**Pragmatics of a World To-Be-Made**

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**Paradoxes**

 We might as well begin with a paradox. After all, how is the problematic expressed if not through a sort of paradox of our present, one whereby the present becomes fugitive, boiling over itself, constituting a time “while passing in the time constituted” (Deleuze, 79)? So does the proposition of this book, of *thinking the problematic,* confront us with a paradox in which the problematic makes itself manifest, from which it cracks open, proffering itself fugitively in search for new presents. And the paradox is this: what does thought ever do, if it does not think the problematic? What is thinking if not the event of becoming possessed by a problematic one cannot shake, let alone properly state, a problematic that spurs the thinker into thinking, feeling and doing? This is what William James alluded to when he suggested that “the thought is itself the thinker, and psychology needs not look beyond” (401). For the thinker is constituted as such by a problematic for which she becomes a *means.[[1]](#footnote-1)* James expounded on this idea with his concept of a “fringe”, a fringe of felt relations on the edge of which thoughts –which is also to say, thinkers– swim. The fringe constitutes a vector of indetermination, and in “all voluntary thinking there is some topic or subject about which all the members of the thought revolve. *Half the time this topic is a problem*, a gap we cannot yet fill with a definite picture, word, or phrase, but which, in the manner described some time back, influences us in an intensely active and determinate psychic way. Whatever may be the images and phrases that pass before us, we feel their relation to this aching gap. *To fill it up is our thought’s destiny*.” (80)

 If the problematic acts as a generative force, as an imperative of adventure, what kind of gesture, which sort of operation, might be at stake in *thinking the problematic?* Which is to say, to what kind of adventure are we propelled to when we ask thought to fold onto itself, to *complicate itself* in order to think that which what makes it think? What difference might this complication make? To which new paradoxes might it give rise to? What new possibles may such paradoxes crack open? Of course, learning to appreciate this generative recursion of paradoxes requires, in the first instance, that we consent to experiment with the radical reversal to which Gilles Deleuze (158) submitted the very notion of a “problem”, when he sought to dissociate it from that “grotesque image of culture” which infects, with equal force, both the constitution of our present and the very mode of passing of the present in the time it constitutes. A grotesque image of culture that has been at the heart of modern colonialism and global capitalism, that has infiltrated modern state politics and development programmes, environmental policy and global health, but also examinations, government referenda, as well as “newspaper competitions (where everyone is called upon to choose according to his or her taste, on condition that this taste coincides with everyone else).” (Deleuze*,* 158)

 Under such an image, the invitation to think the problematic poses no paradox, but becomes equivalent with *solving* problems. This is because, according to this image of culture, problems are not just given– they are given ready-made. All that matters is to find the right solution, the one that will eventually make the problem a mere figment of the unlearned world, an irrelevance, an innocent vestige of our past ignorance. Even as problems become “wicked”, “fuzzy”, or “complex”, the sense of the problematic that our culture espouses is one that treats it exclusively as an epistemic puzzle– an obstacle posed to the progress of our knowledge; a matter for thought and science alone (followed by the acknowledgement that the more sciences involved, the better in driving the problem to its own exhaustion). Thinking there becomes an act of exhaustion of problems in solutions for which thoughts and sciences are never their meansbut their *masters*. And indeed, just as the problems are given ready-made, so are the solutions. They may not be apparent to the ignoramus that is confronted by the problem that a teacher sets out in an examination, or to the state that is puzzled by a divisive response to its own, ill-posed, referendum question . But in this image of culture the very staging of the problem presupposes that a solution *must* exist, that it is a matter of picking the problem apart so as to find it, a matter of identifying the solution with a truth that the problematic itself occluded– *the people have spoken.* It’s always, in the end, a matter of puzzle-solving. The image of the completed puzzle is printed on the box which contains it– all one needs to do is to copy, to imitate, to find the corner pieces that already determine the contours of the problem and simultaneously enable the derivation of the only true solution, the one that reproduces an image that is identical to the one given at the very outset. Indeed, that is what this grotesque image of culture turns the problematic into– a puzzle, a veil, a blockage, a temporary obscurity, a shadow of knowledge, an obstacle to be overcome by following the right example, by deploying the appropriate methods.

 Deleuze’s gesture would then consist, in the first instance, in noting that inside and in spite of this grotesque image of culture the paradoxes persist and insist. The puzzle is never finished, and the solutions the moderns come up with never quite exhaust the problematic. This is why he associates such image of culture with the notion of “stupidity”, *la bêtise,* characterising it after Bergson as nothing other than a “faculty for false problems”, the “evidence of an inability to constitute, comprehend or determine a problem as such”(159; see also Debaise). Because the more this culture of puzzle-solving, which is our own, sets out to achieve the complete exhaustion of the problematic as such –the dream of a universally valid Reason, of a perfectly frictionless world, the perpetual peace of a permanently smooth present– the more the problematic presses on, “it insists and persists in these solutions” (163) such that the latter do not ever solve problems without also making them proliferate in new ways, provoking new imperatives to which thought is called upon to respond. This is why it “would be naive to think that the problems of life and death, of love and the differences between the sexes, are amenable to their scientific solutions and positings, even though such positings and solutions necessarilyarise without warning, even though they mustnecessarily emerge at a certain moment in the unfolding process of the development of these problems.” (107).

 If paradoxes constitute sites where the problematic cracks open, from which it creates a line of fugitivity, the second aspect of Deleuze’s gesture is precisely to trace this line, to follow the problematic outside of this image of culture that has sought, and failed, to contain it. And it is there, outside, that the problematic can no longer designate a mere state of ignorance or imperfection. For it can never be contained in the knowledges that would seek to dissipate it in their solutions. Outside of this grotesque image of culture, the problematic becomes “a state of the world, a dimension of the system, and even its horizon or its home” (Deleuze, 280)– an occasion boiling over onto a new occasion it thereby constitutes, the thought streaming through the thinker it has brought into being, the present passing in the time it has constituted, the world opened up to its own becoming (Savransky, “The Wager”). “Let anyone try”, James (608) wrote prefiguring this gesture, “I will not say to arrest, but to notice or attend to, the *present* moment of time. One of the most baffling experiences occurs. Where is it, this present? It has melted in our grasp, fled ere we could touch it, gone in the instant of becoming.”

 In this other culture of paradoxes, in this culture without image that James’ and Deleuze’s gestures help us envisage, the problematic can no longer correspond to a shadow of knowledge. For it is the present itself that melts in our grasp. How to characterise this melting present, this calling forth of the present moment by the insistence of another present that precipitates the fugue? Might it be that, if the problematic constitutes, in passing, the *home* and *horizon* of the world, it is because it belongs not to a state of mental confusion but to a specific mode of existence, the generative *mode of existence of a world to-be-made*? This is my wager. I am seeking to experiment with this other sense of the “problematic”, which conjures, in a word, the lure of the world’s own fringes, the sirens of what is in process of breaking in, of a buzzing impossibility, of a difference to come (Savransky, “The Humor”). To actualise this difference may be the world’s destiny, but this destiny is never guaranteed. And so we may propose that what’s at stake in *thinking the problematic* is perhaps something that belongs to the art of learning, experimentally, how to relate to this melting present, how to sustain and dramatise the process through which a possible makes its insistence felt with the character of an imperative, by which the world to-be-made irrupts into, and reconfigures, the world made. This is what I am calling, in other words, a pragmatics of a world to-be-made.

**Metamorphoses**

To associate the notion of the problematic with “the mode of existence of a world to-be-made” is of course to recall, in homage and in relay, the expression used by another philosopher, Étienne Souriau, in his essay titled “Of the Mode of Existence of the Work To-Be-Made”. But this not merely ornamental. For if Deleuze’s gesture enables us to trace the problematic along its fugitive lines, outside the false problems of our puzzle-solving culture, it seems to me that Souriau’s essay dramatises with unique taste and ability the task before us here– that of learning how to characterise that process by which a possible makes its insistence felt with the character of an imperative. In a sense, Souriau’s (“Of the mode”, 220) *problem* is of course quite different– “Is existence ever a piece of property that we posses? Is it not rather an objective and a hope?” One might hasten to see this as a mere permutation of the perennial problem we call “ontology”: What does it mean for something “to exist”? And it is that, but *not only[[2]](#footnote-2)*. For once again, under the auspices of our puzzing-solving culture, we have treated most philosophical ontologies as so many *solutions* to this problem. With Souriau, by contrast, the resonances are made possible not least by the fact that he is concerned, above all, with ensuring “that [his] problem is well-posed”: how to think the problem of characterising something as existing?

 Attempting to redetermine the problem, to follow the problematic that forces him to think, Souriau experiments with a dramatic hypothesis: that the problem of existence may not involve a binary choice, but may after all be better approached as a problem of *intensity*, such that, ‘in response to the question, “Does that being exist?,” it is prudent to admit that we can hardly respond with the Yes-No couple, and that we must instead respond in accordance with that of the More or Less.’ (220) Once “being” ceases to be a question of “yes or no” and becomes a matter of intensity and degree, the entire sense of the problem of ontology changes. For it becomes a question of a plurality of modes of existence, of the varying degrees of (in)completion of beings, and crucially, of the pragmatic question of their *genesis*: how to characterise the process through which existence is *accomplished*?. This problem of the accomplishment of existence –of *instauration*, as Souriau calls it– makes it possible to ask a question that would otherwise make no sense. Namely, the question of the particular mode of existence of that which is still in the making, of “the work to-be-made”. It is important to note, however, in which sense Souriau conceives of this accomplishment of existence that implicates all relatively existing things (for indeed, when existence is a matter of intensity, one only exists *relatively*): “We all know”, he writes, “that each of us is the sketch of a better, more beautiful, more grand, more intense, and more accomplished being, which, however, is itself Being to-be-realized, *and is itself responsible for that realization.*” (220) In other words, when existence is a matter of intensity, a possible still in the making must nevertheless have some dim existence of its own, an existence whose accomplishment is neither a case of spontaneous “self-realisation”, nor one of the wilful “construction” of one being by another. As such, just like a thinker is brought into being as a means of the problem that makes it think, “the accomplished existence, here, is not only a hope, but also responds to a power.” (220)

 Indeed, I would like to suggest here that the problematic may have something of this character too, of a yet unmade world that nevertheless makes itself felt with imperative force, that “imposes itself as an existential urgency– which is to say: both as deficiency and as presence of a being to be accomplished, and which manifests itself as such, as having a claim on us” (223) [[3]](#footnote-3). And the reason for this is that, if when ontology is treated as a binary problem (this exists, this does not) the question is where to draw the line, when it becomes a problem of intensity and degree the question is how to think the *intensification* of existence. Which is also to say, how to characterise one’s relationship to the fringe– the relationship of the thinker to the thought for which it is becoming a means, of the constituted present to the one that that is passing in the time constituted, of the world made to the world to-be-made. At stake, therefore, is the *actualisation of a possible,* the determination a problem, the generation of a being that is “only able to be accomplished completely through the power of another being” (223). It is in order to dramatise this process that Souriau (225) pays attention to the very activity of making, and provides us with a most dramatic account of the process of sculpting:

Watching the work of the sculptor, I see how with each blow of the mallet and chisel, the statue, at first a work to-be-made, absolutely distinct from the block of marble, is gradually incarnated in that very marble. Little by little, the virtual work is transformed into a real work. Each of the sculptor’s actions, each blow of the chisel on the stone constitutes the mobile demarcation of the gradual passage from one mode of existence to another.

At stake in this process of sculpting is not, therefore, a mere act of “human creativity” or of “imagination”, a simple process of projection, the impressing of a human will on an amorphous thing through the chipping away at the marble. It would be entirely wrong even to suggest that the marble, the sculptor, and his instruments constitute the only characters in play. Of course, the statue will not be made by itself, and neither “will future humanity. The soul of a new society is not made by itself, it must be worked toward and those who work toward it really effect its genesis. […] If our sculptor –weary, having lost faith in his work, incapable of resolving the artistic problems that stand between him and the possibility of advancing– lets the chisel fall or stops striking it with the mallet, the work to-be-made remains in limbo.” (227-228) And yet the statue is present from the very outset too, as a work-to-be-made, as a generative *problem* that turns the sculptor into its means. It is sculpting’s own *destiny,* yet it is never guaranteed*.* What’s more, its dim existence is highly demanding, a veritable test, pressing on the sculptor not with ready-made gestures that the latter may simply apply on the marble, but with ‘the ever recurring questions of the sphinx: “work it out, or thou shalt be devoured.” But it is the work that blossoms or vanishes, the work that progresses or is devoured.’ An instauration is a thoroughly experimental process indeed, and one can only proceed piecemeal, “groping our way forwards like someone climbing a mountain at night, always unsure if his foot is about to encounter an abyss”. (229)

 In other words, this statue to-be-made, this being-of-the-fringe, constitutes a real character in the process of its own intensification. Reluctant to conceive of it as a “person”, Souriau decided to call this character “the Angel of the work”. But if the experiment of sculpting the statue may well fail to respond to the Angel of the work, to the statue to-be-made, thereby leaving the sculptor frustrated, this is because the Angel of the work does not constitute an *answer* to our problem, one that would be given ready-made. Just like when those of us who write occasionally feel a sense of frustration at the accomplished reality of a text that, when on the page, is not what it could have been; just as we feel a sense of diminishment when the words we utter in a conversation seem unworthy of the idea that we are trying to conjure; such moments disclose the fact that, unlike the experience of being unable to solve a simple problem of arithmetic, the frustration that comes from the failure of an experiment in intensification is not one that reveals our “ignorance” or our inability to overcome an obstacle. Instead, what they make felt is the sense of a certain devaluation, a poverty, a barrenness, belonging to that which has nevertheless been made actual. And such a feeling makes present that this work to-be-made, the Angel of the work, does not designate an answer to our problem, but *constitutes* the very problematic to which we seek to respond, establishing with us a “*questioning situation*” that demands a response but does not dictate what that response shall be.

As Souriau puts it, unable to fully shake off the temptation to characterise the Angel as a person, the work to-be-made never says ‘“Here is what I am, here is what I should be, a model you have only to copy.” Rather, it is a mute dialogue in which the work seems enigmatically, almost daringly, to say: “And what are you going to do now? With what actions are you going to promote or deteriorate me?”’ (232) Which is also to say that, insofar as the problematic demands a response, insofar as it makes itself felt with an existential urgency but does not say what the correct answer will be, every intensification of its existence involves a process of *metamorphosis*: of the world made, whose actuality progressively becomes torn at the seams by the demanding insistence of a world to-be-made; and of the problematic itself, transformed in its being drawn in, in its concrete intensification as a member of *this* world, in its progressive development into a specific problem and its associated field of solvability– always necessary, always unfinished, “for in every realization, whatever it may be, there is always a measure of failure” (236),

**Conjurings**

Deleuze once (107) remarked, that it “may be that there is something mad in every question and every problem, as there is in their transcendence in relation to answers, in their insistence through solutions and the manner in which they maintain their own openness.” Indeed, it is our own grotesque image of culture that anxiously diagnoses the very questioning power of a world to-be-made as a form of “madness”. For if as Souriau (“La culture”, 226) suggested, a “culture is a style of thinking and doing that guides, towards a certain form of patuity, everything that is mobilised and elaborated by the instaurating forces of a human group”, it may well be that, in reducing the problematic to a mere state of ignorance, it is the scientistic, puzzle-solving style of our own culture that leads us to treat the existential urgency of a world to-be-made with nothing but derision*.* As Thomas Kuhn said of the periods of “normal science” which he, not innocently, characterised as fundamentally concerned with “puzzle-solving”:

Perhaps the most striking feature of normal research problems […] is how little they aim to produce major novelties, conceptual or phenomenal. Sometimes, as in a wave-length measurement, everything but the most esoteric detail of the result is known in advance, and the typical latitude of expectation is only somewhat wider. Coulomb’s measurements need not, perhaps, have fitted an inverse square law; the men who worked on heating by compression were often prepared for any one of several results. Yet even in cases like these the range of anticipated, and thus of assimilable, results is always small compared with the range that imagination can conceive. And the project whose outcome does not fall in that narrower range is usually just a research failure, one which reflects not on nature but on the scientist. (35)

This may be striking, or it may not. For if this very style of puzzle-solving leads us “to believe that the activity of thinking, along with truth and falsehood in relation to that activity, begins only with the search for solutions, that both of these concern only solutions” (Deleuze, 158), then the very possibility of a problem that insists and persists in its solutions, that bursts into the world in the form of completely unexpected and disorienting results, would become a sign not of novelty but of a weakness of thought.

And yet, the generative force of the problematic comes from a fringe, from another world in this world, from somewhere other than its eventual determination into propositions and solutions. As Arundhati Roy (44) proposed to the World Social Forum: “Another world is not only possible, she’s on her way. Maybe many of us won’t be here to greet her, but on a quiet day, if I listen very carefully, I can hear her breathing.” Coming from another world in this world, the insistence of a world to-be-made cannot be satisfied by reasons capable of explaining *why* a problem has presented itself with such intensity, turning us into its very means of intensification. Persisting, after every attempt to respond, with its nagging question –“And what are you going to do now? With what actions are you going to promote or deteriorate me?”– the problematic acts as a vector of generativity introducing an after to every ending. Perhaps this is what these collective movements trust when they make their cry for another possible world resonate in various non-colonial languages and through a plurality of efforts and calls to protect and intensify our relation to food, land water, Pachamama, dignity, or *buen vivir* (e.g. Fisher and Ponniah). Namely, that the cry does not simply express a hope, but responds to a world underway that insists with existential urgency, that makes a claim upon them.

In other words, their calls are not only a form of resistance to global colonial powers but also generative responses to another power. They are attempts to induce a metamorphosis that, in laying siege to the imperial force of what has come to be known as “globalization”, might become capable of intensifying a multiplicity of other worlds to-be-made. And if their efforts and calls appear unintelligible to modern ears, this is because, whatever their fate, they already begin to tear the very culture of “puzzle-solving” at its seams. It is, in other words, because their calls and efforts already make present that, to borrow Deleuze’s (158) words again, we risk remaining “slaves so long as we do not control the problems themselves, so long as we do not possess a right to the problems, to a participation in and management of the problems.” The gesture of responding to the problem of another possible world, of intensifying a world to-be-made, cannot therefore be carried out following a puzzle-solving style that would treat the very existence of other worlds in this world as mere delusion. “Work it out, or thou shalt be devoured”: responding to the questions of the sphinx involves a wager and a risk. It may be thus necessary to risk experimenting with another style of thinking and doing that can be generative of an entirely different art, one that rather than deriding the very existence of a world to-be-made may instead concern itself with *conjuring* it, with learning how to attend to the demanding questions it poses, and with letting those questions precipitate a metamorphosis of the world made*.*

 The practices of oracles in the Cuban *Ifá* tradition, for instance, might contribute some useful tools in such a task. Because of their self-cultivation as artful conjurers, *Ifá* Oracles cannot *but* speak the truth– indeed, they cannot but speak a form of truth that our culture of puzzle-solving has banished as a chimera, namely, a truth that is fundamentally *indubitable* (see Holbraad)*.* The oracle’s practice of veridiction consists precisely in conjuring a response to the consultant’s concern, one that becomes intensified as they, in their practices, progressively bring together different, dynamic paths of existence and meaning – the mythical path of Ifá gods, the meaning emerging of the manipulation of the material powders and paraphernalia used during the consultation, and the personal path of the consultant– such that a metamorphosis of all such trajectories can be accomplished (Holbraad). And yet, when the oracle speaks the truth, the verdict is often bewildering to those that consult them.[[4]](#footnote-4) The truth is itself a problem to which the consultant must invent a response, inducing yet another metamorphosis– of their own life, affected by the verdict of the oracle, and of the problem the verdict has posed, eventually actualised in the situated interventions that the consultant makes in response to it. The test, in any case, is what *kind of transformation* is precipitated by the problemthe oracle poses. For if the problematic acts as a generative vector, as a demand for intensification of a possible, a call that keeps the world and one’s life going differently at the fringe, the challenge facing solutions is not whether they are true or false, but whether they promote or deteriorate the intensity of the possible that insists in the problem posed. If solutions there will be, the task is to ask of them *how* they might make a world go on. The pragmatic test insists again: What difference will they make?

 To dissociate the notion of solutions from the modern dream of truth, to recognise that there “are no ultimate or original responses or solutions” (Deleuze, 107), does not, then, lead to a free-for-all attitude, a “whatever works”. The test of truth disappears from the nature of solutions only to multiply at other levels. For if a “solution always has the truth it deserves according to the problem to which it is a response”, truth and falsehood are engendered in the problematic itself, such that it “has the solution it deserves in proportion to its own truth or falsity - in other words, in proportion to its sense” (Deleuze, 159). Is this problem genuine? Does it effectively present itself with existential urgency, making a claim on us, leaving no standing place outside of the alternatives it creates? This is why, when the oracle’s verdict is too far removed from anything that may enable consultants to feel its presence with intensity, the concerns the latter may develop are not whether the verdict is actually [true](http://www.apple.com/), but whether the oracle has conjured a genuine problem (Holbraad). In this way, what displacing the genesis of truth makes possible is a shift in the very relationship between problems and solutions, harnessing the irrepressible generativity of problems and questions while submitting solutions to a pragmatic transformation. For indeed, the best that a solution can do is to *develop* the problematic that calls for it, to promote its existential intensity, to precipitate a metamorphosis that may redraw the contours of a problem so as to make perceptible the possibles it creates.

**Presentiments**

What is at stake in this pragmatic metamorphosis of problems and solutions, then, is a different kind of responsiveness to the problematics that make us think, feel, and make– one that situates a multiplicity of divergent practices and collectives in the face of a shared perplexity, articulating responses that comprehend and appreciate without demanding salvation, responses that can refuse participation into settled modes of problematisation, without their refusal coinciding with a cynical dismissal of the reality of the problematic as such (Savransky, “The Social”). And what this pragmatic metamorphosis perhaps enables, in turn, is the elaboration of responses whose task is neither to be ‘right’, nor to achieve a definition of a problem that no one could refuse. But responses, instead, that may seek to collectively experiment with the imperative that the problematic itself creates at the edge of the present– practices capable of conjuring, intensifying, and consenting to the metamorphic process of responding to worlds to-be-made. The test of those practices involved in the generation of such responses will not, of course, be a test of adequacy, controlling whether, with their solutions, their intensification corresponds to the state of affairs of the world made. By contrast, it will be one of *verification* in the pragmatic sense, that is, of their eventual success or failure in *effecting* such metamorphoses, in *making* a transformation of our world *true*.

William James (*Manuscripts,* 237) once wrote that the distinct mark of pragmatism is, precisely, that whereas other philosophies postulate a pre-existent and absolute truth that our ideas must imitate, “the pragmatist postulates a ‘reality’ for our ideas to be become true of.” A pragmatics of a world to-be-made, after all: the crafting of a response, to the tearing at the seams of our present, by the intensification of a fugitive present that passes in the time it has constituted. Indeed, “if those who think about a future world to be made to come into being did not, in their dreams of it, find some wonderful *presentiment* of the presence for which call, if, in a word, the wait for the work was amorphous, there would doubtlessly be no creation.” (Souriau, “Of the Mode” 230) Which is also to say that, if learning to cultivate generative and heterogeneous relations to those beings-of-the-fringe involves consenting to a pragmatic metamorphosis of the passing, into one another, of our world made and a world to-be-made, then this consent can never a matter of “thought” in abstraction from the feelingof a fringe that this fugitive presentmakes felt with the character of an imperative.

 Thus, whenever it is a matter of thinking the problematic, thought can never become a well of originary gestation, but is always a vector of transformation of a problematic field– the gesture, at the edge of the present, of dramatising the feeling of the fringe, of enabling the passing of another world in this world to set our thinking, feeling, and doing in motion. And in this sense, it is entirely apposite, it seems to me, that Souriau would call this feeling that animates the thinking a “presentiment”– for here the prefix is not attached to the sensible experience itself, but to the dim existence of that which *makes us* feel. To call it a presentiment is to emphasise that it corresponds to the feeling of an “if” rather than of an accomplished “is”. It is the feeling of a possible that demands to be honoured, that calls for its own intensification. To think the problematic, then, may well amount, quite simply, to *trusting* those presentiments. It may amount to giving to the “if” that makes us feel the tools it may need, so that, at the edge of a present that wonders *how* to go on, it may introduce, in the world made, the difference required for the intensification, always at risk, always unfinished, of another world to-be-made.

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1. I am thankful to Isabelle Stengers (“Speculative Philosophy”) for this expression. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For a very generative use of the “not only” see Marisol de la Cadena. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. The resonances are also not entirely coincidental either– Deleuze indeed acknowledged his debt to Souriau in *What is Philosophy?* (220, n. 6) and, as Isabelle Stengers and Bruno Latour (“The Sphinx”, 13) note in their introductory essay to Souriau’s *The Different Modes of Existence*, there are already hidden references to Souriau in Deleuze’s *Difference and Repetition,* references to the work of art to-be-made, and to the virtual as a task to be performed, that are “as plain to see as the famous purloined letter of Edgar Allan Poe.” [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. And interestingly, Deleuze (63) made a very similar point in relation to the oracles of ancient Greece: “Myth tells us that it [a grounding] always involves a further task to be performed, an enigma to be resolved. The oracle is questioned, but the oracle's response is itself a problem.” [↑](#footnote-ref-4)