collective rhythmic grouping (CRG)

ACCESS TO DYNAMIC FORMS BY ARTICULATING RHYTHMIC ENCOUNTERS
IN NEIGHBOURHOODS OF THE PERIPHERY OF ROME

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A thesis submitted to the Centre for Cultural Studies of Goldsmiths College
University of London for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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DECLARATION

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(30th of November 2016)

resubmitted in February 2018

Timothy Pape
To my family
COLLECTIVE RHYTHMIC GROUPING

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the emergence of urban phenomena through a rhythmic articulation of dynamic forms in neighbourhoods of the periphery of Rome. It explores how we can engage with the dynamic of intertwined urban forms, despite only seeing them in particular perspectives.

The argument is based on a radical reformulation of our thought on visuality, de-centring perception from the human subject into the phenomenal field, following the phenomenology of the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. As a ‘thing’ among ‘things’ we participate in the emergence of urban phenomena, and this participation cannot be reduced to a binary, positive or reciprocal relation of seeing and being seen, but includes invisibility. Drawing on the rhythmic theories of the poet Friedrich Hölderlin, these participations repeat themselves on different levels of an eccentric path and in such a way trace themselves. This opens up a ‘thing’-Umwelt relation (in an Uexküllian sense) that shapes dynamic form, not as another whole in which the ‘thing’ would be alienated but as an articulation of variations. Starting off with a discussion on urban “collective-form” referring to the architect Fumihiko Maki, an aesthetic investigation on neighbourhoods in the periphery of Rome provides possible approaches to what I have named collective rhythmic grouping in urban research.

The thesis is an experiment that challenges the limits of reflective thought on urban dynamic forms through an aesthetic reflection that refers to philosophical aspects but is essentially grounded in my own practice as urban researcher. The rhythmic approach aims to contribute to engaging with urban phenomena as ‘built’ collectively of all ‘things’, while this very participation reclaims an Umwelt of human ethical responsibility.
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This thesis investigates the emergence of urban phenomena through a rhythmic articulation of *dynamic forms*. It aesthetically reflects our participation in the *encounter* with urban worlds, in which we humans negotiate our tragic existence: as social individuals with universal aspirations and particular material constrains, and as creative masters and errant slaves of our aesthetic ideas. Trapped in these oppositions of abstract theory and creative practice, any urban research is radically and concomitantly social, artistic, and philosophical. The aim is not to propose yet another perspective on urban reality. Rather, this thesis follows an experimental path belonging to a de-centred phenomenological approach, which challenges the limits of critical thought on urban form through a rhythmic articulation. Necessarily, this has demanding implications on the composition of the thesis itself, which subscribes to different disciplinary standpoints on the perception, production, and transformation of urban form. Hence, the purpose of this introduction is first and foremost to invite the reader to follow me on an *eccentric path* of research through key clarifications and ruling-out objections of principle. In the first outline, the selection of themes and authors, theoretical implications, methodological design, sequence of contents, and my own personal motivation sketch out the experimental character, the articulating potential and analytic limits of the presented approach.

*EXPATRIATION TO URBAN ENCOUNTERS*

The thesis engages with urban neighbourhoods, that is, worlds that are significantly characterised through human co-production of social and material practices and struggles. It attempts to aesthetically reflect on how we participate in their articulation, which necessary excludes an ‘a priori’ determined definition of what urban reality is or what cities are. As if we attempt to understand our tragic existence as urban reality, we might be tempted to say that its insoluble oppositions belong to the complexity of actual urban phenomena, or, in other words, to an ambivalence of subjective experiences. Consequently, they are set
aside or included only as particular cases within urban sciences that we believe will progress to explain these phenomena by their universal conditions and from without (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 14ff.). But what are these universal conditions and what is urban reality? It is neither the ‘thing’ I see, the sensible, nor my abstract understanding of it, the intelligible, both of which come to a stand in human subjectivity. Reality is objective. It is that which we have succeeded in determining by authorized variables and measurements. This reality, however, owes nothing to our encounter with ‘things’, if it regards them as objects, or things-in-themselves, as this excludes our judgement of the encounter as subjective. At the same time, these encounters are the seed of urban actuality that defines our urban problems, which thus urban research little by little reintroduces as objective particular cases. They are retranslated into the language of dialectic relations of reason that define the world of critical research, as if reflective thought needed to except itself from the relativities it establishes (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 16). In the course of this thesis, I will return to multiple variants of this in-built dilemma in more detail. For the moment, it is only necessary to rule out the objection of principle that would stop the present research project at the start.

The opposition of immaterial theoretical standpoints and the production of material ‘things’ is a prevalent issue in contemporary urban or architectural related teaching, research, and practice. But how do we encounter with urban ‘things’? And what are these ‘things’? If they would be stable and determined participants in a factual way, there would be no need to engage with them. A bench in a park or on a square is usually considered a place of rest and recovery, while a bench on a bus stop would be perceived as waiting area zone. If this bus stop has a little roof it can become a place of refuge or shelter in a sudden cloudburst. And if not, or if the bench is dilapidated, this would express a poor supply of public services. Urban ‘things’ come with transformations through different aesthetic constellations and moments of their lifespan. In their aesthetic contribution, urban ‘things’ are historically related to associations and memories and culturally related to their contextualised meaning. If we encounter ‘things’, there is an “excess" to their recognition as objects. Hence, in everyday urban actuality, ‘things’ do not participate as determined objects or appearances but in
relation to material and immaterial contexts, traces, stories and meanings. This relation of participation is named *Umwelt* in the present work.

These *Umwelt*-relations express themselves in *dynamic forms* and thus imply that meaning is not purely immaterial or subjective and ‘things’ are not purely material or objective, but they are intertwined. In fact, a pure separation of material and immaterial leads just to yet another insoluble opposition, that of natural and cultural or historic ‘things’, the latter two of which would be determined by a culturally or historically ideal form and principal of creation. It is this notion of cultural form that has led to an aesthetic idealism of our urban worlds. But is it not precisely the aesthetic character of our urban culture that prevents its capture by theory, with this possible capture being at the same time what aesthetic idealism consistently suggests? Actually, in the emergence of everyday urban phenomena our aesthetic idealism, its universal claims, its failed ambitions and its discharged delusions, all participate as dimensions of our urban world, as they are perceptible as determined forms, materially and immaterially. The human senses the terror of its material connection and opposes it with ideal form. This is a vicious circle that keeps on further separating the poles and, far from being a contribution to urban freedom, it leads to a tyranny of excessive subjective imagination, the tyranny of aesthetic ideas. Particularly in the post-Enlightenment tradition, this requires a high degree of subject centredness, as it is only the individual perspective that can be expressed in aesthetic appearance.

One of the most influential idealistic forms of modern times is the renaissance central perspective. Since the architect, artist and philosopher Leon Battista Alberti (in the fifteen century / 1991) introduced it as a theoretical organisation of visual composition, the central perspective developed to a trusted and taken for granted form of planning, production, and perception of our everyday urban life. Although its imperialistic influence materialised in urban agglomerations all around the globe, it remains an idealistic construct that expresses spatiotemporal dimension in an abstract and distant way, from a static and subject centred standpoint and in a fully determined form of visuality. Hence the central perspective is an omnipresent example of our distant aesthetic judgment that leaves us behind with the inner conflict between sensitivity and reason. This
conflict, however, cannot be understood in a self-exalting and distancing reflection but articulates in the aesthetic dynamic of our encounter with the urban world. The human individual with its Umwelt relation participates in the urban world, and it has to evaluate this participation in itinerant and reversal dynamic articulations of this individual-Umwelt relation. Thus, any attempt to elaborate on our participation in the emergence of urban actual phenomena has to articulate its dynamic forms in de-centred aesthetic reflection. This is how the present work attempts to challenge the limits of critical thinking about the urban and the still-all-too present dignity of architects or urban researchers who seem to be forced to behave as if they can fully determine urban desires, objects or practices. But the urban world did not know this at first. The dignity of human participation must be achieved in cultural and historical encounters, hence with an aesthetic reflection upon transformations, and hence their reiteration as expression in actuality.

/ ELIGIBLE WORKS FOR A DE-CENTRED PHENOMENOLOGY

This thesis engages with the historical and cultural transformation of eight neighbourhoods in the periphery of Rome (Part II). While Rome’s city centre is a prime example of a historical palimpsest over 2000 years, the tendencies of culturally, socially, economically and physically intertwined forms played a key role for Rome’s centrifugal peripheral development that only started in the twentieth century. The sample of case studies is distributed between different intertwiningents of three dominant peripheral building practices in the twentieth century - ‘speculative’ housing, council housing and ‘abusivo’ housing (a specific form of illegal building practice). On an eccentric path of urban research, the proposed rhythmic articulation of urban dynamic forms thereby draws predominantly on the work of three authors. The common ground is their unique and consistently de-centred phenomenological approaches - each with another emphasis - that do not attempt to solve dualisms but develop in a diametrical dynamic to relations of opposition of reflective thought. The Japanese architect Fumihiko Maki emphasises the productive tendencies of dynamic articulations with a proposal of a ‘generative element’ of group-form in his investigations on the physical participation in urban “Collective-Forms” (1964 / Part I). The German
poet Friedrich Hölderlin thoroughly evaluates a dynamic reversal of becoming and declining in his rhythmic articulation of a historically transforming tragic moment (Part III). This thesis engages mainly with Hölderlin’s theoretical essays (1961) and his translations of Greek tragedy (1974a). Finally, the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty elaborates on perception as ‘deviation’ (French écart), the invisible dynamic of seeing and being seen, that radically challenges our thought on visuality, de-centring the logos of perception to the encounter in the phenomenal field (Part IV). The elaborations on this ambiguous relation in an emerging phenomenon refer predominantly to his lectures on “Nature” (2003) in the late 1950s and to his unfinished and posthumously published book “The Visible and the Invisible” (1968a).

In the recent history of approaches to urban space and time, there are several influential writings that, despite challenging previously discussed dualisms in philosophy, this thesis refers to only in selective ways. This concerns, among others, the philosophers Henri Lefebvre (1991), Michel de Certeau (1994), Bruno Latour (2005) and Gilles Deleuze (1987). Over the course of my research, however, the thesis began to increasingly concentrate on the works of Merleau-Ponty, Maki, and Hölderlin for their unique and aesthetic reflection on dynamic relations in the emergence of phenomena, be it a generative, reversing, or ambiguous relation. I will try to spell out this essential way of dealing with dynamic relations by referring to two examples of Lefebvre’s fundamentally different and ambivalent understanding of ambiguity in his article “M. Merleau-Ponty e la philosophie de l’ambiguïté” (1957). This all the more stands to reason, given that the title of the present thesis is often set in association to Lefebvre’s “Rhythmmanalysis” (2004). To begin with, Lefebvre defines ambiguity as an eclectic character that relies upon investigations from different standpoints (1957: 37 in Silverman 1987: 67). Yet the ambiguity of Merleau-Ponty refers exactly not to the accumulation of different perspectives but to the dynamic articulation of their encounter, which is de-centred from any central perspective (1968a: 16). Elsewhere, Lefebvre argues that a “mode of existence is ambiguous because it is both mental and physical, internal and external” and relates this to the human body as intermediary mediating dualisms (1957: 47 in Silverman 1987: 68).
According to Merleau-Ponty, however, any intermediary or “in between” posits that what it mediates already exists, and hence reinforces any opposition it wants to solve (1968a: 200). The ambiguous phenomenon emerges through the participation of ‘things’ in an encounter, which articulates their dynamic forms. Hence this thesis takes an essentially different approach to Lefebvre, and it does not aim to solve any dualism of reflective thought but to challenge its limits through an aesthetic reflection on the essentially ambiguous relations between dualisms in the emergence of urban phenomena.

/ RHYTHMIC PRESENTATIONS AND RE-PRESENTATIONS

How can we think of losing our secure standpoint and principles to look at ‘things’? How can we approach a thinking that we want to challenge? This is where the potential of rhythm joins in with its way of articulation (chapter 09 and 10). In a de-centred phenomenological approach, the logos of phenomena ‘deviates’ from the human individual, or any ‘thing’, and shifts to their encounter in the phenomenal field. The relation of participation of ‘things’ in the encounter is considered their Umwelt relation, and this ‘thing’-Umwelt relation is articulated as dynamic form. In other words, a ‘thing’ that participates in an encounter always has Umwelt relations, which the other participating ‘things’ are part of. This relation is ambiguous and dynamic as any participating ‘thing’ is at the same time presented in the encounter as well as re-presented in the Umwelt relations of other ‘things’; (re-presented in the present work refers to the German darstellen and renders at the same time “exhibiting itself” and “producing a presentation” / chapter 05). Thereby neither the presented nor the re-presented follows any second order logic as in representations (chapter 08). If we think about these dynamic relations, however, we usually think them in oppositions, ‘thing’ and Umwelt, and we think them successively or hierarchically, one after, before, over or under the other. In a rhythmic articulation, these oppositions and hierarchies of thought are not simply rejected but part of the aesthetic reflection. While the oppositions relate over different levels in rhythm, rhythm also articulates a different hierarchy through its relation to its own re-presentation as a sequence of presentations.
Then what would be a rhythmic articulation of an everyday perception? According to Merleau-Ponty, the dynamic of the invisible is what makes us capable of perception (1968a: 248). This invisible, however, cannot be reduced to the backside of the ‘thing’ but articulates as ambiguous relation of the visible-invisible oppositions - or figure-ground relations - of all ‘things’ participating. It is the invisible of seeing and being seen. If we enter a bedroom, we perceive it as group of ‘things’ (the bed table, the cupboard, the window, the walls, the room) around a bed (as well a ‘thing’). We, however, only ever see one side of these ‘things’, for example an angle of the bedframe and a pillow or two walls of the surrounding room. These relations of front-back or figure-ground, unfold in rhythmic groups of related levels. Yet, these levels do not unfold in a hierarchy in front of us or for us. We are at the same time in the room and outside the bed. Actually, we participate in the rhythmic group and the bedroom now is a busy bedroom. It is the dynamic relation of the presentations and re-presentations of the constellation of ‘things’ related to different levels that leads to the articulation of a dynamic form of a bedroom. And the rhythmic repetition of these articulations in different historic periods or cultures re-presents a hierarchy. As a result, in contemporary Western cultures we perceive a bedroom as a group of ‘things’ around a bed that is considered here an accent of the rhythmic group. Yet accent must not be confused with stress. A jacket hanging on the cupboard, which reminds me of my brother, would be a stress and change my perception of the bedroom, while it would still be the perception of a bedroom. Hence while the stress refers to a more subjective aesthetic judgment of the constellation of ‘things’, can the collective aesthetic judgment of the bedroom be considered subjective in the same way? Or is objective? And does it refer to a purposiveness? Or to the constellation of others in our Umwelt relations? While in the given everyday example the questions all seem to refer to the bed as cultural symbol, this would be a reduction when it comes to the articulation of dynamic forms in the emergence of a phenomenon neighbourhood. It is a rhythmic articulation of a collective of individual participations in a constellation of others, of which they form part. The rhythmic re-presentation of this dynamic articulation is what we call collective rhythmic grouping in this thesis.
The thesis itself is presented in a sequence of different parts, which are themselves at the same time presentations and re-presentations. This raises the question of how an approach to rhythmic articulation, that challenges the determined form of any presentation as well as its related subject-centred standpoint of the author, can be presented in academic research? In other words, it raises the problem of articulating in an intelligible way but at the same time avoiding an ideological facing, which would be the delusion of a possible integration of the dynamic into an ‘a priori’ and absolute determined form. The proposed rhythmic research design attempts to articulate the “what” of presenting, which is guided by the respective challenges of the “how” of presenting by following an iterative but progressive path-finding. It examines the reciprocal determinations of relations of oppositions in order to elaborate on their limits, coexistence and relations across different levels of rhythmic re-presentations and to make them fruitful for an aesthetic reflection on the emergence of actual phenomena. This relation of analytic and aesthetic dynamic follows the sequence of presentations of different encounters with philosophy, art, urban theory and empirical urban research on various levels of participating re-presentations.

It begins with intelligible differentiations of ambiguous relation of text forms and concepts. The text introduces dynamically used terms like Umwelt, representation or dynamic form in italic letters, whereas abstractly separated terms like ‘in-between’ or ‘thing’ carry single quotation marks. The respective specific use of the words is introduced with its first appearance. The application of different re-presentations thereby attempts to rely on common tendencies. While, for example, the predominant use of “we” instead of “I” in this thesis refers to the de-centred individual – and hence at the same time collective participation in encounters, it is also a common stylistic means to invite the reader to participate. These differentiations of presentations continue on the level of language. While we claim here that any informative text (I descriptive-analytic) already follows a narrative thread, this thesis further differentiates between the more argumentative use of language (II descriptive-aesthetic) and the more persuasive articulation.
through language (/// aesthetic-analytic). Pointing at the main character of the chapter, any text is a combination of all these different tendencies, which is also traceable through the differentiation of subheadings in the chapters.

The textual re-presentations are thereby closely linked to the re-presentations of content. In this sense, for example, the empirical research is not understood as a basis for the thesis but as participative presentation in different encounters and through different re-presentations. ¹ While the argumentative and informative descriptions of the neighbourhoods in Part I and II refer largely to morphological analysis and secondary literature, the aesthetic of analytical experiments in Part V refers largely to the conducted semi-structured interviews, ethnographic studies and morphological observations. The empirical research, however, entailed also participatory approaches like professional involvements in the research context or shared productions of visual material with the neighbours. These find their way, in particular, into the sequence of figures in the thesis. Analogous to the textual re-presentations, this concerns figure-ground illustrations (descriptive-analytic), photographs (descriptive-aesthetic) and sketches (analytic-aesthetic). Visual figures in this thesis are not understood as mere illustrations of textual arguments. Rather the visual modes of re-presentations provide concurrent articulations of oppositions in thought and hence produce their own narrative. A brief description of the production of the main series of included photographs demonstrates this way of participation in the articulation of the thesis. In the 2003-2004 semester, I had the chance to supervise a master course at the Scuola Romana di Fotografia in Rome. With the aim to present neighbourhoods in one single photograph, sixteen students over four months produced a myriad of photographs in the eight case studies that were discussed on a weekly basis.

¹ The empirical data from neighbourhoods in the periphery of Rome used in this thesis was collected in several field studies and professional activities from 1998-2015. This includes commissioned works in architecture, urban studies and photography. All data used was generated by myself if not explicitly marked differently. An intense field research of a period of six month in 2003-2004 was co-financed by a research grant of the Arnold-Knoblauch-Foundation. In this period I also taught at the Scuola Romana di Fotografia (some related photographic works are included here) and started to develop a rhythmic graphic score, which I draw on in chapter (16). Part of the data collected in 2003-2004 was used for my master thesis on “Rhythmanalysis” in Media and Communications at the London School of Economics and Political Science in 2005 (the data concerned is referenced as such when it appears). A production of eight documentary short films on the neighbourhoods as research tool in 2003 was the centrepiece of my master thesis in architecture at the Technical University Berlin and is not part of this thesis.
As a result, twelve photographs became part of a traveling exhibition that was reintroduced into the neighbourhoods as well as different urban contexts (The photographs are presented between chapter 06 and 07). Experimenting with the central perspective of photography, this was the attempt to narrate the dynamic and ambiguous relations that emerged in the students’ research debate based on ethnographic conversations and observations, in a single photographic print. Dynamic in this thesis is not understood as a simple addition of a temporal aspect, as if we would understand a film as a sequence of static re-presentations from a central perspective. Rather each photograph participates itself as presentation, re-presentation and transformation.

I OUTLINE OF THE SEQUENCE OF CONTENT ENCOUNTER

Part I paves the way for a dynamic understanding of urban form related to urban theory and practice. It starts off with a morphological description of the periphery of Rome, which at first glance appears as a dispersed and formless accumulation of determined urban forms. Alongside Fumihiko Maki’s theoretical investigations on “collective-form”, in chapter (02) the encounter between different building morphologies of neighbourhoods articulates a possible understanding of dynamic form in the emergence of urban phenomena. This is followed in chapter (03) by a cross-examination of dimensional categories of time and space in urban theory, which enquires into the dimensionality of participating ‘things’ in the phenomenal field. In chapter (04), this de-centred phenomenological approach challenges the centrality of an abstract ‘in-between’ as a binary dialectic of action in practice.

Part II embeds the eight neighbourhood case studies in the historical emergence of the Roman periphery during the twentieth century. It begins with an elaboration of the empirically applied understanding of ‘neighbourhood’ alongside the discussion of the human-world relation in a de-centred phenomenological approach (chapter 05). The brief description of the neighbourhoods is presented in a dynamic articulation of the development of various physical forms of settlements related to a selective discussion of social, economic and political periods and tendencies (chapters 06 and 07). Thereby, different ways of re-
presentations - as figure-ground analyses, as photographic works and as descriptive text – give emphasis to the ambiguity of the involved phenomena. This methodological approach can be described as an iteratively and experimentally confronting, assembling, and comparing of different research perspectives, which in order to encounter with each other have to be open in their compossibility.

**Part III** articulates rhythmic re-presentations in encounters between philosophy, poetry and urban neighbourhoods. Chapter (08) elaborates on Hölderlin’s rhythmic approach that develops on an eccentric path with respect to classical ontology, critical philosophy, German idealism, and romanticism. This eccentric path builds up a dynamic in aesthetic reflection that challenges the limits of reflective thought. In the encounter with the synthetic work of Greek tragedy, the thesis starts to translate Hölderlin’s poetic logic in relation to urban form (chapter 09). Related to a brief investigation of historical transformations of rhythm, in chapter (10) its performance is set up as rhythm techne. This is followed by a first discussion of rhythm techne on a walking path in the neighbourhood Corviale.

**Part IV** perceives the emergence of urban phenomena in an invisible ‘deviation’ from seeing and being seen. At first, on the basis of an abstract figure, this ambiguous relation of a dynamic articulation is elaborated in a perceptual encounter and is discussed in relation to Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation (chapter 11). This is followed by a brief historic reflection on the ambiguity in spatiotemporal dimensions in chapter (12). Finally, chapter (13) investigates Merleau-Ponty’s notions of Umwelt and constellation of others, which de-centres dimensionality from the ‘thing’ and moves it to the participation in encounters in the phenomenal field.

**Part V** experiments with different encounters of rhythm techne and analytical urban research. In chapter (14) this starts off with an experimental measurement of the transformation of different characteristics of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘thing’-Umwelt relations referring to social and morphological aspects of the Roman neighbourhood Tuscolano. Chapter (15) addresses Maki’s ‘generative element’ of urban group-form as hero-Umwelt relation (Merleau-Ponty) in a historical tragic
moment of the neighbourhood Torre Angela referring to Hölderlin’s rhythmic representation of tragedy. The presentation of a rhythmic graphic score of social encounters with the urban morphology in the neighbourhood Garbatella in chapter (16) investigates a potential visual re-presentation of collective rhythmic grouping. All these experimental approaches are an attempt to point out potentials of the rhythmic approach referring to intermittent and theoretically framed samples that challenge our critical understanding of urban encounters while reflecting their own limits of application.

/ MY PERSPECTIVE AS URBAN RESEARCHER AND ARCHITECT

The proposed de-centred phenomenological approach to an aesthetic reflection through rhythmic articulation is also reflective of my personal and professional biography. It engages with an inner conflict between sensible experiences and reasonable theories that I am continuously struggling with in all of my various urban-related professions but which is also traceable into the neighbourhoods and homes in our cities. These encounters with the urban field consistently increased my doubt if this conflict can be expediently accomplished from one of its poles and hence beyond collective aesthetic judgments. I first came across rhythm in relation to urban form when neighbours in my research case studies mentioned it to express exactly this inner conflict. Then a rhythm of a neighbourhood is collectively and sensibly present but reasonably inexplicable. A few weeks later I noted in my dairy:

“Trastevere. Rome. March 2004. A morning like any other. But different. A ‘motorino’ is passing by, roaring through the open window. Some kids are playing in the street. Their voices reflect from the opposite building, from the façade. The sounds overlap. The streets are narrow here. From the radio, an Italian voice, I just recognise the rhythmic flow. An impression? My thoughts are somewhere else. In front of me, a newspaper. A German newspaper. […] My coffee on the table. I have to leave for an appointment in La Garbatella. With a neighbour. La Garbatella is a Roman neighbourhood. My research project. […] A ‘normal’ morning. Meaningful? Maybe. But is all this directed? By an eternal artist? By
thought? Or by my coffee on the table? And who articulates its rhythm?” (Pape 2005: 10)

This very personal statement seems to reflect, first and foremost, the solitary activity of a theorist or philosopher conducted in a remote setting. And certainly the solitary life of some great thinkers of modern times has contributed to this impression. If so, a fleeting remembrance of the birth of Western philosophy embedded in the life of ancient Athens may direct us to another narrative, that of increasing alienation, and challenge the advantages of remote thinking. While this thesis is informed by great theoretical and creative writings, its main inspirations steam from my various professional engagements in the urban context. This is the story of a continuous struggle with the same inner conflict from different perspectives. Here, the above discussed oppositions of theory and practice, social and material, subject and object primarily relate to my practicing as an architect, as a teacher of urban studies at university, and as a researcher in interdisciplinary research projects. In particular, through my consultancies for local municipalities on integrative and participatory planning on behalf of the European Commission, I could experience the amplifying effects of these oppositional dilemmas in their application. Working on disciplinary and professional interfaces always involves gruelling struggles and requires dedication but it also constantly discloses key potentials articulated in the urban field. This is even better traceable in intercultural collaboration. Many inspirations to this research steam from my work as a trainer in intercultural youth projects on the perception of urban space, where I could witness a practiced fluency in communicating cultural differences in extra linguistic ways, related to sound, photography, drawings and sculptures. With other priorities, this applies as well for my participation in rich and successful intercultural cooperations on integrative and participatory planning in Buenos Aires, Argentina, São Paulo, Brazil, and different provinces in Cambodia. It is important to clarify, at this point, that the present thesis is written, where not specified otherwise, from the perspective of contemporary Western cultures. Yet, it continuously engages with and is informed by cross-cultural and linguistic translations. This is to say, the thesis engages empirically with Italian culture, is written in English, and develops from my German professional perspective as an urban research scholar and practicing
architect. It does not aspire to be a conclusive study of the urban but to *dynamically* articulate relations and tendencies of artistic, philosophical and analytic aspects in urban research. In this sense, I would like to invite you, the reader, to follow me on the experimental path of rhythmic articulation that attempts to intelligibly and sensibly de-centre urban research through an aesthetic reflection.
Part I paves the way for a dynamic understanding of urban form related to urban theory and practice. It starts off with a morphological description of the periphery of Rome, which at first glance appears as a dispersed and formless accumulation of determined urban forms. Alongside Fumihiko Maki’s theoretical investigations on “collective-form”, in chapter (02) the encounter between different building morphologies of neighbourhoods articulates a possible understanding of dynamic form in the emergence of urban phenomena. This is followed in chapter (03) by a cross-examination of dimensional categories of time and space in urban theory, which enquires into the dimensionality of participating ‘things’ in the phenomenal field. In chapter (04), this de-centred phenomenological approach challenges the centrality of an abstract ‘in-between’ as a binary dialectic of action in practice.²

² To ensure better readability, the content structure of each of the six parts of the thesis is repeated at its beginning (see chapter (01) 017).
Rome is a unique city: unique for its ancient story, unique for its development on the threshold of modernity. Modernity arrived late in Rome because it failed to obtain the necessary industry or a corresponding working-class (Benevolo 1992). While other European capitals became megacities, Rome seemed to be a slumberous city with only 200,000 inhabitants, surrounded by green desert. The first major expansion of Rome in modern times was a doubling of population in the short period between 1871 (the year Rome became capital of Italy) and the First World War. This development was still largely confined within the ancient Aurelian walls, while the land of today’s periphery of Rome was almost completely uninhabited (Archibugi 2005:2ff). The concentration of land property of this surrounding area in just a few hands, half of which was shared between ten Roman families, was to play a major role in Rome’s urban development in the twentieth century (Insolera 2011:153). According to the former major Giulio Carlo Argan (1976-1979), the history of urbanisation in Rome is foremost a history of private interests and land speculation in a manner that resulted in the marginalization of a large sect of the population (Argan 1988: 10). A significant concomitant of these self-reinforcing tendencies was the birth of “abusivismo”, a characteristic form of illegal settlement construction. In the 1970’s it covered the residential development for a third of Rome’s population that had reached nearly three million inhabitants (Villani 2012:49ff). Under the speculative machinations of the landowners and the building industry paired with social segregation-promoting housing policies – particularly during the fascist regime of Mussolini –, the compact city centre seems to have suffered a centrifugation, in which the urban form exploded into a formless accumulation of dispersed pieces, most of which are settlements with a self-contained form (see figure 1.01). From 1871 until today the peripheral development of Rome was realised in an urbanized area fifty times larger than it once was while the population increased twelvefold in the same time (Piroddi 2006).
Figure 1.01 / Figure-ground plan of Rome 2000 / Timothy Pape 2016
A bird’s eye view of Rome enables us to speak about this ‘thing’ we call the city, well-defined by a thin black outline. At the same time, figure 1.01 is of course just an abstract figure-ground illustration of the city of Rome and the outline refers just to an administratively defined abstract limit. In everyday practice this outline can only be experienced by a diagonally crossed out “Roma” on a street sign when driving outside the municipal boundary. “Leaving the city”, however, we would most likely experience much earlier, somewhere in the outer periphery, when the density of buildings and population decreases significantly and is replaced by a vast open landscape. A city is not an abstract object of thought and has many definitions, ranging across numerous spheres, such as the political, social, economic, but also the material, morphological, architectural, and of course cultural. If we are pointing at or talking about the ‘thing’ we call the city, then we might helpfully think of this is an “act of deliberation in an assembly” (Harper 2017), which is one of the original etymological meanings of the word ‘thing’ (today, of course, the meaning of the word has associations with “material objects”).

Even if we think of a “thing”, just for a moment, as a material object, there is more to it, if we call it ‘thing’. In fact, we want to claim here, that part of the original etymological meaning as “assembly of deliberation” (Onions, Friedrichsen and Burchfield 1966:917) is still present in any ‘thing’ we individualise, especially in the everyday. In everyday life, a ‘thing’ not only takes up material traces of interaction, but a ‘thing’ acts as a kind of focal point for different social-cultural stories and meanings. This character of a ‘thing’, this first, actual, and reduced meaning of a ‘thing’ as anything “individualisable from a context”, saves us in everyday life from the labour of defining that ‘thing’s complexities. But without this surplus of the ‘thing’, we would not engage with it as distinguishable from its context. And without this interaction with us, we could not even call it “not yet named object”: hence, we could not talk about that ‘thing’.

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3 The etymology of “thing” is complex and ambiguous: from the Old English “ping” “deliberate assembly”, “affair” and from the Old German “ding” “assembly for deliberation” (Onions, Friedrichsen and Burchfield 1966:916). Both refer back to Gothic “penga” “agreement”, “assembly” and “pengaz” “appointed time”, time of assembly” (Kluge 2011:202). Today’s meaning possibly springs from a semantic shift as “the thing which is negotiated” at an assembly (Kluge 2011:202) with a notion of “stretch of time for a meeting or assembly” (Harper 2017). This relates to the French “chose”, Spanish “cosa” and Latin “causa” “judicial process” (Kluge 2011:202, Harper 2017). Other meanings that developed over time are in circa 1300 “personal possessions”, in circa 1600 “things the speaker can’t name at the moment”, recorded from 1762 “what’s stylish or fashionable” and from 1841 “do your thing” as “follow your particular predilection”, often associated with 1960s hippie patois (Harper 2017).
This is, how ‘thing’ is applied in this work, as “direction of individuation”: intelligibly, as “anything that is or can become an object of thought” (Ammer 2017), sensibly, as anything that is stimulating the senses, and, aesthetically, as anything that forms part of an ambiance. If ‘things’ would be reduced to a fully determined objects (things-in-themselves) or fully determined appearances of these objects (things-for-us), they could not participate in the emergence of actual phenomena, as, then, the being-in-themselves would cut all connection to their outside and being-for-us would cut all connection to their inside.

By talking about one single ‘thing’ - in this case, the city of Rome - we usually do not want to articulate its outside or its relation to any outside, which would be meaningful only in relation to or in comparison with other ‘things’ - in this case the surrounding landscape or maybe other cities. Rather we often point at a certain combination of ‘things’ that compose the ‘thing’, in this case, that compose the city of Rome, and that we can compare, whether that is materially, socially, culturally, politically, morphologically, architecturally or philosophically. In this sense, the abstract figure-ground plan of a city is a good example, as it does not give any information about the ‘things’ of the city apart from the distinction of what is built and not built, illustrated as black and white. However, the relation between black figures and white background, as well as the relation between groups of black figures and the ‘in-between’ white figures, can provide significant information about density, structure, social organisation, or ways of living. If we zoom in for a moment and imagine a group of single black buildings, the remaining white space between them would be considered - at least in relation to the construction industry - as empty, not built space. Yet, depending on the issue we related to the figure-ground plan, it could also illustrate oppositions like full and empty, occupied and available, private and public, or inside and outside. But is not ‘to be outside something’ always ‘to be inside something’ else? “To be outside something is to afford oneself the possibility of a perspective, to look upon this inside, which is made difficult, if not impossible, from the inside” (Grosz 2001:xiv). However, as claimed in this work, different perspectives on a ‘thing’ – in this case the city of Rome - do not only unveil different aspects of the ‘thing’s’ inside but also change the expression of the ‘thing’ and, with it, its outside and its relation to the outside. To see what cannot be seen from another perspective -
from above, from below, just as from another professional standpoint - always incurs a cost, which is the *encounter* with the other perspective. Not even an accumulation of perspectives could stand in for this *encounter* of the perspectives as long as we search for it in the different outsides affording the very perspectives and circulating around the ‘things’. In other words, this work is not about proposing any new perspective with the belief to unveil all that is not yet made visible, not yet made illegible, or not yet made knowable. And it does not claim to fully illuminate the “blind spot” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 33,78,248) of any one disciplinary perspective. It instead acknowledges the necessary existence of the blind spot and attempts to better understand its limits.

In his elaboration on visibility and invisibility, Merleau-Ponty investigates the *encounter* of ‘things’ in his philosophy. The eye, he posits, can change its standpoint and see what before was hidden – like the backside of an object. However, what it can never see, he asserts, “is what in it prepares the vision of the rest (as the retina is blind at the point where the fibres that will permit the vision spread out into it). What it does not see is what makes it see” (Merleau-Ponty 1968: 248). There is always a blind spot, which we cannot eliminate, but we should neither disengage nor ignore this aspect of the visible. The proper orientation towards the blind spot is to modify a given reflection by acknowledging the necessity of invisibility, which will always remain in the *ambiguity* of visible and invisible. For Merleau-Ponty the *dynamics* of the invisible are the connective tissue of the intelligible, sensible and aesthetical participation in an *encounter* (1968a: 174). With an aesthetic bias this work attempts to compensate a sensible and intelligible bias that claims the urban field, and which refers back to the transcendental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Following Kant, there are “in contrast to empirical cognition, […] encounters when [intellectual] intuition is incapable of supplying form to whatever triggered one’s sensibility. For Kant these encounters are not within experience” (Skorin-Kapov 2016:7). By contrast, in Merleau-Ponty’s elaboration of perception (see chapter 11), the invisible of *encounters* in the *phenomenal field* “spans the divide between a ‘cognitive’

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4 The term “*encounter*” is used in this work as ambiguous relation of different individuals that meet but are at the same time inseparable to the “one” *encounter* they meet “in” (see Onions 1966: 220,312)
approach, which considers scientific knowledge indispensible for a meaningful aesthetic appreciation of nature, and an 'engaged' approach, which rejects any form of Kantian aesthetic distancing" (Fóti 2013: 127).5

In urban studies, the firm perspectives of different worldviews, paradigms and disciplinary axioms have contributed decisively to an accumulation of knowledge, while the actual urban phenomena are trapped in the contradictions and fragmentation of this knowledge. While necessarily abandoning any secure standpoint in the competing perspectives in the urban field, this research develops progressively through their confrontations. It takes up different aspects of several perspectives - predominantly architectural, urban planning, socio-cultural and phenomenological - in the attempt to understand their participation in encounters in the urban field. In other words, although this approach necessarily incorporates and develops alongside competing centralised viewpoints, it attempts to decentralise and challenge any unambiguous allocation in the articulation of dynamic form.

/// WORKING DEFINITION OF 'FORM' RELATED CONCEPTS

In the emergence of everyday urban phenomena, various viewpoints, judgements and assumptions supplement but also contradict each other. This is why we start this elaboration by opening the field of research and reflecting on some binary and exclusive understandings, definitions and concepts in the urban field. Especially within disciplines, the affordance of new perspectives through the occupation of differently related or historically demanding surplus of ‘things’ has always led to new possible thematisations. That way, for example in the theory of architecture, the challenges of building design have become a conceptual problem with the very thematisation of the environment of buildings in the twentieth century. The increasing interactions of architecture and urban form in spatial design have caused a momentum addressing spaces of flow in the context of a reflexive dynamic of aesthetics (Waldenfels 1999:200ff). And it is

5 Chapter (08) provides a more detailed elaboration of Kantian aesthetics in relation to Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation.
precisely this ambiguous dynamic of its constitution in the spatial dialectic which reveals the sense of space. This taken for granted sense of space in urban design, however, opens up an indeterminate variety of possible practices. If at the same time urban planning and architecture are to be understood as a determined forms of production, this also raises the question of what it is that is produced through or by architecture. It is taken for granted in the present work that the construction of a house, a neighbourhood or any urban architecture has something to do with the production of a city’s space and time – and of course not exclusively. But how do architectural ‘things’ of a city relate to time and space of a city? Is architecture produced in space? Is city space possible without architecture, without streets, walls, buildings, parks, and neighbourhoods? It seems that in the practise of architecture abstract conceptions of space and dimensional sub-categories of space like place, scale or territory are competing with engaged understandings of urban space. For example, in a hierarchical concept of scale, a house can be built in a neighbourhood, or a neighbourhood can be built in a city, both of which have been already determined as such – through experience or abstract definition. In this line of thought it is even possible to think of a city space as a piece of white paper that is filled up with black figures - physical elements of the city and its inhabitants - that can be economically, sociologically or culturally examined and related. Then each part of the city can only match or not match its determined function, but they have no role in the constitution of abstract space that happened already on the white paper-level. At the same time we could think of a space itself that is built, placing elements of the city in configurations and relating them. But this space would need properties to be understood, like a neighbourhood space that can be built in a city space or a social space in a physical space and vice versa. As such configured space has and needs locality, however, as a question of ‘where’ cannot be reduced to a question of ‘what’ (Waldenfels 1999: 202). In other words, a spatial composition of a neighbourhood or city has a locality and cannot be understood as a thing-in-itself, which would turn it again into an abstract category. A spatial composition like a neighbourhood seems to be a ‘thing’ carrying surplus and thus cannot be separated from other ‘things’ through determined internal properties, but only in the encounter with other ‘things’ in or through time. In fact, in spatial practice space can never be separated from time, but remains always part of the
spatiotemporal dimension of a composition of ‘things’ we thematise. According to the philosopher Elizabeth Grosz, then these ‘things’ are “positioned or located in space only because time is implicated, only because the thing is the dramatic slowing down of the movements, the atomic and molecular vibrations, that frame, contextualise, and merge with and as the thing” (2001:168). In other words, the spatiotemporal dimensionality of the ‘thing’ articulates the in-itself and for-itself in a dynamic form in the encounter between ‘things’. And it is this dimensionality that the ‘thing’ loses when fully determined as an individual object.

While the meaning of the word ‘thing’ has gone through many changes in the history of thought, it is understood in this work as “direction of individuation”. This direction is not spatial or temporal, but understood as relation to the ‘thing’s surplus that makes an encounter possible. This is to say, the ‘thing’ is not that against which we measure ourselves and our limits, as if thought is inaccessible noumenon or reduced to a determined object, but the ‘thing’ actually participates, culturally and historically, in the emergence of phenomena by encountering other ‘things’. As a direction of individuation, ‘things’ enable the assessment of means and ends in practice, where they encounter us. In other words, ‘things’ make multiple different and directed actions possible in an engaged encounter. Their participation in the emergence of phenomena in practice, however, is, at the same time, indeterminate and not reducible to a multiplicity of determined options. In an urban context, the spatiotemporal dimensionality of ‘things’ can be understood as their encounter with their surroundings, and it is in this encounter that they separate to become individual objects. In the encounter with us “we actively produce objects in the world, and in so doing, we make the world amenable to our actions but also render ourselves vulnerable to their reactions” (Grosz 2001:172). If we see a ‘thing’, we see the form of how the expression of the ‘thing’ is articulated encountering our vision. We perceive, however, not only what we see but all ‘things’ that encounter articulated as dynamic forms in emergence of the phenomenon, of which we and our vision are only parts.

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6 Merleau-Ponty notes in November 1959 (1968a: 222): “A ‘direction’ of thought - This is not a metaphor – [...] because the originating locality, even in what concerns the ‘things’ or the ‘direction’ of a movement of things is not identifiable in ob-jective space either, not a relation in ob-jective space -A direction is not in space: it is in filigree across it - It is therefore transposable to thought.”
Figures 1.02 to 1.05 are abstract attempts to visualise some objectified notions of form and related concepts, whereas dynamic form - in the understanding of the present work – cannot be referenced to an abstract visual figure. “Form” is illustrated here as a black figure (see figure 1.02) with the impenetrable black signifying the dehiscence of aesthetics, the ‘deviation’ from an “object immanent world” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 216). 7 8 Thus, form is understood as an asymmetrical relation symbolised in the figure between a determined “outline” (see figure 1.03) and an indeterminate “black”. But it could be understood as well as asymmetrical relation between an organological and avant-garde technomorphology, between self-reference and hetero-reference in system theory (Luhmann 1995), or between a classical closed and a romantic open. Form in the present work is considered as a relation of asymmetrical oppositions of a whole. By contrast, “ensemble” points to all parts of a whole together with no opposition. As in a music ensemble, it is the general result of their arrangement (Hornby 1989:401). This is illustrated as a transparent figure with no absolute determined outline (see figure 1.04). A “composition”, again, is considered as one possible and determined relation of determined parts amounting to a whole (see figure 1.05). This determined relation of composition is usually understood as a composing act approaching from determined parts to a teleologically-imagined whole. In this way we would speak, for example, of an architectural composition, the result of which would not necessarily match its design, by an architect or a group of architects. On the contrary, “structure” moves a determinable relation of topological parts and a whole to the centre of understanding in the attempt to overcome an a priori posited dichotomy of form and content (Deleuze 2005). When speaking of structure in this work, we refer to patterns of organisation or assemblages, whose parts are topologically but not formally determined in their relation as a whole. In short, form, ensemble, composition and structure all deal in a different way with parts and wholes and their relation, determined and indeterminate, closed and open, as somehow structured action. They are

7 “The aesthetic world to be described as a space of transcendence, a space of incompossibilities, of explosion, of dehiscence, and not as objective-immanent space. And then thought, the subject is described as a spatial situation with its own ‘locality” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 216).
8 The use of “deviation” in the present work refers to the French écart (see chapter (04) 69)
possible determinations of thinking form, while dynamic form articulates their participation in the emergence of actual phenomena.

/ MAKI’S THREE PARADIGMS OF COLLECTIVE-FORM

In the following, the question of form will be discussed in a dialogue between the periphery of Rome and the theoretical “Investigations in Collective Form” of the Japanese architect Fumihiko Maki (1964). Written in 1960 as a critique of Western modernity, Maki’s understanding of the urban “as dynamic field of interrelated forces” is maybe more than ever relevant for a discussion on dynamic forms of contemporary urban agglomerations in a global world (Maki 1964: 7). To begin with, however, his urban theories need to be considered alongside the state of mind of his profession in the 1960s, when they were first published, as well as alongside his contribution to the metabolist movement in Japan. With an understanding of the growth of a city as organic lifecycle, the metabolists regarded Japanese culture as antagonistic to the functionalist and essentially uniform notion of Western modernism and its utopic proposals of urban mega forms of the time by Archigram, Archizoom or Superstudio (Lin 2010: 9). While the futuristic proposals relied on both sides on the conditions of advanced technologies and a nuclear world, the mega structures of metabolists like Kenzo Tange worked on an organic model, as the city would be continually regenerated and kept alive by an on-going replacement of parts on a metabolic cycle, as in nature (Taylor 1999:317). In other words, “they implicitly put an understanding of

9 Titled “the era of the international concept of utopia” by the architectural Journal Architettura contemporanea (Lin 2010:28), 1960s Europe saw a second wave of utopian architecture (the social utopias from the 1920s were considered the first wave of utopias). Focusing on new technologies and cultural conditions such as mobility and flexibility, the main proponents of these movements regarded utopias as instruments of societal change – often presented as mega structures. Some of the most important groups of the time have been Archigram from the United Kingdom (Architectural Association – Peter Cook, Warren Chalk, Dennis Cropton, David Greene, Ron Herron, Michael Webb) Archizoom (Andrea Branzi, Gilberto Corretti, Paolo Deganello, Massimo Morozzi) and Superstudio (Adolfo Natalini, Cristiano Toraldo di Francia,), both from Italy (Awan, Schneider, Till 2013: 87).
Japanese *collective* spirit over Western individualism” (Urban 2008: 94 / emphasis added). And while this Western-Japanese dichotomy was interpreted most differently from a Western perspective pointing at the heterogeneity of European culture or culture as such (Wright 1932, Taut 2003), even within the metabolist movement there has been a heterogenic understanding of the degree of *collective* and dynamism of the city. It was Maki’s proposal of “group form” (1964) - an unquestionably great asset to the metabolist movement - which divided the metabolists into two factions. Kikutake, Kurokawa, Kawazoe, and Tange were especially fascinated by the metaphor of city as one whole organism understood as “mega-structure”, whereas Maki and Otaka engaged with the generative aspect of a *dynamically* understood “collective-form” (Maki 1964). In an attempt to overcome the static nature of master planning, in group-form “the whole retains a fluctuating ambiguity with shifting focus from the whole to the part(s) and back again” (Taylor 1999: 316). It is this *dynamic* and *collective* focus of Maki that should not be dismissed, as it cannot be reduced to a critique of modernism in a postmodern way, but, as we want to claim here, this focus gestures towards a way of grouping modernist and postmodernist tendencies, that is, in grouping being and becoming.

According to Maki, collective-form can be understood as consistent explorations of the *dynamic* relationship between the whole of the city and its parts as well as their mutual influence on visible form. Inspired by Luis Kahn, Maki detaches design as an individual activity that belongs to its designer, whereas form refers to a *collective* practice. “One might almost say that it was a [collective] property […] before its discovery” (1964: 20). In the early 1960s, Maki published three paradigms of collective-form – “compositional-form”, “mega-form”, “group-form”– that define the possible basic relationship or linkage between the elements and the whole of the city.¹⁰ All three paradigms can coexist in the same urban configuration. They are not “seen as matrices set at odds or mutually exclusive” (Maki 2009: 16). According to Maki, the urban is “a dynamic field of interrelated forces. […] Any order introduced within the pattern of forces contributes to a state

¹⁰ Collective-form, compositional-form, mega-form/structure and group-form are equipped with a connecting minus (-) here, and marked as such in what follows, in order to clarify the reference to Maki’s concepts.
of dynamic equilibrium – an equilibrium which will change in character as time passes” (Maki 1964: 3).

The compositional-form is a historic design approach, where individually “tailored buildings are preconceived and predetermined separately” (Maki 1964: 6). Their relationship is of static character and established on a two-dimensional plan. Maki refers compositional-form to the traditional city, but also to the modern city planning of Niemeyer (Brasilia) and Le Corbusier (Chandigarh), who tended to design perfect and monumental objects. The act of making a composition with determined functions and linear visual and spatial relationships “has a tendency to complete a formal statement” (Maki 1964: 6). Thus, the compositional-form is usually applied together with the common urban development of master plans. In this way it fosters, according to Maki, the ever-growing discrepancy between the constantly transforming urban society and its physical setting (1963:258).

Mega-form and mega-structure characterise the metabolist design approach and, in particular, the interpretations of the architect Kenzo Tange, to which Maki refers. An established big and stable frame houses all the functions of a city or a neighbourhood and, in this way, leaves flexibility to its elements (Maki 1964:9). It is a combination of one mega structure and countless individual cells. In contrast to the compositional-form these individual cells in a mega-structure are not fully determined or designed, but first and foremost interchangeable and replaceable. Since its emergence in the 1950s, this design approach had a significant influence on city planning, owing to the demand for large infrastructure for, and massive scale extension of, our urban agglomerations. The metabolists divided the elements that take part in the development of cities into two “metabolic cycles”, one with a long-term and one with a short-term character (Lin 2010: 99). Long-term cycles refer to large-scale infrastructures and projects transforming the natural topography (such as highways), while short-term cycles primarily involve anthropocentric lifespans and scales (such as residential houses or apartments). This also reflects Maki’s interpretation of collective-individual relationships, in which the act of collective-form seems to become a kind of order that coordinates design. “Refusing to assert overall control in the mode of the traditional architect, he instead acts like a technical choreographer of movements and elements”
(Koolhaas et al. 2011:306). In this interpretation, the metabolist design of “artificial land” becomes a tool – as geometry is considered a tool for Maki - to free the human-nature relationship, which should not be dominated by the tool (Qiu 2013:62). Regarding mega-form, however, Maki also points out the static character of this approach, criticising its rigidity and monumentality, as well as its possible senescence, if new surprises in technological process and greater societal transformations come about. “Even though a mega structure allows for changeable infill, the main structure itself could become obsolete and lead to the failure of the entire system” (Maki 1964:13).

Group-form is the third paradigm and a new proposal from Maki with an indeterminate character or rather an indeterminacy within its emerging collective elements. He sees series of buildings or elements without apparent beginning or end and as sequentially repetitive. Group-form is itself only a case of what Maki calls collective-form. In a way mediating between the opposed concepts of compositional-form and mega-form, however, it results from “the dynamic equilibrium of generative elements” and thus entails per se the possibility of not seeking an absolute determined solution and of allowing urban form to modify as need arises (Maki 1964: 14). In shifting the attention from the subject to the generative element, on collective-form and its dynamic momentum, Maki also shifts the understanding of locality, visibility and situation. “Forms in group form have their own built-in link, [...] their] elements and growth patterns are reciprocal – both in design and operation. [...] The element of group form is often the essence of collectivity, a unifying force, functionally, socially and spatially” (Maki 1964:19). In this sense group-form could be understood as ‘deviation’ of the dialectic opposition of compositional-form and mega-form, a dynamic that includes Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of invisibility.11

11 The dynamic articulation between Maki’s paradigms of collective-form are related to Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation of different tones in poetic compositions in chapter (09)179.
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Figure 1.07 / Rome satellite view 1998 / (Fontana 2006:394)
At first glance, it seems difficult to talk about a collectivity looking at Rome’s overall form, which decomposes towards the urban hinterland as it dissolves fluently into a green landscape. And maybe there is no collective-form of the Roman periphery, at least not if this refers to any homogeneous structure. It would probably be more accurate to talk about many different Roman peripheries where different settlement processes. In particular, this is the case for Rome’s expansion since the 1950s and regarding the outer periphery, which is home of half the population. The master plan of 2003 declares this area “to be restructured” being poorly defined in its qualities of planned morphology, building typology, and infrastructure (Belfiore 2006: 37). It is tempting, yet also short-sighted, to call the common denominator of the periphery of Rome a general framework of serious deficiencies. The urban morphology and ways of life differ profoundly from one area to the next, between the north and the east, but also suddenly and within the same area since it is rather common to meet decisively different contexts of housing and collective-forms.

Looking from above, from a bird’s-eye or even satellite view (see figure 1.07), Rome presents itself in an explicitly centrifugal form. From the centre, inside the Aurelian walls - with its ancient monuments and building grid distinctively interwoven with the city centre extensions and its typical block structures from the early twentieth century - the Roman periphery can be divided roughly into two different phases and morphological appearances. The first peripheral extension develops star-shaped out of the old centre obliterating or at least blurring the circular form of the Aurelian walls and resulting primarily from the building constructions of the mid of twentieth century. Here the predominant morphological element is the typical Roman townhouse, so called ‘palazzina’ (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:50). As stand-alone multi-family house ranging from three-storey to five-storey residential buildings and sometimes fortified by up to nine-storey apartment blocks (‘intensivi’), the ‘palazzina’ mounts to an uninterrupted and uniform stone desert that is homogeneously distributed in the excrescences out of, and around, the city centre (see figures 1.08 and 1.09 / Insolera 2011:151ff). Formed as sharp star-tips or amoebiform outgrowth, the
ends of these excrescences indicate almost exclusively the abrupt transition to an open periphery and green pieces of landscape (see figure 1.07).

According to Maki’s interpretation of collective-form, and especially looking at the nascency of this first periphery that was for the most part developed outside the master plans of 1909 and 1931, this could be regarded as a group-form with the ‘palazzina’ as a repeating and generative element. Considered as an architectural building type, these ‘palazzine’ are all designed individually and different from each other regarding their interior distribution as well as the tones and texture of their façades (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:53). Given the negligible attention to the design of their surroundings and streets between them, their urban form - in this case the typically Roman building type ‘palazzina’ – seems to be their only collective link. Even their bigger sisters, the apartment blocks named ‘intensivi’, seem to be a collective of buildings with no surrounding, mostly because of the extreme density of buildings with almost no free or public areas. Consequently, with ‘palazzine’ and ‘intensivi’ as repetitive element, the old peripheral suburbs of Rome often have been, morphologically-speaking, almost perfectly grown together and are no longer recognizable as separated neighbourhoods (Muntoni 2006:147-153). One exception to this collective of group-form of ‘palazzine’ are the functional satellite city structures from the Fascist era like Cinecittà in the east or EUR in the south, a second service district built in the 1940s towards the sea (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:175-200). Another exception are the out-of-centre, radially lancing ancient Consular streets, alongside which an undefined agglomeration of low depots is sometimes blurring the sharp ends of the homogeneous stone desert of ‘palazzine’ (see figures 1.01 and 1.07).
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Figure 1.08 / Pallazine Parioli 1973 / (Muntoni 2006:153)

This figure was removed for copyright reasons. Please see original source.

Figure 1.09 / Palazzine Monte Mario 1960s / (Insolera 2011:25)
The outer periphery of Rome that has developed mostly after 1950 presents itself, in a sense, as counterpart to the homogeneous sea of buildings of the ‘palazzine’ periphery. It displays a composition of settlements that is difficult to read in a conventional way in terms of urban growth and development. In fact, the loss of the traditional structural elements of urban growth, the lack of planning rules, typological determinations, and structured open spaces are considered in the literature as exemplary of the loss of urban form in general (Della Seta 1988, Insolera 2011, Piroddi 2006). Settlements studied as singular parts of the city, however, provide clearly circumscribed and well-defined forms as urban fragments, radically autonomous, self-referential, and with no structural links with their surrounding contexts, regardless whether green or built. The major part of these dispersed build-up fragments are residential neighbourhoods that can be roughly clustered into three typologies that we will now elaborate in more detail.

In terms of population, the smallest of these typologies is represented through contracted public-private-partnership constructions. A careful analysis of these planned areas by the architect Valentina Pirrodi (2006) shows that, apart from the closed perimeter and the selection of abstract designs, most of these settlements appear in a morphological centralised urban design with a significant accumulation of circular, crescent or double crescent building typologies (Casal dei Pazzi, Prima Porta, Serpentara I and II, Tor Cenci, Vigna Murata, Vigna Casilino, Vigna Ferratella and others / Piroddi 2006: 40). These “cored” forms are highly introverted in terms of the creation of public space, even if not consistently pursued in the localization of public functions. In terms of Maki’s paradigms of collective-form they evidently refer to compositional-form with perfectly designed objects, whose functional, visual, spatial and symbolic relationships are determined already on a two-dimensional plan (Maki 1964: 6). Their formalised aspiration for possibly creating centres for urban life, however, remains theoretical and abstract due to the mono-functional character of these residential neighbourhoods and their remote accessibility. Furthermore, the hermetic sealing-off with fences and gates towards the surrounding open landscape and greenery (Belfiore 2006:39) reveals these neighbourhoods frequently in the light of “gated communities”.
The second morphologically characteristic settlement typology of the outer periphery of Rome is formed by the huge council housing projects accommodating in total about 400,000 inhabitants. Especially prominent here are the gigantic council housing projects of the 1960s that have been planned under the urban planning model “urbanity through density” (Corviale, Laurentino 38, Tor Sapienza, Vigne Nuove and others / Krämer 2001:49). These mega-forms arrive at building dimensions of more than a kilometre in length, with each project designed as entire neighbourhood for 10,000 to 30,000 people. In contrast to the qualities of Metabolist mega-structures, however, the individual flexibility and freedom of the apartment cells converted in the Roman council housing mega-forms into a sort of isolation. The inhabitants described them as prison cells (Corviale11 2004). Mostly explained by issues of marginalisation, segregation, occupancy policies, mono-functionality, and the incomplete state of the constructions (Kreiblich 1993b, Graben 2008, Panella 2009), their hermetically separated building structures could also be argued to contribute significantly to their isolating realities. As a basic principle of design, these mega-forms have been consequently separated from the outside, absorbing all possibilities for collective space and public services into the structure (Rossi 2009:84). In the end, however, and mostly due to funding shortfalls, these public services and collective spaces have only been rarely realised or finished.

The third, typology of the outer periphery are the called ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods. This typology of illegal urban settlements is a widespread phenomenon in the peripheries of southern and south-eastern metropolises in Europe (Kreiblich et al. 1993). In the mid of the twentieth century migrants have illegally built houses in self-construction for their families on affordable plots of farmland far outside the centre and without any infrastructure. Many of these

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12 These council housing projects were designed in the framework of the Plan for Economic and Council Housing (PEEP / 1964) and were mostly realised in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see chapter (07):135).

13 “Urbanity through density” was an urban planning model that turned away from modern planning principals and had its origins in Germany (Congress of the Association of German Cities, Augsburg 1960). The corresponding and typically large council housing estates are characterised by a high and mono-functional density of housing units and inhabitants. In Italy this building typology was strongly influenced by Unité d’Habitation of Le Corbusier, Marseille (Krämer 2001, Beckmann 2015).
illegally developed neighbourhoods have been legalised retrospectively in highly complex political processes, sometimes decades later. It is remarkable that the absence of urban planning regulations and master plans did not result, in the majority of cases, in chaos or in the development of “slums” but, rather, in successful models of decentralised social organisation (Clementi and Perego 1983). This is also traceable in Rome, where migrants mainly from the south of Italy acquired plots of farmland and illegally built houses for their family, as it was the only possibility for them to settle in Rome in the historically given political situation (Breil 1993:95). Initially, these ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods grew as small village-like neighbourhoods on the characteristic grid of farmland with rows of detached two-storey buildings and huge gardens, smoothly cross-fading into the open green of their surroundings. In addition to this, the conditions of the neighbourhoods that came into being, where the neighbours were strongly dependent on each other, led to close-knit neighbourly life in an open landscape of gardens that gave these neighbourhoods their characteristic form (see figures 1.10 and 1.11). If there is to be found an exhibit A for Maki’s paradigm of group-form in Rome, it seems obvious to talk about these ‘abusivo’ developed neighbourhoods. In Maki’s words, “the element of group form [which in this case could be the illegal houses with their attached gardens,] “is often the essence of collectivity, a unifying force, functionally, socially and spatially” (1964: 19). As the ‘abusivo’ settlements developed with a mutual neighbourly support, the extension of the neighbourhood also guaranteed the possibility for a further development of the building construction, extending them for new family members to join. In this sense, “the element and growth pattern are reciprocal – both in design and in operation. The element suggests a manner of growth, and that, in turn, demands further development of the elements, in a kind of feedback process” (Maki 1964: 19). Describing various traditional villages, where Maki found aspects of his proposed group-form, he also talks about “the repetitive patterns and the intricate order within the grouping of buildings” (Maki 2009: 14). Although this might be all valid for these ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods, it raises a lot of questions as soon as we try to determinedly define the referred to “elements” or “linkage” of them. And this is true as well for many of the previously discussed analogies with Maki’s paradigms of collective-form. Is the “repetitive pattern” an element? Is it the house of the neighbourhood or rather “the intricate order” of neighbourly life? Is
the linkage connecting the houses or are they rather connected by the “underlying internal order” (Maki 1964: 19) of open spaces ‘in-between’ the houses? If the houses are part of a “repetitive pattern”, what role is played by their individual difference? Why has it been possible to find analogies to Maki’s collective-forms on the scale of neighbourhoods, but not on the city scale?

For a moment, we want to hypothetically assume that the ‘houses of the abusivo developed neighbourhoods’ fit into the role of ‘generative element’ of group-form. These houses are built with local materials, in a similar organisation, on similar plots of farmland and potentially at least, as multi-family houses. They are, however, all individually different, due to different cultural backgrounds, different needs and economic abilities, or, in other cases, simply different tastes of the first owners. Thus, any repetition in this context necessarily includes collective similarities and individual differences. And as the emergence of group-form includes repetition, we would necessarily speak of a dynamic form in this context, as the houses participate in repetitive, but uncountable different of compositions in ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods. As Maki describes his group-form primarily alongside traditional villages from southern Europe, analogies drawn now seem to be rather obvious. We want to claim here, however, that the mentioned ‘generative element’ (the building typology of ‘abusivo’ developed neighbourhoods) can be found and repeats itself also in other collective-forms of neighbourhoods in Rome. The houses build in the ‘abusivo’ settlements have all the same characteristics of - and are as well called - Roman ‘palazzine’. Expressly, we talk about the typical and adaptable Roman stand-alone multifamily buildings that can be found in an uncountable repetition within the inner periphery of Rome. The Roman Architect Alessandra Muntoni even claims that the Roman ‘palazzina’ “is a way of urban living. It does not belong to the unity of a neighbourhood. … It is a way of being individual and metropolitan at the same time. […] As its reference it has not a single neighbourhood, but the whole city” (2006: 146). While this claim seems convincing looking at the morphologically blurred and mostly indefinable limits of the neighbourhoods within the inner or ‘palazzine’ periphery of Rome, it also challenges the understanding of ‘palazzina’ as ‘generative element’ in different ways. If the ‘palazzina’ is involved in group-forms of very different neighbourhoods – for
example inner peripheral middle-class and outer peripheral ‘abusivo’ (working class) neighbourhoods –, does the ‘generative element’ change with or even include the context or direct surrounding? And even more general, how can a group-form be understood on different scales, for example on a neighbourhood scale and at the same time on a city scale?

Continuing this line of thought, in a deduced interpretation of Maki’s collective-form, we might as well consider that the ‘elements’ involved in the emergence of collective-form operate in a sort of part to whole relationship in and over different applied scales. According to Agnew scale is defined as “spatial level - local, national, or global -, at which the presumed effect of location is operative” (Agnew 1993:251). Then how can Maki’s ‘generative element’ fit into this hierarchy of scales? Let us return to the example of Roman ‘palazzina’ as a unifying element for the social life of ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods, as well as on a city scale as a Roman way of life. Hence, if we reference the ‘generative element’ to different social and special dimensions, its unifying agency can as well turn into a separating agency. In fact, if we are looking at the territorial location of the ‘palazzine’ in Rome, we find a deep segregation of the Roman society. On the one hand, a typical Roman middle-class building in the inner periphery, while, on the other hand, a typical building for working-class in the ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods in the outer periphery. In other words, while their ‘palazzine’ stay for a unifying “Roman way of urban living” (Muntoni 2006: 146), the location of the neighbourhoods reinforce the hierarchal core-periphery social segregation in Rome (Bodenschatz et al. 2011: 45).

14 Chapter (04) further engages with the relation of a ‘palazzina’ with its surroundings as ‘generative element’.
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Figure 1.10 / 'abusivo' settlement Rome / (Benevolo 1992 (123))

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Figure 1.11 / 'abusivo' settlement Rome / (Benevolo 1992 (134))
The brief discussion of the periphery of Rome has already provided up to this point several possible analogies to Maki’s paradigms of collective-forms as well as many possible different interpretations and intertwinements of their emergence. Furthermore, a brief investigation on the quality of the involved elements, links and processes has pointed at the dynamic, multi-disciplinary and non-linear, but also mutual characteristics of part-whole relationships involved in emergence of urban form. Especially the discussion on Roman ‘palazzine’ and their heterogenic participation as repetitive element on different social and spatial dimensions raises the question of how this ambiguity can be articulated or to what dimensionality this articulation would be related? While chapter (02) has set some basic vocabulary and provided some first Roman examples for a dynamic understanding of urban form, the next chapter will further elaborate on the dimensionality of urban dynamic forms.
In this chapter, we want to engage with different concepts of spatiotemporal dimensionality applied in urban theory. To begin with, dimensionality in its abstract sense is understood here as a sum of degrees of freedom of a position or movement. With the decentred position or movement of dynamic form the question of dimensionality becomes a complex challenge because the firm spatiotemporal reference point of any measurement is dynamic itself. This complexity even multiplies when considering different qualities of time – for example sequence of events, duration, continuum, or possibility of retro-action - and different sub-categories of space, as well as their spatiotemporal interrelations. In urban theory and practice these different concepts and categories of dimensionality are constant and necessary companions, yet their often-opposing character also leads to obstructive contradictions, dichotomies and paradox. Whilst until now, the constitution of urban collective-forms of the periphery of Rome had been first and foremost a discussion of developments in historical times, spatial sub-dimensions like place, territory, scale or networks have structured the debate in different ways and within different disciplinary interpretations. In other words, if we consider space and time as abstract categories to describe spatiotemporal relations of ‘things’, then place, scale, territory, or network become sub-categories of time-space. In the following we elaborate on some different applications of these sub-categories and their combinations. Starting off with architecture and urban planning, the allocation of physical elements is often referred to social aggregates in explicitly described territories or places. In this understanding, territories and places are clearly determined and defined concerning their borders, sizes, and locations on the surface of the Earth and are related by measurable distances (Hartle 2006:180). The technical application of these sub-categories of space becomes primary for the operationalization and physical realisation of urban design and architecture. Following traditional geography, proportions in space and time are translated into the referential ratio of one distance to another distance or one size to another.

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15 Chapter (13) elaborates on Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of dimensionality.
size, all of which refer in some scale ratio to the individual human being or to any human activity (Hartle 2006:180). In its most radical understanding, space is then treated like an empty container for material objects, functionally structured for human use. This fosters, however, paradoxical assumptions. How can a planning practice that is bounded to administratively defined territories of responsibility relate to, for example, economic flows or social relations (Amin 2004:33)? The identification of themes of research in urban field studies is facing a necessity to engage with and reconcile different conceptions of spatiotemporal boundaries, hierarchical relations or “flat” interconnectivity. In fact, it is by codifying space and time and projecting a world that is divided not only into a horizontal dimension of different places, territories or networks, but also a vertical dimension of different scales, that spatiotemporal analysis acquires its conceptual and operational power (Collinge 2006: 244). While concepts of spatiotemporal dimensions have always been present in other disciplines, in recent decades particularly the social sciences have witnessed a more critical and reflexive engagement with their methodological and ontological implications (Brenner 2013:97). The variety of different disciplinary approaches to spatiotemporal dimensions, each of which has in turn been embraced as a focal point for spatiotemporal theory, has led to an uncountable number of succeeding, relating, opposing and transforming theoretical positions (Harvey 1968, Smith 1995, Brenner 2000 and 2001, Marston 2000, Park 2004, Swyngedouw 2004, Moore 2008, and others). It is difficult to overstate the conceptual transformation of these sub-categories of spatial dimensionality “from their geographical history as a foundational cartographic and operational primitive” (Marston et al. 2005:417). Thus, without disregarding the significant contributions of such analyses, it is claimed here that many of them have been too narrowly focused and have neglected to explore the interconnections among the various dimensional concepts, “leading in turn to a variety of theoretical deficits, methodological hazards, and empirical blind spots” (Jessop, Brenner & Jones 2008:398). After a brief overview of the recent history of the debate this work will analyse some aspects of the challenges of scale in cultural political economy by the Sociologist Bob Jessop (2009). This discussion of the transformations in the scientific debate seeks mostly to challenge the primacy, in any form, of a single dimensional category and to grasp, instead, the
inherently polymorphic, multidimensional character of spatiotemporal and sociospatial relations.

/ SUB-CATEGORIES OF SPATIOTEMPORAL DIMENSIONS

In an attempt to overcome the often-problematic spatial assumptions that underpin urban research, several transformations have occurred during the last fifty years across urban disciplines (Sheppard, 2002). In the middle of the twentieth century, the work of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology had a dominant bearing on urban analysis. For scholars like Robert Park, Ernest Burgess (1921 and 1925), and Louis Wirth (1938) the city was understood as an accumulation of socially differentiated neighbourhoods related through the dynamics of ecology with associated behaviours that can be observed and studied. This understanding of places as self-contained and more or less autonomous units of socio-spatial organization has been challenged since the 1960s above all by neo-Marxist approaches of scholars like Henri Lefebvre (1991 and 2003), Manuel Castells (1977 and 1996), and David Harvey (1993 and 1995). All of these neo-Marxist approaches share the belief that the social life of the city is not determined by the city itself, but that both the city and its social life are fundamentally conditioned by ideology and capitalist modes of production.

Following the critique of Ira Katznelson, a limitation of these Marxist urban theories can be found in their insufficient engagement with key aspects of Marxist theory, as neither Harvey nor Castells have systematically engaged with structure and agency or causal determination (Katznelson 1993:93). According to Lefebvre space is not a territorial condition but “a product, which is proverbially replenished by ideologies” and to which complex meanings are attributed (2003:31). In this way, space is increasingly understood as relationally constituted process and embedded in historically changing socioeconomic and political relations (Massey 1995:12ff). This is to say, space is attributed mostly to nation states, while time is attributed to revolution, with the implicit assumption that the territorialisation of political power was established within sovereignty of national boundaries (Jessop et al. 2008:390).

In the 1980s, the theoretical debate about differences in the territorial
organization of society increasingly focused on the scale, or rather distinct spatial scales, of social organisation, produced by the flows of capital, integral to the production of space analysis (Collinge 2006: 244). Urban scholars referred to scale not only in terms of traditional geography anymore, as the relation between cartographical and territorial distance, but also as a social construct (Mahon & Keil 2009: 8). In this sense, and more than structuring human conditions and urban societies, scales are constituted and transformed by social, cultural, political, and economic action. In over 30 years of sustained theoretical debate on scale dimensions, it is this thinking in spatialised but non-territorial terms that has opened up several approaches to insights into the realities of (human) social collectives in a globalised world (Swyngedouw 2004). Yet empirical and theoretical research on scale have not generated, until today, any agreement on what is meant by the term or how it should be operationalized. And while many scholars engage with the neoliberal domination of the process of changing nature of scales of political governance (among others Brenner, Harvey or Jessop), the theoretical debates on feminism and globalisation brought additional major arguments in the urban theory discourse. One of these arguments has been the revitalisation of interests in ethnicity, race, and gender, and their different spatial distribution and organisation in cities (Massey 1991 and 1994). The elaboration of scholars like Sassen commentating (2001) "on the rise of a global urban system and the effects of globalisation on the internal structure of cities" (Scott and Storper 2015:2) has also initiated a new strand of urban research during the end of the twentieth century. It has been precisely this debate on the growing globalisation since the early 1990s that has increasingly challenged the recalibration of inherited global, national, regional, or local relations and their multi-scalar, scale-jumping or hierarchically differentiated interconnections between "capitalist economies, state institutions, citizenship regimes, and urban systems" (Jessop et al. 2008:390). According to Castells (1996), the understanding of socially-constructed scales is still too-fixed a notion of human relationships to explain the globalized world. The “space of flows” integrates different networks that are interconnected rising from the local to the global. In this line of thought, the city is viewed not only as an aggregation of multiple networks, but also as an interconnection node between networks (Sassen 1991). Here, overlapping near-far relations and organisational connections are not
reducible to scales and are described as linking urban and inter-urban networks (Pflieger & Rozenblat 2010:2723-24). Finally, in the last two decades, new kinds of methodological approaches influenced by Latourian actor-network theory (2005) and associated neo-Deleuzean concepts of assemblage have engaged with questions of agency, structure and translation (McFarlane 2011, Farias and Bender 2012). One of the strengths associated with these contextualised post-structural approaches is their ability to question and unveil the “black boxes” of presupposed hierarchical urban dimensions and relations. “We arrive at a logic which dissolves fixed categories; humans and non-humans, technical and social, content and context, macro and micro – all tend to dissolve in the logic of the system or the ‘actor-network’” (Read 2006:16). According to Brenner, however, this comes with the problem that, “especially in their ontologically inflected variants, such approaches reject abstract or macro-structural forms of argumentation in favour of place-based narratives and thick descriptions, which are claimed to offer a more direct means of accessing the micro-social contours of a rapidly changing urban landscape” (2013:92).

Already this very brief patchwork path through the recent history of the debate on spatiotemporal dimensions in urban studies renders the difficulty of giving any comprehensive overview of urban theory or its historical development. Urban theory is a kind of umbrella term embracing various disciplines and schools of thought that deal with relations between the physical and social world within urban space and time, which, again, is understood locally as well as globally. Interdisciplinary approaches and understandings of space and time further extend and lay out the complexity of urban theory. Space is regarded, according to physical aspects, as extension or enclosure, or in various forms of social construction. While some scholars like Castells deal with this socio-spatial relation on a macro or structural level, others investigate the urban question from a micro and actors level (Dicken et al. 2001:17). At the same time geographically

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16 “Neo-Deleuzean concepts of assemblage” refer in this context primarily to elaborations and theories that have been developed in urban space related disciplines in the wake of the “general logic of assemblage” introduced by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their book A Thousand Plateaus (1987). The appropriate use of the Deleuzean concept of assemblage (common but controversially translated from the French term *agencement*) of these neo-assemblage theories and applications (e.g. DeLanda 2006, Hillier 2011, McFarlane 2011, Farias and Bender 2012) remains today a highly controversial issue (Nail 2017 /see also chapter (04) 069)
understood scalar hierarchies and the local-global distinction are often confounded with the distinction between micro-macro levels of social analysis, or between agency-structure or concrete-abstract relations (Collinge 2006: 245). One interpretation of this “perplexing” interrelation is to consider the hierarchical model of scale as deficient, as it merely reproduces “pre-configured accounts of social life that hierarchize spaces of economy and culture, structure and agency, objectivity and subjectivity, and cosmopolitanism and parochialism” (Marston et al. 2005:422). However, an over-hasty replacement of scale with network, which promises to deliver engaged and self-reflexive accounts of social life, brings about the risk “to remain within the metaphysical circuit, and within the spatial structuralism, from which it seeks to escape” (Collinge 2006:251). In other words, by replacing one ontological-epistemological nexus—verticality—with another—horizontality. Thus, even if proclaiming to “level” metaphysical questions of existence, this cannot overlay the presence of epistemological pre-determinations in the everyday life of our cities - whether it is local-to-global continuum in vertical thought or the radiating spatiality of core-periphery relation in horizontal thought. If the discarding of vertical ontologies implies an ignorance of the epistemological baggage “that ‘cover[s] over’ the situated complexities of the world” (Marston et al. 2005:422), this would also disengage empirical research from conceptual thought.17 This is not to say that epistemological concepts of spatiotemporal sub-categories of dimensionality can fully explain situated urban complexities but that they participate in the emergence of urban phenomena “not at some level once removed, ‘up there’ in a vertical imaginary, but on the ground, in practice” (Marston et al. 2005:420).

/ POSSIBLE PARTICIPATIONS OF SPATIOTEMPORAL SUB-CATEGORIES

The question remains, however: how do sub-categories of spatiotemporal dimensions, which we individualise, participate in the emergence of actual urban phenomena? In other words, could they be regarded as ‘things’, in this case as

17 “Vertical ontologies” are understood as treating on type of being as a privileged being within the order of existence.
‘direction of individualisation’ of spatiotemporal dimensionality, which *encounter* with other ‘things’, articulated as *dynamic forms* in the emergence of phenomena? Accordingly, the sub-categories would participate as *dynamic forms*, while their countable determined forms could be understood as object-oriented or subject-orientated in a binary juxtaposition. It is rather obvious that horizontal flows, topological interconnections and accelerating mobility have become more important during the last decades of globalised urban restructuring. But even if this is agreed to be the case, only reflexive investigations on the interconnections among the aforementioned sub-categories of spatiotemporal dimensions as well as an understanding of their participation in the emergence of urban phenomena in practice may solve the problem of their different applications. Bob Jessop, Neil Brenner and Martin Jones argue that “this would enable movement towards a multidimensional, polymorphous account based on (a) the elaboration of sufficiently rich concepts for each of the dimensions of socio-spatial relations; and (b) their deployment in a manner that permits researchers to explore more precisely their differential weighting and articulation in a given spatiotemporal context” (2008:393). A major concern with the debates on spatiotemporal sub-categories has been the failure to distinguish different ways of applying them in urban research. While we recognize this, it is surprising, from our present perspective, how far work in socio-spatial theory is concerned with fine-tuning and applying conceptual tools associated with one or another ‘turn’ rather than with exploring the mutual relations among those categories in empirical investigations. With the emergence of actual urban phenomena, different urban *dynamic forms encounter each other*, both materially and socially, and thus necessarily involve interactions among different spatiotemporal sub-dimensions including all their contradictions, conflicts and dilemmas. In other words, any attempt to articulate urban *dynamic form* needs to take into account the different possibilities of participations of sub-categories of spatiotemporal dimensions.

Following the investigations of Bob Jessop on the different scalar dimensions and scalar turns (2009: 88ff), all sub-categories of spatiotemporal dimensions will be divided here for analytical reasons into four different logics of application: the
logic of rejection, methodology, epistemology, and ontology. A rejection of any category of spatiotemporal dimension usually happens in an essentialist approach to theory, when a category fails to explain certain phenomena of urban formation and is in turn rejected as a valid category. Typically, it is replaced thereafter by a different category of spatiotemporal dimension (Jessop 2009:90). In urban theory, this rejection has been associated for example with the crisis of national states and thus the challenging of national scale as valid dimension in a globalized world. And while the relevance for new ways of reflecting spatiotemporal dimensionality within a globalised world is rather obvious, scale and even national scale are still very present in the scientific debate and in urban everyday life. This raises the question, if maybe it is not the category as such that is provoking difficulties for explaining spatiotemporal dimensions of a changing urban world, and thus needs to be rejected, but a stubbornly clinging to rigid methodological, epistemological or ontological relations. In this sense, a single sub-category of spatiotemporal dimensions may be important as a methodological entry point in a more complex inquiry. In the present work this is the case regarding urban neighbourhoods. At the same time, this acknowledges the presence of epistemological relation to neighbourhoods in practice. We “know”, that a neighbourhood is a place to live in a city and we apply this knowledge to any neighbourhood even if we experience it as ‘stranger’ and thus do not experience living in the very neighbourhood. This relation to the ‘other’ - in this case the stranger in relation to a neighbourhood – may also point to the entwinement of epistemological and ontological aspects of spatiotemporal sub-categories, all participating in the emergence of urban phenomena. Returning to the discussion on Maki’s collective-forms in the periphery of Rome, we have described the participation of ‘palazzine’ in the emergence of different neighbourhoods as well as a characteristic way of Roman living. In a topological understanding of space, this could emerge through near-far relations or small (neighbourhood) and larger (city) groups of houses, which we can epistemologically understand. Alternatively we could name them places on different territories or respectively different scales. The same goes for a social

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18 “Ontology” is understood in the present work as description of what is possible to say or think concerning ultimate existence as well as the character of this existence. This refers to Arkady Plotnitsky understanding of ontology in his discussion on Hölderlin (2015:125 / see chapter (08)157ff.).
perspective that refers to different groups of people, for example, neighbours or Romans, middle-class and working-class. We want to claim, however, that for the understanding of the prevailing core-periphery segregation, the knowledge of different places, scales and territories is a condition. This is to say that all previously mentioned phenomena can be experienced, but only the references to theoretical categories can link near-far, Roman, class and neighbourhood experiences in a way to produce lived segregation. It is unlikely that a middle-class Roman would even visit a working-class neighbourhood in the outer periphery—let alone move to such a neighbourhood. She would have to know about this territorial significance for social difference in order to respect it, which again plays a determined role in the development of the separation of neighbourhoods. And although exemplified with only one example, this nevertheless shows that sub-categories of spatiotemporal dimensions participate in different forms in the emergence of urban phenomena. In other words, their dimensionality has different degrees of disciplinary, methodological, epistemological, or ontological participation.

Any one spatiotemporal sub-category has limits in articulating transforming urban phenomena through its determined definition. The first step towards avoiding getting trapped by those limits of a perspective from a single sub-dimensional category to an urban dynamic form would be to recognise and respect these limits. Again, in the wake of Jessop’s analysis of the traps of scale, the limits will be discussed as dimensional “conflationism” and dimensional “reductionism” (2009:89). Conflationism occurs when we fail to distinguish between the different logics of dimensional perspectives or blur different sub-categories (2009:89). This can happen, for example, if we fail to understand a methodologically dimensional entry point of an analysis as absolute determined framework of its epistemological horizon or if we exploit fuzzy and blurring definitions to embrace a holistic perspective with one sub-category of spatiotemporal dimensions. The reflective combination of different sub-categories can help to avoid this fallacy: A territorial understanding of the place of a neighbourhood as a self-contained and self-identical urban form cannot account for the dimension of ‘palazzine’ as a Roman identity. And, in turn, a socially constructed understanding of place cannot account for the territorially inscribed Roman core-periphery form of
segregation. Yet, taking these remarks to extremes and understanding one-dimensional categories as relevant causal factor in explaining urban phenomena, this would lead us to dimensional reductionism (Jessop 2009:89). If we posit a determined category, we abstract it from its associated content, which in turn impedes their encounter in the urban field. It is important to note these ambivalences produced by the overextension of the language of a single subcategory of dimensionality, while avoiding the total rejection of this very subcategory as well (Jessop 2009: 90). In other words, an abstract sub-category of spatiotemporal dimensions is defined not by the dimensionality of an urban phenomenon, but rather its participation in the encounter with other dynamic forms in the emergence of phenomena. Thus, the dimensionality of urban phenomena is to be found in the encounter and defined by the sum of degrees of different encountering forms. While a brief overview of the recent history of urban studies has pointed out the different degree of participation of disciplinary perspective and schools of thought, a further engagement with the application of sub-categories of spatiotemporal dimensionality has pointed at the different degrees of ontological, epistemological and methodological questions in a possible understanding of dimensionality.
While the previous chapter focused primarily on conflicting spatiotemporal dimension in *encounters* between participating ‘things’, this chapter engages with their connection in the articulation of *dynamic form*: Connection, however, not understood as reconnecting links after we have successfully objectified or subjectified ‘things’, but as in-connection-with or connecting-with. The discussion refers primarily to a few articles, which provide an ingenious re-levelling of the relations of non-linear dynamism in their fields of study or rather from their different disciplinary perspectives. These are among others a “performative morphogenesis of urban situations” by the architect Antonio Losada Romero (2013), “theorising practice” by the sociologist Silvia Gherardi (2016), “transcendental naturalism” - as he calls it – by the philosopher Ray Brassier (2015) and “in-between” by the philosopher Elizabeth Grosz (2001:91-105). Touching different and controversial epistemic grounds, it is worth reflecting for a moment on the possible dominant metaphysical considerations at stake in architectural or building practices. According to the geographer David Seaman, Western researchers trained in architecture or urban disciplines are “thoroughly educated in a dualist tradition assuming that environment shapes people, or people shape environment, or the two mutually shape each other” (2010:10). As suggested by Losada Romero, in Western thought, the environment is often considered as a field of objects, an idea that can be traced back as far as Aristotle’s concept of hylomorphism (2013:50). While Aristotle’s account of matter and form of/as substance is of course much more differentiated (see Aristoteles 1995ab, Annas 1988, Cohan 2009), the dualism of form and matter as necessary components of physical objects grounds the logic of an architectural project that began with Vitruvius (1914 / written ca. 15BC) and continues today as “extensive distribution of architectural elements in Euclidean space” (Losada Romero 2010:50). “The true object of architecture is not bricks, mortar, or timber, but the house” (Aristotle 2002:1811). A project of architecture is built when bricks are put together according to a determined architectural plan in a determined form. It is destroyed when the parts lose that form. And it could be argued that the abstract three-dimensional design of architectural form with or by computers - forms on
which materials are mapped only post hoc - even reinforces the dualism of form and matter. In any case, architectural practice and education seems to have a long history of epistemological assumptions that continued and even further radicalised in the Modern period. This is to claim that only the clear split between subject and object of knowledge in the philosophy of mind of Descartes and Kant’s transcendental distinction between phenomenon and noumenon (1998) made the holistically determined design of entire cities by modern architects possible; the most famous examples of which are probably Le Corbusier’s Chandigarh in India or his design of the Ville Radieuse in Paris (1987). The architect seems to ascend to a transcendental ego, whose powers allow him to develop a standard construction of reality through the objective language of functional buildings: “The elevated eye has gained a manual facility” (Dorrian 2007:6 / see figure 1.12). This conception of design from an omnipotent standpoint is thereby based on a strong separation of time and space as underlying structure of reality referring to the axioms of Euclidean space and a chorological time, independent of the motion of objects. This is exemplified in the famous modern aphorism “form follows function”, the predictability of which can only be studied in objective determinations of static formal spaces and thus ignores the openness and dynamic of urban situations (Losada Romero 2010:58). This approach is challenged more than ever in the conditions of globalisation with a plurality and multiplicity of ideologies and truths encountering in the urban context. Phenomenology, especially after Husserl (1980 / first published in 1913), has challenged this omnipotent standpoint in thematising the experience of built space with growing relevance in urban research in the second half of twentieth century. The centrality and intentionality of human experience, however, also radicalised the modern subject/object distinction. This is also true for some interpretations of Merleau-Ponty’s “Phenomenology of Perception” in urban research (Seamon 2010, Hale 2016), which understand the self and the world, consciousness and urban environment, as mutually determined and mediated by the human body (Losada Romero 2010:51). The present work, however, argues that the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty and especially his interpretation of Uexküll’s notion of Umwelt (2003:167-177) provides an understanding of urban phenomena not as dualist juxtaposition but as encounter between dynamic forms through the participation of ‘things’, one of which is
human consciousness. This is an understanding that has to leave the central perspective of ‘things’, of the human subjects and of the architectural objects, but cannot take refuge in any outside or omnipotent standpoint either.
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Figure 1.12 / La ville Radieuse 1933 / (Le Corbusier 1964:135)
In the previous chapters we have argued that Maki’s elaborations on collective-form point to different modes and degrees of participation articulated in different dynamic forms in the encounter between ‘things’ in the emergence of urban phenomena. In the following, we elaborate on the “linkage” of participating “generative elements” in Maki’s group-form. Here we return to the question of the Roman ‘palazzina’ built in ‘abusivo’ developed neighbourhoods in the outer periphery of Rome as possible ‘generative element’. The ‘palazzina’ is defined as a stand-alone building for a living use. Within this very definition, however, we can see that the ‘palazzina’ integrates characteristics of its surroundings, as it is precisely not an in-built building, but a stand-alone building. The surrounding we look at is an ‘abusivo’ neighbourhood composed of several of these ‘palazzine’. But does this mean that the house as element includes the open space between the houses? Or just half of it? And, furthermore, is this space ‘in-between’ also the ‘linkage’ of the houses or of the neighbourhood? “The point to be made is that as volumetric density (of a building or building complex) increases, the influence of the external space on the final form of the building becomes very great and interior development tends to become a consequence of the present exterior space, and in the process converts this present exterior space into a kind of interiorized exterior space” (Maki 1967: 1). If we consider the dramatic changes of the collective-form of ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods after their legalisation (most of them in the late 1970s), this demonstrates the key role of the open spaces between the buildings. In particular, the increasing economic attraction (as a consequence of the legalisation and the provision of basic infrastructure) resulted in a significant increase in the density of buildings (Krella 1993:57). Gardens have been fenced and often reduced to their minimum possible size. This has mostly led to an increasing anonymity and today these neighbourhoods are mostly declared socially problematic zones by the city authority (Comune di Roma 2016). In this line of thought, the ‘in-between’ of the buildings can play a determined role for the collective urban form of a neighbourhood. But what is this ‘in-between’?
Looking at the figure-ground plan of the ‘abusivo’ neighbourhood Case Rosse (see figure 1.13), a first answer might be: The ‘in-between’ is the empty space, the white space between the houses (which are the black solids). And this is also what in Western cultures would be declare as space: the distance between ‘things’ that can be defined through an objectifying of the ‘things’, in this case illustrated by black forms (solids) on white paper. Strictly speaking, though, the ‘in-between’ is not the white, but the white between two blacks. And as soon as the white becomes a figure itself, it ceases to be an ‘in-between’ (see figure 1.14). This becomes even more obvious, if we refer to a ‘thing’ ‘in-between’ ‘things’, as this expression refers to the ‘in-between’ empty space defined by two ‘things’, within which we find yet another ‘thing’; like a house standing between two other houses. According to Grosz, the ‘in-between’ lacks identity, lacks form and givenness. Yet it allows into being all ‘things’ (2001:91). Thus it has to do with the surplus of ‘things’. Grosz describes the ‘in-between’ as “a space without boundaries of its own, which takes on and receives itself, its form, from the outside, which is not its outside (this would imply that it has a form) but whose form is the outside of the identity, not just of an other (for that would reduce the ‘in-between’ to the role of object […] but of others, whose relations of positivity define, by default, the space that is constituted as ‘in-between’” (2001:91). However, if we refer back to the ‘in-between’ of ‘abusivo’ palazzine, we have described the change of this “‘in-between’ space” in the process of legislation of ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods. Hence we also talk about a temporal ‘in-between’ two states of affairs, two events: before and after the legalisation of the ‘abusivo’ neighbourhood. The ‘in-between’ defined by juxtapositions, temporally or spatially, “formed by realignments or new arrangements, threatens to open itself up as new, to facilitate transformations in the things that constitute it” (Grosz 2001:94) – in this case transformations in the neighbourhood and its houses.
Figure 1.13 / Case Rosse – ‘abusivo’

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Figure 1.14 / Figure-ground diagram / (Rowe and Koetter 1984:88)
If the 'in-between' plays an important role for the collective-form of settlements, do these settlements have an 'in-between' themselves as well? In the outer periphery of Rome, the settlements appear like satellites in a vast and undefined void. They clearly circumscribe well-defined forms or at least physically homogeneous compositions. They appear as urban fragments, which are radically autonomous and self-referential with no proper structural links to their surroundings. According to the Roman architect Emanuela Belfiore what is missing are patterns or networks that offer a continuous interrelation between the vastly distributed fragments of the periphery and the presence of public spaces capable of activating dynamic relations on a metropolitan scale (2006:42ff). In abstract thought, urban public spaces are elements of connection and integration of the city, which establish a permanent relationship between different urban functions and forms. In the periphery of Rome, this potential public space lies on hundreds of hectares of homogeneous asphalt or neglected green areas that are not only sparsely planted but also poorly designed. In addition, the majority of vast open greeneries in Rome are legally private and are either fenced off or contain enclosures like stone walls (Belfiore 2006:54). In this way, and as perfect juxtaposition to the autonomous settlements, also the open areas become inaccessible and autonomous islands. This redraws our image of the Roman periphery from a constellation of satellites in open space to an image of a dense carpet of autonomous fragments, all separated but also all touching each other like irregular honeycombs with no space ‘in-between’ them. Even where some the vast anonymous areas or streets are theoretically accessible as ‘in-between’ space, no public life takes place there. In fact, when speaking about an urban public space we usually do not consider it as contrary to private space, but as an ‘in-between’ of an anonymous public and a familiar private. In other words, we usually think about public city space as highly differentiated and interconnected space that keeps the city alive. While this public emerges in different ways and qualities in the autonomous settlements in the periphery, the only connection between each other seems to be mediated by the city core, the centre of Rome.

Thus, if the ‘in-between’ is considered a linkage, it cannot be reduced to a linear connection of two juxtaposed ‘things’, in our case of two buildings, two neighbourhoods, or public and private. Maki describes this necessarily more
complex relationship of linkage referring to a “subtle internal order” of the “generative elements” in group-form (1964: 11). Here a comparison of the linkage of ‘palazzine’ on different scales can exemplify this relationship. While the linkage between two ‘palazzine’ constructed on a plot of farmland next to each other might be still possible to imagined as happening in a linear contention between them, how does this work at a city scale: between a ‘palazzina’ in the inner periphery and a ‘palazzina’ in the outer periphery, where the ‘in-between’ space measures kilometres of distance and is occupied by half of the city or hours of stressful commuting? Considering, for a moment, space as socially constructed, the ‘palazzina’ as a typical Roman house or even Roman way of life (Muntoni 2006) could be understood as a form of linkage connecting the two ‘palazzine’ in the inner and in the outer periphery. In this way of thinking, however, the ‘in-between’ also amounts to a distance between the ‘palazzina’ in a middle-class neighbourhood in the inner periphery and the ‘palazzina’ of a working-class neighbourhood in the outer periphery, which further separates the two. This brief discussion on the sociocultural and architectural linkage through the ‘in-between’ leads to three first conclusions: (1) In any single central perspective the ‘in-between’ describes a linkage reduced to a direct connection between objectified ‘things’. This is what we call in the present work a “line-of-action”. (2) If we compare or combine different central perspectives, the ‘in-between’ becomes the “site for the contestation of binaries and dualisms that dominate Western knowledge, for the very form of its oppositional structure” (Grosz 2001:93). (3) Thus the linkage of ‘things’ is an articulation of the encounter between different binary relations of juxtaposed ‘things’, each of which has a different ‘in-between’ that refers to a different spatiotemporal dimensionality.

// THE PRACTICE OF ‘LINKAGE’

In his later theoretical writings (1991), Maki elevates the physical ‘in-between’ open space of the city to a key element of linkage. We draw here, however, primarily on his first elaborations on linkage, which are found in his article “Investigation in Collective Form” (1964), and which illuminate the dynamic
complexity of the connections of ‘things’ in the articulation of collective-form. For Maki the city is “the sum total of countless events being generated simultaneously” in a socio-spatial relation that “depends on the autonomy of the individual elements” participating in the urban field (2008:42). And although we will not further engage with Japanese culture here, it is important to mention that there is a different cultural understanding of what in Japanese is called ‘ma’ and in Western literature is often translated with ‘in-between’ (Oosterling 2000). Instead of reacting to arrangements of objects occupying and shaping empty space, in the Japanese “ma” a dynamic understanding of space and time is involved (see Maki 1979, Komparu 1983, Isozaki 1987, Oosterling 2000). “‘Ma’ is a dynamic space-time interval wherein activity and passivity, agents and patients are one and the same, yet different” (Oosterling 2000:76). It seems to traverse the opposition between visible and invisible implying a collective practice that endures the tension of linkage. It could be inferred that in his elaborations on design and form Maki articulates through linkage the intertwining of an “ex ante” of activity, focusing on motives, intentions and reason, and a sociological “ex post” of activity, focusing on power-relations, institutions, conflict and social change (Gherardi 2016:683). ¹⁹ Hence, linkage involves a dynamic of transformation articulated in the encounter of ‘things’ in the urban phenomenal field. According to Merleau-Ponty, this phenomenal field contains all ‘things’ (objects, bodies and minds), provided that we understand by phenomenal field “not only the sum of things that fall or could fall under our eyes, but also the locus of their composibility, the invariable style they observe, which connects our perspectives, permits transition from one to the other […]. But here again, more than ever, the naïve certitude of the world, the anticipation of an intelligible world, is as weak when it wishes to convert itself into theses as it is strong in practice” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a:13).

Before further engaging with Maki’s understanding of linkage in practice, the different uses of practice and action in the present work shall be explained. This is not to propose any new and unified practice theory or to level the fragmentation

¹⁹ This argument refers also to the elaborations of Heidegger on the relation between dwelling as knowledge prior to knowing and dwelling as knowledge from practice (Heidegger 1993:343-364 / see chapter (5) 084).
of the urban field embedded in several disciplinary backgrounds, ontologies and epistemologies. Rather, this is an attempt to respect the meaning of differences through an articulation of encounters in practice. In the late twentieth century, several theories emerged that understood practice as a central process of knowing (Bourdieu 1977, Foucault 1978, Giddens 1984, Latour 1987 and others) and emphasised the intertwining of actions, individuals, contexts, artefacts, rules, symbols, texts, discourses, and embeddedness as the logic of practical rationality. While all the theories we talk about here happen to consider “knowing as the central process in practicing” (Gherardi 2016:686), they all differ in their attitude towards the silent, the invisible, the untouchable, the negative, the empty or the blind spot, in other words what we have referred to so far as the ‘in-between’. One of the most relevant differences, here, distinguishes action theory and the sociology of translation. Both emphasise the primacy of actions in negotiating changing contexts, but “the former confers a key role to individuals, while the latter gives equal weight to human and nonhuman elements” (Gherardi 2016:682 / referring to Guzman 2013:3). Another difference according to Cohen (1996) and Gherardi (2016) is the privilege of action, centred on intentionality of actors - human and non-human - and the privilege of practice, emphasising the de-centred source of significant patterns in a collective performance.20 In the vocabulary of the present work, action, or the line-of-action, is understood as the ‘in-between’ of two juxtaposed or opposed ‘things’ in the dualist tradition of thought, while urban practice is considered as encounter with the urban world, which includes the action as well as actors. Regarding this difference between the line-of-action as axis between two ‘things’ and practice as encounter with the urban world, Merleau-Ponty’s comments in his notes from June 1, 1960: “it would be as vain to take as axis the encounter of the individual practice with the spatial in-itself as [its] encounter with the inert, the ‘relations between persons’ mediatized by space as the relations between persons mediatized by time” (1968a:258, 1964:306). 21 In other words, urban forms are practiced de-centred

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20 “Privilege” is understood here as a metaphysical priority rather than the assertion of a time sequence: thus metaphysical privilege of action/practice in the sense that they constitute the field of emergence.

21 The “his” in the English translation of Merleau-Ponty (1968a:258) has been replaced by “its”, as it refers to practice in the French original (1964:306).
from the ‘things’ and ‘deviated’ from the line-of-action. With this discussion on action and practice, the present work attempts to point at a theoretical problem “of thinking structure as well as multiplicity and indeterminacy within the same abstract framework” (Venn 2006: 107).

Although an intensive engagement with Deleuzean philosophy is outside the remit of the present work, its proximity to the notion of “agencement” of Deleuze and Guattari (1987) and its interpretations in urban assemblage research is especially relevant in this context. Agencement assigns priority neither to collective acts or statements on a horizontal axis nor to territorial or reterritorialised sites on a vertical axis (1987:88), “neither the state of affairs nor the statement but their connection, which implies the production of a sense that exceeds them and of which, transformed, they now form parts” (Phillips 2006:108). In this line of thought, the Deleuzean agencement is close to the understanding of dynamic form in the present work as interpenetration of being and becoming. Its English translation as assemblage, however, and particularly its application in urban assemblage research often separates a structural becoming from a collage of actors. We want to claim here that there is a problematic tendency of neo-Deleuzean ontologically-inflected variants in urban research. This tendency considers that the ‘in-between’ of ‘things’ produces a whole understood as unifying and homogenising at a certain spatiotemporal sub-dimension (Read 2006:15-16, Brenner 2013:92). In other words, it seems that post-linguistic approaches that emphasise knowledge as situated within forms and outcomes of interests, ideologies, contingencies and negotiations (Haraway 1991, Barad 2003 and 2007) often lose their inherent non-representational strength when applied in urban research.

In the following we engage with the tensions between non-representational

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22 “Deviation” in the present work is applied as translation of the French écart, as it is used by Merleau-Ponty. Ecart is translated into English variously as “deviation” “step aside”, “digression”, “difference”, “gap”, “interval”, “departure” (Dorling Kindersley 1997: 114). Merleau-Ponty applies it in the context of relational and dynamic concepts (such as “dehiscence”, “divergence”, “chiasm”, “intertwining”) to express that there is “no monism of the phenomenon, but there is no dualism, either” (Dillon 1997: 157). In comparison with the notion of “de-centred” applied in the present work, “to deviate” does not necessarily refer to a centre but to a movement (that itself refers to a centre), as for example in: “deviated from a way” (principal translation in a French-German dictionary from 1963 (Wilhelm 1963: 31)).
theory and spatiotemporal dimensionality referring back to our reading of Maki’s linkage within the context of the Roman ‘palazzina’. In an attempt to gain knowledge for the design of collective-form, Maki seeks to understand the agency of common material ‘things’ of the urban context participating in ‘linkage’. He considers “to define”, “to select”, “to mediate”, “to repeat” and “to make a sequence path” as the “basic linkage acts” (1964: 36). In their intertwinement, these acts are understood as linkage in practice that can be influenced by design through shifting the degree of the “basic linkage acts” (Maki 1964:36). Collective-form for Maki includes a multitude of non-physical “things’ and human actions as well, since linking is also “assembling patterns of experience in cities” (1964: 35).

“To define” in physical acts is understood as to surround with a physical barrier and thus set ‘things’ off from their environs. Looking from a bird’s-eye view perspective, the city wall separates the city from the outside, but defines at the same time the sum of elements that belong to the city (in this perspective, everything within the wall). For a city dweller approaching the wall from within, it is a physical barrier. Through its circumscribing composition, however, the wall also defines the city, which articulates itself by a *dynamic form* relating its elements with its definition. The wall links the dweller in a sense of belonging to all other ‘things’ within the wall. And these ‘things’ have to be defined in some way to be possibly part of this articulation. In other words, ‘things’ need to have some degree of the act “to define” to be able to participate in the emergence of urban phenomena. “To select” is understood as “to establish unity in advance of the design process by choice” (Maki 2008: 63). When Maki refers to natural circumstances in this context, they are not conceived “as passive, inert and ahistorical burden […] or as romanticized refuge from the cultural” (Grosz 2001: 96), but in their openness for future change. As far as binary structures of dualism are concerned here, “they are considerably more flexible in their scope and history than their logic would indicate, for each term shifts and their values realign, while the binarised structure remains intact” (Grosz 2001:96). “To mediate” is understood as to imply connection. This proposes the possible participation of a superposition of meaning in the emergence of collective-form, like the city wall can “mediate” a sense of belonging to the city. And finally, “to repeat” or “make a sequential path” do not refer to an immortal and given multiplicity of the same, which would infinitise the outside of the same as purely
negative and amorphous term (Grosz: 96), as we have discussed alongside the figure-ground illustrations. Rather, “to repeat” refers to a subtle (re)negotiation and (re)definition of ‘things’ through their different participation within the same or different encounters. Referring back to Maki’s linkage of collective-form, all these described actions from different perspectives that are articulated through their intertwinements in the encounter in the phenomenal field. Hence, the line-of-action as connection ‘in-between’ abstractly juxtaposed or opposed ‘things’ (re-)enters as participant in the dynamic articulations in the emergence of actual urban phenomena.

In the discussions so far, we have provided descriptions of the ‘in-between’ from an outside standpoint, mostly seen from above the city. This includes the key example of two juxtaposed black houses in the figure-ground illustration of the city that are defined by their opposition, their ‘in-between’, the white paper ground that can be bridged through action, from one house to the other. This dualist definition through opposition becomes even more obvious if we imagine two touching surfaces, white and black, positive and negative, where the shared separation, the – on the paper level, inexistent - ‘in-between’ of the abstract formless surfaces, provides their only existing form. That is, one opposition, black and white, rationalised by another opposition, form and formless. If we look, however, at one black figure – of a building, a human or anything – on a white ground, no outline of the white would make the black figure part of the white background, no outline of a city would make a house part of a city, unless the outline is labelled with the concept “city” or “city of Rome” (see figure 1.01). In this case, the intertwining of different levels of ‘in-between’, the city itself, would be defined by the relation of the parts (of the city, the black figures) and the whole (of the city, the outline), both of which have an inside and an outside. Now changing perspective and looking from below, with the eyes of the building or just human eyes, the ‘in-between’ would be defined by the space seen from the eye to the horizon, behind both of which there is invisibility. The ‘in-between’ becomes defined by two transcendental positions of knowledge. Although there are some exceptions (for example in racialised subject formation), Grosz argues, “there is no other who exists independent of the self-same or sovereign subject who always defines the other only in its own image” (2001:94). The ‘in-between’ is
what fosters and enables the other’s transition from being the other of the one to its own becoming, to reconstituting another relation, in different terms. In our image, standing in the middle of a plane – from above a black figure in the open white - the only ‘things’ we see are the limits of the invisible, the floor, the sky, the horizon, our feet, that provide an abstract space ‘in-between’ with no depth and no form. Only a relation to another viewpoint, for example from above, would enable us to grasp the distance, would provide form for the ‘in-between’ but would also change the viewer – the human or the house – into a visible ‘thing’. The viewer now is seen from above. We now talk about the visibility (seen or being seen) and invisibility, which is their dynamic relation in the encounter. In this line of thought, the condition for possibility of form is not the existence of transcendental viewpoints, but their encounter in the emergence of phenomena.

/ HOW DOES KNOWLEDGE PARTICIPATE IN THE EMERGENCE OF PHENOMENA?

In the following, we leave the abstract reduction of a figure-ground plan and engage with the intertwinenent of morphological and socio-cultural perspectives. Then if we look at two ‘palazzine’, we argue, it is not an abstract and “empty” ‘in-between’ that links them but the sociocultural and morphological relation to other ‘palazzine’, neighbourhoods or the parts of the ‘palazzine’ themselves, like their similar structure, organisation, material or façade. In this line of thought the ‘generative element’ of Maki’s group-form is not composed by the ‘palazzina’ and part of the ‘in-between’ space (as discussed in chapter (02) 045) but by the dynamic relations in the encounter of ‘palazzine’, for example the collective organisation of public and private in the constellation of ‘palazzine’. In other words, it is the encounter of or with ‘palazzine’ that articulates their dynamic form. The intertwinenent of morphological and socio-cultural perspectives has been discussed earlier with the example of ‘palazzina’ as ‘generative element’ on a neighbourhood and a city scale. Here the collective knowledge that different social classes belong to different locations in Rome, determined the understanding of the difference of the ‘palazzine’ neighbourhoods. Hence, there are different collective "knowledges" involved that cannot be individual as they belongs to collective-forms (Rome, neighbourhoods), and nor can they be
universal, since they change according to their intertwinements (different neighbourhoods). A further example shall reinforce the collective-form of knowledge that an individual ‘thing’ (human or non human) cannot account for. The ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods in the outer periphery of Rome developed on a two-dimensional tidy grid of farmland dividing the land property like a master plan. As this specific parcelling of landed property refers to an autonomic farming knowledge, it could be argued, that it only coincidentally encountered human settlements. This encounter created a kind of mega-structure – in its organisation referring to Maki’s paradigm – with a stable frame that is housing all the infrastructure of the neighbourhood and leaves flexibility in its countless individual cells. Although ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods were lacking almost all basic infrastructures, they nevertheless inherited infrastructure derived from farming knowledge and conventions. The intensive negotiation of plot sizes, regulations for agricultural buildings and collective intercultural cooperation of neighbours led to a highly complex socio-spatial organisation, characteristic for these forms of neighbourhoods. This is a knowledge that no human neighbour sufficiently possesses but which is articulated in the dynamic form of the ‘abusivo’ neighbourhood. The agency of this characteristic dynamic form of ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods can also be witnessed in its unexpected development after encountering the dynamics of legalisation in the 1970’s (this will be discussed in chapter 16). The claim here is that the way towards knowing does not lie in “plunging deeper” into a conceptual non-articulation of subject-centred or object-centred immanence. Rather it is key to aesthetically reflect the intertwinements of collective knowledge in the articulation of dynamic forms. These dynamic forms articulate in the encounter in the phenomenal field. The approach in the present work is thus considered a de-centred phenomenology with the privilege of the encounter between participating ‘things’, which articulate dynamic forms in the emergence of phenomena. The attempt to better understand possibilities of articulation of urban dynamic form in this first part of the work could be described in Ray Brassier’s words as “reflexive stratification of immanence into representing act and represented content, and the gradual recognition that what we know about the latter (the represented) is conditioned in ways we don’t yet know by the former (the representing)” (2015: 79).
While the primacy of the encounter of ‘things’ might suggest a flat ontology, there is no primacy of being or becoming and no causal primacy of the condition of participation over the result of participation, which are intertwined in the emergence of phenomena. In other words, if dynamic form is articulated in the encounter in the phenomenal field, its articulation must entail the relation between dialectical oppositions like unity and separation, being and becoming. This is where, following Hölderlin, rhythm is introduced in this work as a way of articulating dynamic form in Part III. In addition, this articulation has to be understood in the dimensionality of the encounter as sum of degrees of participation of ‘things’, which will be further developed following Merleau-Ponty in Part IV. And while the approach of this present work more generally provides overlaps with the Deleuzean philosophy of immanence (1987) and its interpretation as flat ontology by Manuel De Landa (2002), the treatment of dimensionality in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (1968a) suggest a different point of departure. This is to say, the present de-centred phenomenological approach starts from an encounter in the phenomenal field - which includes vertical and horizontal relations - rather than from singular individuals as De Landa’s “flat ontology” suggests: “While an ontology based on relations between general types and particular instances is hierarchical, each level representing a different ontological category (organism, species, general), an approach in terms of interacting parts and emergent wholes leads to a flat ontology, one made exclusively of unique, singular individuals, differing in spatiotemporal scale but not in ontological status” (De Landa 2002:47). In the present work, ‘things’ are not “nested in scales” (Brassier 2015:70) but connect with a dimensionality of their encounter as various degrees of individual participation. Once immanence - understood in the Deleuzean way as immanence only ‘to’ itself (Brassier 2015:70) - starts from a de-centred encounter and not a centred individual, some kind of representation participates in the encounter and must, as Brassier argues, not be foregone “in order to reconstruct the real yet virtual problem structure to which the actual phenomenon stands as a case of solution” (Brassier 2015:70). If the participation of ‘things’ in the emergence of phenomena is articulated in dynamic terms, in which the linear ‘in-between’ is a reflective reduction and (re)integrated into non-linear encounters, “knowledge itself must be seen as dynamic process. But then it follows that cognitive processes are not true or
false, they are either interesting or ordinary” (Brassier 2015:71 / emphasis added). The question is to understand how the ‘thing’ can be open to phenomena that transcend the ‘thing’ and that, nevertheless, only exist to the extent that the ‘thing’ participates.

The attempt of the present work is to gain knowledge of the encounter of different ‘things’ in emergence of urban phenomena through the interrogation of possible articulations of dynamic forms. With the encounter being inducible, Part I has opened the research field by provoking and raising questions in a first encounter with urban worlds. As Merleau-Ponty’s claims: “The resolution to confine ourselves to the experience of what is in the originating or fundamental or inaugural sense presupposes nothing more than an encounter between “us” and “what is”— these words being taken as simple indexes of a meaning to be specified. The encounter is indubitable, since without it we would ask no question” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a:159, emphasis added).
Part II embeds the eight neighbourhood case studies in the historical emergence of the Roman periphery during the twentieth century. It begins with an elaboration of the empirically applied understanding of 'neighbourhood' alongside the discussion of the human-world relation in a de-centred phenomenological approach (chapter 05). The brief description of the neighbourhoods is presented in a dynamic articulation of the development of various physical forms of settlements related to a selective discussion of social, economic and political periods and tendencies (chapters 06 and 07). Thereby, different re-presentations - figure-ground analyses, photographic works and descriptive text - give emphasis to the ambiguity of the involved phenomena. This methodological approach can be described as iteratively and experimentally confronting, assembling, and comparing different research perspectives, which in order to encounter each other have to be open in their compossibility.23

/ (05) ENCOUNTERS OF NEIGHBOURHOOD RESEARCH 078
// (06) HISTORY OF THE PERIPHERY OF ROME 1870S – 1940S 091
// (07) HISTORY OF THE PERIPHERY OF ROME 1950S – 2010S 126

23To ensure better readability, the content structure of each of the six parts of the thesis is repeated at its beginning (see chapter (01) 017).
The articulation of multifaceted urban forms of contemporary cities poses a great challenge for normative and historically constructed knowledge of urban related disciplines. The complexity of urban transformations continuously challenges the autonomy of the related disciplines and seems to force them to re-evaluate their epistemological and ontological axioms, to respond to the characteristics of actual urban phenomena. The architect Lasoda Romero argues that this development also increasingly undermines the legacy of the Enlightenment theoretical corpus, “atomizing knowledge in a constellation of seemingly dissonant fragments of speeches but, basically, chaired by the ghost of a modernity whose severe dogmas still resonate in the moral and deontological horizon of the different intellectual practices” (2013:48). In particular, the turn to urban environments and the concomitant renunciation of anthropocentric schools of thought seems to lack a consistent reformulation of human-world relations, which results, if nothing else, in conflicting, reversing or precluding other approaches to empirical urban research. The present work, however, challenges the possibility of reformulating this human-world relationship in any direct linear way or from any centred theoretical perspective. At the same time, this is not an attempt to provide a conclusive study of the urban or related academic approaches to give a complex and holistic account of the human-world relation in the urban field. Rather, the present work aims to better understand the human-world relation in its dynamic articulations of urban form through an experimental approach, which precedes as iterative methodology confronting, comparing and gathering particular theoretical forms of thought, aesthetic forms of re-presentations and empirical forms of research.24 The empirical data of the

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24 The term “to re-present” is understood in this work as a translation of the German word “darstellen”. In distinction to the most common translation of Kant’s use of the term with “to present” as well as to Kant’s use of the term “vorstellen” (most commonly translated with “to represent”), “to re-present” renders at the same time “exhibiting” and “producing a presentation”. In other words it contains a notion of repetition of “to present” – non sequential –, which refers to Hölderlin’s dynamic understanding of “darstellen” in rhythm (see chapter (09) 153). Note: The translation of Kant’s “vorstellen” and “darstellen” is a controversial issue. For example, Werner Pluhar argues in his introduction to Kant’s third critique: “The traditional rendering of this term as ‘to represent’ suggests that Kant’s theory of perception is representational, which, however, it is not” (1987: 14).
present work is thereby exposed to the same aforementioned conflicts of urban related academic approaches. While recognizing these analytically antithetical circumstances, the following paragraphs provide some of the presuppositions of a de-centred phenomenology, which characterised my empirical research studies in eight neighbourhoods in the periphery of Rome. Thus, this is first and foremost a discussion of the way the empirical data is integrated within the present experimental and methodologically iterative approach to urban *dynamic form*.

The philosopher Herbert Spiegelberg (1994:1-2) claims that there are probably as many branches within the phenomenological movement as there are phenomenologists. This is a philosophical debate we will only refer to in a few places in this work when directly related to applied methodological implications. As *dynamic forms* are articulated in the *encounter* between participating ‘things’ in the *phenomenal field*, we start here with an outline of the empirically applied understanding of “neighbourhood” in the field research. From its beginning my fieldwork was influenced by Michel de Certeau’s two volumes of “The Practice of Everyday Life” (1984 and 1998). Here, neighbourhoods are understood as the dwellers’ most evident passage to public space and time of the city in Western culture (1984: 195, 1998: 10ff). The neighbourhood provides a *dynamic* that develops organically step-by-step “rambling” in and out of one’s lodging or staring from one’s private window. It is the space of social commitment for the dweller, where she “grasps” herself as recognised in public through the essential facts of “proximity and repetition” (de Certeau and Giard 1998:8). According to Pierre Mayol and from the perspective of a dweller, the emergence of “neighbourhood” could therefore be described as “a dynamic notion requiring a progressive apprenticeship that grows with the repetition of the dweller’s body’s engagement in public” (Mayol 1998:10-11)\(^25\). It is the place of the dweller’s home from which her lifeworld unfolds. In this anthropocentric view, the neighbourhood stands for

\(^{25}\) Luce Giard and Pierre Mayol were research collaborators of the philosopher Michel de Certeau in a long-term research Project on the practice of everyday life that moved from private urban spheres of dwelling, cooking, and homemaking to the public experience of living in a neighbourhood. The research was published in two Volumes of “The Practice of Everyday Life”. While Volume 1 (1984) is individually authored by de Certeau, Volume 2 (1998) contains contributions of all three researchers and illuminates their commitment to collective research as well as its practical and methodological implications that have been of key inspiration for the field research of the present work.
the way people are immersed in the world existentially. In an overview of theoretical perspectives to environmental-behaviour research the geographer David Seamon (2000) argues that place, home, and “lifeworld” are discussed as key ontological structures of a human-world relation by various phenomenologists engaging with the urban field (Seamon 2000:160-163). In my preparation of the field research the implications of a de-centred phenomenological approach to neighbourhoods developed alongside a critical engagement with these anthropocentric elaborations on place, home and lifeworld. The philosopher Edward S. Casey argues that the human physical embodiment in a place directs our world in terms of here-there, near-far, left-right, above-below (1993: 43-70). In this line of thought, lifeworld refers to the human experience of everyday life, which is generally not object of conscious awareness, while home invokes a unique and “timeless quality” of the relation between the self and others (Day 1998:61). According to Seamon (2000:162), it is the phenomenological aim to make the tacitness of the taken-for-granted human experiences of lifeworld, place, and home explicit. If regarded as key ontological structures of our “being-in-the-world”, however, they - place, home, and lifeworld - also get increasingly challenged by experiences of spatial fragmentation, global breadth, accelerating change and digital communication in our present urban societies. And while their anthropocentric interpretations do not cease to be key participants in the emergence of the phenomenon ‘neighbourhood’, it is claimed here that neighbourhoods cannot be reduced to a binary human-world encounter. Instead, we want to argue that, apart from all individual human perspectives, neighbourhoods are as well collective articulations of all participating ‘things’ – human and nonhuman, material and immaterial. Martin Heidegger discussed qualities of this unique collective relationship in his widely cited speech “Building -

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26 Edmund Husserl’s introduces “lifeworld” as key concept in his “Logical Investigations”, first published in 1900 (Husserl 1970).
27 David Seamon is a professor of Environment-Behaviour and Place Studies. His research and writings focus on phenomenological approaches to place, architecture and environmental experience (see Seamon 2017). In the discussion of research implications of a de-centred phenomenological approach we refer especially to the paper “A way of Seeing People and Place: Phenomenology in Environment-Behaviour Research” (2000), where he provides an overview of phenomenological approaches to environmental and architectural issues.
28 Matthew D. Day teaches phenomenology and psychology. The quoted article refers back to the research of his dissertation “Home in the Western World: A cultural-hermeneutic study”.
Dwelling - Thinking” at the Deutschen Werkbund in 1951 (1993). “The Old English and High German word for building, buan, means to dwell. This signifies: to remain, to stay in a place. The real meaning of the verb bauen, namely, to dwell, has been lost to us. But a covert trace of it has been preserved in the German word Nachbar, neighbor. The Nachbar is the Nachgebur, the Nachbauer, the near-dweller, he who dwells nearby” (Heidegger 1993:349). Here the idea of neighbour implies a close relationship between a group of people and a group of buildings. The “state of being has an additive quality” that grows with the multiple encounters between near dwellers - people and buildings - allowing the individual stranger to become a part of the neighbourhood (Wolford 2008:26). It is a state of becoming, a tension between established neighbourliness and vanishing strangeness, both of which are present in the phenomenon. The phenomenon neighbourhood - on which we reflect as different particular forms of dwelling - depends on the movement of participating ‘things’ as well as their physical, cultural, social and historic dimensions. Thus, we must rediscover neighbourhood not as an object or a sum of objects, but as a phenomenon that refers to the dimensionality of the encounter of ‘things’ in its urban phenomenal field. In this way of thinking, the relation neighbour-neighbourhood (the world of the neighbour) exceeds any binary understanding of a human-world, human-body or material-immaterial relationship. A neighbour, a near dweller, is understood here as a dynamic articulation of being neighbour and becoming neighbour. It is a dynamic form of building and living next to, of a human being and its material home in relation to - next to - others. When describing a phenomenon as a neighbourhood, we refer the dynamic form of neighbour to a composition of being more neighbour and less stranger in relation to other neighbours or strangers. This relation, however, cannot be reduced to a sense of belonging to or becoming member of an existing neighbourhood, but carries a productive character as well. If we build a second “home” next to a first “home” we possibly have as a result two neighbours in their small neighbourhood, which would not exist without both of the neighbours. In fact, the first “home” cannot even be regarded as the first neighbour without the second “home”, without which there would be no neighbourhood. In this dynamic relationship, both “homes” present and re-present a neighbour. And in this sense the articulation of the dynamic forms in an emerging phenomenon – in this case neighbourhood - changes
according to the participating ‘things’ encountering each other. If we now built a third “home”, the former phenomenon neighbourhood ceases to be and a new phenomenon neighbourhood emerges, which contains ‘things’ and composition of the former: for example not only the form of the two first houses, but also their relation to each other; the forms of social life of the former neighbours and also the forms of social life of the new arrival. We talk here about another level of re-presenting. The “homes” present and re-present each other in the dynamic form of their collective relationship, but they are also re-presenting collective relationships. These involved different levels of re-presenting also include former experiences or memories of neighbourly compositions.

This leads to the first implications for the present research: first, a historical becoming of a neighbourhood can be called a palimpsest of phenomena. Following the strict meaning of the word, palimpsest here does not refer to a sequence of re-presentations, but to a scratching and overwriting. There is no linear relationship or causal sequence between phenomena, but they connect only through the re-presentation of former compositions in the articulation of actual dynamic forms of the phenomenon neighbourhood. Second, this relationship is not simply present, but is a dynamic articulation of being and becoming, of being presented and becoming re-presented and vice versa, of producing and exhibiting. Third, the emergence of a phenomenon neighbourhood cannot be understood as a linear sequence of events. Just as only the supposedly “second” near dweller makes the supposedly “first” a near dweller, all participating ‘things’ always refer to the actual phenomenon neighbourhood. Their encounter in the phenomenal field does not articulate with a linear reference but dynamically on various related levels. This includes re-presentations of different compositions of ‘things’ and re-presentations of compositions of experience – for example the former social way of life of a newly arriving neighbour.

The emergence of the phenomenon neighbourhood is socially present and produced, but also materially present and produced, both of which include the re-presentation of former parts of compositions. At the same time, however, determined compositions – socially and materially – present themselves as open for a re-presentation and are as such articulated in the emergence of
phenomena. According to Merleau-Ponty, the relation to a physical, social, cultural or historic dimension of the encounter in the phenomenal field “is deeper than every explicit perception and deeper than every judgment” (2012: 379). Thus, we cannot treat a neighbourhood as an object, either external or internal. In relation to the social dimension of this articulation, Merleau-Ponty argues that “it is just as false to place us within society like an object in the midst of other objects, as it is to put society in us as an object of thought, and the error on both sides consists in treating the social as an object” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 379). An awareness of the phenomenon neighbourhood would be impossible if not referred to as collective of individual participations that are changing their compositions in their repetition - again culturally and historically. In such an understanding of the phenomenon neighbourhood there is no pure or direct access to the phenomenon but to the encounter between ‘things’ through participating in its emergence. An applied, de-centred phenomenological methodology cannot be reduced to an interpretive study of human experience or pure perception but refers, as much as the human being is concerned, to its participation in encounters in the phenomenal field. In other words, the logic of the articulation of dynamic forms in the emergence of phenomena is not a human centred logic but logic of encounter.

If we do not have direct access to things-in-themselves or phenomena, but only to the encounter between ‘things’, how does this translate into methodological consequences for the access to, and the application of, research data? Already the existential phenomenologies of Heidegger (1976, first published in 1927) and the early Merleau-Ponty (2012, first published in 1945) have distanced themselves from the transcendental approach of pure phenomenological reduction of the early Husserl (1980, first published in 1913), who is generally considered as the founding father of the phenomenological movement in the twentieth century. The immersed understanding of the human-world relation in Heidegger’s being-in-the-world is directed against the reduced perspectives of either idealist or realist philosophy. Merleau-Ponty adopts the notion of being-in-the-world in his early attempts to escape a binary subject-object dichotomy, although he corrects the French “être-dans-le-monde” to “être-au-monde” from the very beginning (Landes 2013:29). His aim here is to resist misunderstandings
of the human-world relationship as a container containing subject and objects and to emphasise the ambiguity of phenomena. In his early works, Merleau-Ponty attempts to articulate the relation between a subjective consciousness and an objective body, between a first person and a third person perspective, through his central notions of behaviour (1942) and body (1945). However, we want to claim that être-au-monde also foreshadowed his late and more radical interpretation of the human-world relation as an articulation in the encounter in the phenomenal field – thus human de-centred (see also Umwelt relation in chapter 13). For the phenomenological researcher, this implies that there is no direct access to the phenomenon, but only to the encounter in the phenomenal field, ‘deviated’ from any single perspective, line-of-action or binary relation. When it comes to empirical research, phenomenological reduction, intuition or disclosure cannot any more pretend a pure or direct access to the phenomenon that is described, but only to an encounter that points to the transcendent qualities and limitations of the applied perspectives. The task is not to unveil tacitness of a subjective consciousness or an objective world, but to understand the limits of these intuitions through a better understanding of their ambiguous presence in the emergence of phenomena itself. The research therefore starts with the commitment to describe the ambiguity that shatters the confidence of our understanding, and should not be understood as construction of concepts by which we try to make the ambiguity less noticeable (Merleau-Ponty 1964b: 95-96). In his book “The Visible and the Invisible” Merleau-Ponty illuminates that this phenomenal ambiguity should not be mistaken as binary opposition. In his understanding the invisible does not add to the visible in the sense of objective absence or objectively present somewhere else. Rather the invisible is present in/with the visible, Ineinander with seeing and being seen, and opens up the vision in the encounter between all participating ‘things’ (1968a: 224).30

Although the phenomenologist has to begin and end her research somewhere, it would be misleading to think this development as a linear or sequential process. Similar to the neighbourhood itself, or any phenomenon, there is ambiguity

30 The German Ineinander could be translated into English in various forms as “one intertwined with others” or “others intertwined with one”, but at the same time “one in the others” and “the others in one”, or even “one as other” and “other as one” (see also chapter (13) 250).
involved in research, a tension between a world we are searching for and a world we are coming from, both of which are present in actuality. The emergence of actual phenomena simply seems to happen and we are generally convinced to find the track leading back to us, to our individual perspective as participant or distant spectator. Only sometimes there is this atmosphere that we get overwhelmed by an *encounter* with ‘things’. Then we become part of the composition when listening to music, when falling in love, when suffering personal tragedy, or sometimes, simply, when we get lost in the routines of the everyday. We seem to lose our individuality as inseparable parts of actual articulation. And although these moments are often described as feeling part of a whole, as individual sensation of being closer to reality, ones we are suddenly torn out of the moment again, we say that reality – another reality? - has finally caught up with us again. This latter reality refers to an objectified reality that we can reflect on, that we can judge and that we can explain in a way detached from the actual emergence of phenomena. In a de-centred phenomenological approach, however, both described realities are only extreme moments of *dynamic* articulation. We can neither completely lose our individuality nor can we separate ourselves from actuality, but we can better understand the repetitive transition of individuality in collective everyday dynamic articulation. In this sense an atmosphere of a particular composition of ‘things’ in a neighbourhood cannot be a merely individual feeling, as it is an existential part of a collective. In the same way a distant judging on particular composition cannot be universal truth, as it re-enters and changes the neighbourhood with us dwelling nearby, becoming neighbour. The change of the particular former composition is present in the emergence of the actual phenomenon ‘neighbourhood’.

In terms of implications of a de-centred phenomenological research approach, we want to emphasise two aspects here. First, the invisible first-person perception must not be mistaken for a conditioned bias of perspectives that a phenomenological approach could unveil through any other perspective or combination of perspectives, all of which entail invisibility. Instead, the invisible is existential for any *encounter* in the *phenomenal field* and the attempt of this research approach is to participate in the *encounter* and to understand the degree of seeing, being seen and invisible of the articulated dynamic forms.
Secondly, although the critic of anthropocentrism and subject-object division wants to emphasize the *encounter* between ‘things’ in the *phenomenal field*, this must not be mistaken for yet another viewpoint with more direct access to ‘reality’. The *encounter* is always ‘deviated’ from any line-of-action, thus any pure direct relation between two ‘things’ comes at the cost of discounting the *encounter*, as only the ‘deviation’ from the line-of-action opens the possibility for being participant in the emergence of phenomena. Accordingly, in a research observation - in Merleau-Ponty’s words - “it is only by recurring to the visible that we can understand the emergence of an invisible perception in its relation to what it sees, as a deviation in relation to the visible” (Merleau-Ponty 1995: 278, 2003a: 215). In this sense, the research begins with and includes various different perspectives, which in order to *encounter* with each other have to be open in their compossibility.

In his overview of phenomenological approaches to environmental-behaviour studies, the geographer David Seamon distinguishes three core methods: first-person, existential, and hermeneutic. In this anthropocentric analysis, a first-person phenomenological inquiry refers to a direct access of the researcher to the phenomenon she studies, the existential inquiry refers to experiences of specific individuals or groups, and the hermeneutic inquiry refers to interpretations of material objects or tangible expressions (Seamon 2000: 166-171). The access, proceedings and relevance of these inquiries, however, have to shift, or better, ‘deviate’ from the just described lines-of-action of research, if we want to apply them in a de-centred phenomenological approach. Accordingly, the first-person inquiry in the present research refers to the participation of the researcher in the *encounter* between ‘things’. In this sense, my long-term daily presence in the neighbourhoods turned them into something like a second home, opening up different compositions of neighbours - human and nonhuman, material and immaterial. In existential inquiries, the perspectives of possible participants or groups of participants were considered, as were their embeddedness into the emergence of the actual phenomena they refer to. This was achieved through accompanying interviewees in their daily practice and

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31 Referring to the original French, “écart” is translated here with “deviation” (see chapter 04: 69).
conducting interviews in everyday situations in the neighbourhoods. With the same intent, the supervision of the included photographic works on the neighbourhoods (see Figures 2.09-2.11 and 1.18-2.2 117ff.) was partly held in the field. Finally, the hermeneutic inquiry refers to the observation, reading, and interpretation of compositions regarding architecture, urban settings, neighbourly meetings, ethnographical narrations or simply everyday activities that are represented in the following through figure-ground plans, photographic works, or textual descriptions. However, hermeneutic investigations in the present work also refer to meanings of compositions that re-enter the actual research — for example through expressions in interviews, repetitions in architectural, or urban design appearances or prevalent opinions in the press or literature — as well as their analytical embedding in the historical and cultural context. In this line of thought hermeneutic reading of, for example, different buildings in different neighbourhoods, different historical periods, or different cultures indicate collective architectural styles that participate in the emergence of different neighbourhoods (This-Evensen et al. 1987:8, Seamon 2000:168). The same goes for social, economic or political collectives, all of which again refer to different collectives or systems of knowledge that change in their historical and cultural perspectives. While the classification of conducted empirical and predominantly qualitative research technics - in first-person, existential and hermeneutic - necessarily remains abstract in their dynamic articulations, a de-centred phenomenological understanding also challenges the order or modality of empirical methods. A hermeneutic approach can unveil possible encounters between ‘things’, but the possibility of participating hermeneutic compositions or knowledge makes the articulation of dynamic form necessary. Considered for any ‘thing’, this is especially significant when it comes to symbols that seem to introduce ‘a priori’ structures to an encounter of ‘things’. The encounter, however, resists the distinction of ‘a priori’ form and ‘a posteriori’ empirical content or vice versa. The present approach is no inductive perspective that is contrasted to a

32 The photographic works included here were produced on a master course at the Scuola Romana di Fotografia in Rome in the academic year of 2003-2004. The aim for the thesis of the students was to articulate the most characteristic dynamic form of the case study neighbourhoods in one photo. The course was designed and held by the photographer Roberto Properzi (technical supervision) and myself (aesthetic supervision). For a further description see chapter (1) 016.

33 This refers to an understanding that pure reason or absolute being would prevent freedom and evolution (see Hölderlin chapter (08) and Merleau-Ponty chapter (11)).
logical deduction of an ‘a priori’ assumption of being or positing. Rather, the access to *encounters* with ‘things’ will lead us to revisit the transcendental notion of necessity and possibility, because *encounters* are the change of possibility into necessity through the act of taking up (Merleau-Ponty 2012:174). For the phenomenological researcher, the question is always to know how she can be open to phenomena that transcend her and which only exist for analysis to the extent that she participates (Merleau-Ponty 2012:380). If there is a distinction between perceiving and judging – as an illusion can be perceived even if understood – “between myself, who is analysing perception, and the self who is actually perceiving, there is always a distance” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 45). But through the participation in actual phenomenon this distance is *dynamically* articulated *encountering* the *re-presentation* of judgment, which makes a new judgment possible. Also in the act of reflection “I cross this distance; I prove, by doing it, that I am capable of knowing what I was perceiving” (Merleau-Ponty 2012: 45). In this sense, material, social, economic or political compositions are always in part *re-presented*, when we begin to judge them. And they change culturally and historically.

The following description of the urban development of the periphery of Rome is an attempt to articulate the urban *dynamic forms* of the neighbourhood case studies in their cultural and historical evolution. It is not an overview of a historical analysis of the Roman peripheral development, but an attempt to relate the development of the neighbourhood case studies to different participating and historically changing compositions of knowledge. While the focus stays with the description of different forms of urbanisation, the relations that emerged from the fieldwork in the case studies were driving the selective *re-presentations* of the social, economic, and political. The aim is not to provide a comprehensive analysis, but to challenge the confidence of distant analytical and perspectival understandings and to propose other possible relations through their confrontation, comparison and parallel description. While the different ways of *re-presentations* - as figure-ground analyses, as photographic works and as descriptive text - help to emphasis the *ambiguity* of the involved phenomena, the main body of the next two chapters refers to secondary research resources such as journal article, books, newspaper articles and official documents. A footnote
on the expertise of the authors of this secondary material, whenever referenced the first time, indicates the different disciplinary perspectives involved in the present articulation. It also acknowledges its limitedness in incorporation different disciplines and in falling back on disciplinary tendencies.

In this line of thought, urban neighbourhoods have an economic, political, and administrative tendency to be seen as determined and closed. They often gain their definite form by being possessed, excluded or otherwise legally fixed. In this work, the aspects of research that regard aesthetic reflection somehow initiated with this tendency of neighbourhoods to close up, as this provides a great challenge for any historical or cultural approach. Thus the case study neighbourhoods are taken up in their tendential regulative closure, but also in their aesthetic opening, and both tendencies are contested first and foremost in the dynamics of their physical emergence. Rome seems to provide a perfect model ground for an investigation on historical encounters between urban forms, as “all [its] epochs survived in the same place, intact and mutually interacting” (Freud 2001:69-70 in de Certeau 1984:202). They indicate the complexity and the contradictions of Rome’s unique urban development, which in the 20th century underwent an enormous peripheral extension on its nearly unspoiled hinterland. A massive growth of population - from about 200,000 in 1870 to almost three million inhabitants in 1970 (see figure 2.08) - led to a peripheral urbanisation that seems, at first glance, a field of randomly thrown together individual settlements (see chapter (2) 023ff.). However, for an experimental research approach that attempts to articulate complex urban dynamic forms in the comparison of neighbourhoods, their autonomous morphological structures and well defined and relatively recent period of formation provide, first of all, a possibility to anchor the analysis. After an introduction of the urban situation of Rome in the end of the nineteenth century, the eight neighbourhood case studies are embedded chronologically in the different periods of the peripheral extension of Rome. Garbatella and Tufello are two early peripheral settlements of Rome that were built in inner-peripheral extension. The outer peripheral “explosion” of Rome in the second part of the twentieth century is discussed in the encounter between the prevalent forms of housing constructions: ‘speculative’ housing (Tuscolano), ‘abusivo’ housing (Torre Angela, Case Rosse) and council housing
(Vigne Nuove, Corviale, tor Bella Monaca). This brief description of the case study neighbourhoods aims at relating them in their historical and cultural emergence and to open up possible starting-points for further *dynamic* articulation.
Ever since its foundation on the Agro Romano (“the fields of Rome”) the city of Rome had a particular deprecat ing self-conception in relation to its surrounding periphery. Since its role as the core of an empire, the agricultural and material production of its urban hinterland only played a subordinate role. Rome’s wealth was received as booty and was not the fruit of industrial or artisanal activity (Kammerer 1993: 11). This millennia-old (and ever-continuing) dominance of the political-religious tertiary sector has led to a remarkable indifference towards the urban periphery. As the Papal blessing “Urbi et Orbi” still reconfirms today, Rome communicates first and foremost with the world and defines itself through legitimation and authority.

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34 Peter Kammerer is a sociologist and expert on Roman urban culture (i.a. German translations of Pier Paolo Pasolini).
Figure 2.01 / 1870. Building development of the periphery of Rome / Timothy Pape 2016
Figure 2.02 / 1900. Building development of the periphery of Rome / Timothy Pape 2016
Figure 2.03 / 1930. Building development of the periphery of Rome / Timothy Pape 2016
Figure 2.04 / 1960. Building development of the periphery of Rome / Timothy Pape 2016
Figure 2.05 / 1990. Building development of the periphery of Rome / Timothy Pape 2016
Figure 2.06 / 2010. Building development of the periphery of Rome / Timothy Pape 2016
Figure 2.07 / Main roads of Rome: development in the 20th century / Timothy Pape 2016
Rome’s population

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>194.916</td>
<td>2.587.077</td>
<td>2.781.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>142.335</td>
<td>2.632.915</td>
<td>2.775.250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Data from Rosati 2002 and DiSomma 2011)

Figure 2.08 / Development of the population of Rome / Timothy Pape 2016
In 1871, Rome became the capital of the new Kingdom of Italy. At that time, the city had developed a split consciousness. On the one hand, there was a concentration of traces and agencies of splendid ancient history. On the other hand, Rome showed the provincial character of a relatively small medieval city, which was surrounded by a vast and desolate landscape that served mainly as pasture (Meter 1987:165ff.). After the glory of the imperial era when Rome had over one million inhabitants, the city’s population fell progressively throughout the Middle Ages. At one point, the population declined to 20,000 residents. The Papal city had not managed to fill up the area circumscribed by the ancient walls and had no productive relation whatsoever to the countryside surrounding them (Insolera 2011:36ff.). Today we know that great parts of these surroundings were urbanised in the period of imperial Rome and that the Aurelian walls only served to defend the innermost nucleus of the city. While this abounding urbanisation has been erased and in a way recaptured by its million year old geological and ecological characteristics, the centre of Rome narrates a stratification of the most recent 2500 years of history: the antique city with its ruins of the Aurelian walls, aqueducts, temples, monuments and radiant Consular roads (see figure 2.07), the Papal city with its compact form and its crown of monumental villas as well as, nested around and on top of ancient Rome, the small village-like structure and habitations of a medieval town (Benevolo 1971:9ff.). This setting of the historical stratification of Rome and its periphery in the nineteenth century formed the basis for the development of modern Rome.

During the course of the Italian unification, the annexation of Rome marked the definite end of the Papal States. At this time the city centre hosted little more

35 Helmut Meter is literary scholar whose research focuses on comparative romance literary studies in Italy, France and Spain.
36 Italo Insolera is an architect, urban planner and historian. His book “Roma moderna. Un secolo di storia urbanistica” is probably the most thorough integral investigation of the complex Roman urbanistic development in the twentieth century.
37 Leonardo Benevolo is an architect, urban planner and historian. His book “The History of the City” is a classic in urban studies. His research on Rome is mainly concerned with the modern period of the city.
38 The Papal States existed until 1870 with Rome as capital. In the following, the status of the Pope was referred to as the “Roman Question” that was settled only in 1929 in the Lateran Treaty.
than 200,000 inhabitants (see figure 2.08). However, the national economic situation together with the new capital function and the formation of national administration in the city led to an enormous increase of urban population. During these times the political and economic development in Italy was determined by an internationally prevailing imperialism and high capitalism (Kammerer 1993: 13). In particular, in the northern part of the country, the industry flourished through new technical achievements and the power of the labour movement grew steadily (Graben 2008:20). As the capital of a unified Italy, Rome had the opportunity to fulfil an important potential role as the mediator between the economically developing north of the country and the poor and predominantly agricultural south. Yet, Rome never fulfilled this role. At the time, the forcing of free trade policies with open frontiers by the north in effect even downgraded the economic situation of the agricultural south, which now had to compete with cheap imported products (Gagliardi and Percoco 2011). This development provoked a huge wave of migration and many of the migrants arrived at the gates of the new capital. Unlike other European capitals that experienced a population boom in earlier centuries, Rome’s boom only began with its role as capital city at the end of the nineteenth century (Archibugi 2005:2). This first wave of migration (with more than a doubling of the population in thirty years) demanded both enormous spatial restructuring and a quick modernising of the city. As a result, Rome’s particular development even intensified on the base of the backwardness and squalidness of the medieval city structure where the richness of its grounds and palaces was disproportionate to the dimension of the local economy. There was neither an intense agricultural or industrial sector, nor a brisk trade (Dominioni 1971:175ff). From the outset, Rome has been “postmodern” with its immaterial production of images, symbols, administration and authority (Kammerer 1993:13). And with Rome becoming the new capital of...
Italy, this structural orientation to symbolic production was booming again, while other productive functions, especially industrialisation, were refused. In the urban spatial and morphological structure, the absence of a traditional division of labour between the city core and its catchment area has impeded urban development of a dense network of locations and sub-centres with different meanings and functions (Zocca 1971:22). Instead the Roman core-periphery relationship has continued to be characterised by different forms of separation and arbitrariness until present times (Mariano 2014:554).

Another significant characteristic of the urbanisation process of the Roman periphery was the distribution of land. At the end of the nineteenth century, the old Roman noble families, together with the rich Roman bourgeoisie, had not only political power but were large landowners with monopoly positions as well. In 1871, the municipality of Rome included about 400 manors in the hands of less than 200 owners, who divided most of the Agro Romano between them. 40% of these owners were Roman noble families, 30% families from the Roman grande bourgeoisie and 30% of the property belonged to the church (Bortolotti 1988: 10). This monopoly of power and property paved the way for massive speculations in the flourishing building sector of the new-born capital that was facing major structural changes and huge investments without there being any elaborated urban programmatic or operating supervisory authority. In addition, the financial weakness of other local industries led to a chaotic and uncontrolled urban structural development of Rome in the late nineteenth century (Insolera 2011:85ff). Large plots of land within the Aurelian walls, some of them former luxury mansions surrounded by historical gardens, were parcelled out and passed over to the hands of credit institutions and construction companies, most of them owned by the same influential landowners. Two-thirds of the area within the Aurelian walls was undeveloped and provided great opportunities for urban and building development (see figure 2.01 / Seronde-Babonaux 1983:52). Through their monopoly position, only a handful of noble and rich Roman families dictated prices and made enormous profit as only a few building contractors

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42 Mario Zocca is architect and urban planning scholar.
43 Lando Bortolotti is an urban planning scholar and historian.
44 Anne-Marie Seronde Babonaux is geographer.
shared huge construction areas amongst themselves (Insolera 2011:71ff). Almost all residential areas that were built between 1871 and 1900 were accomplished by the private sector. Under the prevailing liberal Roman politics this private construction sector had wide-ranging freedom in pushing and controlling the urban development (Graben 2008:30). The municipality promoted this development by agreeing special deals and subsidies to the construction companies in a hopeless attempt to play at least a little regulatory role. And it was not until 1883 - more than ten years after becoming the capital city – that the first master plan (‘Piano Regolatore Generale – PRG’) for Rome was approved by the authorities (Insolera 2011:45). This plan emphasised the modernisation of the centre within the Aurelian walls especially through the designation of representative locations for administrative buildings and the provision of affordable living space for the new inhabitants. Its real influence, however, was limited to retrospective regulation of the dynamics of speculative practices that had already become independent (Insolera 2011:52,72). As one consequence of this, development property prices for sites and buildings within the old city centre were going through the roof, making them unaffordable for the majority of the population. Those who could not benefit from these dynamics of the bursting housing market, lived as sub-tenants in decrepit buildings of the historic centre or in makeshift barracks in the periphery (Cuccia 1991: 20).

Only after an economic crisis at the end of the nineteenth century - which came about first and foremost from the building sector - the economic, political, and social situations in the city of Rome started to change. The building activities of the public sector held a more significant role after the collapse a great part of the private building industry (Insolera 2011:91ff). In addition, the Italian government experienced a shift to the left and, between 1901 and 1914 under the leadership of the left-wing liberal Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti, a wide range of social reforms were introduced in Italy. The Law number 251 from 31st May 1903

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45 One of the examples Italo Insolera provides for the speculative development of land is the central Roman district Esquilino, where the prices of land exploded from 9 Lire per square meter in 1873 to 95 Lire per square meter in 1983 (2011:73).
46 Giuseppe Cuccia is an engineer, who worked in the urban context in Rome (several publications on the urban historic transformation of local situations in Rome).
47 From the founding of the state in 1861 until 1946, Italy was a constitutional monarchy. Politically, this period can be roughly divided into a liberal period from 1861-1922 and a Fascist period from
established the legislative foundation for state-funded council housing with the Istituto Autonomo delle Case Popolari (ICP), an institute for affordable council housing (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:51). In Rome, the economic crisis and its consequences abetted the development of council housing, the financing of which was based predominantly on a taxation of private building land (Zocca 1971: 22ff, Insolera 2011:93ff). However, the success of the council housing development depended on the dynamics of landowners, banks and construction companies in the building sector. The structural monopoly that had been established during the first building boom of Rome still had decisive influence on the enforcement and implementation of the proposed building laws and taxation (Insolera 2011:95). In addition, as the building plots had to be purchased at market prices, most of the council housings had to be built in fringe areas of the centre. Eventually, the planned financial system, which had foreseen a subsidisation of council housing through the taxation of building land, failed (Cuccia 1991: 36). And even if the short-term effects of this development were marginal, these political efforts at the turn of the century were the starting point of a characteristic interplay between private and council housing for the Roman urban development throughout the twentieth century. The ‘Piano Regulatore Generale’ of 1909 was the first master plan of Rome to separate zones for private and council housing as well as proposing and regulating different building norms. ‘Intensivi’ (housing blocks) were limited to a height of 34 meters and a maximum of seven storeys. Isolated residential buildings (‘villini’) were defined as maximum three storey constructions with a minimum distance to the plot boundary of four meters and a maximum building layout of 20% of the building plot (Rossi 1922-1946, the latter period of which was presided over by Benito Mussolini as Prime Minister (Duce). Giovanni Giolitti was the Prime Minister of Italy five times between 1892 and 1921. The Giolittian Era (1901-1914) is known for a wide range of progressive social reforms. He introduced universal suffrage for men in 1912 (women obtained suffrage only in 1946), nationalised the private telephone and railroad operators, recognised trade unions, introduced laws for the protection of workers, a national insurance institute and an institute for affordable social housing (Insolera 2011: 91-102).

In Europe, the problem of affordable housing for the working class emerged with the rise of industrialisation and related urbanisation. Italy was confronted with the problem only at the end of nineteenth century - later than in most other European countries. Until the introduction of the Luzzatti Law (Law no. 251 by Luigi Luzzatti) affordable housing for workers was realised only by independent institutions – e.g. charity organisations - financed by state subsidies (Graben 2008:43ff.).

Harald Bodenschatz is an urban sociologist (detailed research studies on urban planning in Rome under Mussolini).
Predictably, this classification of building plots with different regulated building types and density of inhabitants encountered major resistance among the landowners, who wanted to exploit their properties in the most profitable way and thus with the maximum building layout. This conflict paralysed the construction market until after the First World War, when, finally, the regulations of the 1909 master plan were undermined by a decree provisionally allowing buildings with higher exploitation of the building plots. These buildings mostly lost their provisional character as soon as they had been built (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:53).

The historical period from the new-born capital city in 1871 to the entrance of Italy in the First World War in 1915 formed the basis for Rome's urbanisation and modernisation process of the twentieth century was laid out. The process is entangled within the peculiar history of Rome that differs in quality and chronology from the process of urbanization in other European cities (Archibugi 2005: 4). Rome belongs to the category of great metropolitan cities by dint of the size of its territory and its population, but at the same time it contains characteristics of small and medium-sized cities by the nature of its urban fabric and the quality of its historic centre (Archibugi 2005: 17). A strategic response to Rome's particularity was needed at the end of the nineteenth century, when the city's population was increasing considerably and when there was an unprecedented need for new buildings. Today, Rome is a large metropolis resulting mostly from an additive urbanisation process with large peripheral areas built around the former centre core and an overall structure that shows the pre-modern characteristics of Rome's urban layout (see figure 2.01). The Consular roads - extending in a radial form from the centre since the imperial city of a distant past - dominated not only the small papal city until 1870, but are the arteries of the large agglomeration of Rome until today (see figure 2.7). The periphery is shaped like an umbrella that is spanned with the Consular roads as constructive slats (Benevolo 1992:128). The foundations for the structural urban development of Rome have been formed by the tension between a century-early preservation of history and a century-late beginning of modernisation; between a

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50 Piero Ostilio Rossi is a Roman architect (author of a detailed guide on Roman “modern” architecture).
ropy monopoly of landowners seeking to gild their heritage and a fast growing demand for modernisation playing catch-up.

// URBAN ARCHITECTURE ENCOUNTERS IDEOLOGICAL INTENTIONS AND SOCIAL DIVIDE

While in the early 1910s problems of mass unemployment, social conflicts, demonstrations and protest strikes had been on the daily agenda, the First World War tore Italy into an even deeper social and economic crisis. State debts reached unimaginable proportions and in Rome the immigration of untrained labour and with it the unemployment rate increased continuously (Graben 2008:64). As in most European metropolises, the housing deficit became a key issue for urban development in the post-war period. However, contrary to the urban development politics of decentralisation in Germany, England or France, Rome held on to its compact city extension in the tradition of the pre-war period. Even the fascists coming into power in Italy with the March on Rome on the 28th of October 1922 - at least at first - did not change this conception of compact urban extension (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:41). In the early years under Mussolini the unfinished housing projects and plans from before the war were predominantly continued. On behalf of the public building sector, the Institute for Council Housing (ICP=Instituto Case Popolari) initiated a wide range of activities in the 1920s, the greatest and most well-known of which are the two garden city constructions Aniene and Garbatella at the gates of Rome (see figure 2.03 / Bodenschatz et al. 2011:46). The private building sector was promoted with a liberalisation of the building policies - a partial suspension of rent control, tax exemption for new constructions and the abolition of the taxation of building land - with the aim to bind the state-supporting middle classes to the city (Insolera 1993: 102).

Of remarkable importance in this attempt was the renunciation of the traditional - and rather suburban - Roman building type ‘villino’ (one- or two-family house) for the triumphal procession of the ‘palazzina’ - a compact urban building type of a
Given the housing shortage and the pressure from monopoly landowners with speculative interests, the building regulations from the PRG of 1909 were amended several times in the early 1920s. In this way, the majority of the urban extension areas declared zones for the isolated one- to two-family building type (‘villino’) were converted into dense urban neighbourhoods with multifamily houses. While the ‘villino’ is detached on all four sides and limited to 3 storeys with a building layout of maximum one-fourth of the property, the ‘palazzina’ allows a more intense and more compact construction. Although the minimum distance to the building plot boundaries has been increased compared to the ‘villino’ from four to six meters on three sides of the constructions, towards the street this requirement is not applied anymore. In addition, the maximum height of the buildings has been increased to five storeys (Muntoni and Pazzaglini 1987, Bodenschatz et al. 2011:53). In the following years and decades, the ‘palazzina’ quickly gained great popularity not only among landowners and housing associations, but also among architects and prosperous tenants. It is extremely flexible, enables a variety of different partitioning into flats and is applicable to different locations. At the same time the ‘palazzina’ follows the building type of the ‘villino’ with its characteristic detached architecture and the associated possibility of designing the facades on all sides (Muntoni 2006:150). This allowed an appropriate “staging” of the social status of its inhabitants while its availability for home ownership increased its popularity even further. The ‘palazzina’ became the dominant building type for the middle classes and coined entire new neighbourhoods (Rossi 2000:41, Bodenschatz et al. 2011:53). In general, the success of this building type in Rome under Mussolini was closely linked to liberal housing policies promoting the private construction sector as well as private home ownership. While the financial subsidies for the institute for council housing (ICP) were reduced, only ‘the institute of apartments for state employees’ received major contracts to provide the officials of the fast-growing state apparatus with accommodation of good quality, again in order to strengthen their loyalty to the political idea of fascism (Graben 2008:63, Bodenschatz et al. 2011:54).

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51 Alessandra Muntoni is a Roman architect (several publications on the roman building type ‘Palazzina’).
Henceforth, housing subsidies went almost exclusively to private contractors. Private construction companies realised entire neighbourhoods for better-situated residents in the range of a compact city extension. Often these projects were close to council housing or filled up ‘in-between’ areas, profiting from the already realised infrastructure of existing neighbouring development (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:94). In this way, undeveloped left-over spaces within the Aurelian walls were rapidly covered with housing mostly through the construction of ‘intensivi’ and ‘palazzine’ and led to the typical continuous building mass of central Rome (see figure 2.03 and 2.04 / Insolera 2011:126ff). Parallel to this development and triggered by public funds for the construction of individual houses for civil servants, in the middle of the 1920s, a law on the promotion of private home ownership was adopted. The so-called ‘case a riscatto convenzionato’ was designed to fulfil the dream of less wealthy savers for their ‘own home’ through a contractually stabilized repurchase (Graben 2005: 87). This program provided also for the lower middle classes to live in ‘palazzine’ in central areas. Thus, a special and characteristic Roman way of urban housing development was founded during the 1920s, a unique project of urbanization of the middle-class (Muntoni 2006:143ff). From a social, architectural, and urban planning perspective, this development can be considered an independent urban form of mass housing in contrast, for example, to the German ‘Siedlungsbau’ and suburbanization in the USA (Bodenschatz et al. 2011: 50). The new compacted quarters did not correspond to the then internationally predominant conception of a “proper” urban housing development, which was thought to take the more decentralized form of settlements or satellites.

For Mussolini, the housing constructions in Rome served predominantly as a necessary basis for pursuing greater goals and were not necessarily of any greater ideological relevance. In his speech at the occasion of the bestowal of honorary citizenship of Rome in 1924, Mussolini divided the challenges of urban development into ‘necessities’, such as infrastructure or housing, and ‘greatness’, such as antique and fascist monuments (Mussolini 1924). For fascist totalitarianism, the promotion of interests of landowners and the commitment to the needs of middle classes only served for purposes of consolidating and concentrating the fascist power. To the relative weakness of local governments
Mussolini replied with the abolition of local autonomy and - after a short period of adjustments – with the establishment of a state governor, the so-called ‘governatore’ (Steidl 2008: 37). Most of these ‘governatori’ came out of Roman aristocratic families. As a direct consequence, the new organisation of political administration and agency not only further concentrated power by the amalgamation of the role of the mayor, the city council and the municipal committee, but led at the same time to further consolidation of the fascist regime. This centralisation of power in Rome also raised the importance of administration to tremendous proportions. Between 1921 and 1936 the number of employees in state administration increased from 17.700 to 48.300 (Bodenschatz et al. 2011: 41). Industry, on the contrary (apart from the building industry), did not play any important role under the fascist regime, just as in the times before the First World War. While in the first years already-initiated or planned building projects were pursued, after the consolidation of the fascist regime in the middle of the 1920s the course was set for a new orientation in urban design. For Mussolini, Rome was not only the capital of Italy but a testimonial of historical greatness on Italian territory. The new Rome, often also called the ‘Third Rome’, was meant to be again the capital of an empire, architecturally, urbanistically, institutionally, and symbolically, showing dignity to the ancient past: a rebirth of the imperial Rome (Steidl 2008: 32ff, Bodenschatz et al. 2011: 40ff). In the debates carried out at the time, Rome was divided into 4 Zones: the archaeological ‘antique city’, the ‘old city’ build in mediaeval, renaissance and baroque times, the ‘new city’ that has been constructed since 1871, and the ‘newest city’ which fell within the scope of fascist urban development (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:45). Focus of the fascist urban design was the ‘liberation’ and ‘mise-en-scène’ of the ‘antique city’, through uncovering and demolitions at the expense of the ‘old city’, and the reorganisation of the ‘new city’ into a centre for representation of the fascist dictatorship. Mussolini wanted to build a continuity between Roman essence and fascism, between Augustus and Mussolini (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:45). In contrast to this August setting in the centre – which never met its ideological

52 Mischa Steidl’s PhD thesis in philosophy, history and culture deals with the building and destroying of memory through the urban transformation in Rome.
objectives (Agnew 2010) -53, the projects on the rim of the city included first and foremost housing, accompanied by social infrastructure and parks. In the 1930s, the fascist regime built notable satellite projects of regional importance outside the Aurelian walls, like a university city, a sports city, or an aviation centre (see also figure 2.04). Some of these satellite projects were even of national or international interest: The Lido di Roma was the most important leisure city in Italy, Cinecittà was the largest film production facility in Europe and today’s tertiary centre EUR (‘Esposizione Universale di Roma’) was originally planned for the world Expo in 1942, which marked the end and climax of urban efforts of the regime (Rossi 2000:133ff, Archibugi 2005: 19-20, Bodenschatz et al. 2011:214ff).

The immense growth of Rome’s population in the fascist area from half a million to 1.2 million in only 30 years as well as the countless demolitions of buildings in the historical centre intensified the chronic lack of sufficient housing. Whereas in the 1920s the majority of the housing construction was realised as a compact city extension within the Aurelian walls (see figure 2.03), starting in the 1930s the compact form of the city of Rome began to fray (Kammerer 1993:15-16). This second wave of city extension was realised in great part in proximity to the satellite projects of the fascist regime or garden city constructions of the early 1920s, providing the necessary infrastructural development (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:172ff). And although a lot of different forms of council housing were realised during the fascist era, the two garden suburbs Aniene and Garbatella presumably paved the way for this first intense and consolidated development of the periphery of Rome.

CASE STUDY GARBATELLA (FIGURE 2.09)
Garbatella was one of the first projects of council housing in Rome and was planned by the Institute of Social Housing (‘Instituto Case Popolari’ / ICP) in the

53 John Agnew is a geographer. In the context of Mussolini’s influence on Rome’s urban form, he argues that “much recent writing about Fascism and Fascist Rome tends to [...] confuse grandiloquent posturing with actual achievement” (Agnew 2010:16). In the ideological attempt at creating a new Rome, Fascism remained divided in itself between its Futurist supporters and its ambition to stand “on the shoulders of ancient giants”. These compromises gave Papal Rome rather a larger than a smaller presence (Agnew 2010:17). But all the more important, the historical complexity of Rome is to be found in the “everyday romanità of the Romans and their city [and] overcame the best of any singular vision for the city that Fascism could ever offer” (Agnew 2010:17/ emphasis in original).
early twentieth century. The neighbourhood was built in several phases mainly between 1920 and 1940 and provides lodgings for about 8,000 people (Insolera 1993). Garbatella can be considered something like a parade ground for housing constructions and building typologies in Rome, realised in its different phases of building development: from single to grouped ‘villini’, a variety of different ‘palazzine’ compositions to social hotels as a form of ‘intensivi’ (Rappino 1974). The first phase of construction of the Garbatella from 1920 to 1923 was strongly influenced by a Roman interpretation of the ideas of Ebenezer Howard’s model of the Garden City, “in which all the advantages of the most energetic town life, with all the beauty and delight of the country, may be secured in perfect combination” (Howard 1965: 46 / Sinatra 2006:17-19). Along with a meticulous planning of housing construction regarding levels of heights, choppy roof landscapes and the implementation of greenery, the main political emphasis of this first phase was on the so called ‘case educatrice’ (education houses; Rappino 1974:162-180). Through the integration of council housing in the fabric of the city, the intention was to educate the new inhabitants to be citizens of Rome, respecting at the same time their former routines and lifeworlds that were of predominantly rural origins. This was based on the assumption that the quality of a neighbourhood has a positive influence on the social contribution and integration of every single inhabitant (Rappino 1974:174). Forty-four individual buildings were arranged in groups of four to eight detached houses standing guard over shady courtyards. These courtyards served as refuge from the chaos of the metropolis and provided a vegetable garden for every family in the attempt to help improve their low level of income and to retain people’s direct relation to nature (see figure 2.09 / Sinatra 2006:21-22). In the following five different construction phases of Garbatella the interpretation of building types and compositions changed according to the prevailing urbanistic, architectural, ideological and political principles. Being more compact, complex, differentiated or homogenous (Rappino 1974), all these following phases of building development, however, are reflecting the same compositional characteristic of the first phase of construction (see figure 2.16). Thus there is continuity that runs through the differentiated transformation process and accompanied by significantly changing political times and a variety

54 Sergio Rappino is a Roman architect (publication on the building development of La Garbatella).
55 Monica Sinatra in an historian (publication on the historical development of La Garbatella).
of social groups with very different economic realities and cultural origins. This makes the neighbourhood Garbatella especially appropriate as a case study for researching urban dynamic form. In other words, regardless of this palimpsest of fundamental transitions, the neighbourhood seems to have evolutionarily conserved a characteristic individuality and collective. And it is claimed here that the characteristic architectural and detailed physical design with social gardens and courtyards as well as differentiated visual relations is a significant participant in the emergence of the phenomenon Garbatella (see also chapter (16) 320ff).

In 1931, a new Master Plan (PRG) for Rome was adopted, which anticipated a future population of about two million inhabitants. It was the first comprehensive plan for Rome, which included larger expansion areas outside the Aurelian walls. Additionally, in exceptional cases, constructions outside of the plan could be approved with a request for authorization (Rossi 2000:63ff). For the first time, the overall volume of the envisaged new housing construction activities was divided into categories of building types with 15% ‘intensivi’, 58% different sizes of ‘palazzine’ and 27% ‘villini’ (Cuccia 1991:112, Insolera 2011:253). Due to the prevailing lack of housing, however, these regulations were only partially respected, often covering assigned public parks with ‘palazzine’ developments or transforming ‘palazzina’ zones into intensive apartment block constructions (Graben 2005: 67). While the building type ‘villino’ received a share of only 9.4% of the approved building permits between 1924 and 1938, over 85% of the official total new housing constructions were large apartment blocks and different sizes of ‘palazzine’ (Graben 2005:87). Even these official numbers, however, obscure the circumstances of actual housing construction as, with the phenomenon of illegal housing on the periphery, a significant proportion is not included in these statistics.

Regarding the types of urban design of housing in the fascist era, three main forms of construction can be distinguished: the compact urban quarter within the areas of city expansion, the urban and consolidated ‘borgata’ outside the Aurelian walls, and the provisional or illegal ‘borgate’ - mostly shanty towns far outside the compact city - and the PRG of 1931. While the first two types have been
designed mainly for different middle classes loyal to the system, the provisional or illegal ‘borgate’ hosted marginalized, unemployed and homeless people, who were not welcome in the city centre (Villani 2012:11ff.).\textsuperscript{56} In other words, during the fascist era in Rome, class-consciousness was linked to (and even emphasised through) housing design and development. The political interventions of urban development aimed to categorize buildings according to the different levels of society that followed the ancient core-periphery hierarchical descent with a strict separation or segregation regarding social classes (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:45). Whereas the central areas have been earmarked for the upper and middle classes loyal to the regime, the displaced people from the centre and the unbroken immigration from rural areas have been allocated in the periphery (Della Seta 1883:124ff, Graben 2008:70).\textsuperscript{57} As justification for this social segregation Mussolini claimed the necessary adaptation to changing economic circumstances and the relocation of industry to peripheral locations – when in fact the speculative machinations of the building sector as prime industry were predominantly profiting from this development (Insolera 2011:144-145). In short, the answer of the fascist urbanistic project to the growing number of ‘undesirable’ people in Rome was their removal to the so-called provisional ‘borgate’: isolated and illegal settlements that were built outside the consolidated city with poor infrastructure and often temporary character (Barberini 1971:156-158). This concept of ‘borgate’ had been introduced officially in the mid-1920s. Deriving from ‘borgo’, which means ‘small rural neighbourhood’, the term ‘borgata’ implied at first an impression of incompleteness. With the emergence of the first official ‘borgata’, Acilia, in 1924, however, this connotation of the term started to change and is nowadays first and foremost linked to its peripheral location (Lupo 2009: 37-38).\textsuperscript{58} Of the twelve ‘official’ borgate from the period 1924-1940 only five were developed within the limits of the master plan of 1931 (Insolera 2011:148). And it was precisely this peripheral positioning of mostly artisan families that significantly contributed to the relentless spiral of social

\textsuperscript{56} Luciano Villani is a literary and philosophy scholar and expert on socio-political history of the Roman periphery.

\textsuperscript{57} Piero Della Seta is a Roman urbanist promoting urban regeneration in Rome especially in the 1970s. Being one of the leaders of Italian Communist Party (PCI) he was often called the “urbanista rosso”.

\textsuperscript{58} Cristina Lupi wrote her PhD (cultural studies, environmental studies and theatre) about doubts, shadows, and betrayed expectations of the new Roman master plan.
segregation. Leaving their home environments was often tantamount to a forced abandonment of the previous occupation, as the isolated location of the ‘borgate’ also cut them off from any potential customer (Insolera 2011:141). In addition, ‘illegal borgate’ had only been tolerated as long as they could not be seen from the antique Consular roads, which at the same time provided their only infrastructural connection to the city centre. In his fascist propaganda, Mussolini defined the inhabitants of the provisional peripheral settlements as members of marginalized communities. By contrast, the first official ‘borgate’ built by initiative of the fascist government for the lower middle-class could be understood as a kind of social transition at the rim of the consolidated city. (Graben 2008:78-79, Bodenschatz et al. 2011:172).

CASE STUDY TUFELLO (FIGURE 2.10 AND 2.11)

Tufello is one of the official ‘borgate’ developed under the fascist regime of Mussolini and was assigned especially for ‘repatriated’ Italians. The political intention was to encourage and facilitate the return of living abroad fellow Italians with regard to the impending world war (Villani 2012:209). Built on a plateau of ‘tufa’ that gave the ‘borgata’ its name, Tufello was situated at the time on the northeast rim of the consolidated city, just outside the Aurelian walls between the Consular roads Salaria and Nomentana (Bonomo 2007:20). Through its specific position, but also through its characteristic design, political objectives, and social characteristics, the neighbourhood always and in many respects manifested a role of ‘in between’-link, which, it could be said, continues to exist today. Tufello was meant to take the urbanistic role of a catalyst between the bourgeois city and its marginalised outer periphery, the rapid development of which was finally accepted to be unstoppable (Bodenschatz et al. 2011:172). This position was entrenched through the development of a huge council housing project in the 1970s and subsists until today (Vigne Nuove / see figure 2.15). In contrast to the provisional ‘borgate’ of the time, Tufello was built with houses - instead of shanties - providing all necessary basic supply and social infrastructure. The historical core of the neighbourhood - called ‘French’ to emphasize the provenance of most of its first inhabitants - consists of 360 apartments arranged

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59 Bruno Bonomo is a literary scholar and expert on the Roman periphery after 1945.
in different groups of small town houses with up to four storeys (see figure 2.11 / Villani 2012:240). In the second and third phase of construction, the type of buildings increasingly intensified with up to eight storeys. Altogether, Tufello forms a trapezoidal area enclosed by major roads (see figure 2.15). The building design of all phases thereby represents again a sort of ‘in between’, promising good infrastructural and building standards comparable with the ‘villini’ and ‘palazzine’ development of the bourgeois city, which were realised, however, in a homogeneous and standardized form (Bodenschatz et al 2011:173). This had been part of the fascist strategy and propaganda expressing social class consciousness through architecture, and not giving the lower middle or working-class a possibility for an individual face, expression, status or voice. In contrast to compartmentalized individual elements with differentiated potentials of visual and social encounters in Garbatella, Tufello provides a regular and rational metric with visual axes and a central square (Villani 2012:239). Until today, this central square is conceived as the heart of Tufello (see figure 2.10) and even partly compensates the lack of public meeting places in the neighbouring council housing, one of which is Vigne Nuove (mentioned by Interviewees VigneNuove2/13/14). Given this particular role as urban mediator or, in many respects, ‘in-between’-link for the peripheral development of northeast Rome, Tufello offers qualities as benchmark in a comparative study on urban dynamic forms (see chapter (16) 332).

The first 50 years of Rome’s urbanisation process after becoming the capital of Italy had paved the way for a centrifugal core-periphery development. The fascist period reinforced this hierarchical relation through a materialised social segregation. In a dynamic arc of suspense between ancient heritage and demanding modernisation, between ideological power and economic monopolies, the Roman building type ‘palazzina’ manifests a key role for the urban form of Rome. While the ideological intention of monumentalised continuity between imperial and fascist Rome remained at best a fragmented patchwork (Agnew 2010), the ‘palazzina’ urbanisation fostered the consolidation of fascist power as well as its accompanying social discrimination (Della Seta 1883:124ff). We want to argue, however, that this Roman ‘palazzina’ phenomenon is anchored in an interdisciplinary and dynamic architectural and urban understanding of the time.
and was at best - if at all - triggered through its instrumentalisation by the fascist regime. The potential of ‘palazzina’ in this context is first and foremost its ambiguity vacillating between modern city extension and traditional appearance, between collective building type and its individual expression, between rationalised construction and the use of traditional materials. In other words, with the encounter of physical, cultural, economic, and political dynamics in the expression of the urban form, the ‘palazzina’ reflected in some way the complex historical stratification that Rome, Roman society, and Roman architects had been confronted with on an everyday basis. This palimpsest character of Rome provides an explanation for a rather ‘postmodern’ or even dynamic understanding of urban design of the time. In the preface of a special issue of the journal architettura (1936) for the presentation of the master plan of 1931, we can read that “little by little an exquisite artistic sense is extending the architectural influence from the particular to the general rising above the single conception up to the constructive whole […] The street, especially the square, even the quarter, cannot any longer be considered as simple planimetrical areas upon which may be constructed single or scattered edifices having an independent or fragmentary form” (Piacentini 1936:17). If from an urbanistic standpoint this quote could be regarded as being far ahead of its time, the potential of this urban design understanding can be witnessed convincingly by means of the triumphal procession of the ‘palazzina’ as well as the development of the Roman periphery through satellite islands and ‘borgate’. However, we have to admit the minor role of Rome’s master plans in the emergence of the peripheral urban form. By contrast, the monopoly of landowners from the upper social classes as well as the reinforcement of the core-periphery divide are two key participants in the emerging fragmented sprawl of the Roman periphery after the Second World War.

While this quote points at the potential of a particularly complex and dynamic Roman understanding of architecture and urban design, the architects themselves were also trapped in the oppositions between tradition and modernisation and between Fascist propaganda and the possibility for great achievements. As this special issue of the journal architettura was a presentation of the master plan of 1931 and its most important projects, the contributing architects had to be – if not Fascists themselves – at least in accordance with the urban planning objectives of Fascist ideology. In the first paragraph of the quoted text, Piacentini writes: “One cannot fail to see the great importance of the present town planning situation in Rome, which has become once more, after many centuries, besides the capital of a vigorous and flourishing Kingdom, the heart of a great colonial Empire” (1936:14).
Figure 2.09 / Garbatella / Antronello Mazzai 2004
Figure 2.10 / Tufello – Piazza / Guiditta Benedetti 2004

Figure 2.11 / Tufello / Guiditta Benedetti 2004
Figure 2.12 / Corviale /
Figure 2.13 / Case Rosse /
Figure 2.14 / Torre Angela (left) Tor Bella Monaca (right) /
Figure 2.15 / Vigne Nuove (up) Tufello (down) /
Figure 2.16 / Garbatella /
Figure 2.17 / Tuscolano / all 2000 / Timothy Pape 2016
Figure 2.18 / Tuscolano / Timothy Pape 2004
Figure 2.19 / Torre Angela / Leda Ricchi 2004
Figure 2.20 / Vigne Nuove - Bridge / Guiditta Benedetti 2004

Figure 2.21 / Vigne Nuove / Roberto Properzi 2004
Figure 2.24 / Corviale – Corridor / Leda Ricchi 2004

Figure 2.25 / Corviale / Leda Ricchi 2004
After the Second World War, the city of Rome contained approximately 425,000 inhabitants within the Aurelian walls and almost one million inhabitants within its periphery (see figure 2.08 / Insolera 1993: 187, Rosati 2002:453). Due to the lack of large industrial plants and few strategic targets compared to other Italian cities, Rome by and large escaped the widespread bombing of the Allies (Graben 2008:102). Consequently, post-war times in Rome were less characterised by reconstruction than other European metropolises but were nonetheless marked by a high rate of unemployment and a tense economic situation. In addition, the rationalisation of agriculture started to initiate a large new wave of migrants from rural areas of Italy, a migration that formally exploded with the Italian economic miracle of the 1960s (Barberini 1971:162). Triggered by the US Marshall Plan and supported by low salaries, the Italian economy boomed on the fertile soil of liberal politics and thriving automobile and construction industries (Graben 2008:151). Since only a few industrial enterprises settled in Rome, the construction industry and the service sector drove the engine of economy. The migration rate from rural areas to the city of Rome grew considerably in these prosperous years, with Rome reaching almost three million inhabitants by the beginning of the 1970s (see figure 2.08). The need for affordable housing was therefore an urgent one. Yet, even in post-war urban planning, Rome did not manage to formulate an adequate strategic response to the problem of its heritage and its continuing population growth (Archibugi 2005:20-21). Despite several propositions for a decentralised Roman planning at the time - with the ‘asse attrezzato’ as the most known example - , the city's historic centre continued to be treated as sacred ground. Apart from the completion of the...
peripheral tertiary centre EUR, no grand strategy for polycentric metropolitan development was further concretised (Archibugi 2006, Rossi 2009:87). Instead private contractors took advantage of the ‘lack of planning’ of the post-war years for unrestricted construction activities. Rome sprawled unhindered along the ancient Consular roads and far in excess of the Aurelian walls (Graben 2005:107). This development was fostered by the construction of the ring road ‘Grande Raccordo Anulare’ in a seven-kilometre distance of the historic centre (see figure 2.07 / Catalono 1971:37).  

// SPECULATIVE HOUSING IN THE INNER PERIPHERY PERIOD 1950S – 1980S 

The ownership structure of Rome had not changed after the war and, in 1959, as few as seven families owning fifty million square meters shared a monopoly of almost half of the declared building land (Insolera 2011: 153, 195). These landowners largely agreed with the orientation of the fascist master plan of 1931, fostering a city extension in the form of an “oil spill” and thus allowing building property speculations in almost all directions. In fact, it was predominantly the private construction companies that took advantage of this situation between the late 1940s and early 1960s. Of the housing built in this period, which fills the last undeveloped areas within the limits of the master plan of 1931, 15% belonged to public developers, 20% to cooperatives and 65% to private contractors (Graben 2008:124-125). Most of these construction activities were realised as ‘palazzine’ or ‘intensivi’ developments in the semi-central and inner peripheral belt ‘in between’ the infrastructural and housing satellite developments (‘borgate’) of the fascist era (Insolera 2011:204). A strong middle-class emerged as potential new owners of the ‘palazzine’ as a new system of urban development contracts with the municipality backed up this development, which was increasingly abused for speculative trading (Insolera 2011:193-220).

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63 Ezio Catalono is an architect working for municipality of Rome as director for Municipio XVI. 
64 The expression “oil spill” (“macchia olio”) refers to an uncontrolled city expansion of the centre that gave the first peripheral development of Rome its characteristic amoeba- or star-shaped appearance (see figure 1.01 / Lupo 2009 34ff.).
In the 1960s, the characteristics of the ‘palazzina’ changes in accordance with the socioeconomic and technical trends of the time. Instead of individual and collective characteristics, as well as use of local material as representation of social status, the architecture was increasingly limited to a banal debate of technical standard and the use of cheap construction materials (Muntoni and Pazzaglini 1987:2). In parallel the ‘palazzina’ itself became an increasingly attractive object of speculation in the construction industry in the 1960s. Despite intense discussions on structural standards, the basis of the architectural concept of ‘palazzine’ was reduced to an expression of economic neoliberalism under the impressions of the Italian economic miracle and a prevailing strong belief in technology and progress (Graben 2008:126). The creative early forms of ‘palazzina’ soon disappeared from the scene and made space for a competition of cost-reduction and mass production (Muntoni 2006:154-155). Finally, at the end of the 1960s the number of ‘palazzine’ constructions decreased mainly due to market saturation of buildings for the middle-class (Insolera 2011:218). In addition, the central and inner peripheral undeveloped construction areas were becoming scarce and the speculative practices of private contractors focused increasingly on the border regions to the outer periphery. Fostering a rapid extension of Rome with the construction of large housing estates (intensivi), this building development completed the inner peripheral extension resulting primarily from the building constructions between 1920 and 1960 (Lupo 2009: 47 -48).

‘Palazzine’ and ‘intensivi’ are its predominant building types and amount to an uniform stone desert that is homogeneously distributed in an amoebiform outgrowth around the city centre, evoking an abrupt transition to the dismembered form of the outer periphery of Rome (see figure 2.04 / see chapter (02) 038). Of increasing relevance in the last decades of the twentieth century, here speculative practices of the private building sector changed dramatically being challenged by the predominant ‘abusivo’ settlements as well as enormous areas for construction of council housing by the Development Program PEEP in 1964 (Plan for Economic and Council housing / Garano 2006:331, Rossi 2009:82).

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65 Stefano Garano is a Roman architect.
The speculative practices of private contractors in the transition areas to the outer periphery profited from the system of urban development contracts with the municipality. While building speculation in the young capital during the end of the nineteenth century was determined by the monopoly of about twelve major landowners, apart from a growing public awareness, this situation had changed little almost a hundred years later (Insolera 2011:226). The intertwining of political and economic interests increased and, in the 1950s, the majority of the construction companies was represented by politicians from local or national administrations (Insolera 2011:195ff). In addition, the municipality continued to promote the speculative city expansion through the development of peripheral island areas. These caused exponentially increasing values and price levels of the neighbouring properties that all too often were declared building land immediately after. The strength of the construction lobby became unmistakable and brought about a major public issue with the so-called ‘Espresso Affair’ in 1955 (Cancogni 1955).66 The magazine ‘Espresso’ accused the municipality of Rome of corruption in the speculative construction business by arbitrarily transforming areas designated for low-density development into areas for intensive building development (Della Seta 1983: 126). Although the investigations were shelved due to a lack of evidence and the involved journalists were convicted of defamation, the affair remains a symbol for corruption in the construction sector of Rome (Bonomo 2007:47-48, Insolera 2011:215ff). The constraining prescriptions and regulations introduced in these years, however, could not harm the construction activity in a country where what matters most is the ability to rapidly accumulate (profit-margin-system), the ability to meet non-priority needs of individuals (secondary residence), and the ability to guarantee voter consensus through the distribution of benefits while abusing administrative power in open violation of the law (clientelism) (Nigro 1978:161 in Potz 1993:86).67

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66 Manlio Cancogni is the journalist, who wrote the article “Capitale corrotta = nazione infetta” which triggered the so-called “Espresso Affair”.

67 Gianluigi Nigro is an urbanist. Since 1990, he is president of the National Institute for Urbanism in Italy (INU).
A characteristic example of speculative housing activities on a large scale in the 1950s and 1960s is the development between the borgate Quadraro e Don Bosco, where the construction cooperative INA CASA built low price properties for more than a hundred thousand people. “Tuscolano” is how the inhabitants call this neighbourhood. It is composed of parts of the quarters today officially named Don Bosco, Appio Claudio, and Quadraro, situated in the south eastern part of Rome between Porta Furba and Cinecittà along the via Tuscolana, one of the antique Consular roads (Maurano 1962:455). The entire area of this neighbourhood was almost exclusively in the hands of the family Gerini (Cancogni 1955). Due to rising property prices as a result of the neighbouring communal development of Quadraro (council housing) and Cinecittà, and benefiting from state subsidies and urban development contracts, the Gerinis managed to develop Tuscolano with unimaginable profit in just a few years (Maurano 1962:457-458). Instead of a medium grid size of typical Roman ‘palazzine’ neighbourhoods in the inner periphery, Tuscolano is characterised by a large grid with huge building blocks of over one hundred metres in length (see figure 2.17 / Cappuccitti 2014:291). With six to ten storey buildings and a consequent non-observance of the required minimum distance between the buildings the maximum possible exploitation of building land was achieved (Maurano 1962:455). Tuscolano is one of the neighbourhoods of Rome with the highest density (Rosati 2002:491). The typical chaos on the streets of this neighbourhood is framed by an endless row of shops and illuminated advertising occupying the ground level of a threatening scenery of high and closely attached apartment blocks. Today in Tuscolano, a variety of little dynamic forms of neighbourhood life encounter a seemingly unlivable urban situation of deafening noise of traffic and a broadloom of parked cars that leave no space for a blade of grass (see figure 2.18 / chapter (14) 295ff.).

68 Antonio Cappuccitti is an architect and urban planner.
Parallel to the activities of the private building sector for the middle-classes in the inner periphery, the urbanisation of the outer periphery of Rome was characterised by a specific form of illegal development, the ‘abusivo’ settlements. This was a response to the dramatic levels of housing shortage due to an increasing number of rural migrants (a consequence of rationalised agriculture and industrialisation in Italy). In Rome, migrants (mainly from the south of Italy) acquired plots of farmland and illegally built themselves houses for their family, as this was the only possibility for them to settle in Rome in the historically given political situation (Catalano and Rosi 1983, Breil 1993:95). According to an estimate by Della Seta (1988:67), from 1949 to 1975, almost 25,000 hectares were built with approximately 80,000 illegal homes for almost one million inhabitants. Today, roughly one third of the population of Rome lives in ‘abusivo’ developed districts (Petz 1993: 26). Being a widespread phenomenon in Italy, particularly after the end of the Second World War, this first wave of migration came from very different parts of the country speaking various dialects - often unintelligible to each other - and were suddenly living as neighbours next to each other (Pucci 1983). From the beginning in ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods small communities were founded on cultural solidarity and in order to organise basic services like drinking water, electricity supply, health care and schooling in mutual assistance. Being officially farmland for agricultural use, the new neighbourhoods did not have paved streets and the supply of drinking water was organised with tank trucks in these years (Catalano and Rosi 1983:386). The city of Rome mostly tolerated the illegal building construction due to the great housing shortage, especially in the times of major migration waves during the 1950s and 1960s (Cellamare 2013: 5). There was an unwritten law in the Mediterranean that once a roof was finished, the house could not be torn down anymore (Breil 1993: 102). Thus, literally “over night” the ‘abusivo’ neighbourhoods developed on an agricultural grid of farmland with the corresponding typical size of parcelling

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69 Margaretha Breil is an urban planner specialised in urban, regional and environmental policies.
70 Ursula von Petz is an urban planer with a research focus on history and theory of planning.
71 Carlo Pucci is the former head of the Office of Housing of the municipality of Rome.
72 Carlo Cellamare is an urbanist with a research focus on interdisciplinary and participation in urban design.
out. This grid pattern was divided by small streets for accessibility and subdivided into plots, the average size of which was about 500 sqm (Krella 1993:55). The building constructions of the first-generation of dwellers were financed through private savings of the new owners, through the selling of the family houses in their hometowns in other parts of Italy or through long-term and interest-free loans of close family or relatives. Legal means, home loans or property financing were out of the question due to the illicit nature of these new constructions (Catalono and Rosi 1983:389). Often families from the same hometown collaborated in order to achieve lower prices through the acquisition of bigger coherent areas. And, until today, such composed settlement communities characterise the architecture of the buildings of entire streets. At the same time the different construction particularities of the houses represent the variety of different origins of the first-generation families with a building type very similar to small ‘palazzine’ from the centre of the city (Montoni 2006: 144). Usually the ground floors were designed for workshops, the storeys above exclusively for living space, and the rooftops for terraces (Krella 1993:56). Accordingly, the houses in ‘abusivo’ settlements - and especially groups of houses on the same street - often give a homogeneous impression although they are designed very individually. Most of these settlements are to be found typically along the old consular roads of Rome that formed the backbone of the city’s transport infrastructure until today (see figure 2.07). For the ‘abusivo’ settlements these consular roads have been the only infrastructural connection, as well to the centre of Rome as to their hometowns in other parts of Italy (Berdini 1983:203, Catalano and Rosi 1983:387).

CASE STUDY TORRE ANGELA – PART A
Torre Angela is a typical so-called ‘abusivo’ built neighbourhood of Rome, which started to develop as such in the 1950’s and accommodates today nearly 80.000 people (DeAngelis 2012:224). The neighbourhood is to be found in the eastern part of the Roman periphery between the consular roads Casilina and Prenestina, just outside the highway ring ‘Grande Raccordo Anulare’. ‘Abusivo’

73 Bernard Krella is an urban and regional planner publications on space-time structures of Roman ‘borgate’.
74 Paolo Berdini is an urbanist, journalist and politician (Communist Party of Italy, PCI).
75 Alessandro de Angelis is a journalist specialised in writing on themes of the Roman periphery.
settlement activities in Torre Angela started already in the 1920s (DeAngelis 2012:93ff). In 1953, however, the area still appeared as a vast expanse of green fields, meadows and hills with only 2,000 inhabitants (Krella 1993: 53). In the following decades, the manageable ownership of Torre Angela, with the family Brunetti as the single owner, allowed a remarkably rapid development. In 1967, already more than 20,000 people lived in Torre Angela and building activity continued. Until the 1970s, Torre Angela grew as an autonomous village-like neighbourhood with rows of detached two-storey buildings and huge open spaces. As there was no administrative planning, the neighbourhood in these years was characterised by private initiatives and a close-knit of neighbourly communities with public activities mainly taking place in the open ‘private’ gardens. (DeAngelis 2012:123-145).

In the context of ‘abusivo’ settlements, it is significant to reflect on the complexity of the process that deeply characterises the development of the city of Rome in the 20th century. These illegal building constructions are not just a tendency that is intolerable because they are unauthorised and have possible negative effects on their urban settings. They should not be considered mere temporary phenomena needed to solve the housing problem in times when public administration had not been able to give an adequate response. Rather ‘abusivo’ settlements are a widespread process of city self-making, which defines characteristic local social relationships, economies, self-managements, identities, belongings, public spaces, and dynamic urban fabrics or ways of life (Krella 1993:57-59). In the 1960s and 1970s, the negative consequences of ‘abusivo’ urban development were discussed with their excessive land use threatening the natural environment. Around the city, the so-called “red belt” developed with uncountable ‘abusivo’ residents that did not pay taxes and had no possibility of political participation (Clementi and Perego 1983:37-39, Graben 2008:138). In fact, ‘abusivo’ urban development is no secondary phenomenon in Rome, but characterizes the entire urban development of the city (Kreiblich 1993a:38 / see also chapter (15) 305ff.).

76 Alberto Clementi and Francesco Perego are Roman architects.
Under a Catholic-inspired centrist government in the post-war period, the speculative interest and influence of landowners on public decisions transformed regulatory plans in Rome into profitable agreements between dominant forces.\(^{77}\)

The council building sector played a rather smaller role in this period with less than 15% of the overall housing construction occurring until the 1970s (DeRosa 2000:105).\(^{78}\) Its strategic function, however, in providing infrastructure for the private and ‘abusivo’ housing developments should not be underestimated. Here the relatively small and autonomous housing estates realised under the INA-Casa programme from the 1950s had a pioneer role (Graben 2008:115).\(^{79}\) At the same time the massive population growth through migration caused a fast and unauthorised urban extension, in parts with inhuman conditions of life, and made public urban planning interventions ever more necessary. In 1962, the first centre-left government of Rome was formed and in the same year a new master plan was introduced, including a new law for council housing and a corresponding new program (Heigl 2015: 40-41).\(^{80}^{81}\) The PRG from 1962 (approved in 1965) was composed of compromises of the existing conflicts between the interests of landowners and municipality in continuing to follow traditional ideas of urban density whilst integrating at the same time - and for the first time - the outer periphery (Rossi 2000:237ff). The corresponding necessary integration and legalisation of ‘abusivo’ housing for almost one million inhabitants would become one of the most challenging problems of the Roman urbanisation process in the following decades. Social protests and movements in the 1960s and 1970s moved the focus of urban development towards questions of affordable rent, living space, quality of living, and social services, politically accompanied through the first left Government of Rome in 1976 (Heigl 2015: 39-73).

\(^{77}\) The post war period “was based on a coalition between the Christian Democrat Party [Democrazia Cristiana, DC] and the right-wing post-Fascists. In this period, a system of political power and consensus took shape, which was characterised by an exchange of business opportunities and political support and the sharing of conservative visions and values” (Albergo and Moini 2013: 14).

\(^{78}\) Luigi de Rosa is a scholar of history of economics.

\(^{79}\) “INA-Casa” is the state intervention programme for the construction of council housing.

\(^{80}\) Mathias Heigl is a historian (publications on the social movements in Rome in the 1970s).

\(^{81}\) From 1962 to 1976, a Christian-democrat (Democrazia Cristiana, DC) and socialist (Partito Socialista Italiano, PSI) coalition government faced high speculative interest and growing ‘abusivismo’ in the attempt to make the 1962 master plan operational (Archibugi 2005: 109-110).
In addition, the nationally-adopted law ‘167’ of 1962 gave the Italian local councils the chance to start coordinated programmes of low-cost residential housing, for which the new master plan had assigned enormous areas in the periphery. In 1964, the municipality of Rome launched its first Plan for Economic and Council Housing (PEEP) (Rossi 2000:142). The PEEP programs - a second one followed in 1984 - provided for low-cost council housing with a total of 551,073 rooms equivalent to 44,085,840 cubic meters of built volume. The program identified 70 areas to house 700,000 people covering a total area of 5,000 hectares (Annese and Del Brocco 2013:1043). These can be divided into three different approaches to the design of new neighbourhoods. In the beginning, a strong influence of utopias from the metabolist movement (mega-structures / see chapter (2) 035) could be witnessed and all the projects presented a formalisation of urban design on a large scale. The second generation of these council housing neighbourhoods were characterized by large architectural objects that integrate public spaces and services; and, finally, the third generation presented a compromise of large architectural forms and relationship with the urban fabric of the traditional settlements of Rome (Annese and Del Brocco 2013).

The location of the planned settlements was often chosen in proximity to ‘abusivo borgate’ in order to provide the infrastructure for both neighbourhoods with no additional costs (Petz 1993:28). Due to lack of funds, almost half of these settlements of council housing were developed outside the existing master plan, where the community traded off agricultural land with landowners and subsequently reclassified it into building land. At the end of 1973, however, the implementation of the Program PEEP had not even started and the oil crisis, the general economic regression, as well as state financing problems, postponed the constructions (Graben 2008: 176). Most of the first projects were completed only in the beginning of the 1980s and by the end of the program in 1985 about 270,000 rooms for more than 400,000 inhabitants were realised. In the attempt to

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82 From 1976 to 1985, a left-wing government with communist mayors (Partito Communista Italiano, PCI) attempted “to get consensus everywhere at a cheap cost with ephemeral initiatives and reclamation of the illegal agglomerations developed in an [abusivo] way in the urban peripheries” (Archibugi 2005: 110).

83 Marialla Annese and Barbara Del Brocco are architects with a research focus on social housing.
re-evaluate the urban periphery of Rome, these gigantic building projects of PEEP served as tools of urban development intervention to systematise the fragmented peripheral areas and to link them together to one greater continuum. Built under the urban planning model “urbanity through density” these mega-structures were designed as an entire neighbourhood for 10.000 to 30.000 people (Krämer 2001:49). After their realisation, however, the mega-structures appeared separated from their urban surroundings due to problems of marginalisation, segregation, occupancy policies and mono-functionality, but also due to their hermetically-separated building structure. In the context of the design of these mega-structures the Roman architect, Piero Ostilio Rossi argues that “we cannot forget, without failing to grasp the climate which determined these projects, that 1969 was the year in our country [Italy] in which the Trade Union movement put the question of housing and of better living conditions for the poorer segments at the centre of its demands and, through strikes and violent demonstrations, gave birth to what became known as the ‘Hot Autumn’” (2009:84). The gigantic council housing projects of these times have been at the core of a public debate of a social movement in Italy, and Rome was at the centre of these tensions. In the present research, three of the case studies form part of the council housing program PEEP. The characteristics of these neighbourhoods are here described predominantly through the case of Corviale, while the cases of Vigne Nuove and Tor Bella Monaca are of special interest for the present work due to their proximity to the previously described neighbourhoods Tufello (see figure 2.15) and Torre Angela (see figure 2.14).

CASE STUDY VIGNE NUOVE (FIGURE 2.20 AND 2.21)

Vigne Nuove is situated in the north of Rome next to the legal borgata Tufello that was built under the fascist regime of Mussolini. Completed in 1979, it is one of the first projects of the PEEP and, with 524 housing units for 3.330 inhabitants, also one of the smaller projects (Krämer 2001:49). Eight-storey rows of concrete mount to form an architectural ‘mega form’, which visually dominates parts of the north-eastern periphery of Rome with its massive silhouette (see figures 2.20 and 2.21). Until today, only a minor part of the planned public services has been

84 Steffen Krämer is an art historian specialised in architecture.
85 see also chapter (2) 042.
implemented in Vigne Nuove and the neighbourhood understands itself, in this sense, as both a neighbour to, and part, of Tufello (see also chapter (16) 332).

CASE STUDY TOR BELLA MONACA (FIGURE 2.22 AND 2.23)
The Project Tor Bella Monaca is situated in the eastern parts of Rome, next to the ‘abusivo’ neighbourhood Torre Angela. It belongs to the third generation of the projects of the program PEEP and is composed of different isolated building blocks that are linked by huge infrastructural elements (see figures 2.22 and 2.23). Built between 1981 and 1984, it provides 3,400 housing units for more than 10,000 inhabitants. It also provides infrastructural facilities for its surrounding neighbourhoods (Kreiblich 1993b). The different clashing cultural and social backgrounds of the inhabitants of Tor Bella Monaca and its surrounding neighbourhoods, like Torre Angela, have been causing enormous problems of security and social integration, which continue today (see also chapter (16) 330).

CASE STUDY CORVIALE (FIGURE 2.24 AND 2.25)
Corviale is situated in the western parts of Rome on the edge of what is often described as a rampantly growing and fragmented periphery (see figure 2.12). As a monumental ten-storey bar that stretches the length of one kilometre, Corviale rises up on a hill like a wall that protects the rural landscape from the fast growing “urban tumour” (Denk 2001:53). It is rather difficult to find neighbourly activities in or around this housing complex, which accommodates about 10,000 people. Although there are huge areas, which have been designated as “public space”, these are hermetically separated from the flats through thick, closed concrete walls and, by and large, impede neighbourly communication (see figure 2.24). The lives of the inhabitants are almost exclusively bound to their private homes and TV sets as soon as they enter their district (Corviale 2004).

Corviale is based on the radical idea of constructing a large unitary habitational structure that, amongst the housing units, contains the collective forms of the city

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86 Volker Kreiblich is a geographer and historian and expert on informal settlements and housing policy.
87 Andreas Denk is an architectural theorist and historian.
(Panella 2009:544). With this utopian approach to unify urban design and architectural design in one unique gesture, Corviale is the most extraordinary example of typological research of the Italian school of architecture in the second half of the twentieth century, as it thematises the encounter of private and public, of domestic home and collective home, within a single neighbourhood building (Barbera 2009b:72). At the same time, however, the design follows an abstract understanding of urban planning culture, reducing quality control to a correct application of norms and standards (Secchi 2009:527). In fact, Corviale is a residential model planned at a time when it seemed possible to develop social relationships - manifested in collective forms - on the drawing board. And we want to claim here that this is why the collective remained utopian, although it “was realised on the basis of a shared and not an imposed programme” (Rossi 2009:91). In addition, when Corviale was finally handed over to its inhabitants in 1984, these hypothesised ideas of collective life from the early 1970s faced a profound change in Italian society (Rossi 2009:91). Thus, if we consider declaring Corviale a kind of “manifesto of urban decay” (Panella 2009:544) referring to an inability of the planners at the time to respond to the needs of societies’ weakest members, we put in the dock norms and standards of urban master planning in general. But we cannot judge urban design only from today’s perspective - or a perspective from the 1980s - without considering the historical transformation of dynamic forms in urban phenomena.

The lead architect of Corviale, Mario Fiorentino, interpreted the project as a linear construction of varying dimensions. The nine-storey main body of Corviale with almost 2000 apartments is divided into five parts, interrupted by so-called super-stairways, which were conceived as meeting places. In addition, the fourth and fifth levels were supposed to contain a culture and health centre, stores, and a supermarket (Colonna 2009:154). These public services were never realised. Corviale welcomed its first neighbours like a surreal machine of a kilometre length with no collective facilities whatsoever that would refer to any aspect of their previously practised social life. The architect Franco Purini argues that

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88 Raffaele Panella is a Roman architectural theorist.
89 Roberto Secchi is an architect. He was a student of Mario Fiorentini, leading architect of Corviale.
90 Paola Colonna is an architect. She is representative of ATER, the Public Housing Territorial Authority for Rome.
“living in the Corviale would have required heroic class solidarity at the service of a collectivist utopia, while a freer and more casual existential progress was emerging” (2009:561). Concurrently, a new rhetoric of “small is beautiful” and “do-it yourself” gained popularity through the political thematisation of the ‘abusivo’ city, “a lawless megalopolis of almost one million inhabitants, which had grown up at the gates of Rome in the face of the total indifference and foolishness of public powers” (Panella 2009:546).

The active role of the inhabitants, however, soon resolved itself in ever-more pronounced isolation. Corviale progressively closed itself inside its own structure, in a silent implosion of conflicts but also in an introverted concentration of private lives (Purini 2009:562). Up until today, Corviale exhibits elements of decay, ranging from a general lack of any collective to problems of unemployment, safety and drug abuse. In particular, for weaker parts of society, such as children, the elderly, and the handicapped, this situation remains a dramatic one. Corviale is an urban neighbourhood and home for thousands of people that is considered all too often as a pretext for artistic or sociological exercises “on the disparity between an elitist vision of social problems or a voyeuristic taste for the problems experienced by the inhabitants of the grey megastructure that are abandoned to themselves” (Purini 2009:562). In this light, Corviale can only reconcile with itself if it is accepted as transforming urban form of “near dwellers” – rather than being labelled a social emergency (see chapter (05) 081 / chapter (10) 220ff. / chapter (14) 303 / chapter (16) 331). .................................................................

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91 Franco Purini is a Roman architect.
92 In December 2015, an architectural competition (launched from the municipality of Rome) for the first time officially addressed this problem of collective life with the structure (ATER Roma).
In the period of left-wing government in the 1970s, the provision of council housing (PEEP programme) and the legalisation of ‘abusivo’ settlements attempted to overcome the existing dualism between a well-served city centre and a deprived outer periphery with its lack of basic living standards. However, this period of publicly transparent and beneficial pacts between politics and property development did not last long and in the 1980s the process of urbanization in Rome was facing a major turning point (Albergo and Moini 2013: 19). While the population had continuously increased for more than 100 years, in the 1980s it started to stagnate (see figure 2.08). With a liberal centre-left government in place after 1985, the traditional competition between urban developers changed during this period. While state-funded development contracts increasingly shifted to a national level with a focus on unitary management and large infrastructural projects, the housing market opened the doors to private speculation with a growing influence of local small- and medium-sized developers. This early form of urban neo-liberalism in Rome was accompanied by changes of social conditions such as the increasing renunciation from the traditional family model and a high proportion of elderly people and new urban lifestyles (Albergo and Moini 2013: 22-23). The continuing demand for housing in Rome now resulted from a decrease in the average household sizes with a concurrent increase in private households and in the average living space per capita. In part, however, the continuous housing demand was also caused by the surrounding communities of Rome since their populations - in contrary to the municipality - continued to grow steadily in the last 30 years. Accordingly, in the far outer periphery, satellite housing developments in the form of legal and ‘abusivo’ settlements with ‘villini’ and ‘palazzine’ continued to grow. Situated at the limit of the municipality of Rome along the Consular Road Tiburtina, the

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93 Erneto d’Albergo and Gulia Moini are scholars of sociology and political science.
94 The political period 1985-1993 is called “Pentapartito” (five parties). The government was composed of Christian Democracy (DC), Italian Socialist Party (PSI), Italian Democratic Socialist Party (PSDI), Italian Liberal Party (PLI), and Italian Republican Party (PRI). This period was followed by a change in the electoral system (majority system) with a centre-left government in place after 1993, which continued to demonstrate “a remarkable incapacity to find new ways of [urban] strategic planning” (Archibugi 2005: 110).
95 From the end of nineteenth century until the 1940s a household was composed in average of 6-7 people, in 1961 it was only of 3.5 and in 2001 of 2.2 people (Graben 2008:244).
'abusivo' neighbourhood Case Rosse with about 5000 inhabitants is an example of this enduring development (see figures 2.13 and 2.26 / chapter (16) 330).

This shift in the urban development in the 1980s in Rome gave rise to a remarkable new urban form: a blurring and combining of 'abusivo' and speculative construction. With a stagnation of housing constructions in the central and semi-central extensions due to lack of undeveloped areas, the private and speculative housing market had to progressively direct its activities towards the outer periphery. While in legal settlements the private building sector was bound to mandate rents by urban development contracts and regulations, they could determine rents and prices freely in the 'abusivo' settlements (Graben 2008:136ff). And despite their peripheral locations, the possible rents in 'abusivo' settlements were high and varied mainly by the applied building standards. In addition, the investments of the public construction sector in the 1970s and 1980s and the legalising of former illegal 'abusivo' settlements relaxed the problem of lack of infrastructure (Petz 1993:30). As a result, the land and housing prices in these settlements quickly rose and speculations were predictable. Private construction companies invested in the 'abusivo' settlements, setting off a process of morphologically and rapidly increasing density (Graben 2008:137). In contrast to the phase of intensive 'abusivo' constructions in the 30 years following the Second World War, when the houses were built in self-initiative, this second phase - starting off with the legalisation of most of the 'abusivo' settlements - could be called 'speculative abusivismo'.

CASE STUDY TORRE ANGELA – PART B (FIGURE 2.19)
The case study of Torre Angela provides a prime example of these changes in urban development in the outer periphery of Rome. In 1978, the area of the neighbourhood was integrated in the corresponding land-use plan and became thus an official settlement area of the city of Rome (Comune di Roma 1978: 3372). For the development of the neighbourhood, this decision had enormous consequences including the right to public infrastructure, the increase of property value, which had to be ‘defended’ and ‘fenced’ increasingly, and an economic and social orientation towards the centre - as well as the arrival of new inhabitants with various new social and cultural backgrounds. In addition,
following the authentication of Torre Angela in the late 1970s, the neighbourhood became accessible for the speculative housing market. As a consequence, most of the plots were further subdivided and the dominant type of new constructions of the 1980s was a four-storey building with three to four flats. The size of these new building exceeded the abilities and financing options of most families and neighbourhood communities. They reflect a type of housing that was mainly initiated and organised by little construction companies with an interest in capital exploitation through rent or sale of apartments. This lead to an extremely high density of buildings (Krella 1993:57) and today all private open spaces are fenced and reduced to their minimum possible size. At the same time, there are almost no public spaces to be found in Torre Angela due to its original ‘abusivo’ development on a grid of farmland. This has led to an overall dramatic reduction of collective life in the neighbourhood that still today comprises over 50% pioneer families - now in their third and fourth generation. Despite all transitions the characteristics of its ‘abusivo’ origin have a decisive effect on the urban dynamic forms of the neighbourhood (see chapter (15) 310 / chapter (16) 334).………

// RELATIONS TO MAJOR TENDENCIES OF ROME’S URBAN DEVELOPMENT - 2010s

In the peripheral urbanisation of Rome, the actors involved changed in the process of its development and continued to be reorganised in the process of neo-liberalisation that started in Rome in the late 1980s (Albergo and Moini 2013: 23). This highly complex relationship is not easily depicted and depends on local strategies governing the neighbourly life that is influenced, in turn, by the greater urban and national situation. Since the birth of the peripheral extension at the end of nineteenth century, however, there are also tendencies of a significant continuity that characterise the relationship between public and private interests, socioeconomic, and political forms and the distribution of built compositions of settlements: a dominant agency of speculative urban land exploitation, an anarchical agency of ‘abusivo’ housing constructions and an instrumentalised agency of technocratic planning regulations. In an attempt to briefly summarize, it could be argued that the period of laizzez-faire politics in the end of nineteenth century laid the foundations for the remarkable speculative land use practices in
Rome. Then the politics of segregation in the Fascist period paved the way for a developing ‘abusivo’ megapolis in the outer periphery. Here the intention was to segregate the potentially “dangerous” working class, while the central area of Rome had been cleansed. The climax of both speculative and ‘abusivo’ practices under the Catholic-inspired centrist government in the post war period - closely linked to the massive population growth through migration during the industrial boom in Italy – led to a state of social turmoil in Rome and made public urban planning interventions ever more necessary. Paradoxically, the failure of the technocratic major state planning programmes under the left-wing government in the 1960s and 1970s finally manifested the mostly reactive and often instrumentalised role of planning regulations in Rome. While plans for a polycentric development (for example “asse attrezzato”) were never implemented, the legalised ‘abusivo’ settlements and huge council housing projects – all initiated in the 1970s - are declared “urban recovery zones” (“zone di recupero urbano”) in today’s effective master plans of Rome (Comune di Roma 2016). This reflects the ambiguous role of Roman public administration that was, since the beginning of the peripheral extension, constrained by “its commitment to supporting capital accumulation through the private appropriation of urban land [as well as by] its political indebtedness to real-estate interests” (Calavita 1983: 377).96 It made any attempts for land-use planning contradictory and generated, in turn, other conflicts and struggles. At the same time the diffuse and fragmented form of urbanisation in the periphery of Rome impended the success of any technocratic and unitarian strategy produced by a single overarching master plan. Rather the underrepresented socioeconomic dimension of such strategies has made Roman urban planning regulations to a great extent ineffective or reduced them to ‘repair’ and ‘recovery’ purposes. This also explains the decision for extensive legalisations of ‘abusivo’ settlements in the 1970s. It required less public investment than the provision for council housing projects, even though the “ex-post provision of technical infrastructure was undoubtedly more expensive than a [possible] planned development” from the beginning (Kreiblich 2000:210).

It would be negligent, however, to reduce the analysis of urban forms of the Roman periphery to these major tendencies without examining their highly

96 Nico Calavita is a scholar of urban planning and an expert on affordable housing.
complex and *dynamic* interrelations. This is one of the strengths of the rhythmic path we have taken through Roman urban development in this chapter. And it will accompany all following discussions on urban *dynamic forms* across the different rhythmic levels involved in an aesthetic reflection. While any possibility for a successful planning strategy asks for a profound engagement on the part of scholars and activist with the precarity of living conditions in different neighbourhood, these analyses have to acknowledge that the neighbouring practices “are formed within specific value systems shaped by capitalist rationality and its consequences on the concerns of everyday life” (Feliciantonio 2016: 14). This is to say that it is certainly not enough to compensate for urban “degradation” through a technocratic strategy of improving the infrastructure because such proclaimed integration on a wider city scale does not make this strategy effective for the inhabitants that relate substantially to complex local dynamics. Vice versa, by the very fact of *dynamic* relation, integration at individual human scale cannot be equated with integration at a social, cultural or economic level (Archibugi 2005: 51). In fact, social grassroots dynamics should not be viewed through the lens of political moderation without taking into consideration the *collective dynamic forms* shaping them – socially and materially, in the sense that there is a difference between the path of citizenship and a path of neighbourly life. A better understanding of the *dynamic forms* of neighbourhoods – including the physical dimension of dwelling – would lead inevitably to an engaging interplay of various levels of participation, stimulating further reflections on how to prevent *collective* forms from becoming a defensive project, while guaranteeing openness and cooperation with various *dynamic forms* of “strangers” (Feliciantonio 2016: 14). Thus, any attempt for “recovery” in this context has to better understand the interrelations of urban *dynamic forms* on various levels of their articulation in the emergence of urban phenomena.

In this respect, the brief presentation of the eight neighbourhood case studies in the historical emergence of the periphery of Rome in the twentieth century opened up a complex and *dynamic* interplay of urban compositions. The selective references of this experimental analysis to political, economic and social tendencies thereby redraw the interrelations and narrative threads of the empirical investigations in the neighbourhoods. In this way, this *re-presentation of*
interrelated and historically developed urban forms of Rome can be understood as preparing the ground for a more explicit discussion of the articulation of urban dynamic forms through rhythm. At the same time, however, it already articulates many aspects of rhythmic re-presentation, as will be discussed in the following parts of this work. The elaborated compossibility of tendencies reduces the risk of drawing on predominant binary relations - especially in relation to urban physical compositions - when further discussing specific local or individual perspectives from observations and interviews. While the triumphal procession of the housing type ‘palazzina’ illuminated the dynamic controversy of tendencies in different neighbourhoods, the interrelated development of speculative housing, council housing, and ‘abusivo’ housing in the outer periphery of Rome related different and dynamic forms of interests over various participating levels of analysis. In other words, the iterative confrontation and comparison of different binary opposed interests and theoretical judgements – for example, individual-social, public-private, traditional-progressive, legal-illegal - in the articulation of urban dynamic forms points at their degree of participation on different interrelated levels in the emergence of urban phenomena. And all these tendencies change culturally and historically.
PART III_ HÖLDERLIN’S RHYTHMIC ARTICULATION

/ COLLECTIVE RHYTHMIC GROUPING

Part III articulates rhythmic *re-presentations* in *encounters* between philosophy, poetry and urban neighbourhoods. Chapter (08) elaborates on Hölderlin’s rhythmic approach that develops on an *eccentric path* with respect to classical ontology, critical philosophy, German idealism, and romanticism. This *eccentric path* builds up a *dynamic* in aesthetic reflection that challenges the limits of reflective thought. Hölderlin’s *encounter* with the synthetic work of Greek tragedy provides the basis for a translation of his poetic logic into aesthetic reflection on urban form (chapter 09). Related to a brief investigation of historical transformations of rhythm, in chapter (10) its performance is set up as *rhythm techne*. This is followed by a first discussion of *rhythm techne* on a walking path in the neighbourhood Corviale.97

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97 To ensure better readability, the content structure of each of the six parts of the thesis is repeated at its beginning (see chapter (01) 018).
This chapter engages with the rhythmic articulation by the German poet and philosopher Johann Christian Friedrich Hölderlin. Born in German Swabia in 1770, his life and work was influenced by varied political and philosophical movements. Hölderlin was an early supporter of the French Revolution and a fervent admirer of ancient Greek culture. He engaged with both the work of his older contemporaries like Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Schiller or Johann Wolfgang von Goethe as well as his fellow students Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He did this at a time when philosophy was defined by many various currents: critical philosophy, early romanticism, and the birth of German Idealism. Somewhat a mirror of his life and creative period the treatment of Hölderlin’s work in research is full of contradictions. In its historical development this originates not only from the fragmentary character of Hölderlin’s oeuvre but also from the neglect of writings from the period of his supposed madness. In addition, the late discovery of key theoretical essays in 1961 significantly influenced the interpretations of Hölderlin’s work. Always, there has been a lively interest in Hölderlin’s writings that influenced, among others, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Walter Benjamin, Rudolf Haym (1870) uncontestably declared them as product and proof of Hölderlin’s mental illness and only in the beginning of twentieth century gradually (and mainly by Wilhelm Dilthey) a new Hölderlin reception developed (Hoffmann and Zils 2005: 202). However, an understanding of Hölderlin’s way of proceeding in tackling the most important philosophical problems of the time - and not any own psychological problems - and as such being a substantive contribution to modern theory of poetry, eventually gained a wider acceptance only in the second half of twentieth century (Kastenberger 2007:14). Hölderlin’s theoretical essay “Urtheil und Seyn” (1961 / “Being Judgment Possibility”) was discovered only in 1961 on the back of a book in an aristocratic library (Luchte 2016: 49).
Martin Heidegger, Theodor W. Adorno, Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault. In the most complete and significant contemporary reconstructions of Hölderlin’s work by the philosophers Dieter Henrich, Manfred Frank, and Friedrich Beiser, the attempt to place Hölderlin in relation to the philosophical currents of his time results in highly contradictory conclusions: Hölderlin as epistemological realist or absolute idealist (Stenseth 2015). Rather than any contribution to or variant of philosophical currents, however, the present work argues that Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation demonstrates a radically unique and consistent approach that develops on an eccentric path. In order to reveal this eccentric path of Hölderlin’s poetic phenomenology, this chapter starts with some philosophical implications before engaging with the rhythmic articulation of poetry and urban dynamic form in chapters (09) und (10).

/ HÖLDERLIN’S DYNAMIC RELATIONS OF OPPOSING

During his study-stay in Jena in 1795, Hölderlin developed an independent systematic conception in close relation and response to Fichte, whose lectures he attended (Merk 2011:83). In his early works on “Science of Knowledge” (1982), written in 1794, Fichte argues that philosophy has to spring from the experience we have of ourselves, as this experience cannot be further reasoned, since it is evident as such, and because all reasonable knowledge can finally be traced back to it. Accordingly, he considered the “I” as the core of any self-consciousness (Henrich 1998: 2). In this core we find a doubling, between being and positing, which cannot be distinguished as two realities. Fichte argues “the I is to posit itself, not merely for some intelligence outside it, but simply for itself; it is to posit itself as posited by itself. Hence, as surely as it is an I, it must have the principle of life and consciousness solely within itself. And thus, as surely as it is an I, it must contain unconditionally and without any ground the principle of reflecting upon itself; and hence, from the beginning, we have the I in a dual aspect” (1845: 274 / own translationTR1). The I cannot become conscious of its own limits, and thus cannot be self-conscious, unless it possesses an original

101 German original of “Science of Knowledge” (1982): “Wissenschaftslehre 1794” (Fichte 1845).
102 TR1: For the originals of translated citations see appendix 000
and spontaneous faculty to synthesize the finite and the infinite. Fichte deduces the faculty of “productive imagination” as an original faculty of the mind. “Nothing can come to mind, if not through imagination.” (Fichte 1845: 386 / own translationsTR2). Thus the interplay of the I, “in and with itself, whereby it posits itself at once as finite and infinite - an interplay that consists, as it were, in self-conflict, and is self-reproducing” - this is the faculty of imagination (Fichte 1982: 193, Fichte 1845: 215). It oscillates in the middle between the dialectical opposition of determination and non-determination, of finite and infinite (Fichte 1845:216). Thus, for Fichte the act of imagination is the basis for the possibility of our consciousness, for our existence as selves. The original unity of the self-conscious I is to be understood as both: action and product of the same. “Their essential opposition and mutual annihilation are thus identical“ (Fichte 1982:168). This identity in difference of the original I he understood as intellectual intuition, as it posits the immediate presence of the I to itself, independently of any sensory content and different to actual consciousness, in which subject and object are always already separated. Thus, in Fichte’s early work, the productive imagination oscillates ‘in-between’ the dialectical opposition of the I and Not-I, and is understood as faculty of the transcendental subject.

While Hölderlin, in a letter to Hegel in January 1975, only suggestively mentions that Fichte’s “examination of the reciprocal determination of the I and the Not-I (in his language) is certainly curious”, it could be regarded henceforth a basic method or figure of thought for Hölderlin (2009: 130); this is to say, a method to make poetic and philosophical (ideal-real-transcendental) oppositions fruitful for an understanding of actual phenomena and to elaborate on the limits of the relation of oppositions as well as to search for possibilities of their coexistence (Kreuzer 2011:98). In the same letter, however, Hölderlin also undoubtedly challenges the absolute I of Fichte as well as the transcendental distancing through the ‘in-between’ imagination. Hölderlin writes: “At first I heavily suspected him of dogmatism. […] He seeks to get beyond the fact of consciousness theoretically, a great many of his remarks show that, and this is just as certainly transcendentl, and even more strikingly so, as when the metaphysicians we’ve had up till now have wanted to get beyond the existence of the world – his [Fichte’s] absolute I (= Spinoza’s substance) contains all reality; it is everything,
and outside it there is nothing; therefore for this absolute I there is no object, for otherwise all reality would not be in it; but a consciousness without an object is not conceivable, and if I myself am this object then as such I am necessarily limited, even if only in time, and therefore not absolute; therefore no consciousness is conceivable in the absolute I, as an absolute I I have no consciousness, and insofar nothing” (Hölderlin 2009: 130-131). In the first part of the quote, Hölderlin openly criticises Fichte because he “seeks to get beyond the fact of consciousness theoretically” and puts Fichte’s absolute I on a level with Spinoza’s substance, although Fichte himself emphasises the dissociation of his work from Spinoza’s “dogmatism” (Fichte 1982: 226). With direct references to Fichte’s thoughts this leads to different motifs of Hölderlin’s own systematic conception, which he points at in the second part of the quote and that he developed in several theoretical essays, including “Being Judgment Possibility” (2009: 361-62).103 This is what we discuss here.

To begin with, we are following an interpretation of Hölderlin’s thought by the German philosopher Dieter Henrich (1992, 1998).104 Accordingly, for Hölderlin it was not acceptable to separate the core thought of I in such a way from the actual self-consciousness that in its analysis the change, the update of the same self-consciousness - that concentrates on the I as unconditioned core - can be neglected (Hölderlin 1961: 205-206). Referring to the process of becoming self-aware, Hölderlin challenges the indifference of being and positing that allows Fichte to claim no suffering and thus no matter within the thought of I. When we talk about the I, we always have in mind a distance between an actual phenomenon through which we become aware of ourselves as subjects, and ourselves as objects which is made accessible for us in this process and which thus must be present for us to be able to act on it (Henrich 1998: 2). Contrary to

103 German title: “Urtheil und Seyn” (Hölderlin 1961: 216-217). The theoretical essays, poetry, prose and translations of Hölderlin are titled differently depending on the different editions and translations. In order to ensure clarity, comprehensibility and transparency, this work (in the text or in a footnote) will always refer to the Stuttgart complete edition (Hölderlin Sämtliche Werke/ Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe).

104 Dieter Henrich is a contemporary thinker in the tradition of German Idealism. In a series of highly influential studies over the last thirty years he demonstrated that Hölderlin played a decisive role in the development of philosophy from Kant to Hegel in outlining - already as student - an alternative to the dominant view of the foundation of philosophy through a critique of Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre (Henrichs 1997).
Fichte, Hölderlin claims that where I-awareness emerges - which for him is not possible if withdrawn from self-consciousness, and which always necessarily includes a non-active component - there has to be a difference between acting and suffering which relates with the difference between positing and being (Henrich 1992: 485-506). Howsoever we think this unity of I, it cannot be understood as absolute indifference, it cannot be understood without a distance that develops *dynamically* in the relation of being and positing. This is where we leave the analysis of Henrich, as although claiming opposition to Fichte (1992:506) he proceeds - it is claimed here - with a subject centred perspective of thought (see also Hogrebe 1998: 109). The elaborations on the complex relational *dynamic* of being and positing, however, is regarded here as the key moment for Hölderlin for leaving any centred perspective of realist, ideal or transcendental currents. This is where he grounds his work in a *dynamic* articulation in an *encounter* with poetry.

Hölderlin's form of thought develops in close relation to the philosophical views of the time, among others to the dichotomies of Kant, the subject-philosophy of Fichte and the philosophy of identity of Schelling (Kreuzer 1998:XII). His work, however, does not develop parallel but diametrically to them and thus cannot be articulated as enhancement, liberation or rejection of them; they simply lack sufficient common ground – in the sense of a determined ground we can refer to. Their relation rather emerges on different levels of common *encounters*, which we discuss in the following, one after the other. In order to clarify this line of argumentation, we recall that Hölderlin’s understanding of consciousness is not one of a self-sufficient principle. Instead it is a *dynamic* and relational process of *"oppositing"* - understood as “positing in opposition” - of which the idea of a

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105 With “the dichotomies of Kant” we refer in this context to Kant’s logic lectures from the 1770s (1992), and in particular to “§113 Dichotomy and polytomy: A division into two members is called dichotomy; but if it has more than two members, it is called polytomy.” “dichotomy is the only division from principles a priori […]. For the members of a division are supposed to be opposed to one another, but for each A the opposite is nothing more than nonA.” “Dichotomy requires only the principle of contradiction.” “Polytomy cannot be taught in logic, for it involves cognition of the object.” “All polytomy is empirical;” “Polytomy requires intuition, either a priori, as in mathematics […] or empirical intuition, as in description of nature” (Kant 1992: 637).

106 “Diametrical” is understood in the present work as a relation referring to extreme opposites measured through a centre, etymologically deriving from the Greek *dia* (“through”) and *metron* (“measure”). In the context of Hölderlin’s writings “diametrical” is used as synonym for “on an eccentric path with respect to”.
“being-as-such” is a necessary condition (Hölderlin 1961: 216, Kreuzer 1998: XIV). This is to say, regarding our intellectual intuition we can talk about a being-as-such, a unity of subject and object that is inseparable in the sense that it is always present with intellectual intuition. “But this being [being-as-such] should not be confused with identity” (Hölderlin 2009: 361). When I say: I am I, then the subject (I) and the object (I) are not united such that no separation can be executed without damaging the essence of that which is to be separated” (Hölderlin 2009:361). In part, this acknowledges Fichte’s thought who has “shown conclusively that, from Descartes, via German Rationalism and British Empiricism up to Kant, self-consciousness was misconceived as result of an act of reflection by which a second-order act bent back upon a first-order act that is identical to itself” (Frank 2004a: 54). But whereas Fichte concluded a pre-reflexive self-awareness of the absolute I as self-sufficient principle, Hölderlin argued for a dynamic articulation between different acts related to actual reflection with no hierarchy in principle. He talks in this context of two different judgments (the theoretical and the practical) referring to the composition of the German word *Urteil* (“judgment”) with *Ur* = “primordial” and *Teil* = “part” or *Teilung* = “separation” (Hölderlin 1961: 261). “Judgment is, in the highest and strictest sense [which is theoretical judgment], the primal separation of the object and the subject that are most intimately united in intellectual intuition, that separation, by which object and subject first become possible, the original division. The concept of division itself contains the concept of an open reciprocal relationship [oppositing] between object and subject, and the necessary premiss of a whole of which object and subject are the parts” (Hölderlin 2009: 361-62). Then the consciousness that refers to the being-as-such of our intellectual intuition, and thus to theoretical judgment, is grounded in relation to a part, which is not consciousness, and accordingly cannot be represented by the judgment of our

107 The term “oppositing” is an attempt to translate Hölderlin’s German original *entgegensetzen*, the act of positing ‘things’ that encounter with each other in opposition. In order to understand Hölderlin’s thought it is important, that in oppositing the opposition is not complete, but it refers to the process of the act.

108 German original of “being-as-such”: “Seyn schlechthin” (Hölderlin 1961: 261)

109 Hölderlin applies here an etymological pun, deriving *Urteil* (“judgment”) from *Ur-Teilung* (“primordial/original separation/division”). This etymological pun most properly refers to Fichte, who has developed it in one of his Jena lectures of 1794–1795 (Hölderlin 2009: 549).
intellectual intuition but is re-presented with it. As much as the actual consciousness is a primordial separation (judgment), we apply the concept of opposing, which reveals a unity that is not inseparable (as this is the case with the unity of being-as-such), and which is called identity. Accordingly, in the primordial separation of identity, which is practical judgment, “I is opposed [oppositing] to the Not-I, not to itself” (Hölderlin 2009: 362). This also means, however, that there is “a difference between a ground of knowing and a ground of actuality” (Hölderlin 1961: 215 / own translationTR3), which is related in a dynamic articulation - including an opposing on different levels - but is itself not a relation of opposing, not of being-as-such and not of identity. “It is not at all identical if I once say: I recognize the law by its resistance, and then: I recognize the law on account of its resistance” (Hölderlin 2009: 259). In these premises, Hölderlin challenges the absolute I of Fichte and the absolute identity of Schelling as ultimate principles and relates them instead dynamically on interrelated levels (Frank 2004a: 54). The grounding of the central perspectives of self-sufficient principles in a dynamic articulation is key for understanding Hölderlin and can be witnessed throughout his entire work. More than 5 years after his elaborations in “Being Judgment Possibility”, he writes in his theoretical essay “On the Differences of Poetic Composition” (after 1800): “the objective as such, and also the subjective as such, are only a condition of the primordial-one, in which it dwells because it must let itself go, on account of the stasis which cannot occur in it because the way of union in it must not remain always the same, according to the matter, because the parts of the One must not remain always in the same closer and further relation, so that all encounters all” (Hölderlin 1961: 268, 2009: 468 / own translationTR4).

In order for unity to emerge in actuality, the primordial unity must never be identical to itself; it must always be in a relation of being and becoming other than itself (Courtine 2000:64). The opposing in the judgment is the emergence of

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110 “To re-present” refers to the German word darstellen and its use in Hölderlin. Darstellen renders at the same time “exhibiting” and “producing a presentation”. It contains a notion of repetition of “to present”, which is not non a sequential repetition (see also chapter (05) 78ff).

111 “[oppositing]” refers to German original “entgegensetzen” (Hölderlin 1974a:215).

112 Hölderlin notes: Ideal without punishment no law / real without law no punishment (1961: 215).

113 German title in Stuttgart complete edition: “Über den Unterschied der Dichtarten” (Hölderlin 1961: 266)
relation, of which any being is thought of as ground and henceforth acts as present negativity.\(^{114}\) In this *dynamic* articulation, the present negativity limits the centrality of *oppositing* and ‘*deviates*’ it from the centre of thought. The centrality of thought therefore always *re-presents* itself as “*eccentric* consciousness” which cannot be thought in pure self-reference but as process of a relational *dynamic*, in which ‘things’ participate over different levels – for example theoretically grounded on being-as-such to practically grounded on identity. Following Merleau-Ponty, this *dynamic* relation between different *oppositing* on different levels in actuality is described in the present work as *ambiguity* (see chapter 11).

While identity is a *dynamic* relation that does not redeem theoretical *oppositing* but builds on it, the theoretical *oppositing* between subject (I) and object (I) has as necessary condition an idea of unity – Hölderlin’s being-as-such – which is always present with our intellectual intuition (Kreuzer 1998:XIV).

In the emergence of actual phenomena, theoretical and practical judgments always participate and, with them, the *oppositing dynamic* of self-consciousness, which we understand through mediation of the negative presence of our intellectual intuition in identity. In this sense, the experience of an actual phenomenon always carries negativity as well as the *oppositing* of it in a *dynamic* relation. Any articulation in the emergence of actual phenomena includes a mediating in disarticulating relations of *oppositing* - merely unilateral (Courtine 2000:64). That is why for Hölderlin, “the immediate, strictly speaking, is impossible for mortals, as it is for immortals; the God [or any supernatural power] must distinguish different worlds, according to his nature, since heavenly goodness [the supernatural], for its own sake, must be sacred, unalloyed. Man [the human being], as a knowing creature [as cogniser], must also distinguish different worlds, because knowledge [cognition] is only possible through opposition [*oppositing*]. For this reason the immediate is, strictly speaking, impossible for mortals, as for immortals. Strict mediacy, however, is the law” (Hölderlin 2009: 491 / [...] from original Hölderlin 1974a: 285). If we cannot go beyond the relation of *oppositing* in knowledge, *dynamic* articulation must be understood through the ambiguity of the relation of *oppositing*, as only this

\(^{114}\) Merleau-Ponty describes this relation in perception as “being pregnant with negativity” (see Part IV 237, 257).
relation of opposing can repeat itself on different levels – or worlds - and in such a way traces itself (Hiller 2008:11). In the present work, this dynamic articulation – which refers to us as human beings – is called rhythm and, it is claimed, is understood in the same way as Hölderlin introduces rhythm in his elaboration on poetic compositions and, in particular, on tragedy.

// NON-CLASSICAL ONTOLOGY IN RHYTHM

The dynamic of the problematic, as it is set so far, claims and presupposes that Hölderlin occupies a rather singular position in philosophical thought, at least at his time. As identity should not be confused with being-as-such for Hölderlin – and he unequivocally states this in “Being Judgment Possibility” in response to Fichte (2009: 361) – then no structure of identity could ever suffice as a foundation for philosophy. This discretion precluded him from proceeding in the way of Schelling’s philosophy (1968). And the same goes for the philosophy of his other flatmate from the study period in Jena, Hegel, who aimed at bringing philosophy nearer to a form of science, demanding “actual knowledge” as knowledge that reasons itself (Hegel 2012:19). Rather, Hölderlin established here a unique career for himself that we might today call, after Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1970), a paradigm shift. It would be mistaken to ask how Hölderlin could free himself from dialectical logic. As the contemporary philosopher Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (1989:212) argues, this “would inevitably reintroduce the very constraint from which one would like to be: freed (that is, the constraint of opposition in general)”. Moreover, we want to claim here that those who have grasped Hölderlin’s dynamic articulation should not even ask whether we talk about an absolute opposition or a gradual difference. Hölderlin dynamically articulates conceptual opposing in/with actual phenomena, the latter of which can be expressed conceptually only in gradual differences. He aims at a thinking apprehension of actuality, which can be available to us in the emergence of phenomena only through a continuing and repeating articulation of acts of encounters between concepts, recognised inadequately as oppositions, while continually disarticulating their identities. This is why Hölderlin repeatedly uses
comparative forms in his language in order to distinguish the *oppositing* on one level from *ambiguity* on different levels (worlds) of actuality. 115

Following the philosopher Arkady Plotnitsky, Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation contributes to philosophy with a new description of ontology, which is understood here as description of what is possible to say or think concerning ultimate existence as well as the character of this existence (2015:125). 116 Plotnitsky calls Hölderlin’s ontology a “non-classical ontology” as it challenges the possibility of comprehending the ultimate being, ground, essence or workings by thought, “as thought does not exhaust them” (Hölderlin 1990c: 366), whereas “classical ontological thinking always leaves room for such a possibility, at least in principle” (Plotnitsky 2015:125) 117. Then, in non-classical ontology, the ultimate workings are ultimately unthinkable even as unthinkable, as there are insurmountable epistemological limits of thinking, of *oppositing* the unthinkable and the thinkable, even if just in principle. It follows that if there is a limit of epistemology we should not identify the unthinkable with absolute randomness, as this would make any law impossible, even the law of there being no law, hence randomness (Plotnitsky 2015:128). In the same way, the unthinkable should not be identified with the divine. Rather, the question of a possible thinking of any ultimate existence shifts to a question of how thinkable and unthinkable are *dynamically* related. The intuition of this *dynamic* articulation Hölderlin names with the German word "das Ungeheure", which has connotations of something which is "tremendous" "overwhelmingly powerful" "monstrous" and "unknowable". It is a violation of the boundaries, which necessarily must constrain and limit any two sides (Chapman 1992:186); it is where and when all *oppositing, ambiguity* and

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115 In a similar way Claude Lefort (1968:xviii) argues in the Foreword to “The Visible and the Invisible” that Merleau-Ponty “brought into the open the ambiguity of a relation that at the same time opens us and closes us to the truth of what was thought by another, disclosing the profusion of meaning behind us and simultaneously revealing an impassable distance from the present to the past in which the meaning of the philosophical tradition dies away and there arises the exigency to take up again in solitude, without exterior support, the labour of expression.”

116 Arkady Plotnitsky is a Professor of English, Theory, and Cultural Studies and has published on Romanticism, continental philosophy and the philosophy of mathematics and science. In particular, he is interested in the relation of the cultures of modern science and non-classical thought (Lundy and Voss 2015:xi / for example Plotnitsky 2002)

117 Plotnitsky argues that, in this way, non-classical ontology reaches beyond Kant’s ontology of things-in-themselves, which are unknowable but still in principle thinkable or even thinkable as causal (2015:126).
unity are *Ineinander.*\(^{118}\) For Hölderlin, the application of all these acts of thinking are possible only on the level of actuality, which shifts the relation between the dialectical process of thinking and its alethic structure. The possible is not ‘a priori’ or ‘a posteriori’ of the actual but related on different levels in the emergence of phenomena. Their necessary differentiation makes it possible to think actuality, which is articulated in *dynamic forms.* In “Remarks on Antigone”\(^{119}\) Hölderlin portrays human understanding as “unter Undenkbarem wandelnd” (1974a: 266), which is translated into English in different ways as “wandering below the unthinkable” (1988: 110), “going on its way under the unthinkable” (2001:114), “passing through the midst of the unthinkable” (2009: 477), or “wandering beneath the unthinkable” (Plotnitsky 2015:125). Here the meaning of the German word “unter” carries, besides the just mentioned translations with below, under, the midst of and beneath, also temporal and modal dimensions, as for example the translation of *unter Tags* with “during the day” or *unter Tränen* with “in tears” demonstrate (Scholze-Stubenrecht and Sykes 1990: 743). All the more remarkable, however, is the missing key meaning of *wandelnd* in all aforementioned translations - as “transforming” or better “the state of being in transformation” - as it is applied by Hölderlin throughout his work.\(^{120}\) Hölderlin portrays human understanding as “wandering and transforming under / beneath / in the midst of / during the unthinkable” (1974a: 266 / own translation). While this quote demonstrates the difficulties of translating Hölderlin’s texts, which are philosophical and poetic at the same time, it also illuminates why thought for Hölderlin does not suffice to comprehend the relation of thinkable and unthinkable, as it cannot be reduced to a relation of *oppositing.* Before regarding the *dynamic* articulation between identity and being-as-such, thus regarding intellectual intuition, which is the ultimate ontologically available limit for us - and “there and nowhere else one can speak of a being-as-such” (Hölderlin 2009:490) – the ultimate non-classical ontology is necessarily *eccentric.* This is to say, it articulates rhythmically in the *encounter* between the thinkable and the unthinkable on different levels or worlds (for example idealist, realist,

\(^{118}\) The German word *Ineinander* is applied by Hölderlin in the same way as by Merleau-Ponty, see chapter (13) 250.  
\(^{119}\) German title in Stuttgart complete edition: “Anmerkungen zur Antigonae” (1974a: 265)  
\(^{120}\) One of a variety of examples would be from the Pinar translations (Hölderlin 1794a: 89). For German original see TR5.
transcendental, mythological, religious, and others), diversifying the relation into “thinkable”, “unthinkable but thinkable from another world” and “unthinkable”. For just as philosophical thinking is always centred on one level of opposing judgments, so that the re-presentation of this one level makes a whole, and the mere connection between the parts on this one level is called logic, so the critical limits of intellectual intuition have to be treated on various levels of opposing judgments, so that the re-presentation of these different levels make a whole, and the connection between the opposing judgments of all participating levels can be called rhythmic articulation (Hölderlin 1974a: 265). In such a re-presentation, which Hölderlin seeks to present with his compositions of poetry, the limits of ultimate being shift from intellectual intuition to participation, as we now talk about a collective of participating ‘things’ in actuality. The result of this encounter in actuality is the emergence of a phenomenon, which relates - at this ultimate ontological available limit - all participating parts under individual directions - hence all participating ‘things’ - to one individual re-presentation. The individual re-presentation of a phenomenon, in turn, cannot be an object of thought since, with intellectual intuition, it is inseparably connected to the subject of being-as-such at the ultimate ontological limit available. The characteristic of Hölderlin’s approach is the dynamic relation of individual re-presentation to the context: a continuing and repeating articulation of acts of encounter with the self, inadequately recognised as oppositions, which disarticulate the constellation of others in relation to the self, their cultural and historical identities.121 This is what Hölderlin rhythmically articulates between poetry and philosophy.

121 “Constellation of others” is a term introduced by Merleau-Ponty in reference to Simone de Beauvoir’s dynamic tri-relations described in her book “She came to stay” (see chapter (13) 260).
In his letters between 1794-1796, Hölderlin repeatedly expresses his ambitions to elaborate on the *dynamic* articulations of the *encounter* between philosophy and poetry, engaging as he does with critical philosophy and ancient Greek tragedy. In July 1794, he wrote to Hegel: “My preoccupations are pretty focused at the moment. Kant and the Greeks are virtually all I read. I am trying to become particularly familiar with the aesthetic part of the critical philosophy.” (Hölderlin 2009: 105). To regard Hölderlin’s poetic writings “merely” as individual works of art is to miss the point of his philosophical thought as an active part of them. It is claimed here that Hölderlin’s poetry as a whole *re-presents* itself as a radically de-centred phenomenology of actuality with Kant’s *Third Critique* (1987) as one point of departure. With the ‘deviation’ from the Kantian paradigm and its limits – and the modernist subjective turn as such – the approach to intellectual intuition acquired a radically different elaboration, which Hölderlin approached through his poetic phenomenology (Luchte 2016: 63). Leaving the self-centred operation of reflective thought, Hölderlin’s *eccentric* poetic reflection develops in a diametrical way to Kant’s critical philosophy and makes it possible to elaborate on its limits through the participation in an *encounter* with poetry. This is to say, the *encounter* between poetry and philosophy cannot be mediated dialectically, as the dialectic as methods of thought remains on one site and posits an opposition (Schmidlin 1971: 44). Hence the *encounter* is indeed inaccessible to pure understanding in its determined and reflective comportment. In this way, Hölderlin challenges the Kantian notion of reason and, contrary to the romantics, also the subjective purposiveness as Kant’s rationalist solution of the question of the sublime - in which freedom emerges through an escape from actuality. It is through this unique approach of Hölderlin that we explore his writings in the context of Kant’s “Critique of Judgment” (1987). Apart from the original texts of Kant and Hölderlin, we predominantly draw on the text of the philosophers and writers James Luchte (2016), Guido Schmidlin (1971) and Walter Hof (1958), all of whom argue for an unique and consistent approach in Hölderlin’s work that cannot be described in a dialectical critique, renunciation, or liberation of any idealist, rationalist, realist or romanticist thinking.
In September 1795, Hölderlin expresses his attitude towards theoretical thought in general in a letter to Schiller: “I am trying to develop for myself the idea of an infinite progression in philosophy. I am trying to show that the relentless demand that must be made on every system, namely, the unification of subject and object in an absolute – ego [I] or whatever one wants to call it—is possible aesthetically in intellectual intuition. Theoretically, it is possible only through an infinite approximation […]. I am thus trying to show that in order to realize a system of thought an immortality is necessary—every bit as necessary as it is for a system of action” (Hölderlin in Krell 2000:113 / Hölderlin1987: 181). Hölderlin is referring here to Fichte’s I and Kant’s reason, in both of which a unity of subject and object is revealed aesthetically as universality of the sensible in the act of reflection. Such a unity is the result of an infinite process already undertaken and it is - according to Hölderlin - only possible through aesthetic reflection (Luchte 2016: 51). As Luchte argues, however, Hölderlin’s observation of this aspect “was neither merely critical nor does his engagement with critical philosophy end merely with negative scepticism” (2016: 51). Rather, as Hof argues, he regards any unity of experience, any world from a theoretical perspective, as a representation of relations that involve and pervade oppositing (1954: 95). If we cannot go beyond the relation of oppositing in reflective thought, dynamic articulation must be understood as an eccentric path, on which the relation of oppositing can repeat itself and in such a way trace itself. In fact, in his theoretical essay “Being Judgment Possibility” Hölderlin provides not only a criticism of Fichte but also a ‘deviated’ understanding of Copernican revolution, and in this way challenges the basic “bifurcations” of Kant’s critical philosophy (Hamrick and Van der Veken 2011). “We do not seek merely a shift in our perspective from the Earth to the sun, but instead to remember and engage the myriad simultaneity of the openness” of actuality, where the centre acts ‘deviated’ (Luchte 2016: 52).

Immersed in the entanglement of creative processes of experience, Hölderlin challenged the philosophical logic of the Kantian transcendental aesthetics and its separation of the faculties of the soul involved in cognition. This goes as far as

122 For a further elaboration on Hölderlin’s image of eccentric path see chapter (09).
challenging the very basics of Kant’s critical period. In the inaugural dissertation for the appointment as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in Königsberg in 1770, Kant distinguishes two fundamental faculties of mind: sensibility representing the sensible world as phenomena through immediate and singular intuitions, and understanding representing the intelligible world as noumena and involving general concepts (1992b: 384ff. (§3-12)). While the knowledge of phenomena requires the cooperation of sensibility and understanding, a determined knowledge of noumena is not possible.\footnote{The same argumentation can be found in Kant’s “Critique of Judgement” 1987: 323 (§84), published as the last or \textit{Third Critique} of his critical philosophy.} The division of noumena and phenomena is one of origin, not of logical form. Kant describes the form of the sensible world with the two principles time and space that are “not objective and real”, but “subjective and ideal” - “co-ordinating everything which is sensed externally” - and relate as such only to phenomena and not to noumena or things-in-themselves (Kant 1992b: 397 (§15)). It is this division that leads to the Kantian understandings of finite and infinite, of causality and teleology, of mechanism and fate, of beauty and sublime in his \textit{Third Critique} (Kant 1987: §76-§79). And it is these divisions that Hölderlin challenges in his radical poetic and spatiotemporal articulation of actuality, maintaining the finitude of human existence while \textit{dynamically} relating the configurations and tendencies of creative action (Luchte 2016: 63). A passage from a letter to Hegel from January 1795 demonstrates the key role of this part of Kant’s \textit{Third Critique} for his own approach: “The way in which he [Kant] connects the mechanism of nature (and so also of fate) with its purposiveness really seems to me to contain the whole spirit [\textit{Geist}] of his system. Of course, it is the way he solves all antinomies (Hölderlin 1987: 156 / own translation\textsuperscript{TR6}).\footnote{The German word \textit{Geist} is further discussed in chapter (09) 183ff.} Kant elaborates in these chapters on the difference between infinite and finite understanding, whereas the primordial differentiations between possible, actual and necessary, posited ‘a priori’ of any experience, allow for an applied finite understanding (Schmidlin 1971: 46). In their reference to applied empiricism these categories provide the systematic possibility of experience ‘a priori’ to actual experience (Kant 1987: 81 (§76)). Causality as a condition of possibility of experience is itself conditioned through the differentiation of possible and actual, of the universal and the individual, the law
and the lawful case (Schmidlin 1971: 47, Kant 1987: 86 (§76)). The universality of causality, in turn, is the condition for the method of the teleological faculty of judgment from the individual case to the characteristic laws, as the categorical laws make the characteristic possible through their universality. Therefore, the actually encountered laws in characteristic cases cannot be of natural causality but can be thought only by means of freedom under the conditions of purpose (Schmidlin 1971: 47, Kant 1987: 87 (§76)). Thereby “the distinctions of possibility and actuality, universal and individual, nature and freedom all originate from the double nature of the human, which consist of understanding and sensibility, the intuitive centrality of thought. If understanding be itself intuitive, it would include all cases, no category would exist as such, no natural causality and no freedom” (Schmidlin 1971: 47 / own translationTR7). But as the finite reason experiences itself as distinction of nature and freedom and at the same time as inseparable unity of them, it projects an infinite antithesis to the cognitive process, the noumenon. Consequently, for Kant this unseparated and infinite understanding is unknowable, but in the play of sensibility and understanding contrivable through the poetic nature of reason. And this poetic nature of reason in turn frees our finite cognition, which manifests as our proper world.

For Hölderlin, this finite-infinite relation of understanding emerges not in a self-centred reflection under the hubris of reason but in an eccentric encounter, in the rhythmic articulation between reason and poetry. This provides radically different perspectives on the limits of thought. This is to say, Kant’s reason – or Fichte’s I - seeks to separate itself from its surroundings but also claims to master that from which it flees. The distance separating subject and surrounding objects seems to establish the conditions of objectivity, but reiterates the “subjectivity of the perspective […] as a deficient mode of awareness” (Luchte 2016: 54). Hence, for Hölderlin what is always already united in actual experience can be understood only in the encounter with other worlds and hence includes aesthetic sense. In a letter to Immanuel Niethammer from 1796, Hölderlin writes: “In the philosophical letters I want to find the principle that will explain to my satisfaction the divisions in which we think and exist, but which is also capable of making the conflict disappear, the conflict between the subject and the object, between ourselves and the world, and between reason and revelation, – theoretically, through
intellectual intuition, without our practical reason having to intervene. To do this we need an aesthetic sense” (Hölderlin 1990c: 155-156). At this point, we have to recall again Hölderlin’s critique on Fichte’s “I am I” as the best example of the primordial division of subject and object with intellectual intuition, “since in the practical original division I is opposed to the Not-I” (Hölderlin 2009: 362). He claims that in Fichtean and Kantian Philosophy the absolute unity of subject and object is accessible only as aesthetic idea of a subjective universe, which has its own objectivity in the sensus communis” (Luchte 2016: 52). And it is precisely this relationship between the absolute unity of subject and object as theoretical judgment, hence being-as-such – “namely so united that no division can be executed without damaging the essence of that which is to be separated” (Hölderlin 200: 361) – and the identity as practical judgment that the dynamic articulation of aesthetic sense opens up. This is the dynamic relation between judgment as an essence of self-consciousness and judgment as the freedom of fulfilment of subjective purposiveness, the relation between Kant’s beautiful and sublime. In other words, aesthetic sense opens up in the dynamic relation of Kant’s poetic reason and pure reason as rationalist solution of the sublime. In October 1794 Hölderlin announces his approach as ‘deviation’ from Kant’s aesthetics – which we want to further engage at this point – in a letter to Neuffer: “In essence it is to contain an analysis of the beautiful and the sublime in which the Kantian analysis will be simplified and also, from another perspective, varied and extended” (Hölderlin 2009:113).

In the “Critique of Judgment” (1987), Kant discusses aesthetics as a configuration of relations that is exhibited by an object alongside three different types of aesthetic judgments: agreeable, beautiful and sublime. While the judgment of agreeable relates to pure individual pleasures, “through which no object is presented, but through which the object is regarded as an object of our liking (which is not a cognition of it)” - hence no possible disagreement -, beautiful and sublime relate to universal aspects (Kant 1987: 48 (§3)). For Kant, when we encounter a beautiful object, we take it that we ought to judge it as beautiful. When we judge a beautiful object, we enjoy the object without having any desire with respect to it. Rather, we believe that everyone should judge it in the same way. Hence it presents some kind of purposiveness, but without applying any
concept determining a specific purpose, which nevertheless provides a kind of obligation for us to judge the object as beautiful (Kant 1987: 53ff. (§6-11)). Kant emphasises in this context that no determined concepts are involved in the judgment of the beautiful but that, in our reflective judgment in relation to the sensible world, a free play between understanding and imagination is set in motion in response to the object. It is this imagination that is suppressed in the third type of aesthetic judgment: the sublime. When we encounter something absolutely large that we cannot respond with any empirical concept that could adequately capture it, imagination breaks down, “and it is in this failure that there is revealed the susceptibility of reason, which comprehends in itself [- in a self-sacrifice of imagination -] the notion of the totality, of the infinite, without the need for measurement or description” (Luchte 2016: 20). “Hence it [the sublime] must stand for a concept that belongs to the power of judgment or is derived from such a concept, and it must presuppose a subjective purposiveness of the presentation in relation to the power of judgment” (Kant 1987: 103ff. (§25)). This is the subjective purposiveness of reason, the idea of the world as an infinitely large totality, which can subsume the immeasurable totality and leads to the pleasure of the sublime. It is the triumph of reason (Kant 1987: 103ff. (§25)). Hence Kant’s analytic of the sublime is based on an aesthetic idea of a moral law, of the “ought to be” that guarantees our freedom and immortality. Or as Luchte puts it: “Kant’s philosophy is based upon the belief in a reason that assures his ideological desires” (2016: 20).

In a fragment of the Hyperion, Hölderlin directly refers to Kant’s “Analytic of the Sublime” and points at possible and dramatic consequences of the triumph of an aesthetic idea, of a moral law over nature. 125 If we follow this thought, Hölderlin contends, then “the benchmark [the moral and aesthetic law], on which we measure nature, ought to be boundless, and uncontrollable the desire to form the formless - according to the primordial aesthetic idea, which we carry in us - and to subjugate the resisting matter to the sacred law of unity. But the more bitter the pain is in the struggle with her [nature], the greater the danger that, in our displeasure, we discard the divine power, surrender to fate and our senses and

deny reason [...] - or that we, struggling against the resistance of nature, will fight
against her [nature], not to endow in her [nature] and thus between her [nature]
and the divine peace and consensus in us, but to destroy her [nature], and make
the world around us a desert, and the past as a model for a hopeless future.”
(1990b: 188-190 / own translation TR8). While the quote in its dramatic prescience
tempts the reader to refer – in retrospect – to the crimes of totalitarian states in
modernity126 (or perhaps to our contemporary ecological crisis), it first and
foremost points at the division of powers and the meek understanding of freedom
as key motifs of Hölderlin’s approach. For him, the failure of the unity of
imagination and understanding is not a free ticket to posit a universal “ought to
be” but an intimation of our individual existence in actuality. In other words,
Hölderlin challenges the two aesthetic judgments of Kant that relate to cognition –
beauty and sublime - as extremes of opposing - individual and universal -, where the articulation comes to a stand always on one side of the relation, which
is the self-centred subject. He understands Kant’s aesthetic judgments as
unattainable extremes of a dynamic aesthetic - hence no actual phenomena -, while the articulation comes to a stand always on one side of the relation, which
is the self-centred subject. He understands Kant’s aesthetic judgments as
unattainable extremes of a dynamic aesthetic - hence no actual phenomena -, which nevertheless lend themselves for shaping his methodological approach as
they describe the limits of intellectual intuition. Thus, Hölderlin argues against a
static understanding of aesthetic judgments reduced to a relation of opposition.
For even if beauty is posited as the primordial aesthetic idea in and through
which everything is united, this can only be understood in relation to a dynamic of
“becoming in dissolution” (Chapman 1992:173).127 In the encounter with a
synthetic work of art, we are neither a pure spectator nor purely overwhelmed,
but active participants. This challenges Kant’s distinction between noumena and
phenomena as well as the subjectivity of space and time, which according to
Kant’s transcendental idealism only pertain to things -in-themselves as they
appear, not as they are in-themselves (Kant1987: 397-398). In comparison, for
Hölderlin beauty articulates dynamically in the encounter between the two
extremes of no possible participation: (1) the maximum distance between subject

126 One of the best examples where Hölderlin’s expressed premonitions became a sad reality are
the crimes of the Nazis in the Third Reich in moral reference to their racial laws. This is all the
more remarkable given that the NSDAP misused different writings of Hölderlin – out of the
context – for their propaganda (see for example Kreuzer 2011: 312).
127 The expression “becoming in dissolution” is a translation of Hölderlin’s “Werden im Vergehen”
(1961: 282). The title of the related theoretical essay “Das Werden im Vergehen” (1961) is
translated in the following as “Becoming in Declining”.
and object, where the spatiotemporal dimensions belong to the subject, Kant’s judgement of taste; and (2) the minimum distance between subject and object, where the spatiotemporal dimensions become practically overwhelmed in the sublime, and are – for Kant - solved theoretically by the analytic of the sublime. In this radically different composition and orientation of thought in Hölderlin’s philosophical poetry, harmony is a dynamic articulation in the encounter between ‘things’. Intellectual intuition in pure harmony with reason would lead inevitably to the sacrifice of consciousness for itself. The theoretical idea of consciousness – subject-object relation – has a spatiotemporal deficiency, just like the synthetic work of art. It is only through the confrontation with spatiotemporal dimensionality in the encounter that harmony and peace can form themselves, or better, articulate through dynamic form (Hiller 2008:9). Hölderlin writes: “We would have no notion of this infinite peace, of that being in a proper sense of the word, we would not strive to unite nature with us, we would not think or act, nothing would be (for us), we would be nothing (for us), if that infinite unity, that being in the proper sense of the word were not present. It is present – as beauty” (Hölderlin 1990b: 256-257). Hölderlin approaches from an experience of beauty that does not mean reconciliation beyond the conflict. It contains relations of opposing, it contains ambiguity in itself, which makes it possible, and through which it is articulated.

Hölderlin reinforces this understanding of a dynamic articulation in the emergence of actual phenomena in challenging Kant’s pure reason in the ‘analytic of the sublime’. Following Kant, the thoughtful apprehension of beauty as purposiveness is grounded transcendentally, through reflection, and in the pure spatiotemporal dimensions of the judgment of taste, “upon the harmonious play of imagination and understanding, the sublime is a conflict between the faculties […] of imagination and reason” (Luther 2016: 20). If we continue to follow Kant in his argumentation, the human as a rational being - with reason as,

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128 In the present work, it is argued that Maki’s collective-form (see chapter (02)) develops in a similar methodological approach to Hölderlin’s dynamic understanding of aesthetics. With Maki, the compositional-form reflects the distant extreme of a theoretical and universal spatiotemporal dimensionality, the mega-form reflects the extreme of a dissolution of individual determination through the analytic of a more infinitive infrastructural frame, while the group-form articulates as a generative element in a dynamic form between the two.
by definition, the power to conceive infinity - must be infinite in a manner that is demonstrated. In transcendental philosophy, it is demonstrated in situations of existential crisis through a self-violation out of necessity by subjective purposiveness in the ‘analytic of the sublime’ (Luchte 2016: 54). The philosopher James Luchte argues - with reference to Hölderlin – that this is a vicious circle. This is because first of all, Kant's revelation of reason is merely a product of a reflective act, a subjective notion of an idea of the infinite. “If the analytic of the sublime is meant to reveal our sublimity in the face of death – and hence our eternity – […] this cannot be] assured by a mere reflective act, one that remains orientated by the criterion of subjective purposiveness” (2016: 55), as this relation - the triumph over nature - is to the Not-I, and hence refers to identity as in Fichte’s “I am I”, and not to being-as-such. Hence, Kant provides a rationalist solution of the aesthetic difference of being-as-such and identity in making them indifferent through our freedom, both moral and artistic, to directly determine the unknowable noumena, the thing-in-itself, nature, by the will as if we knew (Luchte 2016: 55). And even if we grant Kant's analytic of aesthetic judgments, they are still affiliated with the spatiotemporal dimension of an event. In other words, reason is tainted by spatiotemporal dimensions and necessitates the accommodation of a phenomenal reality as opposed to itself, as a horizon of possible experience. Reason remains a no-thing with no direct contact to spatiotemporal existence, which must (yet cannot) govern this existence.

If we apply Hölderlin's dynamic understanding of aesthetics to Kant's aesthetic judgments, the play between imagination and understanding can be still witnessed as a dynamic harmony of the beautiful in iterate events of life, as for example in the Hyperion (1990b: 30, 81, 253). This iteration, however, shifts the logos of Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation ‘deviated’ from Kant's subjectivism through the contextualisation of re-presenting with a spatiotemporal dimensionality and dynamically articulating the different relations of opposing. The aesthetic becomes the quality of experience, which otherwise can be only ethically posited and as such remains pure object of thought as purpose for practical reason. For Hölderlin, there is no freedom neither in practical reason nor in theoretical self-reference (Kreuzer 1998:XVI). Instead, there is freedom of re-presentation, of mise en scène, which can be understood as a rhythmic
articulation of the question: How can intellectual intuition become aesthetic and make itself tangible to itself?
This chapter explores Hölderlin’s rhythmic re-presentations in the articulation of poetic tragedy. In this context Hölderlin regards completed works of art – and, in particular, poetry – not as any end-product presented in a neutral atmosphere but as a moment of formal consolidation amid a process of experience in the encounter of artist, composition and audience, all of which are intertwined participants (Luchte 2016: 57). From this dynamic perspective of an intertwined process of creative experience, Hölderlin challenges the rational logic of Kant’s aesthetic judgments, which determine those processes by ‘a priori’ conditions of possibility. Following the brief discussion of the accompanying philosophical consequences in chapter (08), we now turn to Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation in the encounter between philosophy and poetry. We will focus in this chapter on five of the theoretical writings of Hölderlin from the Homburg period around 1800 – “On the Method of Poetic ‘Geist’”, “On the Different Ways of Composing Poetry”, “Alternation of Tones”, “On the difference of Poetic Modes” and “Becoming in Declining” – as well as on the translations of Sophocles and in particular on the “Remarks on Oedipus” and “Remarks on Antigone”. Hölderlin shifts the critical limit of understanding and articulates an openness of the individual unity not as scepticism but as the reiteration of the individual representation in a moment of experience and its spatiotemporal dimensionality. “Hölderlin enacts an intimate poetic phenomenology of actuality” in an aesthetic constellation of others and its intimate engagement in the moment of experience, in particular the moment of tragic experience (Luchte 2016: 60). In this line of thought the unity of any moment of experience is itself dynamic. It is tangible through the reversal between beautiful events of more distant aesthetic reflection and the more intimate aesthetic of the sublime. Or to put it the other way around, in the shattering – or mind-blowing, in the pure sense of the word - events of overwhelming, the individual only emerges amid the disclosure of actuality, on its eccentric path through the dynamic relationship. The eccentric logos of this

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experience is orchestrated by a rhythmic articulation according to the insurmountable spatiotemporal distance of the moment and its infinitive variations in aesthetic reflection. In turn, the individual actuality amid the dynamic articulation of the beautiful is governed by its fate in reflection as distant event. This is a radically different approach to actuality than is an idealistic understanding of human individual being, separated from any tangible sense of the constellation of others and served only from the modalities of existence, which are “set up as the mon-archy of existence, beyond existence” (Luchte 2015: 61). The dynamic harmony of the beautiful involving the ambiguous relations of opposing, Ineinander, is turned into an articulation of the Ungeheure, which the collective holds together in the encounter of individually fleeting reflection and collective poetic return to the constellation of others.130 “There is no ‘transcendence’, either to Being or beyond Being as such, but instead the mortal collective enacts the desire to become attuned to the All via ethos and bios, a way of life that took the form of a collective with shared ownership and equality” (Luchte 2016: 62).

// THE CHARACTERS, TONES AND METAPHORS OF POETIC LOGIC

For Hölderlin, a work of art that aims at impression, which is a subjective aesthetic judgment, only complies with an ‘a priori’ ideal or imperative of beauty. In the tense field of reflective, creative, and spiritual (geistig) processes of experience, the poetic aspiration does not fit anymore with the corset of a distinction between ideal and real (Rühle 2005: 84). This distinction between a timeless ideal of poetry and poetry’s sensually - temporally and culturally - determined form appears as ambiguity with tragic features in the encounter of philosophy and poetry. Hölderlin criticises that this ambiguity, which articulates in dynamic relations, is judged in modern works of poetry more according to the impressions they make than according to their calculable law, or by other procedures through which beauty is produced. Hence a school and appropriate

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130 For the meaning of the German Ungeheure in Hölderlin see chapter (08) 157.
craft is lacking, where these procedures may be calculated and taught (Hölderlin 2009: 466).

In his philosophical fragments Hölderlin argues that this more permeating connection of the human individual and its Umwelt, which surfaces as ambiguity, “can be repeated neither in mere thought, nor in mere memory, for mere thought, noble as it is, can nonetheless repeat only the necessary connection, only the inviolable, universally valid, indispensable laws of life, and in precisely the degree in which it ventures beyond this realm peculiar to it and dares to think the more intimate connection of life, it also denies its own peculiar character, which consists of being capable to be understood and proven without any particular examples” (Hölderlin 2009: 367). 

In the continuation of this quote from Hölderlin from the Homburg period, he elaborates thoroughly on his proposed approach to rhythmic articulation and the accompanying shift or ‘deviation’ of the limits of critical philosophy. Then, if these more permeating connections – or higher connections, as Hölderlin also calls them – have any calculable aspect to them (and hence are not pure fantasy) and, if there are any unwritten laws that govern these more permeating connections – “I am saying, if there are such laws, then they are, insofar as they are understood and represented merely separately and not in life, insufficient, firstly because in precisely the degree in which the connection of life becomes more infinite, the activity and its element, [its Umwelt], […] are connected with each other more infinitely” (Hölderlin 2009: 368). Any calculable aspect of such more-than-infinite connections can always merely provide the conditions, which make that connection possible, and not the connection itself. Hölderlin argues, with reference to the Greeks, that in his period of history, during the end of the eighteenth century, in the clutches of the enlightenment and with reference to Kant, we lack a higher enlightenment as “we have really turned the more delicate, more infinite relations in life partly into an arrogant morality, partly into a vain etiquette or an empty rule of taste, and with our iron concepts we believe ourselves to be more enlightened than the ancients, who considered those tender relationships as religious ones, that is, as

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131 Hölderlin describe human Umwelt as the element of the human individual, the surrounding in relation to which it lives (2009: 368 / for Uexküll’s and Merleau-Ponty’s notion of Umwelt see chapter (13) 000).
relationships which are to be considered not so much in themselves, as with regard to the spirit [Geist] that governs the sphere in which those relationships take place [emerge]” (Hölderlin 2009: 368).\(^\text{132}\)

There are no texts from Hölderlin, in which the relation of Geist and Seele (or “soul”) or its related faculties are concisely defined in their terminology (Port 2008:231). The valences of meaning of Geist seem to even multiply through the different or hybrid styles of text between philosophical theory, empirical anthropology and literary poetic (Port 2008:231). This semantic indeterminacy, however, which is grounded in the relational concept of Geist, is key for understanding Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation and even demonstrates the consistency of his approach throughout his work.\(^\text{133}\) With firm reference to works of art – or poetry - Geist is explicated as a collective soul that is common to all and proper to each. Through harmonic reversal and becoming in the encounter with the work of art, its Geist is inclined to reproduce itself in itself and in the other (Hölderlin 1961: 241). For Hölderlin Geist has a historical and cultural, hence a spatiotemporal dimension; Geist is the constellation of others in the dynamic articulation with the one or with the self. In the dynamic ambiguity between the unities of opposing of being-as-such and identity, Geist becomes the other of intellectual intuition. In comparison with an Umwelt relation, which refers to an

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\(^\text{132}\) The additions in squared brackets refer to the original German, hence Geist but also stattfinden, which we want to claim here, is more accurately translated with “to emerge” (Hölderlin 1961: 277).

\(^\text{133}\) The German word Geist is translated into English as “spirit”, “mind”, “intellect”, “wit”, “genius” or “ghost” (Scholze-Stubenrecht 1990: 319). Its etymology and semantic development has a complex cultural history with different evaluations (material, ethical, religious, cognitive, aesthetic): Geist possibly derives from the Proto-Indo-European gais-ta as “mood” and “being out of oneself” – the German word Begeisterung “enthusiasm”, “excitement” and “rupture” (literal translation: “where the Geist befalls”) carries this meaning until today (Onions 1966: 99, 342) – or gais-to as “something that is stimulating”, “inspiring”, “agitating”, “bewildering” or “frightening”. The English word ghost derives from the same origin (Adler 2014: 81). In pre-Christian times, Geist stood primarily for the “elements” – material, aerial, fiery. This also refers to the Greek pneûma (“material”, “aerial”, “fiery”), the Latin spiritus (“air”, “whiff”, “aspiration”) and the Hebrew ruah (“wrath”, “whiff”, “aspiration”) (Adler 2014: 82). In Christian times-- until the middle Ages--the theological and religious meaning of the holy (heiligen) Geist became more important, parallel to the development of the Latin spiritus. It is noteworthy that despite the multifacetedness of meanings related to Geist, until the High Middle Ages there are no linguistic findings of cognitive relations of Geist, such as mind or reason (Adler 2014: 83). And, only in the eighteenth century and under the influence of the French esprit, Geist gained more and more the meaning of cognition and ingenuity. The body as opposite to holiness and immortality (spirit) now was opposite to a Geist of enlightenment (mind and reason). The modern Geist “went faraway” from the “once so close” Seele (soul) and gained, in particular through the French Genie in German Idealism and Romanticism, increasingly also aesthetic tendencies (Adler 2014: 84).
individual one, however, *Geist* refers to a *collective* one. While this reflects the many applications of *Geist* in everyday German language of today referring to historical periods or cultural places, it only reinforces the necessary semantic development of the term. In his attempt to articulate the reversal and becoming of poetic composition historically and culturally (especially in reference to Greek mythology), Hölderlin always employs the *Geist* semantically as the constellation of others of the *collective* one: the constellation of mythological elements in relation to the human body (for example Hölderlin 1990b:12,16), the constellation of religious spirit in relation to the secular body (for example Hölderlin 1990b: 9, Hölderlin 1974b: 310), the constellation of the enlightenment mind and reason in relation to the material or organic body (for example Hölderlin 1990b: 12, Hölderlin 1961: 226), the constellation of becoming and creative genius in relation to the rational and determined body (for example Hölderlin 1990b: 17, Hölderlin 1961: 158,199). The texts of Hölderlin that are considered in this elaboration originated in a historical period, in which the semantics of *Geist* developed again in a dramatic *dynamic*. While, for example, for his former fellow student and friend Hegel *Geist* became a fundamental concept, for Hölderlin *Geist* always refers to the constellation of others in the emergence of actual phenomena. For the rhythmic articulation in the *encounter* between philosophy and poetry “the more tender and more infinite relationships [of actuality] must, thus, be considered with regard to the *Geist* that governs the sphere in which they emerge” (Hölderlin 1961: 277-278 / own translation

This is the beginning of a poetic reflection which names the dualist distinctions, as they are constitutive for theoretical reflection, as divisive, and in this way also challenges the distinct divisions of interior and exterior, subject and object, finite and infinite. For Hölderlin, these dualist divisions *re-present* a tragic flight from and fear of actual phenomena, as they isolate the most intimate of poetic aspiration from its *Umwelt*, through which alone it can take form. This is why he reflects on the *dynamic* relation of different *oppositing* on crossing levels through the interlaced relation of art and nature, ‘organic’ and ‘aorgic’. Hölderlin defines these terms in their extreme limits into pure theoretical reflection with ‘organic’ as autonomous, organisational and productive activity and ‘aorgic’ as the inconceivable, the insensible, the unbounded (Hölderlin 1961: 153). The distinct
oppositions art and nature, ‘organic’ and ‘aorgic’ – in applied research often and, we claim here, mistakenly regarded as analogous (see also Grimm 2001) – are pure theoretical judgments and participate in actuality only in their aesthetic relations with practical judgements. These relations are ambiguous and articulate rhythmically. In other words, from a subjective perspective of pure thought one might argue that the human can be equated with the ‘organic’ and with the realm of art, whilst nature might be equated with ‘aorgic’. Though it is only through the interchanging unities of opposing, whereby each passes over into the other - thereby gaining exposure to the related surrounding – and hence only in rhythmic articulation that the ‘higher enlightenment’ can be attained (Chapman 1992:187 / Hölderlin 1961: 277).

In this sense, Hölderlin projects the relation of art and nature as dynamic form through his alternating reciprocal and form-related determinations of ‘organic’ and ‘aorgic’, which he objectifies as historical and cultural experience in Umwelt relations. The completion of a dynamic form in the relation of art and nature is given, when each is an ensemble, which it can be, and when each allies itself with the other, supplying what the other lacks, and lacks necessarily if it is to be an ensemble, which it can be as a particular (Hölderlin 1961: 152). Hölderlin writes: “The more organisational, more artistic human being is nature’s flowering; the more aorgic nature, when it is felt in its purity by human beings who are organised purely and educated purely in their mode of being, grants them their feeling of completion. Yet such a life is at hand only in feeling, and is not a matter of cognition. If it is to be knowable it must depict itself by separating itself off from itself in the excess of intimacy in which opposites mistake themselves for one another, such that the organisational, which surrendered itself too much to nature and thereby forgot its essence and its consciousness, passes over into the extremes of autonomous activity, art, and reflection; by contrast, nature, at least in the effects it exercises on the reflective human being, passes over into the extreme of the aorgic, the inconceivable, the insensible, the unbounded, until both primordially united sides, advancing in their reciprocal and alternating yet opposing directions, encounter one another as in their outset, except that nature

134 For the definition ensemble and form related concepts see chapter (02) 032.
has become more organised through the shaping and cultivating human being, through the cultural drives and formative forces in general, whereas, by contrast, the human being has become more aorgic, more universal, more infinite” (Hölderlin 1961: 152-153 / own translation TR10).

The necessity of determinacy, completeness and ‘organic’ character of the parts in this dynamic relation implies in turn, and no less necessarily at that, the indeterminacy of what is portable, the excess of intimacy of the ‘aorgic’ (Courtine 2000:69). For the encounter between philosophy and poetry it follows from this argumentation that there must be an excess of intimacy in philosophical reflection and a determined character in poetry – Hölderlin’s poetic calculable law and rhythm techne - which form each other in an altering reciprocal relation on different levels.135 Thereby the rhythm techne lends itself for the individuation of the faculties of the soul – cognition, feeling of pleasure and displeasure, desire - and its system of related categories of powers and tendencies such as judgment, sensibility, understanding, imagination or reason.136 This individuating, however, does not dismember the unity of the soul but articulates its related faculties in alternating compositions in the emergence of actual phenomena, which will be described as succession in our reflection on it. Then as the unity of experience articulates as an open ensemble in succession, the beginning of a work of art or poetry is always incomplete. This is to say, the form of the synthetic soul of a work of art is broken into the antithesis of only two counter faculties or their related systematic powers - for example sensibility and understanding. This deficit, in turn, demands from the encountered human – an incarnated consciousness, the soul of the audience - a simultaneous supplementation of the missing and connecting faculty. Through the activation of one of its own faculties for the unilateral mediation or reconciliation of the antithetic in the work of poetry, however, the incarnated consciousness gets itself caught in an antithesis that

135 “Techne” (etymologically derived from the Greek tékhne) is often translated in English with “craft”, “craftsmanship” or “art” (Onions 1966: 906). It is a context-dependent “power”, “skill” and “structure” to strive for a tangible understanding as opposed to abstract theoretical understanding (Onions 1966: 224). In the present work it is related to the German term Geschick (as used by Hölderlin) meaning at the same time “craft”, “skill” “incident” and “fate” (Scholze-Stubenrecht 1990: 329), hence a practice that is at the same time determined by the individual and its Umwelt (Hölderlin 1961: 275).
136 Hölderlin does not provide any systematisation of faculties and categories, but refers to and builds on the differentiations from Kant (1987: 38).
needs to be reconciled in relation to yet another level of the encounter (Schmidlin 1971: 48). Hence, whatever level of this dynamic relation we reflect on in the description of it, there is a ‘deviation’ of this reflection (in this case the line-of-action of the description), which includes the dissolution or decline of the related form of antithesis. If we describe this dynamic as a process of succession, dissolution is not a necessary stage of the process, which allows the “new” to emerge, rather it is an integral part of the “new”. This motif of the “new” emerging through decline underlies all of Hölderlin’s written work (Chapman 1992:145). And this is how Hölderlin’s approach and his poetry is applied in the present work: as “the possible which enters into actuality as that actuality itself dissolves, [and which] is actualised and brings about the sensation of dissolution as well as recollection of that which has been dissolved” (Hölderlin 1961: 283 in Chapman 1992:146). Following Hölderlin’s argumentation from his theoretical essay “Becoming in Declining”, articulation only becomes truly mediating in disarticulating merely unilateral relations (1961:282ff.). This is because the unity of experience in actuality is never pure, it only ever appears in relation to a world in decline, the moment or the becoming of the moment, the metaphor and transport of one world to another (Courtine 2000:64).137 Purity can only be re-presented in impurity and if you try to render fineness without coarseness it will appear entirely unnatural and incongruous, and this for the good reason that fineness itself, when articulated, bears the colour of the fate in which it emerges; and beauty, when it re-presents itself in actuality, necessarily assumes a form which only becomes its natural form when it is taken together with the very Umwelt which of necessity gave it the form it has” (Hölderlin 1987: 290 / own translationTR11).

Any articulation of this dynamic form which steams from the actual Umwelt

137 The term “metaphor” is used by Hölderlin in its original Greek sense as transposition (Hölderlin 2009: 61). It is not to be understood as a direct, unmediated relationship but presupposes a ‘deviation’ from the connection (translation) of literal meanings of terms; The metaphor lies in neither of the terms in themselves, rather it mediates as a hitherto unstated relational third term which includes the connected terms. The metaphor can, however, only gain meaning and value through its relation with a unity of experience in which it is allowed to come to expression (Chapman 1992: 112 / see also discussion of Deleuzean “agencement” in Chapter (04) “In Between” 000). This translation Hölderlin calls “transport”, associated in its eighteen century French meaning with rapture and ecstatic enthusiasm (Chapman 1992: 177). In the particular case of a tragic moment, this transport is empty, hence the metaphor of intellectual intuition.
relation, however, cannot be reduced to an integration of the ‘things’ of an external world as poetic material, as this would only reinforce the bifurcation on the very level of reflection – in this case interior and exterior world of the subject – and would determine them as dualist oppositions. In the *encounter* with the work of poetry there must be an excess of intimacy in philosophical reflection, hence there must be a determined character in poetry that can be described though reflective judgment and allows a reciprocal relationship from the outset, its primordial separation. Hölderlin names this *dynamically opposing* structure that allows an altering reciprocal relation on different levels, the calculable poetic law - with its related *rhythm techne* - and develops it in reference to Kant’s critical philosophy and his systematic of judgments. In the light of Hölderlin’s challenging of Kantian reason and its alethic structure, however, any poetic calculus would need to be an articulation ‘deviated’ from Kant’s rationalist table of categories, which Hölderlin seeks to respond to with his table of poetic tones, meanings, tendencies and metaphors. In other words, in order to understand the intimate engagement of the human individual with the other – and with the constellation of others – in the *encounter* with poetry, the ambiguity of the emerging actual phenomenon has to articulate in an eccentric way, orchestrated by the presentation, *re-presentation* and transformation of the related *collective Geist* of poetry (Luchte 2016: 67). ¹³⁸ This transcendental-poetic logic Hölderlin determines in relation to the triad of the faculties of the soul in his philosophical essays “Alternation of Tones” (1961) and “On the difference of Poetic Modes” (1961). The tri-unity of the faculties of the soul, its tendencies, the poetic characters and the basic tones allow a calculable number of configurations, which yield a law of succession related to the ambiguity of their metaphors and meanings (Schmidlin 1971: 48-49). In this way, the individual has an intimate engagement with the constellation of others in poetic articulation, while the tables of poetic logic provide the relation to the dialectic structure of thought. The related *rhythm techne*, Hölderlin’s words, “is one of the various successions in which idea, feeling and reflection develop, according to poetic logic. For just as philosophy always treats only one faculty of the soul, so that the *re[-]presentation* of this one faculty makes a whole, and the mere connection between the parts of this faculty

¹³⁸ Related to *rhythm techne*, Hölderlin’s *Geist* is what in the present work is called “*collective rhythmic grouping*”. 

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is called logic: so poetry treats the various faculties of a human being, so that the *representation* of these different faculties makes a whole, and the connection between the more independent parts of the different faculties can be called the rhythm, taken in a higher sense, or the calculable law" (Hölderlin 2009:476). Thus the language of poetry has the same systematic demand as the logic of philosophical reflection, with the difference that poetic reflection does not use language but actualises through language. The moment of the actual mediation between philosophy and poetry, its meaning in reflection, is described by Hölderlin as metaphor. In the first three sentences of his essay “On the Difference of Poetic Modes” (1961), Hölderlin summarises the relation of the poetic genres – lyric, epic, tragic – and the poetic tones – naive, idealic, heroic – to the actual metaphors – feeling, striving, intellectual intuition: 140

“The lyric, in appearance idealic poem, is in its meaning naive. It is a continuous metaphor of one feeling.
The epic, in appearance naive poem, is in its meaning heroic. It is a metaphor of great endeavours [striving].
The tragic, in appearance heroic poem, is in its meaning idealic. It is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition” (Hölderlin 2009: 447 / italic emphasis in the original).

The respective poetic character articulates in ambiguous relations of opposing to the poetic Geist and the basic tone, which reflects the basic attunement (German “Stimmung”) of the poet in the creative process of poetic production. In other words, the basic attunement of the poet induces in its re-presentation a

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139 *representation* refers to German original Darstellung.
140 “idealic” refers to the German idealisch. The present work follows here the translation by Jeremy Alder (Hölderlin 2009) and not other translations with “idealistic” (for example by Thomas Pfau (Hölderlin1988:83)). “Idealistic” as translation refers to the German idealistisch and this difference is key for Hölderlin, as “idealistic” is when “idealic” slips into an absolute aesthetic idea.
141 The German word Stimmung is often translated with “mood” or “atmosphere”. Deriving from the verb stimmen “to tune” – as in tuning a musical instrument –, or “to vote”, Stimmung also means to participate and to be in tune. This leads to a “determination” (German Bestimmung) if related to a ‘thing’, to a direction of individuation (Scholze-Stubenreckh 1990: 688, Kluge 2011: 886, Malpas 2011: 93. In this sense in Hölderlin’s Stimmung is related to the aesthetics of music but also to aesthetics of the unity of experience (Hölderlin 1961: 241-265). Hence Stimmung does not refer to the subject (emotion), the I or the self, but to the aesthetics of the encounter of “things”, inextricably tied up with spatiotemporal dimensions (Ebner, Vetter, and Kadi 2004: 508-509). In this sense Stimmung is translated in the present work as “attunement”.

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specific poetic character. Accordingly, a naive feeling articulates through an 
idealistic character, a heroic striving through a na"ive character and an idealistic 
intellectual intuition through a heroic character (Mieth 2007: 51). This is to say, in 
the moment of unity of experience in the encounter of philosophy and poetry the 
articulation of a dynamic form is mediated by a metaphor (transport) between the 
opposing relations of poetic subject and poetic object, poetic re-presentation 
and poetic Geist, poetic character and poetic basic tone. In the rhythmic 
succession, this is described in three phases: as dissolution, as reversal, and as 
becoming (H"olderlin 1961:282ff.). Through the dissolving of actuality in 
possibility, possibility emerges in actuality. Accordingly, the lyric metaphor 
mediates the becoming idealic of the actual, its dissolution, the epic metaphor 
mediates the becoming actual of the possible, its becoming, and the tragic 
metaphor mediates the reversal between the lyric and the epic (Mieth 2007:51). 
With this poetic techne, H"olderlin attempts to understand the calculable law of the 
different poetic genres related to the actual poetic Geist through elaborating on 
the ambiguous relations of opposing. He reflects on this ambiguity of opposing 
relations through their different successions, which are re-presenting the different 
works of poetry. Although each of the poetic genres includes characters of the 
other genres, one character is always dominant. "Between the character of the 
re-presentation and the free idealic treatment there lies the [...] meaning of the 
poem. This is what gives the poem its seriousness, its firmness, its truth, this 
secures the poem against the free idealic treatment becoming an empty manner, 
and the re-presentation a vanity" (H"olderlin 1961: 245 / own translationTR12). 
Here, H"olderlin elaborates the eccentric of his approach as ambiguity between 
rhythm and rhythmic re-presentation. Focussing on the rhythmic re-presentation 
of tragedy, he demonstrates in his translation of Sophocles’ Oedipus the King 
and Antigone (1974a) how the tragic articulation emerges as actual phenomenon 
through the revelation of this ambiguity. The poem - or the work of art in general -
does not reproduce or reflect subjective or objective thought, but it participates in 
a rhythmic articulation of the unity of experience as dynamic form in actuality.
Bettina Von Arnim refers to this understanding of rhythmic articulation in her transcription of one of several encounters with Hölderlin in the period of 1807-1847, usually defined as the years of his insanity. “Once Hölderlin said, that all be rhythm, the entire fate of man be nothing but a heavenly rhythm, and each work of art be one rhythm, and all be swinging from the poet lips of the god [...]” (von Arnim 2012: 326 / own translation). Made intriguing by its almost oneiric incantation, this quote found its way into many elaborations on rhythm in the tradition of Western thought and beyond (Blanchot 1986: 113, Agamben 1999: 94, Budak 2009: 13). The philosopher Giorgio Agamben refers to the quote in a thorough investigation on the difference between works of art and nature. With reference to Aristotle’s “rhythmos” he discusses the quote in its ambiguity of opposing relations. Then in opposition to “proton arrhythmiston” - the prime and irreducible element – rhythmos would add itself to this elemental and inarticulate nature, composing and shaping it, giving it structure (Agamben 1999:95, Aristoteles 1995b: 23). Referring to Hölderlin’s critique on Fichte in “Being Judgment Possibility”, this could be understood as a “theoretical primordial judgment” (Hölderlin 2009: 361-362). Structure, however, as Agamben argues in referring to the understanding of modern structuralist criticism, is caught up itself in an opposing of essential structure and becoming structure. With the ladder referring to the whole of the work of art that contains more than the sum of its parts - its proper status or form of appearance - the work of art is presented here at once as object and as original principle of structure (Agamben 1999:98). Again, referring to Hölderlin’s “Being Judgment Possibility” this could be understood as “practical primordial judgment” related to identity (Hölderlin 2009: 361-362). In his first conclusion, Agamben seems, in Hölderlin’s words, to confuse (“verwechselt” / Hölderlin 1961: 216) identity and being-as-such, when he argues for an understanding of Hölderlin’s rhythm as “the principle of
presence that opens and maintains the work in its original space” (Agamben 1999: 98). In his own further argumentation, Agamben refers again to Aristotle claiming the “arts can be called ‘beginnings’ as well, and of these especially the architectonic arts” – hence art as a production of the original space of man, as architectonic par excellence (Agamben 1999: 101, Aristoteles 1995a: 1013). While this refers to Hölderlin’s understanding of rhythm techne, in his non-classical ontology, the origin is “Ungleheure”, unthinkable even as unthinkable (Hölderlin 1974a: 201). As Hölderlin’s expression in von Arnim’s quote illuminates, rhythm does not come to a stand on one side, not with the human, not with the work of art and not with any origin. Rather rhythm is a dynamic articulation of the ambiguity of these different relations of opposing – referred to being-as-such and identity. It is the cultural and historical, hence collective articulation of the encounter in which they emerge. In this encounter, “being hurled-out into the epoch of rhythm, artists and spectators” not only “recover their essential solidarity”, as Agamben argues (1999: 102), but participate in its transfigured creation. This eccentric shift or ‘deviation’ from the critical limits of philosophy through active participation is expressed in the direct - but rarely quoted - continuation of von Arnim’s transcription of Hölderlin on rhythm. After “all be swinging from the poet lips of the god”, the quote continues: “and where the human Geist yields to that, it be the transfigured fates, in which Genius be showing itself, and poetizing be a quarrel for truth, and immediately it be plastic, immediately athletic Geist, where the word seizes the body (poetizing form), immediately also in the Hesperian, which be the Geist of observations, constituting poetic delights, where the poet’s tone be resounding under joyful sole, while the senses be immersed in the necessary figuration of ideas of the dominant Geist that be given in the time. This last poetising form be a nuptially solemnly marryng inspiration and immediately be plunging itself into the night and be clairvoyant in darkness, immediately flowing in daylight over all, which this illumines. - Opposed to this, as the humane time, stands the tremendous muse of the tragic time; - and who be not comprehending this, he [Hölderlin] said, never be able to arrive at a comprehension of the high level works of Greek art, the building of which be a divinely organic one, which cannot emerge from human understanding, but which be dedicated to the Unthinkable. And as such the God used the poet as arrow to spring his rhythm from the bow, and who be not
sensing and clinging to this, will never be having either the skill or athletic virtue to be a poet, and such a one would be too weak to be able to grasp himself, neither in the stuff, nor in the world-view of the earlier, nor the later way of presentation of our tendencies, and no poetic form will reveal itself to him. Poets who are rehearsing themselves to given forms can only repeat the Geist as one time given, seating themselves like birds on a limb of the tree of language, and they sway according to the primordial rhythm that be lying at its root, but never will such a [poet] be flying/winging us as the eagle of Geist brooded by the vibrant Geist of language” (von Arnim 2012: 326 / own translationTR14).

This quote elaborates the participation of the poetic Geist in all of its dynamic facets in the encounter between work of art and artist, as producer and spectator. It differentiates the relations of Geist into plastic, athletic, and Hesperian. While plastic and athletic Geist for Hölderlin refers to the building of the individual poem, body or ‘thing’ in relation to the other and its capacity to perform in the collective of others referring to Greek Olympics, the Hesperian Geist refers to constellations of the collective other in the dynamic of the epoch (Hölderlin 1961: 193, Hölderlin 1987: 432). All these relations articulate in a dynamic of becoming in declining, as any synthetic work of poetry is only the beginning of the art character of the epoch, to which it belongs. In other words, art has no absolute but a historical and cultural character in its re-presentation - in this case a Hesperian character. This shortcoming of the beginning can be revealed by the genius in the Geist of time (German “Zeitgeist”) through the reversal in tragic time. Hesperian thereby refers to fatherland but only loosely linked to any particular place or people and not in any nationalistic or political sense (Billings 2014: 193). Hölderlin here draws an image of human history as cultural peregrination with the mythological image of the procession of Dionysus from India towards the west. Hesperian is understood in the sense of a migration, more or less geographically and temporally localised and characterised by a momentary wholeness and relations between the parts (Billings 2014: 191). 144 In

144In his writings, Hölderlin uses Hesperian when describing a process linked to very different cultures and geographical locations: Fatherland, Swabia, German modernity in general, the Occident, or even a purely spiritual state of totality (Billings 2014: 193 ff.). This derives from the spatiotemporal meaning of Hesperian, relative to a hypothetical reference point and pointing towards the West, towards the eve parts of the world. For the ancient Greeks, who considered
the Remarks on Oedipus, Hölderlin described the actual tragic moment as intertwining transition (Ineinander) of spatiotemporal dimensions through the rhythm techne of articulation between naive time (day and night), idealic time (clairvoyant in darkness) and tragic time (1974a: 202). In a historical description, however, moments or eras are changing, and with them spatial geographies and cultures, the rhythm and the present Geist are changing. The only constant is the encounter, which is articulated in poetry through the reversal of human and tragic time as a rhythm from a bow that spans itself in the same dynamic articulation. In this understanding, the tragic experience seems to be a condition of history and culture, which makes itself tangible thought a spatiotemporal reversal – in Hölderlin’s words: “a limitless becoming one with itself that purifies through a limitless division of itself” (Hölderlin 1974a: 201/ own translation TR15). Hence, in the encounter with tragedy the relation of oppositing with the other – the work of art - traces itself in a dynamic and somehow reverse repetition, which leads to the metaphor of intellectual intuition. The purification of spatiotemporal dimensions is achieved again through a relation of oppositing, in this case oppositing a moment of uttermost suffering (Hölderlin’s sublime) – in which “nothing more exists besides the conditions of time or space” - to abstract time and space of a judgement of taste, hence to subjectivity (Hölderlin 2009: 474).

// HÖLDERLIN’S ECCENTRIC PATH

The rhythmic articulation of spatiotemporal dimension in the encounter between philosophy and poetry, between human time and tragic time, between ‘organic’ and ‘aorganic’ and between art and nature is key to understanding Hölderlin’s Sophocles translation but is also present in his entire work. In a first published preface to the “Hyperion” in 1973, Hölderlin uses the image of an “eccentric course, path or orbit” (exzentrische Bahn) to describe the dynamic of the their home country as epicentre of the earth, Italy and Spain were considered Hesperian. For Hölderlin, who applies the ancient standpoint, it signified primarily European countries located in the west and north of the Alps. The term, however, has a historical component as well, in considering the elapsed and elapsing time after midday, which is south of the relevant countries, yet without any ultimate or eschatological perspective. In this view and after the end of ancient world and culture, all countries that made up the Old World are connoted Hesperian or occidental, Western and modern (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998:246).
momentary unity of experience of human presence, of human life-time, and life-space.\textsuperscript{145} “There are two ideals of human presence: a state of utmost naivety, in which our needs are mutually attuned with themselves, with our faculties and with all we are connected with, \textit{just by the organisation of nature alone}, without any contribution from ourselves; and the state of utmost education (cultivation), where there would be the same attunement, yet with infinitely multiplied and amplified needs and faculties, and \textit{now by the organisation that we are able to provide for ourselves}. The eccentric path that the human, in general and as individual, passes through from one point (of more or less pure naivety) to the other (of more or less complete education (cultivation)), seems to be always the same \textit{in its basic directions}\textsuperscript{2} (1960:563 / own translation\textsuperscript{TR16}). The already manifold double condition of the human between nature and fate is given a new way of expression in this image. It grasps the condition not as sole polarity in a static way. The human wants to be both, in all and above all. In this sense, the \textit{eccentric path} (original unity - division - back to a new unity) between nature and fate describes the human as well as the subject (\textit{infant being - self-conscious being – enlightened being}) as the human as object (birth – life – death). This double condition, however, is not related in \textit{opposing} or any pure dualism of centrifugal and centripetal tendencies but is a dynamically moving offset and reversal. This also indicates Hölderlin’s engagement with astronomic senses, which he had studied at the University of Tübingen (Schadewaldt 1952:3 / Hölderlin 1987: 71). As an empirical term, \textit{eccentric orbit} was introduced by Johannes Kepler. To the astronomer, it served to label courses of movement of planets observed from the earth. As long as the earth was thought to be in the centre of the planetary system, these courses of movement seem to be very complex. In an eccentric observation, however, the complex and loop-like trajectories decomposed into simple ellipses with the sun in one of the two focal points (Kastberger 2007: 28).\textsuperscript{146} It could be assumed that Hölderlin in his production-aesthetic impetus

\textsuperscript{145}This elaborated preface of the Hyperion was published in the fourth and last volume of Schiller’s (ed.) “Neuen Thalia”, dated in 1793 and printed for the first time in November 1794 (Hölderlin 1960: 562).

\textsuperscript{146} Following the interpretation of Schadewaldt (1952:2ff) the expression “\textit{eccentric path} (exzentrische Bahn) is used by Hölderlin in its original astronomic sense, and is, in fact, sometimes translated with “\textit{eccentric orbit}” (Krell 2005:275). This refers back to the astronomer Hipparchus (109-120BC), who deviated the position of planet earth from the exact centre in a circular orbit of the sun, and moved it towards the periphery. The now \textit{eccentric orbit} of the sun is...
attempted to find an image for his poetic calculus. In an elaborated draft of the preface to the “Hyperion” (1990b) this outlined or implied basic motif of Hölderlin’s approach gained assertiveness in its articulation of ostensible distinct, fluent or subjectively determined aspects of actual phenomena: “We all pass through an eccentric path, and there is no other way possible from childhood to completion. The unity of the soul, being, in the only sense of the word, is lost to us, and we had to lose it if we are to strive and struggle for it” (Hölderlin 1990b: 236 / own translationTR17). While the term eccentric path disappeared in the final version of the “Hyperion”, the methodological relevance of the image as a basic motive of Hölderlin’s approach returned in his theoretical essay “On the method of poetic Geist” (1961), written in 1799 (see figure 3.01).147

also part of the Ptolemaic System. After Copernican Revolution, now the earth and other planets circulate in eccentric orbits around the world, which was finally proved by Kepler’s first law of planetary motion in the beginning of 17th century. Kepler’s second law of planetary motion further proved that the velocity of the planet on the eccentric orbit varies. Hölderlin was aware of all these astronomic senses of his expression “eccentric path” (see Schadewaldt 1952:3).

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Figure 3.01 / Sketch of eccentric path / Hölderlin (Hölderlin 1799: 46r)
The hand-drawn sketch on the first page of the essay has been mostly ignored in
the predominantly philosophical interpretations of the text. Klaus Kastberger
(2007: 24ff.) argues that this neglect of the materialist process of production of
the manuscript with its corrections, cancelations, and sketches is all the more
inappropriate and incomprehensible when considering the thematic of the essay,
which is exactly a better understanding of the process of production (see figure
3.01). In ‘deviation’ from a pure text, these different modes of expression, and in
particular the sketches of images of thought, provide concurrent articulations of
oppositing relations and hence produce their own narrative (Egger 1998). It is
claimed here that Hölderlin suggests dynamic relations in his drawings, which the
theoretical style of a philosophical essay cannot provide. This concerns in
particular a dynamic articulation of spatiotemporal dimension. In the drawing on
the bottom of the page, Hölderlin elaborates on the construction of epicycloids
(see figure 3.01). It seems reasonable to see in this combination of linear,
cycloid, epicycloid and brachistochrone courses a re-presentation of Hölderlin’s
eccentric path.148 It is a re-presentation that diametrically relates elliptic-implicit
and linear-extemporised tendencies in a process that includes the chiasm of
inversion or reversal (Egger 1998: 389). The point of the furthest distance to the
straight line, the peak of the cycloid course, coincides with the end and the
beginning of epicycloid course, right where it meets with the straight line and
reverses its path. This position in the drawing demonstrates, in a geometrical
way, what Hölderlin regards as caesura, a point when/where something ends and
something begins, but in this sense also connects and separates. It is an element
of the poetic calculus that dynamically (in this case in a geometrical rational)
relates the different courses, which are regarded as different worlds by Hölderlin
or, in the language of the present work, different levels of the rhythm. Hence
caesura is not reduced to issues of poetic metre or content but dynamically

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148 Hölderlin’s sketch on the bottom right of the page shows a geometrical construction of a cycloid
and an epicycloid in a front elevation. A cycloid – the single curve in the sketch - is the curve
traced by a point on a circle being rolled along a straight line, of which the sketch in the middle
shows the basic set up (Pfeiderer 1994: 180 in Kastberger 2007: 24). An epicycloid - the double
curve in the sketch is a plane curve produced by tracing the path of a chosen point on the
circumference of a circle—called an epicycle—which rolls around a fixed circle, the basic setup of
which is shown on the bottom left of the page. As the eccentric path is not symmetrical for
Hölderlin, but based on an ellipsis, all curves have to be considered as brachistochrone curves
with different accelerations, hence curves of fastest connection between point A and point B
connects, separates and reverses the different relations of oppositing in a rhythmic articulation in the encounter between philosophy and poetry. In the geometrical description, the momentary unity of experience in the encounter with the work of art always relates to the ensemble of courses and to the whole figure - not to any single point - and is itself part of the same dynamic relations on another level of rhythm.

In the text of “On the method of poetic Geist”, Hölderlin pinpoints this dynamic challenge of any individual re-presentation. For him a poetic reflection – which is a general idea of life determined by the necessary shortcoming of its individual unity - “begins with an ideally characteristic attunement [Stimmung], [...] in this case it presents itself as such in a particular form, and proceeds in an alternation of attunements, where the succeeding one is each time determined by the preceding one, and is oppositing to it in import [...], and insofar more individual, more general, fuller, so that the different attunements are only connected in that in which purity finds its oppositing relation, namely in the manner of the striving” (Hölderlin 1961: 247-248 / own translationTR18). In the encounter between an individual human and an individual work of art, the law of striving refers to different levels of the rhythm, where each level is re-presented in a succession of relations of oppositing that participates in the articulation of dynamic forms of attunements, which only emerge through ambiguity of the actual phenomenon. In this sense, the naive appearance of the sketch of Hölderlin (its character), has an idealic meaning (its basic tone). In the succession of dissolution – reversal – becoming its tragic metaphor (hence intellectual intuition) would be the reversal of lyric and epic. Then the idealic character of the lyric could be regarded as a path from the unity of childhood (beginning of the path) to the unity of utmost cultivation (end of the path), and as such would create the biggest possible surface in relation to its naive (basic tone) linear progression of life (between cycloid and linear course / see figure 3.01). The naïve character of the narrative (epic) developing symmetrically from beginning to end, is related to its heroic basic tone, which reverses the idealic and naive tones and provides the unity of end and beginning in the point of the greatest distance to the idealic path (caesura). This is the tragic of the human individual striving for unity in the highest point of cultivation (peak of cycloid
course), creating the greatest distance between idealic and naive, between ‘organic’ and ‘aorgic’, which manifests at the same time, however, as the greatest surface between the cycloid and the linear course (which refers to its centristic definition as a circle in the centre of the world). This also reverses the relation of nature and fate from any central perspective between philosophy and poetry, between the attunement of an incarnated consciousness (artist and spectator) and the synthetic work of art. For example, seen from the central perspective of a reader of a tragedy, the highest point of cultivation (peak of cycloid course) would be the knowledge of the death of the heroic character (which would coincide with a caesura in the tragedy). The tragic moment, however, develops over the course of the heroic character’s striving for its fate, which is his death in the synthetic work of art (end of path). Hence the reversal of the tragic articulates in the epicycloid course, where the projection of the knowledge of the hero’s fate (the straight vertical line from the peak of the cycloid course to the linear course) is both the end and the beginning of the epicycloid course but not the death of the heroic character (which would be the end of the path) in the synthetic work of art. This synthetic work of art is the Umwelt of the heroic character. In other words, in this methodological approach, the triad of faculties of the soul is replaced by an open dynamic of relations of opposing between basic tone and appearance (character), between individual (in the human world or in the world of the synthetic work of art), its respectively related Umweltten and its collective philosophical and poetic Geist. In the sacrifice of the heroic character, with which the audience identifies, the tragic moment emerges and completes the work of art in the unity of experience, as the audience Umwelt opens up in the work of art. Yet this tragic moment is only able to be experienced if beautiful (in the Hölderlin sense), if the dynamic form of the tragic moment is attuned in the rhythmic articulation of the complete work of art. Hence the tragic moment cannot be reduced to a point of time or space within human life or the life of the heroic character. 149 Rather it articulates between the two infinitive extremes of the experience: (1) The utmost distance (as surface or projection) in the image of the eccentric path, where/when the human individual is separated from the work of art.

149 It certainly cannot be equated with the caesura, which is understood within Hölderlin as a reversal that relates to the whole of the synthetic work of art and the synthetic attunement of the individual human.
art and the spatiotemporal dimensionality of the encounter is subjective and abstract. This would be the case in Kant’s judgement of taste and relates to the cycloid course; (2) the least (or no) distance in the image of the eccentric path, where the human is integral part of the work of art. We are overwhelmed by the tragedy, lose our limits as individual subjects and are wrapped up in the work of art, which becomes our Umwelt. We live in the tragedy, the spatiotemporal dimensions of which are objective, but artificial. This refers to the linear course. However, highest distance (1) and minimum distance (2) can only articulate in an opposing relation of the courses. This opposing relation reverses in the projection of the peak of the cycloid course – which is for example the knowledge of the death of hero (the heroic character of the work of art) - and is re-presented by the epicycloid course. According to Hölderlin, here the “furious excess” of the human Geist is corresponded with an external power (the synthetic work of art) in a reversal movement, all penetrating the same limits of individual character, natural (us) or artistic (heroic character), and ‘deviating’ them to the unity of experience of the tragic moment. In other words, it is an experience of actuality, a metaphor of intellectual intuition, which articulates the dynamic form of tragic moment in the spatiotemporal dimensionality of the encounter, which Hölderlin re-presents here in a sketch of the eccentric path. Consequently, Hölderlin attempts not to reveal a pure form of tragedy or of pure reason, but to articulate the limits of the emerging actuality. Hölderlin repeatedly articulates and reflects on this dynamic form of his own approach and in particular refers to it in his “Remarks” following his Sophocles translations (1974a: 265,272).
In the following we address the Sophocles translations of Hölderlin, and in particular *Oedipus the King*, as a reference for aesthetic reflection of tragic moments in the *encounter* with the urban field. This immediately raises the problem of translations with respect to intelligibility but also historical and cultural transformations of meanings. In this specific case, the problem is complicated by the fact we are engaging with a translation by Hölderlin (*Oedipus der Tyrann*), rather than the original text by Sophocles (*Oidipous tyrannos*). This complex relation between Greek (language and culture) in the fifth century B.C., the German translation in the end of eighteen century, and its English translation and discussion in the beginning of twenty-first century starts already with the title. A translation into English as *tyrant* or into German as *Tyrann* comes with an obvious pejorative connotation, yet the Greek meaning is more prosaic in this sense (Nisetich 2017). A translation into English as *King*, in turn, cannot render the differentiation of the Greek *tyrannos* and *basileus* (a king by birth), which is crucial for the dramatic successions in the tragedy (Knox 1954). The interest of the following discussion, however, lies not so much in the details of translation – important though they are – but in relating the poetological aspects that were outlined before and which Hölderlin comments on in his “Remarks”. *Oedipus the King* presents the fundamental situation of human beings, one of an ambiguous fate between the extremes of individual and universal that tragically unfolds through the constellation of others in our *Umwelt* relation. The narrative begins with the eponymous heroic character, who had delivered the city of Thebes from a major crisis. Oedipus had correctly answered the Sphinx’s questions, which led to him being proclaimed the new King (*tyrannos*) (Hölderlin’s *Oedipus der Tyrann, first act* 1974a: 123ff.). The drama, however, begins with Thebes again in crisis and Oedipus consulting the oracle of Apollo, who says: “We have been commanded clearly by Phoebus, the king [basileus] / To drive out the land’s

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150 The most frequently used translation into English as *Oedipus the King* refers to the Latin *Oedipus Rex* (Nisetich 2017).
151 Luchte argues that basic idealic tone of the tragedy could be referred to the manner in which *Oedipus* answers the Sphinx’s question. Mankind as answer to “What has four legs in the morning, two in the afternoon and four legs in the evening?” has been all too idealic and universal, and not enough referred to *Oedipus’* own individual fate (Luchte 2016: 64).
disgrace, which is nourished / By this ground, and not to feed the incurable disease” (Hölderlin 2009: 468). According to Hölderlin, the “intelligibility of the whole [tragedy] principally depends on considering the scene where Oedipus interprets the oracle too infinitely, and is tempted to the nefas” (Hölderlin 2009: 467). Oedipus gives expression to this impiety and outrageousness (nefas), by suspiciously turning the general commandment of the oracle to the particular, by relating it to the murderer of Laius, the previous King (without knowing that Laius was his father and that he himself had killed him). Hence, Oedipus fate arises out of his striving for knowledge as to the identity of the Killer of Laius, which necessary involves him in the quest to know himself, an absolute knowledge that cannot be sated in its universality (Chapman 1992: 190). Where the oracle may only advise in a codified language to “judge strictly” and “maintain good civil order in the state” (Hölderlin 1974a: 197), Oedipus interprets the words too literally and enters into sacrificial logic: he seeks an atonement (Lacoue-Labarthe 2000: 123). In the image of the eccentric path, this describes the cycloid course, the striving for highest cultivation. The peak of the course is composed by the ensuing dialogue with Tiresias, the caesura of the tragedy. “He [Tiresias] steps into the path of fate as the guardian of the natural power which tragically removes man from his orbit of life, the very mid-point of his inner life, to another world, and tears him off into the eccentric orbit of the dead” (Hölderlin 2009: 467). In the image of the eccentric path this describes the vertical line that connects the peak of the cycloid course with the point where the epicycloid and the straight line-of-action coincide - the beginning and the end of the tragic hero. Here the knowledge has broken through its limits - and the limits of the subjective spatiotemporal dimensions - and proceeds in an angry curiosity “as if intoxicated in its own magnificent and harmonious form, which can yet remain, at first, provokes itself to know more than it can bear or grasp” (Hölderlin 2009: 469). The subsequent narrative of the tragedy presents itself as a form of catharsis or long serving of a self-imposed fate, first through Oedipus' “almost shameless attempt to gain control of himself, his foolishly wild search for consciousness”, then as “unter Undenkbarem wandelnd” (“wandering and transforming under / beneath /
in the midst of / during the unthinkable") (Hölderlin 1974a: 266 / own translations / see also Lacoue-Labarthe 2000: 124). After Tiresias has spoken, no return to the prior state of affairs is possible and the tragic form develops in a counter rhythm, revealing the different constellations of others in Oedipus’ altering Umwelt relations of his lifetime, that fit in no universal judgement but cannot be blamed on the individual subject either. This dynamic reflects Hölderlin’s diametrical approach that does not come to a stand on either side. Hence it would be a misinterpretation to draw any conclusion on a relation of oppositing through the negation of universality or the particular individual, or through accepting their opposition. Even if, upon reflection of the tragedy, Hölderlin explicitly encourages us to approach from the too infinite interpretation of the oracle by Oedipus (Hölderlin 2009: 467), in the synthetic work of art this idealic beginning is re-presented only in the antagonism of the parts in their determinacy. In our encounter with the work of art, however, the unity of experience articulates as dynamic form in the emergence of the actual tragic phenomenon (Courtine 2000: 68). Hence the tragic phenomenon for Hölderlin lies in the individual drive of reason, in the metaphysical desire as such that no individual can bear. For Lacoue-Labarthe (1998: 17), this is the tragedy of the Western world (the occidental) understanding its nature as philosophical. And, if we follow the possible meaning of Oedipus deriving from oida “I saw” or “I know”, then Oedipus is the character of knowledge and possibly the hero of metaphysics with tragedy as the example of ontological dialectic. In comparison, Hölderlin’s Oedipus does not content himself with subject-object dialectic but is part of a rhythmic articulation. Its character relates to the basic tone, and the tragedy of the character relates to the metaphor of the whole tragedy Oedipus the King. In this sense Hölderlin’s Oedipus might be a metaphysical hero but not the hero of

153 In altering dialogues between Oedipus, his uncle Kreon, his wife and mother Jokasta, a messenger, a servant and the chorus, step by step the actualities of Oedipus’ character unveil (Hölderlin 1974a: 201). In view of his prophecy as patricide abandoned by his parents, Jokasta and Laius, then found and adopted by the royal family of Corinthis, from where he flew when learning about his prophecy. On the way he killed another coachman, his father Laius, in a banal argument and arrived in Thebes. There he liberated the city from the sphinx, married and had children with Jokasta, his mother (Hölderlin’s Oedipus der Tyrann, third to fifth act 1974a: 145-193).

154 The secondary literature on Hölderlin is full of these oppositing interpretations. Even some of those referenced authors here tend to seek the reason for the tragic in the universal (for example Luchte 2016: 64ff) or particular (Schadewaldt 1952: 15) judgment of Oedipus. The tragic, however, lies precisely in their opposing relation.
metaphysics, of which he is simply the victim (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998: 18). Hölderlin’s Oedipus is guilty. He is guilty of universal judgment, of over-knowledge and individual fleeing, reducing the world to an opposing of these extremes and forgetting about the constellation of others in the Umwelt-relations of actuality. In other words, Oedipus cannot know the ambiguity of actual phenomena but he is nevertheless responsible for participating in the articulation of its dynamic forms - his moral in Hölderlin’s sense – and guilty of fleeing into pure judgment in his striving for absolute knowledge. As Hölderlin puts it: “King Oedipus may have an eye too many” (Hölderlin 1984: 249, Hölderlin 1970: 373).

In this interpretation of Oedipus the King resonates Hölderlin’s condemnation of tyranny, a word that had acquired a dramatic connotation during the French revolution. It is therefore significant that Hölderlin kept the word in the title of the tragedy – Oedipus der Tyrann (Lacoue-Labarthe 1998: 64). Yet rather than providing a pure criticism or scepticism, Hölderlin offers an aesthetic answer that challenges the limits of critical philosophy through the elaboration of a calculable law in the rhythmic articulation of poetic tragedy. For Hölderlin, the actuality of the tragic moment is a metaphor of an intellectual intuition insofar as it demonstrates the problems which are inherent in any attempt to establish an autonomy of the subject through reflective thought (Chapman 1992: 185). Hence, theoretical primordial judgments are part of the rhythmic articulation in the encounter with tragedy (the tragedy of the human), which unfolds in its totality of the moment only in spatiotemporal dimensions, in re-presenting itself at the price of a victim, the tragic character, offered in sacrifice to the fate of space and time. In other words, the ambiguity of the actual phenomenon articulates not simply in the spatiotemporal dimensions of an individual subject but in the encounter with the spatiotemporal dimensionality of a synthetic work of art. Thus any actual re-

155 According to Merleau-Ponty’s approach, to which we refer again in chapters (11) and (13), “there has always been a cult of the hero. However, insofar as a civilisation believes that beyond this world lies another eternal world where good wins out over evil, the great man does not stand by himself but is the agent of providence” (Merleau-Ponty 1964b:182). Yet the actual phenomenon emerges in the encounter of a Hegelian hero, “the slave who has chosen life and who works to transform the world in such a way that in the end there is no more room for a master” (Merleau-Ponty 1964b:184) – but with it as well “no longer any external support for heroic action” -, and the Nietzschean hero, the superman “beyond everything that has been or is to be done” (Merleau-Ponty 1964b:183), yet whose heroic power would cease if superman overcame its most powerful opponent: death.
presentation of poetry includes dimensional negativity, which stems from the poetic Geist of its production, its synthetic objectivation and its translation by the audience. While the synthetic work of poetry in this way could be described as a sequence of re-presentations, which is human time, its actual re-presentation is a participation in the emergence of a phenomenon, which includes tragic time. Consequently, the tragic moment, the metaphor of an intellectual intuition, must be a mediation of different levels of time, and more precisely, a mediation between finite and infinite spatiotemporal dimensionality, as continuity and discontinuity cannot be two discrete individual points in a sequence or straight line. In Hölderlin’s poetic logic of tragedy, this ambiguous relationship articulates as equilibrium of the parts. “Hence the rhythmic succession of presentations wherein the tragic transport re-presents itself demands a counter-rhythmic interruption, a pure word, that which in metrics is called a caesura, in order to encounter the torrential alternation of presentations, at its summum [peak of the cycloid course], so that then not the alternation of the presentations but the presentation itself appears” (Hölderlin 1974a: 196 / own translation TR19). This challenges the assumption that there is anything behind presentation and hence the terminology of truth and falsity of re-presentation that participates as alteration of presentation in the rhythmic articulation. The equilibrium of the parts is established through a shift of the caesura, according to the eccentric rapidity of the narrative (the brachistochrone courses), either towards the beginning or towards the end of the narrative. This is Hölderlin’s calculable law of tragic poetry. In Oedipus the King the appearance of Tiresias, the caesura, which reverses fate and actuality in rhythmic articulation, lies more from the beginning of the tragic drama, shielding the first parts which otherwise would tend to be torn along by the counter rhythm of the second part (Hölderlin 1974a: 196). Therefore, the caesura does not fall in the middle of the tragedy which is at no point on a straight line, but it is a reversal that relates different opposing relations on both sides, the human and the work of art, philosophy and poetry. The tragic moment is not the death of the heroic character but the rhythmic articulation of the

156 While in poetic metre caesura is an interruption in a line of verse – most importantly in the classical hexameter – creating a break or disturbance (Chapman 1992:176), for Hölderlin the caesura refers not only to the structure of the synthetic work of art but to the rhythmic articulation of the dynamic form of art in the encounter with philosophy.
dynamic form of the complete work of art in which we appear on the scene, in which we participate. Our Umwelt relations in this unity of experience of the tragic moment “pair” the Umwelt relations of the heroic character, Oedipus himself, who is exiled from his heroic Umwelt in the same dynamic.\textsuperscript{157} For Hölderlin, “the representation of the tragic rests eminently upon this, that the Ungeheure how god [the infinite] and human [the finite] pair themselves, and the limitless power of nature and what is most intimately human becomes one in wrath, thereby grasping itself [making itself tangible] through a limitless becoming one with itself that purifies through a limitless division of itself” (Hölderlin 1974a: 201/ own translation\textsuperscript{TR20}). The unity of tragic experience is a dynamic form that is neither composed by the objective spatiotemporal dimensions of the tragedy, its beginning or end, nor by the subjective spatiotemporal dimensions of the human, its actuality and fate. Rather the experience opens up against the caesura, from both sides. The caesura becomes the horizon of our world in the tragic moment, the limit of the metaphor of intellectual intuition.

The actual space and time of the unity of experience rhythmically articulates in the encounter with the synthetic work of art, between the extremes of watching the tragedy and being in the tragedy, between beautiful and sublime judgment, between the distance of abstract space and time and the overwhelming intimacy of no space and time, between finite human and infinite tragedy. Hence the tragic moment is unfaithful to both extremes: “[finite] man forgets himself because he is wholly in the moment; the [infinite] god, because he is nothing but time; and both are unfaithful, time, because, in such moments, it reverses categorically and beginning and end simply cannot rhyme; man, because in such moments he must follow this categorical reversal and therefore simply cannot be in the following what he was at the beginning (Hölderlin 1974: 271 / own

\textsuperscript{157} According to Hölderlin, this is the main difference between the ancient Greek tragedy, which regards the death of the body of the individual character, and the modern hesperic tragedy, which regards the death through its separation of the collective Geist. He writes: “And so, the deadly-factual, the actual murder through words, is to be considered more as particularly Greek art form and so as one now subordinated to an Hesperian art form. An Hesperian one, as may well be demonstrated, may be more a killing-factual, than a deadly-factual word; it would not actually end with murder or death, because this is where the tragic must be made tangible, but end more in the manner of the Oedipus at Colonus, so that the word from an enthusing mouth is terrible, and kills, but not in a Greek, tangible way, with an athletic and plastic Geist, where the word seizes the body, so that the latter kills” (Hölderlin 1974a: 270 / own translation).
Its weakness is not historical or cultural but the condition for history and culture (Hölderlin 1961: 274). And the rhythmic articulation of tragic moment is an aesthetic reflection of this condition for history and culture in the *encounter* between philosophy and poetry.

***AESTHETIC REFLECTION OF URBAN TRAGIC MOMENTS?***

Can Hölderlin’s aesthetic reflection of tragic moments in the *encounter* with poetry be applicable to aesthetic reflection of tragic moments in the *encounter* with the urban field? Can the city be considered a relative of poetry and what would be a work of art we *encounter* in the urban? If the *encounter* with works of art of poetry and music rhythmically articulates *dynamic forms*, what about paintings, sculptures, colours, perspectives, modulations, sketches, plans, streets, houses or neighbourhoods? In other words, what would be the urban genres, characters, tones or tendencies? Is the architect the urban poet? And is there an urban *Geist*?

There are many urban everyday references in Hölderlin’s poems and writings but there are only very few direct links between poetry as a work of art and architecture or the city. In his essay on the “History of Fine Arts among the Greeks” (1961) and with reference to the tyrant Peisistratos, Hölderlin compares the temples, schools and fountains of Athens with didactic poems that formed a moral order in the city (1961: 198). But if we consider an architectural building as poetic character, or as tragic character like Oedipus, what would be the urban tragedy, and who writes it, who reads it, and who performs it? These questions become all the more complex when considering Hölderlin’s *dynamic* understanding of synthetic works of art as rhythmic sequences of presentations, which no observation of the state of the art of an urban environment could render. In other words, how can the death and hence the absence of a building be a tragedy, if we do not even know about its former presence?

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In the following, we discuss aspects of these possible analogies put into question referring to a staging and performing of an urban tragedy in a work of art by the German artist Mirko Mielke. The theme of this work of art was the demolition of the last remaining typical prefabricated building (*Plattenbau*) from former East Germany (GDR) in the new government district of re-united Germany in Berlin in 2005.\(^{159}\) Being an ordinary variant of its type that had been built thousand-fold all-over East Germany, only its key strategic position in the urban context gave it its heroic character as contemporary witness of recent German history. But it was exactly this prominent site at the east end of the “Bond of Federal Germany” (“Band des Bundes”) – the name of the urban design for the new government buildings connecting East and West Berlin over the river Spree -, which finally was the *Plattenbau’s* undoing.

\(^{159}\) Being a good friend of the artist Mirko Mielke, I had the chance to accompany his art performance in all steps. The insights given here are the reflection of these observations I made during long talks with the artist.
‘Camera obscura’ / Plattenbau Luisenstrasse Berlin / Mirko Mielke 2005

Figure 3.02 / Building’s perspective

Figure 3.03 / Building’s retina

Figure 3.04 / process of unbuilding

Figure 3.05 / exhibited Umwelt
By analogy with Hölderlin’s “Remarks on Oedipus”, the caesura of this urban tragedy (the loss of a witness German history from the urban context in central Berlin) is regarded here as the appearance of the artist Mielke. With his art performances he steps into the path of fate as the guardian of the strategic position, which removed the house from its urban Umwelt, the very mid-point of its cultural and historical relevance, and tore it off into the eccentric orbit of the annihilation (death) of a recent history (see Hölderlin 1974a: 197). Just before its demolition Mielke transformed the house into a “camera obscura” projecting and fixing a last glimpse of some of its visual surroundings on the “retina” of the house - an interior wall of the building (see figure 3.02 and 3.03). This piece of inner wall with the photo of the view of the building was saved and exhibited in different locations across Berlin together with the history of the building and its destruction (see figure 3.04 and 3.05). In this way, through the course of remembrance of the Umwelt relations of the Plattenbau, Mielke articulated the unity of experience of a tragic moment for any Berliner who engaged with his exhibition, re-presenting a counter rhythm to the prior life of the Plattenbau. While building and unbuilding of houses is part of a continuing flow of transformations in the emergence of urban phenomena, in this particular case only the caesura by Mielke’s art performance made the tragedy intelligible in unveiling the invisibility of the houses’ intertwinement with the visible urban environment. With reference to Hölderlin, we might say that the Plattenbau may, like Oedipus, have had an eye too many (see Hölderlin 1970: 373). Compared with Hölderlin’s modern (Hesperian) interpretation of Oedipus the King, this also raises the question, if the tragedy of the Plattenbau may be a more suitable contemporary example of a tragic moment, where the individual is not torn from its Umwelt relations but the Umwelt relations themselves are sacrificed.

According to the encompassing elaborations of the philosopher Henrich on the poem “Andenken”, Hölderlin already presented such an understanding of the city as collective re-presentation of Umwelt relations and directly linked it to his

\[^{160}\text{It should be noted that this demolition of recent history in the heart of Berlin was by and large lost in the shuffle of even more prominent cases like the demolition of the former parliament building of the GDR (Palast der Republik) and, of course, the demolition of the Berlin Wall.}\]

\[^{161}\text{A possible contemporary interpretation of an urban tragic moment will be discussed in the example of the Roman neighbourhood Torre Angela in chapter (15).}\]
dynamic articulation of poetry. The poem “Andenken” is a kind of travelogue of the seaport city of Bordeaux. Henrich discusses the poem and its title in relation to similar terms used by Hölderlin - Angedenken ("remembrance"), Erinnerung ("recollection"), and Gedächtnis ("memory") – and translates Andenken with “course of remembrance”. As was demonstrated with Hölderlin’s image of the eccentric path, this translation attempts to point at an interruption of temporal continuity along with the turning of remembrance toward a new presence (1997: 200-214). Recollection and memory are directed toward something determined in the past, “which we think of as always having been what it is now. By contrast, Andenken appears to be free of any such definiteness” (Henrich 1997: 216). It represents and renews remembrance in a dynamic articulation. The articulation is thereby not entertained by an individual’s pleasure – which only participates – but sets a course of its own and is set going by its weakness in the encounter with what it is directed toward (Henrich 1997: 216). Henrich argues, in a similar vein to our previous elaboration on the eccentric path, that Andenken, “although […] it follows a directed course, it is subordinated to the course it takes” (216). Hölderlin describes the seaport city Bordeaux as a market place, a re-collective presentation of Andenken, which he elaborates on referring to the friends and mariners: “They / Like painters, bring together / What is beautiful of the earth” (Hölderlin in Henrich 1997: 253, 255). The city becomes a painting or poetry. For Hölderlin, however, not only the sea but different eccentric orbits with different rapidities and accelerations participate in the articulation of this urban poetry. Among other ‘things’ he talks about the inert dynamic form of the rivers and the fast changing dynamic forms of the gardens. The re-collective eccentric path of the city is thereby understood like a palimpsest. In the last lines of the poem Hölderlin writes: “But the ocean takes / And gives memory” (Hölderlin in Henrich 1997: 255). Hence there is always a decline of definite memory involved, the scratching of the papyrus, the painting, the poetry, the city, which are integral parts of the new. Understood in this way, Andenken is not a mere repetition, but a participation in the emergence of the phenomenon city. What is lasting is a dynamic articulation of the encounter between re-presentation and presentation,

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162 It should be noted that the only sense of the word Andenken still current among modern German speakers, that of a souvenir from a journey, was only just coming into use in Hölderlin’s day” (Henrich 1997:213).

163 See also chapter (05) 082.
as becoming, declining and reversal. While Mielke’s urban art performance and Hölderlin's urban Andenken are considered here as synthetic works of art, hence as rhythmic sequences of presentations that we encounter, the question remains, if these aesthetic reflections of the urban contain a calculable law already in the perception of the city? And how might a related rhythm techne might be understood?
This employs Hölderlin’s aesthetics to describe *dynamic* articulations in an *encounter* with urban environments as *rhythm techne*.\(^{164}\) In other words, we talk about the description of the logical part of rhythmic articulations in a perceptual *encounter* - and how it participates in this *dynamic* relation.\(^{165}\) In Hölderlin’s terms, this would be the more organic aspect of rhythmic articulation that refers to the logic of reflective thought. In chapter (09) we engaged with the rhythmic articulations of a unity of experience through Hölderlin’s historical and cultural translation of related *rhythm techne* in synthetic works of art in the *encounter* with human individuals. While we argue in this chapter that urban compositions are in their characteristics comparable with Hölderlin’s understanding of synthetic works of art, his articulation though the translation of a poetic tragedy seems to be inapplicable. In contrast to a work of poetry it is incomparably more problematic or impossible to translate, for example, an ancient Greek synthetic neighbourhood into a city of the twenty-first century. The calculable law in the *representation* of poetry is to be found in the *dynamic* relation to the succession of presentations – which in tragedy amounts to a *dynamic* equilibrium. But can this relational *ambiguity* be described in rhythmic perception in relation to the succession of urban presentations? This chapter develops a working definition of *rhythm techne* of everyday perceptual experiences on an *eccentric* path alongside a selection of different historical understandings of rhythm. The variety of ways of dealing with rhythm seems be endless: as structure, regularity, flow, punctuation of flow, symmetry, confinement of movement, pulse, concept, property, practice, method, temporality or relation between metre and meaning. There is rhythm as order of movement in Plato (Michon 2016b); as tool of analysis in Lefebvre (2004); as pattern of writing and language in Meschonnic (2011); as not periodic, but endlessly complex and sensitive to any sort of

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\(^{164}\) In the present work “*techne*” is related to the German word *Geschick* (as used by Hölderlin): a practice that is at the same time determined by the individual and its *Umwelt* (Hölderlin 1961: 275 / see also chapter (09) 176)

\(^{165}\) Following Merleau-Ponty, perceiving in the present work is not applied as representational concept but as a *dynamic* relation of seeing and being seen that always includes invisibility (see chapter 11).
influence, in Manning (2009); as basic structure of music in Cooper and Meyer (1963); as an oscillation constantly linking together moments and milieus - but not being itself the moment or milieu - in Deleuze and Guattari (1987). The following however employs Hölderlin’s understanding of rhythm, articulating dynamic form in encounters with human understanding. A rhythm techne with any ambition to relate to contemporary urban composition needs to refer to and develop through historical and cultural transformations of rhythm, and – Hölderlin’s unique contribution - through the translation of their rhythm techne.

/RHYTHMIC HISTORY OF STATIC AND FLOW

The first systematic theory of rhythm outlined by Aristoxenus in the fourth century BC (1990) defined rhythm as system of durations with a temporal unity (chrónos tópos) as basic measure and a classification in ‘brevì’ and ‘longì’ in a ratio of 1:2. Aristoxenus also coined the term rhythmizomenon to clearly distinguish an arrhythmic matter being structured in a proportional ratio through rhythm from rhythm itself, hence he distinguished form from the shaped. His examples for arrhythmic matters are bodily, acoustic or linguistic movements. Consequently, for Aristoxenus rhythm exists only in relation with a medium (Gibson 2005:88). On this basis, rhythm was understood as a static system of durations until early modern times. In 1650, Descartes was the first to introduce an extended system of rhythmic proportions, which made syncopations and thus in some way unexpected variations from the strict succession of regular classification thinkable. In the same period, the concept of the bar was established as an regular measure leading to a separation of rhythm and metre and thus creating an ambiguous relationship (Gibson 2005:89). This is still close to a present understanding with metre implying regularity and rhythm a ‘deviation’ from it.

In the age of Romanticism, a new concept of rhythm developed emphasizing less formal aspects of rhythm than the unity of nature and individualism through rhythm. The ambiguous relation between metre and rhythm became a stylized ideal for aesthetics and for poetry (Schelling 1966; Novalis 1977). The peak of the debate on the theory of rhythm was reached in the early twentieth century
with the theoretical elaborations on music around Riemann (1922), the
transcendental psychology of Höningswald (1926) and the philosophy of life
around Klages (1934). There is no historically unified theory of rhythm. Rather it
seems that intrinsic difficulties aside, the difference in the approaches to rhythm
reflects different worlds and views of life (Haili 1994:361). At the same time, this
points to the potential of Hölderlin’s rhythm (1960) that, intertwined in a non-
classical ontology, relates those worlds on an eccentric path.166 Here the dynamic
relations of rhythm persistently resurface as ambiguous relations in reflection
upon it, seeming to relate to an ultimate being, yet expressing its articulation
culturally and historically.

In the case studies of the everyday life of the neighbourhoods the term rhythm
referred to the ambiguity between the explicable and the lived: the Roman
rhythm, the neighbourhood rhythm - but also rhythms of work, class, elderly,
young, day, week, centre, or periphery.167 While discussions of rhythm since
Hölderlin addressed predominantly relations in music, dance and biology, the
perpetual constant remained this underlying dynamic and ambiguous relationship
of determined indeterminism, regular change, measured flow or open unity. The
French philosopher and writer Maurice Blanchot describes this phenomenal
ambiguity referring to an example from traditional etymology: “We evoke men of
the sea, brave navigators, frightened and also enchanted, mastering the most
dangerous unknown (that marine infinitude which both buoys and engulfs), by
observing a regular movement, a first legality. Everything comes from the sea for
men of the sea, just as everything comes from the sky for others, who recognize
a given cluster of stars and who designate, in the magic ‘configuration’ of those
points of light, the nascent rhythm which already governs their entire language
and which they speak (write) before naming it” (1986:113). This illustrative
example refers to the derivation of rhuthmos from the verb rein, “to flow”

166 For the debate on the non-classical ontology underlying Hölderlin’s approach see chapter (08)
156ff. In relation to Hölderlin’s eccentric path, “worlds”, “levels” and “courses” are used
interchangeably here (See chapter (8) 155 and chapter (9) 188). “A knowing creature must […]
distinguish different worlds, because knowledge [cognition] is only possible through opposition
[opposing]. For this reason the immediate is, strictly speaking, impossible for mortals, as for
immortals. Strict mediacy, however, is the law” (Hölderlin 2009: 491 […] from original Hölderlin
167 For the research design of empirical ethnographic and semi-structured interviews see chapters
(5) and (16).
The image of periodic repetition in the movement of the waves of the ocean provides the revealing link. As Benveniste has pointed out however, we would usually not associate the movement of waves in the ocean with the verb “to flow”, which we rather associate with the movement of a river with no periodic repetition. In modern times, this ambiguity within the meaning of rhythm is comparable with the understanding of metre as the periodic repetition of different units in text or music and its difference to rhythm, which includes the individual flow in the performance of it. Intrigued by this discrepancy or apparent paradox within the concept of rhythm through the relation to water, Benveniste found that this relation only exists after Plato and Aristoxenus (Benveniste 1974:381). According to Heraclites and Democritus, elements differ through the rhuthmos of the atoms that constitute them and thus rhythm can stand for a dynamic and compositional form. In this line of thought, however, rhuthmos differs from pure or attributed descriptions of form as for example in the Kantian schema. Rhuthmos stands for a changeable, momentary, and distinctive but not permanent and absolute determined form. It is changeable in relation to other moments, thus a distinctive form of succession that rhythm connects to, which creates a repetition as part of rhythm but not an absolute determined repetition. Rhythm is therefore part of form, but form is also part of rhythm. It articulates the being, becoming, and self-production of form. It overcomes the separation of static and dynamic, as in text and performance, through the integration of both, or better through articulating the encounter between them, demanding a different understanding of spatiotemporal dimensionality. This may describe best the difference of the experience of rhythmic articulation mediated by a metaphor in the Hölderlin sense and the transcendental notion of the Kantian schema that is only necessary to bridge the crevice of the pure. In Kant’s words from his “First Critique”: “Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and make possible the application of the former to the later. This mediating presentation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a presentation is the transcendental schema” (Kant 1998 : 272 / italic emphases refer to German original 1966:
This notion of schema relates to Kant’s formulation of aesthetic judgments in his “Third Critique” and emphasizes the difference from Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation of sublime in reaction to it (see chapter (08) 159).

Rhythm does not categorize the world statically, but *dynamically* articulates different forms of participating experiences - which is described here as *dynamic* grouping of parts. According to the psychological studies on rhythm by Bolton (1894) we grasp these experiences in everyday life as unity: a unity that flows and that derives its determined form only in our reflection on it. The rhythmic flow of music is often described with expressions like “feelings of equality”, “sense of order” or “unifying activity of the feelings” (Bolton 1894:146) - thus a unity that seem to provide meaning: some order of everyday life, the determinate combination of indeterminate parts, which suggest that there is somewhere something like an order or aesthetic arrangement. In this sense, rhythm articulates a *dynamic* relation that seems to hold together a unity but cannot be held up. If we want to call it unity at all, it must be an open unity with no beginning and no end, always ready for a different participation. Hence, we talk about a *dynamic form* of a unity not in the figurative sense of a fountain, the form of which remains static (while water constantly flows through it), but like the waves in the ocean, whose form is experienced only in relation to their succession. Following Hölderlin’s calculable law of tragedy (2003b: 239), this dramatic form of waves articulates in reversal relation to a caesura – in relation to the shore or a ship *dynamically* reflecting the waves.

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168 In the present work the German word *Vorstellung* in Kant is translated with “presentation”. See chapter (05) 078.
A WORKING DEFINITION OF RHYTHM TECHNE

The describable result of rhythmic articulation is a composition perceived through an *encounter* in the *phenomenal field*. And as any *encounter* necessarily calls for actual participation, these described results re-present a specific participation in rhythmic articulations. The *Umwelt* relations of these results, however, change historically and culturally, which leads to a different rhythmic articulation, while the only constant remains the *encounter*. Any definition of a *rhythm techne* can therefore only be momentary in their character and should be understood in this way. *We define a rhythm techne* in order to be able to apply an understanding of rhythmic articulation or, in other words, to be able to describe our participation in the *encounter*, in which the actual phenomenon emerges. In this sense we introduce and step by step discuss *rhythm techne* as a

*dynamic* grouping of unaccents around accents on different architectonic levels.

While the distinction of accent and unaccent in rhythmic articulation refers to Hölderlin’s hierarchical description of the relation between basic tone and character, the architectonic levels refer to the involved different relations of *oppositing*. At first, however, the elaborations on rhythm in the early Romantic period illuminate the term ‘grouping’. Contrary to the *schema* of Kant, which is trapped in the pure and ‘a priori’ of the transcendental subject, romantic authors like Novalis, Schlegel, and Schelling developed rhythm as relation of opposition between individualism and nature (Schelling 1966:491ff; Novalis 1977:302ff). In an ‘infinitive reflection’ these oppositions are not neutralized in a synthesis, but are the spine of the movement, which unfolds and enriches, floating ‘in-between’ the antinomies (Fichte 1970:270ff). In Hölderlin’s interpretation this would be an identity relation, hence a relation of *oppositing* of a primordial practical judgement, between the “I” and “Not-I” of Fichte (Hölderlin 1961: 216-217). Then as *dynamic* relation of identity – hence with Schelling (1966) - rhythm would be the vehicle by which we strive to reconcile universality and individuality and at the same time it is the presentation of this reflexive self-reference, which is thought of as one-self in motion. Here Schelling’s theory of self-consciousness is based on a *dynamic* notion of self-subjectivity in the sense of a rhythmical change between
the directions of performance and of reflection. Rhythm articulates the difference in identity and the unity in diversity, with diversity being a greater unity (Schelling 1966:569ff). Thus, following Schelling, rhythm is a subdivision of a greater unity - analysis - combining uniformity with variety as well as diversity again to unity - synthesis. In this sense, ‘grouping’ is not understood as a primarily conscious act or any other primary direction, but as differing degree of direction in actuality. This is where Hölderlin’s critique of Schelling’s philosophy of identity applies, as the differing degree of participation in actuality calls for a hierarchy of participating parts, which is changing. Yet with the change of relation the parts are changing and with it the participating self in motion, which cannot be separated from the encounter of all participating ‘things’. Rather with the participating self in motion a different relation of opposing is involved, which is the primordial theoretical judgment related to being-as-such (Hölderlin 1961: 216-217). And accordingly, the hierarchy of the participants refers to the rhythmic articulations of the ambiguity of the different relations of opposing (related to identity and being-as-such). Following Cooper and Meyer’s work on rhythmic structures of music (1963), in the rhythm techne this hierarchical difference of participants corresponds with the categorisation into unaccents and accents. 169 Then the hierarchical description of rhythm techne as ‘dynamic grouping of unaccents around accents’ reflects the re-presentation of the articulation of different relations of opposing on different levels of rhythm – or in different worlds. In the calculable law of tragedy these worlds merge through an equilibrium of the parts - of unaccent and accent (Hölderlin 1974a: 196).

In this way, Hölderlin’s rhythm of actuality develops a dynamic that denies infinitive convergence with the perfection of an idealistically removed synthesis – which refers to the encounter but does not participate. In Hölderlin’s words, “the unification of subject and object in an absolute is possible aesthetically in

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169 In the works of Hölderlin and Merleau-Ponty “accent” is not a key concept (Hölderlin uses the term only twice in his entire work (1970: 252, 1974a: 284), Merleau-Ponty uses the verb “accentuated” ones in his book “The Visible and the Invisible” (1964a: 317). In accordance with the use in rhythm techne, both relate metric and linguistic accent more to the character than to the basic tone of a rhythmic re-presentation (von Arnim in Hölderlin 1974b: 195, Merleau-Ponty 1995:167), while the accent of a rhythmic articulation stands for a hierarchical description of the relation between basic tone and character (Hölderlin 1974a: 284, Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 317-318).
intellectual intuition. Theoretically, it is possible only through an infinite approximation" (1987: 181). All parts of rhythmic articulation participate in the *encounter* and are therefore never absolutely opposite to each other. If we think of rhythm as varying form, the variety would exterminate the unity; and if we think of rhythm as continuing and unified flow, the unity would exterminate the variety. There is a striving for *oppositing* of our understanding in the act of reasoning (Hölderlin 1999: 282). Hence in the act of reasoning our understanding separates all unity, which is tragedy, determinates all freedom, which is epos, and generalises all particularity, which is lyric (Hof 1956:16; Hölderlin 1999: 283). Hölderlin, however, considers these different genres of poetry and their tones not as discrete, where the finitude of one participant strives for the infinite unity in transition towards the other participants. The parts - accent and unaccent - articulate rhythmically because each of them contains ambiguous tendencies that relate to the different relations of *oppositing*. If reflecting on rhythm, we have to be aware of ‘reflecting’ becoming a participant of the same articulating rhythm. In addition, as reflecting on rhythm always starts from a moment in time, it starts with *re-presentation* of a synthetic result of rhythm, which in reflective thought is a relation of *oppositing*. In the *rhythm techne* this corresponds with *super-positing* results on architectonic levels of rhythm. Thus, the architectonic is understood here as *re-presentation* of reflective thought in the rhythmic articulation. Blanchot thematises this *re-presentation* of reflective thought in reflecting on Hölderlin’s affirmation that “all be rhythm” (von Arnim 2012: 326): “How is this sentence to be understood? ‘All’ does not mean the cosmic in an already ordered totality which would be rhythm’s job to maintain. Rhythm does not belong to the order of nature or language, or even of ‘art’, where it seems to predominate. Rhythm is not the simple alternation of Yes and No, of ‘given – withholding’, of presence – absence or of living – dying, producing – destroying. Rhythm, while it appears regular and seems to govern according to a rule, threatens the rule. For always it exceeds the rule through a reversal whereby, being in play or operation within

170 For full quote see chapter (08) 161.

171 The term “*super-positing*” follows the logic of “*oppositing*”. Hence we talk about the act of positing ‘things’ not in opposition but “above” the *encounter*. This is not to mistake with superimposing things on the *encounter*, as *super-positing* does not refer to a imposed superposition but to the process of the act.

172 For the entire quote see chapter (09)181ff..
measure, it is not measured thereby. The enigma of rhythm – dialectic or non-dialectic, no more the one than the other is other – is the extreme danger. That we should speak in order to make sense of rhythm and to make rhythm – which is not sensible – perceptible and meaningful: such as the mystery which reverses us; we will not free ourselves from it by revering it as sacred” (Blanchot 1986:113).

The quote from Blanchot elaborates on the ambiguous intertwinement of theoretical and practical judgment in rhythm techne and illuminates the fundamental distance of this approach to the urban “Rhythmanalysis” of Henri Lefebvre (2004). According to Lefebvre “everybody senses it [rhythm] in a manner that falls a long way short of knowledge: rhythm enters into the lived; though that does not mean it enters into the known. […] and yet each one of us is this unity of diverse relations [rhythms] whose aspects are subordinated to actions towards the external world” (Lefebvre 2004:77). For Lefebvre, rhythm is centred in the sensible body and structures “eurhythmic” experiences of the world (Lefebvre 2004:20). This leads to an absolute opposition of the for-itself and in-itself as consciousness cannot actively participate in rhythmic articulation but is ‘a priori’ subordinated to action. In addition, Lefebvre describes the “living body” as “polyrhythmic”, thus constituted by a “bundle of different rhythms” (Lefebvre 2004:20/67/81). Following the understanding of Hölderlin, however, rhythm in the present work is not a countable form, but a way of articulating. Any reflection on a rhythmic articulation cannot be reduced to a relation of oppositing but needs to relate the reflection to the self-oppositing (related to being-as-such) and is therefore uncountable. In fact, in the present work, rhythmic articulation is not centred in a sensible body, and is not human centred, but articulates in the encounter of different worlds, which is described in the rhythm techne as eccentric path.173

The eccentric path of rhythmic articulation relates to a succession of presentations, which is not metrically understood as a mere sequence of durational proportions. Instead, the synthetic rhythmic group of presentations in

173 The de-centred phenomenological relation between human, sensible body, and Umwelt is further discussed in chapter (13).
succession relates to hierarchical distribution of participation in the emergence of phenomenon as accents and unaccents. The *ambiguous* relation of the participating part, in turn, can be described in the relation of individual character and *Geist* (Hölderlin), body and *Umwelt* (Merleau-Ponty / see chapter 13), or simply in a figure-ground relation in vision. If we see a figure, we recognise it against the ground. The ‘things’ of the ground (which is a constellation of others) however, do not cease to be there, but become unaccented being grouped around, or in relation to the figure. In this case the figure would be the accent of the rhythmic group and the perceiver (self) would be grouped around it as one of the unaccents. Grouping thus requires a different degree of participation. For analytical reasons the prosodic terms jamb v_, anapest v__, trochee _v, dactyl _vv and amphibrach v_v are regarded here as synthetic rhythmic groups (Cooper and Meyer 1963:6). Then every synthetic rhythmic group contains exactly one accent and at least one unaccent that are mediated in the unity of experience as metaphor - in the example of prosaic terms in the *encounter* of the synthetic work of poetry with the audience. The most well-known experiment regarding the human experience of accents in music is our classification of successive and scientifically identical sounds, for example when listening to a metronome. The experiment shows that we usually group two successive sounds together, classifying them into accent and unaccent (Woodrow 1951:1224ff). *Dynamic* grouping of unaccents around accents in this example could be described as separating out a form of sound after the other form - even if they are the same - and accordingly connecting the second form of sound to the first. From a human centred observation this automatically creates a hierarchy, as one is the first and the other second. However, according to Hölderlin, in the rhythmic articulation there is a reversal in the relation of being and becoming. In fact, we could never experience the first sound as form being separated from the same (second) sound by an abstract ‘in between’ - a mute interval - without the actual presence of the second sound. This simultaneity in experience cannot be articulated through succession but necessarily relates to a different judgment. In the re-*presentation* of rhythmic articulation, this is reflected as an *ambiguous* relation of different relations of *oppositing*. The reflective re-*presentation* of this rhythmic articulation, hence the *rhythm techne*, is proposed as ‘*dynamic* grouping of unaccents around accents on different architectonic levels’.
In the following, we apply our definition of *rhythm techne* in an experimental text on the council housing project Corviale in an attempt to apply Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation to a neighbourhood in the periphery of Rome. In this sense, the neighbourhood is considered a synthetic work of art. The emergence the phenomenon of the neighbourhood is articulated through a *dynamic* grouping of unaccents around accents on different architectonic levels. With a notion of neighbourhood considered as the dwellers most evident ‘passage’ to the public life of the city, in this experiment, we start with a description of Corviale through a somewhat literal translation: a dweller walking from her home through the neighbourhood. Thus we are describing an anthropological everyday experience of an inhabitant of Corviale, which is composed through a collage or blending synopsis of interview extracts and observations collected in the research in 2004. Corviale is one of the mega-structures which was realised in Rome at the end of the 1970’s and built under the urban planning model “urbanity through density” (see chapter (02)042 and (07)137). The 9 storey main building of a length of one kilometre is divided into five parts (see figure 3.07). All floors are made up of two parallel strands of threaded apartments, which are rendered accessible by a central corridor with a thin atrium over the whole length of the building (see figure 3.06). The “homes” are hermetically separated having no window towards the corridor, which is considered here the common area of the neighbourhood. Depending on the individual location and abilities, the inhabitants need between five and fifteen minutes from their home to leave the mega-structure. And this is the way the ‘hypothetical’ inhabitant 741 is pacing off in the following narrative:

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174 For the methodological approach of the interviews see chapter (16) 310ff.
(re-iterated) Figure 3.06 / Corviale – Corridor / Leda Ricchi 2004

(re-iterated) Figure 3.07 / Corviale / Leda Ricchi 2004
The door mechanism closes with a snap. 741 is written in bold numbers next to it. The apartments are numbered in Corviale. 741, that is 7th floor in the 2nd of five sections of the house, of the urban neighbourhood. Corviale is a fragment of a linear city incorporating almost 2,000 apartments for about 8,000 inhabitants. All accessed by one central corridor with a narrow inner atrium. “I am 741” says the inhabitant and looks to the right, down the corridor (Corviale13 2004). The elevators to the left do not work. “From there, where the house begins [pointing to the left towards the first section of Corviale, about 300 meters away] to that strip of light [pointing to the right, where in a distance of about 100 meters some light cuts the corridor sharply incorporated by the dusty air] only one elevator is working for 9 levels” (Corviale13 2004). One elevator for 1500 people. The technical problems afflicting Corviale have always been serious and require costly maintenance. “There are older people or people in a wheelchair who are in a fix” (Corviale8 2004). For 741, it will take about 10 min to leave the house.

Sand crunches between the soles of her worn down white trainers and the endlessly nubby and red linoleum flooring. But this crunching rapidly trails off in the ceaseless corridor. And the red colour fades into the pale grey, dirty concrete. 742 is written at eye level on the concrete wall to the left that accompanies her gaze all the way to its infinity: this undefined black hole of shadow the corridor is pointing to. Behind the number 742, there is probably another little world, another home, maybe similar to 741. But there are no other traces that could confirm this assumption. “To me this seems like a prison” (Corviale11 2004). “A penal institution” (Corviale10 2004). “A jailhouse, a penitentiary, with all its inmates, corridors, and cells, one next to the other. The numeration of the flats seems to be the classical number on the prisoners shirts” (Corviale13 2004). An obsessive serialism composed of recurring elements positioned along accelerated perspectives. Stairs and corridors allude to an infinity always hinting at the condition of the outside, a sculptural outside that evokes feelings of anxiety. “This long and repetitive structure, [with] these infinitive rows of windows, which has been called from the beginning ‘il serpentone’ [the big snake]” (Corviale13 2004). On the left: 743. Again, a little stone crunches under the rolling movement of her trainers. 741 accelerates the tread, drawing a suppositional line in the centre of
the passageway. Same distance to the wall on the left and the balustrade on the right: a one-meter tall concrete wall that is answered by a minatory concrete tooth hanging from above. It determines and accompanies the rectangular shape of the corridor all the way down to the black hole, the end of the corridor. It seems to function like a blinder protecting the passage from any dispensable light or openness. 744 on the left. The arrangement is supported by concrete crossbeams that appear to interrupt the ceiling on a human scale, every two meters. In fact, it only underlines the infinitive bias of the passage in its regularity and repetition. Corviale has been an optimistic idea of a collective neighbourhood through a succession of standardised equality on a human scale. 745, 746, 747. To the left the anonymous wall that is clocked by the repetitive accumulation of numbers announcing separated worlds of individuals. It is mirrored by a clearly defined window between the balustrade and the concrete tooth hanging from above. The window shows the opposite corridors that altogether meet somewhere behind the black hole, somewhere in infinity, somewhere nowhere. Her gaze wanders to the left - 748 - but never loses sight of the elevator somewhere in the black hole. The gaze wanders again to the opposite corridors. They are only partially visible, covered by balustrades and concrete teeth. Their endlessly repetitive play of shadowing details over nine levels blurs into an homogeneous and closed wall. Inside and outside Corviale provides the same appearance. A limiting element located on the margins of the western suburbs, hanging between the permanence of a condition of unbearable isolation and being exposed to an even greater polarization in a segregating communication with the city. “There is no motive for anybody from the centre to come here” (Corviale13 2004). “Here you find kids of the age of 15 that have never seen the Colosseo” (Corviale13 2004). Which is only eight kilometres away. Low professional qualifications, youth unemployment, low educational levels, and an aging population translate into an extremely critical mix that contributes to reinforcing the conditions of isolation. “If you ask my children where I live, they will tell you, I live in Cassetta Mattei. But I live in Corviale” (Corviale12 2004). 749 on the left. Sand crunches on the endlessly red linoleum flooring. Opposite corridors, 750, crossbeams. All leads into the black hole. 751. No neighbours, only numbers. “Old people leave their flat very rarely (Corviale10 2004). “I do not leave my flat” (Corviale7 2004). 754. 755, 756 accompany the gaze all the way to
its destination: this undefined black nothingness the corridor is pointing towards. The crunching sound of her paces rapidly trails off in ceaseless sameness. 759, 760, 761.......... “And if you find an elevator that works, it might happen that you press level 7 and the elevator takes you to level 4” (Corviale10 2004).

/ DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE IN THE DESCRIPTION OF RHYTHMIC RE-PRESENTATIONS

In Hölderlin’s tables of genres, tones and metaphors, this description might be called an epic genre: a naïve character with an underlying heroic tone; a metaphor of the great endeavour to narrate the phenomenon of the Corviale. But the aim here was not to create poetry. In fact, the preceding text is better described as a fragmented accumulation of observations and interviews, something like a short story filled up with descriptive, analytical, and emotional aspects and repetitions. If it has left any unified impression on the side of the reader, this could be probably simple summarised as an embellished description of an ‘anonymous access way’.

But what are the rhythmic groups? What are accents or unaccents? And how do they relate to architectonic levels of the rhythm? Starting from the very beginning of the description, right after the door mechanism closes with a snap, 741 is looking towards the end of the corridor and glimpsing the letters 741 as the view is passing by, the first synthetic rhythmic group that relates to 741 could be considered: the number 741 (unaccent) ~ black hole (accent). And this rhythmic group will repeat almost identically on the way, like a steady metronome: 742 ~ black hole / 743 ~ black hole / 744 ~ black hole / 745 ~ black hole / and so on. Yet also the ceaseless linoleum flooring, the accompanying concrete wall, the fading red colour or the vanishing sound of the steps do not significantly change this repeating rhythmic group. They are nothing more than the similar replacement of one unaccent: linoleum flooring ~ black hole / concrete wall ~ black hole / red ~ black hole / sound ~ black hole / and so on. The prevalent rhythmic group remains almost identical or gets even amplified, when considering the relation to other rhythmic levels, other worlds. This could be for example highly complex field of social visuality and cultural symbols, which are related to
The association of Corviale as prison by the inhabitants through the serial, standardised and anonymous appearance of the corridors amount to / prison ~ black hole / penal institution ~ black hole / or / jailhouse ~ black hole /. Again on another level of the rhythm, this could be referred to the Foucaultian argument that the structure of official buildings - like prisons, schools or factories - is a material manifestation of increasing discipline in modern societies (1979). In the actual walk, all these different levels are obviously intertwined. For example, the opening towards the right, possibly connected with the cultural symbolic of a window, is immediately closed again redirecting the view towards the black hole by a reflecting repetition of the same. Thus, the perception of the corridor of Corviale could be described as a physical manifestation of a metronome with the accent black hole as its recurring sound. While herewith drawing a rather analytical image of the neighbourhood Corviale, we have to take into consideration the change of style in the writing of this last paragraph, at least when referring to Hölderlin's approach to poetry. Although still far from claiming any poetic quality, the dismembering description from an urban researcher perspective brings about tendencies of a lyric genre. It portrays the neighbourhood in an idealised character with a naïve basic tone and meaning. And it leaves us with the sensation that we talk about a standardised, anonymous and vacuous space, which would be the metaphor in the Hölderlin sense.

At this point, we will change again our perspective on the neighbourhood of Corviale. While the first two descriptions have been the viewpoint of a human subject placed in the middle of the world, we want to challenge this viewpoint in perception in a more philosophical reading. Referring to a thorough elaboration from Bryson (1988) on the politics of gaze in Sartre, Lacan and Nishitani, this is a further elaboration on the corridors of Corviale considering the architecture of vision. In other words, we want to challenge a specific set-up, where the self (741) is perceiving its environment directed towards an other. This would be the case, for example, when in a purely functionalist interpretation this other concentrates around the purpose of the access ways (access to what?), which coincides with the intention of the related action of using the access way to arrive

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175 We refer here especially to Foucault's book “Discipline and Punish” (1979).
at the black hole in the end of corridor. Or as an inhabitant described the life in the neighbourhood: “Corviale is like a blinkered horse” (Corviale12 2004). This draws a direct line-of-action moving towards the black hole, while the vision — in this specific interpretation — never leaves the centre of the individual self, at least as long as we consider it being within the objective body in its line-of-action. At the exact moment 741 opens the door and leaves home, the public unfolds before her. It unfolds unchallenged before the absolute centre of subject horizon, and the individual self seems to be “master of its prospects, sovereign surveyor of the scene” (Bryson 1988:88). In the moment of turning the view towards the intended aim of the walk, the black hole in the end of the corridor, the visuality of the self, changes dramatically in Corviale. Whereas before all perspectival lines have vanished away from the individual self, opening the world for it, now all lines seem to get concentrated in the vanishing point and merge with the intention of the individual. The end of the corridor “becomes a kind of drain which sucks in all former plenitude, a black hole pulling the scene away from the watcher’s self into an engulfing void” (Bryson 1988:89). The internal architecture of the corridor amplifies this movement of visuality, where every single line of flight across the apartment numbers, the floor, the concrete wall, the balustrade or the concrete tooth hanging from above, are travelling towards the black hole, which becomes the new sovereign spectator of the scene. Viewpoint and vanishing point converge in the fate of the scene, the end of the line-of-action, this “drain or black hole of otherness” (Bryson 1988:90). There is a reversal in the narrative, the black hole amounts to an insurmountable fate (for the perceiver), which looks back on the perceiver. In other words, the neighbourhood that unfolds between the individual self and the constellation of others, the neighbour and its ‘hood’, this physical, social and cultural plenitude of relations, is caught up in all the repetitive metric of the corridor and is reduced to a straight line-of-action. In this radical interpretation of visuality, however, the individual self now becomes replaceable by any other number or prisoner (741, 742, 743 …), as object of the anonymous access way. The corridor becomes an architectural manifestation of an absolute dualist thinking between negativity and positivity, the other and the self, which in the end, in the black hole, ceases to be.
In the same way as we have argued for lyric or epic aspects in the first two parts of the description of the Corviale, the third description implies a tragic reversal, at least in relation to visuality. But tragic aspects of a description do not already produce a tragedy, the metaphor of which would be intellectual intuition (Hölderlin 2009: 447). Rather than shifting the limits of critical philosophy, the latter description argues for Corviale as physical manifestation of reflective thought reduced to an idealic and mechanist vision. Our brief engagement with the neighbourhood Corviale thus points to the problems and risks of translating an idealic understanding - a “more” pure relation of opposing - into urban planning, urban politics or urban research.

This is not a new argument but rather a reinforcement of an existing general critique of modern urban design, which we have referred to in the discussion of Maki’s compositional-form in chapter (02) as well as the “Godfather” planning of ‘Ville Radieuse’ for Paris by Le Corbusier in chapter (04) (see figure 1.12). While our first general discussion of Corviale with rhythm techne thus reconfirms and integrates itself in the mainstreams of contemporary debates in urban theory, the potential of the rhythm techne lies precisely in its different approach, which is more penetrating (and in this way also limiting) without reducing the dynamic complexity of different perspectives and relations. The brief glances of different readings of the corridor of Corviale in the encounter with an inhabitant, a rhythmic researcher, and a philosopher of gaze pointed at this potential for a shared understanding of different perspectives and their ambiguous relations. At the same time, we have not only referred to urban dynamic forms of the neighbourhood, but to different textual descriptions of Corviale. These descriptions have tackled first and foremost aspects of physical appearance and some general political and social aspects referring to the debate in chapter (07).

We now take yet another viewpoint in order to points to the potential and necessity to integrate the political, cultural and historical Umwelten of the neighbours themselves into a rhythmic articulation. This is the tragedy of Corviale and its planners, Mario Fiorentino and his team (Secchi 2009: 526). Analogous to the structure of Oedipus the King, the tragedy would start with the heroic character of the plan of Corviale, a claimed solution for better collective living
conditions, all in one linear mega-structure. This plan was based on social tendencies present in the climate of social turmoil in the end of the 1960s in Rome, when the trade union movement had put the question of better housing conditions for the poorer segments of the population to the centre of its demands (Rossi 2009: 84). The caesura of the tragedy would be the implementation of the national social housing Program PEEP (see chapter (07) 135). In Hölderlin’s words, the intelligibility of the whole tragedy principally depends on considering the point where the architects interpret the aspiration to better living conditions too infinitely, and hence Corviale is tempted to the nefas. But it would be naive to conclude at this point that idealistic solutions are bad solutions. Rather the tragic unfolds in the reversal, a step by step understanding of a changing Geist of Corviale, hence different constellations of others and different collective rhythmic grouping. To name just a few: the retrenchment of social services due to financial cuts, the changing municipal occupancy policies and a radical chance of the social and political climate in more than a decade from the plan to its inauguration. The architect Roman Rossi argues that “Corviale is, in fact, a residential model planned in a time when it seemed possible to develop the social relationships between people to the extreme. [...] It] was realised on the basis of a shared, not an imposed, programme […], raising high hopes” (2009: 91). Additionally, the first inhabitants of Corviale were not only members of a profoundly changed society (see chapter (07) 138), but were themselves segregated victims of the modernisation process of the centre of Rome and deported in estrangement and exile from the city. The one mega-structure was no longer for all people in any tangible sense but was severed from its Umwelt, and set up as “mon-archy” (Luchte 2016: 61). In this reading, tragedy is an expression of Umwelt discordance, culturally and historically. Yet, the discussion also undoubtedly illuminates that any attempt to further understand the tragedy of Corviale, if it is an urban tragedy, necessarily calls for a study of the historical development of the Umwelt relations of its neighbours, before and after moving to Corviale.

\footnote{176 This outline refers in the wording in Hölderlin’s “Remarks on Oedipus” (2009: 447-450).}
At this point, we can only claim that the free idealic treatment of the planners became an “empty manner” in Hölderlin’s terms, and its re-presentation in the city a “vanity”. Further empirical research is needed to understand Corviale’s everyday actuality, trapped in its distant and anonymous feeling and articulated between the naive segregation of its physical construction and its heroic basic tone as living machine. The beautiful intimacy of the neighbourhood, the relation between the neighbour and the hood, was turned into an monstrous site, in which the collective of the neighbourhood no longer holds (in its own right) supremacy over those fleeting heroes it is pregnant with and which atrophy in its universal aspiration (Luchte 2016: 61).

This first brief discussion of rhythm techne in different descriptions of urban dynamic forms has unveiled potentials and opened questions about rhythm techne as an approach to urban perception: (1) The descriptions of rhythmic representations have shown the potential to redraw dynamic forms in the emergence of actual urban phenomena in a shared aesthetic reflection of different research perspectives (for example architectural and philosophical). This has been experimented through a repeating articulation of perspectives, inadequately recognised as oppositions, in the description of Corviale, while continually disarticulating their identities. (2) The eccentric path of rhythmic representation challenges the uni- and bilateral understanding of our perceptual visions. Hence, applying Hölderlin’s aesthetic reflection, this calls not only for urban but also for visual analogies of poetic genres, characters, tones and tendencies. (3) Any aesthetic reflection following a rhythmic articulation challenges first and foremost our faith in seeing the ‘things’ themselves, or better an understanding of appearances as the phenomena of things-in-themselves in opposition to ourselves. As we cannot go beyond the relation of opposing in reflective thought, aesthetic reflection must be understood as a rhythmic articulation in on an eccentric path of different opposing, as only this relation of opposing can repeat itself on different levels – or worlds - and in such a way trace itself.
Part IV perceives the emergence of urban phenomena in an invisible ‘deviation’ from seeing and being seen. At first, on the basis of an abstract figure, this ambiguous relation of a dynamic articulation is elaborated in a perceptual encounter and is discussed in relation to Hölderlin’s rhythmic articulation (chapter 11). This is followed by a brief historic reflection on the ambiguity in spatiotemporal dimensions in chapter (12). Finally, chapter (13) investigates Merleau-Ponty’s notions of Umwelt and constellation of others, which de-centres dimensionality from the ‘thing’ and moves it to the participation in encounters in the phenomenal field.\(^{177}\)

\(^{177}\) To ensure better readability, the content structure of each of the six parts of the thesis is repeated at its beginning (see chapter (01) 018).
“We see the things themselves, the world is what we see: formulae of this kind express a faith common to the natural man and the philosopher — the moment he opens his eyes; they refer to a deep-seated set of mute ‘opinions’ implicated in our lives. But what is strange about this faith is that if we seek to articulate it into theses or statements, if we ask ourselves what is this ‘we’, what seeing is, and what thing or world is, we enter into a labyrinth of difficulties and contradictions” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 1 / italic emphases in original). These are the opening words to Merleau-Ponty’s last and unfinished book “The Visible and the Invisible” (1968a), published after his death in 1960. 178 “We see the things themselves, the world is what we see” is grasped here as a sense of unreflected faith, but not as antinomy to reflected truth, which would imply that in general every perception lags behind its object (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 156). The notion of faith, as Merleau-Ponty notes, “is not faith in the sense of decision, but in the sense of what is before any position” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 1). However, this should not be misunderstood as a relation of identity between consciousness and memory, as then memory would be defined not only by “the remembered, but also by the outside, by the non-existence of an adequate object in the world in itself at that very moment. [Such a theory] therefore presupposes about us this world in itself; between this world and ourselves it presupposes relations of simultaneity and of succession that enclose us in the same objective time with this world” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 157). Thus, it is not a faith in a relation to being, becoming, or identification, but in a dynamic articulation of all these relations. It is a faith in the dynamic articulation of the encounter with/between ‘things’, hence not a faith in a self-sufficient being, in the participation in perception. Although Merleau-Ponty does not refer to Hölderlin directly in this context, his phenomenological approach to perception develops in a similar way, on an eccentric path to classical ontologies (see chapter (08) 156ff.). The “correlation between thought and the object of thought set up as a principle, [...] I am forever subjected to the centrifugal movement that makes an object of thought be for a thought”. There is

178 “Le Visible et l’invisible” was first published in French in 1964 by La Librairie Gallimard (1964a).
no question of thinking “what Being can indeed be before it be thought by me or (what amounts to the same thing) by another, what indeed can be the intermundane space (l’intermonde) where our gazes cross and our perceptions overlap: there is no brute world, there is only an elaborated world; there is no intermundane space, there is only a signification ‘world’” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 48). Merleau-Ponty names “brute being” and “equivalent” what Hölderlin describes as “being-as-such” and “identity”, and both philosophical approaches elaborate on the complexity of the dynamic articulation that relates the two. This ambiguous relation between “being-as-such” and “identity” is always negatively present, and cannot be explained by the faculty of judgment or intellectual reflection.¹⁷⁹ Merleau-Ponty refers in this context to a relation of pregnancy, hence carrying creativity, production and expression (1968a: 250). “Pregnancy is not an object, it is the form that has arrived at itself, that is itself […] identity in depth (dynamic identity)” (1968a: 208). The relation of pregnancy carries “Weltmöglichkeit (the possible worlds variants of this world, the world beneath the singular and the plural)” (1968a:250). While Merleau-Ponty develops this approach primarily referring to the terms used by Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, such as being and nothingness, in-itself and for-itself, or Urpräsentierbar (possible to be primordially presented), in his elaborations on an ontology of nature he also refers to Fichte, Schelling and Kant: “What we have here is ‘intellectual intuition’, which is not an occult faculty, but perception as it is before it has been reduced to ideas; it is perception dormant within itself, in which all things are me because I am not yet the reflecting subject” (Merleau-Ponty 1988: 143). What Hölderlin attempts to articulate in the dynamic relations of eccentric path, Merleau-Ponty understands as perception. It is this approach to perception that we will engage with in this and the following chapters; and it is the faith in perception, “common to the natural man and the philosopher”, that immerses us into the everyday life of neighbourhoods in the periphery of Rome.

Throughout Merleau-Ponty’s life, we can trace a persistent engagement with perception and, through the deeper study of its dynamic articulation, the necessity of escaping the heritage of classical ontologies – for example dualisms

¹⁷⁹ For “brute being” and “equivalent” see Merleau-Ponty (1968a: 57, 211-218, 222-223) / For “being-as-such” and “identity” Hölderlin (2009: 361-362).
or deterministic causality - as well as the bifurcations of modern philosophy - for example, nature and freedom, body and consciousness, mind and spirit or infinite and finite (Hamrick and Van der Veken 2011: 233). He challenges the unbridgeable split between objects and what we perceive, which he calls “the ontology of the object” or “objective thought” in all its forms, that excludes humans from being active participants in the emergence of actual phenomena and reduces us to onlookers disconnected from them (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 17-23).  

Merleau-Ponty’s late works are informed, as he himself notes, by the dynamic relations of “wild or brute being that intervene at all levels to overcome the problems of the classical ontology (mechanism, finalism, in every case: artificialism)” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 211). In this sense, the aim of Merleau-Ponty’s late work is not to justify a new ontology, but to take up again, to deepen, and to rectify the description of the perceived of the first two books “within the perspective of a non-classical ontology”, which leads to an understanding of “perception as deviation” (1968a: 168).  

This de-centred phenomenology should not be mistaken for a static relationship between a centre and a de-centred new “zero point” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 113). De-centring accounts for a dynamic relation deviated from the thought of perceiving as well as from the empirical description of the perceived. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s work remains passionately phenomenological throughout, building on, relating to and dissociating his approach from the phenomenology of Husserl, while his late works demonstrate his ‘deviation’ from the early works of Husserl (1980). More precisely, Merleau-Ponty refuses any radical reflection understood as reduction to transcendental immanence, which would only be the installation of yet another Archimedean point (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 168). “To reduce perception to the

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180 The first version of the ‘unbridgeable split between objects and what we perceive’ is that between nature as apparent and nature as it really exists, originating with Galileo. “Nature is an object standing over against us as subjects, or spectators”. “In that form, what exists in the external world is not what we see, and what we see is not there”. (Hamrick and Van der Veken 2011: 3 and 235 / emphases in original).


183 The French original “perception comme écart” (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 220) is translated in this work as “perception as deviation”.


thought of perceiving, under the pretext that immanence alone is sure, is to take out an insurance against doubt whose premiums are more onerous than the loss for which it is to indemnify us" (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 36). The point of departure for such an engagement can only be actual perception, the “present world which waits at the gates of our life and where we find the means to animate the heritage and, if the occasion arises, to take it up again on our own account” (1968a: 157). In this sense, Merleau-Ponty does not even stop when it comes to criticising the results of his own prior attempts in the books “The Structure of Behaviour” (1963) or “Phenomenology of Perception” (2012) (1968a: 200). Although the intention is the same as in his later works, the impasse of these early attempts is to be found in their point of departure. This is to say, neither behaviour as a bridge between consciousness and object, nor the body as their medium could overcome the initial Cartesian dualism. On the contrary, they arguably even reinforce them. Hence, clutching to these intermediary notions of behaviour and the body, we would also deprive ourselves of the possibility to understand Merleau-Ponty's original approach; which is not a mediation of a binary immediacy but a notion of ‘deviation’ in the phenomenal field (1968a: 168). In his own words, “it would be to subordinate [...] what there might be that is fluid to what there might be that is fixed in our experience, to subject it to conditions that perhaps are the conditions not of every possible experience but only of an experience already put into words, and it would be in the end to shut ourselves up in an immanent exploration of the significations of words” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 159). If we name the ‘things’ encountering each other, these words have to be taken “as simple indexes of a meaning to be specified. The encounter is indubitable, since without it we would ask no question” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 159).

In the wake of Merleau-Ponty, the points of departure for this rhythmic research on urban neighbourhoods within the periphery of Rome have been declared

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184 In his notes for the posthumously published book “The Visible and the Invisible” (1968a) Merleau-Ponty refers several times to his first two books: e.g. “But all that— which takes up again, deepens, and rectifies my first two books— must be entirely carried out within the perspective of ontology” (1968a: 168). / “The tacit Cogito does not, of course, solve these problems. In disclosing it as I did in Ph.P. [Phenomenology of Perception]. I did not arrive at a solution” (1968a: 111). / “The problems posed in Ph.P. [Phenomenology of Perception] are insoluble because I start there from the ‘consciousness’-'object' distinction” (1968a:200).
encounters with/between ‘things’. These encounters, however, must not be understood as a meeting or reunion of antinomies like consciousness-world in the Cartesian, or contingency-necessity in the Kantian tradition, but encounters between all participating ‘things’ in the actual emergence of phenomena. This involves a complex relation of being, becoming, and negativity. Merleau-Ponty refers to music, light, and colours in this context (1968a: 217-218). For him, yellow is not an attribute of an object, but always a ‘thing’ in actuality and it depends on the level of participation, that is: if it is a fact, a category, a particular, or a universal. A musical note as a particular describes the relation in a field of other tones, but the same note as universal can describe the key of a musical piece. In this sense, the music metaphor is a particular case of a more general transposition of “the equivalent of the philosophy of Being in indivision” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 218); in Hölderlin’s terms: the identity of being-as-such (see chapter (08) 153). This implies the negative presence of the “universality of the sensible” (the aesthetic “Urpräsentation of what is not Urpräsentierbar”) in perception, which is a dynamic articulation of the relation of “my perspective and that of the other, my past and my present” on various architectonic levels. (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 219). We go “pregnant” not “with a set of principles or laws, but rather a system of levels posited in the sensible field by our body in its primal assuming of position before the tasks of the world” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 51). When we spoke about perceptual faith at the start of this chapter, we spoke about this “confused totality [- before all philosophy -] where all things, the bodies and the minds, are together, and which it [perceptual faith] calls the world” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 63). We find this faith everywhere in the everyday neighbourhoods of cities. Michel de Certeau describes these complex relations of everyday perception in neighbourhoods as relation to an ensemble of details, “insinuated into and concealed within devices whose mode of usage they constitute and thus lack their own ideologies or institutions” (de Certeau 1984: xv). This is an articulation of actuality that literally just seems to happen and sometimes overwhelms us. We get overwhelmed by the atmosphere of a

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185 French (German) original: “Urpräsentation de ce qui n’est pas Nichturpräsentierbar” is in fact difficult to be translated: “The primordial presentation of what is not possible to be primordially presented.”

186 For the understanding of neighbourhood in this work and its relation to de Certeau’s research on everyday life see chapter (5) 079.
situation when falling in love, when absorbed into music or “transported” by (Hölderlin’s) rhythm of poetry.\footnote{In the present work, “situation” is a spatiotemporal metaphor. In Merleau-Ponty’s words: “to be understood as an indivision of being and nothingness” (1968a: 216). While points and lines are mere directions - neither spatial nor temporal -, location and moment are their metaphors that relate to situations, more spatial and less temporal, and vice versa. Hence “a ‘direction’ of thought [...] is not a metaphor. (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 221). This coincides with Hölderlin’s use of metaphor (chapter (09)178).} This is a phenomenon that seems to spring from faith in something that “holds the world together in its inmost folds” (Goethe 1952: 16). For Merleau-Ponty (1968a: 149) these notions of love, light, music, literature or rhythm are all notions without equivalent, hence not thinkable as relations of identity (in the Hölderlin sense), as “no separation can be executed without damaging the essence of that which is to be separated” (Hölderlin 2007: 361). They are the aesthetic “Urpräsentation of what is not Urpräsentierbar”, which we share when participating in the same emergence of phenomenon - even though we do not know how to explain or even recognize them, when we are mere witnesses (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 149 and 218). At the same time, we are generally convinced to know ourselves in those overwhelming moments and to be able to reflect on our individual position in them. But time is not an absolute series of moments or events, and, as such, even those intense moments are not pure immanence but carry negativity. In reflection, “everything is obscure when one has not thought out the negative; everything is clear when one has thought it as negative. For then what is called negation and what is called position appear as accomplices and even in a sort of equivalence” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 64). What we lose here is the dynamic articulation between the faith in totality of the situation and this sort of equivalence with our position, which no dualism, pure reason or representation of any being can re-establish. Merleau-Ponty argues that all these perspectives amount to but one perspective in their ultimate self-sufficiency with no ‘deviation’ from them or between them: for example “the perspective in which Being and Nothingness are absolutely opposed, and the perspective in which Being itself, by definition given as identical with itself, eminently contains a contact with Nothingness.” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 65-66). It is precisely because this “oppositing” (see Hölderlin chapter (08) 153) cannot be resolved in perception that, “when we see being, nothingness is immediately there, and not in the margin like the zone of non-vision around our field of vision,
but over the whole expanse of what we see, as what installs it and disposes it before us as a spectacle" (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 66). Nothing is more foreign to perception therefore than a distinct universe of reflective thought that by means of causal action would produce in us representations (Merleau-Ponty 1963:188). In this sense, “the philosophy of human representation is not false, it is superficial. It assumes a reconciliation of thesis and antithesis for which man is the theatre but not the agent” (Merleau-Ponty 1988: 140).

This relation between theatre and agent shall be discussed here with the example of the dynamic relations in public-private encounters, which in urban or architectural practice are often treated as dualist counterparts. It has been argued in chapter (05) that the emergence of the phenomenon neighbourhood has something to do with a dynamic articulation of the repetitive participation of “private” dweller’s in “public” (Mayol 1998: 11). But where and how do public and private encounter in the Merleau-Pontyian sense? Considering the houses or the flats of the dwellers as private, we could argue that public and private meet at the windows and entrance doors, on the threshold of an open door that perforates the hermetic dualist separation of public-private every once in a while, for some moments. But this reflection is insufficient, as it excludes neighbourly social life in the streets, courtyards, squares or homes of the neighbourhood. Following this line of thought, might not the body of the dweller be the ‘thing’ to consider as private? At first this body in motion, engaging in public, walking through the neighbourhood, meeting other people, and pursuing different activities seems more convincing and would mediate between the public and the private in the neighbourhood. We could not explain, however, what qualifies this body to be the body of a neighbour in the sense of a “near dweller”, as there is no reference to the dwellers’ home, at least not in its architectural aspects. In a Merleau-Pontyian approach, we would not disregard both of the relations described, as they would encounter with each other in the phenomenal field ‘deviated’ from their lines-of-action just described. And maybe a balcony, or the related everyday activity of “balconying”, can best exemplify this notion of ‘deviation’: an encounter that is neither inside (private), nor outside (public). It understands itself always from the other side, but there is a ‘deviation’ from this dualism as well. Being substantially connected to the construction of the private flat, the balcony protrudes into the
public space of the street. In other words, the balcony “posits” the private and “super-posits” the public. We can reflect on the situation of being-on-a-balcony only, however, because we know the position of a balcony from outside and before the described moment, and in this sense from a hypothetically absolute viewpoint, be it from the private home or from the street. The balcony is neither public nor private from its own perspective, that is to say from the balcony, and can be both, public and private, from a perspective from without. It is an ambiguous relation of public and private.

// RHYTHMIC ENCOUNTER OF CLIMBING-A-FAÇADE

With this situation of ‘a balcony attached to a house’ in mind, we now want to climb up to the balcony and look at the public life of the neighbourhood. On the way, up we will sketch out a possible articulation of the perceptual field of a rhythmic encounter as a simple plan, or handy figure. It is evident that in this line of thought the figure is abstract with regard to the urban situations it refers to, as its dimensionality is subtracted and replaced by a black figure drawing on a white paper background\textsuperscript{188}. The figure will be developed step by step alongside the example and based on three different viewpoints of a human perception while climbing the façade up to the balcony. The rhythmic encounter of this situation ‘climbing a façade’ will thus be described as an encounter between different visual perspectives in the situation. On her way up she, the human, proceeds hand over hand towards the balcony, from one firm grip to the next, never letting go of the last before securing the next hold. However, for her to get the hang of the situation or simply to understand the situation, she would have to know about her having a body between the two, the last grip and the next grip.

\textsuperscript{188} The terms “rhythmic encounter” and “encounter” are used interchangeably in the present work: the rhythmic is only used to emphasis the relation to rhythm.
Figure 4.01 / Rhythmic encounter of 'climbing a façade' / Timothy Pape 2016
Whilst the two “grips” define the line-of-action as a series of events, the third perspective, the knowledge of this series from without, triggers a ‘deviation’. The perception of the situation does not coincide with the two ‘grip’ perspectives, but is ‘deviated’ from this line-of-action. Nevertheless, all three perspectives are necessary for perception as she would not be able to reach for the next grip if it were not to follow the one before that and vice versa; this is obvious. But she could not move up the façade without a perspective of this series of events from without, which is her understanding of her body as a moveable object, or in other words, of a view of her body moving up from street level to the balcony. At least it is claimed in this work that without this overview from without the line-of-action, the actuality of the situation would be different. The façade climber could not grasp her own movement towards the balcony from the two perspectives looking back and in front of her. And, in this sense, the balcony could as well move towards her, with her having a fixed body, as if she would pull down the façade like a roller shutter or as if climbing on an equivalent of a treadmill for climbers in a fitness centre.

At this point, we could of course also argue, that the third perspective, the overview, cannot originate from the same actuality, as she is participating and thus cannot see herself in the same moment from without herself. The knowledge of her body as movable object, however, is part of the emerging phenomenon. The perceptual field of the encounter thus has to be understood in relation to all three of these viewpoints (see figure 4.01). This goes for any spatiotemporal viewpoint. Imagining three different temporal viewpoints as three still images of a film, shot with only one camera, better illustrates the rhythmic encounter of her three visual perspectives. One hand securely grabs a handle (before / see figure 4.02), the other hand reaches for another handle, the next handle (after/ see figure 4.03), and, in the third picture, we see her body climbing-the-façade (see figure 4.04). ‘Climbing a façade’ would probably also be the overall description of the situation and thus the way we generally refer to this as past experience. Here we will call this temporal level of the third viewpoint ‘history’, understood as history of the actual situation (see figure 4.05). However, she, the climber, can grasp the dynamic in the emerging phenomenon, which is her moving up the façade only if all three pictures are present for her in actuality. And it is important
to notice at this point that all three temporal viewpoints have different temporal positions with regard to the situation. The first two pictures of the grip are necessary taken one after the other, with the same camera, and thus determine a series. The third picture can be taken at whatever point in time that is temporally determined only to the situation as a whole: It could be taken in the past by herself of any other human being climbing. It could be taken by somebody else while she is climbing. Or it could be taken by herself with the help of an instrument deviating the viewpoint, such as a selfie stick. Thus, the third perspective adds a ‘deviation’ from the line-of-action, represented here as a series of events. The temporal position of this ‘deviation’, however, is indeterminate within the situation. In actuality, the all present perspectives encounter with each other, which is the determined of the situation, at any possible temporal moment in the perceptual field, which is the indeterminate of the situation (see figure 4.05). And in this way the rhythmic articulation of this encounter between visual perspectives has to include determination and indetermination.
Figure 4.02 / last grip / Figure 4.03 / next grip / Figure 4.04 / climber from without / all Timothy Pape 2016
We now move to the spatiality of the different viewpoints. Accordingly, the location of the viewpoints shall be imagined by a hypothetically frozen moment of time, the actual moment of her ‘climbing the façade’.\textsuperscript{189} She sees in front of her a hand reaching for a handle (see figure 4.03), and looking over her shoulder she sees behind her a hand holding on to a handle (see figure 4.02), but she cannot see herself, her objective body moving up the façade (see figure 4.04). Again, this view could be that of somebody else, or it could be us seeing her. It is the objective world perspective related to the situation, a ‘\textit{deviation}’ from the continuity of action, but a necessary part of the emerging, if she, the climber, has the ‘hang of the situation’, which in this case is assumed. The third viewpoint cannot be a pure or absolute viewpoint, as it would not have any connection to actuality. It cannot be, however, any Kantian transcendental viewpoint (1998: 493) either, as no absolute necessity, no pure reason could account for the simple difference of a ‘real’ façade and a ‘real’ climbing treadmill. In the wake of Merleau-Ponty, it is claimed here that the spatial position of the third viewpoint has to be within the situation. The rhythmic \textit{encounter} of the three perspectives is again to be found at any position within the perceptual field (see figure 4.05) determined only by its ‘\textit{deviation}’ from the line-of-action. And, again, in actuality we could implement an instrument placing an oversized mirror at a determined position within the perceptual field. The mirror reflection would now account for the connection to the climber. We could of course also argue for a Cartesian dualism and position the \textit{encounter} of all viewpoints - in the hypothetically frozen moment in time - in the mind of the climber. However, if surroundings - which in this line of thought have been hypothetically reduced to the mirror reflection – move or if the climber is moving, the third viewpoint is also changing and no absolute determinate \textit{encounter} of the three viewpoints is possible when understanding the actuality as an \textit{ensemble}. Instead of an indeterminate \textit{ensemble}, the different possibilities for this rhythmic \textit{encounter}, the indetermination within the determined outline of the perceptual field opens up actuality for different possible results: her reaching the balcony or not, falling down, or simply taking different routes.

\textsuperscript{189} In the present work, “location” and “moment” are spatiotemporal metaphors that relate to situations, one more spatial and less temporal, the other more temporal and less spatial.
Figure 4.05 / Rhythmic encounter of climbing / Timothy Pape 2016
The situation ‘climbing a façade’ is described in the abstract rhythmic figure by the *encounter* of three different perspectives, two of which have their viewpoint in the ‘objectified’ line-of-action while the third viewpoint accounts for a ‘deviation’ of vision from the line-of-action. While this determined composition of the figure stands in for the situation as a whole, graspable as *ensemble* for the climber, the indeterminate possibilities of the *encounter* between all perspectives within the perceptual field open up the actual phenomenon. Thus, actuality is open to different emerging phenomena, which we would describe as possible different *ensembles* open to yet other *encounters*. In other words, a rhythmic *encounter* of perception referred to a human activity is to be found in *dynamic* relation to the before, after and history (of the situation) and to behind, in-front-of, and the world (of the situation) (see figure 4.05). The differentiation and separation of these different viewpoints is due to analytical reasons only and should not be understood as perceptual phenomena. Instead, the different perspectives discussed are part of perception and each part of the perceptual field is interwoven with others. Perceptual field in this context has to be differentiated from a *phenomenal field*, which, according to Merleau-Ponty, is “neither a representation nor a location of representations, but a dimension of our [...] embeddedness in a perceptually coherent environment, a primitive aspect of our openness” (Carman 2005: 51). Whereas the ‘deviation’ in the perceptual field indicates the ambivalent character of different dialectical structures that ends in pure dualism, indetermination as part of the *phenomenal field* indicates the *ambiguity* of phenomena. With Merleau-Ponty, ambivalence is understood here as a form of perceptual rigidity when we maintain two views of the same object or being that are not yet recognised to be the same or solidified into a pure identity of opposites (Landes 2013: 21). As opposed to ambivalence, *ambiguity* involves a de-centring – a more than intellectual operation - referring to different determined views of an *ensemble* that is already recognised as such (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 93). The *ambiguity* of phenomena therefore accounts for the openness onto actuality articulating *dynamic forms* of all participating ‘things’. So, apart from a de-centring of visual phenomena away from the mind and the body, the ‘deviation’ of the rhythmic *encounter* through analytical and perspectival viewpoints in the perceptual field also illuminates a possible understanding of *ambiguity* in the phenomenon.
Time and space, thought as a pair that composes all spatiotemporal dimensions, are a prime example for an elaboration of phenomenal ambiguity, in particular in the urban field. In the following discussion we briefly refer to a selection of different notions of time and space. To begin with, the abstract figure for a rhythmic encounter in the perceptual field shall be discussed in relation to one aspect of Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the transcendental illusion (1998: 384-551). As the rhythmic encounter has no absolute determined position according to the abstract figure, no transcendental illusion can be separated determinately from the rhythmic approach. With Kant, “every transcendental illusion of pure reason rests on dialectical inferences” (Kant 1998: 459) and consequently we would find dialectical inferences in our rhythmic encounter. Here we want to look at one logical species of these dialectical inferences, the cosmological antinomies, and, in particular, at time in the first conflict of transcendental ideas. Accordingly, “the world has a beginning in time” (thesis) and “the world has no beginning [...] with regard to time” (antithesis) (Kant 1998: 471). Kant proves that there cannot be a beginning in time, because within the necessary ‘empty time’ that was there before time nothing can develop, not even time. But there must be a beginning, because there cannot be, at ‘any’ moment of time, ‘infinitely elapsed world series’ of successive syntheses of states of ‘things’. It seems that the transcendental ego is looking from an absolute viewpoint over “the world” as a determined ensemble, outside of which there is no time. Following Kant’s argumentation, the transcendental ego then seems to enter “the world”, taking a perspective from “any given point of time”, in other words a perspective from within “the world”, which necessarily points at the openness of “the world”, that now is called infinity. According to the figure of rhythmic encounter, the separation of the viewpoints would illuminate Kant’s antinomy but could be declared also the reason for it (see figure 4.06). And as the rhythmic approach of this work has started with the claim that the potential of rhythm is precisely its way of articulating opposing relation in actuality, this result of a confrontation of Kant’s antinomies with the figure of rhythmic encounters is self-evident. If we continue to read Kant’s antithesis, however, we find a surprising
reference to a dynamic articulation of ambiguity. “Thus many series of things may begin in the world, but the world itself can not have any beginning, and so in past time it is infinite” (Kant 1998: 471). Kant seems to separate the objects that compose the world, which can have a beginning and thus can develop, from the world itself that cannot have a beginning. If we consider the time of an object in the figure of rhythmic encounter after Kant, the objects composing the world can have a beginning and an end, they can develop, which is guaranteed by the ‘deviation’ from the objects through the determinate ensemble “the world”. In other words, in a rhythmic articulation the conflicting dialectically logical inferences form neither an antinomy nor a synthesis, but develop by adding another viewpoint – which is another level of rhythm. The encounter takes place neither on the ‘island of truth’ nor in the ‘stormy ocean of illusion’ (Kant 1998: 138), nor at any pure or transcendental position; it articulates the ambiguous relations of different participatory viewpoints as dynamic form.
Figure 4.06 / Rhythmic encounter: Kant’s first conflict of transcendental ideas / Timothy Pape
The discussion of Kant’s first antinomy highlights the ambiguity of the intertwining relation of space and time. This ambiguity can be witnessed throughout the history of knowledge, where, due to continuous cultural and historical shifts, the concepts of space and time themselves are subjects of continuous fundamental transformation. If we only consider space, the series of philosophical conceptualization and the accompanying disputes over different positions are not linear but follow reversal processes (Günzel 2005: 89ff.). Especially in phenomenology, deconstruction and discourse analysis, spatial thinking is referred to socio-cultural and historical realities. Whenever we say that one notion of space resembles another, we imply that the latter is somehow ontologically superior to the former. They become secondary realities in relation to the new eternal ideal: a world of “less real” appearances that meets a world of “more real” space. This is not to present a new concept of space, but to articulate the inherent ambiguity of spatiotemporal dimensionality in the emergence of phenomena. Any reference to or discussion of concepts of space must therefore first and foremost trace the articulation of ambiguity within the concepts as necessary characteristic of openness in actuality.

One of the most significant concepts of space today - despite centuries-long contestations – is Newton’s theory of absolute space and time, especially in architecture and urbanism. The absolute space described by Newton is not perceivable by our senses, it is immovable and undivided (Newton 1846: 83). In the framework of his mechanics, Newton claims that a body must be considered as in motion if its movement can be perceived independently of other bodies. Newton defines space and time as infinite receptacles for a finite number of atoms in the void “that constitute material bodies and are either in absolute motion or at absolute rest, governed by the laws of mechanics” (Khamara 2006: ii). Thus “absolute space, in its own nature, without regard to anything external, remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses determine by its position to bodies” (Newton 1846: 77). This understanding of Newton’s absolute space as a container, in which objects, bodies, life, but also relative space and time are movable and changeable, seems to echo Kant’s elaborations in the antitheses of his first antinomy of transcendental ideas. In this line of thought, the
container space of the world, if not understood as absolute, but as a determined ensemble, articulates a ‘deviation’ from itself that makes the movable dimensionality of relative space possible.

In contrast to Newton, for Leibniz “time, extension, motion and the continuum in general, as we understand them in mathematics, are only ideal ‘things’ – that is, they express possibilities, just as do numbers” (Leibniz et al. 1956: 583). The relational theory of space in Leibniz is determined by the relation of coexisting bodies or entities. Accordingly, “space, which we deprive of all activity” (Leibniz 1896: 153), is neither absolute, nor an extension. “In this way [space] is no more a substance than time, and if it has parts, it cannot take any absolute position. It is a relation, an order, not only between existences, but also between possibilities, as they may exist. But its truth and reality, like all eternal truths, is grounded in God.” (Leibniz 1896: 153). Merleau-Ponty is referring to this groundedness of Leibniz’s reality in his book “The Visible and the Invisible”: “The donkey that goes straight to the fodder knows as much about the properties of the straight line as we do; it means that the system of objective relations, the acquired ideas, are themselves caught up in something like a second life and perception, which make the mathematician go straight to entities no one has yet seen, make the operative language and algorithm make use of a second visibility, and make ideas be the other side of language and calculus” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 153). In this line of thought, the rhythmic encounter articulates what is “held in Leibniz by the relation of reciprocal expression of the perspectives taken on the world” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 222). Merleau-Ponty draws especially on the articulation of relation in Leibniz’s claim that “what is particular to one would be public to all” (Leibniz 1896: 145). But instead of Leibniz’s philosophy of ‘monads’ - where the different perspectives originate in thought from god as a unique author, and thus lead inevitably to a monad-substance dualism - for Merleau-Ponty, the articulation “of the universe in us is certainly not the harmony between our monad and the others, the presence of the ideas of all things in it— but it is what we see in perception” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 223). There are “no windows” that could provide one individual the ability to witness what is self-evident within the other, but it is the texture of openness in perception, that provides us with a perceptual vision of the self and the other (Merleau-Ponty
In the absolutist tradition following Newton, space and material substance form a dualism in which space is regarded as an infinite receptacle containing the substance of the world. The relational tradition following Leibniz, on the contrary, argues that space is the sum of all simultaneously existing ‘things’ in a context of relations (Löw 2001: 17ff.). In both traditions, however, space is regarded as detached from movement and thus cannot, as in Giddens account, be structured through action or structure action (1984: 132-139). This leads to a separation of two distinct realities with space on the one hand and both substance and action on the other. In these traditional notions, the actions of different parts of urban society, of human beings or material substance are determined always by the same “already existing” space; whether absolute or relational. Space does not seem to be a sociological matter even though urban societies are constantly confronted with concepts and metaphors of space (see chapter 03). As movement can only be described within or with reference to these static concepts of space, but not of space itself, space becomes the epitome of rigidity. Changing spatial formations are systematically excluded. While time progresses, space seems to loiter around (Massey 1993: 118).

Only if the notion of space, and not just the action within it, is grasped as dynamic, spatial transformations can be articulated. Space therefore only develops an effect, as Simmel argues, if it is given a form through social processes of construction (1921: 52-56). He regards, however, Euclidean geometry as a detached but necessary framework for such a construction and, to that extent, relates back to the absolutist tradition of space. Having been frequently criticised as ambivalent (Kaern 1990: 86), this relation to Euclidian geometry could as well be interpreted as a Merleau-Pontyian ambiguity referring to different determined views of an ensemble that is already recognised as such (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 93). According to Simmel, notions of space like “Newton’s discovery” can have a spatial effect as part of social processes of construction, if they become factors in an individual development and thus gain practical significance as cultural values (Simmel 2004: 491); as for example Newton’s absolutist notion of time and space in the practice of architecture today. This has
to be compared to the influence of Newton’s concepts during his lifetime, which he himself refers to regarding everyday perception: “I do not define time, space, place and motion, as being well known to all. Only I must observe, that the vulgar conceive those quantities under no other notions but from the relation they bear to sensible objects. And thence arise certain prejudices, for the removing of which, it will be convenient to distinguish them into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and common” (1846: 83). In other words, according to Newton, everyday practices employ relative space, but the only true space is absolute space. The relative space is merely the perceivable measure of absolute space, which cannot be perceived because of its homogeneity (Khamara 2006: 35). Not until Einstein’s special and general relativity was relative space re-evaluated as an explicable entity, contesting the truth of absolute space. Essential here for the discussion of a dynamic articulation in the rhythmic approach is, firstly, that Einstein ascribes reality only to physical phenomena and not to any abstract points in time or space, and secondly, his description of action at a distance with field theory (Günzel 2012: 212). The general theory of relativity detaches physical space from abstract Euclidian geometry as well as from the absolutist “container space” and replaces them by topological dimensionality (Günzel 2012: 241). In Merleau-Ponty’s de-centred phenomenology this topological dimensionality is replaced by the dimensionality of the encounter of all participating ‘things’ in the phenomenal field (see chapter 13). The dimensionality of the perceived is therefore not reducible to a sum of objects or their relations but articulates all participating ‘things’ as dynamic forms (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 205). Borrowing Merleau-Ponty’s words in the discussion of Gestalt, rhythm is therefore “not a spatio-temporal individual, it is ready to integrate itself into a constellation that spans space and time - but it is not free in regard to space and time, it is not aspatial, atemporal, it only escapes the time and space conceived as a series of events in themselves” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 206). Rhythmic articulation always refers to a spatiotemporal collective in the phenomenal field and thus what we referred to as collective rhythmic grouping “has a certain weight that doubtless fixes it not in an objective site and in a point of objective time, but in a region, a domain, which it dominates, where it reigns, where it is everywhere present without one ever being able to say: it is here” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 206).
The urban situation 'climbing a façade' has been articulated in an abstract figure by the encounter of three different perspectives, two of which have their viewpoint in the line-of-action, while the third viewpoint determines a ‘deviation’ from it. While we separated time and space for analytical reasons, from the discussion on the ambiguity of actual time and space it follows that (1) perceptual experience is not a question of a moment in time or a local in space, but a question of grasping the dynamic relations between history and becoming and between position and being (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 259). “For the visual present is not in time or space, nor of course outside them” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 113). (2) What grants the encounter of views, which are all perspective, is not a universal viewpoint. Whoever gives to this aesthetic idea of a universal viewpoint “the value of an absolute Knowledge” or “seeks in it the ultimate and exhaustive meaning of time and space”, takes up for its own profit our perceptual faith “of having access ‘to the things themselves’, which is [...] much less clear” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 16). When we speak about perceptual faith, we (3) neither speak about presupposing or postulating any conditions, nor even about a “first layer” experience of being in time and space as opposed to any idea of them. In perception “we do not yet know what to see is and what to think is, whether this distinction is valid, and in what sense” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 158). Thus (4) the question of time and space in perception is not so much about sensible or ideal characteristics, but about the aesthetic reflection of their ambiguous relation that articulates dynamically.
In this chapter, we draw attention to a widely unrecognised potential of Merleau-Ponty’s de-centred phenomenological understanding of individuals and their Umwelt relations in the phenomenal field. Merleau-Ponty’s work acknowledged for uncovering an original intentionality anchored in the perceptual life of the body, rather than in the reflective activity of thinking, especially with reference to his book “Phenomenology of Perception”, published in 1945 (2012). Although he himself admits impasses in his early works (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 200), he also maintains that his phenomenological approach and his philosophical ambitions have never changed (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 200ff.). Rather, and especially in the lectures at the Collège de France from the late 1950s (1970: 71-192), he argues against a conditioned misunderstanding of his approach as championing the primacy of perception in terms of sensory data (Vanzago 2011: 114). The potential of his understanding of “perception as deviation” (1968a: 168 / own translation) has been recently argued in various ways by different scholars in relation to dynamic approaches to a phenomenological ontology (Barbaras 2004 and 2011, Carman 2005, Hansen 2005, Kelly 2005, Cataldi and Hamrick 2007, Vanzago 2011, Staehler 2011, Carusi and Hoel 2014a) as well as in relation to natural science and technology (Low 2000, Carbone 2004 and 2011, Toadvine 2009, Bannon 2011, Carusi and Hoel 2014b, Hoel and Carusi 2015). In this chapter, we elaborate the dimensionality of “perception as deviation” and its consequences for the articulation of urban dynamic form. But, before entering into specific aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, we want to draw attention to his particular way of engaging with dialectical views of the world, which accompanied his entire thinking and which too frequently seems to neglected under the weight of traditional conceptions. “What we have to understand is that there is no dialectical reversal from one of these views to the other; we do not have to reassemble them into a synthesis” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 155). This is not understood in the Sartrean way stopping at the antithesis, which remains at the

190 For the relation of “early” and “late” works of Merleau-Ponty see chapter (11) 230-231.
191 The French original “perception comme écart” (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 220) is translated in this work as “perception as deviation”.

190 For the relation of “early” and “late” works of Merleau-Ponty see chapter (11) 230-231.
191 The French original “perception comme écart” (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 220) is translated in this work as “perception as deviation”.

190 For the relation of “early” and “late” works of Merleau-Ponty see chapter (11) 230-231.
191 The French original “perception comme écart” (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 220) is translated in this work as “perception as deviation”.
impasse of the dualism “between a Cartesian subjectivity, which Merleau-Ponty abhors, and the opacity of a meaningless objectivity” (Spiegelberg 1976: 522). Rather in perception there is invisibility always present in the relation to seeing and being seen, or in dialectical terms, there is a ‘deviation’ to the “thinking in oppositions”. This ‘deviation’, however, necessarily de-centres the logos of emerging phenomena not only from consciousness, but also from the body or any ‘thing’. Thus ‘deviation’ is present in any thesis, antithesis or synthesis, but also in reflection - and in the phenomenological ‘reflection’ of Merleau-Ponty’s own attempt of getting access to the “flesh”, which Merleau-Ponty seeks to understand through everyday perception (see chapter 05). “We must not think the flesh starting from substances, from body and spirit— for then it would be the union of contradictories” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 147). Related to the individual - or to us speaking or thinking about it – flesh is a being-other, a relative nonbeing and the opening of a depth, “if not localized, at least not independent of locality” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 224). Thus, flesh is an intertwining, or more precisely as Merleau-Ponty names it, an “Ineinander” of seeing, being seen and the invisible, of touching, being touched and the untouchable (1968a: 245). The German Ineinander could be translated into English in various forms as “one intertwined with others” or “others intertwined with one”, but at the same time “one in the others” and “the others in one”, or even “one as other” and “other as one”. Ineinander is unthinkable, but not independent of thinking, no causal law, but no pure randomness either – which would be the law of the absence of law. Ineinander is what nobody sees, which is neither object nor subject, and not a universal ultimate or a pure being, but, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, the “connective tissue, which west since there will be a result”, which is the emerging phenomenon (1968a: 174). If we attempt to think about this dynamic, it is the encounter “between” Ineinander where another dimensionality appears, founded on an “aesthesiological Ineinander” (1968a: 172 and 2003: 224). As soon as we approach the Ineinander, it articulates on different levels. The ‘deviation’ of reciprocal relations such as seeing/seen in the abstract rhythmic figure, but also touching/touched, presenting/re-presenting, is just a particular level of the perception of the Ineinander that we attempt to reflect on. In the everyday actual emergence of phenomena, the relations articulate on various intertwining levels, for example between a visible for me and tangible for me, and between this
visible for me and a visible for the other (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 245). It is claimed in the present work, that this *dynamic* articulation between different levels of reciprocal relations brings Merleau-Ponty’s and Hölderlin’s approaches together. Hölderlin refers to intellectual intuition - that acts as present negativity, always again – as *dynamic* articulation between an *oppositing* of subject and object related to being-as-such and *oppositing* of I and Not-I related to identity (see chapter (08) 153). In a similar way, Merleau-Ponty considers “phenomenological ‘reflection’” not a pure or opposite direction to perception, but a level of the inventory of this originating and opening passage of the *Ineinander*, which we are pregnant with, and which *dynamically* articulates in actuality, again and again, on different levels (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 253-254).

// MOVEMENT AND PERCEPTION IN THE ABSTRACT FIGURE

We return at this point to the streets of the neighbourhood, where the façade climber is on her way to the balcony. In the analysis of the abstract rhythmic figure the *ambiguous* relation in perception was described through a ‘*deviation*’ from her line-of-action by the introduction of a third perspective. In the case of the climber, this has been the perspective that sees the body as object, as if it would be a body in-itself that is moving up the façade. Following this line of thought, the location of the vision of the climber is therefore to be found somewhere within the *phenomenal field*, not in the body and not the objective body, but in ‘*deviation*’ from the line-of-action that refers to the body. If we separate time and space for analytical reasons, we can imagine some hypothetical spatial or temporal point, where the three subject-centred different perspectives could meet. But as the biologist Jakob Johann von Uexküll argues, “space and time are of no immediate use to the subject. They become significant only when numerous receptor cues, which would vanish without the temporal and spatial framework of the *Umwelt*, must be discriminated” (1957: 31). The quote gestures towards an instrumental quality of time and space, which should not be mixed up with a practiced locality.
in actuality. Rather, location is understood as dimensionality, thus in some way as a relation of the human body of the climber within the *phenomenal field*. Any dimensionality, however, that we locate within a field, with field having by definition no determined form, relates to a *dynamic form*, hence an undetermined variety of compositions. And, since with Merleau-Ponty any form in perception refers to figure-background relations, the *dynamic* refers to an invisibility in the *phenomenal field*. In a central perspective from a static point in time and space this invisibility could be understood as the parts of the surrounding outside binocular vision and the parts hidden by the figure, hence the back of the figure and the concealed background. In a *phenomenal field*, however, invisibility is not seeing and not being seen - hence does not refer to anything that could be visible from another viewpoint but to the invisible relation between all variations of figure-background compositions.

In the abstract rhythmic figure we attempted to visualise the relation to the invisible through a hypothesised ‘*deviation*’ of determined black lines, thus an undetermined relation (in)to a white background. The emergence of actual phenomena, however, does not refer to the spatiotemporal dimensionality of a point but to the moment and location of an *encounter* in the *phenomenal field*. As a consequence of philosophical traditions of abstract or pure position, it is simple for us to imagine the viewpoints of the figure separately as if looking with the eyes of the climber towards the sidewalk underneath her, towards the balcony above her, from the sidewalk or from the balcony towards the climber. Before taking the position of all these different viewpoints separately, however, we have perceived the actuality already as a situation, which can neither be one abstract view, nor the sum of the different abstract views - as the situation already articulates the *ambiguity* of the emerging actual phenomenon. The movement of the climber, or more precisely, the relationship between movement and perception, is key to understanding Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. The climber in the rhythmic figure sees the last grip (behind) as well as the next grip (in front), but she cannot grasp her movement as she does not see her objective body moving towards the balcony (see figure 4.01). The movement is invisible for her. At the same time somebody else, somebody ‘other’ could see her objective body moving up the façade. This other, however, could never see her views, the
views of the climber. It is the *encounter* of the views that is invisible, thus not an invisibility for her that is visible for the other, but an inaccessible invisibility. Thus, this *encounter* is not a point in Euclidian geometry, but a rhythmic *encounter* that includes the seeing, being seen and the invisible, all *Ineinander* and in ‘deviation’ from the line-of-action. Merleau-Ponty argues that from any spatiotemporally abstracted position, a point or a straight line, I factually cannot see myself, as my eyes are invisible for me (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 193 and 254). Then the actual invisibility can be filled by a view of others or my belief in a universal ultimate. There is, however, also an invisible in principle. Just as I cannot see myself moving, I cannot witness my own-movement. “I am for myself a zero of own-movement while moving, I do not distance myself from myself” (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 303 / own translation TR23, emphases in original). For Merleau-Ponty this “invisible in principle” signifies that perception never re-joins, never catches up with the self-movement that it seeks to perceive. This failure is the proof of their homogeneity: perceiving and self-moving emerge from one another. “A sort of reflection by Ecstasy, they are the same tuft” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 254): perception as ‘deviation’ of the self’s line-of-action.¹⁹³ The primacy of perception is not a primacy of sensory data but a primacy of a *dynamic* relation of the self and its other that refers to perception and self-movement as synonyms that are ‘deviated’ from each other, but inseparable: *Ineinander*.

¹⁹³ Merleau-Ponty (1968a: 130) refers here to “experiences that have not yet been ‘worked over,’ that offer us all at once, pell-mell [...] These experiences] have a name in all languages, but a name which in all of them also conveys significations in tufts, thickets of proper meanings and figurative meanings, so that, unlike those of science, not one of these names clarifies by attributing to what is named a circumscribed signification. Rather, they are the repeated index, the insistent reminder of [...] a light which, illuminating the rest, remains at its source in obscurity.”
Figure 4.07 / Rhythmic encounter: movement - perception / Timothy Pape 2016
To further elaborate on Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of perception as ‘deviation’ we are now changing perspectives within the urban situation described in the rhythmic figure in chapter (11). Keeping the same line-of-action, moving from the sidewalk up the façade towards the balcony, now we stand on the sidewalk and we look up to the balcony. Accordingly, the three abstract central perspectives of the situation are an ‘I’ looking from the sidewalk, an ‘other’, which is the balcony looking at the ‘I’ and the viewpoint of the related surrounding of this line-of-action, which is looking at both, the ‘I’ and the ‘other’, as well as their ‘in-between’ distance (see figure 4.08 / see also chapter (04) 071). Then the ‘I’ on the sidewalk does not just see the ‘other’, but ‘the other’ (the balcony) at a distance: A distance that prescribes the line-of-action towards the balcony and that relates to a movement in perception. In other words, this distance is graspable for us, because there is a dimensional relation within the phenomenal field. We could argue at this point that the ‘I’ understands the dimension - and thus the distance of the balcony or any person standing on the balcony - because humans have learned to understand distances. We could also argue that we understand the distance because balconies and their dimension are culturally known. Both are considered as valid arguments in this context but they both also refer the movement in the phenomenal field to a re-presentation deviated from the line-of-action; in these cases an individual or cultural recollection of a similar situation. In other words, the ‘I’ in the abstract figure can see the balcony at a determined distance only if the spatial distance (between the ‘I’ and the balcony) that is invisible for the ‘I’ but visible from any viewpoint in the surrounding, is related to a temporal distance (for example a recollection of a similar situation) that is “visible” for the ‘I’ but invisible for any viewpoint in the surrounding. This ambiguous relation is an ‘I’-Umwelt relation. In contrast to environment, which is regarded here as the surrounding accumulation of objects seen from an abstract position from outside the actual situation, Umwelt is all of the (temporal and spatial) surrounding that relates to the action, but is ‘deviated’ from the line-of-action. The necessary ‘deviation’ from the reciprocal action seeing and being seen in perception becomes obvious, if we imagine an absolute reversal of the line-of-action and look down to the ‘I’ from the eyes of a person standing at the balcony, which would just repeat the same argumentation from the other side of the coin. The distance remains ungraspable within the line-of-action. Thus, the
rhythmic *encounter* has to ‘deviate’ from the line-of-action as *Ineinander* of seeing, being seen and invisible, analysed in relation to ‘I’, ‘the other’ and ‘Umwelt’.

Merleau-Ponty frequently refers not only to the invisible, but also to the untouchable with the example of ‘my one hand touching my other hand’. Then there is “no doubt, it is not entirely my body that perceives: I know only that it can prevent me from perceiving, that I cannot perceive without its permission; the moment perception comes my body effaces itself before it and never does the perception grasp the body in the act of perceiving. If my left hand is touching my right hand, and if I should suddenly wish to apprehend with my right hand the work of my left hand as it touches, this reflection of the body upon itself always miscarries at the last moment: the moment I feel my left hand with my right hand, I correspondingly cease touching my right hand with my left hand. But this last-minute failure does not drain all truth from that presentiment I had of being able to touch myself touching” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 9). This is because only the action stays with the body. The actual phenomenon emerges in ‘deviation’ from the line-of-action of the body. “My body does not perceive, but it is as if it were built around the perception that dawns through it, [...and] it is, as it were, prepared for a self-perception, even though it is never itself that is perceived nor itself that perceives” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 9). The body cannot be the centre of perception as touching and touching oneself - but also seeing and being seen from the balcony - do not *encounter* in the body. A ‘deviation’ through the untouchable is needed for touching and touched to *encounter* (Vanzago 2011: 112). This untouchable is inaccessible for the other and the self, but part of their *dynamic* articulation. Hence there is “no privilege of oneself over the other here, it is therefore not the consciousness that is the untouchable – ‘The consciousness’ would be something positive, and with regard to it there would recommence, does recommence, the duality of the reflecting and the reflected, like that of the touching and the touched” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 254). The untouchable is inaccessible for touching or being touched, thus it is not present in a positive way, but as negativity. And “the negative here is not a positive that is elsewhere (a transcendent). It is a true negative, i.e. an Unverborgenheit of the Verborgenheit [unconcealment of the concealment...], in other words, an original of the
elsewhere, a self that is an Other. [...] Hence no sense in saying: the touched-touching junction is made by thought or consciousness" (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 254). Rather, perception is also expression. “It is expressing of the world while expressing the human being in one and the same stroke” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 113). To perceive means to belong to what is perceived, and not to impose values on it from outside. To perceive means to encounter ‘things’ and to be articulated with ‘things’ as dynamic form in the emergence of phenomena. Thus, in its participation the body, just as any ‘thing’, articulates a form in the phenomenal field that moves pregnant with negativity. And this negativity is itself a dynamic articulation that determines a variety of possible relation with its spatiotemporal surroundings. Following Merleau-Ponty, this is called Umwelt relation, the other of the self, the collective of the dynamic form of the ‘thing’ (human and non-human) in the phenomenal field.

II ENCOUNTER OF OTHERS AND UMWELT

The notion of Umwelt has existed in the German language since the beginning of the nineteenth century (for example in Goethe as a translation of the French ‘milieu’). The importance of Umwelt for the present work is precisely that it is not understood as ‘in-between’, or as a medium between consciousness, the sensory body and the world. Instead it is understood as ‘deviation’ of the ‘thing’ in movement, as the other(s) of the self. The use of the word Umwelt in Merleau-Ponty refers to the biologist Uexküll, who understands Umwelt as the active relation of organisms to the surrounding that cannot be understood with any mechanistic composition of organism and environment.194 Referring this notion of Umwelt to human perception, Merleau-Ponty argues that “the Umwelt is not dissimulated to me. I am witness to my Umwelt. Likewise, my body is not dissimulated to me. It is not a matter of a knowledge of a spectator [...] or a theory, objectively. To know the Umwelt is a more or less large deviation in relation to a zero-body [which in the present work would be called a ‘thing’]; to know the body is a deviation in relation to the there of the Umwelt. This deviation

194 Merleau-Ponty refers to Uexküll’s dynamic understanding of Umwelt (1957) in his lectures on “Nature” in the late 1960s (2003)
is the inverse of the identification I get by movement” (1995: 279 / italic emphases in original / own translation\textsuperscript{TR24}). The Umwelt is therefore not outside the body, and the body is not other than the Umwelt; rather the two terms must be understood as ‘deviations’ with respect to one another.

Before further elaborating on the notion of Umwelt in Merleau-Ponty, we briefly relate Umwelt to the dynamic articulation of perception as ‘deviation’. It had been argued in the present work that, in the emergence of phenomena, participating ‘things’ encounter each other in the phenomenal field and articulate dynamic forms. Hence there are spatiotemporal dimensions present in the emergence of phenomena and there is an evolution from a ‘thing’ and its Umwelt to the articulation of a dynamic form. The spatiotemporal dimensions in the phenomenal field, however, are not subjectified or objectified, hence not a series of events or a composition of events. While the dimensionality of the emerging phenomenon refers to the encounter between ‘things’, for the participating ‘thing’ (direction of individuation) the Umwelt is the variety of possibilities of different encounters in the phenomenal field – which could be understood as a sort of collective of directions.\textsuperscript{195} The dynamic form (for example the human body), in turn, represents the ambiguous relations of these possibilities in a spatiotemporal dimensionality of an actual phenomenon, and hence never re-joins Umwelt or ‘thing’.

This is where we problematize the binary human-world and self-other relationships referring to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of Umwelt. First, we return to the abstract figure of rhythmic encounter and change again perspectives, in order to further debate the relation of the ‘I’, the ‘other’ and ‘Umwelt’. Now we observe a meeting of neighbours, an ‘I’ on the balcony and two different ‘others’ on the street (see figure 4.09). According to Merleau-Ponty, for a philosophy of pure vision in this panoramic view from the balcony, there cannot be an encounter with other human beings, as the pure gaze only dominates objects and would transform them into puppets, which move mechanically by strings. High places

\textsuperscript{195} “Possibilities” refers in the present work to the course of remembrance (see chapter (09) 203), in which every form of actual articulation becomes a possibility: human, scientific, aesthetic, or world course of remembrance. Hence a “world-possibility” = “Weltmöglichkeit (the possible worlds variants of this world, the world beneath the singular and the plural)” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 250)
attract those who want to look over the world but do not want to be engaged (with)in it. (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 77). We want to argue here that this is in part appropriate also for the gaze of a neighbour observing his neighbourhood from the balcony. In part, however, this neighbour would also feel engaged, precisely because it is his neighbourhood. But if ‘I’ am standing on the balcony and looking down to another neighbour, “by definition ‘I’ cannot install myself in him, coincide with him, live his very life: ‘I’ live only my own” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 78). Even if our relationship leads ‘I’ to admit or even to experience that he, ‘the other’, too is a human being, is a neighbour, ‘I’ do not have his neighbourhood as ‘I’ have my own. And what ‘I’ can say about his neighbourhood is always derived from what ‘I’ know about my neighbourhood. He is also part of my neighbourhood and, in fact, this is why ‘I’, or we, would probably speak of our neighbourhood. Thus, the situation, after all, seems to be a problem of the relation between an ‘I’ and ‘the other’, reciprocal or not. In the described situation, however, we look down to two neighbours that interact with each other.

In a footnote in the book “The Visible and the Invisible” (1968a), Merleau-Ponty complicates the problem of others with reference to Simone de Beauvoir’s trio in ‘She came to stay’ (1999):196 “The problem of the other is always posed by the philosophies of the negative in the form of the problem of the other, as though the whole difficulty were to pass from the one to the other. This is significant: the other is not here an other; he is the non-I in general, the judge who condemns me or acquits me, and to whom I do not even think of opposing other judges. But, if one can show [...] that a trio decomposes into three couples, and - in supposing that there are, outside of all abstract reciprocity, successful couples - that there can be no trio that would be successful in the same sense, since it adds to the difficulties of the couple those of the concord between the three possible couples of which it is composed - still the fact remains that the problem of the other is not reducible to that of the other, and so much the less so in that the most strict couple always has its witnesses in third parties. [...] if the access to the other is an entry into a constellation of others (where there are of course stars of several

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196 The French original of Simone de Beauvoir’s “She came to stay” was first published in 1943 by editions Gilimand, with the title “L’Invitée”. Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre partly studied and worked together and belonged to the same circle of friends; their works mutually influenced each other (Greene1998: 293).
magnitudes), it is difficult to maintain that the other be nothing but the absolute negation of myself. For when it is a matter of absolute negation there is but one of them; it absorbs into itself every rival negation. Even if we have one principal other, from whom are derived many secondary others in our life, the sole fact that he is not the unique other obliges us to comprehend him not as an absolute negation but as a negation-model, that is, in the last analysis, not as what contests my life but as what forms it, not as another universe in which I would be alienated but as the preferred variant of a life that has never been only my own. Even if each of us has his own archetype of the other, the very fact that he is open to participation, that he is a sort of [...] symbol of the other, obliges us to pose the problem of the other, not as a problem of access to another nihilation, but as a problem of initiation to a symbolics and a typicality of the others of which the being for itself and the being for the other are reflective variants and not the essential forms” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 81-82 / emphases in original).

For the rhythmic approach of the present work this quote is most relevant in its compact presentation of different relevant aspects and their relation that shall be briefly demonstrated. Merleau-Ponty starts with the “problem of philosophies of the negative in form of a problem of the other”. And while this is in line with his critique on “objective thought” and his argument with Sartre, it again illuminates his dynamic articulation similar to Hölderlin’s approach. If it is an ultimate universal judgment (referring to Hölderlin’s being-as-such) or the judgement of I and Not-I (referring to Hölderlin’s identity), in reflective thought we always return to couples (or Hölderlin’s oppositing). But we cannot grasp the emerging phenomena through an understanding of the ultimate universal couple, but through perceiving as ‘deviation’, as dynamic articulation of the different couples: “there are stars of several magnitudes”, there are accents and unaccents in the rhythmic articulation. Upon reflection, these different couples - which are themselves at least trios - refer to an oppositing of dynamic articulations, as in

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197 In the entire section on this page we refer to the previous quote of Merleau-Ponty and to the rhythmic articulation of Hölderlin that is lead out in the chapters (08) and (09). In order to ensure better readability, these references or not individually marked each time.

198 Merleau-Ponty notes on Sartre (1968a: 254): “Sartre and classical ontology - The historical Totalisation which Sartre always assumes - is the reflection of his ‘nothingness’ - since nothing, in order to ‘be in the world,’ must support itself on ‘all’.”
the *eccentric path* of Hölderlin, the architectonic levels of rhythm, and Merleau-Ponty’s pregnancy with a “negation-model”. But the *encounter* between the *dynamic* articulation of a one-other and the *dynamic* articulation of another-other, hence the *encounter* with another couple, is always a participation (which is the only access) in “a constellation of others”. This relationship is the ‘thing’- *Umwelt* relationship. And there are ‘archetypes’ of these relationships that are called (urban) *dynamic forms* in this work – while Hölderlin refers to genres of art or poetry and Merleau-Ponty refers (with reference to Uexküll) to the *Bauplan* of organisms.¹⁹⁹ These *dynamic forms* are no universal entity but always “an initiation to a symbolics and a typicality”, a scratching and overriding palimpsest. And with the ‘archetypes’ - the poetic genre, the biological *Bauplan*, the urban *dynamic form* – not only their *dynamic* relation to the ‘thing’, the direction of individuation is changing historically and culturally - from the Greek to the Hesperian or in biological evolution -, but also the ‘archetypes’” *dynamic* relation to the “constellation of others”, their *collective rhythmic grouping*.

¹⁹⁹ “*Bauplan*” is German for “plan of construction” or “blueprint”.

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¹⁹⁹ “*Bauplan*” is German for “plan of construction” or “blueprint”.
Figure 4.08 / Rhythmic encounter: otherness / Timothy Pape 2016
In the same way, the reflective variants of being-for-self and being-for-others do not suffice to describe the human-world relation as they forget the necessary participation of the constellation of others; hence collective rhythmic grouping. And this brings us back to the balcony in the urban scenery. In an equal measure, the trio of neighbours, two on the street and one on the balcony, not only each have a being-for-myself and being-neighbour-for-the-other, but they are also part of a for-collective-of-neighbours, a collective rhythmic grouping we often refer to as “our neighbourhood”. If we now consider the talk between the neighbours on the street as line-of-action, the seeing and being seen of both neighbours would be deviated by the view from the balcony. This balcony (or the ‘I’ on the balcony) would be part of the Umwelt of both of the neighbours on the street and thus we could talk of a collective part of Umwelt. Following this line of thought looking down from the balcony, ‘the one other’ neighbour would be the collective ‘part’ of ‘the other other’ neighbour and the ‘I’ on the balcony and vice versa. What is even more important here, in addition to the invisibility of the encounter with one neighbour, an invisibility of another level added to the situation: the invisibility of the encounter of the two other neighbours.

This leads to four claims for the rhythmic encounter. First, in the encounter between ‘things’, there is a valuable difference between others in the Umwelt of each participating ‘thing’, which in rhythmic terms had been described as unaccents and accents. Secondly, there are different levels of opposing relations in an Umwelt, which relate to the rhythmic encounter as architectonic levels. Thirdly, the ‘invisibility’ of an Umwelt can grow, or in other words, can get thicker with a growing participation of others. Lastly, this also means Umwelten have an evolution in their emergence. 200 Merleau-Ponty describes this necessity of development as openness or as ambiguity of open circuit (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 147ff.). From a human perspective, this could be described as: to live is to organise an Umwelt starting from a encounter that cannot itself be referred to without losing its original meaning (Canguilhem 2001: 21). This describes an understanding of progress, which is not a linear progress. The more our Umwelt grows, the more we see, but the more also the thickness of the invisible is

200 “Umwelten” is the plural of Umwelt.
growing in the complex constellations of others. Referring this thought to the palimpsest of a growing urbanisation of our planet, the corresponding complexity of urban life ever more problematizes any binary and reciprocal understanding of a human-world relationship and calls for a better understanding of collective rhythmic groupings.

/‘THING’ AND UMWELT IN THE EVOLUTION OF EMERGENCE

In this lectures on nature (2003), Merleau-Ponty discards any conception of nature in terms of substances and attributes or as an object of or for conscious representations – whether in idealist, realist, transcendental or phenomenological traditions (Cataldi and Hamrick 2007: 228). He rejects any approach to nature that reduces humans to mere disconnected onlookers, which excludes them from being active participants in an *encounter* with nature. The human emerges as part of nature in its evolution of emergence. If there is an *encounter* with nature in the emergence of phenomena, nature cannot be a simple object as “accessory of consciousness in its tête-à-tête with knowledge”, as then nature – as absolute determined in itself - could not be part of the *encounter* out of which we have emerged (Merleau-Ponty 1988: 132). But nature continues to sustain us and we are at the same time a part and an expression of it (Hansen 2004: 210, Merleau-Ponty 1988: 132). As with any phenomenon, the human emerges from the *Ineinander* of an *encounter*, which is understood here as relation without medium (the *Ungeheure* in Hölderlin), hence not a representation or immanence of a pair, which would be a separation that would have to be ‘bridged’ again. Merleau-Ponty challenges the intellectual thesis that meaning exist only where the senses are exceeded from both sides of the equation (Günzel and Windgätter 2005: 594). Instead, “meaning is a matter of transition and degree not of either-or” (Spiegelberg 1976: 525). Nature becomes part of an articulation, in which we emerge. And any valorisation of the parts of an articulation goes pregnant with the *ambiguous* relation to its own reappraisal (Merleau-Ponty 1995: 356). It is precisely this *ambiguity* within the *phenomenal field* articulated as *dynamic form* pregnant with negativity that refutes the Cartesian thematisation of nature as pure positivity, which dominated modern philosophy’s understanding of nature.
(Merleau-Ponty 1988: 137, Hansen 2004:210). Merleau-Ponty demonstrates precisely by not following the irresolvable split between positivist and a negativist thinking but by containing the ambiguity that arises in their articulation, “that there are means to think nature […] only by means of perceived nature” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 214). “It is only by recalling nature as visible that we can understand now the emergence of an invisible perception in its relation to what it sees, in deviation in relation to the visible” (Merleau-Ponty 1995: 278 / own translation). In the same way, Merleau-Ponty engages with the achievements of natural science (Vanzago 2011: 122). Although, in the end, we must also question the perspectives of science “and unveil their ‘teleology’, we must not forget that such intervention is possible only because the ‘so thoroughly un-Cartesian developments’ […] of modern science reveal the very prospect of another ontology” (Hansen 2004: 211 referring to Merleau-Ponty 1995: 359).

Natural science in this more nuanced understanding is an instrument for a particular access to nature, an access conditioned by an instrument we are aware of as opposed to a medium, which tries to convince us to represent a direct access to being. “The ‘science’ attacked by Merleau-Ponty is not science in practice but a certain way of thinking about science, sometimes implicit and sometimes formalized into a philosophy of science” (Carusi and Hoel 2014a: 148). What he criticises is a particular way of Cartesian thinking, which he refers to as “there is” or “flatness of the technicised” (Merleau-Ponty 1993a: 137), and which relates to phenomena in an external way, looking on it from above as a divine science (Hoel and Carusi 2015: 75).

It is therefore no surprise that Merleau-Ponty refers to biologists in his elaboration on nature and animality, whose dynamic theorising contests mechanistic and causal thinking. Here we discuss Jakob von Uexküll’s influence in Merleau-Ponty’s work, in particular through the notion of Umwelt. “Uexküll denounces the Cartesian dichotomy, which joins an extremely mechanistic way of thinking to an extremely subjective way of thinking. Descartes is, in effect, anti-mechanist to the extent that he posits consciousness as a universe entirely different from that of mechanism” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 168). Uexküll’s notion of Umwelt seems to

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demonstrate that through movement there is a ‘deviated’ dialectical relation between the objective body and environment, both of which can be described in a mechanistic way. Hence, Uexküll argues that the Umwelt suggests that the organism should behave or emerge in particular ways, but only inasmuch as the Umwelt is already related by emergence of organisms (Umbelino 2013: 356). In their on-going intertwinement, both organisms and Umwelten, are emerge Ineinander (Hoel and Carusi 2015: 80). We can describe an animal in mechanistic thinking only like a Bauplan as a sum of parts juxtaposed or with causal relations; and the same goes for the environment. Merleau-Ponty argues - following Uexküll - that “we must bring finalism nearer to mechanism, to the extent that the animal obeys its anatomical plan. To this extent, we have to say that it has a Bauplan. Physiologically, the animal does not have a unity, it only approaches unity ever more closely. Only we want to invent an inventor of it. The Bauplan in effect assures the necessary movement for getting food… It is beyond doubt that we take the plan of the animal into consideration only when the structure of the animal is assimilated to the structure of a machine” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 168 / emphases in original). But nature is “not a principal of interiority that would yield to exteriority as it pleases.” In the encounter between producer and produced there is a necessary ‘deviation’, which we cannot regret, as it articulates our actuality as dynamic form: as human body (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 168). In the wake of Uexküll and Merleau-Ponty we consider Umwelt here as the variety of possible participations in encounters and ‘deviated’ from the line of action. This refers to any simple, developed or complex ‘thing’ - to the atom of Niels Bohr as well as a zero-human body - participating in the emergence of phenomena. Merleau-Ponty elaborates on this relationship of ‘deviation’ referring to microscopic and macroscopic dimensions. Then the dynamic form “is not a sum of instantaneous and punctual microscopic events;” it is an enveloping articulation, “with the macroscopic style of an ensemble in movement. In between the microscopic facts, global reality is delineated like a watermark, never graspable to objectifying-atomistic thinking, never eliminable or reducible to the microscopic” (2003: 208). Although in a particular perspective of science we are able to describe embryonic regulation as physiochemical, “it is not physiochemistry requiring an organism of a typical form when the plan of the whole is restored from a part” (2003: 208). The ‘thing’ encounters the world not in
microscopic-macroscopic relation or any other dualist opposition but in ‘deviation’ from its action. The notion of Umwelt no longer allows us to consider the ‘thing’ as effect or cause of an interior or exterior world. In fact, Umwelt is not present in front of us like a goal, nor like an idea.

In actuality, any animal organism is connected to the whole of the organism’s activity, such as seeking food (Umbelino 2013: 354). Accordingly, the relation of animal Umwelt and animal zero body relates the activity that creates the ensemble of organs with the activity of the animal in the world (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 173). This ‘animal’-Umwelt, the internal equipotentiality and external disequilibrium, articulate as dynamic form in the emergence of the phenomenon (Hansen 2004: 227). If we consider a situation in which an animal is involved, “each part of the situation acts only as part of the whole situation. […] The Umwelt is the world implied by the movement of the animal, and that regulates the animal’s movements by its own structure” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 175). And it makes no difference if we reflect on the situation as movement of the animal passing by/through the environment or the environment passing by/through the animal, whose difference is to be found first and foremost in the degree of inertia within the relation ‘animal’-Umwelt. In Uexküll’s example of the tick waiting for years for the body-heat of a passing mammal to stir into action (1975: 13), there is “this ‘singular point’ of life where the Umwelt is no longer dissimulated to itself” and life emerges in ‘deviation’ from the physiochemical, the tick falling down on the animal passing by (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 217). Merleau-Ponty continues by arguing that just as animal life is not only a causal relation in the physicochemical, but emerges as another dimension in the relation of whole organisms, so too the human life “is not just in the objective body, nor even in the physiological” (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 217). Accordingly, ‘human’ is not simply the conjunction of animality and reason, but should be grasped as another dimension of ‘deviation’ emerging from the Ineinander of encounters (Merleau-Ponty 2003: 208). Access to nature in this way of thinking is not returning to our roots, or our ancestors, or any big bang, as the emergence of nature in perception is a repetitive emergence in ‘deviation’. The openness to the world and the perception that we divine within us – at the same time subject-self and object-self – thereby encroach upon each other, are intertwined (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 193). “That
evokes, beyond the ‘point of view of the object’ and the ‘point of view of the subject’, [...] what I [Merleau-Ponty] called ‘modulation of the being-in/towards-the-world’ (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 244 / own translationTR26). This modulation in perception relates to self-movement —named rhythmic articulation when referring to human perception — which should not be imagined developing as sequence of events or points on a line, since in actuality “space does not comprise points, lines any more than time does” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 195). Instead the spatiotemporal dimensionality articulates dynamic form on different levels. Just as “being-as-such” relates to “identity” in “intellectual intuition” with Hölderlin (2009: 361), in perception the ‘thing’ (as direction of individuation) relates to Umwelt as its collective constellation. Hence “the present itself is not an absolute coincidence, […] the present, also, is ungraspable from close-up, in the forceps of attention, it is an encompassing” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a: 195). On the basis of this understanding of ‘thing’-Umwelt relations, the next chapter undertakes an encompassed account on urban encounter.
Part V experiments with different encounters of rhythm techne and analytical urban research. In chapter (14) this starts off with an experimental measurement of the transformation of different characteristics of Merleau-Ponty’s ‘thing’-Umwelt relations referring to social and morphological aspects of the Roman neighbourhood Tuscolano. Chapter (15) addresses Maki’s ‘generative element’ of urban group-form as hero-Umwelt relation (Merleau-Ponty) in a historical tragic moment of the neighbourhood Torre Angela referring to Hölderlin’s rhythmic re-presentation of tragedy. The presentation of a rhythmic graphic score of social encounters with the urban morphology in the neighbourhood Garbatella in chapter (16) investigates a potential visual re-presentation of collective rhythmic grouping. All these experimental approaches are an attempt to point out potentials of the rhythmic approach referring to intermittent and theoretically framed samples that challenge our critical understanding of urban encounters while reflecting their own limits of application.\(^\text{202}\)

\(///\) (14) INSTRUMENTAL UMWELT CHARACTERISTICS (TUSCOLANO) 271
\(///\) (15) AESTHETIC REFLECTION OF URBAN CAESURA (TORRE ANGELA) 293
\(///\) (16) COMPARISON OF RHYTHMIC RE-PRESENTATIONS (GARBATELLA) 309

\(^{202}\) To ensure better readability, the content structure of each of the six parts of the thesis is repeated at its beginning (see chapter (01) 018).
Chapter (14) is the first of three chapters engaging with an experimental application of *rhythm techne* in the case study neighbourhoods tackling particular aspects of the aesthetic reflection of their *dynamic* articulations. While chapters (15) and (16) both elaborate on a description of rhythmic *re-presentation* and the transformation of the phenomenon neighbourhood, this chapter considers the transformation of the participating ‘thing’-*Umwelt* relations. All three approaches carry with them the assumption of there being a phenomenon neighbourhood that is articulated in relations of ‘neighbour’ and ‘hood’, private and public, and neighbourliness and strangeness. In other words, there is a certain rational assumption underlying these experimental applications, which raises the problem of the researcher’s participation in different ways. In particular, in the following first approach we engage with the articulation of material and cultural ‘thing’-*Umwelt* relations as an engaged observer of *dynamic* articulations in the emergence of the phenomenon. Consequently, our aesthetic judgments rest on aspects of Kant’s rational analytics of aesthetic judgments, the problematic of which we have discussed in chapter (08) 160ff. Observation provokes a distance from the observed, as in Kant’s judgment of the beautiful, and a teleologically aesthetic idea of neighbourhood that follows the analytic of the sublime, both of which come to a stand on the side of the researcher. It is claimed here, however, that the approach can nevertheless point to certain *dynamics* of ‘thing’-*Umwelt* relations, as the neighbourhood is considered an emerging phenomenon that articulates different *dynamic forms* - and not an idea of infinity that relates to a mechanistic understanding of nature. Alongside this problem of aesthetic judgments of researchers, we introduce a possible way of dealing with research instruments and participatory agency in a rhythmic approach.
In “The Visible and the Invisible” (1968a). Merleau-Ponty’s states that the “problems posed in Ph.P. [Phenomenology of Perception, written in 1945] are insoluble because I start there from the ‘consciousness’-‘object’ distinction” (1968a:200). In the following, we attempt to develop an analytic of three different characteristics of ‘thing’-Umwelt participation, that refer back to Merleau-Ponty’s bodily characteristics described in the book “Phenomenology of Perception” (1962). There he analysed the body as an intentional medium between temporal consciousness and the spatial world: “[O]ur nature is not long-established custom, since custom presupposes the form of passivity derived from nature. The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the action necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is true for motor habits such as dancing. Sometimes finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body’s natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself a cultural world. At all levels it performs the same function which is to endow the instantaneous expressions of spontaneity with a little renewable action and independent existence. Habit is merely a form of this fundamental power. We say that the body has understood and the habit has been cultivated when it has absorbed a new meaning, and assimilated a fresh core of significance” (Merleau-Ponty 1962:169 / own emphasis in italics).

Embodiment in this quote could be divided between three characteristics that we will name “bodily structure, referring to the actual structure of the body, bodily capacities, symbolising our refinement of abilities for coping with things, such as perceiving or walking, and bodily collectives, indicating the affordance which comes from the experience with others or environments coined by others and therefore collective characteristics, often concerning culture” (Pape 2005:47).  

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203 The term “affordance” in this context refers to the Psychologist James Gibson: “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. The verb to afford is found in the dictionary, the noun affordance is not. I have made it up. I
While this early characterisation of embodiment by Merleau-Ponty already points at a body-Umwelt relation determined by history and culture, the centrality of the body, as well as its motor intentionality, fundamentally changed in his late phenomenology. We want to elaborate on these differences alongside an example out of the everyday: a bench in a busy street in the Roman neighbourhood Tuscolano. Now benches could be seen as carrying cultural value, just as the entire furnishings of our homes, the furnishings of our cities, our houses, our façades, our courtyards and streets, and even our city itself. Benches for Western humans could be understood as stimuli that afford sitting. That is because we have the sort of bodies that bend backwards at the knees’ (bodily structure), because our bodies get tired and we are able to put them in a sitting position (bodily capacity), and because we Western human beings are brought up in a culture where one sits on benches (bodily collective). But do we reflect on the act of sitting? Normally we do not. Benches seem to afford us to sit on them.

First and foremost the example illuminates that all three characteristics are necessarily intertwined. For the bench would not afford us to sit, if our body would not bend at the knees, or if we would not be able to move it - and this is rather obvious. Yet, they would not afford sitting, for example, in traditional Japan, where benches did not exist (Dreyfus 1996). In this sense, we interpret here Merleau-Ponty’s expression that “the habit has been cultivated” in a dynamic articulation of all bodily characteristics. One of his most widely referenced examples in this context is a blind person’s walking stick or cane, which ceases to be an object of environment. “It is no longer perceived for itself; rather, the cane’s furthest point is transformed into a sensitive zone, it increases the scope and the radius of the act of touching and has become analogous to a gaze” (2012:144). In this way, the centrality of the body and bodily behaviour in Merleau-Ponty’s books “Phenomenology of Perception” and “Structure of Behaviour” “provides a means to circumvent conventional dualisms like inner/outer, subject/object [or] person/world” (Seamon 2010:4), which have been applied to urban environments by several authors. For the philosopher Shaun...
Gallagher, “phenomenally, the environment is precisely a ‘manipulatory area’ for the lived body—something potentially to be taken up and incorporated” (1986b: 163). The body of the blind person incorporates the walking stick or cane and the form of the body is extended, as could be abstractly visualised as in figure 5.01. Referring back to the example of the bench that affords us to sit, we could also speak of a ‘place of rest’ that affords us to sit. According to the philosopher Edward S. Casey, human bodies belong to places and contribute to their constitution but places belong as well to human bodies (1996: 24). In this sense, the “body is the material condition of possibility for the place-world while being itself a member of that same world. It is basic to place and part of place. Just as there are no places without the bodies that sustain and vivify them, so there are no lived bodies without the places they inhabit and traverse” (Casey 1996: 24). Bench, body, and ‘place of rest’ relate to each other. From a central perspective of human consciousness, ‘place of rest’ becomes a symbol that the body fulfils by its action of sitting down on the bench. The action of the body here can be described as unconscious or preconscious but the relation to ‘place of rest’ seems to be determined by something like a tacit consciousness. In Merleau-Ponty’s critical reflection on his own early work: “it therefore presupposes a prereflective contact of self with self (the non-thetic consciousness [of] self Sartre) or a tacit cogito (being close by oneself)— this is how I reasoned in Ph. P. [‘Phenomenology of Perception’]” (1968a: 171). Thus, as much as the body bridges the conscious/world separation, it manifests the Cartesian thought of a predetermined world that it merely fills. And “a tacit cogito does not, of course, solve these problems” but reinforces them, because, with a presupposed consciousness-object distinction, “the problem of the passage from the perceptual meaning to the language meaning” is insoluble (1968a: 176). According to the side of the distinction from which we approach it, the body becomes either an extension of consciousness or of world, but refuses their encounter. When we say that the body incorporates environment (Gallagher 1986:163), or “environment appropriates the […] body” (Seamon 2010:11), we learn about a transformation of the body within a presupposed division of consciousness-world. The intention to mediate the division is translated into a

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204 This discussion on “place of rest” refers back to the discussion on home, place, and lifeworld in chapter (05) 080.
bodily intentionality. This re-presentation of the body becomes an instrument for understanding or measuring transformations. But, rather than understanding transformations of the relation consciousness-world that remain pure in their distinction, the instrument articulates its own transformation, in this case through the relation between bodily structure, bodily capacity and bodily collective. If referred to rhythm techne, the body as instrument does not articulate on an eccentric path but comes to a stand on one side of the opposing relations. In other words, the re-presentation of the body measures according to its own posited opposition. Consequently, (1) the application of an instrument should not be mistaken for an articulation of dynamic forms in an encounter in the phenomenal field. (2) This raises the question of how the transformation of the ‘thing’-Umwelt relation of the instrument itself (for example the extension of the blind body through the walking stick) relates to the intention of the instrument?
Perspective on bodily characteristics from a related rhythmic level

Figure 5.01 / Body form – body form with incorporated extension / Timothy Pape 2016

Figure 5.02 / Bodily structure / Timothy Pape 2016

Figure 5.03 / Bodily structure - capacity / Timothy Pape 2016

Figure 5.04 / Bodily structure – capacity - collective / Timothy Pape 2016
/// CHARACTERISTICS OF ‘THING’-UMWELT RELATIONS

From here on we elaborate on the ‘thing’-Umwelt relation as instrument, comparing Merleau-Ponty’s bodily characteristics with corresponding Umwelt characteristics. This comparison is accompanied by a visual re-presentation through sketches - hence a reflection on an architectonically related level of rhythm -, referring to the discussion of form and structure in chapter (02). In figure 5.02, the bodily structure is sketched as connecting lines, symbolising the relation between the parts of the body (e.g. at the knee). This structure enables different possible bodily capacities like bending at the knee, here symbolised with a line that possibly extends the structure (see figure 5.03). The bodily collective is the manifestation of these possible extensions through connecting to other ‘things’, like a bench or a ‘place of rest’ (see figure 5.04). But what exactly does the body connect to in this example? To another ‘thing’ or a constellation of other ‘things’? To an object bench or to a determined idea of a ‘place of rest’ of which the bench forms part? These poles, the material bench and the conscious ‘place of rest’, introduce an ‘in between’ to the actual phenomenon that emerges. In other words, installing an intentional body ‘in between’ consciousness and matter only shifts the ‘in between’, now opposing mind and body as well as body and world. The ambiguous relation of the emerging phenomenon is only postponed. This can be witnessed as soon as we articulate the body in its Umwelt relations, unfolding its determined instrumental form into a participating dynamic form. Now does the body end at the hand of the blind person holding the cane or at the tip of the cane touching the world? Is a cultural symbol like the bench part of the body or does it only belong to the mind? If we sit down on the bench in a motor-intentional-act (Merleau-Ponty 2012), thus pre- or unconsciously, does the knowledge of the bench as ‘place of rest’ belong to the body? Recalling the example of traditional Japan, where benches did not exist (Dreyfus 1996: paragraph 4), this would even introduce new ‘in betweens’ of opposing relations like consciousness and history, cultural and natural world. However, if we in this way open up the articulation to yet other relations of opposing – in other words, if we relate to yet other levels of the rhythm - our initial relation of opposing of the instrument (consciousness-world) remains and taints the results. When finally we refer to constellations of others, the transformation of the instrument cannot
be described anymore in the “original” relation of opposing. Would we resist sitting-on-a-bench in the middle of a busy street simply because it is not restful, or because it does not match with one of the ensembles of ‘place of rest’ we know - a bench with a piece of grass, under a tree, in a waiting room, on a bus stop? All these re-presentations of ‘places of rest’ with a bench are results of rhythmic articulations that could be described in rhythm techne: for example as grouping unaccents – the tree, the grass, the body (or the traffic, the bus stop, the body) – around an accent – the bench. Hence it is not the object ‘bench’ that is participating in the emergence of phenomena, but the ‘thing’ bench that articulates in a dynamic form. Any form applied as instrument – a blind person’s cane, the human body or a cultural symbol – shifts the perspective to one side of the encounter, while the measured agency of participating ‘things’ align the teleological idea implied by the instrument’s determined composition. In the case of Merleau-Ponty’s intentional body, it is the intentionality that incorporates the consciousness-world distinction into the body.

In “The Visible and the Invisible”, Merleau-Ponty considers any understanding of what coexist in the body, under reflective gaze, as a still too static, flatten and juxtaposed contemplation. “We have to reject the age-old assumptions that put the body in the world and the seer in the body, or, conversely, the world and the body in the seer as in a box [(see figure 5.01-5.04)]. Where are we to put the limit between the body and the world […]? Where in the body are we to put the seer […]? There is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a:138). Even the previously quoted section of Merleau-Ponty on bodily characteristics starts by saying that “our nature is not long-established custom, since custom presupposes the form of passivity derived from nature” (Merleau-Ponty 1962:169). Confronting this quote again with Merleau-Ponty’s late understanding of nature being neither a principle of exteriority nor a principle of interiority, the phenomenon of ‘place of rest’ cannot be centred in the body. “Or rather, if, as once again we must, we eschew the thinking by planes and perspectives, there are two circles, or two vortexes, or two spheres, concentric when I live naively, and as soon as I question myself, the one slightly de-centred with respect to the other” (Merleau-Ponty 1968a:138). The logos of the actual phenomenon of a person resting on a bench is an encounter in the phenomenal
field and ‘deviated’ from any intended line-of-action. When introducing a particular instrument, this ‘deviation’ is articulated as a transformation of its ‘thing’-Umwelt relations. The action sitting-on-a-bench would not be a custom or habit of the body, but one variant of the body’s instrumental re-presentation to participate in the emergence of phenomena. Hence the related transformation of the ‘thing’-Umwelt relation can be understood only in reference to the specific variant of participation and the determined aesthetic idea of the instrument.
Perspective on Umwelt characteristics from a related rhythmic level

Figure 5.05 / Umwelt structure / Timothy Pape 2016

Figure 5.06 / Umwelt structure - capacity / Timothy Pape 2016

Figure 5.07 / Umwelt structure – capacity - collective / Timothy Pape 2016
This is the attempt to outline the re-presentations of Umwelt structure, Umwelt capacity and Umwelt collective, hence re-presentations that refer to an eccentric path and not to a central perspective. The Umwelt structure is now sketched as loose ensemble of ‘parts’, while the connection of some of them provides a more defined figure against its background (see figure 5.05). Looking at such a visualisation, we normally consider the most intensive connection between figure and background in close proximity to an imagined separating outline around the figure, although we know that the background continues behind the figure. In a topological understanding of space, a bench that slides towards our legs or one that we encounter staggering backwards would probably afford us to sit. Depending on the Umwelt collective – if it happens in a respectable restaurant or in the midst of an afternoon shower in the streets – we would either surrender or try to resist. The Umwelt capacity, however, to sit down or to resist sitting down, depends not only on the ability to bend the body at the knees, but also on the capacity to participate in the described or other forms. In the abstract figure this is sketched as loose structures in proximity to the imagined body outline (see figure 5.06). One obvious capacity in the described context would be, for example, our muscular strength that determines our ability to resist to sit down. This example also demonstrates the similarities of Merleau-Pontian Umwelt characteristics and Hölderlin’s characteristics of the collective Geist of works of art as plastic, athletic, and Hesperian, which he refers to the participation in Greek Olympics.205

Finally, an Umwelt collective is a relation to the constellation of others, every other of which has its own Umwelt characteristics. The emerging phenomenon cannot be reduced to a reciprocal relation between human body and bench, but their encounter includes the relation between others (red and rosé in figure 4.15). The rhythmic articulation would be determined if, for example, the rain remains in small puddles on the horizontal surface of the bench, which depends on its shape and materiality as well as other circumstances: wood or plastic, concave or convex shapes, sun and or rain. As we talk here about a re-presentation from an architectonically related level of rhythm, it is important to recall that all Umwelt characteristics of ‘things’ participating in the emergence of actual phenomena encounter Ineinander - and not in bilateral relation or inside-outside relations.

205 Hölderlin’s plastic, athletic and Hesperian Geist is discussed in chapter (09) 183.
Instead of considering the *Umwelt structure* of the body first, we might want to begin by looking at its *Umwelt collective*, or the *Umwelt capacity or structure* of any other participating ‘thing’.

In the next example, we engage with emerging phenomena, where human participation is confined to the role of witness. If we consider a stone water basin as a phenomenon, the *Umwelt structure* of the stone containing water has a determined structure enabling its concave shape. If this concave side of the stone is facing upwards, there is an *Umwelt capacity* to contain water. Anything that encounters the water basin in its *Umwelt collective* drowns, dissolves or swims, according to its own *Umwelt* characteristics. In the moment that something swims, drowns or dissolves, the phenomenon stone water basin emerges, “provided that nothing interrupts this adhesion of the multiple. There is a dimension that gives meaning to its surroundings” (Merleau-Ponty 2003:156). And again, we could have started the same analytic elaboration from any participating ‘thing’ in the emergence of the phenomenon: a hydrophilic or lipophilic structure of water, the water displacing capacity of a duck or the cultural value of a swimming pool, all of which have different degrees of agency, if we analytically unfold the articulated *dynamic forms* in reflection. This is how agency is understood in this work: as a variant of a participatory line-of-action, whereas the *Umwelt* relation is the ‘deviation’ from all lines-of-action. In other words, agency is usually referred to as a goal of the action, whereas *Umwelt*, according to Uexküll and Merleau-Ponty has no goal (Merleau-Ponty 2003:176). If any ‘thing’ has *Umwelt characteristics* - here analytically divided in *structure, capacity* and *collective* -, then any *re-presentation* of a *dynamic form* has characteristics of agency when instrumentalised. There is negativity in any *re-presentation* of a *dynamic form* that is a correlative with its participation in the emergence of phenomena. If instrumentalised, this negativity is filled with intentionality, possibly coming very close to determined combinations of *Umwelt* characteristics. In cases where intentions of an instrument do not match the articulation of *dynamic forms* in the emergence of actual phenomena, this leads to a transformation of the combination of *Umwelt* characteristics of the instrument. Thus, an analysis of the specific composition of *Umwelt characteristics* does not provide an aesthetic reflection of *dynamic form* but it can show the potential for participation of
particular re-presentations of Umwelt characteristics. In addition, this line of thinking shows how re-presentation can participate in the emergence of phenomena, though its degree of determination does not necessarily coincide with its agency. In this context, the re-presentation of cultural symbols in our contemporary urban environments is of utmost interest for any articulation of urban dynamic form, especially as, in their complexity, urban actions seem to be less and less orientated towards shared goal and more and more towards an interpretation of symbols (Merleau-Ponty 2003:176).

III ‘THING’-UMWELT RELATIONS AND AGENCY IN ROMAN NEIGHBOURHOODS

In Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account of perception, human beings are not primarily subjects who then determine and define the objects before and around them, nor are subjects or objects determined things-in-themselves. There is an intertwining of ‘things’ in perception that cannot be reduced to the binary relation of seeing and being seen, but includes invisibility (see chapter 13). This relation of ambiguity involved in the phenomenal field is the focus of the following discussion of Umwelt relations alongside a description of a stranger’s short walk through the Roman neighbourhood Tuscolano (see figure 5.08 and 5.09).

Tuscolano is a result of the speculative housing activities in the east of Rome. Situated along the Via Tuscolana, it was mostly built during the 1950s and provides housing for more than a hundred thousand people. Tuscolano is Rome’s highest density neighbourhood. The typical chaos on the streets of this neighbourhood is framed by a long row of shops, bars, and illuminated advertisements occupying the ground level of a threatening scenery of high and closely attached apartment blocks (see figure 5.10 and 5.11). Deafening noise of traffic and an enormous number of parked cars seems to leave no space for a blade of grass.206

206 This short summary of Tuscolano refers its description in chapter (07) 130.
(re-iterated) Figure 5.08 / Tuscolano / Timothy Pape 2004

Figure 5.09 / Pathway of stranger in Tuscolano / Timothy Pape 2004
Figures 5.10 / Shops in Tuscolano / Timothy Pape 2004

Figures 5.11 / Apartment blocks in Tuscolano / Timothy Pape 2004
The moment you leave the tube, you already feel yourself thrown into the thick urban fray. From all around, horns and engine noises of the six-lane and heavily trafficked Via Tuscolana in the afternoon rush hour. The mass of cars squeeze slowly through a wide urban canyon and form a continuous light strip, white on the left and red on the right, until they meet and disappear in a narrowing ravine on the horizon. It is 6pm on a Thursday in the beginning of October, just before sunset. The colourful hustle and bustle is lined by the incessant neon signs of shops on the ground floor of high-rise eight-storey apartment blocks on both sides. Next to me, there is a furniture store, a bar, an auto repair shop, a clothes shop, and a small grocery store, a ‘simple market’. In big letters ‘ATLANTIC’ Multiplex Cinema, a ‘BARCLAY’S’ bank, a gas station. I decide to turn directly into one of the side streets with the hope of entering the ‘real’ neighbourhood and to escape the chaos of the big thoroughfare. Another clothes shop on the corner, a shoe store, a pizzeria - ‘Mini Pizza’ -, an Asian corner shop advertising in Chinese characters. Another pizza shop, a florist, another bar, vegetables, ‘Salumi’, a clothes shop, an IT shop, a pharmacy. A toyshop, a bar, another corner shop, another clothes shop. The scenery has not changed. An endless row of small shops on the ground floor facing the street. The neon signs and display windows ogle at me from both sides and behind those windows the street life seems to continue with just the same intensity. Above the shops, the scenery is framed by apartment buildings that rise up in the evening twilight. Only the street is narrower now, and the apartment blocks with nine to ten storeys are even higher. A small road junction is approaching. It is the same on the left and on the right. I decide to continue straight on. An art shop, a bar, ‘Beauty Women’, a cell phone store, another bar. Suddenly the road space appears a little more relaxed. After a second glance, I realise the withdrawn apartment houses on the right that rise up in dark red - about a car length withdrawn from the street’s edge. The shops on the ground level still line the sidewalk. Structurally there is a clear division in Tuscolano between the commercial street space and the living space inside the blocks. Only small and closed entrance doors, hidden between the illuminated shops, indicate some possible life behind for the hundreds of doorbell nameplates. I meander further through the hectic bustle. Do they all live here? An
old woman comes towards me. She can hardly understand what I am saying as I approach her. “You need earplugs here, as soon as you leave your flat” (Tuscolano1 2003). There is a very mixed public on the streets, people of all ages, middle class, and working-class (Tuscolano4 2003). No luxury cars, no luxury shops, but hardly any branches of international chains either as we would expect in a shopping mall. “There is everything here, an endless number of shops, all you need, and high buildings, no green, everywhere cars, just like one big parking spot” (Tuscolano3 2003), “much traffic, everywhere rubbish, noisy and little air to breath” (Tuscolano6 2003). This is the most common characterisation of Tuscolano by the neighbours I meet on the streets. A young woman takes me to a butcher’s, as she is convinced that her father, the butcher, could indeed tell me more about the neighbourhood. He has been living here since 1953. (Tuscolano7 2003). The butcher shop is overcrowded, a single confused swarming and gesticulating bunch of people. I follow my new acquaintance towards the counter. On the way, I get introduced to more than half a dozen friends that she greets by their first name. And as we go along I get the impression that not many of them are interested in buying meat. The butcher, who is very friendly, takes me aside: “Tuscolano is like a big flock of sheep, more than 400 thousand inhabitants, big as Bologna, with no place to meet.” I comment that his shop must be working quite well considering how crowded it is. “But more than half of the people in here are family and friends. There are no meeting places in Tuscolano” (Tuscolano8 2003). Talking to a middle-aged man he asks me to join him for a cup of coffee (Tuscolano11 2003). Continuing along the street, we encounter another big street: Viale San Giovanni Bosco. Two different types of high apartment blocks face each other, yellow on the left and red on the right, and continue so endlessly. On the horizon, which is just two gigantic blocks away, they frame the church San Giovanni del Bosco - sublime like a dome, it rounds up the superhuman scale of this view. The street appears divided here into two sides, separated by a wide parking lot in the middle. An electronic shop, a gas station, underwear, a funeral parlour, a toy shop, another clothes shop, a sports shop, a book shop, pizza, prescription glasses, a bar. A small knot of people occupies the sidewalk in front of the bar. In the bar again, a similar picture to the butcher shop. A confused, friendly and crowded atmosphere, where everybody seems to know each other, and the barkeeper has
little to do. “People who hang out here know each other personally, all neighbours, friends and family, like a gang” (Tuscolano 2003). He laughs. In less than an hour I now know more than twenty new people by their first names. I conducted eleven short interviews and have collected several telephone numbers for more. It feels like having visited two neighbourhoods in a big city already. I had by no means expected such a familial and intimate welcome. A young woman excuses herself: “I do not have time to talk about the neighbourhood as I have to pick up my daughter at her uncle’s place. But maybe you would like to accompany me, as he [the uncle] will probably be happy to have a conversation with you” (Tuscolano 26: 2004). And as it turns out, her brother-in-law has a small photo/tobacco shop. After school, he looks after his niece until her mother comes back from work. As we arrive, we find them playing and blowing soap bubbles in front of the shop. There is more to these shops in Tuscolano than a commercial activity. They seem to be accents of neighbourly life. But how can their role be characterised and are they characteristic of Tuscolano?
According to Uexküll, to an ‘external’ observer, to a stranger walking through the neighbourhood, a familiar and thus neighbourly path in this foreign environment is just as invisible as is my own eccentric path (Uexküll 1957:70). And if we assume that the familiar, the neighbourly path articulates the stranger in its own Umwelt – of which there is no doubt – then there is no reason to deny the phenomenon of a characteristic neighbourly path; “since it is composed of identical elements”, all Ineinander (Uexküll 1957:70). If we further consider the shops as participating ‘things’ on the eccentric path of encountering Tuscolano, their Umwelt characteristics can provide a more differentiated understanding of their agency, once they become introduced as instruments: In this case instruments to measure the transformations of relations of public and private, of ‘neighbour’ and ‘hood’. The shops in Tuscolano are relatively small-sized private spaces, all having large shop windows to expose their goods and attract customers. This is part of their Umwelt structure. They are located directly on and facing public space, which is one of their Umwelt capacities. Each shop’s performance, however, also depends on their Umwelt collective, for example: what their neighbouring shops sell, if they are the only shops of their type, if there is much competition, what activity is to be found in front of the store, and if there is considerable transit or rather exclusive customer traffic. We want to claim, however, that the role of shops as meeting places for neighbours in Tuscolano does not depend as much on the Umwelt collective of their commercial activity, as the interests to buy goods and to meet people do not seem to necessary coincide. Whereas the Umwelt structure of the shops with their familiar size – we do not talk about department stores here -, their private owners and their directedness and openness to the public street is certainly relevant when it comes to their agency as meeting places. Key, however, is their degree of Umwelt capacity in terms of connecting private and public in Tuscolano. Their locations, facing the sidewalks, give the shops semi-public or semi-private atmospheres. This is even amplified through their structural location between the public street and the private flats above them. In other words, it is not the characteristic of shops in general to afford as meeting places but it is the degree of Umwelt capacity in their specific location connecting public and private that describes best the shops participation in the emergence of the phenomenon neighbourhood in Tuscolano. This is, however, not an articulation of the dynamic
forms of shops in Tuscolano, as this would require including a complex relation of architectonic levels of the *rhythm techne* – for example, the lack of meeting places on a neighbourhood scale. Rather the transformation of ‘thing’-*Umwelt* relations of the shops – introduced as instruments to measure the relation of ‘neighbour’ and ‘hood’ - points to their unique location between the public and private as agency for neighbourly action. In this line of thought, it also falls short to talk of appropriation of the shops as meeting places by the neighbours, as their degree of *Umwelt capacity* plays an active role in this context. In Tuscolano, the grouping of family, friends, and other ‘things’ around their most frequented shops articulated as accent for the (in the interviews) described neighbourhoods. Instead of an endless row of phlegmatic repetition of faceless shops, the repeating overtone of parasitic takeover by familiar gatherings –grouping commercially irrelevant activities around some of the shops – emerges as a shared *collective* of neighbourly *dynamic forms* in Tuscolano – a *collective rhythmic grouping*.

A brief comparison with the position of shops originally intended for the neighbourhood of Corviale shall further elaborate the differentiation of *Umwelt* characteristics. As a monumental ten-storey bar one kilometre in length, Corviale contains approximately 8.000 inhabitants. While the private apartments are hermetically sealed from the central access corridor which amounts to an anonymous public area of identical repetitions of doors, numbers and concrete surfaces, the fourth and fifth floor were originally planned to provide public services for the neighbourhood – a cultural and health centre, a cinema and commercial shops. These services, however, have never been realised. Instead they have been ‘abusivo’ occupied almost from the beginning for private living or professional activities as extensions of (and with direct access to) the apartments below or above on the vacant floors. Yet occasionally semi-public or semi-private activities on these floors open towards the access corridor and demonstrate the potential of *Umwelt capacity* and *collective* of their location. Although hardly visible for a stranger walking through the Corviale, the neighbours are proud of their initiatives for *collective* activities: “In lot 4 they meet

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207 For a further elaboration on the anonymous access corridor of Corviale see chapter (10) 214, for its historical development see chapter (7) 137.
to play cards” (Corviale8 2004). “Up there you can find a Lazio fan club but we have finally managed to counterbalance this with our own Roma fan club down the corridor” (Corviale13 2004). And “there are a lot of activities like our art studio here that is almost something like a meeting place for our friends in Corviale” (Corviale7 2004). Having never been exploited for private interests, these collective activities demonstrate the need for neighbourly life in Corviale and show the potential of the originally planned neighbourly services. In a comparison with Tuscolano, where the private flats develop at great distance (mostly vertical) from the public streets, the ‘abusivo’ collective occupation in Corviale also point at the potential neighbourly agency of the private apartments along the public corridors. Though their position directly borders public space (a theoretical Umwelt capacity) and their neighbours passing by to their own apartments (Umwelt collective), it is the Umwelt structure of the apartments hermetically separated from the corridor that inhibits any meeting agency whatsoever. In this line of thought, any ambition to strengthen the relation of ‘neighbour’ and ‘hood’ in Corviale would have to thematise the passage from private to public in the material structure between the flats and the corridor.

The brief investigations on the neighbourly agency of shops in Tuscolano and Corviale, through their different Umwelt characteristics, have demonstrated the analytic potential of rhythm techne for a more inclusive engagement with particular questions or problems. Such an analytic approach, however, can measure the potential Umwelt characteristics only through the transformation of the shops applied as research instrument, hence as re-presentation with its own rational assumption – implied in the two examples above, a pure distinction of public and private. It would be presumptuous to extend the analysis to any other level of the rhythmic articulation, as this would also mean to measure constellations of others with the same underlying rational and hence reduce the emerging phenomenon neighbourhood to a rational and static logic of a single

\[208\] Foucault argues in his book ‘Discipline and Punish’ (1979) that the structure of official buildings - like prisons, schools or factories – is a material manifestation of increasing surveillance and discipline in modern societies. In this line of thought, the Umwelt structure of the ‘dwelling prison cells’ of Corviale, no matter if we think of it as an intentional or unintentional result of human action, plays a decisive role for the social life of the neighbourhood, both in their materiality and as cultural symbol (Fahlander 2008 135).
oppositing relation. Yet the articulation of neighbourly form in our cities changes, and it is with this transformation that we will engage in the next two chapters.
This chapter attempts to understand how an aesthetic reflection in urban research may articulate the transformation of urban dynamic forms of a historically and culturally changing phenomenon neighbourhood. In particular, we engage with the different challenges of perceiving the Roman neighbourhood Torre Angela (Part II). This combines the discussion of a 'generative element' of group-form by Maki in Part I, which is articulated through rhythm techne on an eccentric path referring to Hölderlin’s tragic moment (Part III) and Merleau-Ponty’s de-centred phenomenology of perception (Part IV). Before entering on an aesthetic reflection on a tragic moment of Torre Angela, however, we recall the challenges of the relation between an observing researcher and the de-centred logos of the emerging phenomenon by referring to the application of the figure-ground relationship in urban studies.

According to Edmund Husserl, phenomenology monopolises the logos of the phenomena, since to speak about something is at the same time to speak from somewhere (Husserl 1980:67). Husserl, however, remains unable to capitalise on an eccentric path of the logos in his transcendental phenomenology, because understands the human body as physical object that possesses the sensations it localizes (Hansen 2005: 221). An elaboration on the distinction between a perception of two-dimensional façade projected to the retina, and a perception of a three-dimensional house including its hidden back demonstrates the fundamental difference to Merleau-Ponty’s aesthetic reflection of a figure-ground relationship. According to Husserl, the features of our perceptual experience are not limited to the sense-data stimulated by objects’ two-dimensional ‘fronts’, but include the hidden aspects of their backs. This is a necessary condition to distinguish a two-dimensional façade from a three-dimensional house (Husserl 1970:538). Thus, Husserl distinguishes between features of the house that we experience as determined (the front) and features that we experience as indeterminate (everything else). Although Merleau-Ponty is following Husserl in this distinction up to a certain degree, it is his different understanding of indeterminacy that leads to his de-centred phenomenology with a necessary
ambiguity within the phenomenon. “The main difference between their views is that Husserl claims the features of an object are hypothesized but sensibly absent, while Merleau-Ponty claims that they have a positive presence in our experience” (Kelly 2005:6). Merleau-Ponty talks here about the positive presence of a background in the perception of a figure, which includes our self-perception. If we look at a house, we do not perceive this house as a two-dimensional figure, even if we cannot imagine the back of the house or if we have never seen a house before. This is because we cannot separate the expression of a house from our own and hence the figure-ground relationship cannot be reduced to a relation of opposing. Rather it includes an ambiguity between the figure-ground relations of the encountering ‘things’, in this case the human and the house. “The perceptual ‘something’ is always in the Umwelt of something else, it always forms part of a ‘field’” (Merleau-Ponty 1962:4).209 Hence, the logos of an emerging phenomenon is de-centred to the encounter of the participating ‘things’.

Merleau-Ponty refers in this context to the famous Müller-Lyer lines, which for him are neither of the same length nor of unequal length (see figure 5.14 / Merleau-Ponty 1962:11). This claim is not made, of course, to tell us that we read the diagram as being ambivalent, in the sense of two different phenomena that refer to the same thing-in-itself. Nor can it mean merely that there is some context in which it serves no purpose to raise the question of the lines’ relative lengths. “We must try to understand how vision can be brought into being from somewhere without being enclosed in its perspective” (Merleau-Ponty 1962:67). In rhythmic terms, the Müller-Lyer diagram shows two different re-presentations of a relation of opposing (line and different ends), which is a perspective of reflective thought. The ambiguity of the phenomenon, however, emerges from the encounter with the human thinking in relations of opposing – hence it is only our judgment that is ambivalent, if we assume direct access and hence pure reflection of the diagram. In aesthetic reflection, it is the ambiguity that reverses (in the Hölderlin sense), hence not two different re-presentations that oppose each other (like the end of the lines) or any pure reflection posited opposite to a

209 The English “middle” (original French: “milieu” 1945:9) is replaced to match Merleau-Ponty’s later usage of “Umwelt” 1968a: 251).
presentation but presentations of relations of *oppositing* on architectonic levels that trace themselves in rhythmic articulation.
Figure 5.12 / Figure-ground Parma / (Rowe and Koetter 1983:62)

Figure 5.13 / Figure-ground Sant-Dié / (Rowe and Koetter 1983:62)

Figure 5.14 / Müller-Lyer lines / (Merleau-Ponty 1962:11)

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In the following, we further engage with this reversal of ambiguous relations referring to the application of the figure-ground relation in urban research, which received particular attention in the middle of the 20th century. As a pioneer of the debate, Colin Rowe founded his Design Studio at Cornell University in 1963 on the figure-ground relationship. In the projection of the three-dimensional structure of cities in two-dimensional figure-ground plans he developed dualist illustrations of cities through an opposing of buildings and vacant areas. This approach had been developed, on the one hand, through a thorough analysis of traditional European urban design and, on the other, via a study of the urban design works of the modern architect Le Corbusier. Accompanied by an enthusiasm for Le Corbusier's architectural works, the studies led to an urban perception as collage of modern and traditional design (Will 1998: 44). In particular, their reversal in the figure-ground illustration challenged the predominant paradigm of functionalism and reductionism and ‘object fixation’ in modern planning. In an abstract aesthetic judgment form a birds-eye view, Rowe and his colleague Koetter defined the change from the enclosed open space of the traditional city to modern urban design with its individual buildings distributed on open and fluid space as a reversal of the figure-ground illustration. Accordingly, a plan view of a traditional city like Parma (Italy / see figure 5.12) would appear as a black patch with white spots illustrating the programmed “voids” (market square, church square) in a largely unmanipulated solid mass of building (1983:63). In contrast, a plan view of Le Corbusier’s design for Saint-Dié (France / see figure 5.13) would show some isolated black solids (buildings) in a largely unmanipulated void (Rowe and Koetter 1983:62). Whereas in the traditional example of Parma, the market square is the distinct white figure against the more indistinct black background of a chaotic building mass, in Saint-Dié the distinct and programmed black buildings stand out against an undefined and limitless white open space. Along these lines, the typical figure of a traditional city is determined by an accumulation of squares whereas the figure of city of modern architecture is an accumulation of volumes. According to Rowe and Koetter, however, our present and future cities are neither black nor white, in the sense of Parma and Saint-Dié, but a collage of an indeterminate variety of different complex contextualisations. Collage is
understood here not as regulatory system, but as *re-presentation* of fragments, hybrids and *ambiguity* of sociocultural diversity (1963: 73 ff.). In this attempt to understand the correlations between the form of physical and socio-cultural relations of the city as complex saturation of meaning, Rowe and Koetter differ fundamentally from other urban scholars like Camillo Sitte or Aldo Rossi, who studied urban form predominantly in terms of its autonomous qualities (Will 1998:47). At the same time “Collage City” (1963) refuses the widespread tendencies of the period to understand the development of cities as a historically determined process of decomposition. Instead, and in the interpretation in this work, this is replaced by a more complex intertwinment of the human *encounter* with the urban.

A comparison of figure-ground illustrations from different historic times and cultures – in this case of the traditional city of Parma and a modern plan for Saint-Dié - necessarily remains on an abstract level, given that as entire cities they cannot *encounter* in the emergence of actual phenomena. In order to articulate *dynamic forms* of their *encounter*, which necessary includes relations of *ambiguity*, we examine a third example from Rowe and Koetter. Harlow New Town (United Kingdom) is an assemblage of the traditional and the modern city through the reintroduction of a programmed urban square amid a setting of isolated buildings. In Harlow, a traditional market place was realised through a closed arrangement of long, narrow buildings around a square. Behind the houses, however, Harlow does not present an vast mass of buildings familiar from traditional cities, but rather an open void with isolated buildings. Rowe and Koetter describe this setting as “a foreign body interjected into a garden suburb without the benefit of quotation marks” (1983:61). “At Harlow … there can be no doubt that what one is being offered is a ‘real’ and literal market-place; and, accordingly, the discrete aspects of the individual buildings played down, the buildings themselves amalgamated, to appear as little more than a casually haphazard defining wrapper. But, if the Harlow town square, supposed to be the authentic thing itself, a product of vicissitudes of time and all the rest, may be a little over-ingratiating in its illusory appeal, if one might be just a little fatigued with quite so enticing a combination of instant ‘history’ and overt ‘modernity’, if its simulation of medieval space may still appear believable as one stands inside it,
then as curiosity becomes aroused, even this illusion quickly disappears” (Rowe and Koetter 1984:60). From a birds-eye view of Harlow, the marketplace resembles a theatre stage that ‘stages’ itself in the middle of a modern city. Its historical stage-set pretends to act as a liberating valve for a determined collective activity informed by a background of everyday life in a vast building mass. It is possible to imagine for us a correlative experience of a person on the square, if we consider a short intense moment, for example a crowded square during a fair or public festival. Overwhelmed by the bustle, we could refer to the idea of a traditional market place. In other words, in the crisis of the play of imagination and understanding, we can enjoy the moment through the triumph of the aesthetic idea of a market place as a determined valve for chaos. This rational reflection would follow Kant’s analytic of the sublime. Hence, we have described above the static rationale of two Kantian extreme, subject-centred aesthetic judgments, a distant beauty and an overwhelming sublime. While in urban research these opposing subject-centred re-presentations are often considered as top-down or bottom-up approaches, the everyday of Harlow New Town is to be found in the dynamic articulation in the encounter of humans and the market square, or in Hölderlin’s words, in a rhythmic articulation of an eccentric path. Thereby, the city dwellers are at the same time observers and producers of the scene: they participate in the encounter of human and market square and refer not to isolated memories or infinite ideas but to courses of remembrance. If we consider the re-presentation of Harlow New Town a synthetic work of art, its rhythmic articulation on an eccentric path could be described as a dynamic relation to a sequence of presentations on a path through the city that passes by the market square (see also “hypothetical path” in chapter (16)). Then any presentation would include a ‘thing’-Umwelt relation (for example market square to modern or traditional city), and the relations of opposing in their re-presentations would trace themselves in the rhythm techne across the different architectonic levels of all involved participation: city dwellers, houses, streets, activities, or courses of remembrance.
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Figure 5.15 / Torre Angela 1950s / (De Angelis 2012:95)

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Figure 5.16 / Torre Angela 1960s / (De Angelis 2012:124)

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Figure 5.17 / Torre Angela 1970s / (Benevolo 1975:1032)

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Figure 5.18 / Torre Angela 1990s / (De Angelis 2012:175)
Figure 5.19 / figure-ground plan Torre Angela end of 1960s / (Krella 1993:54)

Figure 5.20 / figure-ground plan Torre Angela end of 1980s / (Krella 1993:56)
(re-iterated) Figure 5.21 / Torre Angela 2004 / Leda Ricchi 2004
This is an attempt to sketch out a rhythmic articulation of an urban ‘tragic moment’ in the Roman neighbourhood Torre Angela, considered here, in relation to Hölderlin’s elaborations on poetry, as synthetic work of aesthetic research. The development of the typical ‘abusivo’ neighbourhood was divided in the historically descriptive analysis of chapter (07) into two parts, before (132) and after (141) its legalisation in 1978. The figure-ground re-presentation from the 1960s demonstrates the building development for more than 30,000 inhabitants before 1978 (see figure 5.19). Here, a neighbourhood of detached two-storey buildings, which form groups around considerable open spaces, is reversed by the development after 1978 with an extreme and almost exhaustive density of buildings (see figure 5.20). But, as already argued in chapter (07), the political, economic and social relations have also changed considerably around this turning point of Torre Angela’s history. In particular, this effected the transformation or elimination of the gardens - private spaces with semi-public use - that connected the detached ‘palazzine’. In relation to Maki’s collective urban forms, these spaces of crystallisation of the social organisation were analysed as ‘generative elements’ of group-form in the emergence of the phenomenon ‘abusivo’ neighbourhood. This crystallisation of ‘abusivo’ organisation builds the main character, the hero of our urban tragedy of Torre Angela.

But why narrate an urban tragedy, if the historically descriptive analysis has already accounted for the “tragic” development of Torre Angela? There are different answers to this question: first of all, the attempt is not to understand an urban tragedy but to articulate dynamic forms of ‘thing’-Umwelt relations that participate in an emerging phenomenon neighbourhood through a rhythmic approach. Secondly, Part II offered an historically descriptive analysis of the development of Rome which constitutes a narrative thread, mainly informed by the interviews, in which the neighbours of Torre Angela all referred to a dynamic between the early days of the neighbourhood and its transformation after the 1980s. In addition, the description in Part II was informed by a contemporary Geist of urban research (in the Hölderlin sense of a poetic Geist) and was narrated with a Geist of a rhythmic articulation of urban research that developed.
through Part I-VI. 210 This Geist as part of a ‘thing’-Umwelt relation and an appreciation of the constellation of the others, also rejects any pure concept or relation of oppositing: hence not either art or nature, ‘organic’ or ‘aorgic’, analytic or poetic, but rather more analytic or more artistic. In this sense, the following attempt is called a synthetic work of aesthetic research that articulates a metaphor of research intuition and, in this way, challenges the limits of critical urban research through the articulation of ambiguous relationships of dynamic forms.

The following re-presentation provides only key points of the urban tragedy. From the 1950s to the late 1970s in Torre Angela, an ‘abusivo’ peripheral neighbourhood developed on a parcelled-out farmland comprising self-constructions by migrants, whose complex and close knit collective social organisation crystallised in the open private gardens connecting their new homes. The heroic character of this ‘generative element’ of the neighbourhood echoes through the whole process of Torre Angela’s transformation. But it is only in retrospect that the idealic basic tone of the heroic character appear, ignoring the unbearable living conditions of the times, lacking basic infrastructure and civil rights. 211 The caesura of the tragedy falls into the dynamics of the political decision to legalise Torre Angela. In the terms of Hölderlin’s “Remarks on Oedipus” (1974a), the intelligibility of the whole tragedy principally depends on interpreting the general planning regulations and the national Program (PEEP) for better living conditions too infinitively (or universally) and applying them to the particular case of Torre Angela. 212 In this way, the question of responsibility for the bad living conditions in Torre Angela was quickly and easily answered and projected “in-house” to the ‘abusivo’ structure of the neighbourhood. In order to understand the neglect of Umwelt relations in this context, we have to consider the ignorant treatment of “abusivismo” in the planning culture of the times as an isolated and resolvable evil. This is a tendency that is still all too present in

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210 For the use of Geist in the present work see chapter (09) 173.
211 This refers to Hölderlin’s aesthetic reflection of tragedy: “The tragic, in appearance heroic poem, is in its meaning idealic. It is the metaphor of an intellectual intuition” (Hölderlin 2009: 447).
212 Hölderlin notes here: “The intelligibility of the whole principally depends on considering the scene where Oedipus interprets the oracle too infinitely, and is tempted to the nefas. […] Oedipus immediately speaks like a priest: By what cleansing? […] And turns to the particular” (Hölderlin 2009: 468 / see chapter (09) 000)
contemporary planning discourses. These illegal building constructions, however, were not just a temporary trend of development that was intolerable because unauthorised. It is a phenomenon that is not reducible to its segregating consequences for public services and political participation; or to a temporary “wild card” played in order to solve the housing problem in times when public administration had not been able to give an adequate response (Catalano and Rosi 1983 390ff). ‘Abusivismo’ is rather a widespread process of city self-making, which defines social relationships and local economies, local self-management, identities and belongings, political relationships and ways of life. In Rome, ‘abusivo’ housing constructions accommodate one third of the entire population and are thus a key participant in its urban development (Krella 1993:14). The dictionary translates the Italian term ‘abusivo’ with “abusive, unauthorised, illegal, unlawful, illicit” (Bareggi 2001: 213, Giacomo and Kolb 2001:1292). In relation to housing, the present work wants to differentiate the terms “unauthorised” and “illegal” from other terms that are often applied interchangeably in the planning discourse and urban research like “squatting”, “informal” “spontaneous” or even “wild” settlements (Cellamare 2013, De Angelis 2012, Benevolo 1975). ‘Abusivo’ building constructions disregard administrative planning, planning authorities, and regulatory planning instruments, in this case, the land-use plan of Rome, but only if seen from a hegemonic understanding of urban planning and public order can everything beyond control be called “wild” or “spontaneous”. The urbanist Krella argues that in the Roman context the term “wild” was related to the independent element of self-constructing in ‘abusivismo’ and contained a defamatory connotation - in contrast to the unplanned or the illegal (Krella 1993:58). “Wild nature” or “wild tribes”, which signify the not yet cultivated or civilised, both have connotations of underdevelopment, immaturity and inferiority in regard to urban development (Krella 1993:58). These connotations - translated to the ‘abusivo’ constructions or its human actors, the “wild” dwellers - point to an a-social, a-cultural and a-historical no-man’s-land and makes the dynamic forms of social organisation, perception and interest of ‘abusivismo’ unrecognisable. The use of terms like “informal”, “spontaneous” or “autonomous” settlements in contemporary urban planning discourses intends to avoid the described

213 “Abusivismo” is the Italian noun to the adjective ‘abusivo’ and stands for the ‘abusivo’ way of settlement development.
defamations (Krella 1993:58). In the case of Torre Angela or other ‘abusivo’ developed settlements in the Roman periphery, however, these terms are also misleading, as neither the emergence of the houses nor of the neighbourhood are the results of informal, spontaneous or autonomous practices. The parcelling-out of huge agricultural areas on which the ‘abusivo’ settlements developed, followed the interest of and the best financial exploitation for the landowners. The construction of the houses and related issues like necessary distances between the buildings have been organised in complex negotiation processes between the first-generation owners, often orienting themselves to regulations for agricultural buildings. In particular the cultural and social processes that accompanied ‘abusivo’ urban developments in the periphery of Rome, open up an articulation of highly complex and coordinated actions, behaviours and reactions, all of which relate to formal and informal cultural backgrounds. Finally, the ‘abusivo’ settlements cannot even be understood as autonomous and self-regulated practices outside legally binding urban planning instruments, as they played a decisive role in co-regulating and co-determining these instruments and the urbanisation of Rome. Hence, if we have talked before about a too-universal understanding of political planning regulations, this was precisely not a claim for an isolated treatment of individualised problems, but to advocate the need for an aesthetic reflection of the ‘thing’-Umwelt relations of characteristic dynamic forms – in this case Roman ‘abusivo’ settlements - and especially its relation to constellations of others, hence collective rhythmic grouping.

In Hölderlin’s language of the “Remarks on Oedipus”, after the caesura - the peak of the cycloid course in the eccentric path -, where the knowledge has broken through its limits, this knowledge of legal planning regulations proceeds in an angry curiosity "as if intoxicated in its own magnificent and harmonious form, which can yet remain, at first, provokes itself to know more than it can bear or grasp" (Hölderlin 2009: 469).214 The subsequent narrative of the urban tragedy presents itself as a form of catharsis or frustration of a self-imposed fate of better living conditions through the settlement’s legalisation. To continue with the histrionic expressions of Hölderlin’s interpretations of Greek tragedy, the

214 This quote is a repetition from chapter (09) 193.
crystallisation of ‘abusivo’ organisation in the outer periphery of Rome would be the city’s abandoning of the new-born settlements. This relates first and foremost to the historic constellation after Mussolini’s politics of segregation and the unilateral interests of a monopoly of landowners. Following the historic development of the tragedy, the dramatic descriptions of ‘abusivo’ settlements in the everyday language in 1970s and 1980s in Rome as rampant outgrowth or even malignant tumour tissue (Denk 2001: 53) stigmatised these settlements as endogenous threats or even some kind of patricides. In line with this, the developing hybrid forms, like the “speculative abusivismo” discussed in chapter (07), are often associated with a smell of nepotism (TorreAngela7). While all these analogies with tragic elements of Oedipus the King have only little relevance if considered isolated, in their intertwinement they echo a tragic undertone present in the everyday life of Torre Angela. In fact, “new” forms of urban development like “speculative abusivismo” are not imposed by any outside force but articulate a transformation of complex ‘thing’-Umwelt relations of the ‘generative element’ of ‘abusivo’ group-form (the collective gardens in ‘abusivo’ settlements) through changing constellations of the other participating actors: increasing property value through legalisation, neo-liberal politics, shortage of central building land or a process of uprooting through generation changes. Many of these changing constellations were foreseeable. In addition, any contemporary aesthetic reflection of Torre Angela would have to consider also the increasingly diversified inhabitants (today, there are more than 100 different cultural backgrounds). Thereby, the tragic moment - which is here related to the “death” of the social organisation that was typical in the first-generation settlement and crystallised in the now built up private gardens - is not only referred to by interviewees but is the living reality of, over 50% of the contemporary population who are descended from pioneer families – from first- to fourth-generation (De Angelis 2012:224ff).

This leads us to some preliminary concluding remarks on urban aesthetic reflections through a rhythmic re-presentation of a tragic moment: (1) The rhythmic re-presentation of an urban tragic moment follows a tragic narrative thread on an eccentric path. It is a synthetic work of aesthetic research and hence does not claim to provide any complete articulation of a dynamic form.
However, through its *dynamic* articulation of the complexity of different urban research perspectives referred to the *eccentric path* of a heroic character - in this case the crystallisation of abusivo organisation in Torre Angela’s gardens –, it challenges the *oppositing* relations of critical research (neither subjective nor objective, neither particular nor universal) and provides an aesthetic reflection through their *ambiguous* relations across different rhythmic levels. (2) This aesthetic reflection articulates the transformation of *Umwelt* relations, which *is, more than ever,* relevant in contemporary urban transformations. Where Hölderlin identifies the transition of Greek to Hesperian poetic tragedy as a transition from the actual death of the hero and its death through exile and hence the change of ‘hero’-*Umwelt* relations (Hölderlin 1974a: 269), the urban tragedy of Torre Angelian hero is not its exile ‘into different constellations of others’, but the transformation of these constellations. In the contemporary urban tragedy it would not be the hero who is dying through the change of *Umwelt* relations, but the *Umwelt* relations themselves are declining. The vanished gardens were only the crystallisations of the ‘abusivo’ social organisation that was destroyed or dissolved through the changing constellations of legal, economic, political and cultural tendencies following Torre Angela’s legalisation. (3) The *re-presentation* of the historical transformation of *Umwelt* relations related to an urban tragic moment – as we have attempted to sketch out for Torre Angela – can be relevant in two ways: as a comparative example of the transformation of ‘abusivo’ related urban forms around the globe; and as a possibility for disclosing potentials to intervene critically in the driven urban development that has not only been a key promoter of the tragic moment but still impedes a necessary consideration of *Umwelt* relation. (4) If the potential of an aesthetic reflection through a rhythmic *re-presentation* of a historical development of an urban tragedy, is the challenging of the relations of *oppositing* in urban critical research through an articulation of the *ambiguity* in transforming ‘thing’-*Umwelt* relations, how can these be rhythmically articulated without having to refer to any tragic caesura? This is the goal of the next chapter.
This chapter elaborates on a rhythmic re-presentation as graphic score. While the previous two chapters engaged with the perception of ambiguous relations in an aesthetic reflection by an individual urban researcher in the encounter with a phenomenon neighbourhood, the graphic score attempts to rhythmically articulate the encounter between a neighbourhood and a collective of neighbours. Analogous to the previous experimental applications of rhythm techne, it assumes that there is an aesthetic of neighbourhood, which is articulated in relations of ‘neighbour’ and ‘hood’, private and public, and neighbourliness and strangeness. In distinction from the previous experimental applications, the underlying rationale is assumed here in relation to a collective of neighbours, and is called a ‘Walking Neighbourhood’ that is pacing out a hypothetical path through the neighbourhood. And finally, the transformation of this research instrument is not actualised through language but codified in a visual re-presentation on different layers of a score, the interrelations of which articulate the ambiguous relations of the aesthetic reflection.

RESEARCH DESIGN BASED ON SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS AND MORPHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS

The research set-up of the rhythmic re-presentation as graphic score is based on a collective of neighbours that encounter their neighbourhood, which contains themselves and the physical morphology of the neighbourhood. The focus of the research on morphological relations, architectural typologies, social communication and cultural symbols thereby refers to the research data collected in a six-month field research in 2003-2004. Besides morphological observations and numerous social encounters and conversations through the

215 This field research was co-financed by the Arnold-Knoblauch-Foundation. Some of the data from the interviews and a first version of the visual (graphic) score of four neighbourhoods was also part of my master thesis on “rhythmanalysis” at the London School of economic and Political Science (Pape 2004: 73-83). For further descriptions of the empirical research the present work draws on, see chapter (01) and chapter (04).
daily presence in the case study neighbourhoods, the field research included a sample of semi-structured interviews. The itinerant development of the research approach and its methodology has lead to highly complex research design including the application of different and experimental research techniques. This is briefly summarised in the following.

The total sample of interviewees was gathered through spontaneous *encounters* in the neighbourhood and via the snowball principle. The resulting different groups of friends and relatives were a key factor in building up relations of trust with the interviewees. In addition, my presence as German researcher conducting the interviews in Italian (i.e. in a foreign language) significantly changed the interview atmosphere. The interviewees stated on several occasions that they would have answered differently – if at all - to a Roman interviewer who might be suspected of information-gathering by local and public authorities (for example Corviale8, Corviale11).216 Over a period of six months, I conducted between 9 and 17 interviews in each neighbourhood, while I accompanied between 4 and 7 interviewees (each) for several weeks in different meetings.217 Striving for a wide range of different perspectives on the neighbourhoods, the composition of the total interviewee samples was diverse in terms of age, occupation and the date of moving into the area. In the first meeting with the interviewees, they were only introduced to the general theme of the research and handed out a disposable camera containing ten photos in order to document ordinary views and ‘things’ on their everyday walk through the neighbourhood. The interview was conducted in the following meeting, while the interviewees were first asked to draw their typical path through the neighbourhood on a white paper. Without any support of cartographic material, this was a confidence-building entry point to unfolding their neighbourly lifeworlds starting from their homes. Consequently, the semi-structured guide for the interview served only as general orientation (and was left with the interviewee thereafter in the form of a questionnaire). For the most part, the narrative thread of the interview followed the individual interpretation of the theme, the individual photographs and the

216 In particular, this suspicion was present in Corviale and Tor Bella Monaca, both neighbourhoods in which the police went on patrol only in plain-clothes at the time.

217 In the neighbourhood Case Rosse, I only managed to accompany one of the interviewees over a longer period.
sketched path of the interviewees. This interview strategy aimed firstly at producing individual approaches to the research themes: the phenomenon neighbourhood, everyday activities of the neighbours, their perception of their own ‘hood’ and their encounter with the physical and morphological environment as well as with their neighbours. Secondly, it served the stimulation of narratives that enriched the dialogue in alternation with the semi-structured interview guideline.

Consequently, the collective of neighbours, the ‘Walking Neighbourhood’ can be understood as a shared interpretation of the research theme as well as an accumulation of data from the interviews. In its prototype character, the ‘Walking Neighbourhood’ is an analogy to the ‘Walking City’ from Archigram (see figure 5.22), which radically questions the social and cultural relationship between individual and collective dwelling (Marić 2009). In this sense, with the ‘Walking Neighbourhood’, we build ourselves an instrument, and thereby project around it a collective cultural world (Merleau-Ponty 1962:169). It embodies a collective of prevalent aesthetic ideas of neighbourhood and, passing by the urban environment, documents the different encounters of perceiving and being perceived on different layers like in a musical score. While the hypothetical path is something like a common denominator of the individual interview paths, the ‘Walking Neighbourhood’ cannot account for its interior negativity: this is the dynamic between the neighbourly perceptions it is pregnant with and which ‘deviates’ the collective forms of the phenomenon neighbourhood from the individual lines-of-action. This dynamic is to be found in the articulation across the different layers of the score, in which the neighbourly actions manifest. Yet, it is the hypothetical path that endows the graphic score with a general structure that makes the single layers intelligible and the scores comparable. Like a

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218 This interview technique was developed in reference to Witzel’s “Problem-Centred Interview” (2000). What he called problem-, object-, and process-orientated, could be translated here as theme-, ‘thing’- and path-orientated interview (Witzel 2000: 4).

219 “Walking City” was presented by Archigram in 1964 (Sadler 2005) - in this case with the leading role by Ron Herron (Sadler 2005:14) – as a utopian conception of a nomadic city infrastructure, in which urban utilities would not be tied to a specific location. It is a “visually ‘organic’ machine that reconfigured the typical understanding of what a machine should both look like and do” (Schrijver 2009:103). Inspired by the technological progress, the “living machine” Unité d’Habitation by Le Corbusier and the first human in outer space (in 1961), ‘Walking City’ imagines a future, in which borders are abandoned in favour of a nomadic lifestyle.
musical score or a tragedy in text form, it is read from beginning to end, from left
two right, from private home (through the neighbourhood) to public city, yet its
meaning is rhythmically articulated across the layers in the encounter with us.
And if we would attempt to re-present this research setup again as an eccentric
path of urban tragedy, the loss of the pure subjective feeling of neighbourhood
would be its tragic moment and the exit of the private home would be the
caesura, followed by the reversal of the sequence of presentations that now trace
the pure public-private distinction across the layers.

Each layer is a re-presentation of a shared view and a collective accumulation of
a sequence of events. The analytical categories of the layers are thereby a
response to the collected qualitative data of the semi-structured interviews. The
evaluation of the interviews thereby followed a combination of the analysis of
narrative interviews by Gabriele Rosenthal and Wolfram Fischer-Rosenthal
(2004) and the analysis of semi-structured interviews by Christiane Schmidt
(2004). The intention of the evaluation was thereby a shared understanding
rather than a confirmation of preliminary considerations, as an analysis
appropriate to interviews with open questioning cannot interpret the material
according to pre-determined categories (Schmidt 2004: 253). At the same time
these categories are partially pre-designed through the theoretical assumptions
that enter into the narrative of the interview. In an analytical understanding, these
assumptions initially and provisionally even created a shared understanding. This
cannot be separated, however, from a permanently on-going process of
interpretation in actuality. In relation to a creation of categorical layers, however,
“the narration of an experience [in the interviews] seems to be a suitable vehicle
for imparting one’s own experiences to others, as a result and a process, in such
a way that both they and the narrator can reconstruct these experiences and
thereby jointly understand them” (Rosenthal and Fischer-Rosenthal 2004: 259).
The analytical strategy of setting up categorical layers in response to the narrated
data is described layer by layer in the following. All the interviews were coded
according to these layers, which are brought together through the general
structure of the hypothetically collective path. Hence, the eccentric path across

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220 For the design and first evaluation of the research I worked with the original German versions of
these texts in Flick, Kardorff and Steinke 2000.
the layers in the *encounter* with us attempts to challenge the critical limit of an understanding of how *collective rhythmic grouping* articulates in the emergence of a phenomenon neighbourhood.

The categorical layers in this analytical strategy not only transcribe the interplay between the collected narrative data from the interviews and prior theoretical assumptions but they also refer to morphological observations. The interrelation between narrations and morphological considerations were present throughout the whole process of conduct and evaluation of the interviews, again between theoretical considerations in reaction to literature and theoretical traditions, and observation during exploration of the research field. Figure 5.24 *re-presents* an example of analytical morphological engagement related to the layers, and this refers to the morphological aspects of the historically descriptive analysis of the case study neighbourhoods in Part II.

The categorical layers are described alongside the neighbourhood Garbatella, one of the first projects of council housing in Rome. From chapter (06) we want to recall the claim that in Garbatella, regardless of the palimpsest of fundamental transitions, the original characteristics of the architectural and detailed physical design with social gardens and courtyards as well as differentiated visual *encounters* is a significant participant in the emergence of the phenomenon neighbourhood.221 While the interpretation of building types and compositions was different in each of the five construction phases of Garbatella between 1920-1940 - more compact, complex, differentiated or homogenous (Rappino 1974) – they all reflect a morphological arrangement of the buildings in groups of detached houses standing guard over related courtyards (see chapter (06) 110ff.). These compositions also create an interference of the aesthetic reflection through the *re-presentation* of the Garbatellian rhythmic visual score (see figure 5.24). Referring back to the experimental approach to analysis *Umwelt* characteristics in chapter (14), these compositions relate to a repeating *collective Umwelt* characteristic of neighbourly action – with action understood as possible

221 The transformation of Garbatella in the last 80 years includes very different general conditions of the buildings, as well as of economic realities with public and private property, home owner or tenants, whose contemporary monthly rents ranges from 1500 Euro to 9 Euros for an equivalent two room flat (Sinatra 2006:132; Garbatella7 2003).
participation, resulting in different lines-of-action, whereas the Umwelt relation is the ‘deviation’ from these lines-of-action. It is not the recorded ‘thing’ or action that articulates dynamic forms in the visual score but their eccentric path which is articulated in the encounter between the visual score and the reader. This specific research set-up is thereby grounded on the proposition that in perception we have access to encounters in the phenomenal field through a ‘deviation’ from the line-of-action - through being pregnant with negativity, which is a correlative with the participation in action. In this way, each layer presents collective neighbourly accumulations of a relation of opposing, which traces itself in the rhythmic articulation across the layers. In Merleau-Ponty’s language: the invisibility of the perceptual encounter with us is present in the interrelation of the layers. Hence, the attempt is to aesthetically reflect collective rhythmic grouping as a repetition in the rhythmic sequence of presentations in the graphic score.

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222 This specific set-up of the field research and its reference to a collective of neighbours provides many characteristics in accordance with the approach of the “Situationist International” (see Sadler 1999, Debord 2004: 31) and Guy Debord’s “Theory of the Dérive” (1981) that is strongly influenced by Lefebvre’s “Critique of Everyday Life” (1991b). In contrast to Lefebvre (see chapter (01) 12 and chapter (10) 211 and the human-centred reading of the “derive” (see Hill 2003: 66), in the present work the ‘deviation’ from the line-of-action refers to a necessary invisibility (Merleau-Ponty 1968a). Based on a non-classical ontology, the encounter as de-centred logos of the phenomenon articulates urban dynamic forms on an eccentric path (Hölderlin 1961).
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Figure 5.22 / Walking City Archigram 1964 / (Sadler 2005:39)

(re-iterated) Figure 5.23 / Garbatella / Anntonello Mazzai 2004
Circular division of Layer one:
2 min / 5 min / 10 min

Styodur model of physical morphology of ‘path’

Figure 5.24 / Study of Garbatella ‘path’ Timothy Pape 2016
Figure 5.25 / Garbatella 2 / Anntonello Mazzai 2004

Figure 5.26 / Garbatella 'path' / Timothy Pape 2004
Starting from a private home, the hypothetical path of Garbatella leads through the attached courtyard, another courtyard, on the street, by-passing a courtyard to the next and so on (see figure 5.26).223

Layer two (see figure 5.27):
The black lines illustrate activities on the right or left of the walk that involve or potentially involve other humans. In this sense, the well tended flowers in the garden articulate the presence of the old lady (see figure 5.23), who thus participates in this particular composition of an urban form in the encounter with the perceiving body walking by, even if she, the old lady, is not physically present. The position of each bar stands for a temporal position - measured in seconds and minutes of clock-time -, thus for the moment of passing by in the sequence of presentations that is spatially located through the hypothetical path (see figure 5.26).

Layer one (see figure 5.28):
This layer is accompanied by another temporal layer, which categorises sections of the walk according to the distance to one’s private lodging. These categorised sections refer to narrated practices from the interview, hence to practiced time, which is already a rhythmic articulation of the encounter with ‘things’ and thus includes the taken for granted ‘deviation’ of their actions in achieving potential aims: leaving home for anything within a distance of less than two minutes is not asking for any thoughtful decision or even much preparation (this is often seen as “spontaneous”). One would probably not even bother putting on proper clothes, but might walk in tracksuit bottoms to the corner shop, if it was just across the street. This correlates with the use in our everyday language, where to say no to a question like ‘do you have two minutes?’ in most cases would be considered contemptuous, as ‘two minutes’ implies asking for “no” effort. Consequently, the time span up to five minutes stands for “little” effort, whereas a ten-minute walk

223 The visual score presented here is a substantial further development of a grafical score presented in my master thesis in Media and Communication at the London Scoul of Economics and Political Science in 2004 (Pape 2004: 73-83).
from home already involves thoughtful decisions and planning. Activities that take place beyond the walking distance of ten minutes - often referring to work or higher education and to not everyday activities - were in the conducted interviews and questionnaires almost without exception not regarded as part of the neighbourhood and are thus excluded from this analysis. Bound by abstract and practiced categories related to time, the first two layers of analysis are regarded as a sequential distribution and accumulation of collective activities participating in the emergence of the neighbourhood. Hence, they provide parts of dynamic forms as basis for rhythmic groups like the notes in music. These ‘notes’, however, do not provide aesthetic qualities of the relations between them and hence of rhythmic groups. Rather they could be regarded as abstract description of the anonymous path of a stranger walking through the neighbourhood as direct access way to somewhere else.

Layer three (see figure 5.29):

Layer three and four tackle the spatial characteristics of the neighbourhood for each individual in the collective, referring first and foremost to the qualities of proximity. The fact that the dwellers have their homes here leads to an actual coexistence in the same urban territory and a reciprocal relationship resulting from being neighbours, which includes processes of mutual recognition that articulate thanks to proximity (Mayol 1998:9). Whereas layers one and two mainly referred to actions and practises, layer three describes the attunement of the ‘Walking Neighbourhood’ on the paths through different stages of socially being seen. Whether seen from an actual human being, from a commercial activity (shop), or a cultural symbol (private window) or any ‘thing’ potentially involving ‘being seen’ (for example technical devices, religious symbols) in the neighbourhood, the degree of recognition of the passer-by and consequently the quality of a potential social communication depends on the proximity in perception. In an evaluation of the interviews this led to a threefold graded classification in the analysis reaching from “social fore-ground” (black), “social middle-ground” (grey) and “social back-ground” (white). The social fore-ground refers to a confident identification of other human beings, where one is, due to civilised behaviour patterns, even forced to acknowledge the presence of a neighbour, often resulting in a small talk. While this is most likely to happen within
a distance of ten meters, the social middle-ground reaches up to thirty metres, a limit in which it is still possible to visually identify a face (this refers to the human body-Umwelt structure and capacity). Between neighbours, this results usually in a short-greeting gesture such as a wave, unless there is any specific intention for further communication. Anything over thirty metres is considered to be social back-ground, as it is no longer possible to clearly identify a person at such a distance. Due to the scale of the buildings along the path, with a maximum height of three or four stories, and the organisation of the buildings, always facing a courtyard and a small street, the scenes created walking through the Garbatella can be described as a constant alternation between social fore-ground and social middle-ground.

Layer four (see figure 5.30):
The final layer grasps private neighbourly practices in public (in general anonymous others), in which little by little a private individual Umwelt relation insinuates itself as a result of everyday practice (Mayol 1998:9). The red surfaces illustrate an individual practice (at home or in the neighbourhood) that was considered private in the interviews. In Garbatella, this was narrated, for example, as the neighbourly caring for the vegetable gardens and flowers, hanging of laundry or playing cards in the courtyard attached to one’s own lodging (Garbatella8). The pink surface signifies a ‘similar’ practice or potential practice, usually resulting from the superpositing of the “red surface” practice just described or cultural symbols from a related level of the rhythmic articulation. This superpositing in perceiving in the encounter with others refers to a constellation of other (for example to the rhythmic group of a “red surface” and, in this way, produces a rhythmic repetition. In our example, awareness of the effort and care with which one treats the gardens attached to one’s own lodging participates in a reversal perceiving the well-tended flowerbeds of the neighbours in the next courtyard on the path, both of which transform their ‘thing’-Umwelt relation in the emergence of the actual phenomenon. The same goes for other ‘private neighbourly practices’, but also for conscious memories or cultural symbols in the course of remembrance. Hence, in an aesthetic reflection on the eccentric path of the interviewee encountering the neighbourhood, the composition of a rhythmic group in the courtyard attached to one’s own lodging
can repeat through a grouping of other courtyards around the same activity or ‘thing’. This would be called an accent around which the different courtyards are grouped and through which they ambiguously relate across different layers of the rhythmic articulation. This individual rhythmic of perceiving courtyards can be traced as repetition of similar constellations across the layers.

As the graphic shows, the activities on Layer 2 that coincide with the red and pink surfaces on Layer 4 are all activities that happen in the courtyards (see figure 5.30). Yet, the activity ‘caring for flowers’ is not the only one that coincides with the red surfaces and repeats in nearly all of the pink surfaces. As mentioned before, other interviewees considered (for example) the laundry or the corners where old men gamble as a private activity (Garbatella3, Garbatella16). In fact, the layers in the graphic score refer to a collective of neighbours, the ‘Walking Neighbourhood’, and - in the present interview sample – the interviewees referred to particular, private, narrated activity in the courtyards attached to their lodgings, which can also be witnessed in most of the other Garbatellian courtyards. In the language of the present work, the aspects of the Umwelt characteristics of their homes relates also to other courtyards. Hence the repeating collective form is not only the ‘clotheslines’, the ‘corner for gambling’ or the ‘gardens’ (all with or without acting neighbours) but the dynamic form of the courtyards. This is composed of a specific activity considered as private and the constellation of other ‘things’ present in Garbatellian courtyards. In other words, passing through or by a courtyard, the dwellers of Garbatella are perceiving, under the eye of the neighbourhood, the dynamic form of the Garbatellian courtyards articulated as grouping unaccents (the perceiver, houses, windows, small walls, other passers-by but also ‘things’ that their neighbours might consider as private) around accents, which they themselves regard as private. This is a collective rhythmic grouping. For every single neighbour, this composition is perceived differently and changes due to altering circumstances every single time one passes by a courtyard. All interviewed neighbours, however, share the collective rhythmic grouping of the dynamic form of the Garbatellian courtyards. In this case, they

224 Although not significant for the argument in this paragraph, it is worth mentioning that the private activities exclusively related to one’s own lodging, or rather the attached courtyard, is a particularity of the case of Garbatella. As the comparison with the other case studies will show, it is also possible that privately considered activities take place away from home.
are regarded as collective accents for their phenomenon neighbourhood, as all interviewees constantly referred to the courtyards in a course of remembrance, and repeatedly group the ‘things’ of Garbatella in relation to the courtyards. The neighbours’ reflection on this dynamic articulation in the interviews and questionnaires points at the involvement of more distant aesthetic judgments but also at their overwhelming by the context. In particular, this was notable, when they included some services in the neighbourhood but excluded others. For example, a supermarket, which could be reached on a path continuously passing through or by courtyards, was regarded as belonging to their ‘own’ neighbourhood, although in a walking distance of fifteen to twenty minutes. On the contrary, a close supermarket (equally within the political border of Garbatella) that interrupted this rhythmic repetition of courtyards was excluded (Garbatella3 2003).

In rhythm techne, this could be re-presented as: The courtyard participates in the emergence of the phenomenon ‘Garbatellian Neighbourhood’, not as object but as ‘thing’, superposed from a related architectonic level in the rhythm. Its dynamic form articulates in a rhythmic grouping as accent, which repeats in Garbatella’s re-presentation as synthetic work of aesthetic research in the rhythmic sequence of presentations across the layers of the graphic score. In its dynamic articulation the Garbatellian courtyard challenges the distinctions of private-public, individual and collective, ‘neighbour’ and ‘hood’, as its collective rhythmic grouping articulates the ambiguous relation of these relations of opposing on an eccentric path.

Reflecting on the elaboration on Garbatella, the convincing key role of the courtyards, on the one hand, helped to aesthetically reflect on the complex articulation of collective rhythmic grouping. On the other hand, one might object that such a complex aesthetic reflection is not necessary to understand the courtyards as characteristic for Garbatella. Yet collective rhythmic grouping should not be mistaken for the judgment of a determined characteristic. If we think of our own neighbourhoods, we probably and immediately have something in mind, which makes them characteristic and distinguishes them from other neighbourhoods. For the interviewees in the case study neighbourhoods in Rome
it was, however, rather difficult to explain these characteristics, if not through a narration of their own participation or simply referring to it as atmosphere or rhythm of the neighbourhood. And if we start to talk about other neighbourhoods, this becomes even more difficult. Yet all the more important, if we are convinced to know the characteristics of our own neighbourhood, this knowledge tends to rely on our subject-centred judgment on our own characteristic participation, which makes the so-called ‘characteristic’ exclusive. A neighbour who cares for flowers would probably declare the neat gardens in the courtyards as a characteristic of Garbatella, neglecting at the same time all neighbours who do not care that much about the gardens. The collective rhythmic grouping presented above distinguishes itself from the subject-centred perspective as an aesthetic reflection that articulates ambiguity in the dynamic form of the courtyards, in other words their openness for different participations (laundry, gambling corner). In this way, it challenges the exclusiveness of characteristics and provides an integrated understanding of participation. At the same time, however, it is not universally inclusive. The collective rhythmic grouping articulates the ambiguous relation between individual participation and constellation of others.
(re-iterated figures 2.09 – 2.26) Figure 5.31

Torre Angela / Leda Ricchi 2004

Garbatella / Anntonello Mazzai 2004

Tuscolano / Timothy Pape 2004

Corviale – Corridor / Leda Ricchi 2004

Corviale / Leda Ricchi 2004
Figure 5.32 / Comparison graphic scores neighbourhoods / Timothy Pape 2016
Figure 5.34 / Comparison graphic scores neighbourhoods / Timothy Pape 2016
The following elaboration engages further with the collective rhythmic grouping in a comparison of the case study neighbourhoods. In particular, it reflects on the research set up with a focus on the role of morphological structures and social encounters in a rhythmic re-presentation of dynamic form in the graphic score of the different neighbourhoods (see figures 5.31-5.34). This style of theorizing does not aim for universality but is regarded as a contribution to the fragmented array of on-going discussions across the neighbourhoods (Robinson 2011:23).

The courtyards of the Garbatella, which we consider as (collective) accents in the emergence of the phenomenon Garbatellian neighbourhood, are organised around different sections such as vegetable gardens or areas for children that are hemmed with small walls, which, dug into the ground or lifted to a sitting height, stage the place. Its surrounding buildings are slightly displaced while the closing terrace front appears diagonal to it and thus already gives an idea of the next courtyard. One visual perspective always includes a variety of visual sequences. Providing different qualities of stay, in particular the specific visual composition of the Garbatellian courtyards guarantees a high social accessibility for neighbours and public. In a comparison with the other case studies the decisive role of this accessibility of neighbourly urban form shall be emphasised through an aesthetic reflection of the related collective rhythmic grouping. This leads to a further differentiation of the relation of opposing accessibility-inaccessibility of social encounters, which is distinguished according to participation in rhythmic articulation. Falling back into the analytic of a human centred aesthetic judgment, we will discuss three categories: inaccessible other from within, inaccessible other from the same, inaccessible other from without.

In the chapters (07) and (15) we have described a characteristic social organisation that has developed and crystallised in the open private garden structure in the ‘abusivo’ neighbourhood Torre Angela before its legalisation in the late 1970s. Having for the most part no physical limitations such as fences or walls, the open landscape between the ‘palazzine’ provided a neighbourly life, which retrospectively shows several parallels with the one of the Garbatella today.
regarding everyday practices. Yet, in the course that followed the dynamics of Torre Angela’s legalisation, the morphological structure of these points of crystallisation of neighbourly social organisation disappeared. Today, the gardens are fenced and often reduced to their minimum possible size providing at best a small front garden for private family activities (see figure 5.31). For reasons of increasing anonymity, crime, social and cultural conflicts, as well as a general lack of social solidarity, Torre Angela has been declared an “urban recovery zone” by the city authorities since the late 1990s (Comune di Roma 1992, 2002 and 2016). If we look at the graphic score of Torre Angela, however, at least layer 3 seems to promise a potential for everyday social encounters (see figure 5.32). In addition, the figure-ground illustration of the end of the 1990s shows a high density of buildings, which nevertheless still provides a significant net of ‘unbuilt’ spaces (see figure 5.20). With the limited perspective focussing on morphological structures and the potential social encounters, this triggers the following three inferences: (1) If we consider the open gardens as accent of the first generation Torre Angela, the comparison with Garbatella and its courtyards suggests that the culturally, politically and economically changing circumstances in late twentieth century in Rome do not necessarily obliterate social organisations of neighbourhoods that we have described as characteristic for the ‘abusivo’ settlements. (2) The discrepancy of potential and actual social encounters in the particular case of Torre Angela reinforces the importance of an aesthetic reflection on the transformation of urban dynamic form (which the rhythmic representation of the tragic moment of Torre Angela has experimentally demonstrated in chapter 15). (3) Most importantly, however, the different experimental analytics of a rhythmic approach to Torre Angela show that dynamic form should not be mistaken as composition of a determined part plus indeterminate or open part, which promises to adapt to changing circumstances. The transformation of urban dynamic form refers to a transformation of a determined ‘thing’-Umwelt relation, which entails the ambiguous relationship of individual participation to the constellation of others. In fact, we claim here that the stubborn clinging to a determined participation in the dynamic form of social organisation in Torre Angela plays a significant role in preventing the neighbours from grasping the alternating potentials for social encounters. The neighbours of Torre Angela seem to seek refuge in a nostalgic and subject-centred aesthetic
judgement of their neighbourhood, which could be called an ‘inaccessible-other-from-inside’.

Empirical investigation of the recently legalised ‘abusivo’ neighbourhood Case Rosse provides an example of a contemporary ‘abusivo’ social organisation in a morphological structure comparable to first-generation Torre Angela (figures 5.33-5.34). In part because of issues of access to research data and an insignificant sample of interviewees but primarily because of radically different social compositions of the neighbourhood, the intended comparison proved difficult. The interviews conducted indicated that for many neighbours the choice to settle ‘abusivo’ in the far outer periphery of Rome was an intentional decision for an individual and independent life style with little need of mutual neighbourly support. Another case study that was chosen in direct relation to Torre Angela, is Tor Bella Monaca: a social housing project from the 1980s, which was developed next to Torre Angela with the intention of compensating for the lack of public services in the ‘abusivo’ settlement (see chapter (07) 137). While the interviews confirmed the use of these services by Torre Angelian neighbours, they were not considered as part of their neighbourhood, which excludes their possible relevance in the specific set up of the graphic score (see figures 5.32 and 5.34).

In order to move to another proposed category of accessibility, we now engage with the graphic score of Tuscolano. This is a neighbourhood from 1950s, developed with speculative building practises, which resulted in an extremely high density of buildings for about 100.000 people (see chapter (14)). Providing an uncountable number of activities (see figure 5.32, Tuscolano, layer 2) on the street and especially around the shops, Tuscolano seems to be a paradise for social encounters. As the fourth layer shows, however, these activities only infrequently relate to activities considered as private. Rather, their universal and functional structure articulates monotony, an endless repetition of the same. This points at the necessary individual participation in collective rhythmic grouping. In fact, only small but decisive differences seem to change the dynamic form of the shops into accents in the articulation of social encounters in the neighbourhood. These differences are ambiguous relations between the collective and any individual participation, the latter of which we would aesthetically judge from
subject-centred perspective as characteristic: the bar, where we drink the everyday evening coffee, accompanied by a brief chat with the landlord; the bike-shop, if we are passionate bikers or the shops of friends and family (see figure 5.31). Collective rhythmic grouping should not be mistaken for universal and anonymous structures that have to be filled with life or which have to be appropriated. Such a universal interpretation of collective rhythmic grouping, hence the separation of ‘individual subject’ and ‘constellation of others’, would lead to an ‘inaccessible-other-from-the-same’.

A third notion of accessibility of social encounters refers back to the discussion of the neighbourhood Corviale (see chapter (07) 137). In the specific set up of the experimental rhythmic re-presentation through a graphic score, the emergence of neighbourhood is reduced to a maximum walking distance of fifteen minutes from home. In Corviale, this coincides with the empirical findings that the greatest potential for neighbourly life is predominantly bound within the linear council-housing mega-form. As the graphic score (see figure 5.32) unequivocally demonstrates, it is difficult to find any neighbourly social encounters in the access corridors or in the immediate surrounding of the ‘housing machine’. The morphological organisation of the flats realises a hermetic separation of private and public space and, in this sense, reflects its exterior physical appearance of a wall that separates it from the rest of the city (see chapter (10) 214). Although there are many areas designed for neighbourly social encounters, the separated and universal morphological materialisation of Corviale locks up the life of the inhabitants in their private flats. While having a nice view over the city on the one side and a national park on the other, even the closest areas around the building degrade to a distant and fuzzy ‘back-ground’ (see figure 5.32, Corviale, layer 3). Consequently, in the rhythmic re-presentation as graphic score, the mega-structure Corviale (where neighbours are constantly facing a separating wall) amounts to a symbol for ‘inaccessible-other-from-outside’. On the one hand, this points to the potential to transform the neighbourhood with manageable physical restructurings that perforate the hermetic divide. On the other hand, the “empty” graphic score of Corviale also points at the limits of the theoretical assumptions underlying this experimental research set up. In other words, if we measure the emergence of neighbourhood through an aesthetic reflection of the articulation of
*dynamic form* in the *encounter* between public and private (and with a focus on *social encounters* in physical space), there is no neighbourhood Corviale.

In a consultation for the municipality of Rome in 2004 on an urban plan for a “revitalisation” of Corviale, a comparison with the council housing mega-form Vigne Nuove (chapter (07) 136), which was realised attached to the neighbourhood Tufello (chapter (06) 114), made a decisive contribution in this context. The new neighbourhood development plan mainly provided a set of public services outside the mega-structure, an urban context that already existed in Vigne Nuove with the services of Tufello within walking distance of not more than fifteen minutes from home. However, as the comparable “emptiness” of the graphic scores of Corviale and Vigne Nuove demonstrates, this new set up could not provide any transformations of the *dynamic forms* of *social encounters* for the neighbourhood. In 2015, the municipality of Rome launched an architectural competition addressing the physical restructuring of the corridors and the base area of Corviale with the aim to change the *dynamic* of *social encounters* in the neighbourhood. While this might seem obvious after the previous discussion, interventions in existing urban forms that thematise *dynamic relations* between social and physical *Umwelt* relations only increase gradually. This also points to a shift in planning practice, to which the rhythmic approach of the present work aims to contribute.

The brief comparison of the rhythmic graphic score of the eight case study neighbourhoods in the periphery of Rome has introduced very different questions, potentials and limits of this analytic rhythmic experiment. In contrast to the accessible *collective rhythmic grouping* of the *dynamic form* of Garbatellian courtyards (in *social encounter* with morphological compositions), the discussion has demonstrated three related forms of inaccessibility: inaccessible-other-from-inside as a clinging to a determined composition of *collective rhythmic grouping* in *social encounters* that have lost their urban forms in the emergence of the phenomenon neighbourhood through a historical change of the constellation of the morphological *Umwelt* relation (Torre Angela); inaccessible-other-from-outside as social segregation through the reduction of *collective rhythmic grouping* to a morphological relation of *oppositing* (Corviale); and inaccessible-
other-from-the-same as a social apathy through the repetition of universal and functional morphological form (Tuscolano). Apart from the limits of the empirical research data collected in the present work, most notably the graphic scores of Corviale, Tor Bella Monaca and Vigne Nuove have demonstrated the limits of a rhythmic approach if based on an analytical relation of oppositing (in this case public-private). And this goes for all three experimental applications of rhythm technē in chapters (14), (15), and (16). The presented approaches are not all-encompassing but as a contribution on an eccentric path to (and with) empirical research techniques that refer to reflective thought. In other words, the analytically involved rhythmic re-presentations of an aesthetic reflection articulate ambiguous relations and thus challenge the limits of the combined critical techniques of empirical analysis and understanding. Hence, the aim of the three experimental applications of rhythm technē was to demonstrate the potential for its integration in empirical urban research techniques and debates as aesthetic contribution and challenge of an urban environment reduced to relations of oppositing of reflective thought.
This thesis has taken an experimental path through philosophical, artistic, social and morphological aspects of urban research. Using a de-centred phenomenological approach, it rhythmically articulates urban dynamic forms. These itinerant and progressing aesthetic reflections are an attempt to contribute to urban research by challenging the limits of reflective thought in the urban field.

The question that arises with such a dynamic approach that leaves the secure procedure and standpoint of any disciplinary perspective, or even of reflective thought itself, is whether such a reflective approach should continue on an eccentric path or whether it is possible or opportune to gain validity through a critical judgment from remote measurements. In these concluding remarks, I attempt to re-open and relate the thesis to the different implications of academic standpoints and subject-centred aesthetic judgments in urban research through alternating tendencies of reflection. I begin with a sequence of more informative (descriptive-analytic), more argumentative (descriptive-aesthetic) and more persuasive (aesthetic-analytic) reflections, followed by some remarks on the actuality of collective rhythmic grouping.

OBJECTIVE VALIDITY OF A DE-CENTRED PHENOMENOLOGY

The thesis is re-presented as a sequence of different presentations of encounters with philosophy, art and the urban field, all of which participate with altering linguistic and visual re-presentations on different levels in the rhythmic articulation of the thesis’ dynamic form. As the thesis progresses, however, its parts become more closely related with critical research methods and experimental treatments. This progressive path-finding refers to various reciprocal relations of oppositing (in Hölderlin’s words) or reflective thought (in Merleau-Ponty’s words), in order to open them to dynamic relations of coexistence and ambiguity across architectonic levels of rhythmic articulation.

This is, at the same time, a potential, challenge and limit of the thesis: It needs to touch various fields of research and practice in order to be able to relate them...
rhythmically but cannot engage with all of them thoroughly in the same way. Accordingly, the thesis is neither a conclusive study of the urban field or any disciplinary perspective on it, nor is it an encompassing account of urban rhythmic articulation. It is an experiment that develops in an essayistic style.

I begin the thesis with an investigation of *dynamic form* in urban research (Part I). However, rather than following the logics of contemporary debates in urban studies, the discussion is driven by the implications of a *dynamic* approach, and it is guided by the limits of the data raised from the empirical studies. I engage predominantly with the concepts and procedures of urban studies that a de-centred phenomenological approach challenges – for example pre-determined ideas of urban form that separate social and material, temporal and spatial dimensions – and, in this way, start to develop a vocabulary for rhythmic articulation. A thoroughly justified challenging of the various themes and disciplines seems to be, on the one hand, not feasible before developing the rhythmic approach, and, on the other hand, often problematic because of the lack of common ground - as I discussed in relation to Lefebvre. For the same reason, contemporary and, at first glance, more closely related urban research debates, (such as theories of assemblage and performance) are only discussed in relation to their implications for de-centred phenomenology. This aligns with the proposed research design for a *rhythm techne*, which does not seek to be measured against disciplinary or grand theories but develops in *encounters* with their participation. Providing no definite disciplinary frame for the research approach, however, prevents at the same time the possibility of reintegrating and critically reflecting the research results from a single standpoint.

The strategy of integrating an aesthetically-related selection of literature runs through the entire thesis, partly because it is difficult to find current authors in the research fields of urban rhythm and urban perception that challenge subject-centred standpoints and procedures (Part III and IV), and even here the predominant use of Western (or even European) literature in this context points to a cultural bias in the proposed rhythmic approach. The data collection and choice of the empirical case studies draws on the distinction between public and private dimensions in de Certeau's studies of everyday life in neighbourhoods and
research studies on environmental behaviour. In Part II I discuss the problem of these theories for a de-centred phenomenological approach. At the same time this narrow focus of the empirical research on the distinction of public-private related to social and morphological aspects in the emergence of phenomena neighbourhood contributed significantly to the discussion of rhythm technē (Part V), which draws on the narrative thread of physical and morphological development of emergent neighbourhoods of the periphery of Rome in Part II. The investigations on collective rhythmic grouping also point to the need for a systematic account of ethnographic research as well as more explicit elaborations on Roman characteristics through cultural and geographical comparisons. In particular, a further engagement with different concepts of home and neighbourhood in ethnographic and sociological research as well as urban and suburban environments in geography would enhance the aesthetic and critical reflection regarding the experimental applications of the rhythmic approach.

The reflections in Part V come closest to recognised academic procedures of valid reflective judgments. In the experimental combination of conventional academic research techniques with rhythm technē, the thesis presents the beginnings of objectively valid results regarding urban forms in the case studies. Rather than working towards a transcendental aim, the thesis, since it concerns rhythmic articulations of dynamic forms, undertook an articulation of its actual emerging. Hence the aim was not to propose yet another conclusive perspective on the urban filed, but to challenge the limits of reflective thought on urban form through an aesthetic reflection on the necessarily ambiguous relations of participation in the emergence of urban phenomena. Even the process of synthesis of determined forms is called into question through the dynamics of 'thing'-Umwelt relations, whose articulation is the strongest contribution of the thesis. It acknowledges the participation of both materiality and thought in the articulation of urban dynamic forms through decentring the logos of emerging phenomena via their encounter on an eccentric path.
The thesis engages with the theoretical writings of three authors: the Japanese architect Fumihiko Maki, the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin, and the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The common thread of their works is their shared approach to challenge relations of opposing in thinking through an aesthetic reflection that de-centres the emergence of actual phenomena and is dynamically articulated in the encounter with their own practice: urban form, poetic form, and form of perception. I will briefly reflect on the role of the authors and my particular reading of them for the rhythmic approach. By following with a discussion of the experimental applications of rhythm techne, the aim is to trace the potentials and limits of rhythmic re-presentations.

In comparison with Hölderlin and Merleau-Ponty, Maki’s theoretical writings have gained little attention in academic research. Their presentation in the context of urban neighbourhoods in Rome demonstrates Maki’s contribution in challenging conflicting concepts of disciplinary spatiotemporal dimensionality in urban research. In particular, Maki’s ‘generative element’ of group-form indicates impasses in articulating an urban dynamic aesthetic through reflective thinking, since the generative freedom of group-form develops neither inside an aesthetic idea – which would be mega-form - nor as creative aesthetic escape from a determined reality – which would be compositional-form - but through participation. Maki’s relating of rhythmic articulation to physical aspects of urban form can be seen at work in the account of the Roman ‘palazzina’ in different urban phenomena and social and spatial dimensions (for example scale, place, territory, class). The ‘palazzina’ is a Roman way of living, uniform middle-class construction in the inner periphery, and crystallisation of social organisation in ‘abusivo’ (working class) neighbourhoods of the outer periphery. The ‘palazzina’ as object refers thus to different aesthetic ideas of dimensionality. Such an analysis of relations between actual phenomena degenerates to an abstract and insoluble conflict of incompatible aesthetic concepts and removes any meaning from the dynamic form of ‘palazzina’. This is demonstrated in Part I with reference to the phenomenon of social segregation in Rome that necessarily relates to all of the aforementioned aesthetic concepts. In Part II the rhythmic
articulation of different participating urban *dynamic forms* of ‘palazzina’ builds a narrative thread of *ambiguous* relations between modern city extension and traditional appearance, *collective* building type and its individual expression, rationalised construction and the use of local materials. It reflects the complex historical stratification that Rome, Roman society, and Roman architects had been and are confronted with on an everyday basis. Throughout, I employ Maki’s writings to discuss the physical and morphological aspects of participation. Yet, his *dynamic* and generative understanding of participation also relates to a more de-centred and flowing conception of the ‘I’ in the East Asian cultural and philosophical context (see for example Nishida 1958, Pilgrim 1986, Bryson 1988, Seelmann 2013). Given the eccentric and the historically and culturally transforming character of *rhythm techne*, a further engagement with these philosophies would contribute decisively to reflection on the Western bias of this rhythmic articulation.

Rhythmic articulation is considered in this thesis as a *dynamic* articulation that involves the participation of human thought. The *re-presentation* of rhythmic articulation builds primarily on Hölderlin’s theoretical writings and his translations of Sophocles. The systematic relation of the themes of Hölderlin’s theoretical essays to the rhythmic articulation of the *encounter* with the synthetic works of translated Greek tragedy contributes to the dynamic articulation of encounters in urban research. The most original investigation on Hölderlin’s work in this thesis is the consistent relation to Hölderlin’s image of *eccentric path* and especially to his *re-presentation* of *eccentric path* as visual sketch of a more profound experience translatable to urban research and contemporary urban forms. This includes his systematic elaboration on poetic tendencies, genres, tones, meanings, and metaphors as well as his reversal of declining and becoming in aesthetic judgments through a rhythmic caesura. The first experimental applications of rhythmic *re-presentations* demonstrate that the translations from the eighteenth century to today and from poetic genres, tones, and metaphors to urban research are only in their infancy. They raise the problem of perception between perceiving the synthetic work of urban research and perceiving the synthetic work of an urban form. Yet these experimental studies also demonstrate the potential of Hölderlin’s work, which teaches us ways of re-
evaluating experiences, not in order to identify contemporary urban tragic moments but in order to find different ways of re-presenting our contemporary urban phenomena. Urban research should not exhaust itself by circling around obsolete aesthetic ideas and their re-presentations that have lost sight of actual urban phenomena. An aesthetic idea attached to the believed objective validity of their re-presentation is based on a deluded perception, which only increases its distance from actual urban forms. Instead, this thesis posits, urban research should be characterized by aesthetically drawing close relations to urban dynamic forms, if only to challenge them. The encounter with the urban is the freedom of urban research.

Drawing on Merleau-Ponty in Part IV, the thesis engages with the ambiguity in emerging actual phenomena and our participation, which is “pregnant” with negativity (1968a: 216). Merleau-Ponty’s writings are interpreted in controversial ways and, similar to the interpretations of Hölderlin, are often accused of inconsistency between his early works on behaviour (1942) and the body (1945), and his late works on the invisible of perception (1964a). One main difference with the research on Hölderlin is that Merleau-Ponty himself acknowledged impasses in his early works, but also defended himself against misinterpretations of his de-centred phenomenology. The elaborations on perception in this thesis develop in close reference to Merleau-Ponty’s posthumously published book “The Visible and the Invisible” (1968a) and follow current literature that acknowledges the originality and consistency of his understanding of perception as ‘deviation’. Like Hölderlin, Merleau-Ponty rejects classical ontology, which he calls ontology of the object, as it evacuates human beings from being active participants in encounters in the phenomenal field and reduces them to onlookers disconnected from actual phenomena. For Merleau-Ponty nature cannot be perceived as objects, substances, and attributes, proposing instead “a dynamic, process perspective” (Hamrick and Van der Veken 2011: 229). This is relevant to the relations of ‘deviation’ and Umwelt, both of which the present thesis elaborates on alongside an abstract figure of perceptual encounters in neighbourly everyday life. Here, perception involves seeing and being seen, but necessarily includes invisibility, which is the ambiguity of related relations of opposing. Hence the Umwelt relation, this ‘deviation’ from the individual subject-based line-of-action of
seeing and being seen, is an ambiguous relation between encountering figure-ground relations (visible front - invisible back and inside) of the perceiver and the perceived, which are both active participants. Perception is always also expression and movement, hence draws an image comparable to Hölderlin’s eccentric path. In the emergence of actual phenomena, however, ambiguous relations multiply, as the encountering ‘thing’-Umwelt relations generate different constellations of others. Such culturally or historically transforming collective relations to constellations of others are called collective rhythmic grouping in this thesis. Accordingly, I have proposed a differentiation of ‘thing’-Umwelt characteristics, developed in reference to Merleau-Ponty’s characteristics of the body, as structure, capacity and collective, which in turn relate to Hölderlin’s plastic, athletic, and Hesperian Geist.

Following these elaborations, the thesis proposes a radical re-evaluation of perception, de-centred from subjective self and objective other, and articulated as dynamic relation between: Umwelt structure (the objective relation to subjective self), Umwelt capacity (the subjective relation to objective other), and Umwelt collective (the constellation of the others, which refers to the Umwelt relation of all participants, including the self). This leads to a dynamic differentiation of the aesthetics of participation, which also radically changes the relations of perceiving and perceived related to research content and research representation. In different cultural contexts, the eccentric invisible relations of perception are not a menace but necessary to make perception possible. As participant in an encounter, I go pregnant with this negativity (which refers to ‘my’-Umwelt relation) and contribute in this way to the emerging phenomenon. If I perceive another culture, my perception can involve, for example, an inspiring, deprecating, or even terrorising aspect. This can, however, not be reduced to a subjective self (which research could erase through critical self-reflection) since the dynamic aesthetic of perception involves the constellation of others. If on the one hand I subordinate this dynamic relation to an aesthetic idea of perception, this seems to “legitimize” my “terrorising gaze” on an urban other (Bryson 1988: 105) but would, at the same time, distance me from the urban context through the ‘a priori’ aesthetic judgment. Yet, since I am a participant in the encounter, its visuality is a phenomenon built cooperatively. I am also co-responsible for the
collective dynamic of the aesthetic that is more subjective and more objective than any idealised aesthetic of a reciprocal connection. Any re-presentation of this dynamic relationship is necessarily synthetic, as are research re-presentations. Then as participant in a research encounter, the research re-presentation itself presents a historical and cultural de-centring. The culturally and historically characteristic dynamic form of the ambiguous relations between the relations of opposing in the re-presentations, however, cannot be understood through a subject-centred reflection but only through an aesthetic reflection of their transformation.

In Part V., firstly, the shops of Tuscolano are introduced as research instruments within a specific intellectual research frame (positing an aesthetic idea of the emergence of neighbourhoods on the basis of private-public relationships). The re-presentation of the changing Umwelt characteristics of the shops which become neighbourly meeting places aesthetically reflects the different agency of their built structure and their local capacity at the interface of public-private. A second experimental application reflects transforming ‘thing’-Umwelt relations through the rhythmic re-presentation of the research findings as a synthetic work of research. In close reference to Hölderlin’s Sophocles translations, the historical transformation of Torre Angela is articulated as an urban tragedy. This translation of a poetic genre to the urban field raises problematic questions and warrants further research. Nevertheless, it also shows the potential of the rhythmic articulation in demonstrating coherences of urban participation that ‘deviate’ from the accumulation of different understandings of critical research. In Rome, this seems to be especially relevant in the context of ‘abusivo’ settlements like Torre Angela that, not least through a sort of quarantined attention, display a continuous array of planning frustrations. Finally, the visual re-presentation of collective neighbourly practice on a graphic score of a hypothetical path through the neighbourhood, was an attempt to retain ambiguous relationships of urban experience in the research re-presentation. While the layers of the score re-present collective accumulations of urban practises that relate to certain variables, the visual constellations across the layers point at collective rhythmic grouping of neighbourly phenomena. Apart from tackling the rich differences of urban experiences, maybe the strongest contribution of this research approach is
its potential for comparisons across very different urban contexts. Following the geographer Jennifer Robinson, we talk here about a “variation finding” without being limited to determining variables of merely objectively valid comparisons (2011: 9). Rather, urban case studies are brought into careful conversation with each other on certain thematic transformations of urban experiences. In this way, the different experimental applications of rhythm techne point, for example, towards the potential for comparing the different historical transformations of similar social neighbourly organisations in Garbatella and ‘legalised’ Torre Angela. The reference to the seemingly “good example” Garbatella should thereby not be mistaken with a pleading for yet another encompassing and idealic aesthetic of neighbourhood. In this context, also, the launching of an architectural competition on the corridors and base area of Corviale in 2015 is an honourable example of integrating aesthetic reflections into urban research. However, the long period of more than a decade between acknowledging the problem and addressing demonstrates the ongoing difficulty for planning authorities trying to approve interventions that are not explicable through objectively valid and conventional analysis. Being one of the best researched neighbourhoods in Italy within the last fifteen years, with numerous in-depth field research studies that illuminate the dynamic aesthetic of urban experiences, the implementation of the competition also shows the growing relevance of aesthetic concerns for social questions. These impacts, however, cannot conceal the limits of experimental applications of rhythm techne. The thesis presents an unbalanced distribution between necessarily intense theoretical justifications and detailed articulations of dynamic forms of neighbourhoods. This unbalance might be seen as a necessary concomitant of an experimental and interdisciplinary approach, but the lack of systematic accounts of ethnographic studies of the interviewees’ backgrounds is a more substantial limit for a rhythm techne engaging with cultural transformations of neighbourly organisations. Since, however, it does not pretend to be all-encompassing, the findings of this research offer themselves for articulation with other forms of urban research. More positively, due to the dynamic set-up of the rhythmic approach, it participates in urban research in contributing dynamic articulations of aesthetic reflection rather than objectively valid results. In this sense, the experimental applications aimed at bringing reflective thought and actual urban phenomena closer together,
without dissolving empirical *oppositing* like public and private, subjective and objective, pain and happiness, virtue and error. In its desideratum for collective articulations of aesthetics, the experimental applications of rhythm techne did not aim at showing the primacy of the individual or the individuals subordination to a collective. The aim is to rhythmically articulate collective attunements with ambiguous relations of urban dynamic forms.

I REMARKS ON COLLECTIVE RHYTHMIC GROUPINGS

If we demand objective validity of urban experience, we mistake the reflective relation of the self with the relation between self and other, in this case the urban world. This leaves no possibility for an enrichment of experience through the *encounter* with the urban world. The urban world reduces to an outer objective world of empirical confirmations and constraints for the inner subjective self. Yet in an urban context we have constantly to deal with experiences that cannot be subjective feelings, as we share them objectively with no purposiveness; and they cannot be intellectual reflections, as we cannot relate them to concepts. These are meanings that we cannot refer to as objectively valid although we actually experience them and are often also aware of them. It is key to these experiences that they do not refer oneself to one other but they are more subjective than the self and more objective than the other. They articulate an attunement in the *encounter* of self and other. In rhythmic terms, this is an attunement of myself (as a participant of the ‘constellations of others’ of all participating others) and all others (as participants of the ‘constellation of the others’ of myself). It is an experience of the intertwinements of the collective Umwelt of oneself and others, or collective rhythmic grouping.

This level of experience has no objective validity but emerges as subjective and objective actuality; always individual but always collective. Any perception involves both validity and actuality, if it does not want to hang in-between or even increase the in-between. Our striving for objective validity always has to be thematised through an embedding of the perceptive self, not to reason the validity, which would be a naturalistic fallacy, but to be part of the emerging
phenomenon, which the self is not producing, but in the emergence of which it is participating (Hogrebe 1998: 114-115). Collective rhythmic grouping re-presents the objective actuality of this participation: no return to objective grounds and no striving for subjective ideals, but their ambiguous relations in the experience of our modest participation in the emergence of actual phenomena. This more subjective and more objective level of experience is what the aesthetic reflection through a rhythmic articulation aims to contribute to.

Collective rhythmic grouping is thereby only one aspect of rhythmic articulation and should not be mistaken for an idealist aesthetic of immanence. Any human experience remains a rhythmic articulation between individual judgment and overwhelming collective. The tendency of the work to deeply engage with forms of overwhelming tragic moments is but the struggle against an imbalance in urban research. In Hölderlin’s language: the thesis has an idealic basic tone towards overwhelming urban experiences, which remain, however, only metaphors of urban research intuition. In urban life but also in urban field research, overwhelming experiences are constant companions. And although we are mostly unable to re-present these experiences in reflective urban research, “the form of reason which here shapes itself tragically” re-enters into the research as it shapes our understanding (Hölderlin 2009: 484). In this way my continuing professional encounters with urban worlds have been my best advisor on this experimental and eccentric path of rhythmic articulation. In particular, in interdisciplinary and intercultural contexts, the conflict of different aesthetic ideas brings about difficulties of communication and cooperation. The objective validity of these different aesthetic ideas through self-distancing reflection is more than ever challenged in a globalised urban world with a plurality and multiplicity of ideologies and truths encountering in the urban field. At the same time this illuminates the relevance of aesthetic production in the articulation of our social, cultural, and political urban meaning: a meaning that we, hence all participating ‘things’, built together (as it is articulated in our encounters), and that we are collectively responsible for. The experiment of a rhythmic articulation is the attempt to strengthen an increasingly missing level of this responsibility in urban research through rhythmic articulation. As we cannot go beyond opposing relations in reflective thought, so the participating opposing relations must trace
themselves in *rhythm techne* on an eccentric path through an articulation across different levels. Any systemised aspect of *rhythm techne* can then always only provide the conditions which make the articulation possible, but not the articulation itself. Thus the *re-presentation* of urban *dynamic forms* makes the same systematic demand as the logic of reflective thought, with the difference that urban aesthetic reflection should not only use urban *re-presentations*, but articulate through them. In this sense, the thesis understands itself neither as a complete account of a specific piece of urban research, nor simply as criticism of conventional research techniques. Rather its intention is to take a first step towards challenging the limits of our understanding of urban *dynamic form* by demonstrating the need and potentials of rhythmic articulation for aesthetic reflection in academia and research in the urban field.
APPENDIX

COLLECTIVE RHYTHMIC GROUPINGS
TR1 (Fichte 1845:274) German original: “Das Ich soll sich nicht nur selbst setzen für irgend eine Intelligenz ausser ihm, sondern es soll sich für sich selbst setzen; es soll sich setzen, als durch sich selbst gesetzt. Es soll demnach, so gewiss es ein Ich ist, das Prinzip des Lebens und des Bewusstseyns lediglich in sich selbst haben. Demnach muss das Ich, so gewiss es ein Ich ist, unbedingt und ohne allen grund das Prinzip in sich haben, über sich selbst zu reflectieren;”

TR2 (Fichte 1845:284) German original for “productive imagination”: “schaffende Einbildungskraft”.
(Fichte 1845:386) German original for “Nothing can come to mind, if not through imagination”: “es kann nichts in den Verstand kommen, ausser durch Einbildungskraft”.

TR3 (Hölderlin 1961: 215) German original: “Es ist aber ein Unterschied zwischen dem Erkentnisgrunde und Realgrunde”.


TR5 (Hölderlin 1794a: 89) German original: “Es sind zwar der Sterblichen Sinne schneller / Gewinn zu loben, ehe das Recht, den trügerischen, / Zum wilden wandleind zum Nachfest doch”.

TR6 (Hölderlin 1987: 156) German original: “die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur (also auch des Schiksaals) mit ihrer Zwekmäsigkeit vereiniget, scheint mir eigentlich den ganzen Geist seines Systems zu enthalten; es ist freilich dieselbe, womit er alle Antinomien schlichtet”.


dem Göttlichen in uns Frieden und Einigkeit zu stiften, sondern um sie zu vernichten, [...] die Welt um uns so zu einer Wüste machen, und die Vergangenheit zum Vorbild einer hoffnungslosen Zukunft“.

TR9 (Hölderlin 1961: 277-278) German original: “Jene zartem und unendlichem Verhältnisse müssen also aus dem Geiste betrachtet werden, der in der Sphäre herrscht, in der sie stattfinden“.


TR11 (Hölderlin 1987: 290) German original (from a letter to Neuffer in November 1798): “Das Reine kan sich nur darstellen im Unreinen und versuchst Du, das Edle zu geben ohne Gemeines, so wird es als das Allerunnatürlichste, Ungereimteste dastehn, und zwar darum, weil das Edle selber, so wie es zur Äußerung kömmt, die Farbe des Schiksaals trägt, unter dem es entstand, weil das Schöne, so wie es sich in der Wirklichkeit darstellt, so von den Umständen unter denen es hervorgeht, nothwendig eine Form annimmt, die ihm nicht natürlich ist, und die nur dadurch zur natürlichen Form wird, daß man eben die Umstände, die ihm nothwendig diese Form gaben, hinzunimmt“.

TR12 (Hölderlin 1961: 245)  German original: “Zwischen dem Ausdruke (der Darstellung) und der freien idealischen Behandlung liegt die [...] Bedeutung des Gedichts. Sie ists, die dem Gedichte seinen Ernst, seine Vestigkeit, seine Wahrheit giebt, sie sichert das Gedicht davor, daß die freie idealische Behandlung nicht zur leeren Manier, und Darstellung nicht zur Eitelkeit werde“.

TR13 (von Arnim 2012:326)  German original: “Zwischen dem Ausdruke (der Darstellung) und der freien idealischen Behandlung liegt die [...] Bedeutung des Gedichts. Sie ists, die dem Gedichte seinen Ernst, seine Vestigkeit, seine Wahrheit giebt, sie sichert das Gedicht davor, daß die freie idealische Behandlung nicht zur leeren Manier, und Darstellung nicht zur Eitelkeit werde“.

TR14 (von Arnim 2012:326) German original: “[...] und wo der Menschengeist dem sich füge, das seien die verklärten Schicksale, in denen der Genius sich zeige, und das Dichten sei ein Streiten um die Wahrheit, und bald sei es in plastischem Geist, bald in athletischen, wo das Wort den Körper (Dichtungsform) ergreife, bald auch im hesperischen, das sei der Geist der Beobachtungen und erzeuge die Dichterwonnen, wo unter freudiger Sohle der Dichterklang erschalle, während die Sinne versunken seien in die notwendigen Ideengestaltungen der Geistesgewalt, die in der Zeit sei, - Diese letzte Dichtungsform sei einer hochzeitliche feierliche
Vermählungsbegeisterung und bald tauche sie sich in die Nacht und werde im Dunkel hellsehend, bald auch ströme sie im Tageslicht über alles, was dieses beleuchte. - Der gegenüber, als der humanen Zeit, stehe die furchtbare Muse der tragischen Zeit; - und wer dies nicht verstehe, meinte er, der könne nimmer zum Verständnis der hohen griechischen Kunstwerke kommen, deren Bau ein göttlich organischer sei, der nicht könne aus des Menschen Verstand hervorgehen, sondern der habe sich Unendlichen geweiht. - Und so habe den Dichter der Gott gebraucht als Pfeil, seinen Rhythmus vom Bogen zu schnellen, und wer dies nicht empfinde und sich dem schmiege, der werde nie weder Geschick noch Athletentugend haben zum Dichter und zu schwach sei ein solcher, als dass er sich fassen könne, weder im Stoff, noch in der Weltansicht der früheren, noch in der späteren Vorstellungsart unserer Tendenzen, und keine poetischen Formen werden sich ihm offenbaren. Dichter, die sich in gegebene Formen einstudieren, die können auch nur den einmal gegebenen Geist wiederholen, Sie setzen sich wie Vögel auf einen Ast des Sprachbaumes und wiegen sich auf dem nach dem Urrhythmus, der in seiner Wurzel liege, nicht aber fliege ein solcher auf als der Geistesadler, von dem lebendigen Geist der Sprache ausgebrütet".

TR15 (Hölderlin 1974a: 201) German original: ..."daß das gränzenlose Eineswerden durch gränzenloses Scheiden sich reinigt".


TR18 (Hölderlin 1961: 247-248)German original: “(... als durch die poetische Reflexion vermöge der Idee des Lebens überhaupt und des Mangels in der Einigkeit bestimmtes und begründetes Leben betrachtet,) "fängt es mit einer idealisch charakteristischen Stimmung an, es ist nun [...] als solches in bestimmter Form vorhanden, und schreitet fort im Wechsel der Stimmungen, wo jedesmal die nachfolgende durch die vorhergehende bestimmt, und ihr dem Gehalt nach [...] entgegengesetzt und insofern individueller allgemeiner voller ist, so daß die verschiedenen Stimmungen nur in dem worinn das reine seine Entgegensezung findet, nemlich in der Art des Fortstrebens, verbunden sind".

TR19 (Hölderlin 1974a: 196)  German original: “Dadurch wird in der rhythmischen Aufeinanderfolge der Vorstellungen, worin der Transport sich darstellt, das, was man im Sylbenmaasse Cäsur heißt, das reine Wort, die gegenrhythmische Unterbrechung nothwendig, um nemlich dem reißenden Wechsel der Vorstellungen, auf seinem Summum, so zu begegnen, daß alsdann nicht mehr der Wechsel der Vorstellung, sondern die Vorstellung selber erscheint".
TR20 (Hölderlin 1974a: 201) German original: “Die Darstellung des Tragischen beruht vorzüglich darauf, daß das Ungeheure, wie der Gott und Mensch sich paart, und gränzerlos die Naturmacht und des Menschen Innerstes im Zorn Eins wird, dadurch sich begreift, daß das gränzerlose Eineswerden durch gränzerdoses Scheiden sich reinigt”.

TR21 (Hölderlin 1974a: 271) German original: “In dieser vergißt sich der Mensch, weil er ganz im Moment ist; der Gott, weil er nichts als Zeit ist; und beides ist untreu, die Zeit, weil sie in solchem Momente sich kategorisch wendet, und Anfang und Ende sich in ihr schlechterdings nicht reimen läßt; der Mensch, weil er in diesem Momente der kategorischen Umkehrfolgen muß, hiermit im Folgenden schlechterdings nicht dem Anfänglichen gleichen kann” (Hölderlin 1974a: 271).

TR22 (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 253-254) French original: “Et la perception de cette perception (la «réflexion» phénoménologique) est inventaire de cette sortie originaire dont nous rapportons en nous les documents, de cet Ineinander qui s'éveille à soi, elle est usage du immer wieder”.

TR23 (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 303) French original: “je suis pour moi zéro de mouvement même dans le mouvement, je ne m'éloigne pas de moi”.

TR24 (Merleau-Ponty 1995: 279) French original: “l'Umwelt […] m'est non dissimule. Je suis temoin de mon Umwelt. De meme mon corps m'est non dissimule. Il ne s'agit pas d'un savoir de Zuschauer, […] de Theoria, objectivement. Savoir de l'Umwelt = ecart plus ou moins grand par rapport a corps zero, savoir du corps = ecart par rapport au la de l'Umwelt. Cet ecart est l'inverse de l'identification que j'obtiens par mouvement”.

TR25 (Merleau-Ponty 1995: 278) French original: “c'est seulement en se rappelant la Nature comme visible qu'on peut comprendre maintenant l'émergence d'une perception invisible dans son rapport avec ce qu'elle voit, comme écart par rapport au visible”.

TR26 (Merleau-Ponty 1964a: 244) French original: “Cela évoque, par-delà le 'point de vue de l'objet' et le 'point de vue du sujet', […] ce que j'ai appelé ‘modulation de l'être au monde’”. 

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2.09 117 Garbatella / Antonello Mazzai / 2004 / exhibition photographic print 80 x 56 cm / photographic negative scan / (Student of “Lo Spazio”, Scuola Romana di Fotografia, supervised by Timothy Pape and Roberto Properzi) (see also Pape 2004: 62)

2.10 118 Tufello – piazza centrale / Giuditta Benedetti / 2004 / exhibition photographic print 80 x 56 cm / photographic negative scan / (Student of “Lo Spazio”, Scuola Romana di Fotografia, supervised by Timothy Pape and Roberto Properzi)

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2.14 119 Torre Angela (left) Tor Bella Monaca (right) 2000 / Timothy Pape / 2016 / digital drawing / original / (compiled and modified from pdf-files Comune di Roma 2002)

2.15 119 Vigne Nuove (up) Tufello (down) 2000 / Timothy Pape / 2016 / digital drawing / original / (compiled and modified from pdf-files Comune di Roma 2002)


2.18 120 Tuscolano / Timothy Pape / 2004 / exhibition photographic print 80 x 56 cm / photographic negative scan / (see also Pape 2004: 76)

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2.24 Corviale - Corridor / Leda Ricchi / 2004 / exhibition photographic print 80 x 56 cm / photographic negative scan / (Student of “Lo Spazio”, Scuola Romana di Fotografia, supervised by Timothy Pape and Roberto Properzi) (see also Pape 2004: 80)

2.25 Corviale / Leda Ricchi / 2004 / exhibition photographic print 80 x 56 cm / photographic negative scan / (Student of “Lo Spazio”, Scuola Romana di Fotografia, supervised by Timothy Pape and Roberto Properzi) (see also Pape 2004: 80)

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3.01 Sketch of eccentric path on first page of “Verfahrensweise des poetischen Geistes” / Friedrich Hölderlin / 1799 / Stuttgarter Folienbuch (Hölderlin 1799:46r)

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3.03 Camera obscura: Building’s retina / Mirko Mielke / 2005 / exhibition photographic print on concrete 280 x 360 cm / exhibition catalogue / (Plattenbau Luisenstrasse Berlin / image titles are not from artist, but agreed with artist)

3.04 Camera obscura: process of unbuilding / Mirko Mielke / 2005 / exhibition photographic print on concrete 280 x 360 cm / exhibition catalogue / (Plattenbau Luisenstrasse Berlin / image titles are not from artist, but agreed with artist)
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3.06 215 (re-iterated figure 2.24) Corviale - Corridor / Leda Ricchi / 2004 / exhibition photographic print 80 x 56 cm / photographic negative scan / (Student of "Lo Spazio", Scuola Romana di Fotografia, supervised by Timothy Pape and Roberto Properzi)

3.06 215 (re-iterated figure 2.25) Corviale / Leda Ricchi / 2004 / exhibition photographic print 80 x 56 cm / photographic negative scan / (Student of "Lo Spazio", Scuola Romana di Fotografia, supervised by Timothy Pape and Roberto Properzi)

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5.26  317  Garbatella ‘path’ / Timothy Pape / 2016 / digital drawing / original / (see also Pape 2004: 62)

5.27  318  Layer one Garbatella graphic score / Timothy Pape / 2016 / digital drawing / original / (see also Pape 2004: 64-78)

5.28  318  Layer two Garbatella graphic score / Timothy Pape / 2016 / digital drawing / original / (see also Pape 2004: 64-78)

5.29  318  Layer three Garbatella graphic score / Timothy Pape / 2016 / digital drawing / original / (see also Pape 2004: 64-78)

5.30  318  Layer four Garbatella graphic score / Timothy Pape / 2016 / digital drawing / original / (see also Pape 2004: 64-78)

5.31  325  (re-iterated figures 2.09-2.25)

5.32  326  Comparison graphic scores neighbourhoods / Timothy Pape / 2016 / digital drawing / original / (see also Pape 2004: 64-78)
5.33 327 (re-iterated figures 2.09-2.25)

5.34 328 Comparison graphic scores neighbourhoods / Timothy Pape / 2016 /
digital drawing / original /
LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Interviewees are listed according to their neighbourhood and the date of the Interview or conversation with advancing numbers. The suffix a,b,c signify repeated interviews with the same interviewee on different dates and locations. The majority of interviews and conversations is recorded by voice recorder or video. Due to the research design, ethical reasons and personal rights, the names of the interviewees are not listed here or are replaced by fictional names in the text. The list of interviewees consists of: ‘neighbourhood’, ‘number according to the chronology of the interviews’, (date of the interview), ‘Characterisation of Interviewee relevant for the research design’, ‘Situation of interview’, interviewer. All interviews have been conducted with a narrative and open structure. All interviews and conversation were held in Italian and translated by myself in the best of my knowledge.

CORVIALE 7   (17-02-2004) Young artist age 31. ‘Abusivo’ artist studio fifth floor of Corviale. Timothy Pape

CORVIALE 8   (17-02-2004) Old woman pensioner. In her flat on the seventh floor. Timothy Pape

CORVIALE 10  (18-02-2004) Young artist age 30. Corridor in Corviale. Timothy Pape

CORVIALE 11  (18-02-2004) Woman age 44. In her flat on the third floor. Timothy Pape

CORVIALE 12  (13-03-2004) Man age 56 bus driver. Outside of Corviale towards the Park. Timothy Pape

CORVIALE 13B (13-03-2004) Young man age 28, works for the city. At his flat and in the corridors. Timothy Pape

GARBATELLA 3  (13-02-2004) Old man pensioner. Playing cards with friends. Timothy Pape
GARBATELLA 7  (14-02-2004) Young mother. In the streets of Garbatella after bringing kids to school. Timothy Pape

GARBATELLA 16  (04-03-2004) Young mother with two kids. First in the courtyard, then at home. Timothy Pape

TORRE ANGELA 5  (07-12-2003) Middle age lady age 56. first generation dweller (as child). In a bar in Torre Angela. Timothy Pape

TORRE ANGELA 7  (07-12-2003) Old lady age 93 first generation dweller. In her garden. Timothy Pape

TUSCOLANO 1  (09-10-2003) Old woman. Frequented public street in the afternoon in Tuscolano. Timothy Pape

TUSCOLANO 3  (09-10-2003) Young women age 34 working in fashion. Frequented public street in the afternoon in Tuscolano. Timothy Pape


TUSCOLANO 6  (09-10-2003) Man age 45 momentary unemployed. Frequented public street in the afternoon in Tuscolano. Timothy Pape

TUSCOLANO 7  (09-10-2003) Young woman age 27 daughter of butcher Tuscolano 8. Frequented public street in the afternoon in Tuscolano and butchery. Timothy Pape

TUSCOLANO 8  (09-10-2003) Butcher middle aged owner of butchery. Crowded butchery in Tuscolano. Timothy Pape

TUSCOLANO 10 (09-10-2003) Barkeeper age 42. Frequented public street in the afternoon in Tuscolano. Timothy Pape

TUSCOLANO 26  (22-03-2004) Young mother age 30 saleswoman. Frequented public street in the afternoon in Tuscolano. Timothy Pape


VIGNE NUOVE 14  (23-01-2004) Woman circa 60 pensioner. On a dog walk in the late morning in Vigne Nuove. Timothy Pape
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