Moving Together:

Affect, Time and The Political in-between Bodies

Semiha Müge Özbay
PhD Thesis
Department of Visual Cultures
Goldsmiths, University of London
2018
I declare that all work presented in this thesis is my own, and that all references to other sources have been cited accordingly.

Semiha Müge Özbay
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my Supervisor Dr. Nicole Wolf for her valuable comments, guidance, patience, understanding and support and Visual Cultures Department for providing me with a research bursary for the academic year 2013-2014 and making my writing possible.

I am grateful to all my family for their patience, love, kindness, support and understanding since the beginning of this journey; especially, Hakan Aydoğan who has stood by me in all circumstances; my parents Nursel Özbay and Ünal Özbay for their loving and generous support especially opening their home to me; my sisters Hande Nalbantoğlu and Gözde Özbay Suicmez who always listened to me and encouraged me whenever I called them; my nephew Ege and niece Kiraz for always bringing joy;

Many thanks to all my friends; Aydın Teker especially for listening to me during my hard times and for all her choreographies and students; Mustafa Kaplan, my first contemporary dance teacher, for his kindness and knowledge; to all the Çatı members, especially my friends who contributed to my thesis and those with whom I could not conduct interviews, yet shared and experimented experiences dancing together over the years. It was those dances at Çatı that provided the background of this research.

Heartful thanks to my friends (in alphabetical order); Ana Cuscon, Serpil Çağlayan, Georgios Diamantopoulos, Cheryl Godfrey-Ross, Hüsam Süleymangil, Eda Yapanar, and many others…
Abstract

This thesis investigates the affective, temporal and political aspects of dancing together. I endeavour to theorize the affective field in-between dancing bodies with references to transmission of affects, imitative and emotional contagion, attunement, rhythmic entrainment, and mimicry. The temporal aspects of dancing together is understood in terms of Deleuze’s philosophy of time, particularly his concepts such as the Aion, the event, caesura, the virtual, and the three syntheses of time. At the intersection of affects and time, the potentials of the virtual imply the political. The political is conceived as the potential of the creative endeavours and the affective intensities activated by dancing together besides more overt political implications of the various political movements and historical moments. In order to develop these arguments in case studies, I introduce the experiences of a dancing community in Istanbul (Çatı, Association of Independent Contemporary Dancers); dancing rhythmically as part of political struggles during protests, strikes and the Gezi Uprising; and the relationship between the dancer and the audience in Hallo!, a choreographic work by Aydin Teker which is co-composed affectively by the spectators and the performer.
Table of Contents:

Introduction
Research questions and interests 7
Experiences as sources and examples 11
Affect theory 26
Affect and dance 39
Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time and Dance 44
Dance and the political 48
Contributions and Chapter Layout 56

Chapter 1: Towards The In-between: My Experiences of Encounters with The Others
1.1 Arrival and encounters in the dance studio 62
1.2 Encounter with the other 69
1.3 Defining affect in terms of encounters 78
1.4 Approaching The Other After The Encounter 83
1.5 In Search of A Ground in The Interval 84

Chapter 2: Listening to The In-between: Affective Weaving of Moving with
2.1 Boundaries and the transmission of affects 87
2.2 In conversation with a dance community 97
   2.2.1 Çatı: A community of independent dancers in Istanbul 97
   2.2.2 Relationality and attunement 104
   2.2.3 Mimesis and dialogues 125
2.3 Dancing with and listening 133
   2.3.1 Aydin Teker’s Hallo! 133
   2.3.2 Affective co-composition 136
   2.3.3 Kinesthesia and audience participation 141
   2.3.4 On listening and hearing 149
Conclusion 155
Chapter 3: Moving The In-between: Rhythms and Stillness as a Form of Protest

3.1 Definitions 157
3.2 Halay and Horon in protests 164
3.3 The Gezi Uprising, Dancing 171
3.4 Standing Still 181
3.5 Continuities and Disruptions 198
Conclusion 201

Chapter 4: Temporality of The In-Between

4.1 Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time 203
4.2 Chronos, Aion, The Event, and The Virtual 203
4.3 The Three Syntheses of Time 210
4.4 The Time of Improvisation 217
4.5 The Time of the treadmill 228
4.6 The Time of Halays and The Gezi Uprising 232
Conclusion 241

General Conclusion: The Political In-Between Moving Bodies 243

Bibliography and Sources 249
Introduction

How else can one write but of those things which one doesn't know, or knows badly? It is precisely there that we imagine having something to say. We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other. Only in this manner are we resolved to write. To satisfy ignorance is to put off writing until tomorrow - or rather, to make it impossible. Perhaps writing has a relation to silence altogether more threatening than that which it is supposed to entertain with death. (Deleuze: 2004: XX)

Research Questions and Interests

An encounter with the other or an event may trigger a question, which can, in turn, lead to a series of shifts in the way we see and experience the world. When we attend to the event and try to understand it, more questions will arise and take us on an unprecedented journey into the unknown of ourselves as we form connections with the world always in the light or shadow of this question. As one focuses on a question, one’s life itself can become a test to decipher various responses emerging on the surface of events and experiences even though one is aware of the fact that these answers can only point to other epistemological and ontological gaps and niches. These gaps and niches become detours in one’s endeavour to understand the ever-unfolding happenings and becomings in our lives. A question may be born out of an urgency to make sense of our experiences with a responsibility to respond to a call from the world – friends, lovers, rebels, cities, lands, birds, and mountains; dancers weaving poetry with their movements; waves and borders rising in front of immigrants... At times, one finds oneself like an exile far from one’s companions with whom one sets off this journey as a question can also affect all kinds of bonds with the world in order to reshape them. At the same time, a question always marks difference and hope, a
towardness of lifelines as opposed to the frozen frameworks and dead-end definitions with which we are provided. Hence, it “marks the turning point” as it “opens up a new space and new time” “creat[ing] a new world” (Ambrosio 2007: 56).

I cannot claim that my research questions have created the new as such even in my trivial individual world; however, they opened new paths -at times swirling in circles- and lines forming new connections that shifted gears in all areas of my life during this research process. Nevertheless, I am referring to small details in our daily lives, our creative efforts, and forms of resistance and action to take charge of transformation and redefinition of the political in various scales. My interest in the relationality of moving and dancing bodies influenced my perspective on the relationship between all forms of existence, living and non-living, which in turn also affected my approach to the sources of my research questions to which I remained relatively faithful and kept as examples or case studies as part of this thesis. In the next section of this chapter, I will give detailed references to these experiences and events that led me to curiosity about specific themes, patterns, ruptures and breaks. Firstly, I want to present the overarching themes and core questions that motivated my research.

This thesis seeks to delineate the affective and political aspects of moving together in a dance studio, dancing as a form of protest in the streets and lastly, in terms of the relational field between the dancer and the audience. The main focus of the research is on the relationality of bodies mainly when they participate in a creative act as part of improvisational movement practices and become a site of resistance during protests in the streets. What happens in the affective field of the bodies as they dance together? How can the time of dancing-with be configured and what are the roles of temporalities produced through various dance practices? How can we define a corporeal politics and the political emerging in-between the affective and affected bodies? Moreover, vice versa, how does dancing function affectively and politically when bodies are overtly driven by political causes as in the cases of strikes, demonstrations and uprisings? How can the experiences of
moving with the others suggest the possibility of creating new forms of being-with in order to relate to the others and the world in general differently?

I use the words ‘movement’ and ‘dance’ interchangeably and consider both improvisational and traditional practices in this thesis. My focus is on the relational field between moving bodies in dance studios, performances spaces and the streets (during protests) rather than the daily habitual movements in other social contexts in various public places. I am specifically interested in the dance classes, which prioritise improvisation and creativity of individuals rather than choreographic forms. Secondly, the dance piece that I chose to write on is woven by the responses from the audience; hence it bears an element of surprise and improvisation. Thirdly, the improvisational and creative element is also present in the movements of protestors during street demonstrations as people discover spontaneous responses to the violence of state apparatus. However, I am equally drawn to understand the traditional forms of people’s dances such as halay and horon, which have been part of strikes and protests in Turkey because of their affective function in political struggles.

I see the significance of dancing bodies in their immediacy here and now, their choice of corporeal presence in an improvised relationality as opposed to relatively more socially set stages of encounters such as in a workplace. A dance studio can be regarded as another set space where there are unspoken and acknowledged rules that create a safe space necessary for creative contact and relationality of bodies, but the forms of connection through movement can be improvised in infinite combinations in a non-judgemental environment. Walking, standing still, moving in infinite combinations, dancing bodies in a flux of becoming with their immediacy are set apart from the representational structures. Gilles Deleuze's approach to movement can be a reference in this context. Following Friedrich Nietzsche, Deleuze puts the movement in focus in contrast to representation, which is a form of mediation. A movement involves "inventing vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps which directly touch the mind" (Deleuze 2004: 9). Instead of representing, a movement is a repetition
wherein "pure forces" act on the bodies without intermediaries as movements including the gestures and words occur before "organized bodies" (12). The repetition of movement cannot be represented but can be expressed. Movement leads to a multiplicity of centres, perspectives and synchronicity of temporalities, which in turn disrupt representation.

In both cases of dancing together -either in a dance studio or street demonstrations- each participant chooses to be present corporeally rather than as a virtual and online persona which is gradually becoming more and more common form of relating with people in today's world. The immediacy of this bodily presence influences the affective imprint of the dance event on the individuals. The intention and decision to be with the others in a specific place and time; one’s interest in the event; and attending to the others with whom space and time are shared all play a role in the way people are affecting and affected by others. To make or create a sense out of these events can also be possible with attention to and nurturing of these experiences by each participant in various events of moving together.

It was the endeavour to attend to and conceive my own experiences of dancing together that led me to this research. What kept my interest alive was my own affective relationship with these practices as I danced with friends, strangers, acquaintances and comrades who generated in me a faith in the idea that what is becoming, or being created spontaneously or formed over time in-between dancing bodies is part of an emergent language for new forms of relationship instead of a merely fleeting and transitory discharge of emotions. Like all forms of faith, this cannot be proved; however, it is one of the driving forces of my research that points to the acknowledgement of this possibility. As movements are repeated with differences each time, they become the building stones for bringing forth something that did not exist before –poiesis- and may suggest a poetics in the forms of artistic creativity, political resistance and transformation of the status quo. By poetry, I do not mean lyrical forms of language or movement, but rather how a body can become a site for the transformation of habitual forms while
expressing and cultivating a different form of perception of the world. This difference is woven and experimented in-between bodies. As Édouard Glissant suggests in his *Poetics of Relation*, "a poetics cannot guarantee us a concrete means of action. However, a poetics, perhaps, does allow us to understand better our action in the world" (Glissant 1997 (2010): 199). The power and poetics of dancing together lie in the way it opens space and time to conceive and experience the world differently and creatively. This effect is not something that can be anticipated or prefigured in detail like a project, but it can be experienced like variations on scores or improvisations. As Deleuze suggests, “where nothing is fixed, a labyrinth without a thread”, art becomes experience or “the science of the sensible” (Deleuze 2004: 68). Although dance (like poetry) does not provide us with formulas to change the social system, one of its political implications can be the possibility of laying the foundations for relating to each other and the world in general with more sensibility and attention.

After having presented the research questions and general themes of interests that drove the research process, in the following sections of this chapter, I aim to introduce the method of the research, its sources in the creative and political experiences and the relevance of auto-ethnography in addition to the theoretical framework of affect studies. Then, I continue with the question of the political with references to Félix Guattari and Jacques Rancière. I also include brief literature reviews of the relationship between affect theory, politics and dance studies. Lastly, I outline the chapters of the thesis in general.

**Experiences as Sources and Examples**

Each project is triggered and shaped by a series of personal stories, experiences, events, and in some cases, by accepting the chance element, so is this thesis. This research was initiated by the desire to make sense of my own experiences of dancing with others in a dance studio and the streets in Istanbul. I was amazed by the potential of improvised dances with friends and the power of collaborative creation to rupture the habitual and the quotidian. These experiences in the studio
were soon followed by a historical event, the Gezi Uprising during which all forms of dancing were an expression of revolutionary and collective joy, an opening, a glimpse of freedom while the political atmosphere in Turkey was getting more and more suppressive under a regime moving towards authoritarianism. Therefore, the personal aspect has been merging with the social, historical and political moments of the geography I lived most of my life. In this context, I intend to present an account of this inevitable parallelism.

Since 2002, I have been attending the evening classes and a diverse range of workshops at Çatı, Association of Independent Contemporary Dancers in Istanbul; however, I began reflecting on the in-betweenness of dancing bodies years after having been inspired by various movement practices in my own artworks. Soon after this vague interest appeared, I happened to be the person who first saw the fire that destroyed the building in which Çatı was situated. There was a Butoh workshop going on when the fire started and fortunately, the studio was evacuated in time. The next day, my decision to write about Çatı was confirmed by the force of the event. The fire in the building located in a side street of Istiklal Street in Taksim cannot be regarded outside the gentrification process in the centre of Istanbul. Coincidentally, this incident happened on the night when there was a major demonstration against the demolition of the historic Emek Movie Theatre on the same street. Another coincident was that the most popular and symbolic slogan of the Gezi Uprising, "This is just the beginning. Keep up the struggle" was first chanted during the Emek protests. Today Emek Movie Theatre has been replaced by a shopping mall that has a replica of the old cinema in it. However, the struggle did continue with the Gezi resistance against the construction of a mall in the park in Taksim Square.

The sections on dancing together as a form of protest are shaped by these ongoing struggles and my experiences as a participant in many protests over the years. The Gezi Uprising was a pivotal point in many people's lives, as well as for my research process, especially when hundreds of standing people demonstrated the power of stillness as a form of protest following the Standing Man's eight-
hour-long still act in Taksim Square. Moreover, the Gezi experience was marked by the joy of people performing different kinds of dances, most commonly, the collective traditional dances such as halay and horon. This drew my attention to the political significance of these folkloric dances that were appropriated for radical politics in the history of social movements in Turkey.

My last example of dancing with is Aydın Teker's choreographic piece titled *Hallo!* (2015) that highlights the relational field between the dancer and the audience members, which is woven affectively by both parties. Aydın Teker created *Hallo!* with an urgency that forced her after her Gezi experience. This work on hearing and listening was synchronous with my personal stories of not listening to others and not being listened to, as it would also resonate with many audience members' experiences. However, on the centenary of the Armenian genocide (2015) other layers of affects were triggered in the depths of political and historical memory engraved in the personal. It is painful to observe how traumas are deepened when the sufferers are not listened to. Not to listen, not to hear also entail complete denial, ignorance and putting one's traumas on the other side of the scale with the intention to compare each other's pains. Later in the year 2015, the power of hearing the other was felt more strongly when the conflicts in several Kurdish towns culminated, and the public representation of the events was censored or manipulated in the mainstream media. I think that when a society or a person lives without attending to the other and lending one’s ear to the other’s story and pain, they are still affected by the other’s suffering and the dark presence they endeavour to keep out of sight. This is how life withers away when the other’s call is ignored, therefore, listening to the other is a political and ethical act and dancing together is possible only when we attend to each other’s affects.

Since 2013, the political atmosphere of Turkey has been metaphorically similar to the finale of a contemporary dance piece by Taldans (Mustafa Kaplan and Filiz Sizanli) called *We need to move urgently* (created during the Gezi Uprising) in which a folkloric dance (halay) is disrupted when the performers miss the rhythm of each other, gradually falling apart as each continues to dance on her/his own. In
this context, dancing together is possible temporarily, almost like a mathematical coincidence in time, and then we separate and dance away. Being aware of my overinterpretation, I see this scene as a projection of the gradual disintegration of togetherness in the political context of Turkey. Furthermore, a halay was literally disrupted by a suicide bomb that killed 109 people at a peace rally in Ankara (10.10.2015), a historical moment captured by a video camera of a protester. Following the title of Taldans’ piece, we still need to move urgently and find ways of cultivating life and attending each other despite prevailing despair.

The pivotal historical events such as the gentrification of the urban centres in Istanbul; the Gezi Uprising that spread across Turkey in 2013; 87 terror attacks that killed 956 people between 2011-2017 (most of these bombings took place between 2015 and 2017); the coup d'état attempt in 2016 which was followed by a series of tumultuous socio-political ruptures; and Turkey's descent into authoritarianism shook the ground and uprooted many lives. At the same time, they led us to rethink our relationships with each other, our communities, cities and country. Each person has different responses to the questions arising in disjointed times and different capabilities to reshape their choices and actions. These fundamental issues also paralleled my writing process at times adding urgency for finding an answer if not a solution and at other times displacing my perspective entirely. Nevertheless, I do not present either the thesis as a whole or the ideas, affects, and thoughts drawn from our experiences in order to decipher the implications of a historical period, which we can hardly interpret while we are living in it. This would be unfair to the examples discussed in the chapters as if they can be turned into means or elements in a particular political scenario. In that regard, the political history that frames the period of writing forms a background of the examples analysed rather than their meaning or end. Furthermore, the philosophical and theoretical aspects of the thesis try to be part of a broader picture in which the political is redefined in relation to affects, creativity, time, and difference.
The research process was continuously transformed by on-going experiences frequently differing from the ones that laid the first foundations of the thesis. The notion of experience itself implies the intersection between temporality and affects. Experience is not stored in the memory to be rethought self-reflexively, folding onto itself. Instead, it is constantly shaped by the affective encounters and time that can apply shocks to thought and the whole affective and temporal composition of the body and organs in a Deleuzian sense.

Reflection on the affective experience retrospectively or simultaneously is also a phenomenological question regarding the separation between a perceiving subject and the perceived world. In contrast to a phenomenological approach, John Dewey and William James view experience in terms of "connections" and "relations" which render it "an active process of becoming in transition" (McCormack 2013: 24). Dewey explains, "[it] is not experience which is experienced, but nature –stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced" (Dewey cited in McCormack 2013: 23). In this regard, an experience is marked by the ecology and relationality of humans, animals, plants, and inorganic matter that enter into composition with each other with each experience. Hence, it is not a subjective and internal supply, but a worlding, a continuous becoming. Therefore, it is not possible to conceive an experience by its representations (McCormack 2013: 25).

In my opinion, experience as a process is deeply embodied in bones, muscles, organs and soft tissues. Making sense of it can be a means of integration of this corporeal information into our thinking and the way our new experiences of relations and connections proceed. Hence, I write about a relational and constantly becoming interval with the acknowledgement that it cannot be apprehended fully retrospectively. Yet, I cannot deny the subjective aspects of experiencing this interval. For instance, if it was not the impact of affects on my endocrinological system, psychosomatic mechanism and gastrointestinal tract in addition to the central and peripheral nervous system, I may not have been drawn into Affect
Studies in order to explore the forms of relationality between bodies. It was these corporeal experiences of diseases in addition to the nourishing support and joy of connections with others that led me to an interest in the porousness of the body interacting with the world. Therefore, the experience is formed by all these interactions with dancing bodies and the world in general, while imprinting on our bodies in various ways.

To write on one’s experiences involves several layers of conscious and unconscious processes. If one dances simultaneously reflecting on the meaning of one’s movements and experiences at the time of their unfolding, one may not live the full potential of movement flow and encounters. This potential can entail opening new paths for thought and creativity unless they are captured in the framework of the already-known. Doubt, suspicion, awareness, self-observation, awareness, and criticality all induce a kind of distance between perception, language and experience. However, this critical distance contributes to the creative process as it can transform movement patterns instead of fixing the meaning of the experience at the moment of its happening. During some dance classes, there were rare occasions when I interrupted my dancing in order to take down notes about interesting remarks made by the facilitator and my thoughts defining the moments I had just experienced. There were also classes during which we were asked to write down whatever comes to the tip of our pens and improvise writing. In both cases, reflection and linguistic expression became separate experiences, not supplementing the previous one of movement, but making sense of it and creating meaning even though it is hardly possible to seize the temporal, corporeal and affective multiplicities of an experience. The attempt to understand the previous moment in the present flux of time can be likened to a dog chasing its own tail.

T.S. Eliot in his *Four Quartets* writes,

> At best, only a limited value
> In the knowledge derived from experience.
The knowledge imposes a pattern, and falsifies,
For the pattern is new in every moment
And every moment is a new and shocking
Valuation of all we have been. (Eliot 1943: 23-24)

In this poem, T.S. Eliot warns about the viability of experience as a source of knowledge. As each experience is marked by difference, theorisation based on personal experience has the risk of fixing its meaning in time, which will, in turn, affect the way new experiences are lived. However, to make sense of an experience whilst being open to its newness each passing moment can involve giving voice to the resonances of the event without induction of formulas.

Similarly, deductive application of theories in order to understand an experience posits a trap of limiting the potential of experience in the framework of a theoretical source. Following Félix Guattari who claims, “[c]onceptual tools open and close fields of the possible” (Guattari 1995: 126), I can add that implementation of concepts to conceive an experience can limit the multiplicity of its meaning, or, in contrast it can open thinking and future experiences to new possibilities. Consideration of the lived moment with the aid of theoretical tools can either hinder the possible or activate the potential of the unknown. Similarly, attending to what the event or a durational experience suggests and being open to its unprecedented and unthought aspects can lead us to devise new concepts which can consequently induce new experiences. Therefore, neither experience nor theory can be taken as anchors of meaning although both cooperate equally in our continuous endeavour to connect matter and meaning, body and language.

It is also relevant to mention Giorgio Agamben’s understanding of experience as he envisages it in terms of language in his *Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience* (1993). In his essay, which begins with the assumption that modern man is deprived of his biography and experiences, Agamben investigates the place of experience in philosophy and literature and points out how experience lost its credibility as a source of knowledge after the dominance of scientific method. He
asserts that experience is related to the stage before human beings enter the language. Unlike animals that are already in the language, humans acquire language later in their childhood. So there is a period when experiences are not thought or expressed in language.

[T]he constitution of the subject in and through language is precisely the expropriation of this ‘wordless’ experience; from the outset, it is always ‘speech’. A primary experience, far from being subjective, could then only be what in human beings comes before the subject – that is, before language: a ‘wordless’ experience in the literal sense of the term, a human infancy [in-fancy], whose boundary would be marked by language. (Italic in the original, Agamben 1993: 47)

According to Agamben, subjecthood and consciousness are formed by language. For instance, “the flux of consciousness” in modern literature is marked by a monologue of language because consciousness has no other reality outside language (Agamben 1993: 48). James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake is a good example of such an interior monologue. Both Freud (mainly with the concept of the unconscious) and Lacan, emphasise the role of the pre-linguistic and pre-subjective psychic material. Agamben claims that this pre-linguistic material is not merely part of child development in which humans leave a Paradise of pure experience with entry into language. Rather, this non-verbal experience of “infancy” coexists with language and “indeed, is itself constituted through the appropriation of it by language in each instance to produce the individual as subject” (ibid.). Infancy as pre-verbal experience is present all through our lives rather than being chronologically restricted to early childhood. This concept has some similarities with what Wittgenstein conceives as unsayable: “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (Wittgenstein 2001: 89). However, Agamben does not view truth either as an ineffable mystical experience of silence or a psychic reality beyond or outside language. Truth is not something to be defined only in language, either (Agamben 1993: 51). So, neither experience nor language is seen
superior in relation to truth. Rather all these three are constituted together. In short, Agamben suggests the coexistence of the experiential level and language while emphasising the role of experience in knowledge production without severing its ties with language.

Consequently, instead of viewing any possibility of writing on experience as a futile attempt, awareness of the connection between language and experience is more constructive for considering the relationship between matter and meaning, the union of which can be observed in language. Language is not an abstract system, but a corporeal one created by humans "because where there is voice, there is body" (Leonardo da Vinci cited by Agamben 1993: 11). In this context, writing on the corporeal experiences of dancing together becomes an opportunity to experiment with their relationship with the corporeality of language. At the same time, I try not to mystify the effects of movement practices, which always exceed its representation in language. Therefore, writing on moving bodies is always accompanied by an "in-fancy", a wordless realm of pure experience and the humble acceptance of the impossibility of its total apprehension.

In sum, an experience is relational in the way it involves the rest of the world and -in the specific context of this thesis- other dancing individuals. The effects of experiences are corporeal as they have various impacts on each part of the body. Although our experiences can never be fully represented, this does not prevent their expression in language or diminish their value as a possible source of knowledge production. Because language itself is always shadowed by the unspeakable aspects of experience, writing or talking about experiences can be a modest attempt to create meaning and relations which can then invent other new relations and meanings. Nevertheless, it is preferable not to fix these meanings in a theory that can hinder the potential of every new experience of dancing together. On the other hand, as I also hope to realise with the task of writing this research, some theoretical tools can also open up the potential of the experiences of togetherness.
I write about my own experiences of dancing with others in the first chapter of the thesis on the encounter. I remember several past incidents of meeting the others in dance studios, which had strong impacts on the way I perceive my own body and the world in general. The influences of these experiences expand beyond what I can express in language. Moreover, it can take a long period to process the corporeal knowledge and integrate it into one’s life and language. Writing about the silence of movement and the moving body expressing itself outside the linear time of language is a challenging yet inspiring task. Although movements are also realised in chronological order in space, the synchronicity of multiple corporeal events taking place in the body form many layers that cannot be fully captured by consciousness or language.

Regarding this difficulty of writing on movement and body, I want to refer to Hélène Cixous whose concept of l’écriture feminine (a form of writing that experiments with the expression of the inexpressible outside the patriarchal discourse) influenced me in my early twenties. In her introduction to Clarice Lispector’s The Stream of Life [Agua Viva], Cixous writes, “[t]o say something always betrays something. (…) What is tragic is that the word separates. There is a difference in language between the subject who has pleasure and the one who says it” (Cixous’ Introduction in: Lispector 1989: XI). Lispector tries to write the impossible in her endeavour to capture the present moment of experience when she says, “I want to capture the present”, “at the same time I live (the instant), I hurl myself into its passage to another instant” (ibid). A written text lacks the bodily presence of the voice in the spoken language that unfolds in the present time in contrast to a text, which is always written in the past, even when an author wants to seize the present time of experience. In this context, one can recall the first sentence of Lispector’s A Breath of Life (Pulsations): “I want to write pure movement” (Lispector 2011: 2). My voice vacillating between silence and overflow searches for a dwelling “in this kind of different language which does not divide intellect from sensitiveness but seeks for the origin of the word in the depths of the intimacy of the flesh, in us and between us” (Irigaray 2017: 53-54). With French feminist thinkers like Irigaray and Cixous, philosophical writing
began to incorporate the affective, feminine, poetic and corporeal elements which were excluded in a male dominated discourse. Today many scholars use first person narratives and express their affective involvement in practice based or autoethnographical researches. In my thesis, the encounter with and remaking of my body and voice through the encounter with the other prepare the ground for the arrival of others in the next chapters in which I try to implement an academic and “neutral” narrative voice.

The personal narrative that forms the first part of Chapter 1 is primarily based on my arrivals and encounters at Independent Dance in Siobhan Davies Studios (London) where I attended numerous morning and evening classes between January 2017 and June 2018. Most of these classes focus on somatic practices and improvisation. In order to protect the privacy of other participants, I do not mention the date or the instructor of the classes that generated specific experiences leading me to compose the text and contributing to my overall understanding of encounter. Besides, my ideas do not originate from a particular form of movement practice. For instance, the section on the spine is drawn from several movement experiments focusing on the spine with or without a partner. In this regard, I shun from commenting on these experiences as the outcome or effects of specific movement practices. However, I would like to name the instructors of these morning and evening classes at Independent Dance with gratitude and love (in alphabetical order): Gaby Agis, Ben Ash, Alex Crowe, Antonio De La Fe, Charlotte Derbyshire, Manny Emslie, Daria Faïn (workshop), Eva Karczag, Lizzy Le Quesne, Mary-Clare McKenna, Bettina Neuhaus, Martin Piliponsky, Colin Poole, Susanna Recchia, Carolyn Roy, Charlotte Scott, Miranda Tuffnel, Lucia Walker…

I do not only write on my own experiences but also others' in Chapter 2 and 3. The first half of Chapter 2 attempts to comprehend the experiences of the participants of a dance community and friends at Çatı, Association of Independent Contemporary Dancers. Therefore, interviews were conducted as the main method in an endeavour to create a multiplicity of voices. The quotations taken from the
interviews become part of the argumentation of my thesis. Sometimes I felt their presence accompanying me as if we were still in a conversation during the writing process after the interviews were completed. Initially, I kept all quotations as a separate flow in the text without commenting on them. Then I had to give up the idea because ultimately, choosing quotations from the conversations was already an interpretation as I used those parts that were closer to my argument or thinking path. Writing on others’ experiences, I could only interpret their words. There is always the risk of misunderstanding, overinterpretation, manipulation, incomprehension, and misreading others’ narrative, even more so when it is an oral expression instead of written word. On the other hand, writing itself is a form of dialogue. Also a dialogue with other thinkers, artists and scholars… The first intention to let the quotations from the interviews flow in their own way could only be possible if all the conversations were included in their entirety instead of mere sections. The political choice of not commenting on them would stem from the discomfort of being a self-reflexive scholar and a presumptuous or unconscious belief in the superiority of that scholar who desecrates the other and his/her words through fragmentation of analysis. As if these words were not already part of a dialogue, as if writing was not a form of dialogue… In that sense, it is relevant to add another voice to the text that “is a space of many dimensions, in which are wedded and contested various kinds of writing, no one of which is original: the text is a tissue of citations, resulting from the thousand sources of culture” (Barthes 1977: 146).

The original idea behind my interviews is to reflect as many facets of experiences of dancing together as possible and compose a text open to multiple voices and expressions of moving with. Moreover, it is a way of lending an ear, listening to the others’ experiences in order to construct meaning out of our shared experiences. After several stages of grappling with means of unpacking the contents of the interviews, I interpret these accounts as both insider and a researcher with an endeavour to hear and engage with the others. I hope to realize this task without a self-righteous manner.
In this respect, an auto-ethnographical method is a helpful tool so as not to fall into the trap of overindulgence with one's affective relationship with the research field. In their book on auto-ethnography Adams, Jones and Ellis posit that one “tend[s] to write about experiences that knock” oneself “for a loop and challenge the construction of meaning” (2015). The Gezi Uprising and the fire that damaged the Çatı dance studio were definitely such experiences as mentioned earlier in this chapter. The aftermath stage entailed the discussions of Çatı members about the meaning and the future of the association in addition to the dialogues in the neighbourhood forums on the continuation of the political resistance. These discussions were useful to provide a common ground for thinking togetherness, which necessarily involves conflicts and antagonisms. Hence they may result in rifts and separations, which expose power relations and illusions of union based on sameness. Most of the time, I was an observant of the discussions on Çatı, which helped me notice others’ and my highly emotional connection and devotion to Çatı.

My interviews with Çatı members were realised towards the end of this aftermath stage when the resonances of both the fire and the Gezi protests were still felt. So some of the interviewees commented on the gentrification of the Beyoğlu district where the Gezi Park, Taksim Square (the areas where the uprisings took place) and Çatı studio are located. I met each interviewee individually at various coffee places and bars in this neighbourhood. I explained my PhD, research questions and the reason for the interviews to each participant. The interviews were informal and consisted of both question and answer sections as well as long conversations with friends over drinks and meals. They were recorded with interviewees' verbal and informal consents and the recordings were paused or ended if required. I transcribed these interviews and translated the parts I include in my thesis into English. I do not mention the interviewees’ names in Chapter 2 due to the ethical concerns about their privacy. Instead, I allocated a random letter to each interviewee in order to identify that certain quotes are from the same person. However, their names, the places and dates of the interviews are indexed in the Bibliography at the end of the thesis. I want to also indicate that there were
not any risks involved for me or for them, during the research process and there are still no risks when I am using the material after the research process. I take precautions for the protection of the individuals interviewed.

I had to limit the number of interviewees due the necessity of restricting the research field. People come and go, and different groups emerge in different time periods at Çatı, so my interviews were conducted with a group of friends that I shared dance experiences between 2002 and 2012. Everybody's Çatı will be narrated in a different manner and in this respect neither the interviewees nor I claim to represent Çatı with its open-ended diversity of experiences in both movement and friendship. Besides, I do not claim to write a historical, sociological, anthropological, or an objective account of the dances and movements experienced at Çatı since its foundation.

Only the first half of the second chapter is dedicated to Çatı in addition to parts of this introductory chapter; however, it has been a challenging component of my whole research process for various reasons. These can be listed as my own ebb and flow concerning my affective relationship with Çatı on a personal level and the inevitable changes that took place at Çatı in the timeframe of my research. Tami Spry suggests autoethnographers to “[a]void self-indulgence by critically reflecting on our motives for and methods of writing; disclosing information about selves, others, and contexts; and, to the best of our ability, connect our motives, methods, and disclosures to larger cultural issues” (Spry cited in Adams, Jones and Ellis 2015: 96). Following Spry’s recommendation, I prefer to bypass an analysis based on my affective self-absorption and protect the privacy of others. Instead, I reflect with gratitude on the profoundly precious comments and ideas of my friends who were so generous to share their experiences with me.

In the second part of Chapter 2, I utilize interviews with the artists as a supportive method rather than a central one. Aydın Teker (choreographer) and Gizem Aksu (performer) generously shared with me their experiences of the creative process and staging of Hallo!. The three of us met in my flat in Istanbul where I recorded
the interview with their permission. I am grateful for Teker’s wholehearted support as we met several times to talk formally (interviews recorded with the consent of the artist) and informally. Our first meeting in her flat still has affective resonances for me as I recall how she opened her personal archives of her works while recounting her experiences as a choreographer and an academic in Turkey. I hope to dedicate a detailed analysis of her works in another project because in this thesis I focus solely on her latest work, which suggests a unique affective relationship between the performer and the audience members while providing space and time for listening to each other.

Lastly, before I move on to the sections on the theoretical framework and literature review, I aim to clarify a few points regarding my choice of examples and my position as a researcher in relation to them. As mentioned above, the first and foremost reason was to understand my experiences of dancing with others both in a dance studio and in the streets. My experiences at Çatı and during demonstrations led me to question the meaning of dancing together. So rather than being case studies to discuss theories, they are the primary sources of my research questions. When I started my PhD, I used the word “with” rather than “together” and tried to understand being/moving-with in the context of Jean-Luc Nancy’s philosophy. The word “together” entered my lexicon after the fire and the Gezi experience when I began to reflect on togetherness, which denotes to be in a relationship with other(s), a joint action, and being part of a group. The years 2014-2016 were not only politically and socially difficult in Turkey, but also coincided with my personal experience of a divorce process. Teker’s choreographic work arrived just in time to draw my attention to being with and listening to each other. Being with does not necessarily entail togetherness, but still connotes the awareness of the space-time between us. The almost tangible, intensely affective atmosphere, created between the performer of Hallo! and the spectators made me think about this relationality in terms of affects. Although this is not a participatory dance piece in which dancers and the audience move together, there are other participatory aspects, as I will expand in Chapter 2. The verbal element of participation (responding to the dancer's call or not; sharing
one’s experience with the others (or not) during the second half of the piece) presents a risk of making my example confusing in its relation to the other examples explored in the thesis. However, as an example of co-creation of an affective space and opening a ground to listen to each other, I find it useful for my arguments in Chapter 2 wherein these features will be discussed further. Finally, the inclusion of my experiences of encounter in a dance studio in London instead of Istanbul can be a question of interest. First, my other examples are from Turkey because I was born and lived there until I came to London for my studies. As referred to above, the historical and political context of these examples is essential (particularly when I write about dancing during protests) because their timeframe coincided with pivotal historical events in Turkey. My experiences at Independent Dance in London (in addition to other studios such as Chisenhale Dance Space and workshops and classes at the Buddhist Arts Centre) accompanied me and contributed to my process of healing, recovery, digestion and integration. I hope to write more about these movement experiences in the future. In conclusion, I do not conceive dance practices as pigeonholed in any national identity, neither are experiences demarcated by the borders of territories.

Affect Theory

In an attempt to conceive what emerges in-between bodies as they are dancing together or what their dancing together does to the bodies in their relationality, the discussions in affect studies provide a series of theoretical tools. Affect Studies help us understand the body in terms of materiality and senses, rather than representation and discourse. In that respect, it opens dance theory into a field where encounters between dancers, spectators and writers can be conceived with reference to their experiences, which disrupt the dichotomies of subject and object. In this section, I will present an overview of theories that define affect and relationality. I do not intend to give an all-encompassing outline of affect studies, but rather point out the diverse ways of defining and thinking affect that provide a theoretical framework for this thesis. For all practical purposes, various approaches provide a range of perspectives that open possibilities in thinking and
creating the relationality of dancing bodies. For instance, on the one side, with the implementation of neurology and endocrinology to formulate affects, nerves and blood mark the materiality of the bodies. On the other side, philosophical thinking opens the understanding of this in-betweenness to a potentiality in terms of politics and temporality. After I elaborate on various concepts and discussions in the field, I will draw an outline of my approach and comment on the points relevant to this research in order to situate my voice in the conversation.

Individuals are neither self-contained nor in a vacuum, instead they can be envisaged as connected to other bodies. In their introduction to The Affect Theory Reader, Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth (2010) emphasize the “in-between-ness” of affect as the intensities and forces pass from body to body – human or nonhuman-. With each encounter, the in-between-ness of affects opens the body to a continuous becoming beyond its skin-envelope. Affect is located “in those resonances that circulate about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the very passages or variations between these intensities and resonances themselves” (Gregg and Seigworth 2010: 1). The encounter between bodies generates a flow or an interruption of the flow of intensities while the visceral forces beyond the cognitive and emotional field induce us to act and move (ibid.). Departing from Spinoza’s famous quote, “[n]o one has yet determined what the body can do”, Gregg and Seigworth maintain that the capacity of the body is still not known and affect studies attempts to illuminate “the ‘not yet’ of a body’s doing” (4).

Affect theory envisages bodies as a site of intensities, energies, flows, processes and sensations rather than a static two-dimensional photographic image. In that context, Elizabeth Grosz emphasizes the intensities and sensations rather than “a visual map or cartography of the body” (Blackman 2008a: 77) and likewise, Brian Massumi puts the energies and forces between bodies against the body as a “mirror vision” (Massumi cited in Blackman 2012: 13). In opposition to the theories focused on representation, signification, and discourse, affect studies

---

1 I will expand on Spinoza’s and Deleuze’s understandings of affect in Chapter 1 when I define affect in terms of encounters.
problematize cognition, consciousness, representation, and immateriality of bodies that “participate[e] in the flow or passage of affect” (Blackman 2012: 1,4). Another contribution of affect studies particularly to the field of psychology, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick claims, is opening a perspective beyond a subject defined by lack and loss (Sedgwick 2003: 21).

I will give brief accounts of two main positions in affect theory represented by Silvan Tomkins and Brian Massumi in addition to the reactions to their theories, particularly the latter’s. I also refer to scholars such as Moira Gatens, Ruth Leys, Sara Ahmed and Ben Anderson for their comments on the politics of affects, which is essential in the context of this thesis.

Silvan Tomkins, whose work was first highlighted by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s watershed article in 1991, defines affect as the innate physiological and neurobiological mechanism activated by an event. Our awareness of an affect is called feeling. Tomkins specifically identifies three classes of affect as “affect for the preservation of life, affect for people and affect for novelty” which were significant for the process of natural selection (Tomkins 2008 [1962]: 93). Humans are motivated by positive affect and endeavour to maximize it while trying to minimize negative affect (180). According to Tomkins, the affect inhibition should be minimized since the body functions better when affects are expressed. Most of the affective expressions are a result of learning. For instance, the public display of intense affects such as anger, joy, fear, and excitement are generally suppressed. People also learn to show affects that they don’t internally experience, as it is the case when one has to put a sad face or smile depending on the social occasion. Sometimes mimicking the overt expressions of an affect can result in feeling it internally as with whistling in the dark to overcome one’s fear (101).

---

Tomkins emphasizes the distinction between drives and affects after pointing to their similarity in the way both are embodied and connected to cognitive process. Drives are “constrained in their aims” and temporality: For instance, to quench our thirst, we can drink limited types of liquids and we can live without water for a limited period of time (Sedgwick 2003: 18). On the other hand, affects are freer in terms of aim, time and object. An affect can be attached to any object: “Affects can be, and are, attached to things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, institutions, and any number of other things, including other affects. Thus, one can be excited by anger, disgusted by shame, or surprised by joy” (19). In contrast to the “instrumentality” of drives and their “orientation toward an aim”, affects are “autotelic” (ibid.).

Another major figure of affect studies is Brian Massumi according to whom affects cannot be limited to the psychological subject and emotions since they are immaterial and incorporeal forces (Blackman 2012: 21). So he differs from Tomkins who situates affects in the innate physiological mechanisms of a subject, which generate affects in reactions to the events in the outside world. According to Massumi, emotion is subjective, thus, defined and fixed in language by the individual from his/her perspective (Massumi 2002: 28). This point bears a similarity with Tomkins’, which also distinguishes between affects and their awareness as feelings. In contrast to Tomkins who lists and names affects, Massumi sees the potential of affects in their unrepresentability in language. Moreover, affects are “synesthetic” in the way all the senses are involved. They are “virtual synesthetic perspectives anchored in (...) the actually existing, particular things that embody them” (35).

Affects are autonomous in their not being limited to a particular body, perception and cognition. The autonomy of affects is relatively different from Tomkins’ concept of “autotelic” that connotes that unlike drives, affects do not have any purpose other than themselves. Even though they can be attached to any objects, they still belong to a psychological subject. In contrast, Massumi focuses on the preindividual, prelinguistic, free-floating, undefinable and unsignifiable aspects of
affect when he emphasizes their autonomy. Massumi’s understanding of affect outside the limits of emotions and language draws attention to the indeterminacy and the potentiality of the body because there is always a “never-to-be conscious autonomic remainder” (Massumi 2002: 25). In this regard, he refers to Benjamin Libet’s experiment (2004) which shows that neural processes in the brain are activated half a second before subjects intend to move their fingers (Massumi 2002: 29). Therefore, functions like consciousness, intention, volition and cognition lag behind the bodily function that cannot be fully known or signified. In other words, “the skin is faster than the word” (25) and there is always an excess of intensities that cannot be captured on a cognitive and narrative level. Massumi interprets this gap as the excess and fullness that provides the potential of the virtual while the indeterminacy of autonomic nervous system constitutes the potential of affects. As a whole, they mark the “openness” and autonomy of affect defined as the “participation of the virtual in the actual and the actual in the virtual” (35). Beyond the capture of emotions, a remainder that cannot be confined within a perceptual, cognitive and linguistic perspective implies the potential and autonomy of affect without which there would only be entropy (ibid.).

There are various responses to Massumi’s understanding of affect in the form of both developments and critiques. For instance, Patricia T. Clough connects the notion of the autonomy of affects with self-organization of matter and emphasizes the significance of Massumi’s examples that point to “what the body is becoming” (Clough 2010: 211). She adds that the oppositions between the living and the non-living or natural and cultural erode at “a postbiological threshold” (ibid.). Clough explains that the “affective turn” in critical theory shifts focus to the materiality of the body and “matter’s capacity for self-organization in being informational” (207). Following Spinoza and Deleuze, she refers to affects as pre-individual forces that influence “the body’s capacity to act” (ibid.). Clough argues that affect without a focus on the subjective emotions generates a new transsubjective and “biomediated body” that contests “the body-as-organism” - an informationally closed system that has its origins in the nineteenth century (ibid.).
Mark Hansen agrees with Clough who sees “the body-as-organism” as a hindrance to the potential of affect theory. Like Clough, he emphasizes the significance of computational science that facilitates “non-bodily access to the beyond of bodily experience”, a beyond or “virtual remainder”, not restricted to its philosophical theorization (Hansen 2014: 68). On the other hand, Hansen criticizes Massumi for viewing affect as excess beyond the reach of cognitive and narrative capture (Hansen 2014). He proposes conceptualizing affect “as a force operating wholly within processes” instead of excess (italic in the original, Hansen 2014: 70). Moreover, he claims that affects are passive; therefore they should not be equated with power in Spinozan terms.

Hansen’s understanding of affects as passive in opposition to the importance of active affects for the power to act in Spinoza’a philosophy (which I expand on the next chapter) is a problem addressed by Moira Gatens in her critique of Massumi. Gatens disagrees with Massumi who combines the neuroscientific experiments on consciousness and volition with Spinoza’s critique of free will (2014). Gatens asserts that Spinoza’s ontology is monist where every bodily action corresponds to an idea in thought; therefore, affect is neither regarded as autonomic nor primarily bodily (Gatens 2014: 18, 25). Gatens also draws attention to the fact that the Spinozan affect can be active or passive. She adds that Massumi equates affect with effect in his reading of Spinoza’s affect, which is a crucial deviation from Spinoza’s political philosophy because the absence of active affects would have trapped us “in endless chain of cause-effect concatenations” (Gatens 2014: 24).

Ruth Leys’ article titled “The Turn to Affect” addresses the shortcomings of the affect theory in general and Massumi’s interpretation of affects in particular (Leys 2011). Firstly, she delineates the common ideas shared by several theorists in the field. These can be listed as follows: In contrast to emotions and feelings, affects are beyond intention and cognition and “independent of signification and meaning” (Leys 2011: 443). Cognition lags behind “reasons, beliefs, intentions, and meanings to play the role in action and behaviour” due to the gap between
affects and their conscious awareness (ibid.). Leys is critical about Massumi’s and several other Deleuzians’ emphasis on intensity which is associated with “the attributes of the nonsemantic, the nonlinear, the autonomous, the vital, the singular, the new, the anomalous, the indeterminate, the unpredictable, and the disruption of fixed or ‘conventional’ meanings” (449). Leys gives a detailed account of Libet’s experiment, Gallagher’s critique and Massumi’s interpretation of it. She claims that Massumi assigns more meaning to and makes more assumptions about Libet’s experiment than the original context and aim of it. His conclusion about the autonomy of affects beyond intention and cognition demonstrates a dichotomy between mind and matter in which body is prioritized. Finally, Leys draws attention to the political disadvantages of Affect Studies. Accordingly, corporeal and unconscious affective reactions of individuals are deemed more important than ideology, beliefs and ideas in politics. Moreover, the gap between affect and reason in anti-intentionalism renders “meaning or ideological dispute irrelevant to cultural analysis” (472).

Both Gatens and Leys claim that privileging of body over mind presumes the old dichotomy between mind and body. Gatens’ criticism is based on Spinoza’s philosophy that overcomes the body-mind duality, a problem that many thinkers before him such as Descartes tried to resolve while maintaining that distinction in his Cartesian dualism. Leys, with her background in history of life sciences, presents a critical overview of affect theory and in particular Massumi’s approach with details from scientific responses to Libet’s experiment and with a focus on their implications in cultural theory. For both Gatens and Leys, the concept of the autonomy of affects has political consequences. When affects are regarded as effects, an individual’s cognition and intention become secondary in the role they play for one’s actions. Hence, the power to act based on one’s ideas and conscious intention for political purposes are overlooked.

The political shortcomings of affect theory are also discussed by Clare Hemmings. In her critical reading of Sedgwick and Massumi’s affirmative approach, Hemmings suggests that affect does not provide a new open way and
freedom to all the subjects mainly because “others are so over-associated with affect that they themselves are the object of affective transfer” (Hemmings 2005: 561). Gender, sexuality and race play a role in the transfer of affects exemplified in the often-cited examples of Audre Lorde and Franz Fanon’s accounts of others’ reactions to their blackness.

In her understanding of affect, Sara Ahmed responds to the questions of both the autonomy and the political connotations of affects. In opposition to the idea of autonomous affect as something that stands apart like an object, Sara Ahmed sees affect in “the messiness of the experiential” and adds that one is affected by what one is near (Ahmed 2010: 30). Bodies are affected by their contacts with other bodies and objects while emotions form their “surfaces” (Ahmed 2004: 1). In contrast to thinkers who find the emergence of a possibility in the non-intentionality of affect, Ahmed asserts that to be affected entails the evaluation of that thing and the way bodies “turn toward things” (Ahmed 2010: 31). She cites Husserl according to whom one turns toward a joy object intentionally. Then, drawing from Locke’s description of enjoyment, she explains that bodily changes over time also transform the way the world is experienced. Therefore, one might lose interest in what once was considered delightful. Happiness has a significant part in the formation of “our near sphere” by which Ahmed means how we are oriented towards the object of happiness and have it in our proximity whereas we move away from the objects which mark “the edges of our horizon” (Ahmed 2010: 32). Attachment is formed when we are moved by the proximity of something or someone (Ahmed 2004: 100). Drawing attention to the etymological origin of the word emotion – “to be moved, to be moved out”, Ahmed defines emotions as “what moves us”, “what connects us to this or that” in an attachment. Moreover, they are “that which holds us in place, or give us a dwelling place” (ibid.). Briefly stated, emotion or movement is the towardness and orientation emergent between bodies. Lastly, for Ahmed the political power of affects lies in the way they help us diagnose a situation rather than presenting a solution (Greyser 2012: 98). In that regard, unhappiness of a migrant or a feminist killjoy reveals what is not working in the society rather than something to be overcome.
In the same way, our gut reactions ("vomiting as a feminist act") and disgust may be signs that we will not endure a situation anymore. The awareness of an affective and bodily reaction can eventually prompt us to take political action.

Another reaction regarding the politics of affects come from Ben Anderson who challenges the idea of the potential of affect due to its excess that cannot be captured by cognition and language. He states that affects can in fact be known, measured and intervened as in the case of the techniques of tracking consumer confidence (Anderson 2014: 19). Anderson argues that the affective life is "always-already mediated" and never autonomous. Affects can’t be reduced to the "material collectives" or to other "dimensions of life" (13-14). Regarding the question of representation, Anderson suggests that affect is not non-representational while representations do function affectively (14).

Anderson defines affect as "transpersonal" rather than pre-personal in the sense that affect arises in encounters and relations that exceed a person or a thing (Anderson 2014: 84, 102). On the one hand, he argues, an encounter opens life to the unexpected, undetermined, surprising and the new; on the other hand, it may entail violence and misrecognition. Moreover, parties in an encounter do not generally "form a unity or community" (89). Not everyone has the same capacity to affect and to be affected while patterns and "material arrangement" of encounters has a role in its distribution (103). Repetitions, references to past encounters and relations are a significant part of encounters. Anderson criticizes affect theory in general for not paying enough attention to the historicity and organization of affective life. Like Hemmings (2005) and Ahmed (2004), he also addresses Frantz Fanon’s description of his traumatizing experience of a racist encounter as a child (1986). Accordingly, Fanon demonstrates how racialized and colonial affects build up in the bodies and cause psychic trauma and misery (Anderson 2014: 81).

In the following parts of this section, I aim to situate myself in relation to the themes in Affect Studies discussed above. I argue that affect beyond cognition and signification does not only offer a potentiality in a political and affirmative way. It can also be stored as pain clogging the system. When the system is clogged, even creativity, which is its remedy, may not be realized. Therefore, affects as a bodily capacity can at times be transformed into debility. Some individuals cannot process affects for the sake of their survival and instead direct themselves towards self-destruction. Yet, following Spinoza, whose understanding of affects will be discussed in the next chapter, I think that reason is the only answer to a person lost in the loops of self-destructive patterns caused by bad encounters. These poisonous compositions don’t originate in one’s body or the other but in the in-between. Some people may be open to that in-between like a sponge and get literally invaded by it. Then, when thinking gets impaired, reason may fail, too. At that point dancing, moving and creating together can relieve the pain stored in the cells in a welcoming and compassionate milieu. In a way, good encounters reverse the debilitating process of the affective encounters besides the therapeutic function of creativity and movement.

The primacy of affects (body) over consciousness (mind) assumes the duality of body and mind in addition to leaving reason out of the picture, which could not be emphasized enough by Spinoza himself. In that respect, I agree with both Leys and Gatens who point out Massumi’s failure to address to Spinoza’s approach to the questions of body-mind and reason. Furthermore, in my opinion, the autonomy of affects and the potential of the virtual do not outbalance the substantial role of language, and meaning. For instance, in dance, consciousness

---

4 Recent findings in science claim that there is a correlation between social interaction and the immune system. Accordingly, if the immune system is weak, the section in the brain for social interaction does not function well. On the other hand, social interaction increases immunity. (Research published by Anthony J. Filiano, Yang Xu, Nicholas J. Tustison, Rachel L. Marsh, Wendy Baker, Igor Smirnov, Christopher C. Overall, Sachin P. Gadani, Stephen D. Turner, Zhiping Weng, Sayeda Najamussahar Peerzade, Hao Chen, Kevin S. Lee, Michael M. Scott, Mark P. Beenhakker, Vladimir Litvak and Jonathan Kipnis 2016)
and the linguistic expression of a movement experience assist its embodied integration into an individual’s life.

Another aspect of the autonomy of affects is anti-intentionalism as discussed by Leys’ critical reading of affects. Massumi claims that intention connotes repetition, so it does not provide space for the emergence of the new. Following Deleuze and Nietzsche, I suggest that a repetition also incorporates difference since it can never be the repetition of the same. Intention does not necessarily imply determinism of the outcome of an action. It also connotes towardness and choice. On the other hand, our relationships are not formed by intentions alone. There are still many unknown and uncontrollable factors for the outcome of an intended action. Intention may seem to exclude surprises and limit the timespace with the known, however, I argue, a potential is activated when a decision is made and acted upon.

Furthermore, I want to address the question of differentiating (or not) between affect, feeling and emotion in the lexicon of this thesis. Tomkins, Massumi and Manning all refer to the awareness of affects as feeling (Tomkins) or emotion (Massumi, Manning). Ahmed talks about affects and emotions interchangeably in her texts while calling them emotion in her book titled *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (2004). Spinoza also names primary affects such as joy, desire, and sadness in addition to numerous “passions” in his taxonomy. Elspeth Probyn defines the distinction between affect and emotion as former being “of a biological and physiological nature” and the latter referring “to cultural and social expression” (Probyn 2005: 11). In opposition, Sianne Ngai argues, “the difference between emotion and affect is still intended to solve the same basic and fundamentally descriptive problem it was coined in psychoanalytic practice to solve: that of distinguishing first-person from third-person feeling, and, by extension, feeling that is contained by an identity from feeling that is not” (Ngai quoted by Gorton 2007: 334). Therefore, Ngai opts for using these terms interchangeably. I find this argument valid and following Ngai, I also use affect and emotion interchangeably while recognizing the unsignifiable aspects of
affects. On the other hand, I argue that the identification and classification of emotions by an individual may be a confusing and difficult task, too. One may not be able to discern or name them and may think that he/she needs professional help (e.g. from a psychoanalyst) to be conscious of them. Moreover, different cultures have varying ways of differentiation of emotions in addition to the names given to specific emotions, which may be impossible to translate into another language. “Saudade”⁵ in Portuguese and “hüzün”⁶ in Turkish are only two examples that come to my mind in the first instance. These examples are social expressions of public moods shared by many individuals. However, hüzün, for instance, is at the same time a combination of several affects, which are equally free-floating, preindividual, beyond one’s volition and intention. It grips not only individuals but also a whole city as it is poetically described by Orhan Pamuk. Unlike fear or hope, it is hard to identify since it is rather like a sea of sensations in which residents of a city are immersed or something hard to grasp, yet shared in silence at raki tables. I also want to refer to another issue concerning language and affect in the context of translation. The interpretation of Spinoza’s affectio (and in general affect in affect theory) into Turkish as “duygulanım” and affectus as “duygı” already makes it complicated to differentiate it from “feeling” and “emotion” both of which mean “duygı”⁷. Although like Spinoza’s affection, “duygulanım” also connotes action and the affect of one body on the other, the term is a derivative of “duygı”. I find this detail significant to mention because Turkish language is not only my mother tongue but also the language of the interviews conducted for this thesis. Envisaging both affect and emotion as tinted with pre-cognitive and unconscious elements, I find it difficult to differentiate between affect and emotion especially while referring to my interviews.

⁵ Oxford Dictionary explains Saudade as “(especially with reference to songs or poetry) a feeling of longing, melancholy, or nostalgia that is supposedly characteristic of the Portuguese or Brazilian temperament.” Available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/saudade

⁶ Orhan Pamuk describes hüzün in his İstanbul: Memories and The City (2011): “a melancholy that is communal rather than private. Offering no clarity; veiling reality instead, hüzün brings us comfort, softening the view like the condensation on a window when a tea kettle has been spouting steam on a winter’s day (109). (...) [I]t is a way of looking at life that implicates us all, not only a spiritual state, but a state of mind that is ultimately as life affirming as it is negating (113).

⁷ “His” (originally Arabic) is also used to refer to “duygı”. There is a whole range of verbs originating from “duy(mak)” (to hear; to sense; to perceive; to discern something intuitively) such as “duyumsamak” (to sense) and “duygulanmak” (to have feelings or emotions).
My own text, interviews of Cati members, and the second half of Hallo! entail our efforts to make sense of the affective milieu. The measurement of affects in laboratories can be useful in areas beyond the scope of this research, e.g. advertisement industry, political elections, etc. However, the power of affects, if there is any, does not originate from their scale, or being free-floating. It can be activated only when they become part of our meaning world and lead us to action. Both the interviews and the listening section of Hallo! are ways of attending, witnessing and cultivating others’ affects in order to open the ground for being with and creating a dwelling. The unsayable, unrepresentable and unconscious layer accompanies all our experiences as discussed with reference to Agamben in the previous section.

Regarding the political shortcomings of Affect Studies, I agree with the scholars such as Sara Ahmed, Clare Hemmings and Lisa Blackman that affect is generally defined excluding gender, social, economical, race, and age differences. However, the way affect is envisaged as a visceral and energetic force and intensity emerging in-between bodies opens a site outside biological and social determinism. Then a question arises: Do the affects belong to a virtual realm outside power relations? If the potential of affects can be experienced only in a fleeting and elusive moment, how much can we rely on its political potential? Even though there is no prescribed answer, creative and convivial communities and their affective relationality are at least forms of making sense and connections. Yet, affects are not free-floating and simply sticking on the passive subjects without discriminating any gender, age, personal histories, and bodily compositions. The differences in the forms of relating with the affects “in the air” are discussed in all my case studies. I also leave debility and sickness outside the research framework while keeping in mind that they have a major impact on the way we engage with an affective milieu. Still, the affective interaction in-between bodies generates a difference as each encounter is fraught with the unknown. In a creative act, this being-with can have a potential of something good that can open
an individual to the unexpected, difference, a new angle and a surprising direction.

In conclusion, affect theory becomes relevant in the context of experimenting with the sensible, movement and corporeal experience since affects are conceived as constant flux in-between bodies and situated in opposition to the meditation of representation and subject-object relationship. The consideration of the affective milieu presents both possibilities and limits for understanding what happens in-between moving bodies. I suggest that affects constitute one vein of this corporeal relationship. Although it is a significant aspect, in my opinion, the political of the in-between emerges with the next step after identifying the affects and their functions. “Affects become a way to read politics, not politics' telos or origin” (Greyser 2012: 98). Affects can be helpful to diagnose a situation, but may not guarantee political results. At this stage of the research, movement practices and experiences can suggest a new path to define the political emergent in the way new forms of being with are invented.

**Affect and Dance**

The interpretation of dance with regard to affects denotes an emphasis on expression as opposed to representation that signifies a hidden meaning to be deciphered behind the sign. Moreover, the moving bodies imply a process of becoming towards the not-yet rather than being a sign in a structured system. The focus on affects and senses denotes the relationality of moving bodies and the potential of the in-between.

Erin Manning writes on the relationship between politics, sense and movement with a special focus on touch and Argentinian tango practice (2007). Her approach to the relationality of bodies contributes significantly to the development of my arguments in the following chapters, in an attempt to connect affects, politics and dance. Touch, Manning argues, opens the body to relationality and affects while relocating the sensing and moving bodies beyond
the duality of active and passive positions. To think bodies in relation to senses and movement also means that bodies are considered to be processual, becoming and “mov[ing] toward something that is not yet” (XVIII). For Manning, the body in relation to senses (in her text mainly the sense of touch) and other bodies is not an individual body, but an individuation. The individuating and sensing bodies are collective and relational; hence, individuation beyond subjectivity and identity has political implications. Moving, sensing and becoming bodies create lines of flight and disturb the foundational ideas and concepts of “the national body politic” (Manning 2007: XVI). Manning argues that still and stable bodies can be identified and characterized by the state while the excess produced by the senses displaces the national identity. Touch, conceived as a political gesture in the context of tango, and as sensing and moving bodies in general, challenges the boundaries between the bodies and questions the meaning of being together or apart (9). I return to Manning in Chapter 2 particularly when I discuss the relationality of the dancing bodies. Also in relation to the discussions of the body in the context of the Gezi protests, Manning’s notion of touch that exceeds the national body politic forms a background, yet my focus will be more on the gestures such as holding hands in the folkloric dances and passing pavement stones, garbage bags or food packages from hand to hand during the Gezi Uprising. Moreover, the relationality of bodies will be examined mainly in terms of affective contagion, especially that of joy surpassing the body politic.

Derek P. McCormack analyses how the moving bodies create affective spaces with reference to his own experimental experiences of dance (2013). Some of his case studies or examples entail Petra Kupper’s dance workshop at Chisenhale Dance Space in addition to Gabrielle Roth’s 5 Rhythms dance workshop and dance movement therapy classes that claim to have therapeutic functions. Following Massumi, McCormack conceives affect as an autonomous field of intensities within and beyond bodies. Movement of bodies effects the transformation of the intensity and generates affective spaces (McCormack 2013: 3). McCormack refers to William James’ idea that relations are both temporal and spatial (35). Therefore, affective spacetimes are understood in terms of duration,
intensity, rhythm and refrain. McCormack explains rhythm with references to Bergson, Dewey, Lefebvre, and Whitehead emphasizing the relationship of rhythm to everyday life in Lefebvre and Dewey. His example, 5 Rhythm dance workshop is placed at the intersection of rhythm and affects. Gabrielle Roth, the founder of this spiritual dance practice, relates each rhythm with different affects while stressing their cathartic and healing properties. I concur with McCormack’s suspicion of the commodified spiritual practices in the dance market, however, I also agree with him when he adds that with moderation of critical thinking, one can learn to be affected by such practices which may open us to different “affective-somatic experimentalism” (70). In all these workshops, no revolution takes place, as McCormack suggests, yet the affective experiences of moving bodies can open oneself to experimentation with senses and sensibilities (36-37).

The affective space is also conceived in terms of Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of the refrain, which will be discussed in the next section when I write about McCormack’s discernment of temporality of dance. McCormack’s focus on his own experiences in the dance studio is particularly relevant as a precedent for Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of this thesis since my own dancing experiences form a basis for my research in a similar way. Besides, I endeavour to explore my interviewees’ accounts of their experiences in the framework of affect theory. I also implement the notion of the refrain mainly drawing from Guattari. I expand the discussion on the temporality of dancing together in a studio to include Deleuze’s three syntheses of time and the Aion in addition to Manning’s concept of preacceleration.

Petra Sabisch envisages dance in relation to the audience and defines performance as “a relational assemblage” drawing from Deleuze’s concept of assemblage (Sabisch 2013: 117). She also turns to Rodolphe Gascé to highlight the fact that speaking about relations also involves our own relationship with the relation as we enter into composition with it (118-119). In the relationality of a performance, spectators are not considered to be passive observers; instead they actively participate in the performance. It is important to note that Sabisch does not restrict participation with volition or decision of the audience. As much in performances
as in life in general, there are many occasions wherein an active will is not required for our participation. Our bodies partake in the relational assemblages with other bodies and the environment continuously. For Sabisch, these relations produce “qualitative transformations, becomings, alliances with contingent encounters” (italic in the original, 129). She defines this affective relationality as contamination in contrast with catharsis in which the audience experiences an affective purification. Contamination implies “assemblages, alliances, and relations” and supersedes the dichotomies of inside and outside (123). Performances experiment with this sensible aspect of the relational assemblages and participations (131).

Susan Leigh Foster investigates the kinaesthetic effects of a performance on the audience referring to the theories ranging from Condillac’s understanding of bodily sensing to Alain Berthoz’s work on mirror neurons (2008). The kinaesthetic sensation in dance was first explored by John Martin who claimed that the audience experiences the same kinaesthetic sensations as the dancer while the same motor responses are created in the spectators’ bodies even though they are seated (1939). Accordingly, through “inner mimicry”, the audience members also experience the same feelings of the dancer (Foster 2008: 47). Matthew Reason and Dee Reynolds criticize Martin for giving the audience the task of “kinaesthetically decoding the meaning” of choreography as if there is a meaning to be dug out of the dancer’s movements (Reason and Reynolds 2010: 55).

Bruce McConachie’s approach to audience experience involves the cognitive processes of spectatorship (2008). He proposes that spectators form “visuomotor representations” of the actors whom they watch (McConachie 2008: 63). These representations function in a spectator’s mirror neurons and generate empathy, which is “the first step toward our emotional and social engagements in theatre” (ibid.). Watching the motor actions of a performer, a viewer can sense the feelings of an actor and experience empathy. For McConachie, although empathy is not an emotion, it plays a crucial part in leading the audience to “emotional engagements” (65). Another affective aspect of the audience experience is the
emotional contagion, which McConachie theorizes in terms of neuroscientific and cognitive approaches to the materiality of the brain/mind. Accordingly, emotional contagion is spontaneous and automatic. Seated in an auditorium, “our bodies and minds are like the inside of a good violin; we resonate and amplify emotions with each other” (97). Moreover, the utopic and social function of theatre is highlighted in the way it creates a community, or “communitas” via shared emotions: “The more spectators join together in one emotion, the more empathy shapes the emotional response of the rest” (ibid.).

Nicola Shaughnessy investigates various approaches to the participatory practices of performance focusing on relational aesthetics and affective and neurobiological perspectives in applied theatre (2012). With a reference to the title of Claire Bishop’s book *Artificial Hells*, she claims that participatory performances can create “both heaven and hell” “associated with affect” (Shaughnessy 2012: 188). She argues that participatory performances aim at “embodied and shared experiences involving visceral as opposed to virtual forms of social contact” (192). In order to realize a social change, “immersive strategies” are implemented in affective performances that experiment with diverse ways of engaging with the audience (201).

These scholars that reflect on the relationship between the audience and the performer/actor/dancer provide tools to understand the affective relationality between dancing bodies, too. Building up on these arguments, Chapter 2 investigates how inner mimicry, imitation and mirror neurons play a crucial part in the learning process in a dance studio. Furthermore, the discussions on audience participation form a background for the second part of Chapter 2 in which the spectators experience an ambivalent form of participation and a disturbing affective milieu.

The following perspective on affects and dance envisages rhythmic entrainment as a source of affective attunement while pointing to its political and social aspects. These arguments are important to comprehend dancing together rhythmically
particularly during protests discussed in Chapter 3. William H. McNeill posits that muscular binding occurs when the bodies move collectively and rhythmically as in dance and military drill. Consequently, the “rhythmic kinaesthetic stimulation” unites the individuals in a group (McNeill 1995: 7). The military drill creates a fellow feeling among the recruits from diverse social and economical backgrounds. McNeill claims that the affective response to the drills are rooted in the war dances of prehistoric times when men danced rehearsing their previous hunts before setting off for a new hunt (3, 30). His investigation of the importance of rhythmic festive village dances highlights the significance of dancing together that generates emotional bonding and solidarity while eliminating negative affects and frictions (4). Dancing and singing made collective work such as the construction of historical monuments possible if not easier (ibid.). At all the occasions such as festivals, work, war dance, etc. the euphoric feeling shared by the participants created solidarity and social cohesion that played a crucial role in the survival of communities. McNeill proposes that the collective dances, in other words, “keeping time together” result in “discharge of anxiety into collective catharsis” (17). Therefore they engender a feeling of “boundary loss” and enhancement of fellow feeling (8). He also asserts that religion has its roots in the trance state of collective dances (42). However such community dances disappeared with the urban life and the efforts to revive them failed in most cases such as the French and American Revolutions. Lastly, McNeill draws attention to the fascistic outcomes of the rhythmic and collective movement as in military drill and athletic celebrations on national days in countries such as China and North Korea, and obviously in Hitler’s rallies. I agree that such a danger lurks behind the movements realized collectively, however, this theory can be used to understand the feeling of union and solidarity in dance especially during demonstrations and strike action.

Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time and Dance

How can we relate to this temporality, rhythms and repetitions, to the time of connection, and the event of encounter? Gilles Deleuze’s understanding of time
provides answers to this question. He views body as an event and a verb rather than a fixed thing in that body is conceived as movement and action. Deleuzian notions of event, virtual, counter-actualization and the Aion point to the infinite potential of change and creativity for both individuals and society. Thus, Deleuze opens thought and temporal multiplicity of bodies to experimentation. Thinking time in terms of affects implies the materiality of dancing bodies. Moreover, memory at the cellular level transforms the present of improvisational dancing. Before my delineation of Deleuze’s philosophy of time in Chapter 4, in this section I will present the literature review on the intersection between the Deleuzian temporality and dance studies.

In her doctoral thesis, Laura Cull refers to the temporal and affective aspects of performance with a primary focus on a new understanding of presence that differs from Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive approach dominant in the dance and performance studies (2009). She defines the objective of her thesis “to deconstruct simple presence (and a single present) but with recourse to difference as multiplication rather than representation” (Cull 2009: 211). Following Bergson in Deleuze, she views presence as the plurality of presents and the multiplicity of being –human or inhuman- in time (213). She investigates the possibilities opened by Deleuzo-Bergsonian philosophy of time -the concepts of the actual, virtual and duration in particular- in order to understand the performances by Goat Island as one of her case studies. In connection to Deleuze’s virtual, Cull refers to John Mullarkey’s notion of “actualism” that replaces one type of presence with multiple presents (211). Cull takes up Deleuze’s understanding of difference to theorize presence in the context of performance which is then linked to affective encounter and becoming: “one can be ‘present to’ (or ‘with’ or ‘in’ or ‘among’) difference as becoming rather than being; one can encounter difference as affect and duration” (italic in the original Cull 2009: 54). For instance, Cull argues, Goat Island implements slowness and repetition that reconfigures time as difference and presence “as an affective encounter with time’s multiplicity” (203). Furthermore, the multiplicity of presents entails the multiplicity of durations presented to the audience during a performance, so the audience members don’t
share a homogeneous time (207, 235). Cull also highlights the micro-political significance of the affective and temporal aspects of differential presence in performance art.

The theoretical frame of Deleuze’s difference and repetition is also utilized by Valerie Briginshaw who writes about Both Sitting Duet by Burrows and Fargion (2005). Drawing attention to the chance element in Burrow and Fargion’s work, Briginshaw claims that it has a “decentering effect” because one cannot guess what comes next even though it is choreographed, (Briginshaw 2005: 4). After explaining the repetition of difference and exemplifying it with a depiction of movements of the dancers, Briginshaw concludes that repetition of gestures and movements in Both Sitting Duet makes the piece “subversive, transgressive, radical” (24) so much so that it “helps us conceive of ‘new futures’ that have, in Grosz’s terms, the potentiality to be” (41). Briginshaw also argues that the affective qualities of the performers “operate like signs” (35). I agree with Briginshaw that the repetition of singularities in that particular dance piece may have an impact on transforming the body opposed to its historical representations while opening up new concepts. I would add that both repetition and chance elements might be embodied in improvisational dance, during the creative process of a work and its reproductions on the stage. However, our expectations as audience members are not what define chance in the movements of the performers.

Philipa Rothfield who interprets the dancing body through the lenses of Deleuze’s Nietzsche and Spinoza, also discusses the element of chance in improvisation. The Nietzschean body is understood in relation to chance, momentariness of the body, and the meeting of forces (Rothfield 2011: 208). Spinoza in Deleuze enters the stage when Rothfield refers to sensations and affectability (211-212). Rothfield claims that improvisation is a field of “sensuous becomings” (213) as dancing embraces the chance element. Secondly, she translates the idea that “the greater the power of the body (in the Spinozist sense), the more forces are able to be brought into relation to a given body” (215) in the context of a dancer’s
virtuosity and skill which are then connected to “the feeling of power inherent in
the will to power” (216). Although we both refer to the same theoretical sources,
my approach to affects and will to power differ from Rothfield’s in the way I
exclude the discussion of virtuosity and skill of dancing bodies. Instead, I look at
affects in terms of attunement, contagion, imitation, etc. which envisage bodies in
a horizontal relationality. In addition, I discuss will to power briefly in terms of
Deleuze’s third synthesis of time as the chapters unfold.

Derek McCormack elaborates on Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of refrain to
understand the moving bodies at the conjunction of affect and time. Refrains are
the compositions of affect and time as a result of concurrent repetition and
disruption of certain practices, movements, and gestures. The repetition of
practices and techniques generate affective spacetimes that bear the potential of
difference (McCormack 2013: 7) and open to the lines of flight (81). Refrains also
indicate the affective potential of experience and experiment (161). Moving
bodies, McCormack argues, open “onto an affective field of potential movement”
(146). Reading Guattari’s “ecology of practices composed of multiple refrains”
with reference to moving and dancing bodies, McCormack concludes, “it provides
not tools or guidelines for living but opportunities for the generation of novel
refrains through an ongoing process of experiment” (161-162). Similarly, I make
a reference to refrain in my research, however, my focus is on the refrains created
by friendship in a dancing community.

Erin Manning draws from Henri Bergson to comprehend the temporality of
moving bodies. Firstly, she suggests that moving bodies create space and time
rather than time and space being a fixed decorum for bodies (2007: XIII). Movement is always understood in terms of a “mobile relation” and intensities
linked with “affective tone” (Manning 2009: 40). When we move together, “the
virtuality of the not-yet” is activated by a new experience emerging from the
indeterminate and generating the event. The virtual and the actual are both parts of
the event that composes space and time. The potential of relationality is always
incomplete as new movements of relation open the political potential of the in-
between (37). Manning’s notion of preacceleration can be defined as feeling a movement before it actually happens; hence, it implies the virtuality of the movement. Another concept that Manning implements with reference to Bergson and moving bodies is the interval described as “duration expressed in movement” (17). The time of the interval is incipiency, which is formulated in relation to preacceleration. We produce a movement and actualize the virtual in the interval. Thereby, the interval is marked by the potentiality of the virtual that is never consumed fully since there will always be new movements. Politics emerges at the intersection of the actual and the virtual as the bodies become towards the not-yet. In addition to Deleuze’s conception of virtual and actual, I will implement Manning’s understanding of preacceleration and the interval in my rendition of temporality of dancing together, hoping to expand these discussions with my case study in Chapter 2.

Dance and The Political

In this section, I continue with a reading of the political in contemporary dance. I also try to provide a general literature on dance and protest since I investigate the collective dances and stillness as a form of protest at demonstrations in Chapter 3. Additionally, I present a general overview of the ways collective dances function in the society. I also refer to an analysis of dancing communities that sets the background of the first part of Chapter 2. I conclude touching upon the themes of relational aesthetics and participatory practices briefly in order to lay the foundation for the second part of Chapter 2 on Hallo!.

Firstly, I intend to trace the ramifications of the concepts of the political and politics in dance theory. In order to introduce the notion of the political in the context of movement in dance and performance, André Lepecki cites Hannah Arendt who emphasizes the importance of moving politically (2013). He contrasts choreopolicing of the police controlling the movement of the protesters at a demonstration with the choreopolitics of the dancers who move politically. In order to exemplify choreopolicing, Lepecki turns to Deleuze who maintains that
in the control societies, individuals are continuously controlled while the
hegemonic sources of power are not as locatable as they were in the case of
disciplinary societies (Lepecki 2013: 15). Thereby, Lepecki argues,
choreopolicing is a form of controlling the movement and expression of the
political incessantly. Besides, the choreopolitics of a dancer has the potential to
oppose the circulation of “pre-given movements” in “pre-assigned places”
determined by the control-based societies (20). Choreopolitics is understood as
the “redistribution and reinvention of bodies, affects, and senses through which
one may learn how to move politically, how to invent, activate, seek, or
experiment with a movement whose only sense (meaning and direction) is the
experimental exercise of freedom” (ibid.). Hence, dancing can be a way of
moving freely even in controlled spaces and opening a new domain for the
political. This is not necessarily a spontaneous act, but rather it is planned and
programmed collectively. Therefore, Lepecki argues, choreopolitics requires
“(re)discover[ing] and (re)produc[ing]” the political while continually
experimenting with it (22).

Bojana Kunst puts dance and walking against movement in a Post-Fordist
capitalistic sense (2013). In Post-Fordism, flexibility, mobility and visibility are
crucial for the flow of people and money. In order to resist to this kind of
movement that captures the time and rhythms of individuals, new forms can be
discovered while moving together, “creating flows of disturbances and affective
persistencies” (Kunst 2013: 70). Accordingly, everyday movements have a
capacity to bring about change if we consider movement as a disruption and
alteration. For Kunst, the Occupy movements provide an example of moving
together, so do the slow attentive walk of the elderly people since they both
disrupt the rhythm of the Post-Fordist mobility.

Susan Leigh Foster’s reading of the political body also draws from dance studies
and choreography as she analyses the physicality and the kinetic potential of
bodies in non-violent protests such as the lunch counter sit-ins in 1960, the ACT-
UP die-ins in the 1980s and the 1999 Seattle WTO protests (2003). Foster argues
that in each of these occasions, protesters determine a form of political interference in which their bodies play a central role. They learn how to respond to other bodies and take collective action while each protester’s personal agency also influences the decision he/she makes in the moment of direct action. For instance, in a sit-in, a protester may need to maintain a form of active stillness and refrain from impulsive action against the attackers. In this regard, for Foster, political interference requires “a perceptive and responsive physicality” that “choreographs an imagined alternative” (Foster 2003: 412).

Lepecki, Kunst and Foster view the potentiality of the body in the centre of the political. Moving together, learning together in a responsive way with other bodies, inventing new modes of body, affects and senses lead to this potential. Thereby, dance studies offer opportunities to redefine the body as a site of resistance. Dance or movement can be as simple as walking (Kunst), sit-in (Foster), dancing in the rain (in the above mentioned article Lepecki exemplifies his point with a hip-hop video of Turf Feinz⁸). Furthermore, I would add, standing still as in the case of the Standing Man in Chapter 3, running on a treadmill as the dancer of Hallo! analysed in Chapter 2, or experimenting with new forms in a dance studio, the body is at the focal point of resistance whilst new affects are invented and novel modes of relations are formed.

Following a similar thread of argument, Oliver Marchart focuses on dancing that has become intrinsic to protests and suggests that dance can be a form of political acting, or “dancing politics” (2013). Marchart first investigates how and why dance is a part of protest culture tracing the story behind the famous slogan commonly attributed to Emma Goldman: “If I can’t dance, it’s not my revolution”. The true story behind this motto and the original quote are rather different as narrated by Goldman herself in Living My Life, Vol. 1. Goldman recounts how a friend who took her out reproached her for dancing freely in an inappropriate manner as a revolutionary anarchist. Goldman comments:

---

I did not believe that a Cause which stood for a beautiful ideal, for anarchism, for released freedom from conventions and prejudice, should demand the denial of life and joy. I insisted that our Cause could not expect me to become a nun and that the movement should not be turned into a cloister. If it meant that, I did not want it. “I want freedom, the right to self-expression, everybody’s right to beautiful, radiant things.” (Goldman cited in Marchart 2013)

Goldman’s belief in the joy of the revolutionary movement is on the side of life and power to act, rather than violence and terror. Marchart argues that there is an excessive element or a supplement in a political struggle emergent in the “gap between the cause of the protest and the object attained” (Marchart 2013: 41). Following Goldman, we should emphasize joy as the supplement during protests rather than violence on which several writers such as Slavoj Žižek focuses as an excessive element.

Marchart also refers to Hannah Arendt according to whom everyone should experience collective happiness at least once in his/her lifetime (Marchart 2013: 43). Acting together generates a sense of happiness and communality. According to Arendt, this happiness is rooted in the sense of a new beginning and birth. A revolutionary act carries the potential of beginnings; thus, political acting should be thought as a process and a performance like dancing rather than the end result (44). Drawing from Arendt that compares political acting to dancing, Marchart proposes dancing politically meaning dancing together (47).

Gabriele Klein asserts that vulnerability of the body is intentionally emphasized in the social movements as people chain themselves to buildings, hang banners on places hard to reach and resist in sit-ins. It is how the body becomes “the carrier of the signs and symbols of protest” besides being the medium of protest (Klein 2013: 196-197).
My analysis of dancing together and collective joy at the Gezi Park after which “nothing can be the same again” as written on a wall during the Gezi days in addition to the delineation of vulnerability of the bodies standing still share similar intentions with Marchart and Klein.

Next, I present an outline of historical accounts of dancing together politically. For instance, Stacey Prickett explores the relationship between dance and protest investigating examples such as the recreational and participatory dances of American workers during the strikes and political pageants in the 1920s and 30s. In connection with them, she investigates the socio-political context of left-wing dances such as the folk dance classes organized by Co-operative movement in the UK. In addition, Prickett looks at San Francisco Bay Area where the community dance and numerous artist collaborations flourished since the 1960s. The figures like Anna Halprin played a major role in the dance history of not only San Francisco, but of the world. Halprin’s understanding of dance is based on its social and everyday aspects, collective creativity and participation. Rather than dancing on the stage, she chose places such as the city streets as performance venues. Halprin conceived dance “as a transformative practice, one which would create change in the individual, and thus society” (Prickett 2013: 99). Prickett concludes that in all these domains of dances across the UK and the USA, resistance and protest co-existed with the “solidarity and shared heritage” (178).

Writing on the collective joy of dancing in the streets, Barbara Ehrenreich investigates the history of dancing together (2007). Her examples range from the ecstatic religious rituals to rock festivals, from carnivalization of sports events to the fascist and militarized spectacles of the twentieth century. After the decline of the carnivals in medieval Europe and during the colonization of various cultures across the world, European upper classes defined any form of ecstatic dancing as a product of “savage mind”. Ehrenreich explains that it was only in the second half of the twentieth century that anthropologists like Victor Turner recognized the positive aspects of the collective dances such as solidarity, or in his words, “communitas”, but only as an expression of occasional relief necessary
for the structure of the society (Turner cited in Ehrenreich 2007: 10). Ehrenreich proposes collective dancing as an antidote to the “society of spectacle” and consumerism as described by Guy Debord. She claims that the underlying cause of the lack of collective joy in the present societies is mainly the social hierarchy that creates boundaries between people (253). In contrast to the exclusion of people in hierarchical systems, festivals and carnivals are open to everyone. Nevertheless, Ehrenreich also expresses her doubt and awareness when she says, “[n]o amount of hand-holding or choral dancing will bring world peace” and adds how European carnivals co-existed with tyrannies while festivals served to becalm the society (257). Nevertheless, she still advocates the collective joy and solidarity in the face of state and corporate power whilst pointing to the “growing carnivalization of protest demonstrations” (260).

Lois Marie Jaeck explains how some class and racial movements in Latin America utilized local dances as part of their struggles (2002). The Cuban rhumba, the Dominican merengue, the Brazilian samba, the Argentinian tango and the Mexican revival of Aztec dances are given as examples that became symbolic of social struggles. These dances were also implemented to create a national identity and unity by the political leaders. For instance, Trujillo wanted merengue to be the symbol of the Dominican identity (Davis cited in Jaeck 2003: 45) while Fidel Castro saw rhumba as the embodiment of the Cuban Revolution (Daniel cited in Jaeck 2003: 44). After delineation of social aspects of these Latin American dances, Jaeck emphasizes that they lead us to the primordial African roots and in fact to the source of the “collective soul of humanity” and “human consciousness” that transcend representation (49). Therefore, the Latin American dances are revolutionary in its historical, social and humanist senses.

The works of Prickett and Jaeck offer examples that indicate the uses of dance for political purposes in other parts of the world, which share common points with collective dancing in political contexts in Turkey. In addition to being practiced by leftists in general, especially the village or folkloric dances were appropriated
by the state during the formation of the national identities both in Turkey and Latin America. These issues are primarily addressed in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

To conceive the political in a dancing community, I turn to Judith Hamer’s work, but before that, I would like to make a brief remark on the theme. Çatı, Association of Independent Contemporary Dancers in Istanbul, which I examine in Chapter 2, is not considered to be a community dance centre. Although it is open to everyone, it does not serve a mission of teaching dance to various groups in the community. Hence, I exclude the discussions in community dance in my literature review and look at dancing communities instead. Hamer’s work on the dancing communities in Los Angeles is a major source in the literature, which is distinct from the community dance studies (2007). Hamer’s main focus is ethnographic, yet her work has similarities and common interests with Chapter 2 of my research. Firstly, Hamer maintains that dancing communities reconfigure intimacy and friendship. Friendship in addition to other forms of sociality is formed as a consequence of daily interpersonal and intercultural interactions. Hamer turns to Luce Irigaray to theorize intimacy that is envisaged as the beginning of a larger social transformation (Hamer 2007: 25). She emphasizes the importance of dance technique that functions affectively and temporally. Moreover, it is technique that connects strangers to one another and reshapes relationships to create affective milieus. Hamer argues that technique composes “vernacular landscapes’ within urban environment” and creates intimate spaces for “self- and community-building” (60-61). In other words, dance techniques provide a common idiom around which a community can be shaped (208). Hamer’s case studies entailing professional and amateur examples of ballet, Butoh, Khmer classical dance, Pilates and modern/postmodern dance in the schools and studios are all drawn from Los Angeles. In contrast to the entertainment industry of Hollywood in the same area, these dance practices provide utopian models for recreating urban life and forming solidarity and difference (211). Lastly, Hamer explores the spatial aspects of the studios used by the dancing communities with references to Henri Lefebvre, Michel de Certeau and Gaston Bachelard who understand space in relation to time.
As I examine affective, temporal and political aspects of relationality in dance and discuss the relationship between the audience and the dancer in Chapter 2, it is crucial to refer to Bourriaud’s “relational aesthetics” that posits micro-utopias, strategies of being together, and new forms of neighbourhood in everyday life as the interaction between people replaces the form in art (2002). Bourriaud proposes implementing De Certeau’s concept of tactic so as to create a “social interstice” in everyday life, and subvert “the scenario” written by power (Bourriaud 2002: 14). He borrows the notion of social interstice from Karl Marx and redefines it in terms of contemporary art which “creates free areas, and time spans whose rhythm contrasts with those structuring everyday life, and it encourages an inter-human commerce that differs from the ‘communication zones’ that are imposed on us” (16). He exemplifies his point with a work by Jens Haaning who broadcasted funny stories in Turkish in a square in Copenhagen in 1994. Consequently, Bourriaud suggests, a micro-community of immigrants was formed by collective laughter (17). Relational aesthetics is criticized for various reasons such as presenting a consensual and harmonious form of coexistence; excluding conflict in dialogue (Bishop 2004: 65), or dissensus in a democratic communality, which should be regarded as “a self-interrupting whole” (Ross 2006: 173); being illegible and reintroducing the artist as the exegete of the work (Foster 2005: 194); replacing politics with a parody of politics (Rancière 2004b: 92); and reproducing “neoliberal rhetoric of globalization” (McIntyre 2007: 36).

According to Gabriele Klein, there are three forms of participation of audience in a performance (2013). In the first one, the audience participation is conceptual rather than active as in the works of John Cage and Xavier Le Roy. Second, participation can be a form of taking part in which the audience actively shapes the choreographic structure. Klein argues that the third form, participation as involvement, entails pedagogical aspects. Implementing Chantal Mouffe’s concept of the political advocating difference and Roberto Esposito’s understanding of community in which a community should question itself all the
time, Klein concludes that the aesthetic forms of participation are political when they disturb the social norms and create a community (Klein 2013: 204-205, 207).

Teker’s choreographic piece Hallo! that involves audience participation in an ambivalent and disturbing way can be located against the consensual politics of relational aesthetics. However, writing about the formation of temporary communities through dancing in a dance studio or in the street, I share an affirmative tone with Bourriaud. Like Klein, I can add that dancing at Çatı points to a potential to disrupt the conventional and normative conception of the body framed by the national and/or religious body politic.

**Contributions and Chapter Outline**

I hope to contribute to dance studies in an attempt to delineate affective and temporal aspects of dancing together in a dance studio, at demonstrations and in a dance performance. My implementation of Deleuze’s philosophy of time has similarities with the scholars such as Manning, Cull, and Rothfield mentioned above, yet I aim to expand these discussions with my case studies focusing on the three syntheses of time, the Aion, event/Event, virtual/actual, and caesura. I primarily analyse attunement, imitation, kinaesthetic empathy, and the transmission of affects in addition to the creative and political potential of affective encounters of dancing bodies. At the intersection of materiality of bodies, affects and time, the potential of the political is implied in various ways as the chapters unfold.

The first chapter, which implements a first singular narrative based on my own experiences of encounters while dancing with others, can be regarded as a contribution to creative writing examples which are generally used in practice-based researches and less in theoretical theses like this one. Any personal discourse can contribute to the understanding of the affective and temporal aspects of relationality of bodies while bringing a unique voice as a sample into the discussions particularly on affect and dance.
There are researches made in the area of community dance as mentioned in the above section. However, Çatı is not a community dance space, but a non-profit independent dance studio, which has provided space for sharing corporeal experiences for everyone who is interested. In that regard, this thesis attempts to place itself in a niche between community dance and the dance studios for profit. Çatı created a community of dancers and friends who cooperated to teach each other and the newcomers various contemporary movement practices including improvisation. Although it is a community of dancers rather than a space for community dance, scholars working on community dance can find this part interesting due to my autoethnographical method and the interviews made with the participants of Çatı in the way it suggests an example for community building. The interviewees’ description of their experiences related to the affective in-between can be regarded as a contribution to Affect Studies in the way they refer to affective attunement and transmission in-between moving bodies.

This thesis also aims to contribute to the discussions on the political aspects of dancing together as it theorizes the intersection of affects and time while referring to a dancing community, traditional dances during strike actions and protests in addition to the several forms of movement and stillness during the Gezi Uprising. Although there have been several articles on the Standing Man figure of the Gezi Movement which will be discussed in Chapter 3, my interpretation of these dances in terms of their the temporal and affective aspects aims to fill in a gap in the theories on dance and politics in general, and dancing during protests in particular.

My delineation of affective and temporal aspects of Teker’s choreographic piece *Hallo!* is also a valuable example for relational and participatory performance practices particularly due to its both ambiguous and very straightforward nature of participation. Its ambiguity is still marked by the intensity of the affective co-composition of the piece by both the dancer and the audience members while its
more literal invitation to participation is implied by the way it opens space and time for listening to each other.

Furthermore, when we look at writing on dance in Turkey in an academic level, one can observe a gap in the field that lacks a focus on the philosophical and political aspects of contemporary dance in general and dancing together in particular although many dance critics and writers share their comments and theoretical approaches in various blogs (Aylin Kalem, Defne Erdur, Gizem Aksu, Evren Erbatur, Gurur Ertem, Berna Kurt, Ayşe Orhon, Eylül Fidan Akıncı, etc.).

In her PhD thesis, Zeynep Günsür investigates the first thirty years of ballet in Turkey with a focus on the issues such as modernization, nation-building and authenticity (2007). Besides being the first doctoral thesis on dance in Turkey, it also summarizes the history of writing on dance in Turkey. As the predecessors writing on dance, Günsür names Jak Deleon who wrote descriptive articles on ballet (Günsür 2007: 1); Metin And who explored the concept of play in Turkey (28); and Arzu Öztürkmen who mainly studied the relationship between folkloric dances and nationalism (42). She also mentions the M.A. theses on ballet, history of dance at the beginning of the Republic, and “appropriations of folk dance” in the example of Sultans of Dance Company (Bedirhan Dehmen 2003). To conclude, in Turkey my research will be the first PhD thesis that reads dance with conceptual tools from philosophy of time, affect studies and politics. Therefore, I hope to contribute to the field of writing and thinking on dance in a geography where being-with and dancing together as a form of a resistance endeavour to prevail despite the spread of despair in a historical period of censorship, imprisonments, and exiles.

Moreover, I hope to offer examples of new forms of relating to each other affectively in these times when many forms of being and moving together are under the threat of rising polarization in the society, not only in Turkey, but in many geographies across the world.

In the final part of the introductory chapter, I present a chapter outline as follows:
Chapter 1 begins with a first personal singular account of encounters with the others in various dance studios. Here I let my voice/body speak in its own flow without much reference to the philosophical sources that shaped my thinking over the years. I choose to present a personal text about meeting the other as a first step for thinking the relationality of moving bodies. It is about recognition of the other as another world that cannot be fully known, and may feed curiosity, wonder, fear or hesitation. I view encounter as a pause or shift of one’s world with the presence of the other that can trigger unprecedented affects, thoughts, memories, or futures. At times, my text on encounter may sound vague or abstract although each sentence is based on an actual experience. There is an element of vagueness, uncertainty, wonder and surprise in the rupture of encounter, which, like the form of my writing, is marked with breaks, shifts and uprooting while preparing and opening the ground to make connections with the others’ voices in the next chapter of the thesis. So I start from my own experiences and ideas with my own voice, and gradually move on to their theorization. Moreover, this chapter refers to the definition of affect in terms of encounter by Spinoza and Deleuze.

The next chapters still build on the personal experiences dancing with others, but the narrative voice in the rest of the thesis is not immersed in my own perspective, imagery and personal affective reactions. Instead, I explore various forms of dancing with a focus on the affective field between movers. In this regard, Chapter 2 investigates ways of listening to the others in various forms. First, I concentrate on the experiences of a dance community between the years 2002 and 2011. The voices of the Çatı members, whom I interviewed, play a significant role in the unfolding of this chapter as they accompany me in my thinking and writing. After a brief introduction about the foundation of Çatı (Association of Independent Contemporary Dancers), I explore themes such as boundaries, transmission of affects, porousness of bodies, mimesis and dialogue during improvised dance practices. The discussions on the boundaries and the leakages between the bodies are expanded in the light of theorization of various scholars such as Silvan Tomkins, Antonio Damasio, Teresa Brennan, Anne Game, Anna
Gibbs, Sara Ahmed, Lisa Blackman, and Robert Seyfert. The second part focuses on dancing together in terms of the relationship between the dancer and the audience and analyse how a performance is created affectively each time differently elaborating on Aydin Teker's latest work, Hallo! about hearing, listening, being heard and listened to. Teker is a prolific artist from the first generation of contemporary dancers and the instructor of many dancers and choreographers in Turkey. Her choreographies deal with intensities, speeds, microscopic densities, and distortions of bodies that are in constant becoming in the creative production of each piece. In Hallo!, the performer runs on a treadmill for 35 minutes and says ‘Hallo’ to the audience. Each performance is transformed by the spectators’ moods and answers. In the second part of the performance, people share what they have felt in the first part if they prefer to. I explicate the affective co-composition of the piece elaborating on the themes such as boundaries, leakages, permeability, contagiousness, auditory entrainment, and mimesis in affect theory. I also consider the questions of authenticity and the condition of not being affected as the dancer performs the emotions on the stage. Then I discuss Hallo! in terms of audience engagement and participation considering various theories on participation in performance art and dance besides Susan Leigh Foster’s and John Martin’s understanding of kinaesthetic effects of a performance. Foster’s approach to choreographing empathy is evaluated with other references to empathy in social sciences. I conclude the chapter with a section dedicated to listening.

Chapter 3 examines the affective role of the collective dances practiced during strikes, demonstrations, and the Gezi Movement in addition to analysing standing still as a form of protest that spread during the Gezi Uprising. Firstly, I try to define the traditional collective dances such as halay and horon in order to provide a background for the terminology and present the discussions on their historical transformation. Then, I develop my arguments with examples from a diverse range of social movements such as the working class, environmentalist, and feminist struggles, and the Kurdish movement in Turkey while considering the affective aspects of participation in these practices. I continue with my
interpretation of the Gezi experience in general and dancing during the Gezi Uprising in particular with references to joy in Spinoza, crowd psychology, “sociality of emotions” (Ahmed), contagion and transmission of affects (Brennan), hope and fear in Spinoza, Ahmed and Massumi. Then I elaborate on the still act as a form of protest initiated by the Standing Man, the iconic figure of the Gezi Movement with references to Levinas, Butler and affect theory.

In Chapter 4, Gilles Deleuze’s understanding of time with a focus on the three syntheses of time, the Aion, the Chronos, virtual/actual, and event are delineated and then its relevance for my research is highlighted. I provide an investigation of time in improvisational dance, which, I argue, challenges representational choreographic dances while opening the movement to chance and the potentiality of the virtual. Deleuze’s concepts of difference and repetition, duration, chance and counter-actualization are employed to configure the multiple time of this creative practice, which transforms the memory of the dancing community everyday. Then in the next section, I investigate the temporal aspects of Hallo! expanding on the event time of the performance and co-composing community in addition to the use of the treadmill as a temporal, affective and aural element. Deleuze also provides theoretical tools to envisage the temporal aspects of the Gezi Uprising, the collective dances and the time of the Standing Man.

The general concluding chapter draws from the previous four chapters in order to highlight the political stemming from corporeal practices of moving with. While affects play a significant role in bonding dancing individuals temporarily, affects do not guarantee any political outcome. However, various movement experiences explored earlier in the thesis point towards new forms of relating with each other and the world in general. So this chapter seeks to incorporate the themes developed so far in order to suggest a politics based on the temporality of affects.
Chapter 1

Towards The In-between: My Experiences of Encounters with The Others

Starting out from something that is simply an encounter, a trifle, you learn that you can experience the world on the basis of difference and not only in terms of identity. And you can even be tested and suffer in the process. (Badiou 2012: 16)

These words pass through this body, like breath.

1.1 Arrival and encounters in the dance studio

On the way to the dance studio, awe and wonder revisited, yet never the same. Another moment blooms and grows into something, then into another seed. These metaphors. They are just how I make sense of experience. Some mornings, on the tube, you see the tired faces of commuters. Each face in its uniqueness emerges in your perceptual texture and fulfils its role in your affective narrative. As the sudden recognition of another life, another world, each face fills your chest and flows from your eyes, so you close your eyes and immerse in the wonder you combine with the soundtrack in your headphones. Is it another projection or is it a unique moment when one can be closest to recognising and witnessing the other? When you look at creases and soles of someone's shoes, the whole history of standing, walking and running, pressure and weight, haste and idleness, biography in biology appear as in the rest of the body. How you touch the earth, let gravity work on you, how you rise towards the sky. How your weight is distributed by your posture on each side of the body, how much pressure is exerted on your spine by the affective map of your stance.

***

Entering the studio, walking, lying down, sitting, we all arrive differently. Every morning the studio is different. I almost feel who is there, who have entered while I lie down with eyes closed. The transition between the street and the studio becomes a gradual dwelling in the breath. Then I hear someone breathing near me, moving slowly into an inside. Sensing others, I am both inside and outside. The cold floor touching your back, light on your face, the day is setting its tone with the arrival of each person in the studio.

Open your eyes. There. A presence. Faces. You. There were always bodies, so many before you, so many steps taken. And you entered step by step, starting in the middle. There was never the first step.

The first seven steps of Mother Mary before she was taken to the temple. The maiden's dress is blown by the wind like the Roman female dancers' carved into stone. Then she was taken to the purity of an inside. An outset and a pure interior are imagined after taking steps, walking and falling countless times. An absolute beginning, like the virgin time between many falls.

Open your eyes. There. There was never a self-contained inside except in your myopic consciousness. A meeting is not just a specular process neither is love at first sight. You sense the arrival before your eyes meet the other. It can take countless meetings and millions of sensations of bodies and even of that body before it arrives. With all its failures, disruptions, deaths and births, the chemical composition of each cell is resilient and ready for this moment. For each moment the body is prepared, it is immune to many forms of shock unless the harm and destruction of the organism are aimed. An encounter nudges the fluid boundaries of cells.

---

A mosaic depicting this scene based on the apocryphal Gospel of James can be seen in Chora Church (14th century) in Istanbul. A maiden accompanies Mother Mary when she starts walking for the first time as a child. After the first seven steps, she is not allowed to put her feet on this impure world. Then she is taken to the temple where she stays until her puberty. The icon has early references to the Roman art especially the style the maiden is depicted. The iconography in this church is regarded as an essential step on the way to the Renaissance art. My interest stems from my curiosity about walking, touching the earth, first encounter with the world, the idea of purity and interiority in the context of an encounter.
Moving, walking, dancing, you pass by people looking into others' eyes because this is a task at the beginning of a class. Ignoring or responding to their gazes, trying to catch the other's eyes, trying not to ignore, panic when you can't reach another for a while, smile, acknowledge, move away, getting lost in some eyes, others getting lost in yours, sad eyes, “we are in a dance studio, and this is my studio presence” eyes, fearful eyes, friendly eyes. A structured experience as such causes ripples in the awareness of your environment before gazes and faces move on, vanish into anonymity and reappear always fully charged with meaning either resisting it or accepting the ride on a tide of gazes.

Gaze is not the locus of an abstract encounter. On the contrary, seeing, which is regarded as the least physical sensation by an understanding dominated by the visual, is a visceral experience as the gaze resonates in each organ at the same time and image becomes part of the body. The world “outside” literally “enters” the body. The sense of sight is not merely a mechanical projection in the eye. The visceral impacts of all senses are immediate. The effects in the gut, in the heart, blood, hormones, bones, muscles and fascia, etc. are always part of each experience since neither is a separate mechanism running merely parallel to the others.

Two bodies pause to recognise each other, to breathe in the other. A pause or a leap in one’s habitual time as the moment expands before any possible affective flood or linguistic connotation. The world looks back at you. Your horizon can be refracted if you do not raise your boundaries to frame the moment of encounter in a representative framework.

Tending, attending something like love that keeps transforming as you ride on what you let ride you. As soon as expectations, hence hope, fear, anxiety get involved you lose connection with what emerges in the encounter and disconnect with the other due to the uncontrollable nature of the relationship. The panic of having no control over the response scatters the husk body. Is there a right way of
relating, letting go, or giving up? If one chooses fidelity to the moment of encounter, how can one approach to the other? Tending it while dancing, moving, walking and in stillness; accepting the other people, birds, ponds, sky, and trees into the opening of an encounter; including the roots of a tree and a left-hand glove dropped on the steps of a tube station. I can only nurture fidelity to what creates a new relationship with everything each day as the encounter is recreated and transformed as it recreates and transforms you.

“Allowing the present of the body”, I encounter my own and the other’s limbs, organs, bones, skin, smell, and sound and I sense “the taste of now [as] each body part participates in the now with its own now” (Bettina Neuhaus, Morning Class at Independent Dance, 07.03.2018).

I meet my pelvis. Movements trigger emotions that reactivate past traumas, dreams, and former diseases. I meet an opening in an unexpected way as if my hipbone and flesh are separating and a secret subterranean space is discovered. I am joyful like a dog digging a hole to hide its bone.

I meet my spine thanks to the warmth of your spine. Something powerful, strong, durable has been invigorated. I meet the sky and the earth through it. An extinct ancient sea creature extends its head towards the air. I scatter this deep animated sensation to all the people I encounter in the city. In the end, I put it back to sleep after hours spent on shopping streets and crowded squares.

I meet my perineum. I go back to my land. It has not been destroyed entirely yet. I feel my country in my bones, in my anus. It hurts like my heart. I touch my perineum. I will never be at home, yet home is deeply rooted in my body. We close our eyes and move on the floor. Our legs, our ancestors, our future touch each other. We breathe together roll together touch together. Our land is this
ground that connects us. We don't see each other. We don't meet each other. We become both the land and a tribe of rolling breath.¹⁰

I meet my orifices. I sleep for days. Pain, fever and loss of appetite. This call from my body coincided with a major fire in town after which there was solidarity, a new kind of awareness and silent marches.

You meet my thyroid. I wait for your touch. I feel for its arrival as if your hand is hanging in the air. I swallow my saliva expecting you to notice my glands and find the right place for your touch. Maybe you have already touched me. With your gaze. I did not feel it. I am still waiting for your touch. Tears roll down my cheeks. First slowly, quietly, with a warmth and relief as if something is released. Then it is a sudden gust of wind, cold flame. I burst into tears. It happens. It is out of control. This voice is my voice happening now as I sob my thyroids out. Shame.

The impulse and vitality of the heart expand us into the world, calling us towards what matters for us. In the heart we feel the world entering and changing us. (...) the heart is our compass, showing us the ways in which our lives may be nourished and renewed. (…)

Let the movement of the heart… move the body
Where do you go?... what happens?... who do you meet?... what do you become?
(…)

Let the face feel/remember…. the beat and impulse of the heart
Let face and heart... listen to each other

Imagine a conversation (Tufnell and Crickmay 2004: 255-261)¹¹

¹⁰ The encounters described in this and the following paragraphs stem from my experiences at Maria F. Scaroni’s workshop titled Body/Material in Istanbul (in the dance studio of Çıplak Ayaklar Kumpanyası) in 8-11 June 2017 and Daria Faïn’s Coremotion workshop in London (Independent Dance) in 19-21 May 2017. I mention the details of only these examples because the rest of the text originates from a fusion of numerous experiences with the exception of thyroid and heart/face examples. I prefer not to refer to their sources for privacy reasons.
I can't meet your face. You met my heart. I met my heart. I could not meet your heart. Our faces are the maps of our hearts. I am afraid of getting lost again. I find my way only with eyes closed. Then you are there. I am facing your heart. I am moving my arms and hands feeling "gossamer threads" out of my heart. I move my invisible threads as if they will somehow be untangled and woven continuously. Not to tie you, no. These threads are words or vice versa. I cannot utter words yet. Only a weird, wild surprised gaze. Uncontrollable twitching face muscles. Shame. That's how you opened the heart gate. Dancing. Your speed, rhythm, ease and agility. A felt presence intensifies with all of us dancing. We lie side by side in the depths of a pool of breath. It is bigger than us. I can sense your gentle, fragile and vigorous presence, yet I don't know how to hear you yet. You were the cemre. This seed was the word, encounter.

This gossamer thread dance also reminds me of the way my father danced when I was a child. It made us laugh just because it was so different. The way I move my hands must have been inherited from my father’s ancestors. I meet their hands with these threads. I dance... Tying, untying, knotting, unknotting, weaving, spreading, spinning yarns from my skull, fingers, ribs and vertebrae.

My heart is my home. “[H]ome/hearth/heart” (Tufnell and Crickmay 2004: 234). It is not wordplay. It is not a metaphor. I had to be uprooted, displaced to find home again. I leave home at the gate of our hearts. We stand at the thresholds of our hearts and faces. Two tumbleweeds. We return to the chora to let the seed of the encounter grow. One needs courage, cor not only to leave home but also to cultivate the seed and tend the unknown.

***

11 Miranda Tufnell and Chris Crickmay suggest an experience or an exercise of moving with an awareness of the relationship between the heart and the face. Here we are reminded of the fact that the face of an embryo is formed pressed up against its heart. Tufnell and Crickmay define the face as “an ‘interface’ between heart and brain” (Tufnell and Crickmay 2004: 260).
12 “Gossamer threads” is one of the images to move from or with in Skinner Release Technique. This section of the text is based on my numerous experiences of dancing with this image in SRT.
13 Cor: "heart" in Latin.
I try to make sense of these experiences of dancing and moving all day long as I walk in the city, touching the town with my light feet, watching the sky that connects us. As I drink images, the world and I mingle. The vitality of the felt body with a balanced state of affective and other physiological states engenders a kind of groundedness and clarity of mind. Like drops of dew, gentle, temporary, fleeting. It is as if everything in the world finds its place in my body as if I settle in the world without the need to give additional meaning to it. A kind of thisness, haecceity. These resonances build up day by day, as I shed more layers, as my fluid body is transformed on a cellular level. At times I am on the verge of disappearance, almost vanishing into the nothingness we share, ready to pass through a needle hole. Each encounter is a seed for resolution, intensity, expansion, awe, affects, new perceptions and sensations accompanied by acceptance and compassion. My relationship with past experiences is also gradually modified. Am I still clinging to the uniqueness of each encounter? Do I turn into a husk, a shadow without it? Brewing, rising, emerging. A spring that I found after following a red woollen yarn… Still, it is better to let go of whatever a movement experience brings on a particular day. Each one of us in the studio has a distinct way to interpret, sense and feel what movements generate each time differently. We meet each other and experience our own and others' bodies anew every day. In a morning class at Independent Dance (01.02.2018) Charlotte Scott said that there is no textbook about what you will [have to?] feel at the end of each class, or nothing like - you do a specific movement and feel in a certain way. It all depends on the individual, the situation, and various other factors. It is also about what happens in the studio.

After the class, the fear dissipates or sinks into the background still resonating. A leaf is carried on the grass by a sudden breeze. The sunrays wash the branches of a plane tree from time to time just before a gold-rimmed grey cloud floats. With music in my ears, I inhale the trees, grass, beer bottle caps, mandarin peels, a metal knife and small tree branches half buried in the wet earth. A child with an
orange hat is playing in the distance. A young man runs with open arms and a big smile towards the pigeons that fly low in the park. I exhale and start walking.

I try to tend my relationship with an encountered being always anew, without being loyal to a state and to lend an ear to it, approach it each time with care, wonder, attention, openness. How can I look at a face, how can I follow a blackbird? Neither is a sign of truth, but everything accompanies each other on a path laid in front of me. I do not search for an absolute meaning. I am walking towards. That’s what happened after the encounter.

1.2 Encounter with The Other

I am writing on the encounter to make sense of what is still flowing, unfolding, and becoming after an event starts, triggers the rolling of the unknown, something different, a difference made possible by openness on a conscious and unconscious level. To refer to encounter as an event does not exclude its repetitive and continuous happening and rising like a high-relief in time the full shape of which cannot be captured in any form of representation. Yet, I approach with words and lines while moving and turning towards. I am facing you. Face and chest both hurt as they allow space for the seed of the event. I am writing from my guts, from my stomach, from my heart. My throat is tingling and throbbing with its winged gland. My hands are open, arms hanging on two sides of my body. The time of the event becomes flesh and flesh becomes word and word becomes blood. Time, words and blood circulate and nourish each cell before they all vanish. My body is composed of all kinds of material and immaterial multiplicities, beyond my cognition. Bones and muscles, soft tissues, blood, fluids, hormones, the electricity of the heartbeat, energy of each organ and each cell... My body is my house, a dwelling place to start from. First I sense your arrival and then interiority is felt. Springtime. Cemres\textsuperscript{14} fall one by one into the air, water and earth. The seed of

\textsuperscript{14} Cemre: “In Turkish folklore, three fireballs that come from the heavens to warm earth at the end of each winter.” (Wikipedia) This radiation of heat is believed to be the harbinger of spring. It is supposed to fall into air, water and earth in late February and early March. Cemre is pronounced as jemre(y).
cemre passes through the body, enlivens and awakens it. Life, again. Standing in the middle of the forest, standing by the shore, there is still time to tell the story. Remembering words, drawing lines, you hold Ariadne’s thread to record movements in time.

Any utterance is a connection with the past populated by the words of dead people authorised by institutions. This connection is also our gratitude for them. Is there a quiet moment of the encounter, free from nouns, adjectives and adverbs? Free from affects? Encounter as an event can be considered beyond references to the past experiences (accompanied by judgement, hesitation, suspicion, anger, and shame, etc.) and to future expectations (hope, fear, disappointment, etc.).

An encounter entails hesitation and doubts when the fears originating in the past permeate the present. The fear of breaking with several elements of the past with each choice creates light-headedness. So remember and feel the ground and breathe. So forget all the ways you met another being or another event before. Forget dramatic thunders, the events which were noticed late, the encounters that faded away in the noise of the everyday and lost in the labyrinths of time, all the slipping, wasted, missed moments while passing by other lives. Still, you waver between spontaneous action and allowing reception, between reaction and response. You recoil in hesitation before intention and assertion, or avoidance and neglect. Hesitation is the cognitive form of the pause created by an encounter in the habitual organisation of bodies and actions. My head spins with what your presence does to my body. I face the world when my chest is unlocked, ears unsealed, and eyes ignited.

Is it possible to look at you as if you are the first being I have seen on earth? My gaze is refracted by misunderstandings, misrecognition, expectations, and projections, tinted by affects, foggy with hormonal and intestinal dysfunctions. Have I mistaken you for someone else or something else? Is what I feel, sense, think, imagine, assert, decline, agree about the in-between just a will-o'-the wisp?
Orpheus... You see me in the underworld, and I disintegrate in my darkness. Words will follow this darkness, but need light to be uttered because both the body and language dissolve in the marshy underworld. A spark. Fleeting life in the eyes or fake flame in the marsh. What do you intend, hide, claim, or declare with your words when you are not singing? Do they soothe? Do they irritate?

An encounter is a beginning in the middle. I am standing in the woods, on the side of a busy road, at the entrance of a dance studio, at your heart's gate. A dark forest of murmurs. A city of lights and concrete. A studio of uncertainty, distance and surprises. Dancers lie on their backs, expanding roots deep in the ground and their spines are connected along the floor of the studio. No faces yet.

I come from somewhere, which does not exist anymore, but it is not nowhere. Something has passed to the soles of my feet, into my bones from that place. Then I stepped onto other grounds to create a new and different place. A wanderer without a destination, toward nowhere, yet toward... Walking on endless paths, becoming a path. One must stop to see and hear. An encounter requires a pause maybe only for a few seconds. So we stand in the middle. Of time, of the Earth. We fall into time. The moment opens like a gate. We trust the ground under our feet. It supports and connects us. We have been neither exiled nor expelled yet.

An encounter is a beginning in the middle of each other's time. Both beings' horizons collide even though each might assume a juxtaposition of scopes. It is the meeting of two different temporal planes, different rhythms, a clash, a rupture in various sizes from micro levels of everyday life to the expansion caused by the explosive heart/face of a lover or a revolutionary.

Each encounter with a being or an event is unique in the way it moves me and opens space and time for a different response even when it resembles another repetitive pattern. Sometimes it is possible to list the events in a linear order to make sense of them in a chronology. As opposed to a teleological perspective, the
encounter as an event can be related to another time that is continuously woven and rewoven by each event.

Do things build up? Do the past experiences prepare you so that you were ready for the encounter this time? How about resemblances to the past experiences and our habitual reactions?

The moment of encounter can be an opening into the unknown. The noun “opening” does not necessarily connote a revolutionary, or healing, or an enlightening resolution as a response to the existing crises. At the risk of spatializing temporality, one can say that an opening entails the co-existence of all the forking paths: “In all fiction, when a man is faced with alternatives, he chooses one at the expense of the others. In the almost unfathomable Ts’ui Pen, he chooses –simultaneously- all of them. He thus creates various futures, various times which start others that will in their turn branch out and bifurcate in other times” (Borges quoted by Deleuze 1994: 116).

An opening is not idealised because the unknown next moment can be laden with dark corners, serpentine twists, terror and violence that will confirm our projections as time unfolds. Nevertheless, it is not trivialised, either, since who is not excited by a new beginning or a chance to travel to the uncharted waters. An opening is where you find yourself at the threshold of a movement with eyes on the soles, a spine and back made of ears, while hands of gossamer threads dance, slowly, quietly listening and moving with care and weaving each moment with a spider's instinctive ease.

Sometimes we need to melt into the moment of an encounter, rather than waiting for the so-called right time. I melt into the time of my organs that helps me sense your time approaching mine. Without resistance and withdrawal, a softened perception of your body lets me hear your rhythm. Then I can look at the interval between us. I cannot comprehend your time, but only allow it co-exist with mine as we let this encounter develop into a dialogue of silent gestures. I receive the seed into the melting earth and move on with seeds of new temporalities from
you, a blackbird, a beech tree, northern clouds, words in many languages heard on a London bus. No matter how patient you have been in the past, the other’s time is different each time. I can neither transfer time from one connection to the other as if they were bank accounts, nor impose my own time on the other. An encounter opens a new time interval that we can weave together gently like a spider's web between us, changing our times in us. I can't speed up or delay without your consent even though the vertical time of desire may cut into this horizontality.

Falling into time/outside time. Falling in love/out of love. Falling into madness/sadness/ bliss. Then quietude.

Love and body are the sources of our new language. It is created while dancing, or other corporeal experiences during which one is not an objective and witnessing self, but an intensity of sensations. This intensity is teeming in each cell of the body. Depending on the content of the experience, organs are transformed with the electrical and chemical charges as a new corporeal event - a new rhythm- is introduced into the organism. The organism is porous and always open to a bird's flight, a sitting cow, a deer's gaze, mandarin peel, an object encountered at random, but consciousness has to be alert and draw its boundaries, or is it the perineum, or the hip joint? An organism affected by all but nurtured by few.

One opens oneself to the other's rhythm. Do we have a chance to open ourselves or not? Are we prepared for this moment all our lives? Each encounter rides on the previous ones, each rhythm is added to the continuous ride, and some of the encounters are events or caesuras. A new being, a poem, a drama, series of heartbeats can emerge out of the caesarean moment. An open chest is wrenched from the grip of the repetitive patterns of the habitual that rushed toward a point of crisis. I am tipping and swaying from side to side.

How can you dwell in the rupture? Is it an opening of the heart/gate? Is it how you name it? One can rush to a drama; it is too big for me, so it has to explode in a dramatic climax to satisfy our need for punishment by the past deities. Here we
are in our mortality. Vulnerable. How can you take the heartbeat back and swallow it in nicotine smoke, letters to friends, being a gaze in an autumn wood, listening to the hum of the traffic and planes, and now a magpie call, and then the twittering kindergarten children visiting the woods? I am standing still. I am a being of the here and now, a shadow of a woman or all, thinking how to dwell in this moment of heartbeat and breath without hastening it? Then. Walking saying, saying walking. Does experience have boundaries of the body/mind? How do all the messages arrive from the loved ones in the right time unless we float or swim together in a sea of affects and ideas in the atmosphere? This is not a sign of synchronicity that points to the spiritual expansion that gets you closer to a reward that puts you on a higher pedestal that … that... No. Only, these words pass from this body, like breath.

Evening magpie arrives in the garden. It has its time. One can’t speed up this moment to leap into tomorrow with a load of anticipation, hence hope and fear. Learning to dwell in the unknown, gently walking writing the vulnerable moment where you meet the gaze of the others walking and unpredictably verb-ing. An encounter is the suspension of the verb, surrounded by nouns and adjectives neither of which has the power to fix it. Some people will create new verbs as they move. New words will come from the dancing materiality of bodies. We have spoken enough with others’ words. It is a moment when linear syntax and layered semantics of language provided by culture cannot catch up with. Outside home, outside any sheltering structure, you see the other looking at your system that cannot frame the other anymore. Both parties are between their structures, still at the threshold of their homes. More steps need to be taken to approach each other. You have a boundary, a skin envelope radiating, expanding, crunching, hollowing, yet a skin, so that I can recognise and approach you so that we don't merge into one another. Otherwise, one swallows the other in his/her image. Interlocked.

I still cannot grasp it. I am in a wide wide sea of sensations beyond verbal and critical comprehension. It is neither a union nor disappearance, neither expansion
nor contraction; maybe both, like breathing. Vulnerable, gentle, fluid, precious. There is nothing I can demand or expect from it except the continuation of my connection with what nurtures me. I can witness and recognise it, listen to it. There is a possibility of learning to say in the heart of the present, which is too fast for you. Hence, you run into the woods, to slow it down. You can neither slow down what needs to speed up, nor accelerate what is slowing down. Encounter opens a time outside the rhythm of either of us. How can I catch up with the new rhythm of the moment without grasping it as a noun, yet with gratitude for the hum of the verbs emerging in the mo(ve)ment?

When the moment of encounter is met with any already existing thought, its potential will immediately be fixed by a probability defined by past combinations. However, after the event, it can be inevitable to dedicate one's time to the ways of making sense of the encounter retrospectively. When the encountered being is remembered with metaphors, symbols or pictures, its representation will replace what was once encountered. A two dimensional past, frozen in time; colours and objects that remind you of the encountered beings become objects of attachment or cathexis. There is a seed in-between your stomach and heart. It vibrates mainly somewhere around these two organs. If one follows the sensations of the body in conversation with reason, one may find a new way to relate to the world and create a new word to name this emergent relationship. This word does not have to be a linguistic unit; however, it still functions in the formation of an emergent story already spiralling in the atmosphere. You can't control this seed of encounter, but still, attend it with will and intention.

To relate with whom you envisage as being outside the domain of identities based on race, class, culture, religion, gender, etc. and to include in your horizon what you may have considered distant if not separate can be a hard test for power relations. This does not just happen as if you look at the world for the first time like a child because there is the baggage of history and memory without which neither thought nor writing is possible. However, encounter bears the potential of making sense towards ethics similar to the ethics of love.
After the encounter, we may form a bond with words, with sighs, silences while looking at the invisible between us, nothingness we share. “Perhaps loving each other requires that we look at the invisible together, that we abandon the sight of it to the breath of the heart, of the soul, that we preserve it in its carnality, without staring upon it fixedly as a target” (Irigaray 2001: 42). A bond is not the target; it does not aim anything, either. Instead, it is something the growth of which we can affect towards the unexpected, the unknown. We weave one word after the other, one foot in front of the other, one affect into the other, and with each step, a bond is created. It is another thread we make out of our own lives to dance through the labyrinths of time, to connect with the outside, with what is both vital and vulnerable. This bond between us, the mortals, is alive and fragile because it is made of us, made by us. Sewing, knitting, weaving, I come out of a dark night. I follow the thread created by or creating an encounter - time does not always follow a linear chronology of cause and effect. However, this thread forms lines, paths, and branches. Walking along this thread demands the patience and labour after sowing seeds. Each life is already made up of myriad connections created with love, support, actions, utterances, conversations, hatred, humiliation, and intimacy second by second. I am enchanted with your bonds with the rest of the world and afraid of being entangled by some of them. Sometimes respect does not come easy. Sometimes my tongue is knotted. However, the bond is becoming silence, distance, the proximity of the heart, songs accompanying the cityscapes through a bus window. When a sentence arrives from a stranger, a book or a friend, words open a channel into the riverbed of time where I can hear my voice again. I hold the thread for a while. I am not constructing anything in your name. Just pacing the interval curiously. Intuitively, I move towards an understanding, making sense of the intensity arising among all the sensations vibrating in the body humming with outside.

If an encounter was not so rare, why bother to construct a story out of it as one falls into the gap between language and silence? A meeting can be an obligation, an invasion that you prefer to ignore and turn your head away. However, mostly
we see an unexplainable chance element in encounters. Alain Badiou emphasises the chance element in an encounter that always entails uncertainty of the unpredictable nature of the encounter. “[A]ccepting someone entering into your life as a complete person” is the acknowledgement of the uncontrollable aspects in a relationship (Badiou interviewed by Petitjean 2014: n.p.) The contingency of the encounter does not exclude the necessity of making decisions in a shared construction of a relationship. For Badiou, what makes an encounter differ from experience is the way the former disrupts “the rhythm of your existence” as it is the beginning of something that is indefinable and unclassifiable based on your past experiences (ibid.). The disturbance of one's habitual rhythms and the improbability of this extraordinary experience may also cause “repulsion” in addition to the “attraction” towards this beginning (ibid.). To continue one's approach to the unknown requires openness and confidence in the weaving of the new relationality.

The repetition of encounters concurs with pulls and pushes, coming together, and drifting apart like mercury. Generally, both parties become participants of an encounter without their will or intention. At times one senses its ghostly announcement preceding or replacing the surprise of the actual meeting. Other times, one collects signs with an endeavour to decipher the pattern of the forking paths. Sometimes it is like a poem happening or falling in love. Yet, one can learn to let go of whatever is experienced in the encounter and not to turn it into a fixed model or a desirable version to be repeated each time we meet the same or another being. There are times when encounter means suspicion, humiliation, anxiety, violence, violation, and escape in terror. Encounter does not necessarily entail affective involvement in a relationship or allowing the other into one's horizon, either. One may say, “time is not ripe yet”, and walk away if she/he is not ready or willing to form any connection. There are times when one only observes the crossing paths. In a brief encounter, a life/world can be tangent to, or damaged, or empowered by another life/world, mostly not free from judgement, overinterpretation, absorption, and consumption of the other pigeonholed in the past patterns of the psyche or turned into an object of cathexis. One can be
expelled from the garden of wonder and curiosity when the possibility of disruption of the habitual and a new organisation of the corporeal chemistry generate panic.

How can we be distant from each other when our bodies feel the intensity created by the others, or why do we remain distant in our physical proximity as if we were bestowed with eternal time? Lovers feel that the moment of encounter promises eternity, yet they are tested by the duration of time and the process they will shape and be shaped by. “Love is above all a construction that lasts” and not a mere “starting point” (Badiou 2012: 32). It is “less miraculous and more hard work, namely a construction of eternity within time, of the experience of the Two, point by point” (80).

All these early, late, fast, slow, stagnant, frozen, delayed, postponed, procrastinated times shape the interval between us. The randomness of this play of time will accompany our intention and attention that nurture the bond creating a new relationality. We “must be in the breech, on guard” in the name of fidelity to the event of encounter in Badiou’s terms (81) as we labour to weave a world with our movements and words.

1.3 Defining Affect in Terms of Encounters

An encounter opens the bodies into a relationality that is marked with both the aleatory nature and the social aspects of affects. The outcome of an encounter relies on “what forms of compositions these beings are able to enter in to” (Thrift 2008: 179). Affect occurs in an encounter, which is simultaneously structured by affects.

Spinoza’s theory of affects opens us to the potentiality of the body beyond what we can envisage. Spinoza not only connects mind and body denying the primacy of one over the other, but also sees them in relation to other bodies. Therefore, an encounter has an impact both on the body and the mind in a way that can go
beyond our knowledge or consciousness of them. In that respect, his philosophy of affects implies “a discovery of the unconscious, of an unconscious of thought” and “the unknown of the body” (Deleuze 1988: 19). According to Spinoza, there is a parallelism between the body and the mind: What happens in the body helps us conceive what escapes our consciousness and what occurs in the mind is equally related to the body.

Each body is affected by other bodies and we know others’ and our bodies based on these affections. However, affections do not provide adequate knowledge about the body because they are not clear and distinct, but rather confused ideas. Spinozan affect refers to “self-referential states of being” whereas emotions are “everyday understanding of affects” which are culturally constructed over time (Thrift 2008: 221). Spinoza views affect in relation to encounters and power to act. When we meet another body, or an idea encounters another idea, this relation either produces a powerful composition or a destructive one. When we enter into a composition, we feel joy and our power to act increases whereas, in the case of decomposition, we feel sorrow that eventually decreases our life force. Simply put, we love the ones who give us joy and call them good and vice versa hate is the effect of the decomposition, which makes us sad, diminishing our life energy, and in certain cases, even leading to sickness and death. In Spinoza’s life-affirming philosophy, contemplation of suicide is caused by external factors because “[e]ach thing, as far it can by its own power, strives to persevere in its being” (Ethics III P6). Conatus is the essential term, which defines the instinctive endeavour and will to live. The encounter between bodies is understood as the capacity for being affected in an agreeable or disliked manner that will either increase or decrease the power to act. Spinoza sees affect in relation to this power: “By affect [affectum] I understand affections [affectiones] of the body by which the body’s power [potentia] of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of affections” (Ethics III D3). Affect is evaluated either as an active power to act or as the passivity of being acted on:
I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is, when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of which we are only a partial cause. (*Ethics* III D2)

For Spinoza, an affect is a passion or a confused idea when the mind is acted on and the “lack of power to restrain and moderate the affects” is a form of bondage (*Ethics* IV Preface). Unless we avoid excess and have control over the affects, we can then become easily vulnerable in a turmoil at the intersection of inside and outside that sweep us from positive to negative affects. In his reading of Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze claims, “existence is a test. But it is a physical or chemical test, an experimentation” (Deleuze 1988: 40). Reason is Spinoza’s remedy during such an existential test. Reason guides us in the organization of our encounters so that the power to act and the experience of joyful affects can be augmented.

Spinoza claims that affect follows the laws of Nature, thus he treats it “as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies.” (*Ethics* III D1) There is an order, a composition of relations in Nature, which means that one body does not enter into a relation of composition with just any body, but the one that it agrees with. Therefore, it is possible to form common notions with other people. Forming common notions is an art, “the art of the Ethics itself: organizing good encounters, composing actual relations, forming powers, experimenting” (Deleuze 1988: 119).

Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza points to the potential of seeing the body in terms of relations with other bodies and as capacities to affect and to be affected rather than forms or functions (Deleuze 1988). One does not know what the mind and body are capable of in an encounter. When two bodies meet, the encounter may increase the power of one whilst decreasing that of the other; decrease their powers in a destructive way; or, increase the power of both bodies. These possibilities can undergo changes in time as in the case of enemies becoming
friends or lovers turning into strangers (Protevi 2009: 48). Neither a human nor an animal can be thought outside its relations with the world. These relations can be composed or recomposed when one chooses to accept the other into one’s world. Deleuze proposes that a body can be “an animal, a body of sounds, a mind or an idea”, “a linguistic corpus, a social body, a collectivity” and adds that the plane of these relations is no longer a subject, but “individuating affective states of an anonymous force” (Deleuze 1988: 127). Affect is not understood in an anthropocentric subject-object dichotomy, but as the force that is registered in the living and non-living, the corporeal and immaterial. As the subject is replaced by the concept of individuation, the body is constituted in its individuality and capacity to affect and to be affected. This individuality is constituted not as a form, but in a network of relations.

Deleuze defines ethology as the study of relations and capacities between things. Ethology is not only a matter of forming relations, but also an effort to understand how relations can create a new and “extensive” relation and how capacities can develop a more “intense” capacity (Deleuze 1988: 126). In that sense, for Deleuze, Spinoza’s Ethics is an example of ethology rather than morality. He furthers the idea of encounter in Spinoza according to which there is a point and counter point of an encounter; either depleting our ability to act (sadness), or increasing our capacity for action (joy) unless we use reason not to be fettered by affects. It is in this context that Deleuze introduces the question of community:

It is no longer a matter of utilizations or captures, but of sociabilities and communities. How do individuals enter into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad infinitum? How can a being take another being into its world, but while preserving or respecting the other’s own relations and world? And in this regard, what are the different types of sociabilities, for example? (Deleuze 1988: 126)

Deleuze’s understanding of relationality and affect implies the possibility of creating new forms of sociability and affective communities. In my opinion, this
is not necessarily a “happy together” communality where the question of boundaries is disavowed. Laying the foundations of a political approach to the question of relationality, Spinozan-Deleuzian ethics is about being open to the unknown, and the new chemistries emergent in-between and through the permeable bodies. Furthermore, perhaps primarily, it is about the experimentation and creativity that continuously transform what bodies can do.

In-between bodies, affect indicates a difference as each encounter is charged with the unknown. In a creative act like dancing together, this relationality or being-with can have the potential of generating what we cannot define yet as the participants of an encounter open themselves to difference; the unexpected outside the hormonal and verbal loops (not beyond body and language); and to a new angle, a change of direction, and a towardness that refract the known.

Encounter is not only about one’s affective response or the flow of affects in-between. There is a pause, a suspension of the habitual. It may last only a few seconds before one’s habitual thought patterns and judgements rush into the system. Sometimes we need them for a safe ground. An encounter triggers the survival instinct as our gut feelings play a primordial role in the very first subconscious evaluation of the other or a situation for our safety and physical and psychological integrity. However, one tends to forget these first waves of information to fit the other in the framework of one’s projections and knowledge systems. So we are never completely open like an empty space to be filled by the presence of the other, or the affects activated by the encounter. The continuous flow between the personal experiences and their relationship with the others is shaped by affects and habitual patterns of thinking and moving which can be transformed by conscious attention and listening to the in-between. This embodied form of listening and attention to the other can be a first stage of forming a community that begins between the two. Do affects suggest a sufficient potential for an ethical and political ground to rethink the relationship between the individual and the other? I suggest that an embodied form of speaking, writing
and listening in our efforts to make sense of our experiences is the first step to redefine and transform the existing and habitual forms of relationality.

1.4 Approaching The Other After The Encounter

Then how can we approach the other as the first step of creating a ground for a new form of relating to each other after the encounter? Irigaray writes about the major pitfalls that can be faced while approaching another being. One of the common habits that we tend to repeat is the appropriation and domination of the other’s reality (Irigaray 2002: 121). We relate to the other in the framework of our cultural and personal background in addition to various epistemological instruments that shape our worldviews. The other is regarded as an object of analysis in the light of diverse systems of information that we acquired in the past. Consequently, he/she is fixed as a replaceable element in a network of relations based on the Same as we disregard the difference of each individual. For Irigaray, we miss life that is continuously unfolding, changing, and becoming when the world or the other’s world is turned into a completed and fixed object in our horizon.

In “the singularity of an encounter” (Irigaray 2001: 48), the gaze is virginal, as free as possible from the burden of definitions and the mediations of discourses that objectify and fix the other’s becoming. Therefore, the perception of the other is an open horizon that allows space for the mystery and silence of the other. An encounter has the potential to evolve towards the new, unexpected and the unknown if we pay attention to what it brings and cultivate the first physical sensations and emotions while “learning how to perceive again, including through our sensory perceptions, what we meet” (Irigaray 2017: 66). This leads us to an ethics of relationality that denounces simple morality. To respect the other, one “must think of him as a body, as a heart, and also as a present word” and “consider him a singular incarnation which resists already existing language” (Irigaray 2001: 109).
The encounter of the two beings entail meeting of two worlds and two languages. For the possibility of intersubjectivity, dialogue and the dialectic of the two poles, one must first pause before the other and let the silence open space for his/her presence and words. For Irigaray, this requires proximity and intimacy with ourselves because it is only after experiencing our own interiority, we can provide a place for the other in our interiority (2004). We advance from our “dwelling place” where we return altered after the experience of the encounter (Irigaray 2004: 30). The dwelling places, our own intimate physical spaces such as home, or bodily interiority are “the spaces in which each one rests, letting the fruits of an encounter grow in the withdrawal to a proximity with oneself. Such spaces are made of our flesh, our heart, our thinking and our words and they are not always visible, but they exist” (Irigaray 2004: 7). With the existence of a distance from ourselves and from the other, intimacy between the two can exist (Irigaray 2017: 69). The interval between the two cannot be overcome because one can neither see the other as a whole nor be unified with him/her. Yet it is thanks to this interval where one preserves silence and obscurity that the other is capable of surprising us.

1.5 In Search of A Ground in The Interval

How can I find a ground to lift my head out of this conglomeration of the unknown and make sense of the encounter? How can I start moving from this unknown each time? To look in the eye. To lend an ear. To provide a ground and time. A solid ground? A vertical opening, a soft and permeable one, a comfortable bed, a riverbed, a soothing support? We are present, standing by / with each other in an amorphous interval. Falling and rising, we form a ground. A quiet space for a dialogue in which we are immersed, both impersonal and intimate at the same time. A no, a yes.

The ground is not something to fix before we start. The ground is already there, ever changing. Our movements activate it and remake it each time. Neither a territorial tag-of-war nor a search for a common ground. It is not ours. It is made
of our movements. It is not a matter of belonging or possession, hence either of boundaries or borders. A ground is not a territory.

The ground is not a place, not a specific space at all, it is not a home, it is not a root, or a source. It is not something we belong to. The ground is where we move in connection with each other. Walking, dancing, moving, in the air, on the ground.

I am toward… Facing, pacing… Pacing the earth… Sometimes I sense something that I cannot verbalize and reach for my notebook to draw, other times I dance with friends, facing it, moving toward it. Only with the presence of the other, time is activated. Facing? My back shivers.

To enter into the unknown of the improvisational, creative moment, of the space in-between I and the other. Taking risks to step into the unknown and listen to the in-between, repeating movements different each time. Leaps. To activate time once again. Time is enlivened rather than being a structured duration that awaits to be consumed or passed. When you were locked in your own temporality, gazing at a fixed point probably together with other people, you may hear the babbling of the other’s time, finding its bed. You witness their becoming with a sense of wonder and sadness as you get closer to the end of your time facing the unknown and the new. You look at this interval through a crevice. Through the limbo of a suspended time, you peek at the time of a world where an arrow moves forward with urgency and faith.

What is there in-between? Affect is not taking place in the interval. It is about the interval, because of the interval. What is more interesting is the unknown happening, emerging each time and what we can create, build there. Outside homes, where we are displaced, yet where we do not feel homeless as we are ready to leave the familiar and habitual behind. Not all the encounters, meetings have to be disruptive. Quietly, silently being with…
Nevertheless, some people, or some encounters are gates. You pass through the gate (the encounter, or the person), and then you start walking in a place, which is neither yours nor the other’s. Some places and decisions are gates. After passing through such a door, the world you arrive in becomes the new spatiotemporal setting for your new experiences. It sets the tone of your life. Like the gates Alice has to go through…

What if the other you encounter is completely indifferent to the experience of encounter? That is why this chapter is written in first person singular for the most part. The encounter provides a ground where I can make sense of my perception of the other. It is before being with, moving with, it is being on the road. It is before a dialogue, it is the moment when we begin to form a ground, or a potential for a ground which was never experienced before. This will be the ground for moving with. This is where we start with difference, difference of bodies, of worlds. Contingency is its surprising element while the organization of our encounters in a Spinozan way can lead to the affective communities creating new relations in a Deleuzian sense.

Beginning from the encounters, beginning from the activation of time by the other…
Chapter 2

Listening to The In-between: Affective Weaving of Moving with

Listening to the others is an endeavour to lend an ear to the experiences of the others dancing together. It is a form of creating a ground for the affective weaving of moving with and reinventing the affective in-between. This chapter is composed of three major parts. The first part consists of discussions in affect theory about the boundaries between individuals, affective transmission, contagion, in short the relationship between what is considered inside and outside. Second part looks at the experiences of a group of people who dance together in a dance studio in Istanbul. These experiences are narrated in the quotations from the interviews that I conducted with these individuals, who generously accepted to contribute to this research. I explore the concepts of attunement, mimesis and dialogue in order to conceive the affective in-between created while dancing together. The second part of this chapter investigates what happens when a dance piece is co-composed affectively by the dancer and the audience. It focuses on the themes such as kinaesthesia, audience participation and listening in addition to the transmission of affects.

2.1 Boundaries and The Transmission of Affects

Contagion is one of the main themes to be considered in order to elaborate on the affective in-between of the dancing bodies in the studio.

Tomkins’ theory of affects highlights the contagious nature of affects, which situates the individual in relation to others “in a circuit of feeling and response, rather than opposition to others” (Hemmings 2005: 552). Besides the well-known contagion of yawn and smile, for Tomkins, all the affects, except startle, are “specific activators of themselves” and contagious (Tomkins 2008 [1962]: 163). Tomkins considers contagion as a fundamental element of “the social responsiveness”:
It is only when the joy of the other activates joy in the self, fear of the other activates fear within, distress of the other activates distress within, anger of the other activates anger within, excitement of the other activates one’s own excitement that we may speak of an animal as a social animal. (Tomkins 2008 [1962]: 164)

Even though the mechanism of contagion is not known yet, Tomkins posits three possibilities to formulize contagion. First, the inert affective system might be activated and gain momentum. Second, when one remembers an experience related to a specific affect, that affective response might be triggered. Tomkins is cautious to generalize this possibility drawing attention to the probability that recollection of joy experienced with the loved one may instigate distress; or remembrance of fear may produce surprise or shame rather than exact repetition of the same affect. Third possibility proposed by Tomkins is that contagion is “an indirect consequence of the similarity of one’s own responses to social activators” (Tomkins 2008 [1962]: 164). For instance, the smile of a person can activate another person’s smile either due to “proprioceptive modality”\(^\text{15}\) or as a learned response (ibid.).

Contagion is theorized by Antonio Damasio with references to empathy\(^\text{16}\) and his concept of “as-if-body-loop” (Damasio 2003: 115). “As-if-body-loop” is a mechanism of the brain, which produces the simulation of emotional states internally (ibid.). An example would be the pain one feels in a flash when one is told about an injured person in a horrific accident. Empathy is based on this mechanism that changes the body maps\(^\text{17}\) when “certain brain regions such as prefrontal/premotor cortices signal the body-sensing brain regions” (ibid.).

---
\(^{15}\) Proprioception: “the sensory information that contributes to the sense of position and self and movement. Body position is perceived both at the conscious and unconscious levels. The information of conscious proprioception is utilized to facilitate complex motor activity, while unconscious proprioception is important to coordinate basic posturing during sitting, standing and simple gait activities.” (Johnson and Soucacos 2010: n.p.)

\(^{16}\) I will expand on the notion of empathy in the last part of the chapter.

\(^{17}\) Damasio relates feelings to “neural mappings of body state” represented in the brain (Damasio 2003: 96).
neurons involved in this process are called “mirror neurons”\(^{18}\) in the frontal cortex of humans and monkeys. Triggering the sensory-motor structures in the brain, mirror neurons represent and simulate the movements of an individual in another individual’s brain, sometimes causing the execution of the actual movement.

Teresa Brennan’s frequently quoted question, “Is there anyone who has not, at least once, walked into a room and ‘felt the atmosphere’?” (Brennan 2004: 1) situates affects in an “outside in” model (Ahmed 2004: 9) in which the environment influences an individual’s affective composition. The environment and, particularly other people in one’s milieu have an impact on the hormones and affects (Brennan 2004: 73) as the biochemistry and neurology of the body change with the transmission of affects (1). On the other hand, our affects also have an impact on the way we perceive the environment as equally as our perception of a certain affect may influence the way we feel (6). This view on affects disrupts the presumed distinction between the body and its outside (ibid.).

According to Brennan, although affect is physiological and material, it also has an energetic dimension that increases and decreases. Like Spinoza, she explains that our energy is enhanced when we are with the loved ones whereas our energy is depleted in the presence of others that make us tired and depressed (Brennan 2004: 6). She exemplifies the extreme case of the latter condition with chronic fatigue syndrome, “which may be a leaching of a person, a draining off of energy by cumulative environmental stresses and by person and persons unknown” (ibid.). Participants in an encounter bring their “affective histories” and “emotional dispositions”, which have an impact on their interaction (43).

Brennan criticizes the Western model of the emotionally and energetically self-contained subject with clear boundaries whilst pointing to the studies on the hormonal and affective transmission between the mother and the foetus (Brennan 2004: 16). According to theories in psychoanalysis and psychiatry, during early

\(^{18}\) While a monkey or a human being is observing the actions of another animal or individual, mirror neurons fire or mirror as if the observer is actually realizing the same action.
childhood, the child is expected to form boundaries between him/herself and his/her mother and recognize the mother as a separate person in order to be a healthy individual (24). In contrast, some non-Western and non-modern perspectives on mental disorders consider the permeability of personal boundaries through which energies pass from one person to the other.

Brennan explains that the transmission of affects results either in affective alignment of people or their opposition to an affective thread. Although she does not expand on the theme of opposition as much as entrainment which she continues to investigate, it is still crucial to mention that “even when a strong affect has most people in its collective grip, there are exceptions”, always a “lone resister” (Brennan 2004: 11). The transmission process, whereby people experience similar affects as their hormonal and nervous systems are aligned, is called entrainment (9). Chemical entrainment is produced mainly by olfaction. Pheromones,\(^\text{19}\) the molecules that carry chemical information signals, cause reactions in hormonal interactions (ibid.). So, we “feel the atmosphere” by smelling the pheromonal odours that produce hormonal changes consequently affecting our moods (ibid.). While chemical entrainment depends primarily on smell and touch detecting the molecules “literally in the air”, nervous entrainment relies on bodily movements, sight, touch and hearing (69-70). Brennan claims that images and sounds have a physical materiality related with vibrations and frequencies although they are social in origin. Rhythm of sounds and movements play a crucial role both in imitation and nervous entrainment. In that context, Brennan suggests that rhythmic movements (such as in dance) create a collective sense of unification, purpose and well-being (70). Defining transmission as the “horizontal” “line of the heart”, Brennan adds that she does not intend to reduce affects to hormones and pheromones because there can be other means of transmission as in the case of hypnosis (75-76).

\(^{19}\) Brennan mentions that pheromones are proven to exist in animals, which emit and communicate with the other members of their species via these “pollenlike chemicals” primarily for reproduction (Vroon cited in Brennan 2004: 69).
Anna Gibbs contends that affective contagion “leaps from body to body” “at the speed of a bushfire” as exemplified in mediatized consumer economy on a global scale (Gibbs 2010: 186). In Gibbs’ terminology, “mimetic communication” or mimesis is defined as a voluntary or involuntary corporeal imitation involving facial, visceral, somatic “synchrony, as a pervasive ‘sharing of form’” (187). As opposed to an essentialist theoretical framing of the individual as an organism and “finite totality”, she prefers a Spinozan-Deleuzian perspective according to which the subject is open to possibilities and change (ibid.). Gibbs also questions the Platonical approach of cognitive sciences that configures mimesis as copying, and regards the end result as fake and second rate in relation to the original. Imitation is referred as the domain of children, “primitive people” and animals (189). However, the desire to become someone or something else plays a crucial role in learning and play. Mimesis has numerous functions such as disguise, protection, sympathy, and deception. It also connotes asubjectivity and “the immediacy of what passes between bodies” while transforming bodies, vocabularies and movements (193). Gibbs understands mimicry “as a response to the other” and a form of communication rather than representation of the other (ibid.).

After referring to Tomkins’ understanding of contagion in response to facial expression, Gibbs adds that human face functions as a diagram, which facializes the images of “landscapes, houses, foods, animals, skin, and choreographed bodies” (Gibbs 2010: 191). Magazines and television uses facialization to represent various moods and manipulate a form of affective contagion. Following Massumi’s understanding of “mimesis as a movement”, Gibbs argues that contagion and mimesis “traverse the bodies” rather than belonging to the bodies (198). Furthermore, she touches on the fact that cognition and volition complicate the notions of entrainment and mimesis as they disrupt rhythms and synchrony: “Human beings are perhaps as likely to fall out as to fall in with someone else” (ibid.).

20 ‘Sharing of form’ (Condon cited in Gibbs: 2010: 187)
Starting from the “outside in” model of transmission in Tomkins, Brennan and Gibbs, Sara Ahmed emphasizes the contingency of affects which implies that affects are not transferred simply from one body to another (Ahmed 2010: 36). Drawing from Brennan’s statement that one’s perception is imbued by the affects one has while entering a room, Ahmed adds, “what we may feel depends on the angle of our arrival” and “the atmosphere is already angled; it is always felt from a specific point” (37). Therefore, the bodies are not neutral before the transmission of affects as their affective state influences their impression.

Secondly, for Ahmed, neither “outside in” nor “inside out” model is sufficient to explain feelings since “feelings are not about the inside getting out or the outside getting in” (Ahmed 2004: 101). Instead, feelings play a crucial part in the formation of boundaries between inside and outside. Ahmed suggests that these borders are made and unmade by feelings in the same way that we are connected and separated from others. She follows Julia Kristeva’s argument on the role of affect in the making of boundaries as exemplified in the discussion on abjection. Abject is disgusting not because it gets inside from outside, but rather due to the way it “turns us inside out as well as the outside in” (102). Like the skin on milk, the border transformed into an object is abject; at the same time, it is turned into an object because of disgust. In other words, according to Kristeva, borders must be threatened in order to be maintained (ibid.).

Ahmed extends this argument to the “skin of the community” and the relationship between the individual and the community (Ahmed 2004: 104). The skin of a community is formed as a result of alignment of subjects with or against others. Some people are given attributes and characteristics that are not inherent, nevertheless, position them apart from the others and create a boundary. Ahmed suggests: [I]t is through moving towards and away from others or objects that individual bodies become aligned with some others and against other others, a form of alignment that temporarily ‘surfaces’ as the skin of a community” (ibid.).
Giving Audre Lorde’s *Sister Outsider* as an example, Ahmed shows how the skin is experienced as a border where other’s “impression” is felt as a form of violence and negation (Ahmed 2004: 107). This border is created by the bodies “moving towards and away from others” (ibid.). Ahmed asserts that when they move towards each other, a possibility of contact opens in the community. On the contrary, affects stick on the bodies when others move away from them.

Lisa Blackman explores the historical antecedents of the work on affective transmission (including the spiritual, psychic and psychopathological experiences) and analyses writers such as William James, Gabriel Tarde and R.D. Laing (Blackman 2008b). Some of the 19th century writers were interested in the problem of suggestion that implied involuntary and non-conscious behaviours and demonstrated the permeability and openness of the subject in his/her relation with others. For instance, William James examined how the subject maintained unity even though one had anomalous experiences such as drug-induced states of altered consciousness, clairvoyance, medium trances, hypnosis, hallucinations, etc. Such experiences marked the porousness of the self while unity was a sign of the existence of multi-layered consciousness that was open to ruptures and cleavages (Blackman 2008b: 32, 34). In the 19th century, the relationship between the mother and her foetus was another area of study that was marked by the permeability between the self and the other. Blackman also refers to Gabriel Tarde’s work on invention and imitation as a form of suggestion. Tarde’s understanding of imitation was related to “hypnotic suggestibility” and an interest in crowd psychology (40). Some people in the society invent new ideas and influence others who follow and imitate them, but this process cannot be reduced to “mechanical copying” (38). Blackman draws attention to David Toews’s (2003) critical reading of Tarde. Accordingly, Tarde sees the subject as a node in a network and relationality, however, Toews claims, this subject is neither generic nor gender-free: “the limits of invention, and its relationship to imitation, were set by differences that were viewed as gendered, classed and raced lines” (42). Moreover, although repetition is an essential element of imitation, it is not a neutral term. The position of the subject as a node or his/her capacity to be
affected should not be thought without keeping in mind how some of these terms such as instinctual, emotional and involuntary were used to define the feminine, animal and the “primitive” (ibid.).

Blackman states that the theoreticians of affective transmission disregarded the concept of suggestion and turned to “the endocrinological system (Brennan, 2004), the neurophysiological (Connolly, 2002), the neuroscientific (Massumi, 2002) or the gastroenterological (Wilson, 2004)” “within a singular body” (Blackman 2008b: 36, 45). These approaches can be deterministic and can account for neither the subject’s position nor phenomena such as mimesis and suggestion. Instead, Blackman envisages the materiality of affects in relation with “psychological or psychic attunement” (Blackman 2012: 23). She argues that investigation of the psychic, spiritual and psychopathological case studies provides a way of examining transmission of affects and energetic connections without recourse to “the singular neuroendocrinological or neurophysiological body” (Blackman 2012: 103).

Blackman analyses 19th century models that were interested in the “threshold experiences” such as telepathy, suggestion, mediumship, and voice hearing (Blackman 2012: 23). These experiences were “trans-subjective, shared, collective, mediated” and challenged the notions of inside and outside, material and immaterial, self and the other (ibid.). “Mental touch” was regarded as the psychic energy that circulated between bodies that were activated like “lightening conductors” (51). Blackman suggests reconfiguring “spiritual communication” as “connections between the self and other, human and non-human, past and present and physical and ethereal” (120). “Threshold” experiences such as voice hearing imply “being both ‘one yet many’” and mark the vague boundary between inside and outside, material and immaterial, self and other (151).

Ann Game’s approach to attunement entails the relationship with animals (2001). She explains her connection with a horse questioning the distinction between humans and animals. Accordingly, we are both human and horse as a horse is
both horse and human (Game 2001: 1). The entrainment between a horse and a human is achieved when one lets “go of will and self-consciousness” and gets “carried along in the flow” (3). This is experienced in the non-linear time of the in-between.

Robert Seyfert implements a Spinozist understanding of affects emerging in an encounter to conceptualize the co-constitution of bodies, and then utilizes Jean-Marie Guyau’s concept of transmission (Seyfert 2012). Whether affect is located within a body; taken to be collective; or produced in an interaction, all of these three approaches don’t necessarily exclude each other. However, Seyfert claims, there is still an unresolved fundamental question about where affect begins (Seyfert 2012: 29). Criticizing Brennan’s notion of affective atmosphere that acts on the bodies for being deterministic and reducing the body to a passivity, Seyfert asks whether it is possible to account for the individual differences of reaction to affective atmospheres (29-30). He responds drawing attention to the necessity to consider “the active role of all the bodies that are present” (italic in the original, 30). Accordingly, fluidity of bodies in a continual flux, specificity of circumstances, temporal factors and individual differences should be considered to conceptualize affective and affected bodies (30-31). Neither the “atmosphere” is entirely separate from the bodies, nor the bodies are the sole sources of affects and their transmission. Affective transmission depends on the composition of bodies. Seyfert conceives mutually affecting and affected bodies in relation to “the particular channels, frequencies, timbres and tonalities” with an infinite range relying on the bodies involved in an encounter and “their specific historical and cultural sensibilities and capabilities” (35).

Seyfert finds the 19th century thinker, Jean-Marie Guyau’s work (1887) useful to understand affects and transmission. Guyau is interested in the nature of “the inter-passage, the in-between” when the bodies interact (italic in the original, Seyfert 2012: 37). For Guyau, transmission occurs in the in-between rather than in the participants of an encounter or in the atmosphere. The etymological origins of sympathy in Greek is “[s]yn(chronized) pathos” and means “being co-affected”
and “interact[ing] within the same affective frequency” (italic in the original, 27). Proceeding on this track, Seyfert, connects sympathy with suggestion, imitation and artistic creativity. Sympathy may involve feeling the other’s pain simultaneously. Guyau calls this “sympathetic vibrations” or “suggestions and mutual obligations” (Guyau cited in Seyfert 2012: 39). Seyfert compares these notions with the concept of quantum entanglement in physics that theorizes interactions at a distance (39), which he subsequently relates to empathy and compassion.

Lastly, I will trace Erin Manning’s treatment of affects and relationality. Manning sees relation as a major part of experience that emerges beyond the human, objects and the senses (Manning 2013: 12). A relation is not the interaction between two selves who have clear boundaries between inside and outside where the skin is the limit enveloping body and self. Instead, it is the relationality that constitutes the body in its individuation and becoming beyond any categorization and form. The porousness of skin is the potential for “multiplicity of insides and outsides” (2). The body is conceived as “an assemblage” constantly moving, sensing, becoming, “reaching toward”, “feeling-with”, and “sensing-with” in a relation “opened up for experience in the making” (ibid.).

Referring to Isabelle Stengers’ concept of “ecology of practices”, Manning calls the body “an ecology of processes” and “a node of relational process” connected to its environment of which it is part (Manning 2013: 19). This milieu or the relational field is not a neutral vacuum or a space. It is constituted by affective attunement. “Affect activates the very connectibility of experience. It is the force, the lure, through which a certain constellation comes to expression” (26). Different affects are registered by different bodies, however, affects are already there as a force before choosing an individual. Affects are both collective and preindividual instead of being located in an individual body. Body itself is collective and “active in the relational interweaving of (…) more than one ecology in the making” (27). Hence, Manning, following Deleuze and Simondon, writes about individuation rather than individual as she replaces subject with collectivity.
Body is seen as “transindividuation” (before the subject) and “associated milieu” rather than form or Being (30).

2.2 In Conversation with a Dance Community

2.2.1 Çatı: A Community of Independent Dancers in Istanbul

Çatı\textsuperscript{21} resembles a long haiku to which a new sentence is added everyday. (A.)

Çatı is a community of touch and breathing. The body remembers the movements that were acquired over time as a result of dance practice, but also others’ movement vocabularies, smell, weight, and touch. In some contact improvisation exercises we breathe and move together as if an organic structure or a new animal is created as our breaths roll together. I remember the tears and laughter, singing and screams, but more, the silence and the intimate distance during the days and years of dancing, improvising. I remember the affects that accompanied the movements; the body often remembers the unnameable.

This chapter is open-ended by its nature because I write about a dance community and a studio both of which have been changing during the process of my writing. I don’t consider the time of thinking and writing on art works to be stagnant or fixed either, and writing on performance and dance has already been problematized in my literature review. On the other hand, in the case of Çatı, the studio has burned down, moved twice, the core volunteer team of Çatı changed, and above all, new movements and dances are taking place there everyday while new people are joining in. My text here should therefore remain open to additional sections until the dance community disperses and the studio loses its function. Çatı itself is the flow of diverse intensities and acts, rather than a complete structure, so was the writing process. On the other hand, the text reflects on the dancing experiences a group of friends with whom I made interviews. Therefore, while their voices accompany mine, many other voices could not be

\textsuperscript{21}Çatı is pronounced as chatuh, phonetically /tʃatɯ/ and means “roof” in Turkish. It is Contemporary Dance Artists Association in Istanbul.
included. Yet, in my view, the presence of all the other people that danced there has influenced not only this text, but also every one of us at Çatı.

At times, I wrote about Çatı as if it was a being in-itself, probably because I haven’t danced or moved during my thinking and writing process, and I recalled a general mood that framed the experiences of the past whereas there have also been times when the senses, affects and movements of the past were literally present as if I was in a time travel in which the past wasn’t the same anymore. During our long conversations on Çatı with friends, I believe that we have been recreating our past, transforming our experiences and reconfiguring the dancing community.

Çatı, Contemporary Dance Artists Association is a non-profit and independent dance studio that provides classes for artists, students, professionals, and anyone interested in movement from all kinds of backgrounds. It was founded in 1996 by a group of dancers (Mustafa Kaplan, Sevi Algan, Filiz Sızanlı, Talin Büyükkürkcüyan, Ömer Uysal, Ayşe Orhon, Gurur Ertem, Aydın Silier, Özlem Alkış, İrem Çalışmuş, and Aytül Hasaltun) who used to dance at TAL studio (Theatre Research Laboratory) at City Theatres thanks to the support of Beklan Algan and Ayla Algan, two actors who established TAL. As the number of people joining the classes increased, this core group of about ten people found a studio place in Sadri Alışık Street, Istiklal Avenue, No 33, Taksim in 2001. A nineteenth century building housed Çatı between 2001 and 2011 until it was destroyed by fire. In this period, evening classes and several international workshops (Loïc Touzé, Mark Tompkins, Johannes Birringer, Alain Michard, Daniel Lepkoff, Tetsuro Fukuwara, Frans Custers, Sabine Jamet, Yanaël Plumet, Iida Shigemi, etc.) were conducted at Çatı. It also supported a public art project (Elim Sende), dance projects (Sek Sek, Solum, Yarın Oynadı Bile), and an international movement/dance project (Hareket!).

---

22 Due to the expulsion of many artists for political reasons at City Theatres since 2012, TAL is no longer supported by Istanbul Municipality. It shared the same studio with Çatı between 2012-2016.
When we first found the place, we didn’t name it for a while. Earlier, it was used as an art studio. We restored it collectively (...) the studio had corrugated roof panels through which you could see the sky and it used to get very cold. The idea of making a collective performance named “Çatı” (roof) to repair the roof came up and it was realized by Zeynep Tanbay, Aydın Teker, Serap Meriç, Martin Sonderkamp, Naoko Nashiro, Frederic Cornet, and Mustafa Kaplan at the French Cultural Institute. We had the roof renovated; hence the name Çatı was kept. (B.)

Çatı wasn’t founded on commercial or personal interests; it was rather sustained by the voluntary collaboration of people. (...) The motivation was the awareness and the reintroduction of the body. (...) Outside the hierarchical model of human relations and commercial purposes, [Çatı] has given an opportunity to the people interested in dance. (D.)

Dozens of people [dancers, choreographers, performers, etc.] came to Çatı to teach. It is normally impossible to afford such a rich program. When they came to Istanbul, simply googling “contemporary dance in Istanbul”, they found Çatı and met us. We used to ask them if they would like to do a workshop here and they were generally willing to do one. (...) In these workshops the participants were mainly anybody that attended the Çatı workshops rather than professional dancers or dance students. Such choreographers would usually conduct these workshops in dance festivals for the professional dancers who send a proposal letter and pay 200-300 euros. (...) We realized so many workshops without planning ahead. I used to prepare the Çatı programs weekly. (C.)

It has been a community and a cooperation of people that feel passionate about dance and bring their knowledge of their own fields of interest. The independent projects are realized without any support from the state. It provides a rehearsal space outside the dance conservatories and you meet different artists there. (E.)
I was distressed and wanted to move to another country. Then I came across Çatı. The most significant reason for me to stay here was the multi-cultural, generous, non-profit and friendly atmosphere of Çatı. (F.)

The founding principle of Çatı was that anyone who learns something new mostly abroad at a school or a workshop would share his/her experiences with anyone joining the classes. This made Çatı a unique sharing platform to learn about dance, movement and body in Turkey. The dancers that gave courses in the evenings did not receive any money. Each evening a gift was offered from one member of Çatı to the others. Although any member could share his/her knowledge with others when the time comes, there was no obligation to return it. Lewis Hyde says, “the gift must always move” (2007: 4). Instead of returning the gift, it is better to give it to a new party. Hyde thinks that returning the gift creates a line whereas the gift must circulate (2007: 11). At Çatı, no one discussed who gave what, and instead the gift simply passed to the group members.

We continued the practice of teaching each other and sharing experiences that began at TAL (Theatre Research Laboratory at City Theatres of Istanbul Municipality). Our basic need was coming together. [Çatı] wouldn’t be a school. It was a matter of what we can do together, how we can touch each other, how we can be close… It was an embracing family atmosphere like the one created by Beklan Algan and Ayla Algan at the City Theatres. They always supported us during this process. (…) We invite people in order to share experiences. It is an exchange: they give us something and so do we. It has been important for me to keep this exchange active. (B.)

Still today any knowledge about the body and the movement practices is shared among equals within a non-hierarchical system. Being outside the academia, even though the group includes individuals who are or have been members of various academic institutions, Çatı sets a distinct example of teaching relationships among the attendants. The instructors teach anyone who joins a class on any particular evening. There is no set profile of the members apart from the desire to dance.
Anyone can be either in the teaching or participant position depending on who wants to share his/her knowledge or lead the class. Instruction is done in a manner of sharing one’s knowledge of the body with the participation of each individual in the process. Jacques Rancière refers to the “ignorant schoolmaster” described by Joseph Jacotot, who claimed that “one ignoramus could teach another what he himself did not know, asserting the equality of intelligence and opposing intellectual emancipation to popular instruction” (Rancière 2009: 1). Opposing the practice of stultification in which the teacher asserts the pupil’s ignorance and inequality, Jacotot quoted by Rancière, suggests the equality of intelligence and intellectual emancipation. A teacher can even teach what he/she doesn’t know. The instructors / facilitators leading the classes at Çatı don’t claim any superiority or mastery since each experience is equally valuable as people dance among equals participating in the time of dance. Each body has different physical capabilities and diverse affective experiences, which are merged with creative and interpretative processes. No one needs to feel incapable when one can’t do a choreographic phrase, as any version is acceptable and each can interpret the dance sentences in his/her own way. Both the Çatı instructors and the attendants translate their experiences into movements. “He does not teach his pupils his knowledge, but orders them to venture into the forest of things and signs, to say what they have seen and what they think of what they have seen, to verify it and have it verified” (Rancière 2009: 11). As Rancière explains, the student doesn’t learn the instructor’s knowledge (2009: 14). Rather, each attendant has equal capacity to translate his/her physical and affective experience into his/her dance sentences.

Everyone shared his/her experiences at Çatı. When the instructor of the class told us to lift our leg, he/she wanted to transfer a method. (...) The instructors would come earlier, open the door and welcome the participants. [F. opposed his experiences at Çati to the didactic movement practices based on a belief system in which the structured knowledge and regulations block the dancer’s experiences while the instructor has an attitude of a guru.] (...) All these were practiced without assuming an affected attitude as if we were involved in a very important
experience, on the contrary, with ease as if it was the natural flow of things. (...) Just the usual flow... There was no distinction between the levels as beginner, advanced, etc. since it wasn’t a dance course either. (F.)

Ayse Orhon and Sevi Algan went to Europe [for dance education]. Whenever they came to Istanbul, they taught us everything they learned there. So we were instructing each other. Anyone that learned something new would share it with us. It was a way of collective learning. (B.)

The Çatı team asserted that they weren’t training anyone, but rather they provided the transference [of dance practices]. After I returned from ImPulseTanz [Vienna International Dance Festival] in 2008, I wanted to give a course at Çatı and Çatı team accepted it. (...) The members of the classes kept changing and that was a challenge. (E.)

The participants paid a yearly membership fee (which used to be 60 TL=15 GBP for many years until about 2012) to attend the evening classes and the fee for the workshops was generally a symbolic small amount as a contribution to the plane ticket and the living expenses of the guest choreographers. Since 2012, members have to pay monthly membership fees in order to pay the rent and other expenses. In my interviews some of the former members mentioned the discomfort and disenchantment this situation created when they were asked whether they paid or not upon arrival or at the end of the classes. Monthly fee was a necessity for the continuation of Çatı in today’s Istanbul. The former conditions were specific to a time period in the history of Beyoğlu district of Istanbul where many other artist initiatives, small theatres and cinemas could survive. After the fire, between the winter and the summer of 2012, Çatı was “mobile” as workshops took place in various places that opened their doors. Çatı still provides a unique space for performance, dance and improvisation in the city without any funding from any institutions or companies.
Before I move on, I want to briefly note on the historical specificity of the district Çatı was situated in the 2000s. Beyoğlu/Taksim area has been the centre for arts and entertainment since the Ottoman times; however, it underwent a sharp decline after the Gezi Protests due to gentrification, the violence and the continuous presence of riot police, and the bombing in Istiklal Street (2016) besides other reasons. In the first decade of the 2000s, artists could still exist in the centre of the city until the gentrification became more rapid and ruthless after the Gezi Movement that began in Taksim Square as a collective demand for the right to the city. Though it falls outside my research area, the dispossession of the cultural and collective memory within the urban transformation undertaken by the government and the major companies forms a violent background to my writing on Çatı. To give an idea about the neighbourhood in the 2000s, I quote my interviewees:

_We attended several performances mainly in Beyoğlu and we may not have such a chance anymore in the near future as the quarter is converted into a touristic attraction centre. Istanbul shouldn’t stab a dagger in Beyoğlu. Gezi (Movement) didn’t allow that happen in Taksim Square. (...) We began dancing in Rumeli Han. We have already lost Rumeli Han. Then we continued at Istanbul Cultural Centre, which was evacuated as part of Tarlabası project. (...) Atatürk Cultural Centre has been shut down. Istanbulites had a say only at Gezi. (...) Our performances in the streets (of Beyoğlu) were liberating both for us and the performance art enclosed in the studios and limited to the stage. Beyoğlu paved the way for the artistic environment for such practices, however, the present condition is agonizing._ (G.)

_Sadri Alışık was a busy street where all kinds of people co-existed. Rich, poor, bohemians, transgenders, workers, bartenders... There was a relaxed and free atmosphere. The present tension in the streets and the people didn’t exist then._ (H.)

The present studio is situated in Tophane, which is also in Beyoğlu and still close to Istiklal Street, yet has been different historically. Although it is also undergoing
gentrification, it still has a population composed of conservative immigrants from the rural areas and Roma people besides expats and artists.\(^{23}\)

### 2.2.2 Relationality and Attunement

Çatı provides not only a space for dancing, but also time and space for encounters. An encounter does not merely entail meeting people, dancing together and forming friendships. I am also interested in what happens in an encounter and how the moving bodies are affected. As soon as one enters the studio, a wave of sensations and affects might be overwhelming at times. These would never be the same before and after an evening of dance and movement with others. Something radiates there or a process is triggered between the bodies. In this context, concepts like affective transmission, entrainment, and attunement become relevant in order to understand the corporeal dimension of what happens when one is dancing with others. Reflecting on my own experiences and observations and also examining what surfaced in the interviews realized in a specific time period with a small group of people, I can question both the empirical status of this contagious “something” and its spread to individuals in the same way. Teresa Brennan (2004) who writes affirmatively on affect and its transmission is also suspicious that everyone can be swept by the same affective wave and she explains the exceptions in terms of individual differences. Sara Ahmed (2004) furthers this line of thought and adds that each person has a different relation to the same affect. Probably, depending on my own angle of arrival (Brennan 2004, Ahmed 2010), at times I could sense the affective pulls and pushes or energetic forces between the bodies, some of which resisted the general mood; or at other times, I myself could be an “affect alien” (Ahmed 2010). On rare occasions, other members of a group can make a person feel like an alien by their looks and gestures. The transmission of affects is one of the themes to be discussed here,

\(^{23}\) Since 2008, several art galleries have been opened in Tophane. In 2010, two galleries were attacked by the locals of Tophane. Gallery visitors drinking alcohol in the street during the opening nights was mentioned as the main reason. Both galleries moved to other venues in Beyoğlu. To explore the complex history and present of this neighbourhood is beyond the scope of this thesis.
however, what happens while dancing together is beyond the questions regarding
the contagious nature of affects.

The relationality that is created with each step and every new movement
especially during improvisations opens the bodies beyond their habituality. A
different connection with one’s own and the others’ bodies is facilitated when the
habitual forms of perception and thinking are transformed. As Erin Manning says,
“[w]hen we are no longer still, the world lives differently” (Manning 2009: 15).
Encounters in a dance never have predictable outcomes. Sometimes, one can be
immersed in this relationality and become attuned with others, human and
nonhuman. A surprise whilst dancing may induce an individual to question what
he/she thought he/she knew, or simply to enjoy the surprise that a moment of
dancing together brings about. Moreover, a surprise may shift the time and space,
and reshape the quotidian relationships of individuals.

In an encounter, affects can be produced “through a hormonal flux, body
language, shared rhythms, and other forms of entrainment” mostly beyond our
cognition (Thrift 2008: 236). Nigel Thrift claims, conceiving affects as “flows
moving through the bodies” reframes the body as a receiver and transmitter
instead of centres and originators (ibid.). The bodies aren’t separate entities, but
rather affected by the social interaction and connected to other bodies via touch,
smell, kinaesthetic mirroring, and something in the air. Brennan defines
entrainment as the process of transmission, which brings the nervous and
hormonal systems into alignment with each other (Brennan 2004: 9). Chemical
entrainment is produced by pheromones, the molecules that are excreted by an
organism to trigger a reaction in the other members of the species. The
pheromones can be related to sex, alarm, food trail, etc. in animals and to
hormonal interaction and sex in humans. They are transmitted through smell,
touch and taste, and influence the mood of the people (Thrift 2003, 2008; Brennan
2004). The scientific overview of the pheromones is beyond the scope of my
research, however, I find it quite interesting that it provides an explanation about
“something” in the air that we feel when we enter the studio at Çatı. At the
beginning of her book on the transmission of affects, Brennan refers to the atmosphere we feel in the room and explicates how people get connected even in the absence of speech or visual signal (Brennan 2004: 1, 9). Brennan proposes that the “atmosphere” penetrates into the individual as the biochemistry and neurology of the subject changes with the transmission of affect (Brennan 2004: 1). Besides the opening up of the senses as referred by my interviewees from Çatı, the heart, intestines, and stomach are also somehow affected. For Brennan, individuals in a group emit emotions and then, they are affected by “this new composite” of emotions in the air, which plays a part in the group psychology (Brennan 2004: 51).

Dancing, particularly improvisation, may involve movement for the sake of movement without any metaphorical or affective layer attached to it, but at the same time, it is an expression, and may be an expression of affects beyond cognition. One can dance and concurrently experience one or many affects, which keep being transformed with the presence of the others and with each move toward difference. Transmission, then, is a process made up of many flows of changing affects in interaction with each other, including the resistances to certain flows.

Furthermore, the affective transmission can be between human and nonhuman bodies as mentioned by Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth (2010: 1). The intensities that influence and lead the body to act can be related to “becoming” in a Deleuzian sense and to a plural existence that entails plants, animals and inanimate objects. A.’s dance and singing with the wall is an example of this kind of plurality or becoming the inorganic matter:

*During an exercise for a brief choreography, we focused on textures and worked on movements originated by a texture. I experimented with the wall and became*

24 The extreme example of this was the unbearable nausea I had felt before I saw that the Çatı building was on fire. Not being a scientist, my curiosity is at the level of observation without attributing any metaphysical value to it.
the wall. Then suddenly my wall was alive. A feeling of awakening... I sang a melody that generated an opening as if a door opened in the wall. (A)

Another aspect of affective transmission is the nervous entrainment, a consequence of movements, gestures, and rhythms, which generate affective exchanges between people (Brennan 2004: 70). Rhythmic movements realized in sync by a group engender a feeling of communality. William McNeill refers to a “sense of pervasive well-being”, “a strange sense of personal enlargement; a sort of swelling out, becoming bigger than life” which are experienced during a collective ritual (McNeill 1995: 2). The synchronic and rhythmical movements of the people that gather in ritualistic practices, army drill, dance and festivals produce a collective affective experience and a sense of togetherness. “Muscular bonding” that is created by moving rhythmically in sync has an emotional influence and functions as a binding element in the formation of the group (ibid.).

The daily dance practices at Çatı have a power to create such a bonding through movement. This can be exemplified with an exercise in which a person lies on top of another and pays attention to the other’s body. Generally two people begin breathing in sync. In that experience, the borders of each body melt and two bodies form a breathing organism. In another contact improvisation exercise, breathing and rolling together, one can become part of a breathing being made up of many bodies.

Drawing from Daniel Stern, Brian Massumi writes about attunement in the context of the mother and child relationship in which the child is not a passive receiver of the parent’s attention, but is placed in a shared relationality and “an orchestration of movements between their bodies” (Massumi: 2011: 111-112). Attunement is their participation in the same event, which has an “affective tonality” (113). Although the child learns to separate itself from the parent, each

25 I will elaborate on McNeill’s arguments on dancing together rhythmically and the “muscular bonding” in the next chapter.
encounter in life at every age may form affective attunement in a similar way. Attunement does not indicate feeling the same thing, but experiencing the affective tonality activated by the shared event. In that sense, each body is “a self-archiving of a universe of felt relation” (Massumi 2011: 116). Erin Manning (2007) also utilizes Stern’s account of a mother-child relationship wherein experience takes place in the relation, which exceeds both participants without distributing them as passive and active. Attunement is a form of tuning-with, which leads to new possibilities of relation.

Sharing similar interests with Manning and Massumi, Bernd Bösel (2014) turns to Daniel Stern in order to theorize the interpersonal synchronization. Accordingly, the synchronization process is based on “diachronicity, on an interaction that takes time and has a certain rhythm” which can be disrupted when the participants do not share the same rhythm anymore (Bösel 2014: 91). Affect attunement or affective synchronization is defined as “an effect of diachronous interactions of a certain quality” (92). Bösel utilizes Stern’s notion of vitality affects to conceptualize the “background affect” or a certain mood shared by the participants (ibid.). These affects do not need to be “categorical affects” which can be classified as distinct affects such as joy, sadness, fear, etc. as the name suggests. Yet, through rhythmic entrainment, a feeling of solidarity is generated, as it will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.

Rhythm is an evident element of dance in general. In a contemporary dance studio, it can be observed particularly in the choreographic and technique classes in addition to various exercises practiced together before improvisation classes. Dancing together generates the rhythmic entrainment of physiological processes including hormonal and neurological changes parallel to the physical and creative activities. Rhythm prepares the body gradually to a sense of togetherness or being-with, that can lead to solidarity and formation of a community albeit temporarily. Moreover, there is also a rhythm in the regularity of meeting to dance together, which contributes to the community bonding.
In what follows, I will pick up Manning’s and Massumi’s notion of “dance of attention” although they don’t connote dance in its literal meaning necessarily and give the example of the attentive perception of autists (Manning and Massumi 2013). The reason I am interested in this concept is that it is reminiscent of the soft attention of the dancing bodies, which I will clarify as I go along and refer to Manning’s other writings. The dance of attention is “an environmental mode of awareness”, however, it does not mean to pay attention to the environment in a one-way, subject-object or human-non-human relation (Manning and Massumi 2013: 78). Manning and Massumi claim that it is attention with, toward, in and around rather than attention to. Therefore, it is an immersive and immediate “experience in the making” in which the borders of body and its milieu and the boundaries of imagination and experience are blurred (75, 77). In addition to the autists’ integral experience to exemplify the “co-compositional engagement with the associated milieu of emergent relation”, Manning and Massumi describe rushing through the crowd as another example of dance of attention (78, 82). When one rushes through the crowd in rush hour, one is attentive of the openings between the bodies rather than paying attention to each body one encounters. In the flow of people, openings appear and disappear as one moves in relation to the crowd and openings in motion. To be able to move along with the ease of dance of attention, one needs to switch to the peripheral vision and soften one’s focus (83).

There are various dance exercises in which the teacher asks the dancers to soften their foci and be aware of their peripheral visions.\(^{26}\) As the dancers walk in a studio, they must be aware of the environment, not focusing on the studio space or other people around them, but move with/in a presence open to all of these elements. This means walking with a specific awareness of the others and the environment. Occasionally, this attentiveness can be natural when people improvise together as they co-create an improvised choreography in which the

\(^{26}\) Aydn Teker, in her workshop I had the chance to attend in May 2016, referred to seeing with a peripheral vision and soft focus “as if the eyes are resting in an armchair”.

boundaries between one’s own movements and the others’, one’s own speed and the others’ become vague in a flow. This flow disintegrates the borders between experience and imagination in a creative becoming. However, not all improvisation experiences are similar. In many of them, one may be inclined to shut oneself off from the experiences of the others and focus mainly on one’s own movements and flow, even closing one’s eyes to be able to delve into one’s own possibilities. Nonetheless, if these people immersed in their own dances with eyes shut are observed from outside, it is not rare to see similarities in the movements and the affective qualities of their improvisations probably due to the contagious mood that contribute to their generation.

Writing on creativity, Manning suggests that “creative advance” is different from novelty or “the newest new” in a capitalist sense. Rather, it is “the capacity of an event to activate certain vectors” and produce difference (Manning 2013: 24). Improvisation contributes to the creation of new milieus of relationality. Like creativity, improvisation is not about dancing the newest form never danced before, but dancing while outdoing the form (38) and going beyond one’s habitual movements. Citing Deleuze’s expression “beyond our experiences”, Manning remarks, “[w]hen we move beyond our own experience, when we get disoriented in the sound of the in-between, it is the movement that takes over” (83). This is not realized by exerting one’s will to move this or that way in order to impose a form. In this context, Manning reframes “the dance of attention” as the protopolitical potential. She configures the political in relation to the collective invention of the not-yet and the community to come (200).

The relational movement that Manning (2009) writes about requires at least two bodies moving together connected with each other. This connection does not have to be as literal as in contact improvisation because it is also possible to “shape-shift at a distance” (Manning 2009: 14). Shape-shifting is the continuous expression of the dancers inventing movements. Proprioception, which is the feeling of the position and motion of our bodies, help the flow of moving together, furthermore, awareness of and connecting to the other is crucial to
make/share the space together. When we lose connection and dance in the space negligent of others, we may simply step on the other’s foot. Our connection co-constitutes the rhythm. Rhythm is not moving rhythmically with or without music in this context. The rhythm created by dancing together is not exempt from an affective mode. Manning explains how improvisation has contingencies and surprises, partly due to its affective tone that keeps changing. Therefore, “[r]elation cannot be foretold: it must be experienced” (Manning 2009: 41). Borrowing from Spinoza, Manning proposes that conatus is “a way of creating a more-than”, moving beyond the expectations of what a body can do, and eventually initiating a different experience (42). Relational movement or dance forms a “we”, or a collective that is preindividual, Manning argues, rather than being a group of individuals (22). The relational or solo dance shifts our approach to the conceptual dichotomies such as man and woman, body and mind, human and nonhuman, etc.

D.’s quote below can be directly linked to the displacement and challenging of dichotomies by the moving bodies:

_The flow of being with in the first phases of childhood, which arouses curiosity, yet doesn’t allude to personal desires. In the society that I have evolved in or passed through, men and women are set at odds with each other as if the bodies were antagonistic. (…) The flow and flexibility of being with, the evolution and the flexibility of feelings and thoughts as a result of mind-body tuning… (D.)_

D. explains that one recovers the childlike joy and flow of being-with while dancing together. Dancing-with disrupts the dichotomies that locate the bodies in opposition to each other always in comparison and in a negative relation. The mind-body awareness effectuates the ease in thinking, feeling and moving with the others. This awareness can be understood in terms of attending to and sensing with the other.
In a similar way, A.’s parallelism between one’s relationship with one’s body and the other’s indicates the affective space and configures the body in its relationality. The way one feels creates an affective impact on another. Not only our affective mood, but also the way we envisage our own bodies has an effect on both the other individuals and the composition of our relation with them.

*Everything that you feel with your body has an impact on the other worlds. One’s relationship with the body is not only the connection with the flesh, but also the relationship with the other and the other’s body and all that you feel due to that… (A.)*

F. describes the relationality of the dancing bodies in terms of a dialogue with a person whom one might have encountered for the first time. This dialogue is possible when one tunes in to listen to the other. Each body has to open the space for the other in order to create a flow of fleeting touches in contact improvisation.

*We have experienced the relationship with the other bodies during contact improvisation (...) flying, carrying, encounters... in contact improvisation you would have corporeal dialogues with someone that you may not have met before without any restrictions. (...) After you learn contact improvisation, you begin to listen to the others. (F.)*

In contact improvisation, the most intimate “shape-shifting” of moving bodies can flow only when the dancers leave space and time for each other’s space and time. As one mo(ve)ment follows the other, two or more bodies create and unmake forms continuously. The close distance requires a crucial awareness of the other dancers so as not to risk harming their bodies and invade their space and time. Composing and decomposing, uniting and separating, the connection is possible in a dance of attention with the other. When the physical proximity of the bodies presents challenging moments in which one is stuck for a few seconds, either stillness, the facilitating next move of the other, or a movement that one has never tried before emerges as a solution so that one can resume the rhythmic connection.
with the other body or bodies. Following Manning, we can see such moments as
the collective invention of experiences beyond habitual relations.

Listening is an act; it is not being a passive recipient. A. refers to listening to the
others and forming a dialogue while dancing together:

_When I dance with someone, I feel like I know that person without speaking with
him/her. (...) We can have a non-verbal dialogue even better than a verbal one. It
is not a literal meeting of minds in which you feel and think the same things. It is a
meaningful dialogue of the bodies in a deeper level. To get to know someone
through moving together induces pleasant relations with people in everyday life._
(A.)

These new dialogues and experiences are not isolated in the studio, instead they
reshape our relationality with the world on an everyday level.

The relationality of bodies “shape-shift” in a dance of attention as individuals
open up to the sensing-with and tuning-with:

_To lift your arm because the music dictates it is thoroughly different from
presenting and sharing your own being and the being of your arm in the space.
All takes place in the brain, but still it is a form of sharing, communication and
feeling good with each other. Like the butterfly effect of time... (C.)_

The rhythm is not produced by music or moving rhythmically, but it is the
synchronicity of shared experience in which each move such as lifting one’s arm
has an impact on the minute details and the overall relationality of movements.
Moving, dropping an arm, turning, taking a step, all participate in the experience
simultaneously. C. highlights how the moment of shared creation can cause
unpredicted results in time.
In a shared creative experience, the boundaries between the individuals are at stake when the borders between the body and its milieu or imagination and experience become obscure as Manning and Massumi say in reference to the dance of attention.

*During an exercise in which you stand facing a person and explore the face of the other in details, (...) I felt that I was that person. There was no difference. Rather than simply observing the other’s features, I might have been lost in the other. (...) To be able to perceive and listen to the others in the space, to be able to act together... (...) You can’t act disregarding others. On the contrary, you make meaning with them. (A.)*

Although the context of this exercise is not clear, focusing on the other’s face can be a way of studying the details of the features and the traces of gestures and expressions like a map of another life without the additional metaphorical and metaphysical layers. One can observe the affects that surface on the face in that moment; then, meet the eyes where all the meaning happens, the meaning projected onto the observer. To compare face to a map is a reference to the traces of the past. The face is a process, and always mobile no matter how still it may seem. Concurrently, the other is also observing the face of the onlooker. In fact, I use “the other” for the sake of its place in the language structure to refer to a location in our imagination in order to situate the two dancers facing each other. Here, the other does not refer to a difference that the self positions oneself against because both figures, both faces exist as part of an ecology on a horizontal line. Neither of the two is the source of meaning projected on the other although there is no possibility of being in the other’s shoes and dispensing with one’s limited perceptions and hormonal and neural compositions. Each person also observes the other observing him/herself. Or, maybe as in the case of A.’s experience, after awhile, the act cannot be called observation as one gets immersed in the infinitesimal details of a face.
At the beginning of such an exercise, one may smile and look into the eyes of the other looking at oneself first as a gentle salute at the beginning of an encounter, then each smile or giggling can be an escape from the depth one is facing. I am aware that I cannot escape metaphors. It is possible to call it a life. Smiling is only possible in the presence of the other. Subsequently, a threshold can be passed from watching the other watching oneself to the intermingling gazes of the two people who cannot differentiate the boundaries between the self and the other. In this particular incident described by A., we do not know what the second dancer experienced. After most of the exercises with a partner, it is quite common to share experiences and exchange ideas with one’s partner. Personally, I generally find these moments of endeavour to put the corporeal experience into words very hard, and even harder if that experience has an emotional content. This is not only due to the difficulty of sharing intimate personal details, but also because of the unnameable, uncapturable and volatile nature of the affective site in-between. Frequently, the intensity of the corporeal experience is beyond the reach of one’s words. Nevertheless, the body remembers it while repeating always with a difference.

To go back to A.’s experience, to lose one’s sense of boundaries to become the other is not a transcendental experience, but to cleave the self and body open beyond one’s experiences. However, the point is not the erasure of one’s sense of self and the other, it is more about listening to the other, opening a space for the other and to dance with this awareness. In a way, it is not a matter of inside and outside, but the in-between in constant flux. Just before I move on, I want to add that when I use words such as “open” and “cleave” like in the sentence above, at times beyond my intentions, it sounds like presuming something –self, body- to be closed or enveloped. As writing on the other’s words about her experience, I can only interpret them and then, continue further interpreting my own interpretations. That is why originally I wanted to keep the interview quotes as a separate flow in my text without commenting on them. Still and all, writing is a dialogue anyhow.
We are limited with verbal narration. During the workshop we had on Mount Ida, the corporeal contact with a tree and dancing in relation to it were challenging for me due to my understanding of what a tree is whereas a child identifies with an object and creates a dialogue with it. The so-called lost and withheld shamanic experience... The human centred perspective that objectifies everything else limits our relationship with the world. In contrast, on Mount Ida, I realized that one could be unified with a cat, grass, breeze, etc. easily. (D.)

D. refers to the challenges of dancing with a tree beyond the habitual relation with the nonhuman limited with language. He is reminded of a child’s relation with the world in which object identification entails both mimicry and a desire to connect with things and the environment. In this relationship, besides the obvious aliveness of the tree, inorganic matter can be animated, too. In this ecology, it is possible to leave the human perspective and become a tree, “a cat, grass, breeze, etc. easily”. In D.’s case it is reminiscent of the Shamanic experience of being unified with them. It also resembles the experience of attunement between a horse and Ann Game who describes it in spiritual terms derived from Buddhism (Blackman 2008b: 9). Accordingly, one can cultivate a kind of sensitivity that connects one with all kinds of beings (ibid.). D. relates it to the Shamanic experience that can be ecstatic as opposed to Game’s reference to the meditative state in Buddhism. Both states are marked by openness to sensing with and all around leaving one’s self-contained and self-enclosed position.

These moments of intensity can be felt as unnameable moments of jouissance or bliss. Conversely, they can be experienced in the form of a shock or a surprise arising in an encounter:

In one of the workshops of Yanaël Plunet, as we were working with eyes closed, - I think we were imagining that we were in another place- I was accompanied with a person and walking in the studio with eyes shut. Then I came into contact with

27 D. uses the word “hemhal” which means “in the same state or condition” or “a fellow sufferer” with a mystical Sufi connotation. I have translated it as “to be unified”.

116
someone else and felt as if I collided with a different dimension. (…) Imagine colliding into another space and time. It is quite startling. After my father’s death, I experienced the meaninglessness of the world for a period. So many things we are unaware of… Such encounters are stupendous. (A.)

An encounter is also the meeting of different temporalities and rhythms. In the quote above, in my view, it is not the eyes being closed that creates the shock of a collision which is in reality a physical touch rather than bumping into each other with all one’s momentum since one is accompanied and taken care of by one’s partner during such experiments. Imagination of being somewhere else may temporarily parenthesize one’s presence in the studio at least in terms of one’s connection with the other couples experimenting with this idea. However, during such exercises practiced with eyes shut, one’s partner is one’s very intimate connection on whom one relies so that the mover with closed eyes is not risking the safety of his/herself and others’. So the collision described above may have occurred due to the loss of connection. Moreover, the encounter that has the effect of a clash with another dimension is felt like the collusion of two worlds imagined by two people. In that sense, it can be a description of any encounter in our daily lives. While experimenting with a different practice on which one is more focused than everyday experiences, the encounter gains intensity reminiscent of the pivotal times when one reflects on the meaning of life. A. compares her experience of shock at the moment of encounter to the shock of her father’s death. Just like the loss of the beloved changes the colour of the world, meeting someone in a movement exercise might generate a powerful rupture in one’s time and perception. The ripples of such experiments extend further than our daily encounters.

G.’s shock came literally as a slap on the face:

[During an improvisation at Emmanuelle Huynh’s workshop] I encountered someone there, X. (…) It wasn’t a flow with partners. While we were improvising independently, I was struck by X.’s sudden slap in the face. Involuntarily, I
responded with a slap. All happened in a flash and then we separated. It was so natural and acceptable that there was no need to question it. Why X., why slapping... (G.)

I assume that the possibility and acceptance of such a forceful act itself was the surprising element as the bodies continued dancing after the event. (I must note that I did not talk to X. about how he experienced this particular moment and how and why this act was realized.) G.’s reaction to this unexpected slap and the way he processed it in his memory is also important in terms of being open to all possibilities of relationality. A connection does not have to trigger pleasant affects; a surprise does not have to be a metaphysical experience and a reflection about the meaning of life. Yet, a symbolic act of violence can be an estrangement effect interrupting the improvisational flow. The intimacy of friendship might have allowed it to be acceptable in the flux of movements. In my view, some acts towards the other must be regarded as crossing the boundaries of the other in a pejorative way, even though I don’t judge that particular experience morally at all. Moreover, this concern may be one of the reasons why listening came up frequently as a suggestion by the interviewees.

I remember myself being “held captive” by a dancer during Mark Tomkins’ workshop at Çatı in 2006. It was Tomkins who commented on that scene as an example of “being held captive by another dancer”. In such a situation, dancing-with becomes a process of trying to adapt to the other’s manipulations that don’t allow you to move in your own space. Somehow, that intervention has to stop at a point where each has his/her space and time to move together. In that particular intervention, my instant reaction was to dance (as much as I could) parodying “a ballerina abducted by a male figure probably from a seraglio”. On the other hand, I also remember my own crossing the boundaries of another dancer during one of my parodies and feeling ashamed upon being told about it. In consequence, it is a question of how a being can “take another being into its world, but while preserving or respecting the other’s own relations and world” (Deleuze 1988: 126).
The affective experiences during movement practices have a resonating effect in our relationship with the others in numerous ways. For instance, the social and cultural formation of the abject as a boundary between the inside and outside can be transcended in some occasions:

In oral communication one protects oneself from the undesired smell and warmth of the other’s body, whereas in certain practices one experiences a kind of corporeal contact with the dirt between the smelly toes of another person without worries. This is a rehabilitating and curing process of our obsessions about the body. What we dislike and find repulsive in the other’s body is the reflection of our concealed blind understanding and cognition of our own body. Moreover, one can say that what causes us to have these negative feelings of repulsion and disgust are actually our own components that we cannot deal with. Therefore this multi-dimensional encounter has an important role in a person’s adventure of becoming and this is a means of transformation of our discriminations. Perhaps the solution of communication problem lies in seizing the diverse levels of corporeal contact. Maybe the possibility of a democratic communication requires breaking out of our embarrassment composed of blunted perception. (D)

The foot massage we give each other sitting in a circle before certain exercises can alter what is defined as abject and consequently as the other. As D. explains, we cannot handle the disgust prompted by recognition in the other the reflection of our own inside getting outside. The boundaries drawn between inside and outside draws the borders between the individual and the other. According to Julia Kristeva (1982) abjection has its roots in the transition from pre-Oedipal period to the times when the child enters the language and sociality. Abjection is the boundary formation between I and the Other. The boundaries of the body are also the boundaries of the society; hence the self-contained body is a reflection of the social order. Developing Mary Douglas’ understanding of pollution, dirt and taboo in her theory of abjection, Kristeva mentions three basic kinds of abjection, for food, waste and corpse. These are necessary for the continuation of life.
However, this mechanism of abjection can be triggered against the different in the society: women especially during menstruation and pregnancy, homosexuals, immigrants and different races. Touching the other’s feet may not be easy, at least not for everyone. Sometimes the other can be someone one meets for the first time which makes it even easier to project one's feelings of being a stranger onto the other whilst turning the other into an outside(r), a stranger. Corporeal contact with the other transforms our relationship with what is considered abject and its affective component disgust –which does not have to disappear totally; otherwise we would not be able to survive. Such uncommon forms of bodily contact can breed a possibility of democratic communication beyond discrimination and othering.

Another aspect of touch mentioned in my interviews is related to the way dance modifies our relationship with the senses:

*Touch is the first step of perceiving the body. It is worth talking about the meaning of touch in our society. The exercises that alter the perception indicate our need to lay a foundation with opening up the senses in order to surpass the estrangement from the senses... (G.)*

Manning understands the “politics of touch” as “a sensing body in movement” (Manning 2007: XIII). Accordingly, touch is an intention to form a relation with the other, which will in turn transform and invent both parties (XV). The gesture of reaching toward evokes not only exchange and connection, but also separation and exclusion (9). In G.’s quote, touch is the first step to engage with our senses in an endeavour to open our perception and be more sensitive to our milieu and the others around us. On the one hand, the way proximity and touch is experienced in general in Turkey can be disturbing for many people depending on their class, cultural and family backgrounds or individual differences as it can be trespassing the personal boundaries easily. On the other hand, touch in the context of dance studio is distinct since the individuals can decide about how much proximity and touch they allow and inform the other. In specific exercises and
practices such as hands on partner work including manipulations and massages, contact improvisation, etc. touch is an integrated part of the process. In such a framework, one can experiment with sensing one’s body in relation to the other’s touch and sensing the other with one’s own touch. In that case, touch becomes an exchange and connection in which the in-between is literally shaped with reaching toward the other.

A new relationship to one’s body is experienced by the creative movement and dance practices at Çatı. In my interviews, the participants frequently referred to reconnection with the body and opening the senses through dance. I would like to present more examples in order to elaborate on the body.

The opening body focused on the breath, muscles and movement (…). The form of movement at Çatı is the blend, the harmony, and the flow of reintroduction to the body, a new relationship with breath, and the mind-body awareness. (D.)

I had to restructure my body in order to reenergize myself. This could be possible with awareness and allowing the perception to open up. [Mind-body] awareness became part of my vocabulary as a result of improvisation practices. I had the chance to return to my free body gradually. (…) Dance is like the mother’s embrace. The touch, smell, hearing, and sight –even my perception of music– have been transformed by dance and flowed towards a silent life wherein there is only the sound of movements. (G.)

One discovers the capacity and the limitations of one’s body and witnesses the opening up of the body. In addition to the theatricality and performativity, changing the imagery and sharpening the senses… (…) Not only perception, but also proprioception… (…) Without an awareness of the body, movements are actualized in an incognizant manner. (F.)

Mind-body awareness is considered to pave the way for the sentient body. “Reintroduction”, “restructure”, “discover” and “reenergize” are the expressions
that assume the potentiality of the body to be other than what it has been and to do otherwise. This difference is not necessarily generated by a socially constructed body or a long-lost original one although for instance, G.’s sentences connote that a “free” body that lost its authentic structure could be attained by improvisational dance. “Imagination” and “sharpening of the senses” are the key words that demonstrate how creativity and sensation play a major part in the transformation of the body. Simply put, these changes make us happy, curious, surprised, free and even euphoric in addition to generating social outcomes and diverse possibilities for establishing other worlds and lives.

One of the changes that dancing generated in C. is that movement has become the basis of his experiences of other art forms. For instance, he began using words associated with movement in his poems.

*[In my poetry] I see things in relation to movement. When I read my poems, I see a movement related vocabulary. (...) My experience of the other art forms such as cinema is also based on movement. (C.)*

Bodies in contact recompose a different poetical corporeality and autonomous capacity through dance as they leave the repetitive habitual movements of a given body of a particular geography and religion.

*Dance, the awareness of breath and movement is the process of getting acquainted with a different and concealed body. It is the remapping of the body with an awareness of the limitations of the presumptions about the body. The body itself cruises in this map. (...) Dance awakens the potential to come out of the shell that imprisons us and surpasses the limits drawn by our own thresholds and assumptions. It is a means and a mode of the emergence of this potential and our discoverable possibilities. (D.)*

I do not interpret the affective time-space of the in-between only with an affirmative tone as there are many occasions of dissensus, separations, exclusions,
betrayals, gossips, frustrations, departures and returns as part of the Çatı experience as it would be in many dance spaces where personal relations can go sour. Although the critical distance of dissensus can be very constructive for a community, I do not include such stories not only to avoid conflict among friends, but also to focus primarily on the relationality in terms of movement and dance rather than personal relationships. Therefore, my focus will be on the discomfort and estrangement one can experience as an affect alien during dance classes.

Sara Ahmed (2010) writes about the experience of alienation and being an affect alien or killjoy. One feels alienated when one does not enjoy the actions, experiences and objects considered to be good by a community. This creates an affective gap between the individual and the community. The individual, disappointed by his/her experience of disappointment, may doubt him/herself or be angry with those who promised happiness. This is how “[w]e become strangers, or affect aliens” (Ahmed 2010: 40). Anticipation and expectation have a role in our disappointment when we discover that we have not been affected by the experience in the same or promised way that the others seem to experience. Ahmed suggests, “[i]f we arrive at objects with an expectation of how we will be affected by them, then this affects how they affect us, even in the moment they fail to live up to our expectations” (Ahmed 2010: 41).

Ahmed mentions the times when we assume that we experience the same affect with the people in a room and discover soon that is not the case (Ahmed 2004: 10). An intense feeling in an environment may involve miscommunications in that each individual may either have a different affect or relate to the same affect in a different way (ibid.). Ahmed argues that it is not the shared emotions, but the objects of emotions that circulate in a community.

K. explains the feelings of estrangement, curiosity and doubt when faced with an affective community. The arrival in the dance studio and the encounter with the others become a moment of observation and hesitation:
I didn’t want to know anybody because they seemed weird to me. I was sometimes curious about their professional lives; nevertheless, I did not really want to learn that, either. When I entered the studio, I used to think, they are like strange creatures. Human beings, yes, yet, so different… Also the way they communicated with each other… They looked each other in the eye while they were dancing. Obviously they knew each other. There was something intimate in the air… I didn’t know where this intimacy stemmed from because they were not talking much. Then this observation transformed into a different feeling. For instance, I see you, but we never speak to each other, not even say hello… Despite that, to see that you are there creates a certain feeling. We may speak later on, but in that moment only the feeling of your presence… (K.)

Even though the people attending the classes change over time, it is possible to speak of a group of participants that attend regularly in different periods over the years. There are people that continue to dance at Çatı at least once a week, or more rarely like attending only the workshops they are interested a few times a year. Apart from the core group (that also changed with some exceptions) that shoulders the various responsibilities of the place including its financial organization, and the people that would drop in occasionally since they first joined the classes, the other participants of the classes might be new members. The days that K. started to join the classes were the times when the so-called “old” members were still coming together to dance although in smaller groups. The moment one arrived in the studio, one used to begin the warm-up individually and there would generally be a quiet atmosphere almost one stepped into a different ritualistic state. It did not mean that people ignored each other or did not talk to one another, but the general atmosphere was quiet, sometimes disrupted by joyful cries of people meeting and embracing each other. All these might seem unusual for a newcomer. There are peculiar ways of group formation such as various kinds of dominant affects and behavioural habits in a group. Its boundaries are partly drawn by the affective composition and the use of language. These two factors also have a role in the feeling of belonging, which is good for the continuity of an organization so that new people take responsibility for
looking after the place and gradually teaching classes. Sometimes, the group might have a hard shell not facilitating the newcomers feel at home or not allowing them to take charge or contribute in decision making. Some groups might be excluded or feel excluded and decide to leave the group. Despite the fact that there are continuing participants in each period of Çatı, it is not possible to call it a homogeneous community primarily due to the composition of the heterogeneous group made up of independent artists who can collaborate with the other participants and/or friends at Çatı. Secondly, being an affect alien for some time is almost common as people come and go and return to Çatı over the years. However, it is harder when you want to dance, but the affective atmosphere and “energies” of others are either unbearable, or you start feeling and saying things in a different “language” which may be sceptical and critical in a way that sounds destructive. You may not experience the same affects shared by the others in the classes and get disappointed with yourself and blame others or yourself for the failure of your expectations. Gradually, some individuals may stop joining the classes and quit dancing unless they create or discover other possibilities of dancing.

Moving, composing with, pulling and pushing the affective in-between, individuals may prefer silence to personal contact. Sometimes the personal is left at the door including the personal relationships because the classes are less joyful when your relation goes sour. On the one hand, as K. says, it is often better not to know everyone. On the other hand, getting to know someone can be a good experience, too.

2.2.3 Dialogues and Mimesis

A “dialogical” body is formed in a Bakhtinian sense by the others’ rhythms, forms of movements and gestures. Like a novel made up of multiple voices, the body

---

28 Bakhtin (1984a) gives Dostoevsky’s works as an example. Dostoevsky’s novels are dialogical because they are not constituted as “a single consciousness, absorbing other consciousnesses as objects into itself, but as a whole formed by the interaction of several consciousnesses, non of which entirely becomes an object for the other” (Bakhtin 1984a: 18).
becomes a site open to others’ traces and shadows. For Mikhail Bakhtin (1981), not only novels, but life itself is dialogical in the way we are in a continual dialogue with language, artistic works and traditions, etc. while simultaneously creating individual differences and add new compositions to the polyphonic world unless we accept the authoritative voice that is monologic and closed to dialogue and creativity. Writing in the context of language about “word’s semantic openness to us, its capacity for further creative life in the context of our ideological consciousness, its unfinishedness and the inexhaustibility of our further dialogic interaction with it”, Bakhtin continues:

We have not yet learned from it all it might tell us; we can take it into new contexts, attach it to new material, put it in a new situation in order to wrest new answers from it, new insights into its meaning, and even wrest from it new words of its own (since another's discourse, if productive, gives birth to a new word from us in response).

(…) Such variants on the theme of another's discourse are widespread in all areas of creative ideological activity, and even in the narrowly scientific disciplines. Of such a sort is any gifted, creative exposition defining alien world views: such an exposition is always a free stylistic variation on another's discourse,- it expounds another's thought in the style of that thought even while applying it to new material, to another way of posing the problem; it conducts experiments and gets solutions in the language of another's discourse. (Bakhtin 1981: 346-347)

Like Bakhtin’s understanding of discourse, a movement is also a unique recomposition of movements observed in the past or witnessed while dancing together. These movements are partly mimicked and partly transformed into a different movement during an improvisation. Similar to the words used by a novelist, gestures, styles and forms of movements are picked up consciously and unconsciously and added into one’s own movement vocabulary –no matter how minutely hidden in the details of the emergent dance-. These materials can be
evolved into new movement phrases. Therefore, just like in the other areas of life, in the dance studio, too, we are in a continuous dialogue with the others even though we may not be in a literal dialogue. Each class is pregnant with dialogic confrontations unless one mechanically copies the others. However, dialogue does not mean absorption of all the influences like a sponge. Some gestures and forms are ignored or disliked, yet the dialogue is still maintained despite resistances.

The predictable repetitions leading to the inventive moment are contiguous to the tedious spiral of draining blockages. The studio is not a factory of the newest dance forms never seen before. On the contrary, it is a place where similar movement styles are repeated and imitated by the participants who mimic their teachers and the other participants in the class in addition to the dancers they observed on stage or in various locations. In order to understand this mimetic process, mimesis and its role in creativity and invention will be discussed in the following section.

It is a standard fact that imitation is part of the learning process and the cognitive function. Whenever one wants to find the “pure and authentic” movement and tries to eradicate all the remains of this mimetic process, one would only stand still or any attempt to move would be an awkward miming in total estrangement. On the other hand, imitation—conscious or unconscious—establishes a companionship of humans, animals, plants and inanimate objects.

Gabriel Tarde’s concept of imitation contributes to the idea that bodies are permeable and open to the environment and other bodies. Tarde asserts that social organization is based on imitation, conflict and invention, or repetition, opposition and adaptation (Tarde 1903). Suggestion-imitation process explains how ideas pass from one individual to the other and how mind can be influenced. The notion of suggestion is highlighted in Tarde for whom “[s]ociety is imitation” and “imitation is a species of somnambulism” (Tarde 1903: 87). There is a space of interaction and influence between the minds; however, imitation cannot be understood as simple mechanical copying. There can always be a “surplus” that is
the seed of something new (Barry and Thrift 2007: 517). Interference in the repetition creates a difference and leads to inventions and changes. Tarde explains it as follows:

every invention and every discovery consists of the interference in somebody's mind of certain old pieces of information that have generally been handed down by others (...). From that as a starting point, we may say that the generic term, of which invention is but a species, is the fruitful interference of repetitions. (...) [A]though the idea of Repetition dominates the whole universe, it does not constitute it. For the bottom of it, I think, is a certain sum of innate, eternal, and indestructible diversity without which the world would be as monotonous as it is vast. (Tarde 1903: 382-383)

Tarde’s concept of “generative imitation” entails invention, which Tarde defines as the “fruitful interference of repetitions” and the result of combining imitations (Marsden 2000, n.p.). An invention transcends imitation after including it. The interference that leads to the invention takes place at the moment of “hesitation or confusion” when repetition of the ideas and the practices are contradicted (Barry and Thrift 2007: 517). On the other hand, “imitative imitation” is the means by which these inventions are propagated in the society (Marsden 2000, n.p.). Tarde’s notion of rejection or “counter-imitation” in relation to the process of imitation is described as “doing or saying the exact opposite of what they observe being done or said” for the sake of mere negation (Tarde 1903: XVII). Tarde sees a rebellious and anti-social mind behind it rather than an inventive one (XVIII). The crucial point in Tarde is that the inventor is not necessarily a genius since every imitator has the potential to invent new combinations. Invention is possible when an individual engages with the previous ideas and transforms them in the imitation process, which is open to leaps and twists leading to new forms and ideas.
The concept of imitation presupposes the possibility of interaction between individuals that can influence each other; thus, there is a continuous flow between the bodies. Deleuze and Guattari, in their homage to Tarde, state, “[i]mitation is the propagation of a flow; opposition is binarization, the making binary of flows; invention is a conjugation or connection of different flows (italic in the original, Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 241). The affective states are also transmitted from one person to the other in this flow.

Nigel Thrift regards imitation as “a high cognitive function, mirroring both the means and ends of action, and highly dependent upon the empathy generated in an intersubjective information space that supports automatic identifications” (Thrift 2008: 237). Thrift also argues that imitation is different from emulation in that the former entails anticipation and mind-reading (Thrift 2008: 237). This capacity evolves as infants interact with their milieu and conceive “the other as ‘like me’” (ibid.). Imitation occurs beyond cognition and volition, hence it is “automatic and unconscious” (ibid.).

In our interview, L. referred to imitation as a method to enhance her movement quality. Imitation of others’ dance, she explained, contributes to her vocabulary of movement and initiates a difference that comes as a surprising point in her dance. Feelings of uneasiness and confusion intervene in the repetition of the same. Mimesis becomes the source of invention as Tarde suggests. In this version of imitation, L. views dance as a performance in which multiple roles can be taken up as no true essence is assumed behind movement qualities.

At Çatl I find different things to experiment with, new things to work on. This is what I try to experience during improvisations: To go beyond my own movement quality. That’s why I can do a movement in the same way as an instructor does. (...) To imitate another person adds a new quality to my own movements. Consequently, I may be able to do an unexpected movement while dancing. Otherwise, one always moves in the way that feels comfortable -especially on the
stage- so as not to take risks. In contrast, a movement that you feel uneasy with opens a different door. (L.)

My interviewees’ answers to the question why there are major similarities in the movements of dancers at Çati vary as follows: this trait can also be observed in the international contemporary dance scene; and it is simply because we dance together. E.’s reply points to memory and the mirror neurons:

[On the similar movement quality of the dancers at Çati during improvisations] I believe it is related to the collective memory. I think that there is a collective kinetic transference. The mirror neurons; the togetherness in the same space where there are no mirrors; the absence of a judgemental teacher profile made that transference possible. (E.)

When a person sees another’s movement, the mirror neurons are fired and the brain map of that movement is activated in the observer’s brain (Damasio 2003). The same movement can also be actualized in this kinaesthetic interaction between the bodies. Besides the transference of the knowledge of certain physical practices and methods of dance, there is a transmission of sensations of movements beyond the cognitive realm of the participants. The kinaesthetic and emotional empathy is an essential affective and physical component of being-with. E.’s last point about the absence of a judgemental teacher is very crucial for the learning process. Such a teacher holds the space for the others and welcomes all possibilities including failures.

From another point of view, K.’s experience of the others’ movement demonstrates how imitation can be regarded as a form of a relationship instead of mechanical copying. I find this quote particularly interesting for pointing at the moments of failure and negativity in addition to questioning the origins of a movement, either hers or the others’.
I used to compare my movements with the others’. (...) It wasn’t copying the others. To see others formed a kind of relationship. I sometimes tried to give a meaning to the others’ movements and questioned what makes that person move that way. When an improvisation session began, I didn’t have anything in my body to hold on to. (...) I didn’t know what to do with my body. I was surprised and asked myself why the others move the way they do. (K.)

Sometimes, hesitation and doubt can interrupt the flow through which others’ movement vocabularies and affective tonality pass between the bodies. These moments of suspense and suspicion may provide a critical distance to question the accepted norms. Eventually, this stance may lead to an individual invention. In contrast, it can also result in the renunciation of any form of dance movements, either to quit dancing or to redefine dance and movement in a novel way. As Bakhtin suggests, we need to borrow from others in order to create our own words or movements. We are already born into a polyphonic environment that makes us who we are, hence, I is heterogeneous and dialogic. To quote Deleuze, “[o]ne never commences; one never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters in the middle; one takes up or lays down rhythms” (italic in the original, Deleuze 1988: 123). Dancing is to respond to that rhythm, not necessarily following others’ rhythms, since resisting against that rhythm is another form of response just like stillness in relation to the flow and rhythm of others. Bakhtin remarks, “[o]nly the mythical Adam, who approached a virginal and as yet verbally unqualified world with the first word, could really have escaped” this dialogic relationship (Bakhtin 1981: 279). It is not possible to reach a state of being a tabula rasa unless one loses certain brain functions. So, when we enter the studio, we always arrive in the middle and join the rhythm, play with it, or leave it.

Anna Gibbs understands “mimetic communication” as the voluntary and involuntary bodily imitation that involves contagion of affects (Gibbs 2010: 186). The synchrony of expressions, postures and movements generates shared emotions. For instance, a mutual affective communication entails entrainment in which the listener’s movements and gestures are synchronized with the speaker’s
speech rhythm, movements and gestures (Gibbs 2010: 197). I would add that something beyond the semantics of expression and the semiotics of gestures passes onto the other body. On all accounts, mimesis does not merely consist of repetition or representation. Gibbs views it as a form of relation whereby both parties undergo a transformation (Gibbs 2010: 194).

Mimesis is part of children’s plays, too. From childhood to adult life, it is a form of learning. Each learning experience has the seeds of difference as each body has its own unique combination of repeated actions. Gibbs mentions Walter Benjamin’s essay on mimetic faculty that refers to children’s plays. Accordingly, children imitate objects such as a windmill or a train besides social roles and professions (Gibbs 2010: 193). Similar to the children who mimic nonhuman and inanimate objects, one can imitate animals, plants or any form of matter as part of a dance improvisation. In addition to the joy and playfulness of a child’s game, one can be immersed in a different process while becoming -a deer’s gaze, a stone, and sea fern... Skinner Release Technique (SRT) 29, which utilizes various images from nature, helps the creation of unexpected possibilities of movement qualities whilst one’s perception and sensation are transformed through a becoming process. For instance, becoming a deer’s gaze changes the way the body, self, inside and outside are experienced. One needs a transition period before leaving the studio to go out into the street. That is why there is an optional time given to the participants who can write, mark, draw or paint and contemplate on their experiences in the SRT class. This is crucial in order to reassess one’s boundaries sometimes simply for one’s safety in the street. I do not claim that one gets out of one’s self while dancing and then gets back into it as if it were an envelope. Some people may be more flexible in their adaptation from an intense process back to the everyday life in the city while some may remain in a certain state (of becoming stone, for instance) for a longer period, which may have an impact on their everyday function unless they somehow manage to embody that

29 There are no Skinner release classes at Çatı, however, some of the teachers (e.g. Idil Kemer) use parts of this technique in their classes and workshops. My ideas on the Skinner Release Technique are based on my experiences in SRT classes in London.
new quality into the flow of their continuous becoming, adding a different -not necessarily new- sentence each day.

Particularly in an improvisation class, each moment is open to surprises, evolving into difference with each move and stillness. Therefore, one is never the same after such a class when the affective and physiological changes parallel to the creative endeavour reshuffle the body’s possibilities each time in a new way of becoming otherwise. Memory records this ‘otherwise’ and anticipates a sensation of a certain affective and physiological state that made the previous creative moment possible. Or, the body remembers the movement series that gave joy in a kind of flow in which hesitation and fear can also be transformed into a movement quality. Sometimes one mimics oneself. As long as one does not get blocked in either admiration or distrust of one’s dance, this self-mimicry gradually opens to difference after many repetitions. I concur with Bakhtin, Deleuze, Tarde and Gibbs who see novelty in mimesis that reveals the potential for new possibilities and opens the subject to the impact of the other. This impact initiates a series of changes in both individuals rather being an imprint on the passive body.

2.3 Dancing with and Listening

2.3.1 Aydın Teker’s Hallo!

I am captured and held captive by her face and attached to every detail of her facial expressions that project a distinct emotion. I am totally immersed in her ride on the affective waves of the space. I look at her face almost with admiration and love. Tears for an unidentified loss... The face is demanding, sad, joyful, wistful, strong, lost. It is the face that pushes and pulls our gazes.

The Levinasian face is distant, outside me. There is a space between I and the Other. On the other hand, I feel our faces merge, not necessarily mirroring each other. Our memories, projections, stories also meet in the in-between in the
moment of the encounter of our faces. Her call is echoing in my guts. My ears burn. We don’t lose our identities. Yet our chemistries have already changed. Is it a borderline experience that erases the boundaries between inside and outside, takes everything like a sponge and gets invaded by the Other?

I wish I could see other people’s faces. She has access to the gazes of others, she knows... I am alone face to face with her vulnerability and her call for the responsibility for her death. Well, she is running from something as if in a horror movie, or lost in a dark alley in the middle of the night. It is too loud, we feel helpless in our seats.

Aydın Teker’s Hallo! (2015), reflects on hearing, listening, being heard and listened to. The piece is composed of two parts each lasting thirty-five minutes. In the first part, the performer enters the stage, programs the treadmill and runs for thirty-five minutes in different speeds. The stage and house lights are on as the performer and the audience face each other. Whilst running, she looks at the spectators and says “Hallo!” with changing intonations, pitch and stress in her voice tinted affectively in various ways as she salutes, whispers, questions, screams, shouts, demands gently, fearfully, panic-ridden, angrily, furiously, helplessly, joyfully, welcoming, smiling. At one point, the performer holds onto the handrails, lifts her body up with legs in the air off the treadmill as she runs and/or dances in slow motion for a brief moment as the treadmill continues to work relatively faster. There is also a short period when the treadmill is programmed to stop while the performer keeps walking and then running. Towards the end, all the lights go out. The spectators sit in silence in the dark for three minutes as the sound of the working treadmill is heard. Then in the dim light we see the empty treadmill that works for another three minutes. It stops at the end. During the duration of the performance, the audience hears the noise and the bleeps marking the timing and speed changes of the treadmill. In the second part of the performance, Aydın Teker and Gizem Aksu sit facing the spectators and start a conversation with the spectators who share their experiences of the first part if they prefer to.
I had the chance to see *Hallo!* three times, twice at Moda Sahnesi (April 14 and May 20, 2015, Kadıköy, Istanbul) and once in the Control Room at Energy Museum, Istanbul Bilgi University (November 8, 2015) as part of a series of discussions on contemporary dance and the dynamics of labour.

This chapter will expand on the political and temporal aspects of the affective co-composition of the performance by the dancer and the audience. My exercise in thinking diverse relationalities is mainly based on my personal experience of three performances in addition to the comments and remarks made by the audience, and my interviews with Aydın Teker and Gizem Aksu.

In my interview with her, Aydın Teker said that she had “vomited this work” and emphasized the strong urgency that forced her to create this piece (My Interview with Teker and Aksu, June 2, 2015, Istanbul). Her expression connotes the literally visceral immediacy of the creative process. She added that the Gezi experience was the pivotal point for the emergence of this bodily urgency when she realized that she had been living in a glass jar, namely a small artistic community in Turkey for whom she was creating her works in the past. This emergency also triggered an awareness of how she didn’t hear others and listen to them well enough before:

“*It was a kind of an apology: I didn’t hear my students, my daughter, the ones I love. Lots of things happened in Turkey and we weren’t heard. Did I hear? How painful it is... Maybe we get into better times... Each time she performs, it hurts, it is painful for me.*” (Aydın Teker, April 14, 2015, second part of the performance entailing the conversation with the audience, answered in English as a response to a spectator’s question)

In one of our informal conversations in the spring of 2015, she explained:
“I experienced not being heard very strongly in a period of my life. Then I realized; do I hear? As if in a filmstrip, I recalled the times when my students were complaining, “Professor, you never hear us”... This has been my apology from humanity. Gizem stood by me during this process.”

She emphasized many times that the composition took only four months to complete - an exceptionally short period compared to her previous works which were generally produced in about two and a half years. Pointing at her abdominal region, she said, “I felt it and choreographed from here” and “it came out in a day”. She also drew attention to the process she shared with Gizem Aksu, one of her students at Mimar Sinan University Dance Department. Teker stated that her encounters with Aksu running in the parks inspired the idea of running as the main element of the choreographic process. “I saw Gizem running all the time” (My interview on June 2, 2015). This image also led her to utilize a treadmill as part of the performance.

“While I was choreographing, the process was more important, a great sharing... I believe in Gizem’s process. I just leave it to the way Gizem feels that day and what she experiences with the audience.”

They decided to perform Hallo! in places such as parks, coffeehouses, private homes, and workplaces. At the time of my writing, they had already performed at a factory (Istanbul), in a house (Istanbul) and a bookstore/café (Ayvalık) in addition to various performance venues in Istanbul and other cities.

2.3.2 Affective co-composition

Each Hallo! performance is continuously transformed by the audience's changing moods and answers. The experiences of the performer and audience members are altered not only by what the performer brings into the room, but also what the spectators carry with them when they arrive. The performance is knit affectively through rhythm, sound, laughter, violence, tears, smiles, screams and whispers as
the piece is danced or run together with the audience kinaesthetically. In that respect, the dancer and the audience co-create the performance affectively each time differently.

The encounter of the performer and the audience is loaded with possibilities as the performer looks at the eyes of each person and says “Hallo”. The chance element is affectively directed with each gaze as the visceral dynamics are set into motion. Every time the performer utters “hallo”, she projects her emotional state onto the audience. Each member of the audience arrives in his/her seat with his/her personal history and capability of being affected and to affect. Gradually, the performer’s repetitive ‘hallo’s in changing tones and emotional colours start to build up an affective space open to interaction with the audience members. Needless to say, there were differences in the reactions of the audience at the performances that I attended.

The dancer looks at each member of the audience for different durations as each person answers her call with his/her gaze, gestures, maybe saying hallo, maybe uncomfortable to use a foreign word as a response to the dancer demanding something they may not identify. Hallo -not merhaba, selam or alo in Turkish language- may have reduced the sayable to a foreign word. We may choose to avoid contact, yet it will still be an answer. Some people answer her call surprised to hear their own voices in this uncanny environment to which they might have arrived hoping to passively consume an artistic event. Some project their voices almost theatrically while others wave at the dancer, or smile in a supportive manner.

General social codes of courtesy can play a part in the choice of the reactions of the audience members. This would lead them to restrain their feelings especially as the audience does not sit in the dark. Depending on the emotional quality and force of the response, people can have a tendency to judge each other when one

---

30 Kinesthesia denotes sensation of movement in the body. According to John Martin, even though spectators remain seated, they experience the same sensations in their bodies as the dancer moves on the stage (Martin 1939). This concept will be developed in more detail later in this chapter.
shares his/her emotional response with a group of people that one has not met before.

Gizem Aksu defines her own experience as a new introduction to hearing herself and being heard by others. She expressed that she could run only in the presence of the others and referred to the audience members whose breathing was synchronized with hers (2015). This can be defined both as a rhythmic and affective entrainment in which two or more bodies become attuned as described by Brennan (2004).

During the performances that I attended, some audience members expressed their feelings of guilt, fear and anxiety while some focused on the idea of not being able to respond even if one could hear the other. A participant said that she remembered the pain of having lost her friends and family members when the stage lights were dimmed. It is impossible to refer to all the affects that were mentioned in the second part of the performance although the predominant one was guilt in the three performances that I participated. Majority of the audience does not give feedback either by saying hallo or by expressing their feelings and ideas during the second part of the performance. As a spectator, I feel and witness the presence of affects experienced in the performance space. The dancer’s affects are activated by the affects in the room while the audience is affected by her affective expressions and voice. However, as mentioned earlier in each chapter, following both Brennan and particularly Ahmed, it can be argued again that no one in the room is affected in the same way by the affective milieu. Spectators’ personal histories, bodily capabilities, mental and psychic states besides their cultural, social and gender, etc. backgrounds play a part in the way they are affected or not. Even if they are affected, they may give different meanings to their affects and share them in numerous ways both in the first and second parts of the performance.

What is experienced in the room is the affective intensity, rather than the same affect shared by people. Although it can be claimed that affective attunement or
estranagement are experienced at every performance, or in any social milieu, *Hallo!* itself is founded on the idea that each performance is recomposed by people’s moods which render the piece to an experiment on affects, boundaries, leakages and limits. The boundaries of the individuals are unsettled with each *hallo* and direct gaze continuously. Especially the direct eye contact of the performer makes it difficult not to be affected by anxiety, anger, fear, despair, joy, pleasure, compassion, kindness, etc.

Therefore, face is an important element in the affective transmission during this performance, especially when accompanied with a *hallo*. Face is a call to responsibility in a Levinasian sense. If we bracketed all the in-betweeness of the milieu woven affectively, we would still talk about “I” sitting on a chair as part of the audience and the Other calling and demanding something that could not be defined. At the same time intensified by her self-expressivity, the responsibility to answer her call might feel like a heavy load for the audience. Then a gap widens between us when “I” has no idea what the right word or a gesture would be. She is whispering or screaming each time she collapses into herself, head on against the invisible Other. Although the audience is witnessing this condition, our presence seems to lack something.

Spectators might shun from direct eye contact with the performer in order not to distract attention afraid of teasing the artist with a gaze full of selves. The gaze of the spectator is equally captivating as the dancer opens her heart and shows her wound to us. She opens her heart, we hear the call or not. Aksu said that in some performances no one responded to her, making it very hard for her to continue to perform due to the lack of connection. Our gazes work in her psyche. Face is so important for experiencing the humanness of the other that during capital punishment either the victim is blindfolded or the executioner’s face is covered

---

31 Two dancers (names to remain confidential) commented that the dancer in *Hallo!* put too much of her own personality into the performance. They said that in the end this was a performance and that was not what they meant with “stage presence”. “Too much of her presence… Too much is asked from the audience” (an informal conversation, May 2015).
(Protevi 2009: 28). Protevi also mentions the accounts of wars that describe how seeing an enemy’s face has the power to prevent the killing (ibid.).

Tomkins who sees face as the site of affects explicates the taboo on looking at the face (2008 (1962)). He explains that only the children look directly into the eyes, however, they are also taught not to stare at the face of the others (Tomkins 2008: 106). For him, wearing a veil in certain cultures is also related with this taboo (117). Referring to Charles Darwin’s *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals*, Tomkins describes that we are aware of our and others’ affects based on the facial and visceral responses (114). At birth the face dominates the rest of the body in size and density. Interestingly, children are better equipped to recognize the facial differences. They also emphasize the face in their drawings and paintings. Tomkins claims that face has an oral function in that finger sucking, blanket sucking and pacifiers in children are also facial responses, which may continue in the form of smoking in adult life (116). Therefore, face is a very complex organ that combines the familiar with novelty as we try to define the meaning of expressions. Shame or embarrassment are harder to control as signs as “[c]hanges in bloodflow to the face which produce changes in the temperature of the face are also received as feedback, most notably in the blush” (122).

As the performer runs looking into the eyes of the spectators, each spectator deciphers a series of facial expressions projected with a demand to be answered by his/her facial expressions. At the same time, mirror neurons play a role in the transmission of affects as we watch the face of the dancer. So an unintentional mimicry may occur on the spectators’ faces. When she runs fast, her face is blurred, impossible to capture in a cinematic or photographic mode as if disappearing in the sea of affects flooding the room. When she stops, we witness her tired face, which is almost washed away by her movements through this experimental experience of becoming. It is like the end of an ecstatic dance when she looks at us as if newly awoken from a dream.
2.3.3 Kinaesthesia and The Audience Participation

In the first part of this section, I aim to refer to kinaesthetic empathy in order to construe how watching a dance performance affects the spectator’s body and then continue with various theoretical approaches to audience participation to configure how Hallo! creates an unsettling situation in which the spectators cannot be certain whether they are invited or dissuaded to be part of the performance.

Susan Leigh Foster writes a historical account of theorization of kinaesthesia in Europe and the USA (2011). Kinaesthesia is formed of two words derived from Greek: kine meaning movement and aesthesis denoting sensation (Foster 2011: 74). It is defined as “the muscular sense of the body’s movement” (ibid.). In the scope of this thesis it is relevant to trace its history back to John Martin, an American dance critic who wrote about modern dance in the 1930s. According to John Martin, proprioceptors in our bodies make us perceive our movements giving a sense of our muscular and skeletal posture (112). Martin also connects movements with emotions in that we know the feelings of the other people by looking at their expressions and movements. He applied this to his theory of dance spectatorship according to which a viewer watching a dancer experiences the same kinaesthetic sensations like the dancer through “inner mimicry” (Martin cited in Foster 2008: 48). This does not only make us active participants of the movements we witness while we are sitting in our chairs, but also feel the same feelings with the dancer as our sense-receptors activate the corresponding feelings in our bodies. For Martin, the musculature is connected to feelings, hence it has the capacity to transmit feelings between the dancer and the spectators primarily via visual stimulation.

Developing Martin’s ideas further, James J. Gibson writing in the 1960s, maintained that kinaesthetic information was derived from vestibular organs of the inner ear; cutaneous and visual sources; and, muscular and joint receptors (Foster 2011: 115). His ideas were embodied in the practice of contact
improvisation of the same period in the 60s (Foster 2008: 51). In contact improvisation, one follows one’s sense of body in relation to the other body that one dances with as two bodies get into a flow of kinaesthetic relationality.

These two approaches presume that people experience the same feelings no matter what the physical, cultural and historical components are. In this regard, Foster turns to Alain Berthoz who argues that individuals perceive their environments differently based on their cultural backgrounds and genders, in other words, *habitus* as theorized by Bourdieu (Foster 2008: 53). On the other hand, Berthoz also suggests that the discovery of mirror neurons that are fired when we see a movement being actualized supports the idea of kinaesthetic empathy to a certain extent. Vittorio Gallese is the neuroscientist that studied the mirror neurons:

A metaphor that describes well this correspondence between observed and executed biological motions is that of a physical “resonance”. It is as if neurons in these motor areas start to “resonate” as soon as the appropriate visual input is presented. This “resonance” does not necessarily produce a movement or an action. It is an internal motor representation of the observed event which, subsequently, may be used for different functions, among which is imitation. (Gallese cited by Foster 2011: 165)

According to Gallese, mirror neurons play an important role in our ability to interact socially and to connect with the others around us (166). Therefore, empathy is crucial for the existence of a society. In addition, Gallese emphasizes that the personal histories and mental capabilities influence the way mirror neurons function (167).

In Reason’s and Reynolds’ view, empathy is generally used interchangeably with kinaesthesia although empathy is rather connected to emotional contagion and fellow feeling (Reason and Reynolds 2010: 53). Foster explains that with Freud’s analytical method, empathy began to be conceived as “a cognitive understanding of others’ feelings, more than a sharing of them” (Foster 2011: 163). Edith Stein’s
On The Problem of Empathy (1917) redefines empathy as an “enriching” experience in which two individuals remain separate, yet connected in a “we” (Stein cited in Foster 2011: 164).

The dancer running in Hallo! can reactivate the kinaesthetic sensations related to running while her facial and bodily expressions changing with the responses of the audience members have a new wave of impacts on the bodies. Therefore, not only the spectator’s body, but also the dancer’s is open to this kinaesthetic mimicry that has the potential to create emotional contagion and empathy eventually. Both the dancer and the spectators are in a multiple-channel relationality forming a matrix of intensities made up of movements, mimicries, proprioceptive, kinaesthetic, and empathic sensations. These intensities and forces move in-between the bodies as if a collective dance takes place in their relationality. Each individual can transform them unless he/she is closed to this potential either personally or due to various physiological and psychological debilities. A sick body may not have the ability to be part of this flow. For instance, a disease may debilitate one’s resilience and physical strength to cope with any social environment. Some illnesses can make the individual feel like he/she is the one that clogs the energetic smooth flow in the room, or he/she has made others feel negative affects. Although these arguments solely rely on my anecdotal evidence, I suggest that the sick body should be investigated in more detail in relation to affective transmission and relationality in addition to the research on autism and disabled bodies.

Without digressing further, I intend to continue with the theme of audience participation. In Hallo!, the audience participation is a vague theme unlike many participatory works that are overtly demanding participation at times placing the audience under obligation in a tyrannical manner. Before viewing Hallo! in terms of audience participation and whether the unease it generates is another form of restriction or a difference with a potential, I will present an overview of discussions on relational aesthetics and participation in performance practice.
Nicolas Bourriaud’s notion of relational aesthetics initiated a series of discussions both in contemporary art and performance art since its publication in 1998 (English version 2002). Bourriaud emphasizes art as a form of inventing new forms of being together and constituting new “inter-human relations” that constitute “social interstices” in everyday life outside the frames of power structures (Bourriaud 2002: 14). He focuses on the artists who, instead of making artworks, are interested in offering social contexts that form a community creating the meaning of the work collaboratively. Bourriaud does not prescribe interactive art or the virtual relations on the web, but rather points to the significance of artistic practices that activate physical, face-to-face relations with small gestures and interventions. Hence, they are considered to be micro-political rather than having a political agenda or content.

Bourriaud’s relational aesthetics has been criticized especially for its consensual attributes. Claire Bishop’s essay on relational aesthetics advocates antagonism besides other problematic points in Bourriaud’s theory (2004). She contends with Bourriaud’s understanding of subjectivity as a unified whole and community as a consensual togetherness excluding its disruptive antagonistic elements. Bishop follows Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe according to whom in a democratic society, conflict is not abolished because without antagonism “there is only the imposed consensus of authoritarian order – a total suppression of debate and discussion” (Bishop 2004: 66). Antagonism does not exclude hope or utopia, but opposes the seemingly absolute consensus of totalitarianism. Moreover, Laclau and Mouffe view subjectivity neither completely as decentered nor entirely unified since the Other always intervenes in the constitution of the precarious subjectivity (ibid.). This approach can also be applied to the society, which can maintain plurality only when it entails antagonism. Bishop implements Laclau’s and Mouffe’s argument to emphasize the importance of antagonism in artistic practices that she exemplifies with the works of Thomas Hirschhorn and Santiago Sierra that create discomfort and disturbance rather than euphoric feelings of micro-utopic togetherness (69-79).
In *Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and The Politics of Spectatorship*, Bishop continues to develop a historical and critical view of the notion of participation (2012). She argues that many participatory art projects eliminate the aesthetic aspects of an artwork in favour of ethical and social values. Therefore, these works are assessed in terms of their moral and political content, or the social bond that they presumably form. Consequently, Bishop asserts that the aesthetic identity or even the success or failure of these works to create a community cannot be discussed (Bishop 2002: 13). She finds the discussions revolving around empathy and compassion generated by an artistic practice also problematic since these ethical norms tend to repudiate disruptive and antagonistic artistic interventions (25).

Jacques Rancière construes the position of the spectator with reference to Joseph Jacotot’s notion of the ignorant schoolmaster (2009). I have already explained the position of the ignorant schoolmaster in relation to the teaching method at Çatı. In the context of the spectatorship, Jacotot’s suggestion that an instructor can teach another person what he/she does not know denounces the difference between the actors who act and the passive spectators (Rancière 2009: 1, 13). For Rancière, viewing does not denote passivity. As a matter of fact, the spectators also act as they observe and interpret the action of the actors, compose their own narratives, and translate their own stories (13). Therefore, the attempt to transform the spectators into actors is still based on the inegalitarian distribution of roles between the audience and the performers. “Every spectator is already an actor in her story; every actor, every man of action, is the spectator of the same story” (17). This dissolution of boundaries is what Rancière defines as the emancipation of spectators, which leads to the emancipation of the community viewed as “a community of narrators and translators” (22).

For Massumi, seeing is also a form of action (Massumi 2011: 43). When we see, an event and a potentiality are activated wherein an affective relationality is formed (ibid.). This should not be mistaken with Bourriaud’s relational art that implies an interactive interpersonal exchange. By contrast, Massumi advocates
“immediation, immediately lived relation” (73). This is an affective intensity that can be disruptive, yet always considered to constitute new potentials for life (76-77). Therefore, Massumi distinguishes between interactivity and relation in that the former implies an instrumental function whereas the latter involves vitality and intensity (Massumi 2002: 46). This intensity emphasizes the lived experience and indicates a life-affirming approach that can be related to Spinoza’s *conatus* behind all life forces (Massumi 2011: 84).

Massumi also draws attention to the fact that interactive works may be tyrannical in the way they require participation, especially “when the imperative is to express yourself ‘truly’ and ‘authentically’” (2011: 47-48). This is reminiscent of the demand of the Foucauldian power regime that demands self-revelation. Massumi explicates,

> You are viscerally exposed, like a prodded sea cucumber that spits its guts. You are exposed down to your innermost sensitive folds, down to the very peristaltic rhythms that make you what you are. (...) The power element is always there, at least on the horizon. You have to strategize around it. You have to strategize how not to make prodded sea cucumbers of your participants, at the same time as you don’t want to just let them stay in their prickly skins. Simply maximizing interaction, even maximizing self-expression, is not necessarily the way. I think you have to leave creative outs. You have to build in escapes. (...) make them immanent to the experience. (48).

In *Hallo!*, the audience participation is not necessarily required, and generally the audience is not certain whether they are supposed to participate in the performance or not. Participation is mainly possible in the form of responding to the dancer’s *hallos* and partaking in the conversation during the second half of the performance that opens space for the audience to share their own experiences. However, as mentioned in the previous section, there is also a more subtle form of participation, an undercurrent that co-composes the piece in the first half of
Hallo!. The verbal and gestural responses of the audience do not necessarily engender a feel-good type of smooth affective milieu because the dancer can predispose the audience towards a different affective direction. Any single detail matters during this co-composition. Nevertheless, there is always a possibility that participation can result in a mess, a cacophony that can dissipate not only the affective resonance of a particular performance, but also the work itself. In that sense, the dancer does not only act as the person to whom all the affective energy is invested in, but also the gatekeeper of a vortex that plays with dosages in a Deleuzian sense.

On the other hand, the affective display that involves alarming screams, revolting cries, and painful expressions may stir negative affects, unrest and anxiety in the audience under the performer’s gaze. The second half of the performance tends to be partly a question and answer session with the artists, and partly time designated to the participants to share their own feelings. This is where the audience is encouraged or at least given space to participate. After the intensity of the performance, for some spectators, the second part might be a relief while some may find it rather awkward to talk about one’s intimate feelings. The long quote above by Massumi is relevant in the sense that the participants may already feel “viscerally exposed, like a prodded sea cucumber” and may decide to show their pricks, or hide and keep silent so as not to obey the imperative to express themselves. Even though it is not a compulsory demand, the odd situation of ambiguity of answering or not in both parts of Hallo! may generate unease, hence antagonism rather than consensus in the way defined by Mouffé, Laclau and Bishop. People may decline to be part of this affective exchange or they may show their discomfort and disagreement verbally.

Before moving on its political potential, I aim to describe some extreme incidents in Hallo! performances: In a rehearsal version of the performance at the university where Teker taught before her retirement and Aksu was an MA student, the reaction from a group of students was quite disturbing for the rest of the audience as they shouted and waved constantly mocking the whole setting. Although the
artists are ready for all kinds of reactions, some reactions may sabotage the performance and annihilates the spacetime of the performer. Teker recounted a performance in Ayvalık, a seaside town in the northern Aegean Region of Turkey where Teker began to live after her retirement in the summer of 2015. During the performance in Ayvalık, a woman literally stopped the performance by attacking Aksu who was running and saying *hallo* to the audience as usual, decided to terminate the performance entirely when the woman’s attacks continued. Aksu explained that she chose to hear her and complete the performance at the moment when it turned into something unexpected and violent. In a usual occasion, that woman would be forced out of the venue by a security guard. However, in this case, Aksu intentionally opened some space for her. On the one hand, at first it is possible to think that it was unfair for the rest of audience who arrived there with an expectation to attend a performance. On the other hand, the situation might have been life threatening for Aksu and the audience if continued. When Aksu went out, she saw that woman was crying outside the theatre. Then she hugged Aksu and told her that both Teker and Aksu were very sincere. That was the end of an uncanny interaction. Therefore, unforeseen, disturbing and disrupting forms of relationality may be experienced during a performance and induce the performer to react in time and take initiative. Although these cases might be regarded as extreme, opening space requires some boundaries just enough for the movement and relationality to be maintained.

According to Massumi relational and participatory aspects of a work of art do not necessarily make it political (2011). Politics and aesthetics are not regarded as two distinct realms wherein the political is infused into art as a means to an end as if only politics has the power to generate change. Hence, the artistic practices that intend to be explicitly political may fail to do so because they restrict the interpretation of the political with the political content. Instead, Massumi argues, both political and artistic practices are “aesthetico-political” (Massumi 2011: 12-13). “An art practice can be aesthetically political, inventive of new life potentials, of new potential forms of life, and have no overtly political content” (53). In this vein, the intensity of the process in terms of both feelings and life forces activates
a creative relationality, a novel form of existence and a potential of becoming (12, 171). Therefore, politics is not envisaged as an “add-on or afterthought”, but intrinsic to the artistic experience opening new potentials (171).

This approach is reminiscent of Guattari’s understanding of artistic practices defined by their potential to compose new percepts and affects which, in turn, generate a rupture in the subjectivity and open it to becoming (Guattari 1995: 129). Therefore, the politicality of art resides in its potential of creating new relations between the self and the other with new rhythms and intensities.

Therefore, Hallo! opens new forms of thinking relationality and unsettles the audience position, taking them to a half an hour ride of affective transmission while reflecting on the meaning of listening to the other. Hallo! is political in the way it experiments with affects while questioning the possibility of attending to each other’s affects, and creating space for listening without a moral imperative. The ebb and flow of affects are activated in the relational field in-between the bodies, which can engage with the rhythm of the running body and experiment with the intensities.

2.3.4 On listening and hearing

The audience is surrounded by an aural atmosphere: the continuous roaring noise of the treadmill, bleeps in a high pitch slicing time, the performer’s breathing, sounds of her sports shoes as she runs. Hallos in various pitches and tones. Rhythm is a constant with changing speeds for 35 minutes. The continuity of rhythm lays the blocks of the auditory entrainment. We may ignore the call of the performer, yet we are still immersed in the sound. In my opinion, ear is the most vulnerable and uncanny sense organ due to its being trapped easily. You can close your eyes not to see, breath from your mouth not to smell, but no earplug is sufficient to block the world getting into you. Ear holes, just like your pores, keep letting the outside into the body. That is one of the reasons why auditory entrainment through rhythm can lull someone into sleep, make people chant
slogans, dance in a trance together in a club, march in the army, get lost in a religious or spiritual ecstasy.

The first rhythm a human being ever hears is the pulse of the mother in the uterus. Life has its rhythm in the blood that makes noise ringing in the infant’s ears. According to Trevarthen, “pulse or rhythm and affective sympathy are the two main components of attunement between mother and infant” (Gibbs 2010: 198). So it is also the first experience of affective attunement between two beings. The infant is open to all the sounds of life in the world, yet is closest to the mother’s voice and sound of the rhythms of her body. The rhythm of language and the tone of the mother’s voice begin to form the human psyche. This process continues after birth and it is a gradual and long-term process to be able to separate oneself from the imprints of the rhythms and sounds of the world as inside and outside are gradually divided and boundaries of self are established. These boundaries are porous and leaky, but still need to preserve a certain intensity and directionality of life forces for the organism to survive.

Rhythm can open one to the breathing and voice of the other. Aksu mentioned a spectator’s comment on the fact that his breathing changed with her breathing. Hallos, none of which is uttered with a flat, blank or apathetic tone by the performer, direct the affective intensities to the audience. The underlying rhythm and expressive tone in the language becomes an element of entrainment in the process of listening. Gibbs explains that one’s movements and gestures are synchronized with one’s speech and the listener picks these synchronically as both the speaker and the listener are entrained (Gibbs 2010: 197). The rhythm of doing and saying things may become very similar especially among family members or partners. The exaggerated version of this mimetic entrainment is best represented in Woody Allen’s film Zelig (1983). Zelig, the protagonist in the movie, is the embodiment of entrainment and mimesis as his boundaries evaporate with each of his encounters and he emulates all the characteristics of the other, becoming the other.
In order to be entrained affectively with the other and to be open to the ecology of sensations between bodies, one has to listen to the other. Opening such a space can be possible first by listening to oneself as an observer so that an inner space is ready to receive the other’s flowing or stuttering words and affects. The way the performer in *Hallo!* described her listening to herself exemplifies how one can transform the influx of affects emerging in the body into a performance:

*It is related to deep listening. Spiritually, I moved to such a state. (...) How can I keep moving with what I hear? How can I live with what I hear? Sometimes it is hard to accept what reaches the surface from the depths. How can I live with it? By opening a quiet, safe and compassionate space for it.... At the same time, I am running... I reflected on how to put these two together.* (Gizem Aksu, May 20, 2015, shared with the audience during the second part of the performance)

The concept of deep listening is related to the Buddhist practices, particularly Thich Nhat Hanh who calls it compassionate / deep listening. According to Hanh, deep listening is compassionate like a mother’s embrace. He refers to the retreat they realized with Palestinians and Israelis who were traumatized by the conflict in the region (2013). In that retreat, gradually each group was able to listen to the other. Accordingly, when we learn to face what surfaces or appears in ourselves and to live with it without guilt and resentment, it can be possible to have the courage and space to hear the other, particularly one’s so-called enemies.

Attending to one’s own affects, one is able to hear the others. Brennan explains that people can listen to what they are feeling and try to identify them with words. Discernment is realized only with “living attention or love” (Brennan 2004: 139). However, if “the heart is sealed”, affects harden (ibid.). Then, it can be harder to unclog the flow of energy that might have been depleted by negative affects. For Brennan, heart is not a mere metaphor. She refers to Henry Abramson’s comments on Rabbinic literature according to which affects are carried in the blood as blood circulates through the heart, so do all the emotions, therefore, the heart “knows” one’s affects (Abramson cited by Brennan 2004: 114). Listening to
oneself with love and affection, one is able to release the occluded life force. This thinking and feeling process can be materialized with the aid of language as one searches for the right word or may need to create new words to signify feelings. Others’ words are at hand and one can extend towards the other that points to a new vocabulary of thought.

“Taking on other’s feelings” implies a different sense of boundaries set between the self and the other which is distinct from the barriers raised between people projecting negative affects on to the others (Brennan 2004: 123). One can listen to the other when one is able to discern both one’s own and the other’s feelings by sensing them rather than setting boundaries to expel the others while hurling affects of anger and resentment at them. Kindness, Brennan suggest, is paying attention not to transmit negative affects to or inflict pain on others (124). Discernment of feelings can only be realized in silence when tempestuous affects are suspended for a brief moment (128). Then one is able to listen to one’s inner verbal loop and examine them. With this practice one can learn to be attentive to the others’ feelings and listen to them empathetically. This method has been prescribed by many mystical traditions such as Buddhism and Sufism. Brennan’s reference source, though, is Immanuel Kant. Brennan proposes that one needs to discontinue the loop of negative affects in order to resist violence (135). Although easier said than done, one also must learn to be able to stay in equilibrium when aggressive or hateful affects are projected on oneself. This is also the challenge of the dancer in Hallo! who becomes a vessel of others’ affects. She is vulnerable in the way she is subjected to all kinds of negative affects. However, in a theatrical setting –be it a performance venue, a house or a factory- hopefully the social codes apply. Nonetheless, the performer may need protective methods such as not taking these projections personally in order to keep running and performing.

Attending to other’s bodily and facial expressions and movements is a form of listening. Affects are generally reflected in one’s words, which, especially in psychoanalytical practice, are believed to release the energetic clogging of the psyche. Brennan claims that such words are expressed when they are pushed by a
life drive (140). Listening to oneself is a practice of finding the right word for a feeling. Similar to Brennan’s approach, the second part of *Hallo!*, the spectators are being listened to. The space provided for the audience can experienced as an obligation to express oneself even though there is no obligation to speak. For such intimate affects to be shared right after they have been experienced, one may need time and a safe space, which might not be a performance venue among the strangers. However, the knowledge of this possibility of being heard can transform a spectator’s own view on listening and being heard into a new direction. For instance, when *Hallo!* was performed in a factory, one of the workers expressed his realization that his wife was crying out *hallo* and he never heard her. I don’t argue that an artistic practice needs to raise consciousness in a didactic way or the end of a performance can be reduced to a moral and/or political message to be taken home. Nevertheless, everyone creates his/her narrative of the action on the stage. Besides, there is nothing wrong for a husband to have that moment of realization especially in Turkey where violence against women increased up to 1400 % between 2002 and 2015.  

The question of empathy arises with the theme of listening to the other. There are numerous experiments conducted in science in order to understand how empathy functions. Daryl Cameron, who bases his arguments on the recent scientific researches, claims that empathy is not an autonomic response, but rather is shaped by many variants such as motivation and choice that affect a person (Cameron 2015: n.p.). People tend to “avoid empathy under certain motivational conditions” (Pancer et al. 1979; Sow, Batson and Todd 1994 cited in Cameron 2015: n.p.). In *The Empathy Exams*, Leslie Jamison explains, “[e]mpathy isn’t just something that happens to us – a meteor shower of synapses fining across the brain – it’s also a choice we make: to pay attention, to extend ourselves. It’s made of exertion, the dowdier cousin of impulse” (2014: 55). Empathy also entails parochialism in that people can be insensitive to the suffering of outgroups such as homeless people

---

who are dehumanized as if they lack mental capacity and are able to do harm (Cameron 2015: n.p.). Empathy is compared with compassion in various experiments according to which “compassion is not felt as distressing as and exhausting to the same extent as experience sharing” because people prefer their own emotions to others’” (Singer et al. 2014 cited in Cameron 2015: n.p.). In this respect, mindfulness studies in an academic context (e.g. Stanford University, CCARE\(^{33}\)) highlight how one can be aware of one’s emotions without being overwhelmed and how one can focus on compassion and feeling others.

Cameron also emphasizes that “moving in synchrony with one another” increases the potential for compassion (n.p.). Similar to the feelings of solidarity created while dancing together rhythmically both at demonstrations and in the studio, the inner mimicry or kinaesthetic empathy generated by the rhythmic running of the dancer in *Hallo!* can activate both affective empathy and compassion. This does not mean absolute identification with the person who is running from or towards something on a treadmill. Neither is it a cathartic moment that requires preservation of one’s distance from the performer and the “purification” of negative affects as the Aristotelian term suggests\(^{34}\). Rather, this involves existence of two separate individuals who can attend and listen to each others’ feelings as the circle is completed in the second part of the performance.

Empathy also excludes judgment of the other while accepting the vulnerability of the other for whose pain one opens space and time by listening. On the other hand, Sara Ahmed argues that the painful testimonies of indigenous Australians cannot be shared either by sympathy or empathy (Ahmed 2004: 39). The others who did not undergo the same tragedies cannot experience that pain. Thus, the aim is not the creation of fellow feeling in respect to the pain of the other, but “an attentive hearing” which confirms that such pains cannot be reconciled. Ahmed suggests, “learning to live with and beside each other, and yet we are not as one” (ibid.). I agree with Ahmed that it is not possible to experience someone else’s

\(^{33}\) The Center for Compassion and Altruism Research and Education, Stanford Medicine.

pain, however, one can feel pain while listening attentively to the other’s suffering.

Without boiling down the potentials of the intensities in a dance performance such as *Hallo!* to a teleological meaning or political content, it is also inevitable to draw parallelisms between the political situation of Turkey at the time of its production. Teker explains the effect of the experiences during and after the Gezi Uprising on this dance piece. Moreover, the suppressive political situation in Turkey raised the urgency of listening to each other’s pain for the revival of the peace process to terminate polarization. Ankara Bombing on 10 October, 2015 was the breach opened by the creation of terror that continued in a series of bombings. If this gap widens, then it takes more time to heal and hear each other. As Ahmed and Brennan suggest, attentive hearing and listening are necessary to be able to live together. *Hallo!* marks such an urgency as the audience is immersed in the affective intensity of not being heard or listened to.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, I tried to conceive the affective aspects of dancing together such as transmission of affects, attunement, mimesis, dialogue, and relationality of bodies in general with a focus on the interviews conducted with participants of various improvisational dance practices in a non-profit independent dance studio. Then I explored how a dance piece can be interwoven affectively in-between the dancer and the audience members in terms of attunement, transmission, kinaesthetic empathy, listening, and audience participation. It is still possible to ask: Do we need affective attunement to experience the in-between in a fulfilling way? As Björk sings in her song titled *Stonemilker* (2015), why do we “wish to synchronize our feelings”? The feel good sense of affirming togetherness can equally be doubtful; however, attunement is also a mode of connection that is realized by opening and closing a bodily relationality while being sensitive and sensible to the ecology of mortal, vulnerable yet resilient beings. Hence, what matters in bringing all these details of affect theory into the discussion of these
two examples is the way they open the in-betweeness to questions about boundaries, inside-outside and the porousness of bodies. Despite boundaries, experimenting with the affective relationality can provide a possibility of creating new forms of relations with each other as in the cases of Çati and Hallo! Thus this can be accomplished when we attend and listen to each other. Listening to the interviewees, listening to the audience, listening to each other while we are dancing together, in general listening to the affective in-between woven by moving bodies is another way to create a ground together. We make and remake the ground we share with our movements, which in turn resonate in our daily lives in the way we listen to and care for each other.
Chapter 3

Moving The In-between: Rhythms and Stillness as a Form of Protest

*What does matter is the mutant rhythmic impetus of a temporalization able to hold together the heterogeneous components of a new existential edifice.* (Guattari 1995: 20)

In Turkey, it is common to dance together during demonstrations, strikes and Labour Days alongside singing folk ballads and chanting slogans. In this chapter, firstly, I reflect on how these collective dances (*halay*, *horon*, etc.), which have their roots in the Anatolian village traditions, are a major form of protest across the country. From the “*horon*”s of the Black Sea Region against mining and the construction of hydropower plants to the “*halay*”s of working class struggle and the Kurdish movement, dancing has been the embodiment of solidarity and union for various political causes. Second part of the chapter focuses on the dances during the Gezi Uprising and the wide spread of standing still as a protest when thousands emulated the Standing Man’s act at a critical point of the riots. I am aware of the large scope of these topics especially considering the fact that I don’t intend to utilize an anthropological, ethnographical, sociological or a historical methodology. My curiosity is rather ignited by an interest in the power of affects that are transmitted by such performances that establish social bonds in diverse political contexts.

3.1 Definitions

The collective dances in Asia Minor have their roots in village culture and vary in each region, town and village despite the similarities in themes, music and movements. After the conversion from Shamanism to Islam, the nomadic Turkish tribes settled in a geography that was already full of the traces of Hittite, chthonian, Hellenistic, and Byzantine cultures, and mother goddesses of Anatolian, Mesopotamian, Egyptian and Greek origins, which formed the
The heterodoxy of Anatolia (Asia Minor). The heterodox Islam in Anatolia has strong relations with dance: Alevi semah and Mevlevi sema have philosophical and physical parallelisms with the Shamanistic rituals and Dionysian festivals of the region. Dance continued to be the part of the everyday rituals in the long historical period from Seljuk State to modern Turkey. It is hard and unnecessary to search for a root of these dances in a geography that has been open to nomadic, plural and hybrid ways of being with although diverse states and hegemonic powers forced one identity and attempted to centralize these passages and flows. Yet for the practical purpose of setting a background, I will try to define the terminology and present some of the discussions on the collective dances in Turkey.

Metin And, who wrote about dances and games in Turkey in 1974, explains that he prefers to use the term “village dance” rather than “Turkish folk dance” to refer to the diverse range of dances in rural areas as opposed to the staged dance performances by professional dancers for entertainment in the urban setting (And 2012: 143). The importance of participation as opposed to watching others’ performance is highlighted when he claims that for villagers, the dances that they themselves participate have been highly esteemed as opposed to passively watching a professional dancer. The best male dancer in the village was honoured with a special title symbolic of the dancer’s courage and respectability such as Efe in the Aegean Region, Dadaş in the East and Seymen in the Central Anatolian Region (ibid.). These are still popular yet more generic titles, as their relationship with excellence in dance is less significant today.

And also comments on the word “dance” in Turkish (oyun) and “to dance” (oynamak). Oyun means children’s game; dance; dramatic performance; card and dice games, sports game; play; deception, intrigue. In the pre-Islamic Turkish cultures, both the shamans and the shamanic ritual itself were called oyun (And 2012: 37). Moreover, And analyses the etymological connections between the old Turkish words for dance, magic and wisdom and their relationship with the shamanic culture. It is interesting to note that oynâşmak (“to make love”) also
means “to dance together” although this second sense is rather archaic and not used in present-day Turkish.

Ozturkmen adds that dans (dance) in Turkish “refers to dancing in modern contexts, such as ballet, disco dancing, stage dancing, or ballroom dancing. Dans etmek (to dance) is therefore a modern concept in Turkish use, as opposed to oynamak (to dance/to play) which primarily has a reference to traditionality” (Ozturkmen 2001: 139). Both during the Ottoman Empire and the early Republic period, the Anatolian traditional dances can be classified as village dances or traditional native dances of various ethnic groups; religious dances such as semah of Alevi, sema of the Mevlevi sect (whirling dervishes) and dances of other sufi orders in addition to the professional dances as part of spectacles and entertainment in the urban areas. The western styles of dances were introduced to the Ottoman culture during the modernization and westernization process in the nineteenth century. After the foundation of the republic, ballroom dances such as waltz, tango, fox-trot, twist, etc. were popular among the middle and upper middle classes mainly living in the cities. Both the traditional and modern dances in Turkey underwent many changes in terms of form and the context they are practiced in. The investigation of these changes with regard to history, sociology and anthropology is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, in the context of this research, I believe it is useful to present a brief overview of the development of the “national dances”, “folk dances” or village dances in order to frame the background for the collective dances before I discuss the way they became an element of protest during strikes and demonstrations.

Following the foundation of the republic, the first systemic formulation and classification of village dances began as part of a project of constructing a national identity. Parallel to the formation of the national states in various geographies of the world, “folklore” was an object of research to be utilized as one of the symbols of the new nation. Ozturkmen explicates the relationship between the nation building and national dances as “a continuous process of exclusion and inclusion of the formerly existing aspects of culture, a process of
redefinition or reinvention of the “old” as the new national symbols” (Ozturkmen 2001: 140). In the first years of the republic, the state launched a folklore research program to trace new roots and connections for the nation that highlighted Anatolia and Central Asia as the new geographical sources after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This did not mean to accept the existing cultures and traditions in their heterogeneity and hybridity; on the contrary, it was a step of homogenization of cultures under the umbrella of a certain Turkish identity.

However, like every process, this was not as monolithic as it is easier to view for the sake of theoretical perspective. There were upsides and downsides of this attempt to formulate the Anatolian sources if the objective of creation of a nation in all its imagined forms is put on the other side of the argument. For instance, People’s Houses (Halkevleri), which were opened in 1932 and sponsored by Republican People’s Party, functioned not only as the ideological shaping of the rural communities according to the Ataturk-led revolution, but also played an important role for the education of the rural population in areas like music, drama, sports and dance while in Village Institutes, villagers were taught modern techniques of agriculture, carpentry, construction, mathematics and science. People’s Houses, led by the local people, provided the first step to systematize the village dances and form local troupes (Ozturkmen 2001: 140). These troupes performed during national celebrations and local festivals while representing their towns or villages in nationwide festivals. Ozturkmen asserts that there were two consequences of this transformation: firstly, the local dances were systematized for the stage and secondly, people were exposed to the dances of other regions of the country (2001: 140).

Following the 1950 elections, Democrat Party, which is the first of the right-wing conservative parties with a liberal economical agenda and close ties to the U.S., was in power. People’s Houses (478 at the time) were closed by the government in 1952. Furthermore, the 1950s marked the first wave of migration from the rural areas to the cities. Ozturkmen points to the developments following the internal migration and the introduction of the local dances in the urban centres (2001:
Accordingly, private folk dance clubs were established in the cities and folk dance was introduced to high schools and universities as a social activity. This was also the period when national dances (*milli oyunlar*) began to be called Turkish folk dances and national folk dance competitions were organized. Ozturkmen discusses how the representation of dance form was affected by these changes as dance movements were organized according to a floor pattern of “geometrical shapes such as circles, crosses, diagonal lines, or straight lines” which were applied to all dances and consequently creating a uniformity (2001: 141). The same uniformity applied to the musical instruments and the dancers’ costumes.

I claim that there are two sides of the systematization and classification of any traditional dances. On the one hand, the first attempt to systematize the local data by People’s Houses and afterwards the spread and reorganization of these dances in the urban context were instrumental in the creation of a body of knowledge related to the movement practices of a geography. On the other hand, the individual differences and improvisational elements of the dances were erased by the choreographic and archival endeavours that intended to reconfigure the dances in a defined set of movements. The creative, festive and carnavalque elements were subdued in the schematic choreographies as movement qualities and vocabularies were reduced to formulas. Originally all these dances were always performed collectively at the weddings, circumcision ceremonies, and village festivals and on the day the young men were sent to military service. With the formation of national dance troupes and folklore clubs these dances were turned into spectacles. These spectacles were choreographed for national celebrations in town squares and at schools. Especially the versions that used to take place in the stadiums on the national days until recently included hundreds of dancers displaying traditional dances while forming geometrical patterns and various symbolic compositions. Such large-scale choreographies represented discipline and national unity, rather than collective joy of dancing (Ehrenreich 2007). Halays created by schools and army in the stadiums on national days can be compared with choreographies of collective joy by the state in countries such as Germany.
before WWII, USSR, North Korea, and China.\textsuperscript{35} Moreover, folk dances have been reproduced as a cultural spectacle in the tourism sector (Turkish nights) and the culture industry (big productions by Fire of Anatolia and Shaman Dance Theatre\textsuperscript{36}).

***

Of all the collective traditional dances, \textit{halay} and \textit{horon} are the popular dances that people participate in during strikes, demonstrations and Labour Days. Particularly, \textit{halay} is the most widely known collective dance form in Turkey whereas mainly people of the Black Sea Region origin practice \textit{horon}. The popularity of both forms may stem from the largeness of the geographical areas where they are originally performed. The use of these dances in a political context cannot be configured without the historical developments mentioned above and the propagation of folk dances in the cities that have been the seats of political struggles, primarily, of the working classes. Before I elaborate on the political and affective aspects of \textit{halay} and \textit{horon}, I will provide various descriptions and etymological origins of these genres.

\textit{Halay} is danced hand in hand, shoulder to shoulder or holding the little finger of each other forming a circle or a line and moving rhythmically with sets of steps, halts and jumps varying from region to region. The people at two ends of the group hold handkerchiefs that they wave rhythmically with a series of hand and arm gestures. One person from the group occasionally sings a song while the others repeat him/her. \textit{Halay} is accompanied by traditional musical instruments popular in the region, most commonly by a \textit{davul} (a large double-headed drum that is played with mallets) and a \textit{zurna} (a double reed wind instrument).

\textsuperscript{35} Kinesthetic forms created by young people symbolizing healthy and young bodies of the new nation were also a major part of the national celebrations in Turkey until AKP government.

\textsuperscript{36} Berna Kurt wrote on these two dance companies in “Fire of Anatolia and Shaman Dance, etc: The ‘Evolution’ of the traditional dances” (2010).
There are different propositions for the origin of the word halay. Sevan Nisanyan’s Turkish etymological dictionary offers hilayi/halayi in Kurdish which means “stand, dance, jump”\(^{37}\) as the origin. In Wikipedia yal in Azerbaijani meaning “row, line of chain” is suggested. Deniz Karakurt’s *Turkish Dictionary of Mythologies* traces Turkic and Altaic origins in relation to the pre-Islamic and shamanic systems of faith (Karakurt 2011: 102). Accordingly, halay or alay is a ceremonial dance originally practiced around a bonfire and related to the cult of Al or Hal, fire, life force and eternal cycles.

Horon is from Greek χορός (chorós) meaning “dance; a group of people singing and dancing; the place where people dance”.\(^{38}\) It is danced in the Black Sea Region of Turkey. In Greece people who had to immigrate to Greece from this region during the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations in 1922 also practice horon. Similar to halay, it is danced hand in hand in a circle or a line. It is characterized by the fast foot and leg movements and even faster shaking of the upper torso. These movements are believed to signify the movements of *hamsi* (a silver anchovy fish)\(^{39}\) and the Black Sea\(^{40}\). There are slower versions of horon in the eastern Black Sea towns. *Kemençe* (kementsie, pontic lyra or folk fiddle) and *tulum* (bagpipe) accompany horons.

In Turkey folk dances are classified according to the geographical regions: the Black Sea is *horon* region and the central and southeastern Anatolia are *halay* regions. And asserts that these names do not denote definite genres of dance, but rather they refer to “dance” in general in these geographical regions (And 2012 (1974): 158) and the etymological sources mentioned above support this idea.

\(^{37}\) [http://www.nisanyansozluk.com/?k=halay\&x=0\&y=0 Accessed: 23.02.2016]

\(^{38}\) [http://www.nisanyansozluk.com/?k=horon\&x=0\&y=0 Accessed: 23.02.2016]

\(^{39}\) *hamsi* (a silver anchovy fish) of the Black Sea is the main part of the local cuisine used in diverse range of recipes from bread to dessert besides being an important source of economy.

\(^{40}\) There are numerous mimetic village dances in Turkey in which movements of animals are imitated. This trait can be observed in many indigenous dances across the world.
Innumerable examples of collective folk dances are performed in demonstrations, strikes and uprisings while the regional cultural differences play a major role in the kind of dance a protester is accustomed with. Many urban activists regard halay as “repetitive and old-fashioned” and something they watched or might have become part of on national day celebrations during school years probably with the pressure of a teacher or a parent. One may dance individually in the presence of others in a club whereas halay may seem archaic, rural or unfamiliar to a middle-class activist of urban origins. Sometimes participants may intend to join a halay, but simply they may not know the steps unless it is kasap halayi danced typically at the finale of most of the wedding parties across the country. It is obvious that age, social and economical class, and most importantly rural background have a significant role in one’s habits of dancing. Therefore, whether or not halay or horon is danced depends on who the demonstrators are.

The traditional dances are generally not practiced in the Istanbul pride parades in which many people dance joyfully to the rhythms of the Brazilian drums or other kinds of music while chanting slogans as crowds walk through Istiklal Street. On March 8\textsuperscript{th} Women’s Day, during the Feminist Night Parade in the same street, women march blowing whistles, chanting slogans, dancing, and singing songs accompanied by drums while small groups occasionally dance the halay at various points of the event.\textsuperscript{41} However, the demonstrations in Istiklal Street are mainly in the form of marches, so dancing is rare or individual, yet jumping rhythmically with slogans\textsuperscript{42} during anti-government rallies is common unless the demonstration is related with a tragic event.

On the other hand, halay is predominantly practiced in front of workplaces during strikes. Actually, a strike begins officially with a press release, slogans and

\textsuperscript{41} At the end of the 2015 feminist parade after the press release was read in Turkish and Kurdish, Kece Kurdan ("Kurdish Girl"), a traditional Kurdish song sung by Aynur Doğan was played several times through the loudspeakers while several women were dancing the halay.

\textsuperscript{42} Especially during and after Gezi, demonstrators jumped chanting: “Jump! Jump! Whoever doesn’t jump is Tayyip.”
Halay is frequently referred as the *starter* of a strike or a demonstration in the socialist papers that publish news about the working class. A song made by Grup Yorum called *Grev Halayi* (Halay of Strike), also known as *The Workers’ Halay*, is frequently played during the strikes in addition to the folk ballads sung outside factories as the workers dance hand in hand. I assume that folkloric dancing in protests might have its sources in the first wave of migration from villages to the industrial cities in 1950s. The tradition of collective dancing in villages might be embodied knowledge taken for granted by the workers who moved from villages to cities in the 1950s. Alongside other traditions, they brought with them the halay of the central and south-eastern regions. Simply put, that was the dance they all knew and practiced collectively. However, these dances were already systematized versions developed in the early Republic. The spread and continuous practice of these forms were facilitated by the folklore clubs. The transformation of the village dances mentioned above also explains how people from diverse villages could dance the same type of halay or horon in a similar way even though individual improvisations would exist alongside the schematized versions.

Halay in its original rural context has been a form of social bonding and unity. Therefore, dancing together during strikes was a natural outcome of this tradition. McNeill elaborates on the bonding and uniting aspects of the village dances.

---

43 Grup Yorum is a music band known for their political songs (1985-present). Some of their members were arrested and tortured. Some albums and concerts were banned over the years.

44 The first strike in the Turkish history was that of the telegraph workers in 1872. A general research was not sufficient to find any sources that document whether workers danced during the early strikes or not. This claim would need further historical research into Ottoman documents in Arabic alphabet, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.

45 I don’t intend to fix the working class migrants’ culture or dances in the stagnancy of the traditional even though the traditional can be appropriated for progressive politics, as it is the case in the practice of halay at protests. 1980s and 2000s mark the years that several cities and particularly Istanbul underwent new waves of internal migration and its cultural effects were discussed in articles by writers such as Nurdan Gurbilek (1992) and Berna Kurt (2009). For instance, music was hybridized in various ways: a fatalistic and depressed tone in the 1970s and 80s running as a counter and/or undercurrent of the workers’ movement was projected in the music genre called *arabesk* which entailed not only despair and resentment when faced with the metropolis, but also a reaction against the existing economical, cultural and social status quo. The 2000s witnessed the emergence of dances such as hip-hop, *apachi* (a kind of tektonic or electro dance), revival of breakdance and *kolbastı* (originally a dance from the Black Sea Region) among the youth in the peripheries of Istanbul.
Firstly, I will explain his arguments and then connect them with my train of thought on the continuation of these dances by working classes during strikes and Labour Day rallies. McNeill suggests that dancing together rhythmically was the key element of survival for people as early as the ages of both hunter-gatherers and first farmers (McNeill 1995). Moving together in time was a means of forming social bonds and cohesion. Hunter-gatherers dancing together might have rehearsed moving together at hunt while farmers might have worked the land collectively more easily as they sang together rhythmically. Besides, dancing together might have given them a sense of belonging and safety that was fundamental in the formation of a community. Consequently, the community members shared food and strived to protect their territories and supplies from the threats of wild animals and other groups of people. Later in history, village dances had a similar effect of uniting people besides the function of reducing social frictions and tensions (McNeill 1995: 4).

McNeill explicates how “keeping together in time” functions in terms of rhythm, muscular bonding, and physiological and emotional changes. Dancing together rhythmically sets in motion a sense of “personal enlargement” (McNeill 1995: 2), “an intense fellow-feeling” (9), and “individual discharge of anxiety into collective catharsis” (17). McNeill calls this visceral element of social cohesion “muscular bonding” that he describes as “the euphoric fellow-feeling that prolonged and rhythmic muscular movement arouses among nearly all participants” (2-3). Then, he delineates the physiological responses to the bodily rhythmic movements that begin in the sympathetic and para-sympathetic nervous system. Hormones are excreted by the pituitary gland while other organs such as the hypothalamus, amygdala, and the right side of the cerebral cortex are also affected. Eventually, the left side of the brain, which is the seat of verbal function, is activated. This explains why it takes time to express such experiences verbally (6). McNeill does not claim to offer a precise scientific explanation for the bodily responses of people moving together rhythmically because at the time of his writing the laboratory experiments were primarily focused on the responses to the visual and auditory rhythmic stimuli. However, he asserts that the subconscious
response to the rhythmic kinaesthetic stimulation has a pleasurable effect in the conscious level. Keeping the lack of experimental evidence in mind, McNeill suggests that the “input from muscles and voice” resembles the echoes of the mother’s heartbeats in the uterus (1995: 7). Thus, the euphoric feeling of self-expansion and union experienced while moving together is similar to the pleasant sensation of a fetus in utero.46

Likewise, Teresa Brennan refers to “the sense of well being that comes with a rhythmic entrainment with one's fellows (in dancing for instance)” (Brennan 2004: 70). Entrainment is a form of transmission of affects in which one's nervous and hormonal systems are coordinated with another’s (9). This chemical process can be triggered by visual, auditory and olfactory stimuli. Similar to McNeill’s “muscular bonding”, Brennan’s rhythmic entrainment is a form of relationality that generates positive affects. These positive affects in turn help a community endure times of distress and build resilience. As in McNeill’s notion of collective catharsis, dancing releases the general tension and resolves minor frictions among strikers. Protesters may feel stronger as part of a “we” reanimated by the joy of dancing together. Furthermore, rhythmic entrainment generates empathy, trust and social cohesion among the participants (Koelsch cited in Trost 2014: 213). Their previous social interaction in the workplace or during other protests augments the movement synchronization while dancing and demonstrating (Yu, Watanabe, Shimojo cited in Trost 2014: 213). The sense of belonging, solidarity and communality is reinforced during a strike or a riot as people struggle for shared causes.

In various web forums, workers and state clerks discuss why they dance during strikes. They give reasons such as “to show the unity and solidarity of the workers to the employer”, “to build morale as halay is anti-depressant in the depressing atmosphere of a strike” and “to celebrate resistance like a feast”. A forum member asks humorously whether one has to learn to dance the halay in order to go on a

46 Silvan Tomkins argues that there is no evidence of happiness or pleasure experienced by the baby in the womb. However, while rocking the baby and singing tunes, the rhythms that mimic the heartbeats of the mother soothe the new-born (Tomkins 2008: 225).
strike. A joyful video offers an answer: the workers chant “shoulder to shoulder” while simply jumping shoulder to shoulder during the Renault workers’ strike in 2015 as part of the Metal Workers’ Strike including Ford and Fiat workers.

The first International Workers’ Day celebrated by masses in Istanbul took place in 1976. On May 1, 1977, five hundred thousand people gathered in Taksim Square in Istanbul. The video footages of that historical day show demonstrators dancing the halay. The overflowing joy and excitement of thousands were cut short tragically by fires shot from two buildings in the square and resulted with the death of 36 people. Following this event, May Day rallies in Taksim Square were banned between 1979-2010 although Labour Day continued to be celebrated in other places. After being celebrated with music and dances by thousands that filled the square for three successive years (2010-2012), it was banned again in 2013. The historical significance of Taksim Square for workers’ movement since the 1977 Massacre has also meant increased state security measures and suppression. On May 1, it is impossible to travel to the central districts of Istanbul because the metro and ferry stations are closed and Taksim Square is surrounded by hundreds of policemen in riot gear. People who live or work in these areas are unofficially forced to stay at home. My next example of halay took place on one of those May Days. On May 1, 2015 in Kurtuluş district of Istanbul, the riot police attacked a group of protesters with tear gas and water cannon. After the attack was over and some protesters were arrested, a group of elderly residents put music in their car radio and started to dance the halay in Kurtuluş Street. This small gesture temporarily lifted the spirits of many people stuck in their homes watching the clashes from their windows. Despite being terrorized all day by the violent spectacle of state forces, such a brief incident could be a spark of joy and hope, sometimes the only available tool of resistance.

---

47 The first Labour Day in Ottoman history was celebrated in Skopje in 1909 and in Istanbul in 1912. In the first year of the republic (1923) the Workers’ Day was officially celebrated, but a year later public celebrations were banned. In 1935, May 1 was named as the Feast of Spring and Flowers.
In the Black Sea Region, horon is danced when the locals resist against the construction of hydroplants across the region and mining as in the case of Artvin, Cerattepe. The call for solidarity with the Cerattepe resistance was also an invitation to the horon, which was responded by people dancing in many town squares across the country. On another occasion, in 2014, about five thousand people danced hand in hand creating a halay of 5 km. in Dersim in the eastern Anatolia region in order to protest against the hydroplants which the government was planning to build in Munzur Valley.

A simple web search in Turkish exemplifies hundreds of halays and horons danced to protest all kinds of issues such as violence against women, animal rights, dismissal from work, construction of nuclear and thermal power plants, right to the city, right to water, etc. in addition to some peculiar cases. For instance, a group of shopkeepers in Istanbul burned down their own shops and danced as a reaction to the demolition plans of the local municipality (2009). Another is a halay by statesmen in their black suits in the aisle of a plane to celebrate the first Turkish Airlines flight from Hakkari (2015). The latter example was the state’s appropriation of this dance particularly popular among Kurds - its absurdity put aside.

A similar appropriation can be observed during Newroz, the most important festival of Kurds. Dancing around the Newroz bonfires and jumping over them, a Middle-eastern tradition of celebrating the arrival of spring, have become politicized since the Newroz tragedies of the 1990s in the Kurdish towns and villages of Turkey. Over the years, several governments none of which lacked nationalist traits, tried to trace the origins of Newroz in the central Asian Turkic tribal traditions. Statesmen in suits jumped over symbolic fires as “living proofs” of this claim. Kurds regard the Newroz not only as a time of regeneration in

48 Hakkari was a strategic Kurdish town during the war between Turkish army and PKK in 1984-1999.
springtime, but also as a symbol of political revival and ethnic affirmation of a long suppressed culture. Newroz celebrations of 2014 and 2015 in Diyarbakır where more than a million people gathered were the best examples also shared by more Turkish supporters than ever during a period of ceasefire and hope for the resolution of the Kurdish issue.

Halay and protest are almost synonymous for the Kurdish political movement. Kurdish language and music were banned between 1980 and 1991 whereas dances could not be forbidden. Broadcasting of Kurdish songs could have been prevented while the bodies could emerge anywhere anytime and dance without music. In that respect, the Kurdish dancing bodies have been a site of resistance in various political occasions such as pro-Kurdish political party rallies, anti-government protests, Newroz celebrations, etc., as these bodies multiply in halays that signify the unity and solidarity of the Kurdish people. Kurdish nationalism is also emphasized with national colours (red, yellow, green), traditional costumes and V-sign (associated with supporting PKK), which are also common elements in the Kurdish halays.

The joy, outrage, physicality and power of people dancing together present a threat in the eyes of the centralized homogenous monolithic power embodied in the nationalist state. Hence, in Turkey some people were arrested for dancing “ideolojik halay” (ideological halay): a university student (Van, 2006) and a woman, mother of a two-months old baby (Bursa, 2015) were charged with dancing ideolojik halay. In addition to the “ideological halay” charges, many university students have been accused of “ideological dancing and jumping” (2009), “ideological whistling” (2011)50 and “ideological sitting” (2015)51 by their universities.

Before concluding this section, it is necessary to note that dancing together rhythmically does not automatically lead to freedom and joy or a realm free of macro and micro-fascisms and exclusions. John Protevi indicates the fact that the Nazi celebrations were also joyous, however, their joy was manipulated by marches, slogans and symbols while their rhythmic entrainment was a forced one (Protevi 2009: 51). Therefore, such a rhythmic entrainment neither led to new encounters, nor increased the participants’ power to act in a Spinozist sense. As with affects, rhythmic entrainment can be maneuvered and exploited by the hegemonic powers.

3.3 The Gezi Uprising, Dancing

To live! Like a tree alone and free,
To live! Like a forest in brotherhood...

Nazım Hikmet

A monument does not commemorate or celebrate something that happened but confides to the ear of the future the persistent sensations that embody the event: the constantly renewed suffering of men and women, their re-created protestations, their constantly resumed struggle. Will this be all in vain because suffering is eternal and revolutions do not survive their victory? But the success of a revolution resides only in itself, precisely in the vibrations, clinches, and openings it gave to men and women at the moment of its making and that composes in itself a monument that is always in the process of becoming, like those tumuli to which each new traveller adds a stone. (Deleuze and Guattari 2009: 176-177)

How to write about a past event after so much water has gone under the bridge and the perspectives shifted several times? What is loyalty to the so-called authenticity of the moment as it is made and remade by each one remembering

---

52. These popular lines from a poem titled Pleu by Nazım Hikmet (1902-1963) were written on many banners at Gezi Park and other places where the uprising spread in 2013.
each time? How is it possible to avoid making a past event a nostalgic and static object while trying to unknot or split up the affects that were both the driving force and the consequence of a series of events, which would later be remembered as the Event? How can the present of the past be matched with the present of the writing when one knows the impossibility of capturing it?

To regard the memory of Gezi as a static block made up of pictures and videos of the period has the danger of turning it into a nostalgic object, however, these images also function affectively and set in motion a new possibility of relating with the past and present. According to Teresa Brennan, “images are matters of vibrations” that are “carriers of social matters” (Brennan 2004: 70-71). An image is matter in the sense that it is processed and registered in the body. It is a vibration that causes an “electrical entrainment” just like auditory stimuli (ibid.). Brennan gives the example of a violent image that affects the body no matter how indifferent one feels. Although it is social in origin, its effects are felt physically in the body. The various images of Gezi can function in a similar way triggering affects associated with past experiences.

However, time accumulates between the lived and the present moment and forms layers that modify this connection. Despite the joy of the people dancing at Gezi, watching a video recording of it, one can feel frustration and sadness as if mourning for a lost object. That is how such an image becomes an object of nostalgia severed from its initial spark and affects. While nostalgia entails sadness in which “the mind’s power of acting is diminished or restrained” (Spinoza), the potential of Gezi as an event ceases when we don’t relate to it. As Erin Manning suggests, “[t]o remember we have to forget the what of memory and shift to the how of its strange vibrating surface” in order not to “fall into the clutches of the transcendent traps of nostalgia” (Manning 2013: 56-57). The parallel emphasis on vibration in Deleuze that I quoted at length above manifests how a revolution or an uprising can continue in the vibrations and openings experienced by people. In that respect, Gezi is always becoming and continuously transformed by other struggles and revolts.
Writing on movement and dance as part of the Gezi experience, I can stumble upon another trap that Manning warns about: “memory risks falling into transcendence, into the infinitely regressive search for meaning” and leading us to make “preimposed associations and recognitions, making superficial links between a preconstructed then and now” (Manning 2013: 57). In that sense, the past event is neither yearned for nor configured in a static frame according to one’s perspective or theoretical tools, but rather it is treated as a flow of vibrations and an open-ended, non-teleological source.

***

An unknown yet familiar opening in time is widened by voices, smiles, and gentleness. With anger, excitement, bliss, courage, joy, laughter; sleepless, strong, and feeling more real, physical than ever while standing, shouting, singing, running, marching, applauding together… The bodies of the revolutionary thousands resist any definition as these are the times when words cannot catch up with the velocity of the actions. Only poems may describe the dreamlike ten days of the Gezi commune: “We are the soldiers of Turgut Uyar⁵³” (graffiti in Taksim). “Clark Kent by day, Superman by night”⁵⁴, people from diverse backgrounds met during the resistance against the state violence for their right to the city, their bodies, and for the protection of a park in the centre of Istanbul. The Gezi experience was certainly anti-capitalist as the people shared everything such as food, drinks, clothes, books, and ideas at Gezi where the construction of a shopping mall was prevented while several companies, restaurants, shops, and institutions that support the government were boycotted. Particularly during the commune days, imagination and humour in the streets peaked when the walls of fear collapsed. There was constant creation in every corner of the park: children painting, people dancing, musicians playing music, performances, trees covered with colourful wool knitting, yoga, tango, halay, all shared at the same time by the hundreds who never met each other before. A heterogeneous community of diverse backgrounds and political orientations acted collectively forming an anti-

⁵³ Turgut Uyar (1927-1985) is an avant-garde Turkish poet.
⁵⁴ A banner at Gezi referring to the white-collar professionals that joined the protests.
government resistance. You could see competing football team fans hand in hand as “Istanbul United”; a man carrying a Turkish flag with an Ataturk portrait running hand in hand with a boy holding a BDP (Kurdish political party) flag. Communists and socialists protected the anti-capitalist Muslims during their Friday prayer in Taksim Square. Feminists and lgbttq members were erasing the sexist swearwords on the walls. In Istanbul, a survival city where fury reigns, a sudden wave of gentleness rose. The city was transformed by constant becoming and a creative flow. The Gezi experience can remind us of what Deleuze and Guattari wrote on May’68:

What counts is what amounted to a visionary phenomenon, as if a society suddenly saw what was intolerable in it and also saw the possibility for something else. It is a collective phenomenon in the form of: “Give me the possible, or else I’ll suffocate...” The possible does not pre-exist, it is created by the event … The event creates a new existence, it produces a new subjectivity (new relations with the body, with time, sexuality, the immediate surroundings, with culture, work...). (Deleuze and Guattari cited in Zourabichvili 2012: 11)

It was not only the recognition of a possibility, but also actually living one version of possibilities. Individuals participated in the event that had its own dynamics. Event is a possibility unfolded by its actors moment by moment. It is made up of people that perform a no. The state might have covered it with its power mechanisms, affective engineering, arrests, killings, and violence; yet, fidelity to the event can be realized by connecting to the life force, not necessarily joy, but the determination of conatus that fuelled the uprising.

The Gezi experience demonstrated the possibility of creation of meaning together. As the uprising was still happening, like a note to be remembered in the future with a reference to the spirit of ’68, it was named as the Gezi Spirit that doesn’t only signify a peaceful form of resistance, but also the multiplicity of affects (hope, joy, outrage, fear, sadness, etc.), gestures and attitudes. At the same time, it
means solidarity, humour, creativity and collaboration. To call it a spirit is not capturing it in a transcendence that exceeds life; on the contrary, it implies the materiality of the bodies that acted together to create new relations and possibilities. Even though to identify a time period with a general spirit is not exactly the same as identifying it with one affect, there is still one point that requires attention. To designate a general mood to a historical time period and to name the affective environment of crowds can mean to ignore the individual differences and the power of each encounter (Anderson 2014: 108). Ben Anderson discusses how both popular media and academia tend to characterize epochs by a dominant affect or public mood such as an “age of anxiety” or an “age of fear” (107). On the other hand, to assume the existence of a Gezi Spirit even metaphorically is exactly a reference to the multiplicity of the encounters, affects and differences.

This experience was not limited with the park or Istanbul as millions of dissenting people across Turkey were in the streets. As Judith Butler explained in her talk in Istanbul (2013), the people who could not be out in the streets to demonstrate include the disabled, prisoners and many others for various reasons. According to Butler, their experiences cannot be regarded as secondary compared to the experiences of the ones actively engaged in the streets. I would add that the event was a physical encounter; no matter how far a person was whilst witnessing it on social media and live streaming platforms. An affective contagion was produced across oceans on the conditions that one related to the city, people and the cause.

I certainly would not like to reduce being oppositional, social background and political ideologies to affects, but affects function more powerfully than any knowledge or information because the body learns faster when affectively stimulated and information is embodied. The intense emotional contagion plays a significant role in creative activity and humour as joy dominates the body whose

---

55 Except one town (Bayburt) according to the report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
capacity to act is increased in a Spinozist sense. Gezi protesters did not form a community dominated by one affect, but rather the shared time frame of intensities and multiplicities supported the resistance while a potentiality was being transformed into unexpected forms of togetherness. Not everyone could be on the barricades. People acted depending on their abilities: at home banging pots and pans\(^5\); standing still in their streets; shouting at the police to expel them from their neighbourhoods; witnessing, filming or photographing the incidents in their streets and share them on social media in the times when nothing was broadcasted about the uprising on the Turkish media; aiding the flow of information on social media in order to assist the protesters in the streets; and even just feeling, feeling excited, angry, furious, happy, joyful and become part of the spirit.

To understand the spread of the Gezi Protests across the country and the contagion of the affects among the participants, it is crucial to present an overview of some of the perspectives on the transmission of affects and crowd psychology.

The social sciences of 19\(^{th}\) century engaged with the spread of affects, ideas, and particularly crowd behaviour, however, the application of these theories were usually tainted with right-wing politics that conceived the crowds as open to manipulation and suggestion due to their inferior mental capacities (Thrift 2008, Brennan 2004). Brennan discusses some of the crowd psychology theories of the nineteenth century and early twentieth century turning to writers such as Gustave Le Bon, William McDougall, Sigmund Freud, Floyd Allport, and Wilfred Bion. Le Bon maintains that people in crowds are possessed by the “collective mind” which makes them lose their rational faculty, act like “primitive people” and do things that they would not do in their individual lives (Brennan 2004: 53). Hypnosis and suggestion were proposed as the causes of crowd behaviour under the spell of a “leader” (Brennan 2004: 54). Le Bon and many of his contemporaries emphasized the pathological and irrational aspects of emotions

\(^5\) The first version of this protest in Turkey was realized in a civil disobedience movement in February, 1997 when people turned their lights on and off and banged pots and pans in their balconies every night at 9 p.m. for a month as a reaction to the connections between the government and mafia, revealed in a traffic accident (known as Susurluk Accident) in 1996.
and deprecated any gatherings for social causes. Freud also highlighted the role of the leader with whom people replaced their ego ideals. However, unlike Le Bon, he recognized the individual differences in the reactions to the contagion of emotions. McDougall explained suggestibility with telepathy and defined contagion in terms of imitation and the effects of sight and sound (Brennan 2004: 56-57). As for Allport, the individuals in a crowd imitated each other, however, the madness emergent in groups is based on the madness in common among the individuals that gathered for the same purpose with mutual interests.

In contrast to the class-biased and conservative views of crowds, the 1960s were marked by an affirmative perspective that indicated the rational aspects of gathering to achieve political goals. Brennan proposes that the transmission of affects and “the intelligence and conscious motivations of persons” influence the group psychology (Brennan 2004: 61). In addition, she draws attention to the violence and vandalism of some football fans and the insanity of seemingly rational gatherings on everyday basis. Therefore, she neither celebrates nor denounces the power of collective affects.

For Brennan, contagion is an affective transfer between individuals in a crowd. However, the transmission of affects is not just the passage of affects that impinge on a passive body because individuals’ affects form a “new composite” of affects, which also spreads among the group members. Furthermore, rhythmic and mimetic identification, and nervous and chemical entrainment play a role in the transmission of affects.

The horizontal and spontaneous organization of protests across the world has recently been a common trait also shared by the Gezi Protests, which did not have any leaders. In Turkey, the mainstream media commented on the crowds in the streets with a reaction similar to the conservative 19th century writers mentioned above. Contrary to this biased view, it is possible to talk about an intelligent crowd that acted in solidarity during the Gezi Uprising even though the participants had diverse political backgrounds and demands. I agree with Brennan
that the gathering of people generates new affects as each encounter triggers a new affective process. Simultaneously, the affective contagion has an impact on people especially due to rhythmic entrainment and mimetic identification while they are dancing, chanting slogans and singing together.

Nevertheless, the individuals would not experience the same affects or even if they do, they would process them differently based on their personal, social and psychological differences for the simple reason that they are not passive automatons. As Sara Ahmed argues, we are not affected in the same way by the affects in a room –or Gezi Park in this context. Even if we are affected, we do not have the same relationship to that affect, so it is not the affects, but the object of affects that circulates between people. (Ahmed 2004: 10-11). Ahmed’s “model of sociality of emotions” highlights their social and cultural aspects (9). In this regard, she refers to Émile Durkheim according to whom emotions are imposed on the individuals from without rather than originating in them. As discussed previously in Chapter 1, Ahmed compares the “inside out” and “outside in” models of emotions and criticizes them for presuming that two objective and separate realms of inside and outside exist (ibid.). In the “outside in” model, the crowd is seen as an individual who has feelings. Ahmed opposes to the assumption that feelings are “something ‘I’ or ‘we’ have” (10). Instead, Ahmed suggests that emotions form the boundaries that in turn shape the ‘I’ and ‘we’ and constitute the social. Therefore, she rejects the affective contagion model (e.g. of Silvan Tomkins) that considers affects as things passing between people.

I agree with Ahmed’s view that the object of affects circulates and the emotions constitute the boundaries between people. In the case of the Gezi solidarity, the individuals in the park shared the same object of affect, still, the contagious aspect of the circulation of affects in the crowd needs further explanation. Randall Collins’ notion of ritual connected to the affective entrainment becomes relevant at this point. According to Collins (2004), the group members of a ritual can experience affective entrainment when they share the same rhythm. Inspired by Durkheim’s notion of ritual, Collins’ theory of the interaction ritual places the
situation rather than the individual at the centre of microsociology. It focuses on the “momentary encounters among human bodies charged up by with emotions and consciousness because they have gone through chains of previous encounters” (Collins: 2004: 3). Accordingly, a political demonstration is a form of ritual, so are smoking and sexual interaction. A ritual with a successful outcome increases the energy of its participants whereas a failed ritual drains their energies. Collins argues that the rhythmic entrainment, shared affects and “mutual focus of attention” are important elements of affective contagion and synchronization (76). Having common goals, focusing on one purpose, gathering, forming boundaries with the outside and the arrangement of the place are the crucial components of a ritual with high emotional content such as a protest. The solidarity and the emotional arousal of the participants increase the synchronization of bodily movements and facilitate the collective action (77). The feeling of solidarity and belonging is maintained only temporarily unless they are transformed into long-term affects. A symbol functions as an element of maintaining the affective intensity (83). These symbols are in circulation particularly during other protests and anniversaries. The Gezi Protests also created its own symbols, which will be discussed in the next section. Before the end of June 2013, badges, t-shirts, flags and bags, etc. with the pictures of the iconic figures of Gezi were already on sale in the park. These symbols still circulate especially on its anniversary. Besides, some of the slogans and songs are identified with those days and repeated during other protests as a reminder of the Gezi Spirit.

Gezi showed that what the bodies can do surpasses expectations of any organizations that would gather people on a predetermined time and place for a demonstration. For instance, thousands marched on the Bosphorus Bridge following an inner urge to move together without manipulation or direction of an organization. The collective decisions and actions taken immediately by an intelligent crowd could not have been planned or foreseen. The joy of connecting with each other increased the life energy and the physical and mental abilities of people who rose above the limits set by fear. Each person was able to do what he/she could not have imagined before. The power of the crowd and the creative
outburst at Gezi increased the capabilities of bodies and transformed what is sayable and doable. Dancing together was an expression of the joy of being with and a general projection of good encounters.

Foti Benlisoy compared Gezi to Paris Commune during which a “dialectic leap” was realized as the historical continuity of exploitation and domination was disrupted (Benlisoy 2015). In Paris Commune, Benlisoy comments, the revolt of the barricades against the lit-up boulevards was similar to the barricades of Gezi against the construction of a shopping mall. I agree with the author who says that this leap should be like riding a bicycle or walking: once learned, it should not be forgotten.

***

The white-collar workers found themselves in a chain of people carrying stones to a barricade. The chain of people hand in hand protected the anti-capitalist Muslims praying in Taksim Square from the riot police. The mothers hand in hand circled Gezi Park to support their children as a reaction to the prime minister who ordered families to urge their children to leave the streets and return home. A hand holds the hand of the other next to her/him, a paving stone/food package/garbage bag are given from hand to hand to hand… The mimetic gesture of holding hands and/or passing items in a chain of hands multiplied, as one became a part of the solidarity mechanism.

The same gesture of holding hands is produced each time a halay is set in motion. Either during a celebration, a demonstration or a factory strike, with or without music, generally singing together, one person holds the hand of the other and another person holds the hand of another as the chain gets longer and longer in seconds. Gezi Park and Taksim Square were full of hundreds that danced continuously. Moreover, dancing was not limited to the traditional collective dances. Many genres of dances existed side by side: tango, contemporary, samba, and traditional styles. Dancing together was part of the festive celebratory
atmosphere that can be called *carnivaleque* in the Bakhtinian sense to refer to lightness, humour, polyphony, co-existence of diverse groups and resistance to the authoritarian regime (Bakhtin 1984b).

Barbara Ehrenreich, writing on the collective joy and power of dancing together, demonstrates the need for conviviality in the contemporary societies as she points to the healing aspects of collective dances (Ehrenreich 2007). Dancing in the streets at the time of Gezi was an outburst of that strong need almost in a cathartic and ecstatic way. As David Harvey said on the second anniversary of the Gezi Resistance, “Gezi was a struggle to create an objective unalienated alternative in an alienated environment.” The gestures of forming a chain hand in hand and the passing things from hand to hand were a form of reaching toward the other.

The Gezi Uprising was not only carnivalesque as if all the violence, killings, tear gas and water cannon attacks did not happen, however, before fear and terror took control of the tired bodies, the festive spirit lasted even between the police attacks. Singing, dancing and humour were the most powerful ways of resistance on many occasions even when faced with the riot police. Many of the young policemen might have wished to be on the rebels’ side witnessing all the fun they had to fight against.

### 3.4 Standing Still

The Gezi Uprising had many iconic figures: the woman in red whose hair went up due to the tear gas sprayed right on her face; the woman in blue with arms stretched as if welcoming the water cannon that shot at her; the naked man in Istiklal Street; Vildan Teyze (Auntie Vildan), the woman with a head scarf wearing a Guy Fawkes mask; the elderly woman with a sling shot (who was

---


59 Seven police officers committed suicide in Istanbul during the Gezi days. The cause of their suicides is not known.
detained during another protest); Talcidman who carried a big tank of stomach medicine on his back to heal protesters’ eyes after tear gas attacks; the musician with a guitar in front of a police riot vehicle; the man with a Guy Fawkes mask playing an accordion; çArşı (a major group among Beşiktaş football team fans who have always voiced their political and oppositional views both in the stadium and at the demonstrations and became more active during the Gezi Uprising) and Davulcu Vedat (Vedat The Drummer) from çArşı group who captured an earth digger in the street and chased a police riot vehicle; the people reading books in front of the riot police with shields; Darth Vader; the protester with the rainbow flag on the barricades; the moonwalker dancer dancing during the police attacks; the whirling dervish with a gas mask (Ziya Azazi); and several lovers kissing among the flames on the barricades… And 8163 people were wounded (according to March 2014 records); 11 people lost their eyes; (according to 2013 mid-June records) 8 dogs, 63 cats, 1028 birds were killed due to the excessive use of tear gas and rubber bullets. The dead to be remembered, a wound in the memories of revolutionaries at the same time still part of the struggle as the trials continue in 2016: Ali Ismail Korkmaz, Abdullah Cömert, Ethem Sarısülük, Mehmet Ayvalitaş, MedeniYıldırım, Ahmet Atakan, Hasan Ferit Gedik, Berkin Elvan (14 year old boy who was shot by a tear gas canister and died after 269 days in coma).

The most famous cult figure of Gezi is the Standing Man (Duran Adam) is reminiscent of Tank Man who stood in front of the tanks after the uprising in Tiananmen Square had been suppressed by the Chinese army in 1989. Unlike his Chinese predecessor, Erdem Gündüz, a performance artist and dancer didn’t remain in the Gezi book of anonymity. Two days after the people were expelled from Gezi Park and Taksim Square by water cannons and tear gas, there were an intense frustration and anger in the air. No protester was allowed in the area and the epic days seemed to be over. Just when there was a deep disappointment and heaviness of failure and defeat, Erdem Gündüz started his eight hour-long standing completely still in Taksim Square. The police could not do anything

http://www.duranadam.com/ that has no connection with Erdem Gündüz has lots of photos of the standing man protests. Gündüz’s own website: http://www.erdemgunduz.org/
except searching through his bag three times in case he was a bomber, as they were also taken by surprise. In a short time, social media was full of his pictures and ‘duranadam’ became the top trending hashtag on twitter while many people were joining his standing protest in Taksim. When the riot police started to move preparing for an attack, he decided to end his performance walking back in the opposite direction of the police forces. Nevertheless, the police detained some of the standing people in the square.

Gündüz’s act of civil disobedience was one of the pivotal points of the Gezi resistance: It gave people hope and opened a possibility of another form of protest after the loss of the park and the square despite nineteen days of struggle. He became a symbol of standing up, perseverance, and patience. In his interviews, he emphasized the fact that he was merely one of the resisters and others could take up his act and continue the protest in other places. It spread more quickly than he could foresee both at home and abroad. A woman stood where Ethem Sarısülük was murdered by a policeman in Ankara and hundreds stood in the streets where they lived; the white collar employees in a shopping mall (Kanyon), the lawyers at the court of justice in Istanbul, and the professors in front of the university rector’s building (at 18 March University and they were prosecuted in 2013). This form of protest was emulated by people struggling for other causes. For instance, the farmers in Kurşunlu Village (Çanakkale, Bayramiç) stood in silence protesting against the cutting of 760 trees for a mining pit. In Taksim there were dozens of people just standing everyday, mostly with a book in their hands. The effect of the act was so powerful that the police had to do something in return, consequently, they were told to sit down and read books facing the standing people in front of their base (Atatürk Cultural Centre). So policemen and standing people were reading books together in the same square. Then some government supporters arrived in the square and began walking in circles alluding to the party slogan of AKP (Justice and Development Party) “No Stopping, Keep Proceeding” which began to be used since the general elections in 2007.
There are many psychological, political and social reasons for the fast spread of the standing protest in Turkey. It is possible to read it with a reference to the affective contagion. Nigel Thrift explicated how political engagement in Western cultures is limited to brief periods and tied to the affective impact of certain events (Thrift 2008: 240). Thrift claims that Western cultures “can be ‘switched on’ by particular issues with high affective resonance” (ibid.). In the case of Turkey, left-wing, feminist and queer, environmentalist organizations and chambers of numerous professions (architects, doctors, bar associations, academics) and workers’ unions are generally the organizers and driving force of demonstrations. However, after Hrant Dink (an Armenian journalist) was murdered in 2007, and four years later, after Gezi Park was emptied, the response of thousands was spontaneous and direct as people flowed into the streets without directions of any leaders or organizations. The part of the society that had an anti-government stance reacted in an unforeseen way when triggered affectively. There was no one to tell thousands of people to go into the streets after the protesters in the park were evacuated fiercely with tear gas. Just like it happened after the murder of Hrant Dink, crowds –mostly that never protested before– following their anger against the injustices, crying “enough”, could no longer sit at home and watch “penguin documentaries”61 on television, but felt a strong urge to go out and stand in solidarity with the victims of violence for the protection of a park. Fury, frustration and empathy triggered a surge although affects are not the only reason. Similarly, the standing man protest spread partly due the affective contagion that influenced the society. Yet, affective contagion does not include all the people in the society. People neither get affected in the same way nor express their emotions similarly. There are cultural, social and personal differences of degrees of being affected. However, the number of people standing still testified the power of the act.

Even though Gündüz is a performance artist and a dancer, in his interviews he didn’t use the word “performance” to define his standing that is, in a way, a

---

61 CNNTurk was broadcasting a documentary on penguins while Gezi was happening. The silence of the media during the Gezi Uprising made most of the Turks realize that it was the same media that told them everything they knew about the Kurdish issue.
durational performance as a form of protest. He repeated several times that this was the way he resisted and he was only one of the protesters. In my conversation with him, he drew my attention to the fact that he thinks with his body rather than with words: “If one is stuck during an improvisational dance, the body itself finds the solution and opens up a way to do the next movement”. In my interview, he also said that he felt pain due to the latest developments at Gezi, and his body’s response to this pain and anger was going to Taksim Square and standing still without making any plans or choreographic preparations in advance. He added that he saw “a candle light” that he himself ignited at AKM (Atatürk Cultural Centre), and he wanted to share his hope with the people. He was standing as a civilian citizen and he wasn’t connected to any organization unlike the pro-government sources, which tried to prove surreal conspiracy theories such as being a spy just because he performed his dance pieces in other countries in the past. Such conspiracy theories, ridiculous as they may sound, can endanger a person’s life in Turkey. He explained that like the other Gezi demonstrators, he had already transcended the fear of violent police intervention. His Kemalist background and his looking at Ataturk Cultural Centre where a huge Turkish flag and an Ataturk Portrait were hanging was praised by the nationalist media while it was a reason for criticism of many people who would have preferred to face Gezi Park, without adding a nationalist tinge to that powerful act. Gündüz told me that the reason why he was staring at AKM was that the government closed down AKM since 2007 and they did not start any restoration work in addition to their remarks about its complete destruction.

Ataturk Cultural Centre which was built in 1969 was a state-owned venue where classical music concerts, operas, classical ballet, contemporary dance, theatre, art exhibitions took place. For classical music, opera, ballet, and dance it was the only place in Istanbul for many years. Especially, with its architecture, it has been the symbol of modernist heritage, so the closure and demolition of the building represent not only the destruction of an art centre, but also the eradication of any traces of the early Republic’s modernist ideology. It is situated in one of the most valuable parts of Istanbul, right in Taksim Square, therefore it could not remain
outside the construction boom of shopping malls and hotels in the city. Due to the big reaction against its demolition, the government had accepted the restoration of AKM by Sabancı family, however, during the Gezi protests, the PM announced that he would destroy and replace it with a “baroque opera house”. AKM’s role in the art scene of Istanbul, the relation between state and art, the Republic’s foundational ideology and the history of its connection with art; neoliberal construction ideology of the AKP government; the social history of the square (a site for major demonstrations such as May Days and Prides) are the themes of an extensive study which will not be part of my present research, however, I find it essential to make this brief remark in order to understand the standing people. The protesters occupied AKM during the Gezi Resistance and the whole building was covered with posters and banners of various socialist, communist, anarchist, and Kemalist political groups and the flags of the football teams of Istanbul. After the police evicted the square, those banners were replaced with a giant Turkish flag and Ataturk poster while AKM was turned into a police base. Gündüz, who watched several dance and theatre performances for years in this building, was naturally outraged by the conversion of a cultural centre into a police base.

Gündüz added that he recalled Ataturk’s speech to the Turkish youth while he was standing. The choice of the direction he faced has certainly Kemalist and nationalist roots, however, like many Kemalist young people who were transformed by the Gezi experience, his political stance seems to have altered when he said that this system had to be destroyed completely and “maybe there should be anarchism”. He also told me that he used to live in Tarlabası⁶², and if you live there, you should learn a few words in Kurdish. The reason why I am implying such points in his talk is to prevent the image of a typical nationalist exclusionist figure. On the other hand, his understanding of politics is framed by the representational party politics as he told me that he didn’t “stand there for political reasons and others tried to interpret it in a political context”.

⁶² Tarlabası is a district near Taksim Square where mostly Kurds, African immigrants, Roma people and transgender sex workers live. Recently, many buildings in Tarlabası have been demolished in the process of gentrification.
In my interview, Gündüz also mentioned that it would not have mattered if he stood in a random place on a random date, for instance in France on May 17th rather than in Istanbul on June 17th and emphasized the criticality of his timing. He also drew my attention to his most recent dance piece called Witch Tree in which he investigated themes such as the relationship between sculpture and the body, and focused on standing still and destroying dance itself. Therefore he believed he might not have chosen to stand still out of blue. Edip Cansever’s poem called Witch Tree was recited as part of his dance piece and it entailed phrases that augured his standing for trees in a park:

I am passing from a path I have created on my own, / On the path, I see a dry Witch Tree. / I'm looking at the Witch tree in silence. (...) I am a man who flows / in order to be explained. / And I stand there, / On the path / That I created on my own. / And there I stand, and there I am, / since I stood there, I am still, / standing still.63

Similarly, Gurur Ertem64 (2014) reminds us of the Turkish cast version of Jérôme Bel’s The Show Must Go On in which Gündüz was one of the dancers and in one section of the performance where the dancers were singing along the songs they listened through the headphones, he chose singing “I am a walnut tree at Gülhane Park”, Cem Karaca’s song (1987) based on a poem by Nazım Hikmet.

***

On May 31st, 2013, Defne Erdur decided to do a standing performance as the continuation of her series called In Between Prayers – Doing Nothing65 between 17:13 -20:38 (between the afternoon and the evening praying times) at Gezi Park. She didn’t know that this would be the day when the Gezi Movement started. In

---

63 Taken from Erdem Gunduz’s website.
64 I will refer to her reading of the Standing Man later in the text.
65 Defne’s standing performance In Between Prayers- Doing Nothing was first realized in a public space at the Court of Justice in Istanbul on April 30th, 2013.
the early hours of the morning, the police attacked the activists who were sleeping at Gezi Park in order to protect it from demolition. Consequently, the longest period of public resistance in the history of Turkey was triggered by the reaction of the people against the police violence and this memorable solidarity formed the Gezi community. When Erdur reached Taksim Square just before the afternoon praying time, the square was already filled with people protesting against the police violence that took place earlier on that day. Close to where Erdem would stand two weeks later, Erdur began standing still facing Gezi Park, however, soon later she had to flee from heavy tear gas attack together with all the other protesters that began to run in the direction of Divan Hotel66 behind Gezi Park. Erdur resumed standing still facing Gezi Park in front of Divan Hotel for more than an hour. She was among hundreds of protesters standing, but not still. When she met some of her friends that recognized her performative presence and asked whether she was performing, she answered that life itself had become a performance. In my interview, she described her experience as “both absurd and cosmic” as the number of people standing behind her increased as if she was being “cloned”. Another police raid led the protesters to bolt towards the temporarily safer streets while Erdur, living in the neighbourhood, reached a street corner where she continued standing still until the call to prayer announced the evening praying time and led her to stroke her face in the way a Muslim ends her praying.

My objective in referring to two public performances entailing standing still is not based on a desire to seek for an author or the origin of that practice in Turkey. I equally understand Erdur’s sensitivity regarding the sources and the outcome of her own performance and Gündüz’s spontaneous and pure bodily reaction without any theoretical formulation and referential framing. However, in order to comprehend their performances in the historical context of dance, a brief account of Steve Paxton’s “small dance” is relevant. In our interview, Erdur also related

66 Divan Hotel, a five-star hotel, sheltered the protesters during the Gezi events and it was fiercely attacked by tear gas and water cannons on June 15th. The hotel was given “Hospitality Innovation Award” by PKF hotel experts, based in Germany’s Munich, for displaying “civil solidarity, courage and hospitality in crisis situations”.

188
her standing with Paxton’s while acknowledging the connection. André Lepecki (2001, 2006) and Gurur Ertem (2014) referred to small dance in their writings as a gesture to grasp stillness in dance. I will detail Lepecki’s and Ertem’s arguments in the next section of this chapter. Even though I am not the first person to refer to small dance in the context of discussions on stillness due to their obvious link that I will write below, I think it is still relevant to write on this issue briefly. Paxton’s small dance has an important place in the history of dance equivalent to John Cage’s influence in music in the way they suggested silence in music and stillness in dance respectively.

Standing still has been part of an exercise in contact improvisation (CI) since the 1970s. Steve Paxton, founder of contact improvisation, created a preparatory exercise called small dance, which helps the internal understanding of one’s own body before CI and consequently facilitates sensing the shifts in the energy and the weight of one’s partner during CI (Stahmer 2011: 10). In small dance, the practitioner experiences the micro movements of the standing body focusing on the skeleton, gravity, weight, breath, and the internal organs with the directives such as:

Breathe from the bottom of the lung up to the clavicle. Can you expand the ribs out and up and back easily? Defining the diaphragm in terms of sensation. Bottom of the lung. Two domes of muscle. So with each breath you’re massaging the intestine… (...) In the direction the arms are hanging, without changing that direction, do the smallest stretch you can feel. Can it be smaller. Can you do less. (...) Standing… Relax erect with the weight toward the back half of the knee, put some weight on the balls of the feet… relax the scalp… relax the eyelids… relax behind the eyes… deep into the cone of the eye socket… don’t spend any energy blocking or focusing… let your ideas flow. (Paxton 1977, 1986)

Paxton employed small dance in his 1972 project called Magnesium which was a series of jumps, leaps, and falls of the twelve dancers including himself and
culminated in the silence and stillness of the small dance. Small dance has a major impact on the contemporary dance comparable to the rupture created by John Cage’s ‘4’33’’ in music. Paxton was one of the dancers of Judson Church Dance Theatre that emerged from the dance composition classes of Robert Dunn who studied with Cage. Paxton explained his connection to Cage saying “When I heard Cage talking, it was a more articulate version of what I had mutely been feeling, and I was very drawn to it” (Banes 2002: 21). Cage and Paxton were both influenced by Zen Buddhism. Paxton’s instructions in small dance are reminiscent of the meditation directives suggesting doing whilst non-doing. The acceptance of whatever comes into the present moment is a Zen element in dance as are silence and chance in Cage’s music.

Standing still that has its origins in the meditative Zen practices, and the traditional Buddhist and Taoist exercises was appropriated by the postmodern dance of the 1970s. It was then developed into a well-known CI exercise. After forty years, in different political and cultural circumstances, two CI dancers from Istanbul (both are also active Çatı members and instructors) employed it as a protest tactic that circulated through the multiple bodies whose plain presences were transformed into a passive yet powerful resistance. In this context, Foucault’s questions regarding authorship become applicable:

All discourses, whatever their status, form, value, and whatever the treatment to which they will be subjected, would then develop in the anonymity of a murmur. We would no longer hear the questions that have been rehashed for so long: Who really spoke? (…) With what authenticity or originality? (…) Instead, there would be other questions, like these: What are the modes of existence of this discourse? Where has it been used, how can it circulate, and who can appropriate it for himself? (…) And behind all these questions, we would hear hardly anything but the stirring of an indifference: What difference does it make who is speaking? (Foucault 1984: 119-120)
To repeat Foucault’s question what difference does it make who is performing when the act itself was appropriated as the most widespread form of civil disobedience in Turkey and heard by the world although it commenced as “a murmur of anonymity” facing the state apparatuses and the suppressed mute media.

***

In this section I will present a diverse range of overviews on stillness in dance, still-act as a political form, and the standing man, then I will continue with my own analysis of standing still.

In his article on stillness and Jérôme Bel’s work, André Lepecki claims, “stillness emerged in moments of historical anxiety and could be seen as the body’s response to those moments” (Lepecki 2001: 2). He also adds, “stillness operates at the level of the subject’s desire to invert a certain relationship with time” (ibid.). Accordingly, a dancer, standing still in the midst of social and historical agitation, proposes a time in which memories “emerge in the social surface” (3). Writing on the history of stillness in dance, Lepecki mentions Paxton’s small dance that defined standing still as dance (1).

Dee Heddon suggests standing still as a form of performance after writing about walking with references to thinkers such as Guy Debord and Michel de Certeau (2009). She asks what the potentials and phenomenology of standing still would be and claims that standing still is even more radical than walking which is considered to be a protest against the fast track of our lives (Heddon 2009: 168). In her view, standing still as a choice and an action should be differentiated from the frustration of waiting (ibid.).

Gurur Ertem, dance critic and one of the founding members of Çatı, wrote about “the corporeal politics” of the Gezi Uprising and the Standing Man (2014). In her article, she also refers to Paxton’s small dance and its relationship with Zen at its
birth. Besides referring to the various political, social and cultural aspects of Gezi events, Ertem expands her interpretation of the events proposing an image of movement, a metaphor of “a fall and a spring” that she connects to Doris Humphrey’s understanding of dance as “fall and recovery” (Ertem 2014, n.p.). In the context of the Gezi Uprising, the fall is symbolized by Lobna Al Lamii, a dancer and an activist who was shot in the head by a tear gas canister and got partially paralyzed, while the rise is emblematized in the figure of the Standing Man.

Fırat Güllü (2013) reads the standing man’s act in the context of guerrilla theatre. Like in guerrilla theatre, the action takes place as a surprise / flash performance in a public space generally in an unfriendly environment. The purpose of guerrilla theatre is to create an action or an image, which engenders an awareness of a political issue. In my interview, Gündüz said that his aim was to show his reaction against the silent media which either didn’t broadcast or publish anything on Gezi, or reflected a biased pro-governmental view on the events while thousands took to the streets; four people were killed (by June 17) and thousands were wounded. Standing still and doing nothing right in the centre of the city, he wanted to draw the media’s attention to the Gezi protests. In guerrilla theatres or flash performances, creation becomes collective and is repeated in different places and times, just as it happened with the standing protests that spread in Turkey and abroad.

Two days after Gündüz’s’s performance, Ömer Kurhan wrote about his suspicions about the nature of Gündüz’s act. He claimed that the standing man performance was not an act of civil disobedience because just when people started to gather in Taksim and began to stand still with Gündüz, he completed his action and drew back. It is true that his act triggered a civil disobedience movement; yet, Gündüz interrupted it just when it was growing into a powerful position in front of the state forces. Kurhan believed that Gündüz’s retreat was similar to CHP’s general attitude (Republican People’s Party in opposition). Accordingly, Gündüz presented a performance as a spectacle and it was over, he didn’t let it turn into a
real civil disobedience. In my opinion, “standing” is an act of civil disobedience in the form of passive resistance. Gündüz’s retreat was due to the police forces getting ready for another attack and he said he felt responsible for the others that stood with him. In passive resistance, to withdraw when faced with violence is not cowardice or treason. On the contrary, the action can be repeated in different places in different times when a new possibility of resistance is produced. Güneş Aydemir, writing about civil disobedience and referring to Thoreau, asserts that civil disobedients disperse not to escape but in order to reunite “just like breathing” again and again (Aydemir 2013: 127).

In January 2014, a conference titled “Performance, Body, and Public Space: Perspectives Opened by The Standing Man” was realized at French Cultural Institute in Istanbul. As part of the conference, Zeynep Günsür asserted that in our geography “ordinary public demonstrations, civil resistance techniques, and relational practices in daily life” should be examined in order to understand performance practices because “horizontal profiles and alternative representations are more courageous, threatening and transgressive” than the performance as an art form in Turkey. Islamic culture stamps the ideology of seeing and being seen in a way that is hard to be exempt from for the artists. Günsür referred to Zeynep Sayın’s book titled *İmgenin Pornografisi* [*Pornography of Image*] (in Turkish) and how it is acceptable to “substract onself from the gaze of the other” since “the subject that presents his/her self to the gaze is regarded as glorifying oneself and his/her image, which is not tolerable”. Military coups, unresolved murders, “the gaps and the traumas in the social memory” are the intersection points with the ideology of gaze in this geography. Günsür claimed that the Standing Man presented himself to the gaze in a passive form, thus he used “a method that subtracted himself from the gaze”. The individual’s anonymity opened a space for others to enter and emulate the performance.

In an informal conversation, Ayşê Orhon, with a reference to Adrian Heathfield, indicated that people were already standing still and Gündüz’s act functioned as a stamp or a tattoo that emerged as a consequence of people’s acts. In her article,
which was unpublished at the time of my writing, Orhon associates standing still with the concept of *deixis* defined as the “personal, locational or temporal address that is not entirely clear as it is uttered”, and “free-stands for ‘the action to show’, ‘to demonstrate’” (Orhon 2015: n.p.). The Standing Man was “standing for” something while his “non-verbal gestural deixis” summoned the others into action (ibid.). The response of the others was not a re-staged performance, but rather a resonance of the Standing Man’s “gestural deitic center” as the individuals created their own gestural deixis, standing for their own values and gazing towards the direction they chose (ibid.).

***

In my view, standing still facing a state apparatus, the body becomes vulnerable and precarious. One can easily recall the performances of Marina Abramovic’s *Rhythm 0* (1974), *Artist is Present* (2010) and Yoko Ono’s *Cut Piece* (1964) in which the audience is faced with the pure presence and vulnerability of the artist while being hostage to the Other’s responsibility and call in a Levinisian sense. I argue that Güdüüz’s standing still and doing nothing in a hostile space bring time to suspense. Suspended time between the impossibility and the potentiality is where he stood face to face with violence like the silent trees before a storm. The solid wall of state violence is shattered by the Other that interrupts the static timeless captivity of the Same.

Echoes of Emmanuel Levinas: It’s not my death, but the Other’s death that connects me with the finitude and infinity. Of the face of the Other I hear the call not to leave him alone when s/he is dying. I won’t be here when I die (Epicurus), but I witness the Other’s death that puts me in responsibility. Temporality is possible with this infinite responsibility. Faced with the pure presence standing in front of hard time of the state, others feel the responsibility to stand by the precarious one. That is why people felt the urge to stand by Güdüüz and not to leave him alone when he was facing the police, symbol of state violence. According to the reports of the day, about three hundred people arrived in Taksim
to stand still as a response to his silent call. The solidarity and the affective state of Gezi days generated awareness and empathy for the Other. This is also one of the reasons for more than a million people to join Berkin Elvan’s funeral in 2014.\footnote{Berkin Elvan was a 14 year-old boy, shot by a tear gas canister when he went out to buy bread near his home during the Gezi protests. He died after 269 days in coma. His funeral was one of the biggest public funerals in our history, compared to the funeral of Hrant Dink in 2007.}

Levinas sees the whole body like a face or as Judith Butler says like a mouth that makes moral claims on us (Butler 2004: 133). After quoting from Levinas, “The face as the extreme precariousness of the other. Peace as awareness to the precariousness of the other”, Butler says, “To respond to the face, to understand its meaning, means to be awake to what is precarious in another life or, rather, the precariousness of life itself” (134). We are awakened and torn by the Other that can never be fully grasped or represented, so infinity opens up time. The bodies of both standing man and woman function as a face, the call to responsibility for the Other. The pictures of “duran adam” on social and traditional media might both multiply and risk to petrify its effect, however, there is always a surplus that is life itself or the precariousness of the person that exceeds any representation.

“The Other is the future” (Levinas 1987: 77). Both the future and the Other are unexpected and surprising ways of opening up the Same to the new or a birth. Alterity opens the future as we face “the abyss between the present and death, between the ego and the alterity of mystery” (81). The future is formulated not as something to be extracted from somewhere ahead, but right in the present, in the face-to-face with the Other that rips the eternity of existence and lets the self depart from itself in the evanescent of the present. The future of the resistance takes a fresh turn with Gündüz’s launch of this form of patience and passivity and involves being ready for anything in the world of possibilities (Levinas 2000: 20). Even though Gündüz’s time is the time of patience and passivity, it is also teeming with possibilities as it opens a crack in the hard surface of the state time and points to a new form of resistance.
The standing still performance is reminiscent of Tadasana (mountain pose) in yoga and Wu Ji or Zhan Zhuang (“standing like a post” or “standing like a tree” a form of standing meditation) in chi kung. The metaphysical implications of either Tadasana or Wu Ji are not relevant in this research, yet I find these connections worth mentioning: Ismet Himmet, a tai chi and martial arts master, stood in the wu ji posture for a long time period in a crowded street in Hong Kong where there were both pedestrians and vehicles in order to demonstrate what wu ji means in chi kung. His video is similar to Kim Sooja’s video work called A Needle Woman in which we see a motionless woman’s back in the middle of a busy street.

Standing still reveals a quiet time as opposed to the velocity of the attacks and the running away from them. A passive resistance in silence, non-doing and patience bring the time to a different speed. After the evacuation of the Gezi Park and Taksim Square by the police who continued to deploy violent methods to disperse the protesters, some resisters started to feel disappointed and trapped by a cycle of resistance: going into the streets, being gassed, and rushing back, and springing forth again from the side streets, only to head back into a shelter after another gas and water cannon attack. Except the comrades of “level 5” that threw the gas canisters back to the police or extinguished them in a water butt, built barricades, threw stones, the general public that filled the streets were getting frustrated and many were talking of another form of resistance which could not be defined yet. After the hustle and bustle of “the running of the riot vehicles festival”68, people needed to breathe slowly and decelerate. Probably, Gündüz’s stillness was the answer they needed.

Gündüz’s creative protest has produced a new “collective spatio-temporal assemblage” defining the time and the body of resistance in a novel way (Zourabichvili 2012: 11). His standing in Taksim Square can also be understood in relation to the caesura, the interruption or rupture that is described by Deleuze with references to Hölderlin (Deleuze 2004). Accordingly, in caesura, past and

---

68 It is a reference to the Running of The Bulls Festival in Spain. This comparison was made as a joke in a video that showed hundreds of protesters escaping from a police riot vehicle in Istiklal Street.
future are produced in such a way that there is a non-symmetry between the before and the after. In relation to the third synthesis of time, Deleuze reminds us of Hamlet’s famous phrase, “time is out of joint” (111). In such interrupted times, “[t]ime itself unfolds” “instead of things unfolding within it” (ibid.). Gündüz’s act divided the time of the Gezi Uprising into a “before and after” and marked a difference. This difference pointed to the unexpected potentiality of the body that grew into a new corporeal community as the standing people all over Turkey emulated his action. The standing still protest is not called “Erdem Gündüz’s protest” because his individuality is superseded by the action and he has become equal to his action. Deleuze says, “the event and the act possess a secret coherence which excludes that of the self; that they turn back against the self which has become their equal and smash it to pieces, as though the bearer of the new world were carried away and dispersed by the shock of the multiplicity to which it gives birth” (112).

The standing still has the resonance and the power of an event after which neither performance art nor resistance can ever be the same in Turkey. The stillness of the standing figure becomes the needle hole amid the chaos through which a difference emerges. However, the power of stillness is not restricted with the localness of Turkey. Rather, the event time of the standing people is connected to the other events of stillness across the world and the power of peaceful protests resonate in various geographies in the way the Tank Man’s stand did. In neither of these occasions the standing still protest was appropriated. Instead, they were actualized in other parts of the world as intuitively as the Standing Man stood in Istanbul. In Baton Rouge, Louisiana, a woman named Ieshia Evans stood still during a protest after an unarmed African American was killed by the police in July 2016. The second example is the ten year-old Mexican boy, who stood against thousands of homophobic demonstrators in Celaya, Mexico in September 2016. Both of these moments will also be remembered as the caesuras in the history of Black Movement and LGBTIQ Movement.
3.5 Continuities and Disruptions

The meaning of continuity is questioned after the revolts are suppressed while they wax and wane in different countries around the globe. Michael Hardt refers to Karl Marx’s metaphor about the mole regarding the discontinuity of the French revolutionary uprisings: “The mole metaphor, for him, establishes a hidden continuity. Even when you don’t see it, it’s still there—and, even more, it’s working out of view. When it next appears it has moved further along” (Hardt 2012, n.p.). The power and joy of masses that support long-fought causes for a brief period vanish gradually for various reasons such as state violence. After all, in the context of Turkey, to join a demonstration began to mean gathering for a short time only to be attacked with tear gas, water cannon and plastic bullets generally even before the press statement.

On the other hand, the forums created during the Gezi Uprising were transformed into the neighbourhood forums and solidarities that have continued the local struggles for parks and city gardens (bostan) besides providing platforms for discussion of strategies to take for diverse social issues, however, the interest in the regular meetings of solidarities decreased by time. Continuity does not mean to continue resistance with the same people for the same purpose, but to create new ways of struggle and solidarity in diverse areas, as it was the case with the signatures collected first by academics, then, by several other professional groups for peace in the Kurdish towns of Turkey in 2016.

The political developments after Gezi traumatized part of the society that voted for the opposition parties. Suruç and Ankara bombings were deeply traumatizing for the left-wing people. In Ankara, a peace rally was organized by the unions, the chambers of diverse professional groups, and left-wing groups including a wide range from the main oppositional Republican People’s Party to People’s Democratic Party, from socialists to anarchists, in order to stand in solidarity with the Kurds for peace. Two suicide bombers caused the biggest massacre (109 people were killed) in the history of Turkey. A moment was captured by a video
camera of a university student (Melike Tombak) that showed young people
dancing halay, singing a revolutionary song called “Bloody Square” (Kanlı
Meydan). Just as they chanted the words “this square is a bloody square”, a bomb
exploded behind them. A video still shows this exact moment of the explosion
behind the dancing group. Then Turkey went through a series of bombings and a
coup attempt in one year (2015-2016). It is difficult to comment on the recent
history or on today.

Is it still possible to talk about hope, or is it even necessary when the halays are
literally destroyed by bombs?

After the traumatizing events, particularly after the bombings, people experience
panic and terror. John Protevi argues that the body is “de-subjectivized” when the
subject “drop[s] out (as in a blind rage)” or is “reduced to a helpless spectator (as
in a freezing or fleeing panic)” in the extreme cases of rage and panic in the
society (Protevi 2009: 46). In consequence, the situation of rage and panic polarizes
the world in which the possibility of social relations withers away (47). Majority of the people are unable to give meaning to the events they follow and
witness. Even when they interpret them, they can still feel helpless and powerless
although many groups continue their legal struggles against injustices. The
atmosphere of despair, rage and panic polarizes the society in which the witch-
hunt causes distrust and suspicion in its members eventually leading to their
isolation.

For Spinoza, both hope and fear are problematic as each entails the other. Hope is
declared as “an inconstant joy, born of the idea of a future or past thing whose
outcome we to some extent doubt” (Ethics III D12) while “fear is an inconstant
sadness, born of the idea of a future or past thing whose outcome we to some
extent doubt” (Ethics III D13). Therefore, when one is suspended in time with

69 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LLfMCUPTPIw
a longer version includes graphic images:
n_tamami.html

199
feelings about the positive or negative outcome of an action, event or a thing, one acts without adequate kind of knowledge and the “guidance of reason” (Ethics IV P47). If we follow Spinoza, the social, political and economical conditions or a surge of fear after a wave of hope should not affect us as long as we keep implementing reason in an insane world.

On the contrary, Ernst Bloch does not see the inconstancy of hope as a problem:

Hope must be unconditionally disappointable, first, because it is open in a forward direction, in a future-orientated direction; it does not address itself to that which already exists. For this reason hope – while actually in a state of suspension- is committed to change rather than repetition, and what is more, incorporates the element of chance, without which there can be nothing new. Through this potion of chance (…) openness is at the same time also kept open. (…) [Hope] stands too close to the indeterminacy of the historical process, of the world-process that, indeed, has not yet been defeated, but likewise has not yet been won. It stands too fully within the topos of objectively real possibility, which surrounds what presently exists with danger, not just with potential salvation. (Bloch 1998: 341)

As we are trapped in the living present, clogged with the flood of news about the present situation of a country, we tend to forget the indeterminacy and the chance element of the events in history. When the incompleteness of the present is considered, hope can be a driving force of our actualizations. According to Bloch, “the world itself, just as it is in a mess, is also in a state of unfinishedness and in experimental process out of that mess” (Bloch 1996: 221). The world’s incompleteness is what makes each attempt to start anew possible. A work of art is one way to experiment out of this mess. All living things have a horizon or a future without which the reality is considered dead (223). It is this horizon that makes change and hope possible.
Many argue that the Gezi Uprising did not entail a horizon and a future collectively imagined. In contrast, when seen from Bloch’s perspective, it was the opening of the present to the horizon in the sense of co-existence of multiple potentials in the present that opened each person to a horizon beyond what was thought possible, beyond what they could foresee. Each person had his/her own version of that fleeting opening that may have felt like hecceity, or thisness.

Emphasizing that there cannot be politics without hope, Sara Ahmed envisages hope in the present which entails both the failed examples of the past and the not-yet of the future that we create with our actions (Ahmed 2004: 184). Hope generates a feeling of expansion and joy as the bodies open to new possibilities.

Another answer would involve imagination and creativity. Lawrence Grossberg, in an interview conducted by Seigworth and Gregg, emphasizes the political connotation of the crucial difference between the possible and the virtual (Grossberg in Seigworth and Gregg 2010). He explains how the theories of imagination were based on the belief in the possibility. As in the case of utopia, such theories are not founded on the present. In contrast, if one focuses on the present to reconfigure imagination and politics, one finds the potentiality and contingencies of the virtual in the actual (Grossberg in Seigworth and Gregg 2010: 320-321). So, imagination is not conceived as an escape from the present, on the contrary, it is a chance to understand and transform the present. It is here that dancing together enters the scene. If we cease to dance together in both literal and metaphorical sense of the word and accept the manipulations of the fast-forward news shaking the society on a daily basis, we may forget how to imagine. It is only with imagination and creativity that the virtual can be danced through.

**Conclusion**

Chapter 3 focused on various forms of movements including traditional Anatolian dances during strikes and protests; repetitive gestures and movements of resisters such as building a barricade, holding hand in hand to protect each other; and the
Standing Man protest during the Gezi Uprising. These movements were analysed in terms of affective contagion, rhythmic entrainment and bonding in the context of affect theory. Like the previous chapter, my narrative voice was a mixture of relative neutrality and high affective engagement in the personal experience of social events. This tone of the chapter also stems from the difficulty of interpreting the recent history while some traumatic events are still happening. For instance, in a period while I was reflecting on halays, Ankara Bombing destroyed a halay. These elements can be regarded as autoethnographical. In that respect, the affective encounters both with people and the social events becomes part of my text on dancing together driven by overtly political causes.
Chapter 4: Temporality of The In-Between

4.1 Deleuze’s Philosophy of Time

Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of time provides a wide conceptual framework the complexity of which I can hardly do justice in the following sections. Its relevance in this thesis stems mainly from the way he connects time, bodies and affects while opening thought and body to difference. To see the body as an event and a verb, rather than a fact or a thing reconfigures the body in terms of movement and action. His concepts such as the virtual, counter-actualization, event, caesura and the Aion explained below, illustrate the potential for novelty, creativity and change both on the personal and social levels. Moreover, these concepts are also related to singularities and the preindividual as Deleuze sees body and subjectivity in terms of individuation and heterogeneity of temporal dimensions. In a world of dissolved selves and temporal multiplicity, the impersonal event and access to the virtual generate another potential for freedom and experimentation.

In the first section, I attempt to outline Deleuze’s notions of Chronos, of Aion and the event mainly focusing on The Logic of Sense while trying to understand the virtual as defined in his four books. Then, I continue with the three syntheses of time developed in his Difference and Repetition. In these two sections, I also touch upon affective aspects of Deleuze’s philosophy of time. Then I continue with the investigation of temporal aspects of dancing in the studio, on the stage and in the streets during protests with references to the examples explored in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.

4.2 Chronos, Aion, The Event, and The Virtual

In The Logic of Sense, Deleuze (1990) differentiates between two distinct yet connected kinds of temporality: Chronos and Aion. Deleuze introduces these two notions while referring to the Stoics’ understanding of bodies and “state of
affairs”, (Deleuze 1990: 4). According to the Stoics, all bodies are causes rather than causes and effects in relation to each other. The time of the bodies and the state of affairs is the present in which bodies act and are acted upon. Secondly, bodies are causes of incorporeal attributes: “They are not things or facts, but events. (…) They are not substantives or adjectives but verbs. They are neither agents nor patients, but results of actions and passions” (5). The Aion, the time of the incorporeal effects of bodies and becoming, divides itself in past and future and eludes the present (ibid.). Hence, the two forms of time exist simultaneously; one is the present of the bodies that “absorbs past and future” and the other is the past and future infinitely dividing the present of the incorporeal effects of bodies’ “actions and passions”. The Chronos is the limited present of bodies, their causes and actions. It contracts past and present and it is infinite due to the eternal return of the Same. On the other hand, the Aion, the unlimited past and future of the incorporeal events and effects, subdivides each present. It is finite because it does not repeat itself. In the Chronos, one moves from past to the future as the presents follow each other whereas in the Aion the present cannot be fixed as the moment decomposes in both directions of past and future. This difference does not mean that there is an arrow of time that goes from past to future, neither does it indicate the separate dimensions of time such as past, present and future because Chronos and Aion are not two separate entities, but always thought in concert with each other.

The Chronos is composed of relative presents, which are encased in a larger present (Deleuze 1990: 162). Deleuze defines Chronos in terms of corporeality thus affectability such that the future and past are the residues of affects in a body. It is configured in its circularity, accidents, disconnections and blockages whereas the single line of the Aion, free from the bodily content, entails the incorporeal attributes. These effects, Deleuze argues, is what makes language possible as language is also separated from things and bodies (166).

The bodies are the causes in the living present and the infinitives are the effects in the past and the future, so how do the Chronos and the Aion complement each
other? The present both passes into the past and participates in the future. It is determined by the past in how it passes away whereas it is part of the future in its contribution to the novelty in a new future. Therefore, the living present becomes the expression of both the past and the future. As James Williams explains, the Chronos depends on the Aion “to move outside itself into the past and into the future, whereas the latter requires the former to move from a pure and chaotic potential to a fully determined set of relations” (Williams 2011: 150). So, all of one’s past and all of one’s future (including the events that will not be actualized) are the components of one’s present. The present does not only contribute in the future, but also expresses the virtual effects, which would otherwise remain as potential. The present event is both the cause and virtual effect. The actual event synthesizes all the events and also has an effect on the intensities that will be actualized in other events (151). Through difference in the actual present, we can influence the virtual realm or the Aion. If we create novelty, live differently and experiment with our lives in the living present, the effects of these will also affect the Aion and consequently, the other actual presents.

Deleuze exemplifies Aion with Lewis Carroll’s *Alice in Wonderland* and especially the section in which Alice keeps changing size and becomes both smaller and bigger after drinking from a mysterious bottle or eating a piece of cake. Her becoming is an event that eludes the present as she becomes both smaller and bigger, pulled in both directions of past and future (Deleuze 1990: 1). The instant of her becoming is without thickness as it decomposes in both ways. For Deleuze, there is neither a specific instant of becoming nor a measurable period of time. All the becomings are connected as variations such that we “grow wiser and duller, and older and younger, and faster and slower –all ‘at the same time’” (Williams 2011: 139).

Another example drawn from Carroll’s work is Alice’s question, “Which way? Which way?” that cannot have a definite answer because it is both or all directions at the same time. In the context of Alice, the names and adjectives dissolve and are replaced by verbs, which, Deleuze explains, is also the dissolution of a fixed
identity (Deleuze 1990: 3). This uncertainty is not read as personal doubt, but as
the nature of the event in the way it invalidates the common sense that there is
only one direction and thus, fixed identities. According to James Williams, each
situation requires making new choices as the general knowledge and the moral
principles to ‘guide’ the person through a moral dilemma keep changing with the
evaluation of each new situation (Williams 2011: 144). Therefore, there is no
absolute prescription that directs us “which way” to go. Each choice subverts the
subject whilst altering and transforming it in a process of becoming. For
Williams, this ethical inquiry demonstrates Deleuze’s moral philosophy about
how to live with a loss of identity (145). In consequence, this becoming is seen as
a shared intensity and a collective event since all the events are in communication.

Events are singularities ideal by nature and their time is the Aion. While
differentiating between Chronos and Aion, Deleuze explains that the Chronos or
the present is “the temporal realization of the event” that involves active or
passive bodies while in the time of Aion, which pulls time in two directions of
past and future, the event either has just happened or is about to happen.
Therefore, a double question arises: “What is going to happen? What has just
happened?” (Deleuze 1990: 63). Deleuze also highlights the chance element in the
Aion. Singular points of the events are connected to the aleatory nature of the
Aion (64). All the events communicate with each other forming the Event.

The time of the event is not outside time, but considered as part of the multiplicity
of time. It is a different kind of time in which the measured chronological time of
the Chronos is interrupted as time floats. In the time of the event, contemporaneity
of temporalities points to the caesura where still-there and already-past coexist.
The event does not occur in time as a movement, but it rearranges the before and
after of the caesura which is conceived as the instant in which before and after
bifurcate. According to Deleuze, “the actor thus actualizes the event” (Deleuze
1990: 150). The actor opens himself to the impersonal role in the moment
dividing into already past and yet to come. It is the movement of the pure infinite
verb that puts the actor’s present always in the future or already in the past.
Therefore, Deleuze posits theatre as the art of movement that differs from the theatre of representation (Deleuze 2004:12).

Actualization means, “to be incarnated in a body”, to express and resume new actualizations (Deleuze 1990: 110). Independent of its actualizations and in line with the Aion, the event is always “yet-to-come and always already passed” (146). However, it is still actualized and incorporated in the body. According to Deleuze, the event is not what happens; rather it is inside what happens. Following a line of thinkers from Epictetus to Nietzsche, Deleuze suggests to love one’s fate (amor fati) in that one becomes “the offspring of one’s events and not of one’s actions, and thereby to be reborn” (149). This is the time when we say, “here, the moment has come” (151). All events are actualized in the present as each event is embodied in an individual or a condition although the past and future of the event are impersonal and pre-individual.

The “mobile instant” of the event forms the counter-actualization (Deleuze 1990: 151). The counter-actualization can be understood as a movement from the actual to the virtual in the process of becoming. Eugene Young describes it as “see[ing] ourselves, to some extent, as actors in our own lives” so as to “attain a perspective that lifts us out of our present or actual circumstances” (Young 2013: 75). It is with counter-actualization that we can cease to see ourselves as the victims of circumstances and guilty of what could or could not have happened. This implies the impersonal and virtual aspect of the event. It is also why Deleuze offers the present of the actor and the dancer as an example for the counter-actualization of the event.

With respect to event, actualization and counter-actualization, it is also crucial to define the virtual to which I have already made references in the previous parts of this section. So, I intend to refer to the notion of the virtual in Deleuze’s four books starting with Dialogues II. Accordingly, the virtual is not a parallel reality or another world of possibilities awaiting actualization. Bodies retain the virtual even though actualization might be different. The virtual encompasses the actual
so that there is always an element of uncertainty and indetermination (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 148, 151). The relationship between the actual and the virtual form an individuation or a singularization determined for each particular case unlike the predetermined and constituted individuals. The process of actualization affects both the image and the object on the plane of immanence or consistence. (The plane of immanence, marked by becoming and individuation is contrasted with the plane of organization, which entails the state, education, being, family, military, etc. I will discuss these two notions in Chapter 3.) “The actual falls from the plane like a fruit, whilst the actualization relates it back to the plane” (150). Therefore, the plane of immanence entails the virtual and its actualization concurrently while these two aspects of time form a kind of circuit. The virtual and the actual also mark a split in time in terms of the passing of the continuous present that defines the actual and the “ephemeral” virtual preserving the past “continually making minute adjustments in response to changes of direction” (151).

In *The Logic of Sense*, the virtual is thought together with the singularities that form the cuts in the continuum during the actualization of the virtual. It divides the plane of immanence creating multiplicity of planes, which in turn merge into one and lead to the actual. Singularity is the actualization of the virtual. Singularities are understood as “turning points” and “knots” that denote discontinuities and potentialities that generate changes in a system (Deleuze 1990: 52). In that respect, an event can be conceived as a singularity. A singularity is preindividual in the sense that it cannot be fixed or determined like an individual. It is rather “the fourth person singular” as Deleuze cites Ferlinghetti (103).

In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze differentiates the possible from the virtual (Deleuze 2006: 96-97). Firstly, the possible is antithetical to the real, and the virtual is opposed to the actual. In contrast to the possible, which has no reality, the virtual is real even when it is not actualized. The possible can be realized or not, yet the real always resembles the possible. On the other hand, the virtual is not realized, but
actualized and the actual is not similar to the virtual. Instead, actualization of a potentiality is envisaged in terms of difference and creation.

In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze formulates the virtual as part of the real object, which has both an actual image and a virtual image. For instance, in an artwork, the virtual side has a structure entailing various elements, sets of relations and singular points that designate a unifying centre (Deleuze 2004: 260). In this context, Keith Faulkner indicates the influence of Structuralism on Deleuze’s notion of the virtual in that it “consists of the coexistence of all relations within a structure” (Faulkner 2006: 135).

As Deleuze continues to point to the differences between the virtual and the possible, he emphasizes the fact that this distinction is not only in the verbal definitions *per se*; rather it is primarily a question of existence. If we conceive existence with the notions of the possible and the real, then existence becomes “a brute eruption, a pure act or leap which always occurs behind our backs” (Deleuze 2004: 263). If the non-existent were also possible, then there would not be any difference between existence and non-existence. The possible as the double of the real restricts the potentiality with resemblance and identity. On the contrary, the potential is entailed in the virtual that is open to multiple identities as actualization differentiates and creates singularities and multiple lines (264).

Before concluding this section and in connection with the previous part on affects, I want to elaborate briefly on the temporality of the bodies in an encounter in Deleuzian terms. As we move from one milieu to the other, living through different events, “there is a rupture in every encounter” (Zourabichvili 2012: 96). Moving closer or away, attending to or turning away in each of these encounters, we enter and exit various milieus and “relationscapes”70 (to use Manning’s terminology, 2009). The history of affects is imprinted in each organ. Each organ in the body has its own duration such that, as François Zourabichvili suggests, the

---

70 In reference to Erin Manning’s term that also gave the title of her book, *Relationscapes: Movement, Art, Philosophy* (2009).
organism itself is constituted of different presents, durations, speeds and slowness (Zourabichvili 2012: 95). The time of the organs is moulded by the affective traces, which change, or, in times of sickness, disrupt their rhythms. “Time is the intensity of bodies” (100) as affects are inscribed in the bodies. An encounter can result in the rupture of a surprise or the singularity of the event that alters the temporal dimension of the bodies and their ways of making sense in such manner that we may not recognize who we are. The subject changes by means of actualization through time. Changes and differences in time displace the concept of identity or any fixed centre. That is why its becoming and individuation is also called transindividuality. Becoming is not being something/somebody and then being something else/somebody else; rather it is the in-between and the process that evades fixation. Since time is mobile, every new event alters the relations between the events not only in the life of an individual, but also in the social and political life in general.

4.3 The Three Syntheses of Time

In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze’s understanding of time is associated with Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence and Bergson’s unity and multiplicity of duration both of which conceptualize time in the form of divergence, opening, and becoming. Deleuze theorizes the bifurcation of time into habitual, memorial and the future. In the habitual time, the present moments constitute time, which is the ‘living-present’. Memorial time is the past as the events are placed into time. Time of the future is the eternal return of difference. The synthesis of the three is required for any experience.

Deleuze begins with the introduction of Hume’s example, the repetition of AB, AB, AB, ... (Deleuze 2004: 90). Each element in the sequence is independent and changes nothing in the object. When A appears, we expect B, and this occurs as a consequence of contraction, which forms a synthesis of time. The expectation of the phrase A following the phrase B is simply based on what Deleuze calls habit that is the first synthesis of time on which the psychic and organic lives rest (99).
The succession of the instants constitutes the time simultaneously causing it to vanish into “its constantly aborted moment of birth” (91). “Time is constituted only in the originary synthesis which operates on the repetition of instants. This synthesis contracts the successive independent instants into one another, thereby constituting the lived, or living, present” (ibid.). The past aspect involves the preceding instants being retained while the future is envisaged in the anticipation of the same contraction. The present goes from the past to the future and frames the passage from the particular to the general since the mind follows generality and forms a rule for the future. “Passive synthesis or contraction is essentially asymmetrical: it goes from the past to the future in the present, thus from the particular to the general, thereby imparting direction to the arrow of time” (ibid.). This is a passive synthesis happening in the mind, which excludes the operations of understanding or reflection.

In this context, it is relevant to explain what Deleuze means by contraction. Contraction is the ability to combine things and make associations that occurs before consciousness, reflection and knowledge (Young 2013: 7). Imagination and habit are forms of contraction. Every organism and every organ in the organism are composed of contractions, retentions and expectations as Deleuze argues, “we are made of contracted water, earth, light and air” (Deleuze 2004: 93). For instance, the retained past is found in the hereditary composition of the cells. Deleuze thinks contraction together with contemplation and it is with contemplation and imagination that we infer something new from repetitions.

In the first synthesis of time, the living present is primary in relation to the past and the future, which are the dimensions of the present. On the one hand, the presents are contemporaneous with other presents such that different species, individuals and organs of an organism have co-existent presents. On the other hand, the duration of an organism’s present may differ depending on the nature of its contraction and contemplation. Deleuze gives the example of fatigue that “marks the point at which the soul can no longer contract what it contemplates, the moment at which contemplation and contraction come apart” (Deleuze 2004:
98). We all have changing rhythms and presents; moreover, as Deleuze warns, “one cannot go faster than one’s present – or rather, one’s presents” (ibid.). The first or passive synthesis of time entails all the habits, contractions, contemplations, imagination, presents and fatigues. The self of this time is characterized as passive, dissolved and “larval” in addition to being “modification” itself (100).

While habit is connected to the present in the first synthesis of time, the second synthesis is linked with memory. Deleuze’s understanding of memory pertains to Bergson according to whom “(e)very present must have a past aspect in order for it to pass away. (…) The present could not become past if there was not something past in the present.” (Williams 2003: 94-95). The present doesn’t succeed the former presents in a linear chronology (Deleuze 2004: 102), on the contrary, as Deleuze asserts, the past and the present are contemporaneous and co-existent (Deleuze 2004: 103; Deleuze 2006: 58-59). The second synthesis constitutes the past that causes the present to pass. All of the past in the present is associated with the Bergsonian idea of the present as the contracted state of the past (Deleuze 2004: 103). Therefore, the past is the synthesis of all time while the present and the future are its dimensions.

The successive presents end up being part of “‘the same life’ at different levels forming destiny (Deleuze 2004: 105). However, destiny does not mean a determined path, on the contrary, Deleuze sees freedom in the unfolding of the same story at different levels because one can choose the levels. There are echoes, resonances, connections and an element of chance rather than determinism in the relationship between the successive presents. The pure past co-exists with the present as a virtual dimension. Each present contracts a level of it in one’s life and also in the co-existence of other lives, be it the life of a philosopher or a pig, as Deleuze exemplifies his point with. They all actualize “the same past at different levels of a gigantic cone” while choosing their own “tone” or “lyrics” (ibid.). Although there is a pure past where the events are stored in the Bergsonian metaphoric cone (Deleuze 2006: 59), it is still prone to change with each new
present. Because of the habitual repetitions and recordings in memory, we tend to fix the identity of things, however, these fixed representations also change through the occurrence of the new presents. “If each new encounter transforms our relation to the past, then the past we remember changes” (Faulkner 2006: 12). Therefore memory does not store preformed representations of the past, but each remembrance creates the past anew in a Proustian way.

Deleuze takes up Nietzsche’s eternal return to explicate the third synthesis of time emphasizing the recurrence of difference. Accordingly, the conditions or the combinations return instead of the previous identities, which have already been dissolved (Deleuze 2004: 50). Deleuze exemplifies his argument on the return of the difference with the tune that remains the same while the lyrics of the song or the pitch and tone of the singer’s voice might change in the repetition (105-106). To put it in another way, “what returns, in the eternal return, would be the sound of each drop of water and not the sound of the wave itself” (italic in the original, Faulkner 2006: 119). In that context, for instance, what is repeated is not the historical fact, but the historical conditions (Deleuze 2004: 113). The future is discerned as pure difference that cannot be anticipated. This is how the eternal return affects the new.

Nietzsche’s eternal return is the return of difference that repeats itself without repeating identity (Zourabichvili 2012: 103). The only identical element in the eternal return is becoming as opposed to the repetition of the Same. Becoming implies multiple identities if we were to include identities in the discussion even though becoming rather than identity would be the foremost principle marking the possibility of difference. The will of “will to power” cannot be contained by the limits of the individual or Self, but by the one who can transform his/herself (Nietzsche’s Overman) (Deleuze 2004: 51). One example would be the poet who affirms difference with his/her creativity while repudiating the existing representations “in the state of permanent revolution which characterizes eternal return” (64). In contrast, the politician denies the different and tries to preserve the established order while making use of historical representations. Difference is
affirmative in a way that is distinct from the affirmation of the politicians or the “slaves” who assent to their rulers without questioning. The “yes” of difference entails negation and destruction while affirming the creation of the new as opposed to the conservation of the old values (66). Hence, the eternal return discharges what needs to be denied and puts difference in the centre. This implicates a world of differences behind which no substance, Idea, essence or identity lurks. Each transformation implies the “completed” yet “unlimited” time of the eternal return and chaos without identity (69).

The third synthesis of time or the empty form of time is also understood in reference to Hamlet’s expression, “time is out of joint”. Deleuze defines the time out of its hinges as a “demented” time liberated from the god (the Roman goddess of the hinge and doorways was Carda), freed from its cardinal points and emptied from the events. Furthermore, Deleuze reintroduces Hölderlin’s concept of caesura, the cut in time, which unevenly divides before and after. As mentioned in the previous section in the context of the event, caesura is a unique event after which nothing can be the same again. Therefore, Deleuze focuses on the dramatic figures such as Oedipus and Hamlet to exemplify this notion. First, the act is “too big” for them in their struggle to cope with the actualized event (Oedipus) or the thought of the possibility of such an act (Hamlet) (Deleuze 2004: 112). As Nietzsche writes about Zarathustra faced with his fear of the revelation of eternal return: “Your fruits are ripe but you are not ripe for your fruits” (115). Second, a fracture is experienced both in time and their selves when they are transformed to be equal to their acts and capable of realizing them. These dramatic moments are the caesuras or cuts wherein time is split into before and after, hence, creating a difference. The affective component of such moments plays a role in this difference as the turmoil displaces the identity opening the subject not only onto its wound, but also to a line of flight and deterritorialization. Consequently, the self dissolves and is replaced with the coherence of the event and the act when the dramatic figure becomes “the man without a name, without qualities, without self or I, the ‘plebeian’ guardian of a secret” (112). When the time is out of joint, the circle of the Same is destroyed and a new circle, that of the Other, is formed.
There is no ground to root oneself in the unhinged times while everything is being formed anew. Nevertheless, the belief in the future is based on the return of the yet-to-come.

The Moment is another notion that Deleuze draws from Nietzsche in order to explain the intersection of the past and the present. Unlike the dramatic scissure of the caesura, the Moment is a “gateway that intersects two paths, one stretching out infinitely into the future, the other into the past” (Faulkner 2006: 13) as “the present is divided ad infinitum into something that has just happened and something that is going to happen, flying in both directions at once” (Deleuze 1990: 33). The Moment is different from “the now” moment that dominates the metaphysics of presence in Western philosophy (Reynolds 2004: parag.4). It is rather the “crystal of time” that divides the moment into two heterogeneous directions as the present and the past (Zourabichvili 2012: 156).

Deleuze employs Nietzsche’s notion of eternal return to theorize repetition. One should will something as much as willing its eternal return at the same time and make *amor fati* (love of fate) a moral test. Accordingly, will to power does not denote desiring power at all. For both Nietzsche and Deleuze, will to power means, “whatever you will, carry it to the ‘nth’ power” (Deleuze 2004: 9). In his idea of future as such, Deleuze excludes subjectivity and identity since he believes that subjectivity involves anticipation or a projection that results in the domestication of the future by an agent. The yet-to-come that returns can be experienced without embracing identity or subjectivity.

Another aspect of the eternal return is that it depends on both the present and the past. Firstly, the return depends on the pure past “as reserve of difference” because the difference is not created out of nothing and (Williams 2011: 136). Secondly, it also depends on the present and a departure from the repetition of the Same (ibid.). As Zourabichvili emphasizes, the eternal return implies “the virtual multiplicity of time” (Zourabichvili 2012: 108). The third synthesis of time constitutes the future that affirms the independence of the product. Only the
autonomy of the new product matters instead of the conditions and the agents that produced the event because the identities do not recur in the eternal return. This also means that the present is no more than an agent to be erased during the process and the past is no more than the conditions. On the other hand, when the three syntheses are considered, none of the dimensions of time is preeminent as each is connected to the other affecting the passage or transformation of one or the other. All the three elements produce repetition in that “[t]he present is the repeater, the past is repetition itself, but the future is that which is repeated” (Deleuze 2004: 117). Repetition requires passing through the three stages according to which one repeats the habits in the present and memories of the pure past in order to denounce the repeated content and make the new product and the repetition itself the difference.

Deleuze asserts that repetition as an act creates the novelty rather than inferring something new from the repetition (Deleuze 2004: 6). It does not change the object or the state of affairs repeated, but creates something new in the mind that contemplates it as the difference appears between two repetitions (90). Deleuze differentiates repetition from habit in the sense that it is not a task or a duty to be accomplished daily in all its tedium. With the habit, either the intention or the action remains the same even though there is also an element of repetitiveness. It is also distinct from memory in the way it requires a psychological self like the habit does. In that sense, repetition signifies transgression, singularity, universality, distinctiveness, instantaneity and eternity as opposed to what is considered as the general, the particular, the ordinary, and permanence (Deleuze 2004: 3). Deleuze sees repetition on the same side of irony and humour in their instantaneity and transgression of the law, which assumes the permanent order of the general and the particular.
4.4 The Time of Improvisation

When I write about dancing at Cati, I mainly refer to the improvisational rather than the technical classes. I understand improvisation as the opening of dance to difference and chance in a Deleuzian sense.

When the participants repeat the scores and directions given by the instructor in a usual dance class, they acquire movements, which become habitual over time. Hence, in every class based on the Euro-American context of contemporary dance, one can observe similarities in the styles and forms of movement although this semblance is never as distinctive and formal as the ballroom or traditional dances because any kind of movement including stillness, walking, running, sitting are considered to be a form of dancing. However, the participants in a dance class repeat dance movements with differences, firstly due to the variations of physical capabilities, debilities, age and gender, etc. Secondly, mimesis, as mentioned in the previous section, is never a mechanical process. Deleuze states that reproduction of the Same or imitation always includes difference. He adds that imitation plays a secondary role in learning, which cannot be reduced to the representation of the same action; instead, it involves the relation between “a sign and a response” (encounter with the Other) (Deleuze 2004: 25). Accordingly, we do not learn because somebody asks us to repeat what he/she does. Instead, we learn from the teachers, who invites us to do with them. Therefore, this process generates heterogeneity rather than the reproduction of the Same (26).

The mechanical repetition of the instructor’s movements that is necessary in the first stage of learning can be conceived as the acquisition of habitual movements. This stage can be understood as the first synthesis of time when the dancer follows a series of instants from the past to the future simultaneously contracting the presents and the movements taught to them. The contraction is realized as a habit; hence, it does not include making conscious associations. As cited earlier, no one can “go faster than one’s present” (Deleuze 2004: 98), so each individual has his/her own rhythm in the process of habitual and imitative repetition of
movements. In this mimetic endeavour, the difference implies the equality of the original phrase presented by the instructor and the version interpreted by the participant. Deleuze’s understanding of difference and repetition is also his attempt to denounce Platonism in the way he refuses the superiority of the origin or the model over the copy. The notion of Platonic difference is based on the assessment of the copy in terms of its resemblance to the model. David Toews explains that Deleuze was influenced by Tarde’s theory of imitation in his *Difference and Repetition* (Toews 2003: 91). Following Tarde, Deleuze analyses the emergence of creativity and novelty in mimetic repetition. Deleuze’s approach that emphasizes the difference in the process of mimesis is generally accepted in the community dance classes. D. comments on the learning process as follows:

*The hesitation before actualizing the movement exercise suggested by the instructor... Daring to do it and realization of its practicability... It is a kind of internal and mental expansion as if managing this tough moment once will alter the potential of one’s capability to do the next combinations. (D.)*

Here, the learning is seen as the introduction of pure difference and novelty that expands one’s potential for the other new mo(ve)ments while one is transformed both physically and mentally as if a threshold is transcended each time.

The repetition in the learning process gradually forms the memory of movements in addition to all the movements observed in the past. The present encompasses the echoes and resonances of the others’ and one’s own previous dances while each movement changes all the past movements simultaneously. This is the second synthesis of time in which each remembrance creates the past in a new way. Whilst watching a dancer, one occasionally observes the traces of his/her past dances, movement qualities, and the shadows of other people’s dances that can be recognized and, if desired, analysed as if unstitching a piece of embroidery. Nevertheless, the present dance is different from both the past ones and the others’ movement styles emulated by the dancer who is the embodiment of difference.
For the present to be in constant change, it “must express or actualize a multiplicity of pure differences” (Williams 2011: 13). This means that the dancer moves with the pure past and expresses a new movement that is the singular event. With the singularity of the movement, the dancer alters the relation with the past movements and rearranges the connections with all the movements of the pure past. Therefore, the second synthesis of time implies the potentiality of creativity and experimentation. The past is not the remembrance of a static memory, but a changing one in process. As the past and present are contemporaneous, dancing involves both the present moment and the pure past. Yet, this does not denote that the present dance is determined by the former dances, although it is conditioned by them. It entails them as vague or unrecognizable traces. In regard to a child learning to walk Deleuze maintains, “[n]o one has ever walked endogenously” and emphasizes the habitual character of even the very first steps (Deleuze 2004: 123). Each walk has the potential to transform the habituality of the past walks and our relation with walking itself. Thus, even the most habitual movement can be recreated in a new way.

Deleuze explicates the concept of duration in Bergson in terms of “transition”, “change”, “multiplicity” and “heterogeneity” (Deleuze 2006: 37-38). Its “becoming” can be defined as the actualization of the virtual (42). Duration is not static, but processual due to its “virtual character” (Ansell-Pearson 1999: 34), therefore, no movement can be repeated in the same way and there will always be a difference, which is why an improvising dancer has the infinite capacity for invention. Following Bergson, Deleuze’s notion of duration opens one beyond the now moment of the present because past and present co-exist: Even though “present acts” and “past ceased to act” (Deleuze 2006: 55), past is not the former present that has passed as if the presents followed each other successively. The present has the pastness in it, so the past “is”, rather than “was” (58-59). On the other hand, just like in Proust’s novel À la Recherche du Temps Perdu, the past is not awaiting our attention as if it is a block of memories, but it is transformed in the present with each “remembrance of things past”.

The past is transformed by the “I” that remembers it in this moment. I find it rather weird. Why did I feel that way then? (...) Not being able to remember because you are not leading the same life anymore. (K.)

K. points to the fact that when one changes, one does not have the same relationship with one’s own past which is also transformed in a Deleuzo-Bergsonian manner. This is also valid for one’s affective relation with one’s past.

While dancing together, carrying each other’s weight, pushing, touching, rolling together, the corporeal intensities vibrate in the duration wherein each dancer’s present co-exists with the others’. Thereof, the question of multiplicity of durations arises. Deleuze responds with Bergson’s example of three different fluxes of time that one can observe sitting on the bank of a river: “the flowing of the water, the gliding of a boat or the flight of a bird, the uninterrupted murmur of our deep life” (Bergson cited in Deleuze 2006: 80). The observer’s duration contains the other two fluxes and it is this third duration that “discloses” and “encompasses” other durations (ibid.). Drawing from Deleuze reading Bergson, it is possible to claim that the fluxes of duration of each improvising body are embraced in a single duration even though it entails multiplicity. Deleuze extends this co-existence to the whole universe when he writes, “Everything happens as if the universe were a tremendous Memory” (77).

Each moment has layers on layers and all is stored in time. Like an eternal reflection (...) a kaleidoscope of life... Time at Çatı is an extensive time. (H.)

H.’s understanding of the time of dancing is similar to Bergson’s metaphorical cone that signifies the pure past storing all the events. H. also refers to the extensive time of dancing at Çatı. This notion of extension and expansion of time was reiterated several times in the interviews.
The movements can be repetitive or a person might be repeating similar movement qualities developed over time, however, different combinations are formed during each improvisation. Deleuze’s third synthesis of time that parallels Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return is principally about the recurrence of difference, rather than the Same (Deleuze 2004: 50). In the eternal return, there is no causality between the events, as the combinations are constituted randomly like in the throw of dice (Faulkner 2006: 13). The repetition that occurs in the movements of a dancer is impersonal and it embodies “a continuous metamorphosis of energy” (Faulkner 2006: 124). Like a throw of dice, the dancer’s each move opens to chance. However, it is possible to observe a pattern in dance even when improvisation appears to be chaotic.

Deleuze claims that movement and repetition challenge representation as he opposes the theatre of repetition to the theatre of representation:

In the theatre of repetition, we experience pure forces, dynamic lines in space which act without intermediary upon the spirit, and link it directly with nature and history, with a language which speaks before words, with gestures which develop before organised bodies, with masks before faces, with spectres and phantoms before characters - the whole apparatus of repetition as a “terrible power”. (Deleuze 2004: 12)

Reading this quotation with improvisational dance in mind, I suggest that no movement can be fixed in representation because the dancing body, with its forces and intensities, is in a flow of becoming that cannot be captured by words striving to situate it in a cultural and social context. Leaving the field of representation, improvisational dance becomes the experience itself as the sensible generates a “world without identity” (Deleuze 2004: 68-69). The dancers become one with the movement/act in the event time while shedding personal, social and cultural identities.
The improvisational dance happens as both the time and the bodies move opening the moment to the potentiality of the virtual. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze conceptualizes the relations between real/possible and virtual/actual. He proposes that the reality is “the unfolding of a pre-designated possibility” (Grosz 1999: 26) whereas the virtual, which is also real, induces actualization. Realization is the concretization of a plan as opposed to actualization that involves creativity and innovation. While the relation between real and possible is determined by resemblance and limitation, the virtual/actual relation entails difference and creation. Creativity initiates the passage “from a virtual unity to an actual multiplicity” (Grosz 2005: 109). In terms of dance practice, the virtual would exceed what we can imagine or represent as the possibilities of movements. There would always be a surplus element as Massumi explains in his definition of the virtual (Massumi 2002). In fact, to imagine one’s movements or even looking at one’s reflection in the mirror while dancing clogs the flow of the creative intensities and the emergence of the unexpected.

The improvisational moment is not the “now” moment, but rather it is “the gateway” where the past and the future diverge (Faulkner 2006: 13). Every present is divided by two directions, one towards the past, the other towards the future (Williams 2011: 156). The present can never be fixed in the presence – being present- since the body always creates the new leaving behind the identities and the self as it moves beyond its cultural representations.

In F.’s view, “to be in the present moment” is only a question of language and discourse. The moment itself cannot be fixed since time is a continuous passage. F. voices his suspicion of the discourse about presence transferred from Zen Buddhism to dance. He argues that the present cannot be fixed and the claim to occupy the present is a cultural fiction.

*The existence of the moment is disputable. We imagine a divided straight line. Just like searching for a station in an old radio, the moment shifts all the time towards the future. (...) “To be in the present moment while dancing” might be a
linguistic issue. Maybe it is a matter of concentration. We may find another word for it. You are focused on and in the body then. (F.)

Deleuze associates the instant with the present of the Aion that “is the present without thickness, the present of the actor, dancer, or mime – the pure perverse “moment”. (…) It is not the present of the subversion or actualization, but that of the counter-actualization” (Deleuze 1990: 168). Aion is the “pure event”, “pure becoming” and “empty present in eternity” (Deleuze 1990: 150) which “pushes away past as well as future” (Deleuze 1990: 63). The counter-actualization means the creation of difference in the pre-established models of movements, thus disrupting the repetitive and reified structures defined by technicality or set rules in some dance forms. Improvisation opens unlimited potentials beyond the expected variations.

The life process is composed of the instants and the co-existence of all the times in the instant. The instant comprises eternity and entails the information of the whole universe. Each instant carries that information. The present entails it all. (K.)

K. regards time in a Deleuzian way that makes a reference to the present instant composed of all the past and all the future. The instant of becoming is pulled by both past and future. The event is the dancer’s instant of counter-actualization. K.’s view of the instant as a carrier of information is similar to the Aion wherein all the events communicate. The time of improvisational dance is the Aion, which entails the element of chance that reshuffles the potentials.

One can feel as if time is eternal or it loses its importance. As if there is an expansion, an expansion of the instant… You have to be present in the moment when you are dancing. You are there anyhow. (A.)

Actually, we expand the time at Çatı. (...) Time at Çatı is bent and folded. There is no linearity. (C.)
Extension and expansion are two notions repeatedly used by the interviewees to refer to the temporality of dancing at Çatı. In the quotes above, movement and dance are considered to transform time, as the moment becomes a gateway to the eternal aspect of time, which can be translated as the Aion, the present of the dancer. This is distinct from the linear chronological time of the Chronos.

Sometimes the dancers may not know what to do next in such moments:

[On the encounter with another dancer during an improvisation] *It was an immense intensity... I found it hard to let it continue, let it flow. We got separated. I didn't let it happen. What was it? I drew back when faced with the power of the moment. Either it was such a full moment that nothing else could be added, or it faded away before it reached wherever it was leading to. (A.*)

This is the moment of hesitation when faced with the moment of production of difference. Manning argues that the creative moment bears the capacity of the event “to activate certain vectors otherwise backgrounded, thereby generating an uneasy field of difference” (Manning 2013: 24). The creative movement practice can be an opening to the virtual; however, this can be a fleeting moment that produces a precarious feeling. Occasionally, the action may not be carried out to meet the event. In this example, what could have happened if the movement of the dancers continued to be actualized remained in the virtual realm. The actualization and counter-actualization are not like reaching a point or arriving at a destination because these would imply a predestined and already known locus where one has been before. On the contrary, the virtual is marked with discontinuity, uncertainty and indetermination. In that sense, the above-mentioned experience can also be considered as a singular event. Still, such potentials can be reactivated in a whole new way in another place at another time by another dancer.

G.’s account of trance-like temporality during an improvisation when he felt he became inorganic matter can be interpreted as the pure time of becoming -already passed, yet-to-come-. In contrast to a dramatic moment, he recalls the event with
lightness such that he can laugh at it. The lightness of the moment had an affective layer that had the visceral intensity of life force:

*I created this potential as if I sculpted it. I can laugh at that experience now, but it has filled me with life force that I can feel deep in my bones. (G.)*

In order to understand the relationship between movement and time, I want to quote Manning *in extenso* and then comment on it with examples from the voices that contributed to this research:

The dance floor moves the dancers. The ground shifts, and through its shifting, bodies recompose. The actual occasions created through the relational event of movement taking shape form a nexus of degrees of relevance, where every actual occasion is in some way present in every other actual occasion. This despite the fact that each interval is singular, coloring the particular actual occasion with a qualifier that distinguishes it from the plethora of other actual occasions. We may thus prehend the whole (the nexus—the dance as such) or a singularity (one particular movement). When the singularity surprises us the interval will come to light: a moment of magic! Total exfoliation: laughter. We feel the interval’s eternality: there will always have been more than one. The eternality of the interval carries an infinity of potential preaccelerations, an infinite subrealm of experience and expression. When movement makes us laugh (or cry), this laughter captures a singular interval, activating its relevance above the nexus. We feel the movement moving us. (Manning 2009:21)

Firstly, it is pertinent to explicate some of the concepts used in this eloquent passage. The first one is the interval understood in terms of both space and time. For Deleuze, the interval is “a distance or a gap between the movement [the living] receives and the one it gives, namely the movement it executes” (Deleuze cited in Boucher 2012: 103). Marie-Pier Boucher adds that it is a “temporal movement” (ibid.). In Manning, the interval is the “third space” of relation and experience activated by the moving bodies (Manning 2013: 2). It is also the time
of “incipiency” and “becoming-actual of the virtual” in which the virtual aspect disappears while new movements are invented continuously (Manning 2009: 18). Its eventness and singularity (21) are created collectively in a togetherness (22).

Manning’s concept of preacceleration is defined as “the virtual momentum of movement’s taking form before we actually move” and “a movement of the not-yet that composes the more-than-one that is [the] body” (Manning 2009: 6, 13). It is the feeling of the movement before its inherent potential is actualized. It also indicates that movement is always beginning and continuous as new movements are invented perpetually (14). Furthermore, Manning relates preacceleration with affects in the way it has an effect on the experience before its actualization. A dancer preaccelerates into the relational field between the moving bodies. This relationality is generated by the time of the bodies “becoming-movement” with “affective tonality” (Manning 2013: 207). In consequence, the affective attunement engendered by dancing bodies cannot be understood in terms of linear time (ibid.).

According to Manning, both space and time move the dancers. The moving bodies form a relationality in which the actual is co-present with all the actual conditions. The singularity of the interval has an effect on all the actual occasions. When faced with the singularity of the event as dance, one can experience surprise in the form of laughter or tears. The interval or the temporal, affective and spatial relationality of the moving bodies invents new movements while activating the potential of preaccelerations of the virtual domain. Hence, this preacceleration entails infinite possibilities of experience and expression.

G.’s laughter entails the lightness of the singular interval. A.’s hesitation to continue the flow marks the preacceleration in the moment of its disappearance. Omer also suggests that both time and space move us:

*We live in the same places and if we didn’t experience time differently, the space would feel heavy. One needs to transform both space and time with movement.*
Sometimes the space moves us; at other times, time moves us. When things go wrong, one has to expand the time through movement. Instead of making a series of movements, to move with the right kind of breathing at the right time, feeling the others while using less material and... (C.)

Time is experienced differently while dancing as the time is transformed into the duration of the interval in the space-time of the moving bodies. The incipiency of the movement is felt before it is actualized while the body feels the others affectively. The preacceleration does not simply mean that the movements follow one another, but rather it is the felt sense of time and movement interwoven with the affective attunement of the dancers.

In one of Hawking’s books there was a sentence like “the particles that move less appear as distinct things”. Drawing from this I claim, when we move less, we become separate bodies even though we have a kind of contact beyond the skin. (...) For instance, at Çatı I know that you are there. I feel like expanding, growing towards you, feeling outside the body, too. (...) The ecstasy generated by the movement... (K.)

Excluding a commentary on Hawking’s philosophy of time referred in this quote, I can highlight the point that when we move more, we get connected more. Dancing is feeling-with and towardness that expand both the sense of being and temporality. Sometimes the result is ecstatic when an individual experiences rapture or displacement as the etymology of the word suggests.

In conclusion, the dancing body is at the intersection of the past movements of all the dancers and its own present that transforms both the past and the future of Çatı. The creative movements open the time to its eventness and virtuality as the repetitions recreate difference each day anew.
4.5 The Time of the treadmill

Here, I investigate the temporal aspects of Hallo! elaborating on the time of the performance, the dancer and the co-composing community in addition to the use of the treadmill as a temporal and affective element.

Deleuze associates Aion with “the labyrinth made of the single straight line which is invisible and everlasting” in Jorge Luis Borges’ story (Deleuze 1990: 62). This labyrinth implies an eternal return of events rather than individuals. The dancer of Hallo! runs lost in a labyrinth of a single line as past and future of the runner subdivides the present of each step on the treadmill. The instant of Aion is “atopon, without place” (Deleuze 1990: 166). The two simultaneous times of “interlocking presents” and “elongated pasts and futures” are embodied in the dancer and in the metaphorical sign of the treadmill where the running dancer evades the fixity of space and time in the in-between of already been and yet-to-come.

The dancer’s body becomes a “body-sieve” absorbing the others’ affects “punctured by an infinite number of little holes” opened by the spectators’ gaze and affective transmission (Deleuze 1990: 86). Her one and only word is corporeal, intensely physical and directly acts on the other bodies as much as the dancer’s body from which it is hurled. Her hallos are breathed in and out and howled across the audience like the howl-words (mots-cris) of the schizophrenic that Deleuze describes in the thirteenth series of The Logic of Sense (Deleuze 1990: 86-88).

According to Deleuze, the actor inhabits the instant and “represents” while the acts and emotions of the character depicted take place either in the past or in the future (Deleuze 1990: 147). He/she contracts his/her own personality to be open to the pre-individual role. In other words, the actor’s present is the punctual instant of the Aion as the future and the past of the represented action divides the
empty present of the actor “which has no more thickness than the mirror” (Deleuze 1990: 150). Therefore, Deleuze claims, the actor actualizes the event.

Reflecting on the crack Artaud, Fitzgerald and Lowry experienced and wrote in their flesh, Deleuze asks whether it is possible to counter-actualize an event like the actor’s and dancer’s “flat representation” without letting the depth of the crack demolish language and life consequently leading to victimization and sickness (Deleuze 1990: 157). Looking at the lives of these writers, Deleuze discovers how great thoughts emerged in these cracks into which they delved at the expense of self-destruction. Nonetheless, Deleuze does not necessarily suggest such dramatic outcomes: When one comprehends the event, the event can be experienced in the flesh. Besides, the crack enables us to go beyond our preconception of what is possible and counter-actualization frees the event.

The dancer of Hallo! does not erase her personality completely as each performance is experienced in the flesh and moulded by the affective tonality of the dancer and the audience. Nevertheless, she steps on the treadmill and starts to run as part of a choreography with set temporality and space that inaugurate the event time of the performance distinct from the usual flow of Chronos- the present of “the state of affairs”. Even though her affects may be genuine, she still manages to contract her personality in the event time of Aion. Her “role” does not import her neither to a neutral and impersonal realm nor to the “flat” representation of the dancer. Instead, she cries or whispers a series of thunderstorms and breezes of hallos from the depths of her flesh as the audience faces the crack opening wider. Her demand to respond to this crack, or so the spectator may think, is almost like a call to thrust our fingers into her wound. In the second part of the performance, the dancer sits next to the choreographer and answers the audience questions or converses with them. She is back to the present of the chronological presents as the event time of Aion glimpses with the expression of others’ events connected to the Event in words and in silence. Challenged by the crack presented by the other, the participants may question how
to listen and to be listened to and open themselves to a different possibility that emerge in the rupture of each instant of the event.

A sound membrane is formed by each *hallo*, and concurrently, a language-membrane surrounds the space with each word addressed to the other. This new layer touches the loop of words fleeting in the minds of the audience echoing with intensity. At times it turns into a force disrupting any other thought to pull the others inside the sound membrane knit by affective threads.

All the resonances and echoes – though many lost in the crack-, the aggregate of affective correspondences, all these events compose one Event. Each instant marked by the steps of the running dancer also affirms the chance element in her vulnerability to the other’s responses. Chance is an element of Aion as there is a “unique cast for all throws” and “a single instance for all that exists” (Deleuze 1990: 180). The Event counter-actualized by the dancer forms “a single voice for every hum of voices” in this relationality of events (ibid.).

In his theorization of the event and becoming, Deleuze asks Alice’s question in *Alice in Wonderland*, “Which way? Which way?” and responds, “always in both directions at the same time” (Deleuze 1990: 3). The event is this uncertainty that destroys the belief that there can only be one way and consequently only a fixed identity. Whichever way we choose to go, we would not know the consequence of either of them in any moment of decision. By the same token, we would not be able to compare two consequences anyhow as we choose only one direction,. This is common sense. Yet, it is possible to infer an ethics from this question. James Williams comments that to ask “which one?” imposes a morality that prescribes a right direction. In contrast, if we change the question to “each one to which degree?”, this will render it a matter of dosages and experiments with limits and intensities (Williams 2011: 143). It does not mean to experiment individually at the expense of the community and dispense with social norms altogether. As an answer to such a dilemma, Williams proposes that “each moral situation is singular and resistant to general knowledge” (Williams 2011: 144). Besides, with
each becoming, any knowledge that can give a definite answer is modified, so a novel response is required after evaluation of each singular situation. Accordingly, there are no general moral principles, but an ethics that demands new choices and acts for each individual case.

The spectator is confronted by this ethical question each time the performer utters *hallo*. Even though the spectator may assume it to be an interactive performance and believe he/she is supposed to respond somehow to this address, how to respond becomes an ethical question. The emotional outbursts of the performer can leave the audience in the midst of an affective turmoil unless they prefer to keep a distance while witnessing the game unfold. On the other hand, the spectator may be open to this affective and ethical exchange to which he/she does not have to respond verbally, yet feel the urge to react empathically and provide a welcoming affective space in him/herself. Then, each moment one may ask, “which answer or attitude is the right one?” With each *hallo*, one can re-examine the situation and choose an answer or an attitude. Nevertheless, there is no necessity to literally react to the performer in an ethical dilemma. Still, the situation created on the stage urges us to question how much it is possible to listen and to respond to the other’s call in our everyday lives. Each time the dancer says *hallo* as she keeps running, she experiments with the dosages of this call that puts the audience in a position to decide on his/her dosage of empathy, compassion, kindness, impatience, anger, anxiety, neutrality, etc. Each choice or the direction taken undoes the audience and the dancer at the same time. Both are torn by the uncertainty of the direction to take, yet are transformed by this becoming process.

Furthermore, each performance bears multiple possible answers and each answer changes the dancer affectively and influences the tonality of the next *hallo*. All the potential answers exist as part of the event time actualized in multiple combinations in each performance. For Deleuze, an event is collective always in relation with other events. Thus, the ethical enquiry in the minds of the spectators and the event of becoming are collective, too.
4.6 The Time of Halays and The Gezi Uprising

According to Deleuze, an event is a singularity. Singularities are described as “turning points”, “knots”, “boiling points”, “points of tears and joy, sickness and health, hope and anxiety, ‘sensitive’ points” (Deleuze 1990: 52). Outside signification, the singularity is “a-conceptual”, neutral and pre-individual (ibid.). A singularity is pre-individual in its being neither individual nor personal in the sense that it cannot be fixed in an identity (102). As Deleuze cites Lawrence Ferlinghetti, it is rather “the fourth person singular” (103). In Gezi or similar uprisings that took place in various parts of the world such as Brazil, Greece, Egypt, USA, and Spain, the pre-individualities acted with an intelligent and affective will, unlike the way the crowd psychology would suggest. A singularity is marked by discontinuity, heterogeneity and potentiality while forces act to create shifts and thresholds to change a system. Rather than being a group made up of multiplication of individuals, there were singular event times when the people themselves became singularities and events for brief periods like a flash of lightening. As the event was actualized, the potential of the singularities was realized beyond the selves and individuals that were participants of these events. Therefore, what can be described as the nomadic impersonal “free and unbound energy” and the unconscious in a Deleuzo-Nietzschean sense flooded the streets of the cities across the world (Deleuze 1990: 107).

If the singularities are events, their transformation implies a historical event. Deleuze differentiates between events and accidents as he refers to Novalis who discerns the divergence between the ideal event and its actual imperfect unfolding. The same goes for the ideal Gezi in the minds of people and the actual historical unfolding of the uprising. The collective dances were the celebration of the ideal event in solidarity, not necessarily the “victory” of an actual revolution. Dance is the affective embodiment of the event inscribed in the flesh. Touch -holding hands- multiplies the energetic transmission, which decomposes the person or the individual incorporated in the pre-individual event time of dancing together.
Events are neutral and not affected by the individual and the collective; otherwise they would have been identical with their actualization in time. Deleuze gives the example of a battle that is actualized in varying ways and conceived differently by each participant (Deleuze 1990: 100). The event of a battle is indifferent to the victors, heroes and the vanquished. A mortally wounded soldier can grasp the event intuitively beyond courage and cowardice or other actualizations in the war. He is able to see the Event only when he does not fight as a soldier anymore. One cannot grasp the Event while acting simultaneously. In other words, one cannot act and actualize a part of the event while reflecting and commenting on it concurrently.

The people at Gezi participated in the Event as action flowed without contemplating on it because the Event could not have been realized temporarily if the reflexive thinking paralyzed the action. Not only during the resistance on the barricades or in the flight or fight mode in the streets, but also while collectively dancing or standing still, the action happened creating the Event free from the diverse manners it is realized and seized by each person. In many conversations after Gezi, the common comment, “everyone had his/her own Gezi” exemplifies how each grasps the Event differently even though they participated in the same Event.

The time of the event is the Aion that divides the present into the past and the future in that one asks, “what has just happened at the Gezi?” and “what is going to happen next?” in an endeavour to comprehend the event. The chance element of the Aion is present in every moment of the uprising even though the attacks of the state forces can be organized according to a plan. All individual events emergent during the Gezi days are connected to form the Gezi as an Event. Although the event is incorporated in the bodies of the protesters, the event is not defined only by its actualization since the time of the Aion is “yet-to-come and always already passed” (Deleuze 1990: 146).
James Williams suggests that for Deleuze the focus is on the present of each part of the chain going from past to present, hence we should concentrate on what to do now considering the past and future rather than spending our energies on the question of what happened (Williams 2011: 133). This question is relevant when looking at the Gezi experience after a series of other events and tragedies happened in the country. Instead of lamenting in nostalgia for what could not happen, the question asked by Nikolay G. Chernyshevsky (1863), then Lenin (1902), Chto Delat71 and many others becomes urgent everyday: What is to be done? (Chto delat?)

Deleuze and Claire Parnet propose the “revolutionary-becoming of people, at every level, in every place” (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 147). If revolution is thought to be impossible, then the thinkers must think the impossible “since the impossible only exists through our thoughts” (144). Instead of lamenting for the death of the revolutionary victims, Deleuze and Parnet suggest recognizing the “life-force” that mobilized them and writing our own “book of life” (145). Lamenting for the revolutionary victims has a different aspect in Turkey because the perpetrators of the political crimes and tortures are almost never punished, instead they can be rewarded with political positions at the state level. Remembrance of the people killed for their political views is a form of demand for justice on every anniversary while the families, friends and organizations continue to seek justice at the courts for years. On the other hand, I agree with Deleuze and Parnet that a struggle cannot be rooted in the failures of the past and grief, but in the life drive and thinking the impossible.

The affirmative approach of Deleuze and Parnet does not reduce the revolution to utopia or a spontaneous struggle as it also emphasizes the significance of organization (ibid.). Yet, this organization is distinct from that of the State on the plane of organization because it is on the plane of consistence constituted by all kinds of struggles for numerous issues such as gender, ethnicity, freedom of expression, etc. Therefore, revolutionary-becoming involves taking action in all

71 Chto Delat is a contemporary artist group founded in 2003 in Russia.
areas of life even when authoritarian regimes suffocate as many outlets as they can.

In the context of Gezi, however, I emphasize the spontaneous dynamics of the movement, which was triggered both politically and affectively. In the post-1980 coup d’état period when political organizations were prohibited or suppressed, a major segment of the population shunned from politicization in any areas of life especially in the work place and universities even though unionization of the workers and the state clerks including the school teachers continued. The 1980s were pivotal for the feminist movement while the 90s witnessed the rise of the Kurdish movement, so I am not referring to a depoliticized society, either. The environmental struggles mainly against mining and hydropower plants in the 2000s and major strikes such as that of the Tekel workers in 2009-2010 mark turning points in the organized political struggles that paved the way for the Gezi Uprising. Thus, the unorganized spontaneity that emerged at Gezi was created over time by the momentum of various struggles. The government’s systematic intervention in the secular daily life was also a primary factor that impelled people to act after years of depoliticization. Moreover, the spontaneous act of revolt was followed by new forms of organization in the parks, in the neighbourhood forums and quicker and wider forms of spontaneous organization in solidarity for various causes.

One of the major post-Gezi discussions was about the lack of organization and a future oriented project in the traditional leftist sense. Without neglecting the importance of these critical issues in addition to the class and cultural composition of protesters and their wide range of political and personal reasons to join the uprising I primarily focus on the affective element in the urgency to go into the streets. Hence, François Zourabichvili’s comment on involuntarism in politics becomes relevant in this context: “the will no longer precedes the event” (Zourabichvili cited in Aarons’s Introduction, in Zourabichvili 2012: 10). Zourabichvili’s remark on Deleuze’s understanding of politics highlights how “political sensibilities” emerge “through rupture” “along with the possible worlds
in relation to which they draw their urgency” (Aarons’s Introduction, in Zourabichvili 2012: 10). Therefore, rather than planning a revolution, the encounter with the possible and the intolerable creates the urgency for the event to occur. In that, as also Kieran Aarons argues, the event and its affective components have a political significance for Deleuze.

To create the possible is to create a novel collective spatio-temporal assemblage that responds to the new possibility of life created by the event, or which serves as its expression. A genuine modification of the situation does not take place as the realization of a project, for it is a matter of inventing the concrete social forms that correspond to the new sensibility, hence the inspiration can only come from the latter. The new sensibility does not present a concrete image that could be adequate to it: from this point of view, there is only creative action, guided not by an image or a project of future reform but by affective signs which, following the Deleuzian leitmotif, “do not resemble” that which actualizes them. (Zourabichvili cited in Aarons’s Introduction, in Zourabichvili 2012: 11)

The neighbourhood forums, artistic events in the squats and bostans (gardens in the public areas which were mostly derelict until they were reclaimed by people for collective use) were the first sparks of collective creativity inspired by the event of Gezi. The environmental sensibility became widespread with new ways to take action. However, most of these struggles failed to achieve their objectives as in the case of deforestation in the north of Istanbul for the construction of the third bridge on the Bosphorus and its highway links. Cerattepe resistance, though, reignited the Gezi-style creative and joyful protest of the locals against the mining companies in Artvin in the Black Sea Region.

Deleuze differentiates between the plane of immanence or consistence and the plane of organization. The plane of organization implies transcendence and is marked by “a harmonious development of form and a well-ordered formation of the subject” (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 95). Forms, Being, education, state,
religion, and law are on the plane of organization. In contrast, the plane of consistence is defined as “successions of catatonic states and periods of extreme of haste, of suspensions and shootings, coexistence of variable speeds, blocs of becoming, leaps across voids, displacements of a centre of gravity on an abstract line, (...) a ‘stationary process’ at dizzying speed which sets free particles and affects” (ibid.). Individuations, collective assemblages, and *hecceities* are on the plane of consistence construed as movement, speed, slowness, and flux. The Gezi experience was a break from the plane of organization as many participants experienced a leap into becoming and the hecceities of the plane of consistence.

Hecceity, a concept Deleuze borrows from Duns Scotus, means *thisness*, the property that constitutes the individuation or uniqueness of an object. It is distinct from a subject, a person or substance. Hecceity is also conceived as an event, thus related to “the floating times” of the Aion (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 92). Deleuze gives the example of the heroine’s stroll in Virginia Woolf’s *Mrs. Dalloway*. Her stroll, in the course of which she “penetrates like a blade through all things” is a hecceity or an event wherein her thoughts, affects and perception are experienced in a flux of becomings and processes that takes her to a time distinct from the living present of the Chronos (ibid.). A hecceity or an event is imbued with intensities and the power to affect and be affected. The plane of immanence or consistence also entails suspensions, interruptions and hindrances, hence we “start again, start again from the middle” and form “new relations of speed and slowness” (94). Void, silence, fog, speed, sharpness, clarity, voice, and slowness exist in varying dimensions and degrees on this plane of multiplicity. The rigid binaries of the plane of organization such as gender, age, class, etc. are unsettled on the plane of consistence wherein new middle lines and multiplicities emerge as in the case of May 1968 and the Gezi Uprising. In our conversations about Gezi, all my friends who participated in the uprising referred to the change in their experiences of daily life as if they were alive for the first time, as if everything existed in the clarity of fulfilment and will never be seen in the old light again.
Deleuze delineates desire in terms of the plane of consistence as opposed to its definition as lack. Accordingly, we already have what we desire otherwise we would not know it. If we do not know what we desire yet, we must create it taking all the risks. Only those who lack desire, see it as lack. In contrast, for Nietzsche desire is the “will to power”; and for Deleuze and Parnet, it is grace and virtue (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 91). It involves affects, intensities and hececeities. Deleuze highlights the political in desire as the plane of consistence is constructed collectively by social becomings, which turn the revolution into a festival: “the revolution will be a festival” (95). Despite this affirmative and festive tone, desire is not a natural spontaneity or a cult of pleasure free from the constraints of law and order. On the contrary, these determinate conditions have to exist for desire to emerge. Desire and the emergence of multiple potentials played a major part in the carnivalesque and festive spirit of the Gezi times. The pro-government media and the government were shocked by the flow of intensities, which they could only interpret as evil and sinful.

People can react to oppression and exploitation spontaneously, however, the desire for a revolution needs to be constructivist and collective, not just spontaneous. According to Deleuze and Parnet, the success of a revolution is not that important compared to its process. In this regard, it is better to focus on the deterritorializations and reterritorializations of movements. A society is constituted by both the plane of organization and the lines of flight. The latter is created collectively in “a time which is not pulsed, a hececeity like a wind which blows up, a midnight, a midday” (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 136). Even in such an event time, deterritorializations are accompanied or followed by reterritorializations.

At Gezi, collective action replaced the leader as the origin of enunciation and movement. Still, each participant had his/her own fluxes, thresholds, lines of flight, deterritorilizations, and reterritorializations sometimes with lurking micro-fascisms. All of these events of ruptures are interconnected in the Event of Gezi and other uprisings in the global context. In 2013, the protests in Brazil coincided
with the ones in Turkey and the protesters showed solidarity with each other in various forms such as posters, banners, slogans, flags, etc. Obviously these symbols are only physical aspects in the living present of the Chronos. As events, all the protests not only in recent history, but also throughout history have an impact on each other and the way the events unfold while their actualization affects the virtual in event time of the Aion.

Deleuze and Parnet maintain that the individuals and the groups are formed by lines (2007). The segmentary and rigid first line entails family, profession, education, military, and retirement. The second one, the line of segmentarity is still social, but more flexible, intimate and personal. Thresholds, modifications, detours, ups and downs of our histories are all parts of this molecular line related to various rhythms and becomings. Thirdly, the line of gravity, velocity or the line of flight takes us even beyond the thresholds of the second line “towards a destination which is unknown, not foreseeable, not pre-existent” (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 125). Most people never experience the third line in their lives.

Deleuze and Parnet also refer to F. Scott Fitzgerald who describes various forms of breaks in a person’s life. The first one, the “cuts” (coupures) involve the changing rhythms and positions such as youth-old age, success-failure, health-sickness, etc. which almost all human beings experience in their life times (Deleuze and Parnet 2007: 126). Secondly, the “crack” (fisure) may be invisible, however, it still influences one’s thresholds in a positive or negative way. After a crack, either one cannot endure any segments of one’s life any more, or feel a relief and tranquillity. The crack is both personal and collective just like the line of segmentarity and the line of flight. According to Fitzgerald, the third form of discontinuity is the “rupture” which is depicted as the absolute threshold, becoming and pure movement: “Only movements concern me” (127). It is rather difficult to describe this state, which Deleuze and Parnet exemplify with Kierkegaard’s description of the knight. It is a state of becoming imperceptible and invulnerable while moving with precision. In the rupture one always begins from the middle and exists in the middle of two lines. This is the space of
groundlessness in the in-between. The middle is not the centre or the mediocre, but is opposed to the points of origins and teleological ends. For instance, rhizome and grass are in the middle, horizontal and non-totalizing in contrast to the arborescent and hierarchical principles.

The Gezi experience was a rupture, which was driven by the intolerability of the situation at the time. It was a rupture in the history of a land, in the city, and in the lives of the participants. However, the rupture in an individual’s life may be filled with the debris of political frustrations after a series of counter-revolutionary moves on the plane of organization. Then, the question becomes how to continue the revolutionary becoming under an authoritarian regime and in a state of emergency when even the basic rights are suspended. How can one carry the rupture inside as a driving force to dance through hardships and at the same time continue the struggle? I have no definite answer to this question, but following Nietzsche and Deleuze, I suggest repetition and willing the impossible to the “nth” power. Hence, bearing the limits of my research in mind I continue with an interpretation of repetition in revolts and dancing in protests in the following section.

Deleuze says that the festivals “repeat an ‘unrepeatable’” in the way they actualize it in its “nth” power (Deleuze 2004: 2). In this sense, halay is the eternal return of the festive joy, solidarity and protest. The circle of people disrupts the linear mechanical speed of the work time while their dance is connected to the past and future protests and festivals. Each celebration of the insubordinate people becomes part of the chain of all the past and future halays as the embodiment of difference and novelty. Their imagination of a different future creates the difference in the present momentarily and fleetingly, yet adding another link to the chain of people dancing against the status quo.

Deleuze asserts that repetition is not a historical reality, but rather it is the historical condition that generates novelty. Accordingly, the analogies with another historical event are not only in the historian’s mind and text. The
participants of an event act identifying themselves with their predecessors, too. Deleuze gives the example of the analogy between the French Revolution and the Roman Republic in that the revolutionaries “lead their lives as ‘resuscitated Romans’, before becoming capable of the act” (Deleuze 2004: 113). Therefore, first they identified with the Romans, and then they repeated a mode of the pure past while producing the new. The new created by their actualization was the French Revolution, which later influenced many modern revolutions in history including the Ottoman modernization beginning in the 19th century, the foundation of the republic and the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey.

The agents or the specific conditions that pave the way to the repeated event do not matter. The destruction of the Same and creation of a new circle of the Other play an important role in the return of the yet-to-come (Deleuze 2004: 114). Instead of the identity of the participants, their historical action matters. As long as they identify with the figures from history, they actualize their historical role spontaneously. During and after the epic two weeks of the Gezi Uprising, many socialists, communists and anarchists were already comparing these days with those of the Paris Commune in 1871. Besides, May’68 across many countries and the 60s-70s in Turkey provided a revolutionary identity for the rebels who created a complete difference out of the pure past. In the contemporary uprisings from Tahrir to Puerta del Sol, from Syntagma to Wall Street, the echoes and resonances of the presents were unfolding the same story in diverse levels, each of them contracting a different aspect of the virtual dimension of the past. The revolutionaries or the protesters in various geographies still actualize the same past with different lyrics while transforming both the past and future with each new present.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter, temporal elements of dancing together were explored drawing from Deleuze’s philosophy of time. Dancing together, one is open to the surprises of the present moment and imagination on the move. Even if one repeats the usual
habitual steps, something different can emerge as other bodies touch, affect, 
transform one’s bodily constitution, challenge and possibly interrupt the loops of 
the raving mind towards the territory of imagination. There is no temporal order 
of this as body, mind, other’s bodies, the space and time in-between are all in a 
process wherein one is made, unmade, remade by each other. Does the 
actualization of a potential present the ideal version of an evening class if one 
opens oneself to the experience? What happens then? Can it happen everyday? It 
does not have to, however, the potentiality is there to be actualized as each step, 
each move and each turn transform the present reality. So, neither the present, nor 
the body is seen as a site on which power relations and culture are imposed. 
Dancing bodies can be envisaged in connection with the open and constantly 
changing materiality of relations. Dancing together and initiating new forms of 
being-with, the affective community of Çatı reinvents the creative time and the 
politics of relationality.

In the context of Hallo!, my reading of temporality is focused on the eventness of 
the performance in addition to the specific aspects of the dance piece such as the 
time of the treadmill and the dancer.

The dances during strikes and protests repeat the unrepeatable event of each 
resistance in the eternal return of people dancing in circles for centuries. The 
difference in the forms of acting and doing, even though small, trivial and 
fleeting, paves the way for difference in being-with in-between bodies during the 
Gezi Movement. The standing still protest was the moment of caesura in the 
unfolding of events at Gezi. It generated difference and a change of rhythm rather 
than the disruption of the rhythmic repetitive dances. It was a rhythm in stillness 
as the actual presence of standing people embodied solidarity and being with.
General Conclusion: The Political In-Between Moving Bodies

In the final part of my thesis, I endeavour to discern various aspects and interpretations of the relationship between dance and politics/the political in the framework of its diverse assessments in the chapters. Therefore, firstly I present some ideas on how the political emerges in relation to bodies, senses, affects, and the experience of a work of art. The major concern of the thinkers to whom I refer is what a work of art does or what happens between people in that experience rather than the message or the meaning as the guarantee of a political outcome.

Jacques Rancière defines political art in terms of the disruption of the distribution of the sensible (2004). A work of art doesn’t have to be politically engaged or represent political and social conflicts to be political (Rancière 2004: 60); rather, political art “disrupts the relationship between the visible, the sayable, and the thinkable without having to use the terms of a message as a vehicle” (63). It has the potential to reframe and transform the modes of being together, modes of doing and saying while forming communities that question the distribution of roles (Rancière 2004: 39-40, 2008: 4). According to Rancière, artists suggest a new form of expression of the community as they “weave together a new sensory fabric by wresting percepts and affects from the perceptions and affections that make up the fabric of ordinary experience” (56). Art can change the given sensible world that fixes what is perceptible and thinkable. A “community of sense” emerges as a result of reframing the relationship between bodies (72), creating new combinations of sense data (57) and finding novel ways of enunciation.

Félix Guattari asserts that artists create “toolkits composed of concepts, percepts and affects”, rather than teaching people (Guattari 1995: 129). The rupture of sense by a work of art produces subjectivities. A novel composition of percept and affect transforms the relationship between the self and the other in such a way that one leaves the familiar terrain and becomes the other (93). Guattari shuns from positioning artists as “the new heroes of revolution” (91) and suggests that
art is the creative activity of anyone whose subjectivity is reshaped with the experience of new rhythms, forms and intensities. He doesn’t privilege art as the only domain of creation, either; however, art has the potentiality to disrupt the forms and signification in the social field (130-131).

Rancière’s and Guattari’s reading of the political in art are useful to comprehend how dancing together generates new affects and percepts while forming new communities of sense. This also marks the main intersection of affects and politics in the context of my research, which investigates various affective embodiments of the political in each chapter. Dancing together is political as it proposes new modes of being together in addition to the redefinitions of the body with which it experiments. On the other hand, neither Guattari, nor Rancière renounces political engagement or implies withdrawal into oneself or an isolated artistic domain. Moreover, my own understanding of politics does not exclude the struggles and resistances either organizational or spontaneous, in the streets or in the workplaces as resistances can be spread in time and place in every area of life. Dancing is part of the organized political struggles such as strikes in Turkey wherein it asserts joy and solidarity amidst challenges of the political struggles.

Each example of the thesis contributed to the political aspects of affects both similar and varying ways. In Chapter 1, the encounter with the other suggests difference as one’s horizon shifts with the entry of the other into one’s perspective. One can never fully represent or apprehend the other according to one’s system of knowledge. Hence, an encounter involves being at the threshold to meet the unknown. The Spinozan and Deleuzian ethology suggests forming good encounters, which will create new ways of relating with others and their relations with the world. Dancing together can become a way of experimenting with these new encounters that can create new sociabilities. In that context, the experiences at Çatı initiate an affective community, which establishes a ground for new forms of relating with each other creatively and affectively.
The political in *Hallo!* has two major connotations: First aspect can be identified as the politics emerging from the intensity of the relational experience and its power to open novel forms of experimenting with affects. Second aspect is understood as the politics of listening and empathy in addition to its potential reference to the political climate of Turkey at the time of my writing. *Hallo!* opens the ground for togetherness as we lend an ear to each other.

The halays and dances during protests literally embody resistance and move the ground while opening the streets to new encounters with the others and with the event time of social movements, in particular the Gezi Uprising. As it is in the case of the Standing Man protest, movement or stillness during protests can be a means of improvisation when we answer the call of the other in solidarity. These improvised responses can be rooted in empathy and fellow feeling when individuals open themselves to the rhythm of others.

The affective and political potential of the virtual emerges in-between dancing bodies, which disrupts the habitual time of the everyday life marked by power relations. When time is out of joints and there is no ground to stand on, dancing and moving together can be a technique to reinvent the ground. This ground is not a territory defined by belonging and identities, but a deterritorialized one. It can also be called a “groundless ground” in Irigaray’s terminology (Irigaray 1996: 101) that she delinates in the context of the relationship between two sexes, which, in my opinion can be rethought concerning our relations with each other in general. Accordingly, a “groundless ground” is “without definitive resolution or assumption, always becoming in the outward and return journeying between one and the other, with no end or final reckoning” (ibid.). This means being always open to the difference and unknown in each other. In that sense, a community or togetherness is not characterized by sameness, identity or boundaries. This groundless ground we share and remake with our movements also points to the earth as the ground we share as opposed to the boundaries of territories. (In that respect, I also think there is a parallelism between talking about boundaries/affects in theory and borders/immigrants in politics.) Various forms of creative
encounters discussed in this thesis constitute a groundless ground for communality, imagination and experimentation of new forms of interaction. Walking, dancing, standing still, rolling, sitting, lying, leaping, rising, falling side by side, moving with, but maybe not always together, with words, sighs, cries, laughter, yet always open to the unknown of our differences…

To conclude;

Throughout the preceding chapters, I have endeavoured to address the affective and temporal aspects of dancing together in my case studies that entail a dancing community, a dance performance co-composed by the affective milieu between the dancer and the audience, and dancing as part of political struggles such as workers’ strikes in addition to the bodily gestures and presence in terms of movement, dancing and stillness during the Gezi Uprising. In Chapter 1, I presented a first person narrative of my experiences of encountering the others during movement practices. Encounter is primarily defined in terms of affects, and with thinkers such as Badiou, Irigaray and Deleuze although there are not many theoretical references or involvement in this chapter based on my personal experiences. I tried to verbalize the diverse aspects of encounter in an open text. This prepared the ground for the other voices – interviewees, other scholars, philosophers and even events. In Chapter 2 and 3, I moved on to the theories in Affect Studies that focus on the boundaries and porousness of bodies. Then, I engaged in my own and interviewees’ experiences to conceive the relationality of a dance community. I relied on my observations to interpret the other examples – a dance piece (Hallo!) and dances as a form of protest- and implemented theoretical tools from Affect Studies and Deleuze’s philosophy of time.

My overarching research questions that led the thesis have been as follows: What happens in the affective field of bodies as they dance together? How can we define a corporeal politics and/or the political emerging in-between the affective and affected bodies? And vice versa, how does the dance of a collective function affectively and politically when bodies are overtly driven by political causes as in
the cases of strikes, demonstrations and uprisings? How can the time of dancing-with be configured and what are the roles of temporalities produced through various dance practices?

The inevitable digressions of unexpected details that each case study or example induced me to delve into testify that only one dimension or a snapshot of an experience can be framed by theoretical or other interpretations.

The affects in-between bodies have been discussed primarily with references to attunement, rhythmic entrainment, transmission of affects, imitative and emotional contagion, which imply leakages and the permeability of boundaries. In addition, the notion of relationality in the sense it is conceived particularly by Manning in her theorization of dancing bodies influenced many sections of this research. As the bodies encounter each other forming new affective compositions, their dancing together rhythmically generates fellow feeling, solidarity and empathy. This is especially true for strikes and protests; however, dancing in the studio or the relationship between the dancer and the audience does not necessarily involve all of these affirmative concepts. In other words, negative affects, exclusions, estrangement, refusal to relate to the affects “in the air” are all parts of these dancing experiences. In any case, affects cannot be excluded from the relationality and materiality of bodies. However, dancing together is generally marked by good encounters that decrease the debilitating effects of negative affects and increase the power to act in a Spinozist manner, hence movement in creative and political forms of togetherness has the capacity to open the potential of affects.

In the chapters focusing on my examples, dancing together is envisaged as a temporary act, an interval, and a fleeting moment that activates the infinite potential of the virtual in a Deleuzian sense. In this regard, the Deleuzian understanding of time has opened numerous possibilities to theorize the dancing and moving bodies. Furthermore, the affective interaction of dancing bodies generates a difference that implies the emergence of the unexpected and the
unknown. Deleuze’s concepts such as the event, the Aion and the virtual helped me conceive the present of dancing as indeterminate and open to experimentation. The affective and political potential of the virtual emerges in-between moving bodies which disrupt the habitual time of the everyday life marked by power relations.

At the intersection of affect and time in-between moving bodies, the political is materialized in various ways, either overtly as in the case of dancing as part of political struggles; or in terms of the potential of the creative endeavours of a dancing community on an everyday basis and the affective intensities experienced by the audience and the dancer during a dance performance.

My research is at the crossroads of diverse approaches to dance in the way it looks at affect, time and politics. Manning, McCormack and Cull elaborate on each of these themes. In general, these notions are explored in relation to dance practice by the scholars mentioned in Introduction that include Foster, Phelan, Lepecki, Sabisch, Kunst, Rothfield, Briginshaw, Klein, Ehrenreich, Prickett and Hamera. This thesis has aimed to contribute to their discussions with the introduction of specific examples from Turkey. Secondly, I hope I have made a small contribution to both affect and Deleuze studies while introducing the theoretical and political possibilities of discussing dancing communities and the relationality of bodies. I also hope that this thesis has provided a novel approach to envisage and theorize the dance practices in Turkey.
BIBLIOGRAPHY and SOURCES:

Books:


Ahmed, Sara. 2005. The Skin of the Community: Affect and Boundary Formation. In:


**Journals and E-Journals:**


**Web Sources:**


Erdem Gunduz’s web page: [http://www.erdemgunduz.org/index.htm](http://www.erdemgunduz.org/index.htm)


Paxton, Steve. 1986. The Small Dance, The Stand. Available from:
http://myriadicity.net/ci36/satellite-events/the-small-dance-the-stand.html
[Accessed: January 20th, 2014]


Rogoff, Irit. 2005. “WE: Collectivities, Mutualities, Participations”, originally submitted by Marten Spangberg on 19/03/05 Available from:
http://mode05.org/node/145 [Accessed: July 9th, 2008].

Tekay, Mebuse. 2015. Kirginligin Adi Diyarbakir Olmus. [Disappointment is the name for Diyarbakir] (In Turkish) T24 News Website, 23.12.2015. Available from:

Wictionary, “kinesthesia”. Available from:
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/kinesthesia


Wikipedia, “halay”. (In Turkish) Available from:


E-books:

Karakurt, Deniz. 2011. Turkce Soylence Sozlugu. [Turkish Dictionary of Mythologies] (In Turkish)

Videos on The Web:

A longer version includes graphic images:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yd-7iT2JtXk [Accessed: February 2013]


**Online Blogs:**


Aydin Teker’s blog: https://aydinteker.wordpress.com/


Defne Erdur’s blog: http://inbetweenprayersintime.wordpress.com


My Interviews:

Interview with Aydın Teker and Gizem Aksu, 02.06.2015, Kurtulus, Istanbul
Interview with Cemil Gülüm, 08.02.2014, Taksim, Istanbul
Interview with Cevat Edrisi, 21.02.2014, Tophane, Istanbul
Interview with Cumhur Kocalar, 03.02.2014, Taksim, Istanbul
Interview with Defne Erdur, 10.12.2013, Karakoy, Istanbul
Interview with Eda Yapanar, 06.02.2014, Taksim, Istanbul.
Interview with Erdem Gündüz, 06.12.2013, Taksim, Istanbul.
Interview with Idil Kemer, 27.02.2014, Taksim, Istanbul
Interview with İsil Uysal, 04.02.2014, Taksim, Istanbul
Interview with Lerna Babikyan, 11.02.2014, Arnavutkoy, Istanbul
Interview with Mustafa Kaplan, 23.12.2013, Tepebasi, Istanbul.
Interview with Nilay Arıöz, 04.02.2014, Taksim, Istanbul.
Interview with Ömer Uysal, 04.12.2013, Taksim, Istanbul.

Talk Notes:


Theses:

