musical performance, ethnographic writing and ethnographic film making (Krüger 2009:161).
Critical ethnography from the 1980s onward has instead followed the model of the ‘positionality of voices. [The anthropologists’] voices carry forward indigenous meaning and experiences that are in opposition to dominant discourses and practices’ (Madison 2005:6, IO). While the ethnographer in such texts reflects her/his act of studying and deems it to be an act of domination, this does not necessarily result in an outspoken positioning of the scholar her/himself in the text. What George W. Noblit et al. (2004) call ‘postcritical ethnography’ emerged in the 1990s and engendered an outspoken and explicit ‘activism stance [, whereby] the ethnographer takes a clear positioning in intervening on hegemonic practices and serves as an advocate [...] [for example by] offering alternatives’ (Madison 2005:6, IO). Translating these ethical discussions to concrete critical practices by the ethnographer delivering texts or other performances to an audience, anthropologist John L. Jackson Jr. (2010:281, HO) has made a helpful distinction: he differentiates ‘between sincerity and authenticity, two related lenses for spotting “the real” and its varying implications for ethnographic research’. Rather than providing an ‘authentic’ report on the research process and being accountable primarily to the audience, the anthropological ethnographer is above all obligated to her/his research participants. With sincerity towards the interest and positionality of research participants as co-performers being the primary obligation, how can these research dynamics finally be enacted in the tactics of scholarly representation? Must the (post)critical ethnographic researcher explicitly advocate her/his position in the text or can the activity of the ethnographer also remain in the background, only occasionally and tactically moving to the surface of the text?

**Tactics of scholarly representation**

The culmination of a research project is its staging on the page. In the tradition of critical ethnography, an ethnography can take a narrative form or utilize a specific
literary practice; a poetic writing style evoking the fieldwork situation or the inclusion of the ‘I’ of the researcher or an on-going narrative of the research process. Beyond these ethnographic writing styles, whose use intensified in the period of the writing culture debate, the emergence of a ‘postcritical’ (Nobilit et al. 2004) – or, as I would prefer to say ‘performance’ – ethnography since the 1990s called for more experimental ethnographic writing styles (Denzin 2003:77ff.).

Such new forms of ‘performative writing’ stress the performative nature of writing itself, which ‘shows rather than tells [and] is writing that speaks performatively, enacting what it describes’ (Denzin 2003:93) and ‘evok[ing] what it names’ (Phelan 1998:13). With Denzin (2003, 1997:90-124) two forms of performative writing can be differentiated: performance writing which ‘looks distinctive on the page, […] may be deeply citational, with footnotes and endnotes’ or ‘may combine several different types of texts, such as poetry, first-person reflections, quotations from scholarly works, and the daily newspaper. [Such] [p]erformative writing requires performative reading, an active collaborative form of reading’ (Denzin 2003:93) on the part of an informed and collaborative recipient. The other form of performative writing described by Denzin (1997:90-124) can be called ‘performance texts’; ‘ethnographic and cultural texts turned into poems, scripts, short stories and dramas that are read and performed before an audience’ (Denzin 1997:91). These ‘performance texts’ require their embodiment by a voice and/or body before an audience, while the first form, ‘performative writing’, is sustained mainly by a collaborative reader.

The tactics of scholarly representation can therefore involve embracing live situations such as the theatrical presentation of a ‘performance text’ by one or more performers or a lecture performance of the scholar her/himself. These tactics can also involve the engagement of readers through a distinctive typography or mixed media text forms, which reflect the performative nature of
reading. In the next chapter I will resolutely experiment with this style of performative writing, making use of typographical anomalies and combinations of text types (including the encyclopaedia entry format among others), but I will also experiment with the narrative. Such a performance activity does not (as demanded by Nobilit et al. (2004)) ‘explicitly’ but rather implicitly ‘consider how [my] own acts of studying and representing people and situations are acts of domination’. Instead aiming for a fully self-critical ethnography, I embrace the performance paradigm and understand scholarly representation as a tactical performance (in text or other media). I am sincere to the interests of my research participants, but I do not explicitly present their voices through my voice, which in any case is impossible due to the sensitivity of my research subject (my research participants are antagonistic to the use of explicit language to make definitive demands). Therefore, rather than operating from an unambiguous positioning, I instead tactically intervene in the hegemonic practice of writing.

I present the following chapters as a performance ethnography sketch employing the triad of theory, analysis and activity in performance, insofar as 1) it takes the concept of the ‘performativ[e] from performance theory as its guiding theory, 2) I apply performance as a method in dialogical research situations, participation in cultural co-performance and an ethical conduct of research according to the principle of sincerity to my research participants (laboratory cases), and 3) my tactics of representation include new ethnographic writing styles, whereby I not only integrate the research process as part of the narrative, give a detailed analysis of concrete performances and provide meta-reflection on larger issues indicated by the total performance text, but also ‘leav[e] room for choice, irony, contradiction and surprise’ (Kisliuk 1998:12) in my text.

In order to realize a full ‘performance ethnography’ I therefore now choose (as I have chosen in my research process) to change my research perspective. In the
first laboratory part of this study (Ch. 1) I have analysed concrete live and media performances as if they were texts that illuminate other (theoretical) texts. This process eventually led me to further develop the performance art studies vocabulary of the ‘persona’ into a notion of the ‘(pop music) persona’. In the next, second laboratory part of this study (Ch. 3), I will engage with performance as a method of research. From this point on, performance becomes the ‘interpretative grid laid upon the process of study itself’ (Carlson 1996:190). As I engage with anonymity and performativity of discourse about pop music the distinction between constative and performative utterances in my scholarly research collapses. I want to reply to the disappearance into an authorless dream space of sound one encounters in EDM with a theoretical voice that is conscious of the performative nature of the representational dimension of writing and research. This voice should not be content with merely displaying this performativity but must negotiate her/his relationship to a (reading) public and to a field/discourse from which her/his research knowledge arises. With the aim of executing a performance research of musical phenomena that integrates the ‘full performance paradigm’ from performance ethnography, I understand performance as a method of research that affects writing and other (discursive) knowledge practices.

Tactics, as already revalued by de Certeau as a form of (everyday) knowledge, should in the following become the guiding principle of my own knowledge production. Tactical performance, which I have, until now, solely studied as the domain of pop musicians’ critical practice to be analysed by me as the scholar, will become the methodological grid of the scholar herself. This approach places the scholar on a transdisciplinary (and ideologically and discursively) ‘moving base’ (Spivak 1999:IX-X). I will translate tactical performance from the field to the stage of ethnographic representation.
Conclusion Ch. 2

Instead of making processuality undisputable by employing a strictly ‘processive’ terminology I have suggested a differentiated vocabulary of performance (processive and theatrical performance) that acknowledges the various degrees and interrelations of materialities and reflexivities employed in pop music. When speaking of performance, one concentrates not only on an activity that creates presence and immediacy but also one that is set apart from mere processive ‘doing’ of culture, art or sociality. Performance is linked to material enactment but always also to forms of display; it is also ‘always performance for someone, some audience that recognizes and validates it as performance even when, as is occasionally the case, that audience is the self’ (Carlson 1996:6, IO). To study performance in (electronic) pop music means to understand the processive and the theatrical in performance as being inextricably linked.

I have found that analyses of performance in music are undertaken in two ways. The first approach is the music-as-performance school of thought which analyses concrete musical performances and recordings or understands musical performance as social performance. Here, Philip Auslander developed the notion of the ‘musical persona’ by fusing musico-cultural and social performance by which both linguistic and non-linguistic means of signification can be included in an analysis of musical acts. The persona in this approach appears as a name for a poststructuralist agency that Carlson (1996:171, HO), paraphrasing Judith Butler, has described as arising ‘not from some choosing subject existing before the performance of identity but rather from the “self” constituted by performance’.

Nevertheless, what these persona approaches do not reflect is that it is (first of all) theoretical discourse that marks this social activity as performance. The theatrical vocabulary employed in the music-as-performance approach tends to naturalize the processual-performative in social practices, but such (theoretically
marked) deconstructions of the self cannot be equated with real social transformation or empowerment.

The second approach of including performance in the analysis of music is similarly unreflectedly dealing with the processuality of its subject matter. Drawing on the ‘music-is-performance’ paradigm acknowledging performances as its subject, this approach manifests in pop music studies most regularly as a focus on the ‘sound’ of music and a radical shift towards a processual terminology regularly accompanies this approach. For example, EDM theory, drawing on process philosophy and a theoretical vocabulary derived thereof, naturalizes processuality and makes non-discursivity into an absolute.

I therefore suggest a third approach to understanding performance in music that is grounded in a performance research/performative anthropology approach, which will understand performance not only as subject but also as the method of study. In the tradition of critical ethnography, this approach concentrates on writing as a medium for the performance of the music researcher but also considers the problem of the positionality of the ethnographic scholar by developing new forms of staging scholarly knowledge practices. Tactical performance, which positions the scholar on a trans-discursive ground, and only gradually reveals her/his long-term intentions, becomes one option for scholarly staging practice. By utilizing the methods of tactical performance in her/his knowledge practice, the advocacy of the ethnographer is negotiated implicitly rather than explicitly – an approach suitable for sensitive research subjects (such as in this study).
Revised structure of the study

As I have announced a revision of my perspective, a refined outline for the remaining parts of this study seems to be appropriate here. As a step towards a possible performance ethnography, the excursion I take with the next subchapter will approach theoretical discourse itself as performance. I will apply the performance approach to theoretical discourse about the ‘persona’, the theoretical term introduced in the first chapter of this study. My summary of the theoretical positions surrounding the ‘persona’ will be enacted as a fictional encyclopaedia entry that serves as a performance writing on persona theory requiring the collaboration of the reader. The authoritative representation initially brought forth in the act of writing an encyclopaedia entry will then subsequently be undermined by a discussion of additional fake entries. This performance writing excursion is meant to prepare the groundwork for the last chapter of this study (Ch. 3), which is devoted to bringing together scholarly performance ethnography with performance research from within the musical field. There I will return to musical projects that themselves undertake pop music research in the form of performance and use ‘fake’ and ‘collaborative imagination’ as critical artistic practices of performance ethnography.
Excursion: Persona – encyclopaedia entry with one
genuine (and one false) etymology

If I were asked to write an encyclopaedia entry for the term ‘persona’ I would probably submit something like the following:

**Persona (persona)**

1. **Gen.**

   In common English usage persona designates an auto-scripted role. The persona spans the space between self and public display, whereby performance is the prerequisite of both self and public role.

   The term persona brings together the spheres of the aesthetic and the everyday, as already indicated in the double Latin usage of the term – as theatre ‘mask’ and social ‘role’. Nevertheless, neither Latin usage referred to an absolute, self-conscious ‘person’ in the modern sense (Fuhrmann 1979:93).

   In the course of its development into the modern ‘person’ the Latin ‘persona’ has undergone a process of internalization and immanentization. Reappropriations of the term ‘persona’ in the 20th century have, however, defied this internalization. For C.G. Jung (see infra psychol.) the persona is an ‘individual’s system of adaptation to, or the manner he assumes in dealing with, the world’ (Jung (1950)1975:122). This anti-foundationalist reformulation of the persona already contains the basic features of later post-structuralist persona-conceptions – as developed in social theory, literary and art studies, star studies and practices.

2. **Etymol.**

   The etymology of the Latin term ‘persona’ is controversial. One group of etymologists traces the direct root of the Latin persona in the Etruscan ‘phersu’ (Rheinfelder 1928:25, Altheim 1929). Altheim (1929:48) argues the case that the Etruscan phersu was most likely a former god of the underworld, whose name came to signify the mask. Whether ‘phersu’ first transmuted into the Greek ‘prosopon’ before then becoming the Latin ‘persona’ – as another group of etymologists argue – remains in doubt. Nonetheless, both the possible direct precursors of the Latin persona, ‘phersu’ and ‘prosopon’, signify that which in modern English one calls ‘mask’.

   In the Greek and Roman territories prosopon and persona were indeed material theatre masks. It was in the terminology of Greek rhetoric that persona (here still ‘prosopon’) first acquired the meaning of ‘role in life’, which was elaborated upon later by the Romans, foremost by Cicero, and is still echoed today in sociological role theory. The semantics of ‘persona’ from Antiquity, a ‘mask’ or a part played by a person in society and life, were later inherited by the term ‘role’\(^{85}\), whereas the semantic field surrounding ‘person’ acquired the meanings of individual personality. In

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\(^{85}\) The term ‘role’ was borrowed by English language from French in the 15th/16th century (Barnhart 1988:935).
contemporary English, which has the two words role and persona, role refers to the theatrical and social role while persona connotes the agency of the individual person constructing the persona her/himself.

3. Philosoph.

The transformation of the persona into the modern person has been attributed to various periods. Starting with Antique rhetoric (Cicero), attributes of the personal enter the associative field of persona in addition to its mask connotations. The persona describes the constant characteristics of a subject, by which she or he becomes recognizable as an individual.

To what extent the Latin persona approximates today’s personality is a matter of contention. Yet most commonly the transformation from the former ‘persona as mask’ to the modern ‘person as autonomous individual’ is linked to the Christianization in the late Roman era. In either case, it can be safely said that between Antiquity and modern times the concept of the persona has undergone an inversion in the form of an internalization process (Konersmann 1993:202, Weihe 1993:202) with the modern ‘person’ relying on an ‘inner self’.

4. Psychol.

C.G. Jung carried over the term ‘persona’ of Classical Antiquity into the modern age. With reference to the Roman persona as the mask of the actor, Jung conceptualized it as an outward personality. In opposition to individuality and personality, Jung’s ‘persona’ stands for the part of the self which is directed to the outside world and which functions as a protective mask.

5. Sociolog.

Modern social theory has taken from the Ciceronic notion of the persona the idea of the relationality between society and individual, albeit with diverging valuation of the poles. D. Kolesch (2004) divides modern role theory into two main positions: on the one hand a social role model where the individual alienates her-/himself in society, puts on a mask and acts according to a script written elsewhere. On the other hand the social role model that seeks the genuine within (and not behind) the mask. This second tradition of modern role theory is represented primarily by E. Goffman for whom the self is as much a product of the scene as is the role; the self is produced in role-play.

Yet such an evaluation of the poles of individual versus societal role models is only possible under conditions of modernity, when the boundary between private and public have become fluid, negotiable and require continuous validation (Sennett 1977). Accordingly, a modern adaptation of the persona should be able to self-reflexively consider its own validating operations.

In her theory of subject-formation and gender, J. Butler (1988) notably amended the notion of the self as constructed through performance (as had been asserted by constructivist social theories) by focussing on the historicity and the preinscriptedness of spaces of social performance. She conceptualizes performative identity as being doubly oriented: as the generation and (forced) repetition of social norms. Like most social theorists Butler conceptualizes the

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85 Dahrendorff (1974) argues for a connection between the modern (absolute) person and Cicero’s persona (see Fuhrmann 1979:97ff.).

87 See Jung (1964:171ff.)
relationality between society and individual without recourse to the vocabulary of ‘persona’. If one were to locate the persona in Butler’s thought, it would most likely be the self-attributed reflexive element of identity generation that stands opposed to the external element of identity restriction or determination.

6. Literary and Art Studies

In art studies the persona is a generic term appearing in literary and drama theory, musicology and performance studies. In literary theory the ‘persona’ has been established as ‘the voice of the author’ (Murfin/Ray 2003:338) inside a text, frequently in lyrical texts or narratives as well as in fictional texts. The notion of the persona suggests that the author can assume a ‘mask’ within a text – be it explicitly as the narrator of, or a character within a text, or implicitly as an ‘image of the artist’ (Booth 1961:73) cultivated through a ‘style’, ‘technique’ or ‘tone’ (Booth 1961:74) of writing. W. Booth (1961) has distilled these rhetorical registers of the persona in his work on the ‘implied author’, whom he traces in fictional texts. His conceptualization came about as measure to counter naive interpretations of literary texts as mere autobiographical works and as such is consistent with deconstructions of the historical author as practiced since the 1940s, which themselves reached their widest proliferation with Barthes’ and Foucault’s post-structuralist critiques of the author in the late 1960s.

Aesthetically, the persona is developed by (the experience of) a discrepancy of voices; in the case of literary narratives as a discrepancy between the voice of the narrator and the author, in the case of drama as a discrepancy between the voice of the figure and the author. In musical contexts, the discrepancy between the voices of the composer and the singer/performer are indicated on stage by the specific materialities of the singer’s voice or performer’s body. In contrast to a monologic ‘composer’s voice’ (Cone 1974) of classical music which ideally controls the singer whose material voice only serves the composer’s intentions and personality, in pop music contexts attention is drawn ‘to performance itself, to the relationship between performer and work’ (Frith 1996:200, IO).

With a focus on the performance character of pop music Frith’s work (1996) draws links to approaches from performance studies, but it was P. Auslander who explicitly used the vocabulary of ‘persona’ to draw attention to the performative nature of selves presented on musical stages. Performance studies is a field spanning theatre studies, anthropology, sociology and linguistics. The theatre strand therein concerns itself with the shift in theatrical practices from literary and

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88 ‘Persona’ as ‘a character deliberately assumed by an author in his writing’ (Simpson/Weiner 1989:598) was first used by R. Bentley (1732)1974:sig A3) in his preface to J. Milton’s ‘Paradise Lost’: ‘If any one fancy this Persona of an Editor to be a mere Fantom, a Fiction, an Artifice to skreen Milton himself.’ Nonetheless, according to Barnhart (1988:781) as a term in literary theory ‘persona’ was first used in 1958: ‘To this extent Lewis Eliot is, as it were, a convenient and comfortable persona for his author’ (in Times Lit. Supp. 20 June 345/1 cited according to Simpson/Weiner 1989:598).

89 In narrative theory the persona is comparable to Genette’s (1980) category of ‘voice’ and Stanzel’s (2001) category of person.

90 See Booth (1961).


92 E. Cone’s theorisations on the ‘composer’s voice’ have recently been revived for the analysis of pop music song performance (e.g. Frith 1996:184ff., Moore 2005).
dramatical texts to (post-dramatical) performance. While in literary/drama theory the persona is a unit of receptory imagination activated by the literary text, the ‘dramatis personae’ on theatre stages are not confined to the linguistic signs of the role text, but also encompass actorial bodies and their appearance on a stage (Wunderlich 2001).

In post-dramatical theatre and performance art the persona is multimodal – a mix of image, sound and flesh –, and in theoretical accounts much attention is given to the synthesis of these components by the audience. Unlike ‘characters’ on theatre stages, performance art personae are not scripted by dramatical texts. Yet although the (performance art) persona might be considered to be at some remove from literary and classical music forms of genuine authorial or compositional intentions by the bodily presence of the performer, this presence might very well be scripted and enacted by performers who draw on their everyday life and social experiences.

Since the 1970s, feminist performance artists have developed personally enabling performances in which they explore multiple potential selves called ‘personae’. On the stage of the theatre and the stage of the everyday these ‘persona artists’ presented ‘speculative journeys’ (Elwes 1985:189) to ‘alternative, imaginary, even mythic selves’ (Carlson 1996:152), dealing less with their individual biographical experience than providing ‘autobiographical fantasies’ (Traylor 1976). In their time, these performances were understood as transformational due to the ‘active authorship’ and ‘irrefutable public presence’ of self-exploring women in traditionally male-defined theatre (Elwes 1985:165,189).

However, the political dimension of persona performance – of displaying the performative character of the self – has been the subject of some critical revision. Performance art persona performance was criticized for its ‘presumptuousness’ (Carr (1989)1993:179) and for being merely personally, rather than socially, enabling (Carlson 1996:161). A result of these criticisms has been a shift in art practice, as well as in performance theory/studies, from the sole concentration on the activity of the performer to her/his specific engagement with the audience and the public (Carlson 1996:186).

In performance studies of pop music phenomena, Philip Auslander (2004a, 2006, 2009) applied the notion of ‘persona’ from performance art and developed it into a term that describes a ‘performed presence that is not a character (in the usual sense) but also is not quite equivalent of the performer’s “real identity”’ (Auslander 2004a:6, HO, see also 1997:39-45, 108-25, 1992:57-81). Auslander’s ‘musical persona’ (2006) is a ‘version of self’. Auslander’s perspective shift from the text to the performance paradigm enables him to consider musicians performing personae (rather than, or in addition to, fictional characters or song personalities) in their vocal/sonic, visual and verbal instances.

Considering musical performance as one instance of social performance, which Auslander understands (consistent with radical constructivist social theories) as essentially performative, allows him to find an alternative position to the expressionist model of musical performance, as exemplified by Godlovitch (1998), who sees musical performance as an expression of a personality. On the contrary, Auslander (2006:103) offers a self-presentation model of musical performance; his notion of the ‘persona’ (Auslander 2004a, 2006, 2009) as the organizing ‘presence’ of the artist within
(rather than behind) a performance can be used to develop a notion of the ‘pop music persona’ (see supra Ch. 1.1 and the four vehicles of persona construction in pop music).

The term ‘pop music persona’ references the affinity of pop music and performance art insofar as pop musician-artists frequently make their creative contribution through the performance of or modification of other authors’ or vernacular musical materials. Pop music performers constantly deliver a ‘double address’ (Goodwin 1992:75) to the audience, which provides the ‘constitutive indeterminacy’ between role and person in the performative situation of pop music (Diederichsen 2008a:96).

The term pop music persona also marks the genuinely performative character of pop musical selves which arises from pop music’s status as a media music constantly negotiating between the absence of the sound source or principal anonymity of sound originators on recordings and the presence of performers on live and public media stages. The term ‘persona’ in pop music contexts acknowledges that pop music practitioners themselves stage and dramatize their (sonic) anonymity in media, live and recorded performances. A pop musician performs ‘her/himself’, at times employing ‘fictional or semi-fictional identities that the artist constructs in the lyrics and his public appearances’ (Lebold 2007:59) and thereby establishing a ‘star persona’.

In the aesthetic experience of the audience, the pop music persona arises from the discrepancy between the voices of the empirical, real person of the musician and her/his (star) figure. Due to the multidiscursivity of pop music, ‘in which no one media site is privileged’ (Goodwin 1992:25), and its dispersion among the production spheres of live and recorded, the persona manifests itself in the disparities between vocal/sonic, visual and textual elements as well as between live and recorded performances.

The collectivity or individuality of the pop music persona remains a controversial issue. Auslander conceptualized the persona – as a presence co-produced by musicians and audience – largely using examples from pop music and in this (popular) context it seems to be especially applicable. Auslander argues that the ‘emergent character of musical personae’ is relativized by the necessary ‘negotiation of a working consensus with the audience’, which functions as a ‘co-creator’ and introduces social frames and genre restrictions (Auslander 2006:113,115,117). Nevertheless, Auslander’s (2006:103) ultimately ‘performer-centric’ perspective precludes an engagement with further institutions of pop music (such as stardom), and inhibits a full discussion of collectivity versus individuality of the pop music persona beyond merely symbolic claims.

7. Star Studies

In star studies the term persona indicates a certain perspective of the phenomenon of celebrity. While both terms, image and persona, are often used interchangeably, and both indicate a recognition of a general mediatedness of the celebrity, a differentiation between them exists: the term image is specifically used to connote celebrity as a product of the audience’s imagination, while the term persona indicates that it is a product of the media and of agents of the cultural industries. Persona

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93 ... or ‘star personality’ as Frith (1996:212) termed it.
approaches to star studies analyse the production context of celebrity, with a distinction between intra-textual (artist-generated) and the extra-textual (industry-personnel-manufactured) dimension of the persona.\(^{94}\)

Within the production-oriented approach one finds perspectives from organisational sociology, political economy and post-structuralist discourse analysis, which differ in their location of the agency for production: from the individual cultural industries worker (organisational sociology), to the industry as a whole dominated by the logic of capital accumulation (political economy), to power as dispersed among various agents and factors ranging from individual performers to the audience and from technological to cultural-historical factors (poststructuralism).

A specific approach, which concentrates, on the agency of the individual artist behind the persona has been developed within the cultural industrial context of film by historian Barry King. King used the vocabulary of ‘persona’ with an eye towards a critical institutional analysis. King’s ‘persona’ is conceptualized as the ‘bargaining power’ of self-employed performers, such as post-studio system film actors (King (1986)1991:178) – a situation that can be likened to pop music production contexts. In contrast to Auslander, whose performance studies approach on persona concentrates attention on the creative activity of the performer, King does not naturalize agency in the creativity of the performer. Instead he objectivistically shows that the capacity to claim creativity, or other forms of artistic authority, are crucial for ultimately consolidating autonomy for the performer.

Both the objectivistic analysis (King) and the phenomenal analysis (Auslander) arrive at the term persona – indicating commodified performativity as economic capacity in the first case, or direct, substantial agency in the second. With their respective epistemological groundings in objectivist realism and radical constructivism, these analytical approaches of persona emerge as either self-attributed, reflexive identity (Auslander 2006) or as commodified performance/tivity (King 1987). This contradictory usage of the term persona underscores the fact that language, including academic, conceptual language is neither a neutral nor an objective tool, but is invariably informed by the scholar’s underlying attitude of either supporting the subjective agency of individual performers or the collective interests which stand against an objective agency of the cultural industry.

*Berlin, 2009*

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**Persona – reprise: one false etymology**

Postscript – 2012

I reproduce the article above exactly as I would have published it in December 2009. So many things have happened since then… allow me to recall some of the more significant events:

During a supervision session at university, a professor suggested that presenting research in the form of an encyclopaedia entry focussing on etymological provenances is an inauspicious approach; it is a device often used by early stage students, (i.e. not to be used in a published dissertation text). I have since learned, that indeed, the encyclopaedia article is a text form that, with its apparently ‘rigorous writing’ style, often obscures a ‘basic vagueness’ (Borges 1999:69). I realized that in my encyclopaedia entry I had worked out contradictory usages of one term – persona – and that, rather than obscuring a basic vagueness in knowledge, I had decidedly exposed the performativity of knowledge. Through this I had become rather interested in intensifying and exposing knowledge as performance and was slowly embracing the idea of writing as performance.

In March 2011, during my regular visits to Berlin’s Staatsbibliothek, I found a book (Mohr 2001:26), which proposed a use of the term persona, which stemmed from a very different etymology – one that by now had long been declared ‘false’. Interested in the performance of the written word, I decided to add a few pages as an additional subchapter to my fictional encyclopaedia entry. I present it here from the meta-perspective of the current state of knowledge as a ‘false’ etymology:
8. History

A further etymology derives ‘persona’ from Latin ‘personare’ (to sound through). It first appears in antiquity in Aulus Gellius (Gellius V, 7), who cites a 1st century B.C. work ‘De Origine Vocabulorum’, in which the grammatician Gavius Bassus derives the word persona (mask) from personare (to sound through). This etymology is then passed on, appearing for example in Boethius’ sixth century text ‘Contra Eutychen 3’ (Boethius 1973).

Having long been under suspicion, this etymology was finally declared false in the early 20th century, on account of the variance in the ‘o’-vowel pronunciation between the spoken persona and personare. Nonetheless, this etymology of ‘sounding through’ has made its way into contemporary terminological histories (see Mohr 2001:26).

The persistence of this particular etymology may be rooted in the fact that Bassus had not only written a text ‘proving’ the term’s origin linguistically but had also provided a cultural-technical explanation for the link between persona and personare; he based his etymology on an alleged voice amplification property of theatre masks themselves which would have allowed actors to acoustically project their voices further into the audience. The grammatician Bassus was aiming solely to an explication of a word, yet his (false) theory of the voice amplification was avidly cited and disseminated — fulfilling the need to explain how the actors of Antiquity were able to make themselves understood in theatres with audience capacities of 20,000 or more.

Acoustically, an amplifying effect of a head-enclosing mask with a small mouth opening is not possible (Dingeldein (1890)1975:18). Voice amplification through external technologies has in fact only existed since the invention of the megaphone in the 17th century, and did not find widespread use until the 20th century and the invention of the microphone and loudspeaker (Göttert 1998:12,347ff.). What is then the appeal of this etymology that makes cultural historians envisage ancient Greek voice amplification technologies? There must be weighty cultural forces at work.

Although today the notion of a person bound to an inner self is undergoing erosion, for much of history the concept of the person was linked to the idea of Geist (spirit); first moulded by Christianity in late Antiquity, and subsequently shaped by the philosophical concept of the person as spirit-participating individual (geistbegabtes Einzelwesen, Halder/Müller 1988:228). The spirit has always played the immaterial counterpart (pneuma) of an exterior material carrier — even after its transfer into the secular concepts of reason and sense (Koch/Krämer 1997:9). The notion of interiority of the person is closely intertwined with the notion

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95 The relevant passage in Gellius (V 7) can be found in Dingeldein ((1890)1975:17): ‘Lepide mehercules et scite Gavius Bassus in libris quos de origine vocabulorum composit, unde appellata persona sit, interpretatur; a personando enim id vocabulum factum esse coniectat. Nam: caput, inquit, et os cooperatione personae tectum unique unaque tantum vocis emittendae via per pervium, quoniam non vaga neque diffusaet, in unum tantummodo extitum collectam coactamque vocem ciet (et) magis claros canorosque sonitus facit. Quoniam igitur indumentum illud oris clarescere et resonare vocem facit, ob eam causam persona dicta est, a littera propter vocabuli formam productore.’


97 On the reception of the alleged acoustical effect of antique actor’s masks see Dingeldein ((1890)1975).
of the immateriality of the spirit. Therefore, the concept of a person as external mask allowing the inner spirit to sound through (Lat. personare) conformed tidily to the idea of the inwardness of intellectual life.

The deduction from the amplifying masks linked the persona with a medium, which we today know to have always been ambivalent: the (human) voice. What made the etymology so compelling was its complicity with a notion of the voice as revealing an inner being and a ‘natural’ and untechnologized primary medium of communication. Yet the voice itself, even under ‘natural’ conditions, is today considered not a neutral tool but a medium which brings its own material parameters into play; pitch, timbre and volume are significant features of the voice, supported by the dramatical tools of mimicry and gesture on the part of the voice-accompanying body (Göttert 2003:13).

That voice is itself already bound to medial carriers was made evident once electronic media had acted on it in various ways and exposed its mediality. This evidence has informed 20th century theory and contributed to a materialist and linguistic turn, and later, a media turn in the humanities (Koch/Krämer 1997:10ff.). Thus the exteritoriality and physical-medial aspect of Geist/spirit came into focus and linguistic and technical media have since been considered apriori to reasoning and understood to form our technologies of the self.
Truthfully presenting ‘sounding-through’ as a false etymology of persona and exposing the culture-historical reasons for its credulous acceptance is one option. But how could a scholar tactically include such falsities and the critical knowledge that can be gained by them in her/his knowledge practice? An account on the (pop) music persona informed by contemporary critical practice would not discredit the ‘sounding-through’-theory as merely a ‘pseudo’-etymology but learn from the linguistic plurality that such an ‘alternative’ etymology presents. If scholarly analysis takes the persona not only as an object or phenomenon to observe but understands itself as a performance (enabled by linguistic and technical media), what (new) forms of writing and scholarly practice does this require?

One year after the above mentioned supervision session at university, I had stopped investigating proven etymologies and had attuned myself to the power of false ones instead. I had the opportunity to present my research again, this time with my study group. I hyperbolically used the authoritative writing style of encyclopaedias to deliberately and openly mock the faith vested in academic (reference) works. Up until this point I had believed that one could use such a satirical voice only in live situations. I was surprised to hear from my music colleagues that, beginning in the 20th century, music reference works such as encyclopaedias and dictionaries had also sometimes included so-called ‘Nihilartikels’ – incorrect entries on fictitious ‘subjects’, deliberately submitted by venturous authors or even by editorial staff themselves. David Fallows (2001) has surveyed them in an entry on ‘Spoof Articles’ in the New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians 7 (2001), and thereby replaces false articles that have circulated and were printed in the New Grove 6 (1980). Fallows (2001) speculates on the motivation of their authors; amongst these fake entries biographical articles are the most frequent, probably because the writing style of
biographies is often literary and their grand narrative encompassing a small factual basis is deceptively easy to imitate. Yet also it might be an extraordinary motivation for someone to submit and see a spoof article printed since, after its disclosure, it reveals not only the universalist ideology of neutral and objectivist encyclopaedia language as such, but also the performative character of ‘personality’ itself – the fictitious person’s personality as much as the encyclopaedia author’s her/himself. In historical music reference books one finds, for example, articles on the fictitious ‘Otto Jägermeier’ (see Gaub 2003), ‘Guglielmo Baldini’, ‘Dag Henrik Erum-Hellerup’ or P.D.Q. Bach (Fallows 2001). With such a fake entry about a fake person, the text’s author or subject not only generates an apparently factual ‘object’ of the text, but also performs or comes into being in the text itself. Musicologists producing spoof articles for a music dictionary not only criticize a disputable review system or the superficiality of knowledge presented in encyclopaedias (which in turn might put the musicologists’ own rigorous academic work in a better light). It can be argued that these articles also serve to deconstruct precisely these musicologists’ own subject positions and make the performative and medial nature of the self apparent; music reference books are written for an academic readership, and the entries and articles always conclude with the contributors’ names or initials. Presenting oneself as a trickster to one’s academic peers destabilizes musicologist authority in several dimensions as this not only puts the rhetoric of academic texts in general on display but also calls into question the assumed coherence of the academic (author) subject.

(For now) the fake entry provides a promising approach to quasi-objectivist research – to be further discussed in the next chapter. However, I have resisted the temptation to produce such a fake entry in this chapter myself. Although the references to (rare) local publications in German which are only accessible at
Berlin's Staatsbibliothek in the previous *History* subchapter might sound outrageously fictive, they are in fact well documented. I hereby assure you of this.
3. Laboratory Case II: Ursula Bogner and performance research

With the shift in my perspective from ‘performance’ as object of study to performance as method of study I decided to engage more actively with the musical projects ‘under study’. The following two chapters are the result of a collaboration with my laboratory case project ‘Ursula Bogner’. Since discovering Ursula Bogner and the first compilation album of her works in 2008, I decided to make her one of my ‘laboratory cases’.

Fig. 11: Badge ‘Ursula Bogner’, faitiche, Badge 32 mm

The interdisciplinary oeuvre of the late German electronic musician Ursula Bogner was released on compilation albums (2008 and 2011), exhibited in galleries (since 2009) and enacted in performances – although in her lifetime she had made no attempts to publicize her work. I began visiting exhibitions and live performances of her works conducted by Jan Jelinek and his music colleagues. Because of my interest in her case and the considerable amount of fieldwork I had already conducted, in 2010 Jelinek asked me to contribute a text to the extended liner notes (book) accompanying a second compilation of her works. An
extended version of the next subchapter (Ch. 3.1) was printed in the book Ursula Bogner. Sonne = Blackbox (Menrath 2011a). I also contributed a modified version of chapter 3.2 (under the title From Fake to Collaborative Imagination: Alternative Historiographies with Ursula Bogner (Menrath 2013)) to the catalogue of the exhibition ShePOP. Frauen. Macht. Musik!, on the role of women in the history and culture of popular music. Ursula Bogner was not included in the ShePOP exhibition (March - Sept. 2013 rock’n’pop museum Gronau/Germany), but in the catalogue text I imagined her inclusion as an alternative historiography of female pop music and as an intervention in the workings of the cultural institution of the museum.

Performance ethnography advocates new forms of writing and staging scholarly knowledge practice. Up to this point in my text, tactical performance has been identified as belonging to this new form of critical practice; first by describing a musico-artistic investigation of persona construction and then by discussing the applicability of tactics in academic projects. While the excursion following Ch. 2.1 into the format of encyclopaedia entries provided an example of how such tactics can be enacted in scholarly writing, and the publications of modified versions of Ch. 3.1 and Ch. 3.2 represent new tactical stagings of scholarly knowledge, in the remaining part of this study I can and will not reveal the tactics of my personal collaboration with the Ursula Bogner project. Instead, in the following I will ‘name’ and discuss (rather than perform) tactics as a method in academic practice using the example of the laboratory case of Ursula Bogner.

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98 A copy of the book and the music can be found in the appendix (illustrative material).
99 Jelinek first requested an interview with me for the compilation liner notes, which in the form of an email interview may also be found in Ursula Bogner. Sonne = Blackbox (Menrath 2011b).
Projects of tactical performance can take various forms. Moodymann’s tactical performance of the pop music persona and its individualistic undercurrents (Ch. 1), for example, employs the temporality of tactics in the form of the always provisional positionality of an agent. Another form of tactical performance, the tactical inclusion in encyclopaedias or other academic reference books of falsities such as those suggested by the last chapter’s ‘fake entry’, similarly employs temporality in that it aims for an eventual revelation. However, this type of tactical performance entails a different, and specific engagement of the audience: a (temporary) delusion on the part of the audience. Fakes and their temporary delusional effects can be found not only in scholarly but also in artistic practices. The following subchapter (Ch. 3.1) will discuss ‘fake’ in artistic practices. In the field of the arts and in media critique, ‘fake’ has become a kind of ‘catch-all-term’ and a precision of the terminology is urgently needed.

On the other hand, disabusal of delusions (of academic contemporaries and predecessors and lay people) is a common and accepted academic operation of critique. In this tradition of judging critique, knowledge is understood to be produced by the correction of falsities. By contrast, Foucault, through his historical-critical approach, alluded to the relativity of the epistemological frames by which a strip of discourse is evaluated as false or true. With his notion of critical practice Foucault moved away from the judging and towards the self-critical aspects of critique ‘to establish critique as the very practice that exposes the limits of [the] epistemological horizon [within which practices are formed] itself, making the contours of the horizon appear […] in relation to its own limits’ (Butler 2002:217). Within this context of critical practice, the deliberate inclusion of falsities for the sake of ‘exposing the limits’ of a specific epistemological horizon (of, for example, a musicological encyclopaedia) can be justified. By contrast, in judging critique, delusions are disabused in retrospect and not
deliberately perpetrated. In any case, the active production of a delusion – a
deception – poses an ethical dilemma for the scholar. The deceptions instigated
via fake entries about fictive personalities such as mentioned in the last chapter
may be justified by their relative harmlessness for their audience; either the entry
remains unnoticed because nobody actively searches for it, or only inattentive
scholars who are particularly susceptible to the authority of reference books
would be affected and any deeper research would unearth the non-existence of
the personalities under question.

Tactical performances have to take into account the (prospective) reaction of
their specific audience. The last chapter of this study (Ch. 3.2) will therefore
discuss the effects of tactical performances on audiences. In analysing a second
laboratory study from the musical field, the ‘case’ of Ursula Bogner, I will appraise
the tactical inclusion of self-delusions on the part of the audience (as opposed to
deceptions of the audience) in what will be called ‘collaborative imaginations’. A
differentiation between complicit and collaborative practices will help to put this
opposition in perspective.
3.1 Spectacle or transformation? A brief history of the term and (critical) practice of fake

In this chapter, I will engage with the concept of ‘fake’, trace its history, give a short overview of ‘fake’ practices from art to media criticism to pop music and finally arrive at a critical discussion of the transformative potential of these critical practices. In the course of the chapter I will argue that in art and media criticism, respectively, the fake allows divergent strategies of criticism regarding claims to reality to come to the foreground and, in the case of the fake in pop music, both of these strategies are present in varying combinations. In the history of the term that follows, both approaches – from art and media critique – will be explored in their respective contributions to a general concept of fake in pop music. The order of their presentation is not meant to imply a chronological development.

Fake in art

In their shared dimension of deception, the practice of fake bears some similarity to the practice of forgery, and to this day the art forgery is the best researched and documented form of forgery (Reuleke 2006:19f.). Thus, the history of the term and concept of the fake begins in the sphere of art. According to the conventions of modern art, a forgery is a work or artefact with counterfeit origins. Both fake and forgery relate to questions of reality and truth, yet in the context of art one finds an important distinction: the English word ‘fake’ does not primarily denote the counterfeit object itself, but specifically signifies the process of faking – the verb ‘to fake’ meaning to disguise, to feign, to simulate, to make up (Römer 2001:14). To denote something as fake may thus mean that one considers an artwork to be a counterfeit, or, and this is the specific and genuine connotation

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100 While forgeries are by definition related to artefacts (Reulecke 2006:21, Doll 2012:12,23), fakes are concerned with processes (Römer 2001:14). Additionally, unlike hoaxes, fakes employ not only linguistic forms of representation (practical jokes) but also sonic and/or visual ones.
that ‘fake’ gathered in the art context, indicts a deed to be an act of falsification.\footnote{101}

An art ‘fake’ refers to the whole process of faking; the act and not just the artefact.

Besides its emphasis on process, the fake has, in contrast to the forgery, also come to accommodate a positive connotation. With ‘fake’ one regularly refers to a merely temporary deception, while an exposure of the fake as a fake is ‘part of its design from the very beginning’ (Doll 2005:153, TM). And since in a fake, in contrast to the forgery, the unveiling is constitutive (Doll 2005:153, Huth/Volland 1989:vii), the intention to deceive is ultimately of no consequence for its evaluation (Römer 2001:14).\footnote{102} Therefore, the art fake has gained, contrary to the commonly negative usage of the English word ‘fake’, a positive connotation. A fake is an unselfish forgery (Huth/Volland 1989:vii), in that it does not take advantage of the respective historical conventions of art, which it replicates, or at least, the faker does not take advantage personally. Rather, a fake effectively documents their deconstruction. In the following, the fake will be understood as just such a self-reflexive falsification of origins. The fake employs a temporary falsifying for the sake of an eventual disclosure and its ultimate aim is to disturb the implicit regularities of discursive processes. However, as the fake is always also an experimental practice (Doll 2008:252, 2012:72), its liveness and singularity entails that it can have unpredictable effects (Doll 2008:255).

\footnote{101}{The etymology of the word fake is uncertain. ‘Fake’ was reported to be used as a slang term among Londoners in the 19th century (Barnhart (1988:366). While the meaning of the slang verb fake is contested, Ayto (1990:218) sums up its usage as standing ‘for any number of nefarious operations, including beating up and killing’. Its path from lower-class speech to current usage in Standard English is unclear (Barnhart 1988:366). In Standard English it means ‘to produce a fraudulent copy’, which Ayto (1990:218) links to the Germanic root ‘feg’. ‘Feg’ evolved into the German verb ‘fegen’ – to ‘brush, sweep’, but also has ties to the long-obsolete English verb ‘feague’ denoting nefarious operations. The usage of the ‘fake’ as a noun originates in the art world.}

\footnote{102}{I prefer Doll’s definition of fake to Römer’s narrower concept (2001:14, TM), which considers the fake to be ‘an artistic strategy which sees itself as forgery from the start’. However, both refer back to the positive connotation of fake in their definitions. By concentrating on the positive connotation, a different conceptual history is referenced here than that of Dyer (2007:14).}
As a critical demonstration of the conventions of representation, the fake is a tactical operation and appeared as a term in the field of art at a point in time in which the ‘transition from a concept of art as object to art as performative process’ (Brandstetter 1998:424, TM) was also being theorised. In 1973, the treatise ‘The Fake as More, by Cheryl Bernstein’ was published in an American anthology of art theory. With its decidedly positive connotation of fake it characterizes the beginnings of fake’s genuine terminological history (Römer 2001:19). In this treatise the alleged author ‘Cheryl Bernstein’ argues that in a fake ‘[...] by reproducing existing art forms the artist both receives the sanction of his predecessor and at the same time negates the attempt to observe any new formal development, thus shifting the entire phenomenon to a superior, that is, critical, level’ (Duncan 1993:216f.). Thus, the critical potential of the fake lies in its refusal of modernist values such as innovation and progress, and in its refusal to claim authorship of precisely this same critical refusal (the author takes on the name of the predecessor). Consequently, the author ‘Cheryl Bernstein’ was a fiction of the text itself; its ‘real’ author, the art historian Carol Duncan, who had made up not only the author, but also the artist and the exhibit described in the 1973 essay, was only disclosed in 1986. This revelation was followed by a republication of the text in 1993 in a collection of essays by Duncan (1993) and was presumably a reason for the term fake, (denoting a tactic of falsifying epistemological practices for the sake of an ultimate critique) gaining widespread usage in the art world in the 1990s (Römer 2001:13).

105 Duncan significantly expanded the notion of fake towards this epistemological dimension – which forms another contrast to the manual-technically connotated, product-oriented ‘forgery’ (Römer 2001:21). Within her text ‘The fake as More’ (Bernstein/Duncan 1973) this epistemological dimension could yet not be explicitly developed, as in this essay artistic and academic practice correlated (Römer 2001:27) and Duncan had placed the text itself as a ‘fake’ within an art anthology.
**Mimesis – simulation/simulacrum – fake**

The affirmative momentum – the ‘approval’ of what is false – also brings the fake into the vicinity (but only the vicinity) of simulation, which continues the mimetic practice of the visual and performing arts at the level of technological media. Mimesis relates to the imitating, representational dimension of the arts.

Simulation produces – precisely as mimesis does – an impression of reality in the recipients through sensory persuasion. Contrary to mimesis however, simulation does not claim any truth for its representations of reality, rather it is satisfied with the illusory status of its productions. The simulation makes it possible to ‘approve of that which is not’ (Kittler 1991:200, TM), namely by imitating the mechanisms of representation themselves.

The terminology of simulation, widely applied in the 1980s and 1990s, when the disappearance of the real in the wake of new technologies was being proclaimed (see Baudrillard (1981)1999), indicated not only a rejection of positivisms but also entailed a radical relativism: in the context of an overall non- or hyperreality a distinction between true and false becomes irrelevant, and simulation accomplishes a sensory persuasion of its recipients without referring to an objective truth or reality.

In this regard, the fake, although working with simulating practices, differs from simulation. Like simulation, the fake is concept-historically located in the postmodern and poststructuralist critique of metaphysical equations of reality and truth (Römer 2001:270f., Voropai 2007:4). But while the use of the terminology of ‘simulation’ usually provides a generalizing, abstracting critique of metaphysics, the terminology of fake is not deployed in order to question an essential truth. Instead, the fake provides a deconstructive critique of truth-claims as being always field-specific, and delusions as situated and specific to observers. In the
case of the fake, it is the indication of truth as always individual, time- and place-
specific, which provides critique. In contrast to simulation, fake does not
altogether leave behind the reference to truth and the oppositions of true and
false but functions and circulates precisely and only within them (Doll 2012:11).
The ontological questions raised by ‘simulation’ (Baudrillard (1981)1999) give
way to the epistemological and discourse-specific questions raised with ‘fake’.

A theoretical background for fake practices has been provided through the
discourse on the notion of the simulacrum (e.g. Deleuze (1967)1983, Foucault
1977). Deleuze’s positive notion of the ‘simulacrum’ – a phantasm that ‘includes
within itself the differential point of view [with] the spectator [being] made part of
the simulacrum’, and which ‘contains a positive power’ by ‘negat[ing] both original
and copy, both model and reproduction’ (Deleuze 1983:49,53, IO) – provided a
theoretical avenue for the practical implementations of fake. The critical practice
of fake takes into account that ‘truth’ is not universal but time- and discourse-
specific, and, in contrast to radically relativist positions, sees its critical capacity
not in evaluating manifold perspectives as being equally true, but in ‘expos[ing]
the limits of [their] epistemological horizon’ (Butler 2002:217). The critical practice
of fake amounts to a form of self-critique that is not interested in an objective
evaluation, but in describing the discursive and epistemological conditions for
several forms of ‘empirical truth[s]’ (Doll 2012:11) defined by various times and
places.

Although the term itself had yet to come into widespread usage, the fake as a
self-reflexive operation as described above had been established in the cultural
field of the arts since the 1970s. Here, the fake was used to criticize the dogma of
originality in modern art. It was particularly directed at the notion of artists working
mimetically and the traditional differentiation between original and copy. In art, a
fake is evidence of the continuing presence of an ideology of the original, but it is
also a catalyst for its dissolution in the postmodern era. Among the fake strategies of re-photography, appropriation art and other conceptual art practices that are critical of media and institutions\textsuperscript{106}, the sensory persuasion process of mimesis and simulation is deconstructed through mimicry.

However, the fake does not meet the criterion of positivity of critical practices. By its ultimate exposure and rejection of a specific discourse practice, the fake remains a form of critique that is based on negation, and negative critiques require a platform for their staging. The fake attains a platform through the imitation and subsequent rejection of some specific discourse. In the case of the art fake, this may be the discourse, which still upholds a difference between original and copy. In order to expose such a discourse, art fakes from appropriation art and conceptual art often do not fully conceal their falsification, but signal it textually, so that a careful examination of the artwork may gradually reveal the fake. This may be called the temporal and scenographic dimension of fake – crucial for fake operations in media criticism – the field, in which, along with art, the fake is most often employed.\textsuperscript{107}

\textit{Fake in media criticism}

As a media-critical practice fake is utilized by art and activist groups such as communication guerrillas (e.g. autonome a.f.r.i.k.a.gruppe 1997:65ff., Huth/Volland 1989), pranksters (e.g. Re/Search 1987, Yes Men 2004) and culture jammers (e.g. Dery 1993, Lasn 2005). For these groups the succinct formula for fake is: ‘Fake = falsification + revelation/denial/confession’ (autonome a.f.r.i.k.a.gruppe (1997:69), TM).\textsuperscript{108} An established pattern of media-based

\textsuperscript{106} For an overview and additional literature regarding fakes in art, see Römer (2001).
\textsuperscript{107} Römer (2001), whose conceptualization of fake I have largely followed up to this point does not explore this temporal dimension. He concerns himself primarily with open plagiarisms (such as appropriation art works). In the field of pop music this temporal dimension is of utmost importance and it will be included in my conceptualization of fake via Martin Doll’s work (2005, 2008, 2012) on media critical fake projects.
\textsuperscript{108} For an overview of media-critical fakes see autonome a.f.r.i.k.a.gruppe (1997).
representation of an institutional proclamation is imitated in tone, style and subject but is eventually revealed to be a ‘fake’. Like the art fake, media-critical fakes practice a critique of the epistemological horizon of ‘representation’; they attack the notion that media (artistic or mass media) merely depict reality instead of shaping it. In this respect, media-critical fakes relay their impetus to enlighten more openly than the art fakes do. In mass media, there is no better story than an investigative scoop – the quintessence of journalism’s rationalistic-informative imperative. And, even more so than the illusion that appeals to the senses, it is the cognitive deception that is central to the media-critical fake: subjects are deceived, on account of their entanglement in certain discourses and epistemologies their expectations lead to exigency. The complicity of the recipients is appealed to not only with sensory delusions, but also with the suggestive power of argumentations, which subdue the cognisant subject.

Thus, to accomplish its aim, every media fake requires, on the part of the recipients, a recognition of deception on two levels: a deception on the level of the senses and a deception on the level of the recipient’s psyche. Yet who is the audience and who provides the platform for such a recognition? The receiving subject can reflect on its state only after the fact – after the moment of ‘unwitting deception’ (Grau 2002:23) – or through comparison with an ‘other’ space of socio-cultural discourse. Therefore, in order to recognise not only the overwhelming of the senses (by mimesis) but also of the subject’s psyche (by suggestion), a medium which choreographs time and space is necessary; the falsification within the fake has both a temporal and a dramaturgical or scenographical quality.

109 With its critique of mimetic as well as suggestive methods, the fake accomplishes a paradigmatic deconstruction of immersive media technologies which require precisely this kind of interplay between mimesis and suggestion (cf. Volmar 2003:6, Grau 2002:22ff.)

In contrast to forgery, the fake actually contains the script for its own exposure: an 'immediate reality' is falsified by the temporary adoption of a 'naive' notion of reality, and which is ultimately revealed as a mask. Yet it is only from a distance that recognition can take place. To this end, the fake requires differences between notions of reality that can be addressed either historically or socio-discursively. Fakes operating in a long-term perspective (such as Carol Duncan’s art fake) can draw on historically varying notions of reality linked to time-specific discourses and their implicit epistemologies regarding ‘true and false’ (see infra Ch. 3.2). Media fakes, by contrast, work with the script of a rapid revelation scandal and employ synchronous socio-discursive differences in epistemologies and notions of reality, which manifest themselves in differing mediality competences. For the moment, it can be summarized here that the (social) variability of mediality competence plays a decisive role in media fake tactics, since the subject's disillusionment, which is central to the media-critical fake, can only arise from socio-discursively different notions of mediated reality.

**Fake in pop music**

The reconstitution of a recipient's psychic-subjective dissociation is as integral to the fake as the deconstructive mimicry of sensory-mimetic media technology; however, these are emphasized differently in the media-critical fake and the art fake. While the media-critical fake employs suggestive technologies to critique epistemic certainties, the art fake is concentrated on sensory-mimetic technologies. And what exactly would a fake in pop music be, in a field in which suggestive and mimetic media technologies have always been closely interconnected?

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111 Here, 'mediality competence' should be understood as the ability to critically examine reality production on the basis of its mediality. Beside this reception competence, active knowledge of media and their design would also be part of a more comprehensive 'media competence'.

112 Compare Simanowski (2001) inferring a media-pedagogical dimension of fake.
Pop music has consistently implemented notions of mediated reality. At the level of the auditory, the listener has always been confronted with simulations: Recording, amplifying and broadcasting technologies construct virtual acoustic spaces, virtual continuums come into being through (tape) montage, and more recently digital music distribution technology increased the availability of acoustic and electronically produced sound (e.g. Grossmann 1991:100). The material objects of pop music, sound recording media, are so pervaded by technological mediation that a reception based on the aesthetic criterion of 'originality' seems nearly inconceivable. Likewise, the fact that pop music adheres to the rules of the market economy is not news to its recipients, and therefore neither the fact of technological nor promotional mediation in pop music seems worthy of a fake.

Subcultural fakes

Nonetheless, there are platforms for fakes in pop music. Essentially, the notion that musical reality is not represented, but rather constructed by the media, has long since established itself in the world of pop music production. The reception side, however, lagged behind until the early 1990s (Grossmann 1991) – less so on the auditory level, but rather at the level of image and promotion, wherein a direct correlation between the endorser of a musical product and its producer was still strongly assumed; the scandal surrounding Milli Vanilli is one piece of evidence of this (now historical) discrepancy (Grossmann 1991). The Franco-German pop group’s international career ended with a scandal in 1990 when it was revealed that the duo had lip-synched all their live performances and not sung on their recordings themselves – culminating in the retraction of a recently awarded Grammy113. Still, it was not until the mid-1990s that a 'media musical

113 The Milli Vanilli scandal might actually represent the watershed regarding the values of authenticity in popular music; it was notably not their actual, (young) audience that was ‘upset about their lip-synching’ but the ‘fan’s parents and parental surrogates (such as the representatives who called for legislation and the attorneys who filled consumer fraud suits) who were disturbed’ (Auslander 1999:85).
model of reality’ (Grossmann 1997:248, TM) gained traction for a larger public.

Prior to the 1990s, the fake had been most definitely in use as a tactic of
differentiation in those subcultures that mixed productive and receptive practices
and had abandoned the representational paradigm.

Generally speaking, the discursive institution that is addressed and challenged by
pop music fakes is that of (musical) authorship. In performative and theatrical
contexts it is not ‘originality’ (of a pop music artefact or of the sound text) that
constitutes the defining value but ‘authenticity’ (Brandstetter 1998:433).

Authenticity relates to the notion of the author, and accordingly, fakes in pop
music frequently crystallize around the author subject. Thus, the personality of
the (recording) artist is the default staging ground for fakes in pop music.

Since it was primarily subcultural figures who strategically used fakes in pre-
1990s pop music, the dramaturgy for their exposure was not a didactic scandal,
but rather a microstructuring masquerade: projects such as Hybrid Kids114, Silicon
Teens115, Claire Thomas & Susan Vezey116 and Damenbart117 did not follow a
script of spectacular unmasking of ‘true’ identities behind artist pseudonyms, but
instead differentiated their audience on a micro level. The suggestive power of
these projects affected the different strata of the audience with varying levels of
intensity – with responses ranging from face value acceptance to suspicion of
fakery. Many fake projects were only fully ‘clarified’ in the early 2000s, often in
the course of the original recordings being re-issued. Thus in pre-1990s pop

114 Supposedly a compilation of various local musicians from Peabody, Kansas; actually a
production by Morgan Fisher, keyboardist for Mott the Hoople: released in 1979 on Cherry Red
115 Fictitious New Wave quartet created by the founder of Mute Records, Daniel Miller, with
116 Fictitious duo that had released a cassette (Snatch Tapes) in 1980, and shortly after landed a
track on the Cherry Red compilation Perspectives and Distortion. The planned LP did not
materialise after the fake was uncovered: Claire Thomas and Susan Vezey were an invention and
production of Snatch Tape’s founder, Philip Sanderson. In 2002 the cassette recording was re-
released on CD by Anomalous Records.
117 Impressionen 71 was the album released on DOM Elchklang in 1989 with supposedly long lost
material by the fictitious krautrock band Damenbart – actually a production by the new wave
musicians Hirsche nicht aufs Sofa/HNAS, re-released in 2003 by Psychedelic Pig.
music, subcultural fakes served first and foremost to cultivate niches – to channel and differentiate an audience. As with art fakes, these subcultural pop music fakes employed sensory-mimetic technologies to simultaneously reveal and conceal information from the audience, while the media fake principle of temporal deception was employed primarily to determine a project's audience by its specific medially competence.

The marketing fake

Since the 1990s notions of mediated reality have also established themselves in the reception side and it has become apparent that major differences between the models of reality on the production and reception sides of pop music can no longer be determined. In addition, the concept of a critical subculture unravelled within a ‘mainstream of the minorities’ (Holert/Terkessidis 1996). However, since the fake does not aim to deceive its own audience but always an other recipient, the subcultural fake terminates within the mainstream of the minorities. Here, the mirror of an ‘other’ audience, by which the fake's disillusioning aspect could be credibly demonstrated to its actual, 'intended' audience, disappears.

Nevertheless, in the 1990s the operation of fake in pop music reappeared in a new form as a singular marketing instrument, whereby its dramaturgical dimension was now no longer used for niche cultivation but was instead redirected towards generating maximum attention for pop debuts. For example, in 2006 Scottish newcomer singer-songwriter Sandi Thom established her identity online as a D.I.Y. artist, only to soon afterwards garner media attention with revelations about her PR-fabricated identity and the ensuing debate about her authenticity, which in turn earned her an album contract with Sony/RCA. At the time, the audience felt deceived by the help that Thom had received in her

118 'Was Sandi Thom's effortless rise just too good to be true?' In: The Independent. 30/05/2006. http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/music/news/was-sandi-thoms-effortless-rise-just-too-good-to-be-true-480288.html [13/07/2009].
‘search for identity’ from a PR agency. Thom ‘had to’ admit to receiving professional help with her marketing – a series of supposedly self-made videos of ‘basement’ performances, uploaded to the Internet by the PR agency. Nevertheless, she hit a nerve with her prospective fans and was one step ahead of the journalists with her media-cultural ethics. Her continued success was based on a revised credibility: it was no longer the integrity of her public personality but her sheer skill as a musician that was now invoked – a point which presumably would not have been of interest without the suspicion of a fake in the first place. ‘I’m not a fake’, she argued, ‘and look at my band – they’re not fakes’. In Thom’s case the unmasking of the supposedly transparent and democratic online media as part of a PR machine triggered a credibility crisis out of which she emerged with a new aura formed by a new (but actually perennial) criterion of authenticity: musical ability.

Another example of a fake as a marketing instrument is the case of the New York Afrobeat group Daktaris. In 1998, their debut album Soul Explosion was presented as a re-release of original recordings by a Nigerian band from the 1970s. Some months later, after revealing themselves to be a modern, retro band, no backlash ensued – they had won over their fans as Afrobeat revivalists – but now with a new name, the Antibalas Afrobeat Orchestra. In this case too, the revision of authenticity criteria was crucial. Through their status as an Afrobeat band cultural authenticity was first invoked, only to ultimately be

122 The change in name may have perhaps stemmed from a personell change.
123 Platinum Weird, whose album Make Believe in 2006 received much media attention, was another marketing fake – a fictitious band, supposedly from the 1970s, whose masterminds and actual performers, Dave Steward and Kara Dio Guardi, had been established figures in the music and entertainment business for decades.
outweighed by the fake operation's promise of medial authenticity. A fake promises authenticity by revising discursive conventions and their respective epistemological categories and dichotomies of true and false. However, the dilemma of any media fake is that this revision of authenticity can itself only ever be negotiated within mass media and that any revelations remain a mass medial construct (Doll 2012:363); the medium can never fully reflect itself and therefore a media fake such as the pop music fake cannot achieve a media critique in an ‘empathical sense’ (Doll 2012:363).

Far removed from the aims of emphatical critique, marketing fakes use recursivity instead to provide a background of suspicion against which newly emerging personalities can prove their sincerity. So, while until the late 1980s fake personae served to authenticate a ‘true’, already established subcultural identity (mostly as short-lived side projects of established artists), since the 1990s fake personae have instead functioned as spring boards for emerging artists.124 Furthermore, the pop music-marketing fake relies on the temporality and socio-cultural scenography of the media fake insofar as it employs spectacular falsifications of other audience's mediality competences. The pop music-marketing fake uses these schisms within the audience in order to create a credible image of an emerging music artist personality.

At this point, the ambiguities of the (critical) practice of the fake become apparent: because an ‘other’ is required to function as medium of reflexion, the implementation of a fake brings with it the risk of reproducing the exclusivity of the very knowledge formations being criticized125 — regardless of whether the fake

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124 Prior to the 1990s fakes already had marketing potential in pop music. See for example Greil Marcus's ‘The Masked Marauders’ hoax: his 1969 review of a fictitious album of a fictitious supergroup in the music magazine Rolling Stone generated so much media attention that an actual recording was finally made and successfully marketed by Warner Bros. (under the label name Diety Records). Marcus’s hoax, however, was not intended to be a marketing trick.

125 Hal Foster (1999:118) diagnoses a similar danger for appropriation art, which he describes as a combination of deconstructionist and ideology-critical strategies.
perpetrator’s intent is to educate a ‘naive’ audience in media competence or, as with the marketing fake, simply utilise the ‘other audience’ as unwitting extras.

**Conclusion Ch. 3.1**

After differentiating fake from forgery, in this chapter I investigated the operation of fake, whose positive connotation is due to the generally unselfish, critical intentions of its perpetrators (in contrast to the rather selfish, often commercial intentions of forgerers). Fakes employ a temporary falsification for the sake of an eventual disclosure and the capacity of the fake revelation to expose epistemological certainties that are implicit in specific discursive formations qualifies the fake as an acutely self-critical form of critical practice. This chapter followed the development, from the 1970s onward, of the concept of fake in the art field, where the strategy of sensory delusion is central, and in the field of media criticism, where suggestive technologies are employed to effect the course a fake takes once it is initiated: temporarily imitating a certain discursive convention for the sake of eventually revealing the genuinely imitative structure of discursive norms.

In pop music fakes, both strategies – sensory-mimetic and suggestive technologies – are employed. Pop music fakes appeal to the complicity of recipients not only on the level of sensory delusion, but also on the level of psychic-subjective deception. For at least a brief moment, the complicity of the audience must remain involuntary in order for the fake to operate beyond the level of a sensual delusion on the level of a deception of the receiving cognisant subject. The dramaturgy of any fake includes a moment – however fleeting – when subjects are deceived and when their expectations, stemming from their entanglements in certain discourses, lead to exigency. Because the receiving subject can reflect on the state of being deluded only after the fact – after the

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126 Compare Simanowski (2001) regarding the media-pedagogical dimension of fake.
moment of ‘unwitting delusion’ – or through the comparison with an ‘other’ space of socio-cultural discourse –, the fake requires a scenography not only of time but also of socio-cultural space. Fake tactics engage with differing levels of mediality competence and address them either historically or socio-culturally. The moment of insight arrives when one acknowledges one’s ignorance by thinking: ‘How could I have formerly been so naïve?’ or ‘How can they (the socio-culturally other) be so naïve’? Consequently, recipients either retrospectively observe their own behaviour or there emerges a division of the audience: the actual audience of the fake – those who ‘get’ the fake – vs. the other audience – those who ‘don’t get’ the fake. The actual recipients of the fake themselves become the observers of the other audience and it is precisely this mechanism that characterizes media-critical fakes.

While the effectiveness of fakes in general hinges on the variability of mediality competence within an audience, the (subcultural) pop music fakes which were perpetrated until the 1990s (when a clear division between subculture and mainstream still allegedly attained) employed the limited music-medial knowledge of a mainstream audience not for the purpose of provoking a didactic scandal, but in order to differentiate an audience on a micro-level and to foster niche-structures. But as such differences in mediality competence became increasingly less apparent within the technologically advanced field of pop music, the practice of the subcultural fake was largely abandoned by the 1990s. However, some elements of fake tactics were soon revived as marketing tools: the fake revelation used for a revision of authenticity in order to create an instant history for newly emerging artists. No longer a tactic for temporarily falsifying and eventually exposing epistemological certainties, the cultivation of fake as a tool for marketing necessitates a deeper inquiry of fake’s critical dimension. By ostentatiously critiquing specific authorship conventions, a pop music fake always
partially re-stages authorship – echoing Derrida’s insight that performance can never fully escape representation (see supra Ch. 2). Yet, the medium’s inability to ever fully reflect on itself is not the only deficiency of media fakes. The fact that media fakes (including pop music fakes) employ parts of the audience as their medium of reflection seems to me to be even more problematic.

Although the practice of fake may criticize a mainstream discourse about music and its specific epistemic regime of, for example, naturalistic representation, it does not effectively transgress it. First, by its very own operations of revelation the fake (re-)invokes a concept of knowledge representation as disclosure of (absolute) information – a stark incongruity with the relativity of epistemological horizons that it basically promotes. Second, and more importantly, because fakes require ‘extras’ – involuntary accomplices either from the group of unwitting journalists or the receiving audience – in order to expose the limitations of their epistemic certainties and prove a point, they basically leave everyone in their place – the critic, the actual and the other audience. That the complicity of the ‘extras’ is involuntary does not necessarily point to an ethical problem in the distinctly ludic field of pop music, but to a pedagogical and didactical problem: as soon as the unwitting participants (the other audience) are exposed as such (to the actual audience), further engagement of these involuntary participants becomes highly unlikely. This negativity sets fakes, which acutely meet the criteria of self-criticality and object-field-specificity, apart from genuine critical practices. The exclusory socio-cultural scenography of fakes contradicts a concrete transformatory potential. An analysis of the concrete transformatory effects of fakes should include, beyond a transformation of practices of knowledge representation, its effects on the practices of knowledge production: does a fake transform the way in which musical knowledge – practical or theoretical – is produced, and does it enlarge the sphere of participants in
knowledge production?

Since the 2000s, descendants of the practice of spectacularly falsifying epistemological reliabilities of the fake have emerged. The next chapter will discuss a tactical critical practice, which engages with the concrete transformatory effects for its specific audience and produces alternative realities in an imaginative and collaborative reconstruction with the audience.
3.2 From fake to collaborative imagination: the laboratory ‘case’ of Ursula Bogner

In the first week of November 2011, an entry on Ursula Bogner appeared on the German-language Wikipedia website. It stated: ‘since 2008 two record albums have been released under the name of Ursula Bogner on Jan Jelinek’s record label [f]aitiche’. With this entry in the ‘free encyclopaedia’ the phenomenon ‘Ursula Bogner’ became part of common knowledge – or at least part of the German speaking commons. But what’s so ‘common’ about knowledge anyway? The collaboratively produced Wikipedia does not have a sole, authoritative editor and its peer review system is arguably ineffective. Some Wikipedia proponents may maintain that the ‘collaborative nature of the apparatus means that the right data tends to emerge, ultimately, even if there is turmoil temporarily as dichotomous viewpoints violently intersect’ (Holkins 2005). Yet what is the ‘right data’ in the case of Bogner, who since the release of her first album in 2008 has been the subject of media discussion around the question of whether she had been a ‘real amateur musician’ or is the invention of Berlin electronic music producer Jan Jelinek? How does one know about Ursula Bogner?

128 Jerry Holkins himself mocks such a position in Penny Arcade see http://www.penny-arcade.com/2005/12/16
She is registered in Wikipedia by name; there are several variegated private photographs.

Fig. 12: Cover image Ursula Bogner. Pluto hat einen Mond/Pluto has a moon, 7Inch, 2009

The current state of information about Bogner on wikipedia.de is a summary of her appearance in various media. Yet where do all the ‘dichotomous viewpoints’ vanish to after the ‘temporary turmoil’? Can there be one single representation of the shifting knowledge about a historical person given the contradictory empirical evidence of her existence? And what about the disparate areas of knowledge (pop culture trivia vs. investigative knowledge from journalism and academia), can the situatedness of knowledge areas, their social or historical contextuality (Berger/Luckmann 1966, Foucault (1966)1970) and their potentially contradictory epistemologies be made accessible by a hyperlinked website entry? The answer is no – and this is precisely where Ursula Bogner becomes interesting. Instead of a distanced critique of the accuracy of, or authority for, ‘data’ representation, the case of Ursula Bogner delivers a post-foundational and positive form of self-critical knowledge production, engaging as

a means of articulation (Butler 2002:22) that which Foucault (2007:56) called ‘fiction’, and what will be addressed here as ‘imagination’. The following chapter will engage with this concrete ‘laboratory case’ of critical practice, the self-critical impetus of which leads neither to solipsist self-inspection of reasoning (philosophical self-critique) nor to an expository negation of concrete historically or socio-culturally situated epistemologies (fake). Instead, this case produces critical knowledge of pop music celebrity as a collaborative and also experimental practice. Despite the incalculable effects such practices have, I will risk a representation of this laboratory case here in a written form.

For me, Ursula Bogner has existed since 2008, when she became one of my ‘laboratory case’ studies. The first Bogner release is *Recordings 1969-1988* from 2008, the booklet of which presents the following biography as a matter of fact:

![Fig. 13: Liner notes, Ursula Bogner. Recordings 1969-1988, faitiche 01cd, 2008](image)

Electronica artist Ursula Bogner was born in 1946 and raised in Dortmund. After finishing her studies in pharmacy in Berlin she worked for pharmaceutical giant Schering. Apart from her career she developed a ‘keen interest in electronic music’ and ‘throughout her early twenties, she followed the activities of Cologne-based ‘Studio für elektronische Musik’, attended seminars by studio founder Herbert Eimert, exhibited great enthusiasm for Musique Concrète and, later on,
shared her children’s enthusiasm for British New Wave pop’ (Jelinek 2008:2). Her obsession with electronic music ‘drove her to build her own studio for extensive recording and experimentation [...] in the parental home’ (Jelinek 2008:2). ‘Nevertheless, Ursula Bogner never involved herself in any scene, never made her music public’ (Jelinek 2008:2). How, then, do we know about Ursula Bogner at all? ‘By chance’, Jan Jelinek met Ursula Bogner’s son, Sebastian Bogner on an airplane journey; ‘[t]he usual small talk soon led to the topic’ (Jelinek 2011:2) of his late mother Ursula, who – it turns out – had also dabbled in electronic music. Sebastian Bogner was ‘generous enough’ to grant Jelinek access to her tape reels and supplied him ‘with invaluable insights into his mother’s life’ (Jelinek 2008:3). Since then, Jelinek has investigated Bogner’s archive by periodically releasing her recordings and performing her compositions with fellow musicians, as well as organizing retrospectives of Bogner’s interartistic oeuvre in art galleries.
Ursula Bogner is the missing female link in the history of German electronic music. She fits neatly into an international line of innovative female electronic music composers such as Delia Derbyshire, Daphne Oram, and Else Marie Pade – women whose pioneering works from the 1950s onwards have only become widely acknowledged and appreciated within the last ten years. Over the last decade, record labels ‘have done a roaring trade [...] in exotic electronica compilations, many of them by ‘overlooked women composers’ (Momus 2008:12). Derbyshire, Oram and Pade worked in institutions such as UK’s BBC Radiophonic Workshop and Danmarks Radio. Until now, no German female musician has been amongst these rediscoveries.

In 2008 I decided to make Ursula Bogner one of my ‘laboratory case studies’ and hence I began collecting press material and conducting fieldwork on live performances of her works. The media reception of the 2008 Bogner release *Recordings 1969-1988* was initially dominated by suspicions of her being a ‘fake’. Yet her status soon changed from that of a fake artist to that of an imaginary artist. Why the operations that have taken place around Ursula Bogner may be considered a ‘collaborative imagination’, rather than fake, will be the subject of my analysis here.

In my understanding, both the fake and the collaborative imagination challenge the distinction between fact and fiction and constitute in themselves inherently ambivalent formats that are critical of documentary positivisms. Yet although both have similar starting points from the point of view of production, fake and collaborative imagination differ significantly in the form of knowledge practice they ultimately effect in their audience. With the notion of ‘knowledge practice’ I draw on culturalisations of concepts of knowledge as they were developed in science
studies (Latour 1987, Knorr-Cetina 1999, Tkaczyk 2011)\textsuperscript{130}, which focus on the 
practices that constitute knowledge formations in the first place.\textsuperscript{131} The notion of 
collaborative imagination as a new form of knowledge practice stems from 
contemporary ethnography (Marcus 2007) and will allow me to critically discuss 
the transformatory potential of ‘fake’ tactics: operations that, in the name of self-
criticality, also re-establish prior borders between subjects and objects of 
knowledge.

**Ursula Bogner as fake**

In the last chapter (Ch. 3.1) I derived from art and media critique a notion of fake 
that is defined as distinct from forgery. In contrast to a forgery, it is the unveiling 
itself that is constitutive in a fake (Doll 2005:153) and thus a fake accommodates 
a positive connotation. The formula for utilizing fakes by artists and activists is the 
following: an established pattern of media-based representation of an institutional 
proclamation is imitated in tone, style and subject but is eventually revealed to be 
a fake, thereby exposing the representational conventions and implicit 
epistemologies of specific discourses and their producers. The fake employs a 
temporary falsifying for the sake of an eventual disclosure, and its finely tuned 
dramaturgy is employed to ultimately disturb the institutions and implicit 
regularities of discursive processes.

This time-sensitive efficacy of fakes is what Martin Doll (2012) parallels with the 
historical effectiveness of falsities as developed by Michel Foucault in his

\textsuperscript{130} Although science studies do not explicitly reference performance theory or performance studies 
(Tkaczyk 2011:116ff.), they propose a concept of knowledge as a dynamic process that is linkable 
with the concept of the performative.

\textsuperscript{131} In the art world one finds a similar turn towards knowledge practices, which are discussed under 
the term ‘knowledge production’. Originally an economics term used in 1950s and 60s educational 
policy, ‘knowledge production’ was appropriated in the 1990s by collaborative art and exhibition 
projects and ‘programmatically instrumentalized for the self-empowerment of lay experts’ (Holert 
2011:48). The term knowledge production was originally used to claim subversive aspirations for 
processes of ‘research’ undertaken in the field of art, while during the documentas and biennales of 
the 2000s the conception of art as research was promoted within a global discourse (Holert 
2011:48) which in turn helped commodify artistic research processes; see Holert (2011) also for a 
differentiated critique of artistic research and knowledge capitalism.
scientific-historical and discursive-archaeological analyses. With Foucault one can argue that every discipline is ‘made up of errors as well as truths […] – errors which are not residues or foreign bodies but which have positive functions, a historical efficacy, and a role, that is often indissociable from that of the truths’ (Foucault (1970)1981:60). A meta-(historical) perspective can draw attention to the universalistic nature of most truth claims, and, more specifically, link them to time- and space-bound discourses, and connect their respective true/false differentiations to concrete power formations. Seen this way, in a long-term historical perspective, scientific errors can encourage transformative processes in the epistemology of a discipline. Doll (2012) explores whether deliberately provoked falsities (as in the case of fakes) are – ex post facto – able to achieve precisely these kinds of transformations. However, unlike the long-term agency of scientific falsities unearthed by Foucault, it must be taken into consideration that contemporary media fakes have a relatively short and explosive form of progression, and instead of a historical contingency they reveal a (synchronous) socio-cultural contextuality of knowledge (cf. Berger/Luckmann 1966). While in the case of fakes the truth claims of journalistic discourses are exposed as contingent, the attendant media scandal usually devolves into a hierarchisation of socio-cultural knowledge formations. This is because, like other forms of negating critique, fakes rely on a platform for their negations, for which it is necessary to split the audience into at least two parts. In the worst case, one part of the audience ridicules the naiveté of the other part of the audience (those they deem less medially-competent, i.e. those who don’t ‘get’ the fake), and an expert audience of journalists determines the ultimate valuation of the fake. I submit that unlike Foucault's contemplative archaeologist of knowledge, the journalist

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132 Notably, Foucault's project was not to deny the existence of truth altogether but to resist a universalistic notion of truth, and to provide tools for describing the dynamics and transformations of knowledge practices.
becomes personally involved in fakes. Due to her/his powerful position relative to other (unprofessional) audiences, s/he can transform this involvement into complicity and essentially continue with the profession’s discourse practices unperturbed.\textsuperscript{133}

Analysing concrete effects of mass media fakes, Doll (2012:241-416) comes to the sceptical conclusion that they often have contra-productive results in regards to their initial aims of transforming conventions and discourses. Although their revelation principally illuminate the protocols and conventions of a certain field of journalism, in the processes that follow their exposure the epistemological certainties and universalist claims to truth that the fakes originally intended to disturb are often actually reinforced. After the revelation, the fake provides a platform for a renewed discussion, which often concludes with a restoration of the prior distinctions between true and false (with the fake case becoming, in retrospect, \textit{the} exception from the rule (Doll 2012:324ff.).)

Accordingly, when analysing the effects of Ursula Bogner in the framework of a media ‘fake’, I found little substantial transformation in the discourse of music journalism. Upon my examination of the German and English language press coverage of the 2008 Bogner release,\textsuperscript{134} only 29\% of the available space in the music press, and an even lesser 17\% in the non-music media such as daily press and event magazines, focused on the music of Ursula Bogner, with the majority of the text primarily concerned with her biography and inquiries about the factuality or fictionality of her persona. Similar numbers were to be found in the press coverage of the second Ursula Bogner release (31\% in the music press, \textsuperscript{134}The print material consulted for my press content analysis, in which I allocated each unit of examination (each separately comprehensible sentence) to one of the thematical categories of either music or biography, can be found in the appendix to this study (illustrative material).
17% in non-music media) in 2011 – although by this time three years had passed since suspicions of fake had been made public. Journalists stuck to a script of personalist reception\textsuperscript{135} – elaborating on the possible Bogner author figure rather than her musical qualities – and upheld their conventional role as ‘neutral mediators’ who are devoted to the truth of facts and point out fictions\textsuperscript{136}. Additionally, rather than using the Bogner releases for a long overdue elaboration on the work of female electronic musicians from the 1950s onwards, the press concentrated on Jelinek's oeuvre. In summary, in the discourse of music journalism a restoration rather than a transformation was effected; neither the epistemological foundations nor the disproportionately male-dominated content of pop music journalist discourse were unsettled.

**Ursula Bogner as collaborative imagination**

Nevertheless, a transformation did take place among the (non-professional/non-journalist) audience. Among the variety of audience reactions that fakes bring about, it may be observed that besides denominating an artistic tactic and production strategy\textsuperscript{137} of sequential revelation, a fake is always also an ‘experimental practice’ and its eventfulness entails the potential for unpredictable effects (Doll 2012:72) – in the case of Ursula Bogner, this experimental dimension was deliberately intensified.

Lacking the means to extensively survey individual audience members’ experiences, I am left to deduce audience reactions from online blog and social

\textsuperscript{135} Music journalism, like cultural criticism in general, commonly filters the reception of an artists’ music or work through the author figure instead of engaging with the musical sound or performance.\textsuperscript{136} Most journalists disclosed ‘as much as possible’, expressing doubts about the factuality of Bogner's biography, while nevertheless extensively ‘reporting’ on it. The imperative of distinguishing between fact and fiction was dismissed rhetorically by some journalists with the allegedly more important indicator of the ‘high quality of the music’ for which, nevertheless, only a cursory and superficial analysis was provided.\textsuperscript{137} The term ‘fake’ is a category of production referring to a production-aesthetical tactic that uses the ontological precariousness of the epistemological distinctions between true and false to unfold in shifting knowledge representations through time; with ‘fake’ one denotes an artistic tactic that has a specifically sequential and socio-culturally scenographical form of procession (see supra Ch. 3.1).
media responses to Bogner, from reactions I gathered attending live performances of electronic musicians enacting Bogner's oeuvre, as well as from my own experiences consuming the Bogner material. When looking at the liner notes and album press release, one finds that rather than painting a consistent image based on a social stereotype, Bogner’s biography is pre-scripted in a dual image of an average middle-class housewife with very eccentric hobbies. The liner notes indicate that her curiosity was not limited to music, but also involved astronomical and para-scientific theories. And ‘[b]esides composition she also tried her hand at drawing, printing and developed a strong fascination for Wilhelm Reich’s orgonomy, the sexual researcher and psychoanalyst’s bizarre late work on his discovery of orgonenergy’ (Jelinek 2008:2). The CD booklet and the press release also included eccentric imagery, which did little in authenticating Bogner’s biography.

Fig. 16: Ursula Bogner, photograph accompanying the liner notes and press release to Recordings 1969-1988, faitiche 01cd, 2008

Less than three weeks after the release of the first Ursula Bogner album,\textsuperscript{138} the electronic musician and blogger Momus posted an entry on his blog referring to the press photo above. For him, this photo portrays Jan Jelinek himself in drag;

\textsuperscript{138} The official release date of faitiche 1, \textit{Ursula Bogner. Recordings 1969-1988} was 24\textsuperscript{th} October 2008. The Momus blog entry dates to 12\textsuperscript{th} November 2008.
with his blog entry ‘Inside every synthetic man there’s an electronic woman’

Momus ((2008)2011) then begat his own pop-musical history of Ursula Bogner and sent the matter into further ‘phantastic orbits’ (Jelinek 2012, TM). Having deliberately chosen the questionable photograph, Jelinek also states that he included ‘dissonances in the [original Bogner] story, so that the suspicion of fake [could] hang in the air from the very beginning’; this ‘open-endedness of the story’ (Jelinek 2012, TM) was meant to stimulate imaginations (such as the blogger fiction advanced by Momus ((2008)2011) and affect a role reversal of the audience: from recipient to participant.

In ‘What is Critique?’, Foucault (2007:56) suggested a ‘historical-philosophical practice’, in which one ‘make[s] one’s own history, fabricate history, as if through fiction’, as a form of critical practice that exposes the ‘question of the relationship between structures of rationality which articulate true discourse and the mechanisms of subjugation which are linked to it’. While ‘[t]here is thus a dimension of [Foucault’s archaeological] methodology itself which partakes of fiction’ (Butler 2002:222), he does not provide us with more specific descriptions of the ‘art form’ such critical practice may take. Butler (2002:224) relates Foucault’s critical practice to the operation of ‘staging’ and thereby hints at the crucial question of how fictions encounter their audience. I suggest that the means of articulating critical practice in the case of Ursula Bogner are best understood as ‘collaborative imagination’.

A conceptual model for such collaborative imaginations is provided by the liner notes, printed on the back cover of the vinyl edition and included as extended version in a 126-page book accompanying the CD edition of the second Bogner release *Sonne = Blackbox* (2011). This second Bogner release was not compiled by Jan Jelinek himself but by another Berlin-based electronic music producer,
Andrew Pekler.\textsuperscript{139}

Fig. 17: Ursula Bogner. Sonne = Blackbox, faitiche 05cd/book /Maas Media vol. 43, 2011

The format of extended liner notes are characteristic of pop music records that compile ethnic, gendered and historical music – a type of compilation that has enjoyed increasing popularity in the first decade of this century. Such compilation projects of music of the past and music of the ‘others’ frequently begin with a preparatory phase devoted to inquiry and research which are documented to varying degrees of meticulousness in the liner notes accompanying the release. Such liner notes typically contain the life story of the rediscovered musician or the history of the documented scene or musical culture, a personal history of how the compiler gained access to the material and sometimes technicalities about the compilation process. This format marks a standard for compilation work that may be analogous to a ‘traditional modality of anthropological fieldwork’, where ‘naturalist modes of narration and representation’ are employed (Marcus 2010:86). Such compilations investigate the ‘native point of view’ and ‘local knowledge’ of an ‘other’ or ‘former’ culture, and they culminate in a – textual and sonic – representation of local or historically specific musical knowledges.

In the Bogner project one also finds many allusions to a process of research, with

\textsuperscript{139} CD and LP of this second release are entitled Sonne = Blackbox. Voice and Tape Music by Ursula Bogner.
the compilers spending preparatory time in the archive and with Bogner's contemporaries. For example, for Sonne = Blackbox compiler Andrew Pekler excavated the 'recording notes that accompanied some of the tape reels', which Bogner used 'not only for technical notes but also to jot down fragmentary ideas, associations and perhaps the sources of inspiration for the music on the tapes' as well as index cards from a filing system 'which [Bogner] used to record thoughts, concepts, text fragments and word games' (Pekler 2011:114,116).

This process of research evoked in the Bogner liner notes clearly does not conform to positivist models. Jelinek himself declared in the introduction to the book accompanying Sonne=Blackbox that 'no texts have been selected to verify her identity in this volume, as this would be a reduced selective approach,'  

140 For example Jelinek (2008:2f.,90) mentions his personal contact with the Bogner family and documents his interview with a Wilhelm Reich scholar on ‘orgone research’, a field of interest that also fascinated Ursula Bogner.  

141 In his liner notes to the first Bogner release, Jelinek (2008:3) also refers to the technicalities of accessing the reels: 'In the late 1960s, Ursula Bogner started to record her own music on reel-to-reel tapes. With some of these titles, we only found individual tracks of pieces recorded on a four-track-recorder – in these cases, I had to recombine the separate tracks to recreate the original piece. [...] Ultimately, only three of the tracks featured on this CD/LP are such „reworkings“. All other titles were taken straight form the original reels.'
namely the "establishment of truth" (Jelinek 2011:6, HO).

The approach taken here seems to go decidedly beyond a simple negation of positivist discourse. While an act of negating mockery, such as a fake, sets up an act of revelation that draws a clear line between a (solitary) agent of a critical disclosure – the subject of knowledge – and an audience that merely ‘receives’ the disclosed knowledge and acts as an object within knowledge processes, collaborative imagination establishes other forms of relationship between individual and collective by enabling a new form of knowledge practice itself. A mockery may criticize, yet adheres to, a practice, however self-critical, of representation. By contrast, the Bogner project seems to be aiming for a transgression of representation. How does it aspire to such a transgression and does it thereby achieve a participatory or emancipatory transformation of knowledge practices?

The process of research is presented in the Sonne = Blackbox book as a decidedly polyphonylcal endeavour by various ‘experts’ including texts by the blogger Momus, by the musicians compiling Bogner’s musical work, by a curator who exhibited her drawings and photographic work as well as by cultural theorists (including myself (Menrath 2011a, 2011b)). As editor of the book, Jelinek (2011:8) also stresses that since Bogner’s biography has become ‘a data stream of countless alternative narratives [...,] [i]n the end one can only hope that in the future speculations will continue to encircle Ursula Bogner’s identity’. A collaborative effort is established by transgressing the borders of fictionality and factuality, and without resorting to a further demarcation between subjects of knowledge and its objects. The Bogner book oscillates between the factual and the fictional by ‘mockumenting’ (inventing the musician Bogner in the manner of documentation, curatorial contextualisation and theorisation), but also by ‘mystifying’ (functioning as part of a work that invents and fictionalizes its own
author) Bogner. Thus, the book documents the sum of ‘knowledge’ about the ‘object’ Bogner, an object that is only produced in the process of reading and receiving.

In journalism, such a bi-focality between fiction and fact is seldom tolerated\(^{142}\) – and the brief summary of the press reaction presented above underlines the fact that in this case journalists did not transform but merely reformed their usual practice. Yet polyvocality and bi-focality between fiction and fact are characteristics of the ‘collaborative imaginaries’, that are now establishing themselves in contemporary ethnographies; as pointed out by George Marcus (2007, 2010) these ethnographic practices go beyond a critical reflexivity and questions of representation and instead, develop new strategies for collaborative research and knowledge practice. Here, ethnographer and (local) co-ethnographer (the former object of research) collaborate in an imagination of a third entity, starting not from ‘uncorrupted’ local concepts but from the already perspectivized and situated knowledge of both the ethnographer and her/his ‘local’ co-agent. The operation of collaborative imagination proposes a production of knowledge about ‘another’ reality, be it historical or contemporary, which includes the disparate and singular perspectives of those partaking in this reality. Such collaborative imaginaries, in my understanding, provide performance ethnographies – their method of inquiry being co-performance (Madison 2005:168) of a culture. In literature, theory, film and music, for example, the multiple-use names Luther Blissett (e.g. Hollings 2000), Wu Ming, Nicolas Bourbaki, Alan Smithies, Monty Cants in and Karen Elliott provide similar scenarios for collaborative knowledge practice with a diverse range of ‘authors’ – from professional to amateur – producing non-hierarchized knowledge under

\(^{142}\) An exception to this may be the journalistic practice of ‘new journalism’, which ‘is based on facts, and allows fictions’, but only does so if ‘they are made transparent’ (Haas (2004:69, TM). Yet while new journalism practitioners may report in a literary manner, the subject of their reporting is still assumed to be factual.
these names. The example of the Momus blog entry hints at a medium in which similarly collaborative developments are possible within the realm of popular music whereby a plurality of imaginations about, for example, Ursula Bogner can arise. Unlike fakes which reconstruct the historical (Foucault (1966)1970) or socio-cultural contextuality (Berger/Luckmann 1966) of knowledge but cannot avoid staging and hierarchizing these variegated, yet ultimately fixed knowledge formations, a collaborative imagination around a multiple-use name enacts and motivates a pluralisation of knowledges.

**Faitiche: collaboration, duplicity, multiplicity**

Another explanation of the multiplicity enacted in the Bogner project can be provided with the concept of ‘faitiche’ (also the name of the record label that has released Ursula Bogner’s recordings). According to Jelinek (2012) the rediscovered *Ursula Bogner. Recordings 1969-1988* were the first release and even the impetus for him to start his artist-run record label named ‘faitiche’.

Faitiche is a made-up word, taken from the German translation of Bruno Latour’s concept of the ‘factish’ – itself a portmanteau word that Latour invents from ‘fact and fetish’ (Latour 1999:266,274). With this concept, Latour intends to undermine the subject-object-gap of modern science and the discrepancy between the epistemologies of constructivism and realism (Böhme 2006:91). Latour’s solution (faitiche) is bound up in his argument that the question: ‘Is it real or is it fabricated?’ (Latour 1999:267) may only be answered by the suspension of the decisional imperative (Böhme 2006:91). Latour investigates the links

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between ‘fact’ and ‘fetish’ and finds that not only can the words be traced etymologically to the same root (the verb ‘to fabricate’), but also that in the modern era a ‘fact’ is created precisely through the destruction of a ‘fetish’. Latour proposes a new understanding of fetish, not as a blank ‘thing’ on which erroneous beliefs are projected; instead he understands the fetish as a fabrication of the anti-fetishist, not of the so-called ‘fetishist’, whom the anti-fetishist accuses of fabrication and of naive belief (Latour 1999:270).

Latour’s focus is on the action of fabrication and he aims to suspend the division between a subject (with knowledge, belief and agency) and an object (lacking all of the former capacities) by suggesting a radical turn towards action instead: both fetishes and facts are fabricated, and according to Latour (1999:284), the manufacturing process takes place not in the mind of a believer but is externalized among a network of agents (‘aktants’) which are neither fully subject nor object. The divide that Latour specifically aims to suspend here is that between humans and non-humans, between agents with internal beliefs and non-agents of the outside world. Latour aims to destabilize the anthropocentric notion of ‘action’, and assigns things and the material world a co-authorship of actions – not by arguing for a consciousness of material things (Böhme 2006:78f.), but by removing the customary emphasis on intentionality within the notion of action. A ‘faitiche’, as a synthesis of fact and fetish, can therefore be understood as a form of action within a network that consists of a ‘multiplicity of non[/]humans’ (Latour 1999:284). Applying the notion of the faitiche/factish allows one to abandon the field of epistemology. In its place, the action of denouncing knowledge as illusory becomes central. Understood as actions ‘beliefs [are] grant[ed] ontological content’ (Latour 1999:286). Instead of a distinction between epistemological and ontological matters, Latour (1999:285ff.) adopts a heterogeneous ontology.

The recordings of Ursula Bogner lend themselves well to such a notion of
faitiches as collaborative (or ‘collective’ (Latour 1999)) actions between humans and non-humans. On the first Bogner release, *Recordings 1969-1988*, one can clearly hear ‘old synthesizers looping out according to mathematical patterns that weave together basic melodies and cold, eerie soundscapes eking and echoing out evocations of outer space’ (Nasrallah 2008), while on the second release, *Sonne = Blackbox*, human actions are discernible in the form of a female voice. Here vocal and electronically produced sounds entangle into a non/human network as one listens to ‘analogue abstraction [...] mixed with vocal-based “emotive registers”’ (Morgan 2012, HO). Machines have a definite co-authorship in this music: their actions are intertwined with human actions and within the sound text; their (non-intentional) voices are audible beside the (emotive) human voice.

While producing such multiple entanglements on the level of sound, the project’s media and live dimensions do not invoke multiplicity in a comparable way. The Bogner creation myth, for example does not definitively detach Bogner from her ‘creators’, the recordings’ liner notes repeatedly name the artists that compiled and archived her music and in live contexts, Bogner’s music is presented by well-known musicians (in groups of varying size). In a tactical operation similar to Moodymann’s (Ch. 1), these musicians draw an audience to the event with the currency of their individual (or group) author names to then present a performance that, due to its event character, indeed *enacts* multiplicity and collectivity. The multiplicity or co-authorship of the Bogner project as presented in media and live contexts has less to do with the particular suspension of divisions between human and inhuman than it does with the division between audience member and performer. Bringing Latour’s notion of the faitiche/factish to bear on this case emphatically focuses attention on its event character. This focus on the event productively disrupts my essentially epistemological framework for
analysis, and therefore I now turn to the ‘live media’ contexts of the Internet and of live performance of the Bogner project.

**Ursula Bogner on the Internet**

At the time of writing his blog article entitled ‘Electronic Drag’, Momus could not find an entry on Ursula Bogner on the Internet platform Wikipedia (Momus 2008). Such an entry appeared only in 2011, three weeks after the release of the second Ursula Bogner album *Sonne = Blackbox*. The collaborative encyclopaedia Wikipedia therefore had no significant share in developing the collaborative imagination of Ursula Bogner. Perhaps this is self-evident, yet despite its collaborative nature, Wikipedia is not a workable platform for fakes or for collaborative imaginations: Wikipedia is itself a project founded on the role reversal of knowledge receivers becoming knowledge producers – hence it provides no platforms for fakes, which require decisive schisms within the audience. The pluralisation of knowledge encouraged by Wikipedia nevertheless has a definite limit: in principle, only knowledge that can legitimize itself as ‘fact’ is allowed, and although the potential sphere for such legitimations may be expanded to represent more than one single episteme, Wikipedia abides by a notion of knowledge production as data gathering (rather than imagination) and excludes what is deemed to be outright ‘fiction’. Imaginations of Ursula Bogner therefore inhabit other corners of the Internet, such as blogs, forums, music- and video-sharing platforms and (label) websites.

The medium of the Internet plays an ambivalent role in the Bogner project. On the one hand, the contextual paucity of net-based communication (its reliance on text-based communication) allows for user delusion and inventions to flourish. On the other hand, Internet communication about music relies (as does print communication) on a reference system of identifying and locating label and artist
names. However, this identifying function of the Internet is undermined by the multidimensionality and ambiguity of signs (Schönberger 2006) on the multitude of sharing and social platforms on the web through which fan culture knowledge circulates. The Internet allows publicity without a necessarily reductive identification, and thus provides production spaces for imagination, which are not restricted to specialists or to a ‘professional audience’.

**Celebrity and collaboration**

The vital semiotic activity of publics (via blogs, personal websites) along with their engagement in the circulation and exchange of narratives (Facebook, Twitter, forums, sharing platforms) about celebrities within cultural networks underscores the fact that celebrity culture (especially in its contemporary digital media supported form) entails more than ‘a simple identification with the nominal figure’ (Gilbert 2003). Seen through a perspective Jeremy Gilbert calls ‘deconstructive’ (2003:95,97), a celebrity allows ‘transversal exchange[s] of meanings and affects’ within an audience network to circulate. Gilbert’s (2003:96) deconstructive account provides ‘a way of understanding even the most apparently individualist of cultural formations – those focussed on a fascination with celebrities – as necessarily subtended by an affective infrastructure of transversal sociality’. At the same time that he is deconstructing celebrity, Gilbert is rightly sceptical of attempts to link celebrity culture with democratisation (familiar from post-structuralist accounts of celebrity), as these commonly conflate liberal democracy or capitalist individualism with democracy (see supra Ch. 1.2). Gilbert (2003:99,101) argues that what is staged in celebrity culture is not ‘cultural democratisation’ but a competition of individualized ‘candidates for imaginary authority’, and that it is ‘capitalist individualism, not democracy at all that is ‘at the heart of celebrity culture’ (Gilbert 2003:101). Celebrity culture presents the celebrated individual as a democratic production, yet the collectivity invoked is –
as Gilbert (2003) rightly ascertains – only a disguise for radically competitive consumer individualism.

In order to avoid falling back on a judgmental discursive critique I ask: how could the linkage between individualist-liberalist and collectivist-democratist ideals in celebrity culture be shown as ‘false’ without residing to (evaluative) terms such as ‘pseudo-collectivity’? In my understanding, collaborative imaginations that deploy multiple-use celebrity names can falsify such linkages between individualist liberalism and collectivism. The scenography of these critical practices does not rely on a discursive ‘paradox’ or revelatory terms such as ‘pseudo-collectivity’ but on networked actions of actively creating faitiches. Without going all the way to a new definition of action and its distribution amongst humans and non-humans, what I find interesting about Latour’s take on idolatry and fetishism\textsuperscript{144} is that he understands the idol or the fetish as ‘not about what people know’ but what they do (Banks 1999:12). Digesting the understanding that the ‘insight into the production mechanism’ of a fetish (its pseudo-character), ‘far from destroying the “fetishist” illusion in fact even strengthens it’ (Zizek 1997:102, HO), Latour suggests that we treat the idol or fetish as quasi-objects or factishes/faitiches. Similarly, the critical practices of pop music celebrity presented in this study do not do away with fetishist inversion but open it into a playing field for musicians/producers and recipients instead. The production mechanisms of celebrity are made available for enactment and collaborative experience – as critical practice not in the sense of an intervention that discloses a ‘pseudo-collectivity’ but in the sense of a scenography for a vital and volatile quasi-individualist experience.

Staging celebrity as quasi-individuality and refuting its linkage to collectivity also

\textsuperscript{144} While there are differences between idolatry and fetishism, their modes of operation reveal structural parallels (Böhme 2006:93).
shifts focus to the event character of celebrity. The collaborative imagination of a pop idol stresses the entangled multitude of actions (by producers and recipients) that ‘fabricate’ a celebrity. The ‘collaborative imagination’ as a tactic may be initiated by a researcher, activist or other agent, but its outcome, the ‘collaborative imaginary’, is often not fully and particularly intended or, at least, not by the initiator solely. And in the case of Ursula Bogner this experimental live dimension is intensified deliberately.

Unlike ‘Luther Blisset’ or ‘Wu Ming’, ‘Ursula Bogner’ is not simply a name attached to a written text (in print or on the internet), but a persona that is performed in live performances. Live performances are self-evidently contingent (yet subject to institutional conditions and standards of interaction), and while a single live event is volatile, its retrospective examination can provide guidelines for future live projects. The next section will therefore re-examine the live performance situations of the Bogner project.

**Ursula Bogner in live performance**

A recently published study (Female Pressure 2013) recapitulates that even today ‘women are notoriously under-represented in the realms of contemporary music production and performance’ and for electronic pop music festivals ‘a proportion of 10% of the line-up represented by female artists is considered above average’. Like the media space, the live performance space of electronic pop music today is gendered and male-dominated. This was a ‘shocking and disheartening’ (Female Pressure 2013) diagnosis for activists in a scene that has long understood itself as progressive and has promoted collectivisation and democratisation of music production since the late 1980s. The question of representation, long ignored in electronic pop music politics, remains unresolved.

Journalist Abi Bliss (2013) asserts that although ‘[m]en may make up the majority
of musicians working and performing within electronic and experimental music, [...] a clear disparity exists between the number of female artists who can be discovered through browsing blogs or platforms such as SoundCloud, and the amount of them invited to appear at festivals, in clubs, in university concert halls or in art spaces'. Regardless of whether this invisibility of women is due to or despite the disidentificatory anonymity practices and community formulations of EDM, in 2013 gender-based exclusions persist on a large scale in electronic dance and pop music.

Parallel to its operations in the media space, the Ursula Bogner project uses ironic quotation of these male-defined standards of live performance. In her seminal discussion of drag performance Judith Butler (1993:125) asked whether ‘parodying the dominant norms [is] enough to displace them’? Although not using ‘drag’ in the narrow sense of embodying other gender(s) on stage, the Bogner project is engaged in ambivalent forms of female impersonation. On stage, the Ursula Bogner persona is not impersonated by male bodies, but is invoked by images, voices, sounds and texts credited to her. Thereby, Ursula Bogner does not serve as a pseudogynynm,145 by which male artists extend their expressive dominion into female sensibility (Elwes 1985: 188), but retains a synchronous and separate existence on stage distinct from the musicians performing her works.

The Wire magazine reviewer Frances Morgan (2012), although approving of the fake dimension of Bogner in media performance and recordings, is especially uncomfortable with the ironic objectification she sees taking place in the three-dimensional scenario of an Ursula Bogner live performance at the Mutek international music festival (Montreal 2012), and summarizes: ‘Is the endpoint of

145 Momus (2008) draws this analogy between Ursula Bogner and Marcel Duchamp's female pseudogynynm 'Rrose Selavy'.
this playful exercise in gender-bending postmodernism just a theatre full of people staring at a photo of a woman, listening to music made by men?’ Indeed, at Ursula Bogner performances the audience listens to (almost exclusively) male contemporary electronic musicians performing Bogner’s oeuvre accompanied by a visual presentation of Bogner’s archival material. Although Morgan’s condensed critique does not withstand a detailed analysis of the variety of Bogner live performance scenarios, her review is unique in acknowledging the questionable effectiveness of masquerade performances\textsuperscript{146}, and brings my discussion back to Judith Butler’s 1993 reflections on drag performance.

After having set up the criterion that drag is ‘subversive to the extent that it reflects on the imitative structure by which hegemonic gender is itself produced and disputes heterosexuality’s claim on naturalness and originality’, Butler (1993:137) added a notable qualification regarding the specific theatrical or medial situation in which masquerade performance is presented: if a presentation invites one to ‘enter into a logic of fetishisation’ and ‘installs the ambivalence of that ‘performance’ as related to our own’, it can allow the audience to either ‘absen[t] itself’ and ‘commodification [...] will be [...] completed’ or, alternatively, a ‘distance will be opened up between that hegemonic call to normativizing gender and its critical appropriation’. In the following, this distinction will serve me to differentiate among the various masquerade performances of the Bogner project and analyse which temporal and scenographical tactics are applied in different live performance scenarios where hegemonic gender norms are imitated.

There have, in summary, been two different series of performance routines after each of the two Ursula Bogner releases, and their specific theatrical set-up has to be considered. In the first series of performances the Ursula Bogner project was

\textsuperscript{146} Morgan (2012) is also the first (and only) performance review on Bogner. As with academic performance analysis of pop music (Quirck/Toynbee 2005) performance reviews in the press are rare.
performed in small art galleries and clubs. Six electronic musicians (usually including one female) performed an archival Bogner score for six signal generators. The performances did not take place on stage but rather on the floor level, surrounded by the audience and without the use of stage lighting.

Fig. 20-23: Performance Ursula Bogner. Schleusen (sonor) at the opening of the exhibition Ursula Bogner. Pluto has a moon, in gallery ‘Laura Mars’ Berlin, 11/12/2009

On these occasions the suspicion of fake arose due to the participating audience being drawn to the event via music- and art-specific journalistic media that had circulated the Bogner backstory. Role reversal between audience and producers was incited, and indeed, I vividly remember participants spinning the Bogner

147 A live recording (excerpt) of Schleusen (sonor), a concert for six signal generators by Ursula Bogner, performed by Mo Loschelder, Andrew Pekler, Tim Tetzner, Kassian von Troyer, Holger Zapf and Jan Jelinek on 11th December 2009 at Laura Mars Gallery, Berlin, can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FY1RPOcCIWM
This collaborative Bogner live production was also realized within the larger scale of an electronic music festival – as part of Club Transmediale Festival 2011 in Berlin. Here the performers appeared before an audience whose members (largely) had no knowledge of the Bogner back-story.

In the live productions following the second Bogner release from 2011 – the performance setup that Morgan reviewed in June 2012 – audiences were provided with more background information: images of Bogner herself, photos of index card material, drawings, contextual information on orgonomy and more were presented in a slide-show behind the two male musicians Jan Jelinek and Andrew Pekler. Live footage of improvisation with what was advertised as ‘Bogner’s original tape loops’ was also projected in close-up on a second screen next to the musicians.

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148 One (older) gallery visitor even reported to the curator at gallery Laura Mars Berlin, Gundula Schmitz, to ‘very probably’ have met with Ursula Bogner back in the 1960s at the ‘Studio für elektronische Musik’ in Cologne (Schmitz 2010).

149 A live recording (excerpt) of Schleusen (sonor), a concert for six signal generators by Ursula Bogner, performed by Mo Loschelder, Andrew Pekler, Tim Tetzner, Kassian Troyer, Holger Zapf and Jan Jelinek on 2nd February 2011 at CTM11, Festsaal Kreuzberg, Berlin, can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KufOuelPr40

149 In the context of music festivals one finds diverse spectatoral communities, who are informed about the events to widely varying degrees and therefore may not be informed about the fake suspicions that have circulated with Bogner’s name.

150 A live recording (excerpt) of Sonne = Blackbox. Voice and Tape Music by Ursula Bogner, performed by Andrew Pekler and Jan Jelinek, on 3rd December 2011 at Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin, can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kiVVwlg-HE
With its staging of laboratory-like conditions, the incongruities and the mediatedness of Bogner’s biography become apparent to the more attentive segment of a festival audience (comparable to the well-informed attendees of galleries and club spaces). But for a wide range of the audience watching the performance in the context of festivals such as Club Transmediale or Mutek the incongruities are less likely to register. Furthermore, the Bogner history is told visually with a slide show that unavoidably applies a narrative cohesion upon otherwise disparate images. An audience sitting in the darkened space of the theatre may be tempted to give themselves over to an objectification of Ursula Bogner images without reflecting on or questioning their own role in the process. Without carefully addressing its diverse spectatorial communities, the ironic quotation in the Bogner live performance runs the risk of simply re-inscribing or reinforcing the ‘very representations they supposedly deconstruct’ (Auslander 1992:23) – as Morgan has posited in reference to the Ursula Bogner live performance at Mutek 2012. Like the ‘performative’, which, by repeating (gender) norms not only enables a slippage between them but also is complicit in their enforcement (Carlson 1996:171f.), the ‘imaginary’ has both a productive and a
reproductive side (Kamper 1986:71). Imagination is not only an anthropological
capacity of creatively making appear a new image of something that neither is or
was (Castoriadis (1975)1990:218), it is also a negotiation of a vast archive of
images and socially shared imaginations. A tactical critical practice balances
these two by exposing the genealogy of structures while transgressing them and
a transformation can only be achieved when specifically addressing the
heterogeneous sub-audiences.

The Ursula Bogner project has genuine potential to illuminate gender as socio-
culturally and medially constructed. While undoubtedly providing a platform for
participatory knowledge production on the part of the audience, the
transformative quality of such collaborative imaginations is unstable and its
success depends on a finely tuned address of the respective audiences – only
then does the project enable a reflection on individual complicity in the
construction process and meet all the criteria of concreteness, self-reflexivity and
positivity in critical practice.

In this chapter I have omitted a discussion of whether appropriating a female
music history is ethically appropriate for male musicians. This is because, in the
case of Ursula Bogner, the artists presenting the Bogner oeuvre identify
respectfully with female musical narratives, and their perspective as male artists
is discernible. Moreover, I propose that the transformative power of masquerade
performance depends less on the specific positioning of the performer, than on
the extent to which the audience is – in its heterogeneity – tactically involved in
the process.

I have argued that the media fake uses the social contextuality of knowledge to
show the imitative structure of discursive norms. And in an analysis of the Bogner
project in the framework of a media fake and through an examination of its media
dimensions and effects, I concluded that one part of the audience (the professional, specialist, journalist audience) was able to – in Butlers (1993:137) words – ‘absen[t] itself’. This points to a structural problem of media fakes: by employing the disparity of discourses for a hierarchical splitting of the audience, media fakes tend to conspire with and empower the already dominant segments.

**Complicity in Ursula Bogner**

While the transformative power of the media performance in the Bogner project has been found to be limited, in the live scenarios in point of fact the heterogeneity of the audience is addressed respectfully and collaborative imaginations and participatory knowledge productions are allowed for. The general advantage of live over media settings is that a liminality in the complicit activity of the audience can be continuously sustained. Deliberately produced ‘dissonances’ (Jelinek 2012, TM) or incongruities in the case of Ursula Bogner essentially create an audience of accomplices – and complicity can, with Gesa Ziemer (2007:9, 2013),[^152] be understood as a form of collaborative activity: with co-functionality, rather than co-intentionality, being the defining characteristic of complicit activity, collaboration may comprise of both voluntary and involuntary actions. However, the operation of fake severs voluntary from involuntary collaboration – a fake exploits the involuntary complicity of (certain parts of) the audience. The practice of collaborative imagination, by contrast, avoids spectacular, disruptive revelations in favour of sustaining a liminal situation for the audience, which can function as the stimulus for collaborative speculative reconstructions and new forms of knowledge practice.

While both the tactics of fake and of collaborative imagination may be understood as operations that bring about complicity, for effecting their respective outcomes

[^152]: Gesa Ziemer elaborated on both co-thinking/co-acting and voluntary/involuntary components of complicity in her keynote ‘What is complicity’ at Berliner Gazette Conference *Complicity in Supermarkt Berlin*, 09/11/2013, see also the publication Ziemer (2013).
fakes depend on involuntary complicity while collaborative imaginations uphold a
liminality and avoid a differentiation between involuntary and voluntary complicity.
In the case of fake however, its revelation instantly nullifies any motivation
amongst the involuntary accomplices to contribute to such complicit activities.
When analysing the media component of the Ursula Bogner project in the
framework of fake, I found its transformative power to be limited. The addressees
of this operation were able to ‘absent themselves’ and carry on with their
personalist reception mode. But the fake component was not formative for the
Bogner project – there was no sudden ‘revelation’ and accordingly no involuntary
accomplices exploited. Instead, the project managed an ongoing interplay
between media and live performance components and thereby sustained a
genuinely liminal state of complicity in its audience. Instead of the fake, it is the
critical practice of collaborative imagination that provides the proper framework
for conceptualizing the operations encircling Ursula Bogner. How academic
practice can learn from the critical practice of collaborative imagination and what
forms of (intellectual) knowledge practice it translates into, will be the subject of
the following section.
**Critical scientific practice**

With the habitus of scientists, the musicians involved in the Bogner project excavate and re-perform Ursula Bogner’s oeuvre. They thereby re-stage knowledge and discourse about music as a new form of collaborative knowledge practice. The specifically transformative power of these self-critical knowledge practices lies in the collaborative transgression (rather than in self-centred hegemonic demonstration) of discursive norms and power structures. Their ‘micro-collective’ (rather than ‘self-centred’) (Ziemer 2007:9) form of critique establishes itself in live (rather than media) performances, which activate an archive of images and imbue imaginations.

According to Foucault, critical practice takes place in disruptive practices of self-transformation. For the last decade, subjectification practices in knowledge institutions of academia have increasingly been ‘submitting to neoliberal positions’ (Klein 2013:146). As is the case in electronic pop music, in academic research today the notion of a community ‘that results in […] a desirable anonymity for the artist or writer’ (O’Dair 2008:7) seems at odds with the increasing privatization of the individual in academic star culture. A multiple-use name such as Ursula Bogner instigates a practice that is critical of liberalist individualism. Whether in pop music celebrity productions or in competitive knowledge formations of contemporary academic research, multiple-use names can highlight the collective nature of artistic or scientific research. Jeremy Gilbert (2003:106f.) has suggested adopting the anti-celebritist statement of electronic pop musicians as a model for academic work: ‘Write collectively under assumed names’. The artists and cultural critics/writers contributing to an oeuvre of Ursula Bogner, collectively and together with the audience, embrace a radical rethinking of research culture. Rather than playing popular-amateurist knowledge off against professional-specialist pop music knowledge, in the Ursula Bogner project the
various agents (human producer/audience, material and immaterial) participating in the constitution of pop music discourse and knowledge are activated for a critical, collaborative knowledge practice.

Beyond the poles of the individual vs. the collective-social, in the Bogner live presentations I found short-term, small-scale communities emerging: these situative communities were (in contrast to the affectively-induced sonic communities of rave culture) induced by the transgression of discursive institutions of pop music. In this case, by the collaborative imagination of the persona of Ursula Bogner, which established a liminal play between performers and audiences and considered the agency and volatile mediality of pop music artefacts (records, texts, images) whose aesthetic quality exceeded their character as documentary objects. As tactical critical practices of pop music celebrity, these performances emphasized both the materiality and the collectivity of the processes of celebritisation; they include material objects/documents, the producers and recipients in a live and collaborative production of a new celebrity. While multiple-use names are still far from becoming an established academic practice, academia has found a consensus-format for the critical live presentation of research: more than two decades after Dwight Conquergood (1991:190) suggested ‘performance as a form of scholarly representation’, and further fortified by an academic turn towards artistic practices in the last decade, the ‘lecture performance’ has established itself as a standard practice at (humanities) conferences. As an alternative to publishing research, (lecture) performance of research critically engages with the textualism of academia in a concrete and self-reflexive practice. Yet while in 1991 Conquergood (1991:190) considered performance as ‘threatening the text-bound structure of the academy’, it is today not at all clear whether the process-orientation of this format represents a disarticulation of academic constitutives, or is in fact a symptom of the post-
Fordist constitution of academic knowledge production in the 21st century, demanding flexibility, constant re-evaluation and self-precarisation.

Beyond multiple-use author names and lecture performance, what new formats of scientific critical practice could be developed learning from the tactical and collaborative critical practice realized in the Ursula Bogner project? The project’s liminality between critical reflection and creative imagination is also typical for the field of performance studies, which, according to Dwight Conquergood (2002:151f.), ‘brings [a] rare hybridity into the academy, a commingling of analytical and artistic ways of knowing that unsettles the institutional organization of knowledge and disciplines. The constitutive liminality of performance studies lies in its capacity to bridge segregated and differently valued knowledges, drawing together legitimated as well as subjugated modes of inquiry’. Nevertheless, the complicity that both fake and collaborative imagination demand also stimulates another form liminality, that between voluntarity and involuntarity.

How can one provide a critical scientific research practice that is ‘symmetrical’ not only in the sense of Latour (1993:111), who understands the ‘objects’ under study themselves as parts of a multiplicity of agents, but also in the sense of Conquergood (1982:9), whose ‘dialogical performance’ acts symmetrically with research subjects and audiences but remains self-critical towards the researcher’s concrete actions and legitimisations of knowledge? Learning from the Bogner laboratory case, in the following I will sketch a critical practice of scholarly ethnography that transgresses both empirical fieldwork and representational practices of anthropological research.
Imaginary ethnography as performance research

For this final sketch I will turn back to an anecdote from the field of music reportage I introduced in the opening part of this study (Ch. 0.3): the 1976 cover story on the emerging dance culture of disco that music journalist Nick Cohn published in the June 1976 edition of *New York* magazine. At that time Cohn had just relocated to New York from the UK, where he had been a chronicler of British youth cultures and had enjoyed a standing as a journalist with intimate knowledge of pop music scenes. Cohn took advantage of his reputation and produced the article ‘The Tribal Rites of Saturday Night’, which was – as he himself in retrospect called it – a ‘fraud’ (Cohn 1994): ‘I wrote it all up. And presented it as fact’ (Cohn 1997 cited after Gilbert/Pearson (1999:36)) as ‘I knew nothing about this world [...] [and] didn’t speak the language [...]. So I faked it.’ In his text, Cohn invokes a phase of participant observation, which did not in fact take place. After his confession, which Cohn voluntarily made two decades later, he was accused of ‘imagined ethnography’ (Gilbert/Pearson 1999:20) – although Cohn himself had never claimed to have provided an ethnography in the first place.

In the 1970s and 1980s, anthropological ethnography survived a wave of ethnographies (Castaneda 1968, Donner 1982, Mead 1923, MacLeish 1972, Nance 1975) that were suspected of having been fabrications and whose authors were accused of plagiarism or ‘fraud’ (DeMille 1976, DeHolmes 1983, Freeman 1983, Iten 1986). The ensuing epistemological debates served to largely relieve the discipline of cultural anthropology of the assurance of a scientific-positivist epistemology, and reinforced the certainty of the variability of historical, social and cultural knowledges. One outcome of this was the valorisation of a previously marginalized course for anthropology: to not only better understand ‘the other’ but to better understand oneself (Köpping 1987). The reflection of the
The anthropologist’s own value bias (Köpping 1987:17ff.) became legitimized as itself a valuable outcome for ethnography. Acknowledging that one is always reflecting and writing about oneself when one reflects and writes about others does not yet mean that one is exempt from the ethical liabilities of fieldwork. One must acknowledge one’s own pre-conceptions and values – for which the process of encounter with the ‘other’ in the field is the ‘indispensable midwife’ (Köpping 1987:31f, TM).

In Cohn’s case, the exposure of his essentialistic understandings of ethnicity (Goldman 1978:152), his ignorance of gay culture’s role in the development of disco (Gilbert/Pearson 1999:8), his ‘dance-deaf’-ness (Goldman 1978:154) and allegiance to the antiquated frameworks of ‘subcultural theory and style journalism’ (Gilbert/Pearson 1999:25) was provided by contemporary and successive critics of his work. In retrospect, with this text Cohn himself unintentionally ‘illustrated [...] the romanticism at the heart of subcultural discourse’, but, it must be said, that he also ‘wholeheartedly contributed to [this] romanticism’ (Gilbert/Pearson 1999:21). I agree with Gilbert and Pearson’s analysis of Cohn’s case, but not with their accompanying condemnation of anthropological methods. Cohn’s ‘Tribal rites of Saturday Night’ (1976) is not a work of anthropology and Cohn himself nowhere claims to be writing a work of anthropological ethnography.

What a performance ethnography of anthropological provenance can learn from this case is that the reflection of the ethnographer’s preconceptions may itself be a valid outcome of a study. The acknowledgment of these preconceptions should take place through encounter with the ‘other’ in the field and through intensive examination of the research material, and finally be made available – implicitly or explicitly – to the recipients of the ethnography. What collaborative imagination as performance ethnography could aim for is not an unsound ‘imagined
ethnography’ (Gilbert/Pearson 1999:20) whose recipients become involuntary accomplices in a deceit, but rather a voluntary *imaginary ethnography* on the part of cultural co-performers and recipients. The ‘commingling of analytical and artistic ways of knowing’ (Conquergood 2002:151f.) in performance ethnography brings the ethnographer in the strenuous situation of constantly re-balancing obligations – to the field, to academia, to a wider audience – but for ephemeral phenomena (such as certain dance music cultures) that elude definitional knowledge, collaborative imagination, however arduous and instable, may be the adequate form of knowledge production.

The term ‘imaginary ethnography’ has been used by Fritz Kramer (1977), in his case, to denominate pre-positivist ethnographic texts that alienated other cultures to the point where they appeared as the reversal of the ethnographer’s own cultural premises – as inverted worlds. These imaginary ethnographies of the 19th century are illusionistic; they do not make the projections of their authors explicit and have little to do with the ‘reality’ of the investigated cultures. Only in hindsight has it been acknowledged that they were merely self-reflections of the culture of the ethnographer. But seen through the lense of performative anthropology, role reversal and role play stand at the centre of any ethnographic fieldwork experience. ‘Participant observation’ includes various role reversals between distant observer and involved participant; this resonates strongly with the research practice of performance ethnography being understood as *performance*.

In performance ethnography of the 21st century, such research performance is carried out as collaborative process and self-reflection does not work merely in one but rather in multiple directions. *Collaborative imaginary ethnography* as research format could include imagining cultural elements, figures, histories or futures collaboratively. The reality of the investigated cultures would then be synthesized with the specific imaginaries of the investigating culture, while the
speculative and performative character of any object of cultural inquiry stands in
the foreground. As critical practice of anthropological ethnographers, imaginary
ethnography would be concrete and field-specific, self-critical of anthropological
knowledge practices and productive-positive (in contrast to the destructive or, at
most, reformative effects of fakes).

**Conclusion Ch. 3**

Contrasting the operations of fake and collaborative imagination, this chapter
concerned itself with the transformative effects of tactical critical practices and
their transferability into the field of academic research. The laboratory case
addressed here is Ursula Bogner – a German female electronic music composer
of the 1960-1980s whose interartistic oeuvre has, since 2008, been re-released
and re-performed by Berlin-based contemporary electronic music producers.

First, the tactical operation of media fakes (exposing the epistemological horizon
of discourses by first mimicking and then exposing its implications) was tested for
concrete effects. The laboratory case of Ursula Bogner had initially been
understood in the media as a ‘fake’. When analysing the media effects the
Bogner case had on the professional media audience of journalists I found little
evidence of transformation in their discourse. The majority of journalists
proceeded with their script of a personalist reception of musical productions.

The Ursula Bogner project was wrongly understood as a fake. But its inefficacy in
the media dimension is in accord with the empirical results that Martin Doll (2012)
gathered from various fake cases, showing that they frequently produce results
that are contrary to their intended disturbance of epistemological certainties. An
epistemological horizon, once exposed by a fake revelation, is all too frequently
re-established rather than transformed. I have ascribed this to a particular
structural problem (as analysed in Ch. 3.1) of fake; namely the tendency of fakes
to hierarchically split the audience in order to demonstrate its critique through a negation and disqualification of segments of the audience as involuntary accomplices, thereby re-enforcing prevailing epistemologies. The discourse-critical element in fake operations does not necessarily lead to a re-evaluation of the legitimizations of ways of knowing, as its critique is (although concrete and reflexive) ultimately negative.

The Ursula Bogner operation was markedly ineffective in the journalistic realm, but this was not on account of it being a fake, but rather because the journalistic media were not its intended target. The media activities coincided with the much more formative live operations of the project. Bogner’s status changed from that of a fake artist to that of an imaginary artist on account of reactions that appeared in the blogosphere to the first Ursula Bogner album, and in the course of live performances following both album releases. When addressing the matter of Ursula Bogner in live media (internet and live performance) I came to the conclusion that the operations and practices involved would be best described as a collaborative imagination.

Collaborative imagination is a research practice stemming from contemporary ethnography (Marcus 2007) that, in the aftermath of the writing culture critique of the 1980s and the concerns raised at that time over strategies of representation, has been specifically directed at developing new strategies for collaborative research and knowledge practice. I understand it as a form of performance ethnography in which ethnographers and local co-agents and accomplices collaborate in an imagination of a third entity, a co-performed and partially invented cultural element, drawn from the cultural imaginary. Collaborative imagination exceeds the dimension of fiction, which Foucault formulated for an archaeological methodology, in that it organizes the encounter with an audience as collaboration.
My conclusion was strongly motivated by the Ursula Bogner material itself; the (extended) liner notes to the records which propose non-positivist models of music research for compilation work, and are themselves documents of a polyphonal research process on Ursula Bogner by experts from the field of electronic music. These liner notes demanded collaboration from their readers as they more or less fabricated the author of the musical work that was compiled. Furthermore, the fact that Ursula Bogner’s oeuvre was released through the record label faitiche – a French and German translation of ‘factish’ (Latour 1999) – invoked the theoretical context of Latour’s network theory. This helped me develop a notion of celebrity as ‘factish/faitiche’; an entangled multiplicity of actions by various actors or aktants (human, non-human, producers, recipients). Celebrity productions in pop music commonly stage this multiplicity as a democratic activity, while a (ideology-)critical account may depict it as a ‘pseudo-collectivity’. By contrast, the critical practice of collaborative imagination of a pop music celebrity through a multiple-use name (or persona, such as Bogner) presents celebrity as a quasi-individuality and simultaneously refutes simplistic linkages to collectivisms.

However, due to its event character, collaborative imagination as a collective tactic often has unintended effects. When analysing the various live performance scenarios of Ursula Bogner from 2009 to 2011, I found their transformative potential to be unstable and contingent on a careful addressing of their specific audience(s). A collaborative transgression – with the recipients – of established, legitimized ways of knowing did, in part, take place in these performances: usually in small club settings, when the audience was addressed as participants and induced to complicit activities, and seldom in large-scale festival settings – only in the rare moments when the material objects ‘documenting’ Bogner, instead of remaining objectifications, sustained a volatile mediality and
transformed into co-agents in a fabrication.

Collaborative imagination is a tactical critical practice, which forms a post-foundational critique on account of the provisional positionality of its agents (tactically stimulating new collectivities beyond social collectivism or individualism). In contrast to fake tactics, which employ a specific sequentiality in critically exposing epistemological practices, for the critique in collaborative imaginations, neither place nor time are of paramount significance. Instead, the process of knowledge justification is itself redefined. Such an alternative epistemology is (self-)critical of the nexus of power and knowledge and aims to disarticulate what is considered a way of knowing. The transformative effect of collaborative imaginations, although unstable, is likely to occur in the liminal situations of live performances. And herein lies the crucial difference to the fake, the transformative potential of which is dampened or even negated because, although it targets dominant media discourses, it does not (positively) offer alternative legitimisations of knowledge.

Translating the critical practice of collaborative imagination to the field of scientific practices, I discussed the multiple-use name, which has as its target individualized authorship in academia, and the lecture (live) performance, which aims its critique at the textualism of academia, as already postulated or established formats. Performance research today has to meet the challenges that a post-Fordist knowledge economy, which re-appropriates process-orientation as flexibility of an increasingly individualized researcher, poses on academia. Advocating the format of collaborative imaginary ethnography, the chapter ends with a conceptual sketch for this 21<sup>st</sup> century methodology that is self-critical, affirmative and reformulates processuality as collaboration with co-agents from the field and in the audience. The collaborative practice of imagination can bring about an intersection of aesthetic-mimetic and discursive-diacritic forms of
knowledge, while a differentiation of the imaginative from the imaginary produces a reflection of the constitutional fields of knowledge, thereby allowing for new crossovers and connections between these traditionally distinct forms of knowledge. Unfortunately, the heterogeneous forms of knowledge participating in the practice of collaborative imaginary ethnography must remain the topic of a future research inquiry.
4. Conclusion: Satellites of the self

‘Unlike duplicates fly away in unsteady orbits.

Satellites of the self.’

Ursula Bogner, liner notes to ‘Trabant’, 02/12/1970

(Pekler 2011:116)

Since the late 1980s, through its anonymity practices, electronic dance and pop music has advanced an aesthetically and socially productive critique of the institution of individualized star personality in pop music. Socially, the personal anonymity of producers and dancers effected a collectivisation and allowed for non-identitary community formation. Aesthetically, the scene largely eluded linguistic discourse through anonymity practices that made use of sonic, dance and media invisibility strategies. Yet, beginning in the early 1990s, the anti-discursive refusal of personality and resultant ephemerality of this music culture itself became an object of representation in media and academic discourse.

While the oft-depicted radical anonymity of electronic dance music (EDM) continued to fundamentally refuse star personality with the help of sonic and anti-discursive strategies, the practices of anonymity performance, investigated here for the first time, deliberately enmeshed themselves in the discursive and media institutions of pop music.

For, within the confines of linguistic (i.e. academic, journalistic or scene-internal) discourse, anonymity never stays still. For example, definitive knowledge about an anonymous subject, cannot be produced without impairing her or his anonymity, without registering or making her or him known. Anonymity is an unstable object of knowledge – and as a quasi-object (Serres/Latour) it corrupts distanced forms of inquiry. Therefore, as it becomes an object of (academic, i.e.
discourse-bound) knowledge, electronic music culture calls for an experimental methodology.

This study has set out to find new ways of knowing about anonymity in electronic pop music. Towards this aim, a transdisciplinary process of finding (critical) knowledge practices in theoretical, but also in musico-artistic fields has been activated. Rather than serving as examples, the selected musico-artistic anonymity performances represented here are the laboratory cases of this study; they initiated a (successively documented) learning process of the researcher herself, while formulating self-contained models of knowledge practice that were not only productive in this study but are also potentially applicable in the wider field of scientific practice.

My analysis of anonymity performances in electronic pop music began with the application of the concept of critical practice as formulated by Michel Foucault and further developed by Judith Butler for a practice-immanent rethinking of criticism as a post-foundational and self-critical practice. Enlisting the aid of Foucault and Butler, the criteria I mapped out for critical practice (of concreteness, positivity and self-reflexivity) proved to be productive for an analysis of the musico-artistic anonymity performances under investigation here. In addition, a further aim of this project was to implement the standard of self-criticality from critical practice in this study itself. Therefore, critical practice was not only an object of investigation, but was itself applied as research practice.

Critical (research) practice was realized in this project by carrying out research as performance; the present performance ethnography experimented with research as performance in the tradition of activist and performative anthropology. Resisting the impetus of objectifying culture as factual research object, this study explored the processuality and performativity of cultural research. The
transdisciplinary process of finding new knowledge practices – stemming not from the theoretical but from the practical musical field – has been documented in this performance ethnography. Continually guided by its laboratory cases, this performance ethnography processually imported concepts from the laboratories, refined them, screened them for their limitations and from time to time also abandoned them. Its writing style developed from a reflexive to an increasingly performative one (Phelan, Denzin), so that the text increasingly evoked what it named and showed rather than told. Finally, an auspicious new knowledge practice (collaborative imagination) from one of the laboratories was adopted and proposed as a new research format productive beyond the scope of this study.

Sorting through the various strata of (subcultural) EDM and the mainstream club culture of electronic pop music that grew out of it in the 1990s, it became apparent to me that these new ways of knowing are to be found precisely on the fringes: among musical artists who position themselves at the liminal zone between subculture and mainstream and at the margins of electronic dance or pop music in general as genre-crossers and instigators of avant-garde projects.

Free of EDM’s subcultural dogma of withdrawal from discourse and critical of the mainstreaming of the radical chic of anonymity that took hold in the 1990s, these music projects resolutely employed language and discourse in experimental and artistic ways.

Although anonymity practices and anonymity performances are both activities critical of personality-centred discourse and the ‘star subjectivities’ that developed in pop music (and reached maximum extent in the superstar culture of the 1980s), anonymity performances accentuate singularity and self-reflexivity rather than the habituality of EDMs subcultural routines of anonymity practices. Instead of doing anonymity, the projects I had come to observe perform anonymity and decidedly employ discursive representation and engage in public media.
Although Moodymann and Ursula Bogner, the two laboratory cases of my study, certainly also made use of non-discursive media such as sound and the dancing body, they both explicitly engaged in language and discourse. Their operations of articulating anonymity in performances were the focus of this study and I have come to understand these as discourse-centred performances of anonymity.

When following these projects in their ways of producing critical knowledge about anonymity an anchor in the paradigm of the performative was essential. Yet I found the extent of engagement with the performative, as the principle of the duplicity of practices in both iteration and generation (Derrida/Butler), to be very limited in music studies. Scholars engaging with performance in music have tended to concentrate on the analysis of discrete performance events (in real time or as recordings, both taken as self-evident objects of analysis), have emphasized performance as a processual, social activity (as habitualized social practice), or have approached musical performance with a quintessentially processual terminology (such as sound intensities and experiences). By contrast, I suggested (with Toynbee) investigating the duplicity of the performative in musical performance through a differentiated vocabulary (deriving from performance theory) of performance as both processive and theatrical.

At a later stage of the study, the notion of the duplicity in the performative was transported to the field of practices via the notion of tactics (de Certeau). A tactic is a performative practice that expands the ideological or social positioning of a critical agent to a wider framework of time and space: doing critique with the help of tactical formats does not necessarily result in disclosing one’s consistent intentions but in tactically re-positioning oneself (temporally or socio-spatially). This reformulation tied in with a rethinking of critique as practice as provided by Foucault and Butler, who framed critique as a positive doing, emphasized its performative and action- orientation, and, with their post-foundational
approaches, advanced a basic dupli- or multiplicity of epistemological or ideological positionings. Contrary to the radical collectivism that is usually connoted with the electronic music scene, the two laboratory projects of this study were not consistent in their ideological positioning (towards individualism or collectivism). Their critical practices (rather than negating refusals) of pop personality were therefore more specifically understood as tactical critical practices. The medium of their artistic investigation was performance, and performance’s conflation of process and product and its capacity for synchronical, dialectical (rather than linear) argumentation was productively combined with tactical practice.

Contemporary performance studies – spanning the fields of theatre studies, anthropology and ethnography, sociology, psychology and linguistics, and bringing together various fields of human action under one cross-disciplinary paradigm of a general duplicity of (theatrical, social and linguistic) actions – provided another anchor for this study. Performance is here not only understood as the subject but programmatically also as the method and activity of study. Despite this programmaticism, the performative has nevertheless found its way into music studies all too frequently in the rhetoric of the performative ‘nature’ or essence of music – while the performative aspect of music studies’ own knowledge production is largely left out of the analysis.

In contrast, I have developed a methodology for the performance ethnography (Conquergood, Denzin, Madison) of music-cultural practices, which integrates the performative as the principle of the duplicity of practices in both theory and methodology. I combined the theory of the performative that understands linguistic (incl. academic) discourse as action with a symmetrical methodology developed by Latour, that undermines the subject/object-gap of modern science by following the knowledge practices of laboratory subjects as quasi-objects of
research. Both sociological practice theory and the performative science approach were essential for the development of a transdisciplinary concept of knowledge practice, which reframes knowledge first as a practice (rather than an inventory) and second as the performative activity of scholars (as well as other knowledge producers), which does not neutrally represent a pre-given reality but also enacts this reality.

The symmetrical methodology adapted from Latour (1999) allowed me to follow knowledge practitioners other than myself in their knowledge practice. I followed pop music agents into their musico-artistic laboratories – projects in which they perform discourse of anonymity – and reported on the critical knowledge practice of anonymity as developed and deployed by these agents. Drawing on the current of thought and practice of performance anthropology, where the scholar engages in a triad of performance in theory, analysis and activity (Conquergood), performance has been incorporated in this academic study in three ways: Continually learning from its laboratory cases, this research report documented the researcher’s processual development from detachedly analysing a live performance as an object of study to becoming an engaged performance ethnography – with intervention in the research field and collaboration with the musical project ‘under study’. Secondly, this report also made use of elaborated reflexive ethnographic writing styles, such as using poetic and literary language, the inclusion of the ‘I’ of the researcher and an ongoing narrative of the research process, while in later stages of this study more experimental forms of performance writing, namely a fictional encyclopaedia entry, were employed. Thirdly, and lastly, in the final stages of this study I reviewed another of Latour’s symmetrical concepts, which I had found through one of my musico-artistic laboratories: the factish/faitiche. This portmanteau term, a combination of the words fact and fetish, is not a conventional analytical category but, according to
Latour, denotes a type of action that sidesteps the modern divide of fact (nature) from belief (society). Faitiche can be understood as a meta-concept for a methodology that is corrosive of the distinction between subject and object of research, and therefore, albeit in retrospect, also as quasi-methodology for this study.

The meeting of musico-artistic and scientific ways of working was facilitated in this study by the common ground of discursive practices. Both of the laboratory cases in this study were engaged in the discursive realm, yet they were found to have taken differing routes towards their critiques of star personality in pop music. Researchers can learn from their tactics, and from their respective musico-artistic knowledge practices one can deduce further formats for critical intellectual practices.

Detroit music producer Moodymann critiques the pop personality as a construction of the (historically evolved and medially operating) pop music industry, and in a live & DJ performance (2006) reviewed here he exposed – with the help of a stage-covering curtain, voice-over-techniques and radio-DJ-like verbal commentary – the various historical and formal-aesthetic dimensions of the star personality in pop music. His representative-descriptive, or enacting, and to a lesser extent interactive performance was strongly evocative of poststructuralist star studies, which analyse the historical and medial parameters of celebrity in specific cultural industrial fields via descriptive texts. However, in his mimetic deconstruction of star personality, Moodymann was predominantly authoritative (and only somewhat dialogical), and his (primarily self-enabling) performance as an eclecticist and conceptualist lacked the self-critique, which constitutes a criterion for critical practice.

Notwithstanding, this project became productive for this study because
Moodymann, in return, alluded to a limitation of the concept of critical practice itself. In his performance he incorporated the strategy of *insistent naming* (Diederichsen); he identified himself emphatically with the musical history of African-American Detroit and thereby situated himself in a decidedly minority position – a position from which an initial recognition within an identity system is aimed for (in lieu of a critical reflection or destruction of this discursive system). Seen against this background, critical practice was illuminated as an exclusive practice of privileged subjects who aim to unlearn the privileges of their subject position instead of struggling to win a position as a subject in the first place. Although the Moodymann project did not lend itself to formulate a model format for self-critical academic practice, it pointed to the limits of critical practice, which criticizes institutions from a privileged position or only when acquainted with institutional knowledge, and is therefore not accessible to everyone.

Self-critique was central to Ursula Bogner, the second laboratory project – here, epistemological horizons (even those of one’s own critical practice) were exposed. A critique that merely bemoans factual states, was transformed into the fiction and imagination of alternatives; an exploration of potentialities. The project developed an alternative historiography of electronic pop music by introducing a female pioneer into its history – through the rediscovery and reworking of Ursula Bogner's recordings and via the presentation of an interartistic oeuvre in exhibitions and in book form. Despite overlapping with the practice of fake (a temporary simulation and ultimate exposure of epistemological certainties) the project of Ursula Bogner as *collaborative imagination* could be clearly dissociated from a fake: because the fake deceives parts of its audience and at its eventual disclosure admonishes this audience of its naiveté, it introduces a clear hierarchy between forms of knowledge. Collaborative imagination, by contrast, aims for a transgression of legitimized ways of knowing by sustaining an ongoing liminality.
between amateur- and expert knowledge (the audience is likewise recipient and producer) and between discursive-retrospective criticality and creative-productive imagination.

The Ursula Bogner project staged the pop personality as a receptive void, to be filled with collaborative imaginations. With its artful invocation of a process of research, the Ursula Bogner project also pointed to a possible widening of scholarly practice, from which exemplary formats for critical academic practice could be deduced. These include the adoption of multiple-use names, which has as its target the institution of individualized authorship in academia, and the (live) lecture performance, which aims its critique at the excessive text-dependence of academia.

A hybridity of forms of knowledge similar to that of the Bogner project can be found in performance studies which mediate between analytical and artistic ways of knowing as well as between legitimized and precarious forms of knowledge (Conquergood). In order to introduce the format of collaborative imagination into performance studies, in its final part this study turned from solely applying to conceptually advancing ethnography as performance research. For performance studies, it was the reflexive turn in cultural anthropology that was the primary catalyst for a new self-criticality in the production of knowledge; ethnographers’ critical perspectives have manifested themselves (since at least the 1960s) in self-reflexive writing styles and, since the late 1980s, in methodology, with the emergence of performance ethnography. In this study, researcher and performer have been conflated in the figure of the ethnographer, whose ‘field experience’ includes role-play and role reversals between distant observer and involved participant. In the field, this study experimented with collaboration and tactical re-positioning between involved and distanced cultural critique as a performance, and in the text, with writing as the medium for the researcher’s performance;
a new way of staging scholarly knowledge practice and negotiating the relationship to a reading public has been developed through the text format of the fictional encyclopaedia entry.

In performance ethnography, alternative knowledge practices of cultural co-agents are included as inherently active sources of research. In the cultural studies of music, a similar performative turn could be advanced by conceptualizing as performance not only sonic and bodily performance practices, but also discursive ways of knowing about music as they are practiced in the academy and in the field. Such a new performative form of music ethnography radicalizes the act of researching. In this study, the laboratory case of Ursula Bogner provided a format for such a new form of research; collaborative imagination together with research subjects and with audiences. This research format seems to be particularly suitable for dealing with sensitive research subjects that disallow simple testimony or disclosure (Hamera 2011) and, like electronic dance music, are themselves resistant to an imperative of self-disclosure and spectacular identification.

So far, the scepticism of electronic dance and pop music culture towards discursive engagement has effected a shift in music studies to sound-centred perspectives and to a processual vocabulary; the non-semiotic, sensory qualities of pop music sound and its capacity to stimulate and collectivize have been adequately theoretized. Now that theory and terminology seem to be firmly in place, only a congruous methodological answer to electronic pop music’s withdrawal from discourse and explicit language remains to be given. Instead of continuing an authoritative discourse about ‘electronic pop music as existing outside discourse’, a transdisciplinary methodology that establishes a symmetry in the knowledge production of research subject and research object is required. Following a suggestion from one of my laboratory cases, I advocate collaborative
imaginary ethnography as a possible alternative research format. When collaboratively imagining a cultural element, figure, history or future, the reality of the field culture becomes synthesized with the imaginary of the investigating (ethnographer’s) culture, while the speculative and performative character of any object of cultural inquiry is foregrounded. The research format of collaborative imaginary ethnography awaits further elaboration – to me it promises to work against the fetishisation of the research object as the ‘other’ by corrupting the researcher’s own impetus to differentiate, and in its place fosters a diversity of perspective. ‘Unlike duplicates fly away in unsteady orbits. Satellites of the self’ (Bogner 1970).
5. Appendix

5.1. References


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