
http://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/26692/

The version presented here may differ from the published, performed or presented work. Please go to the persistent GRO record above for more information.

If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact the Repository Team at Goldsmiths, University of London via the following email address: gro@gold.ac.uk.

The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated. For more information, please contact the GRO team: gro@gold.ac.uk
“Mobility” is by far one of the most frequently used words in political debates and statements that discuss the values upon which the EU is predicated and that are at the core of so-called liberal societies. In Security, Territory, Population, Michel Foucault famously contends that since the XVIII century the main governmental problem has been “a matter of organizing circulation, eliminating its dangerous elements, making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximizing the good circulation by diminishing the bad” (Foucault, 2007: 18). However, instead of flattening heterogenous practices of mobilities under the rubric of circulation, and referring to the government of mobility as such, what requires further investigation are the asymmetries through which different practices of mobility are governed (Bigo, 2011; De Genova, 2013; Fassin, 2007). In this regard, Claudia Aradau has introduced the expression “political grammars of mobility”, meaning by that “the relations between mobility, security and subjectivity”, pointing to the misleading tendency in the literature to regard mobility and circulation as synonymous, and to the need of investigating how “different forms of mobility matter for security practices” (Aradau, 2016: 565). This also echoes what in this article I call governing migrant mobility through mobility, highlighting the twofold role of (forced) mobility, as an object of government and as a a technology for regaining control over migration. This article investigates how mobility works as a governmental technology for governing unruly mobility – meaning by that the movements of illegalized migrants – and, simultaneously, it focuses on the effects of containment beyond detention that the government of mobility through mobility generates.

In critical migration literature expressions and terms like “border regime” (De Genova, 2016; Tsianos, Karakayali, 2010) and “contested politics of mobility” (Squire, 2011) are used to highlight the unequal and asymmetric functioning of borders as well as of migration policies. In particular, the increased presence of women, men and children seeking asylum in Europe, which has been framed by states and by the EU in terms of a “refugee crisis” and “migration crisis”, have put the government of mobility at the core of the EU’s political agenda (Bojadjiev, Mezzadra, 2015). The
(non)governability of migrants’ presence and movements has gained central stage both in the media and at the level of states’ narratives.

Migrants’ mobility as an object of modes of control has been widely explored in the literature. As critical migration scholarship has demonstrated, the mobility of illegalized migrants is subjected not only to arrest and detention but also to decelerations, disruption and selections (Bigo, 2002; Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013; Tazzioli, 2018). Yet, while the governing of mobility has gained centre stage in the academic debate, mobility as a technology for governing migration - what I call governing migrants’ mobility through mobility - remains quite under-theorised and not widely explored. The two mutually related arguments that underpin this paper are the following. First, mobility is not only an object of control but also a “political technology” (Foucault, 2012) of migration governementality that is enacted by directly or indirectly keeping migrants on the move - disrupting their autonomous mobility and forcing them to undertake convoluted geographies. Second, the effects generated on migrants’ lives and movements are not only forced hyper-mobility but also spatial dispersal and modes of containment beyond detention - that is, containment is not only enforced by keeping migrants in detention but also by obstructing and disrupting their autonomous movements. This paper explores mobility as a political technology considering it from a twofold angle: on the one hand, the modes of containment beyond detention put into place by states for regaining control over unruly migration movements; on the other, strategies of migrant dispersal that are enacted by local and national authorities. Through such an analysis, this essay questions the taken for granted nexus between mobility and freedom, in light of the use of mobility for governing migration: indeed, a focus on modes of migration control that hinges on mobility as a political technology of governementality leads us to disjoin freedom and mobility, with the latter which in liberal discourses tends to be conceived as one of the main ways in which the former is fully actualised.

In so doing, this paper does not look at asylum seekers transferred from one city to another - see for instance Nick Gill's work (Gill, 2009a). Rather, it takes into account more invisible and unofficial strategies to keep migrants on the move and to force them to divert their routes or to undertake the same journey multiple times - by pushing them away from critical border zones or by hampering them to stay in a given place. In most cases, these unofficial or indirect forced displacements take place as part of a grey area of non-registered state’s practices, recalling what Alison Mountz defines “hidden geographies” that are generated through “what is not known in the realm of displacement” (Mountz, 2011: 318). The paper proceeds as follows. The first section makes some
Mobility as a technique of government?

The government and the obstruction of migration movements are also enacted through (forced) mobility, and not only by generating immobility and enforcing detention. Such an approach speaks to William Walters’s notion of “viapolitics”: this latter entails considering that vehicles are surprisingly missing in migration theories, while they structure and make possible the materiality of migration movements as well as of the governmental measures through which migrants are managed (Walters, 2015). In this regard, a clarification is needed about “mobility” and “migration” and on how I use these terms throughout the paper. First, this article deals specifically with migrants’ mobility, and not with mobility as such, showing that state authorities try to regain control over unruly migration not only by detaining or deporting migrants but also by keeping them on the move and forcing them to undertake convoluted geographies. Second, in order to analytically distinguish migration from mobility, I argue that when someone’s mobility is defined as migration, means that his/her mobility appears as a problem, that is as something to be governed and controlled. As Bridget Anderson has aptly remarked, “migration signifies problematic mobility. People have always moved, and human movement is only contingently constituted as an object of investigation and a problem for policy […]. “Migration” already signals the need for control and in public discourse is often raced and classed”. (Anderson, 2017: 1532). It follows that being governed as a migrant does not concern only people on the move: immobility, strandedness and temporal...

1The Dublin Regulation, implemented in 1997 and then revised in 2003 and 2013 establishes the Member State responsible for the examination of the asylum application. The Dublin Regulation has been conceived to prevent so called “asylum shopping”, that is, migrants who claim asylum in more than one country. Although there are three main criteria for determining what is the state responsible for examining the asylum application ( family connections, valid residence document or visa, first country of entry) the most frequently used is the “first country of entry”. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604. Although the effective number of migrants who are returned to the first EU country of entry under Dublin is not high, the Dublin Regulation is used as a tactic of deterrence for discouraging migrants to claim asylum and threatening them to be taken back.
suspension are all part of the heterogenous migrant conditions.

Third, despite migration and mobility cannot be conflated, I do not take here mobility as a synonymous of movement. Building on Tim Cresswell's seminal work, mobility should not be confused with mere spatial displacement - movement from a point A to a point B (Creswell, 2006): mobility is always shaped by and takes place within specific configurations of power relations, which also determine the differential restrictions for the people to move and, therefore, the hierarchies of mobility. To put it otherwise, mobility itself is always historically and politically determined, being differently regulated by multiple legal, technological and administrative measures. Thus, mobility cannot be assumed as a transhistorical or universal category, nor it can be equated with the kinetic act of moving. Relatedly, mobility is source of data extraction and circulation - e.g. the biometric data collected at the national frontiers (Amoore, 2006). Thus, I oppose here to any “generic conception of mobility in favour of a view of mobility as an accomplishment that is always contextual, and enacted by means of specific assemblages of bodies, machines, infrastructures, communication devices, conduct, and so on” (Walters, 2015: 472).

This article stems from a combination of ethnographic work and research fieldwork that I conducted between Italy and France, in 2015 and 2017, and analyses of institutional documents and public statements released by French and Italian authorities, as well as data and statistics I collected from NGOs and international organisations. I have decided to use the general expression “governing migrants’ mobility through mobility” to analyse the different ways in which mobility is used as a technology for governing illegalized migrants across Europe, and for decelerating, diverting and troubling their movements. I am interested here in mapping the forms of direct and indirect displacements to which they are subjected, and not to state-led migration programmes. Therefore, by focusing on illegalized migrants, I explore how mobility is not only one of the (many) components and experiences of migration; it is also used as a technology of government.

The EU’s fight against intra-European migrant movements is a case in point, I suggest, for investigating the modes of governing migrants’ mobility through mobility. The erratic geographies enacted by migrants who try to dodge the spatial restrictions imposed by the Dublin Regulation and the increasing population of “refugees in orbit” (Moreno-Lax, 2012) across Europe, are not side-

---

2 I conducted fieldwork in France in the city of Paris (October 2015 and November 2016) in Calais (October 2015 and April 2017) and in Marseille (September 2015, June 2016 and March-April 2017), interviewing migrants, local institutions and French NGOs, between September 2015 and December 2016. Concerning the fieldwork in Italy, see page 9.

3 Through such an expression I refer to the convoluted and circular movements undertaken by those migrants who are bounced back at the internal frontiers of Europe or who are forced to stay on the move for long time, before eventually reaching their destination.
effects of the measures of containment. On the contrary, through forced mobility states try to regain control over migrant movements by keeping migrants on the move and generating effects of containment and rerouting that go beyond detention (Garelli, Tazzioli, 2016).

The fact that mobility is both an object of government and a technique for disciplining unruly movements has been touched upon by scholars in different academic fields, as I flesh out in this section. Yet, it remains a relatively marginal aspect in the literature on migration. In the book *Return: Nationalising Transnational Mobility in Asia* (2013), Xiang Biao, Brenda S.A. Yeoh and Mika Toyota provide an original and compelling analysis of state-led migration return programmes and policies in Asia, contending that migrant workers’ returns should be seen as part of states’ strategies to renationalise migration through the enforcement of regulated mobility: “this mode of governance seeks to regulate mobility through mobility. States govern mobility not by blocking but by facilitating movements […] returns thus nationalise transnational mobility” (Biao et al., 2013: 3). Similarly, in the article “A New Mobility Regime in the Making”, Xiang Biao illustrates a shift in contemporary Chinese migration politics, “from a policy of ‘blocking’ to a strategy of ‘channelling’: government does not attempt to stop migration anymore, but still regards tight regulation as necessary in order to achieve an ‘orderly movement’” (Biao, 2007: 5). These analyses bring into focus the incorporation of mobility into political strategies and concrete measures for channelling migrations, both to regain control over them and in order to capitalise on mobility, extracting value from it. That is, return migration schemes are constitutive of national and transnational economies that are grounded on migrant labour. The regulation of migration through migration consists in a series of state and inter-state programmes on the basis of a “just in time and to the point” rationale that is particularly glaring in circular migration (Mezzadra, Neilson, 2013: 67). Yet, what I look at in this paper does not concern migrant labour schemes and are not even comprehensive and targeted to state’s economic politics but, rather, are measures adopted for disciplining and containing migration movements through forced mobility.

Some scholars of the Mobility Studies literature have pointed to the way in which mobility is also part of a political technology for governing movements. Jørgen Ole Bærenholdt has rightly stressed that in the literature “the main emphasis remains on the government of mobility rather than on government through mobility”, (Bærenholdt, 2013: 26), gesturing towards analyses that, instead of spatialising mobility as merely movements that occur across predefined spaces, start from mobility as a technique of government. By introducing the notion of “governmobility” Bærenholdt focuses on the ways in which in con-temporary societies “the regulation of mobilities are internalised in
people’s mobile practices” including bodily, technological and institutional forms of self-government, which are enacted relationally and embedded in systems” (Bærenholdt, 2013: 29). In this way, he turns the attention from the materiality of practices for disciplining “unruly” movements towards the modalities in which mobility as a technique of government has become part of rationales of self-government. From a similar perspective, Anne Jensen pushes us to “see mobility as part of governing logics” (Jensen, 2013: 262) while Ole B. Jensen and Tim Richardson take into account the structural role of mobility in the construction and functioning of the EU (Jensen, Richardson, 2004). The way in which Mobility Studies conceive of mobility as a technique of government is, however, from the point of view of how contemporary liberal societies necessitate mobility for regulating social and economic phenomena: mobility is assumed as a relatively homogenous practice, although people’s access to mobility is subjected to processes of hierarchization and inequality.

What I am interested in here is, instead, to elaborate on how the presence and movements of some people are the object of measures of containment beyond detention: that is, how migrants’ movements are diverted, decelerated and obstructed. In this case, what is enforced is not mobility as such – in the sense of the autonomy and the right to move: rather, mobility functions here as a form of containment, interrupting and disrupting migrants’ geographies and autonomous movements. Scholars in the field of Mobility Studies actually tend to conceive mobility in terms of circulation, analysing how this latter is regulated, strengthened and managed, and conferring a positive meaning to mobility, conceived as the essence of freedom. But does circulation represent the appropriate figure of mobility in order to account for the geographies of those migrants who are not allowed to (smoothly) move? Ultimately, as Aradau and Blanke have stressed in their analysis of the economy of circulation, “if governmental analyses need to reintroduce sovereign and disciplinary power to account for the differentiation between good and bad circulation, the sociology of mobility similarly does not question mobility itself” (Aradau, Blanke, 2010: 46). In fact, the production of “abject subjects” (Nyers, 2003) who are forced to move outside the authorised channels of mobility constitutes the inherent correlate, although usually invisible, of circuits of free circulation. If we go back to Foucault’s description of modern governmental rationale, which is predicated upon “the division between good and bad circulation” (Foucault, 2007: 18), two related questions can be raised: what about those individuals who are discarded as “bad circulation" and who are nevertheless governed through (forced) mobility – and not only through blockages and immobility? In the place of “bad circulation" should we rather speak of practices of mobility outside circuits of circulation?
In the field of carceral geography, the use of mobility as a strategy of government is tackled by bringing in the reality of forced movements; that is to say, these scholars highlight that (some) migrations are regulated through *forced* mobility – and not by enforcing and facilitating migration. This literature takes a distance from the above-mentioned works that deal with mobility in terms of (free) circulation: the forced transfers of migrants from one detention centre to the other are the main case in point analysed by these scholars (Conlon, Moran, Gill, 2013; Hiemstra, 2013; Loyd, Mountz, 2014; Martin, Mitchelsson, 2009). In particular, Nick Gill mobilises the notion of “governmental mobility” to illustrate the “governmental effect of the mobility of the asylum seekers” (Gill, 2009b: 187), referring to the forced transfers migrants are subjected to in the UK, when they are moved from one detention estate to another, with the result of preventing the consolidation of networks of support around them. Carceral geography literature equips us with appropriate analytical tools for elaborating on mobility as a measure for regaining control over autonomous migration movements. However, migrants’ erratic geographies that I discuss in this paper are induced and forced by state authorities not only through official transfers from one detention center to another, but also in a more indirect and informal way. In migration geography, Jonathan Darling has pushed the debate further by speaking about the “UK asylum dispersal system” (Darling, 2016) highlighting that asylum seekers are scattered across the UK, being transferred by the authorities in small groups into hosting centres often located far from urban contexts. As I will show, migrants are moved not to detain them but to push them further away; or they are indirectly forced to move under their own means in order to dodge controls or escape deportations. To push this further, we should investigate whether forms of containment through mobility are put into place beyond the “carceral circuits” (Gill et al. 2017).

The fourth stream of literature that deals with mobility as a technology of government is closely connected with the migration context I focus on in this paper, that is, migrant movements across Europe. Works on the so called “Dublined migrants” highlight the erratic geographies that migrants are forced to undertake due to the spatial restrictions imposed on them by the Dublin Regulation. This literature brings attention to the fact that migrants are ultimately kept on the move and forced in a way to restart their journeys many times (Brekker, 2015; Fontanari, 2016; Schuster, 2011a, 2011b). In particular, they stress the hypermobility that the Dublin Regulation generates, giving rise to a population of “refugees in orbit” (Moreno-Lax, 2012). According to this scholarship, to be relevant is less the state of permanent and convoluted mobility that the Dublin Regulation generates on migrants’ lives than to recognise that “disruptive practices such as expulsions and deportations produce existential conditions of precariousness, *restlessness* and *stuckness* at the same
time” (Picozza, 2017: 237).

Schuster rightly gestures towards an analysis of the juridical conundrums and of the material hindrances that asylum seekers encounter because of to the Dublin Regulation and due to the strategies employed by states to reduce the number of asylum applicants (Schuster, 2011a). To be more precise, the relationship between juridical level and material obstacles is, far from being a linear one: the latter are in fact the outcome not only of law enforcement but also of a series of racialising mechanisms that change over time and established differences among migrants. In this sense, as remarked by legal geography scholarship “the unfolding of spatialities” (Blomley et al. 2001: XVI) of control is substantially shaped by the legal boundaries set by national and European laws and, however, it is inflected also by the specific and uneven ways in which these latter are enacted.

Migrants subjected to the Dublin Regulation are de facto in a permanent state of transit even whilst they are physically blocked at the borders or juridically stranded. Building on these analyses, I want to expand here on what in these works remains undertheorized and seen as a mere consequence of measures of migration containment and control: forced mobility as a strategy of migration governmentality. Assuming this involves bringing attention to the effects of containment beyond physical confinement that are produced on migrants who are kept on the move. Furthermore, this paper does not focus specifically on migrants who are transferred under Dublin Regulation; rather, and more broadly, it takes into account the movements of illegalized migrants across Europe that are tackled by states as undisciplined mobilities and forms of “spatial disobedience” (Tazzioli, 2015). These forms of migration correspond to what the European Union defines as “secondary movements”. This is a term that, however, I deliberately refuse to employ to address migrants’ erratic geographies as an outcome of states’ attempt to regulate and contain migration mobility through forced mobility. Indeed, the term “secondary movements” has a specific governmental genealogy and requires to be critically unpacked, in the light of the EU migration glossary at large. “Secondary movements” is a term used by the EU to designate the convoluted and erratic routes that migrants undertake across Europe as an outcome of push-backs at internal frontiers, spatial restrictions imposed by the Dublin Regulation and rejected asylum applications. The introduction of the term on an EU level reinforces the image of migrant linear routes, moving from one point to another, while those movements that do not respond to this geographical pace, are disqualified as “secondary” (Zimmerman, 2009). Yet, the widespread use of the term highlights the attempt by member states to regain control over autonomous migrants’ geographies.

---

4 Nationality is for instance one of the main criteria through which states enact the Dublin Regulation in a differential way.
Containment through mobility at the Italian frontiers:

Como and Ventimiglia, two Italian cities respectively located at the border with Switzerland and France, have become critical border-zones for migrants in transit. Ventimiglia is not a newly built frontier; in April 2011 France temporarily suspended the Schengen Treaty, obstructing entrance to French territory for Tunisian migrants who had arrived in Italy after the outbreak of the Tunisian revolution (Garelli, 2013). For Tunisians, Ventimiglia became a tough border on their way to France. However, Ventimiglia turned out to be a racialized intermittent frontier: in both 2011 and 2015 Schengen was in fact suspended only for third-country nationals and so identity checks were made by French authorities on the train connecting Milan to Marseille, essentially on the basis of people’s skin colour. In contrast to Ventimiglia, the transformation of Como into a border zone is far more recent: as the activists of Como Senza Frontiere, a network supporting migrants in transit, point out: “despite its geographical location – being a frontier-post close to the Switzerland – Como had never been an effective border for migrants until summer 2016”\(^5\). Indeed, migrants who wanted to move to Germany used to take the train in Milan and cross directly to Switzerland without stopping in Como. Yet, since Swiss authorities enforced border controls in late June 2016, Como has become a forced stopping point for migrants who then end up temporarily stranded in the city.

The material and the information that I present in this section is the result of the fieldwork I conducted in Ventimiglia and in Como between August 2016 and January 2017. The fieldwork included participatory observation and semi-structured interviews with local authorities, NGOs (Doctors without Borders and Caritas), the Red Cross, the police, citizens supporting migrants near the Church of Ventimiglia, and interviews with Sudanese and Eritrean migrants in transit.

By bringing attention to the ways in which migrants have been forcibly moved or indirectly kept into movement by Italian authorities and bounced back by the Swiss and the French police what emerge are modes of containment through (forced) mobility; that is to say, border tactics that consist in regaining control over unruly movements, not by fully stopping migrants but, rather, by forcing them to follow erratic geographies and to bounce across borders. These border tactics are predicated upon a politics of dispersal of migrant multiplicities. Speaking about containment through mobility could appear to be an oxymoron: to what extent can migrants’ presence and movements be contained through mobility? The notion of “containment” remains in fact fundamentally under-

\(^5\) Interview with activists from the network Como senza Frontiere, January 5, 2016.
theorised in the scholarship and tends to be equated with detention or confinement. Instead, I argue that there is the need to analytically distinguish containment from these related notions that convey a sense of distinction between a spatial inside and an outside. Although containment can consist in spatial segregation or in temporary detention, however it is not narrowed to spatial confinement and it can be defined, in a wider way, in terms of spatial restrictions imposed on the migrants that also generate temporal suspension. In fact, spatial restrictions do not necessarily involve immobility or strandedness; they can also consist in convoluted or repeated movements that migrants are forced to undertake, diverting from their established routes.

To put it differently, containment is actualized through a series of different strategies for limiting migrants’ autonomous movements, not only by generating strandedness and immobility, but also by keeping migrants on the move. More than a policy of constant tracking and pervasive control, containment through forced mobility is in part the outcome of a triple governmental “retreat”: not seeing, not dealing with and not protecting the migrants in transit. Therefore, containment through mobility refers to the obstructions, decelerations and restrictions generated on migrants’ geographies, beyond detention and spatial confinement. As I explained in the introduction, containment is not narrowed to a physical dimension: it includes measures and policies that troubles and hinder migrants’ movements and can also generates temporal suspension – e.g. the juridical limbo in which many migrants are and that generate strandedness and condition of indefinite wait. This latter should not be seen as a side-effect of spatial confinement. Indeed, building on Doreen Massey, who notably has insisted “on the inseparability of time and space” (Massey, 1992: 84) and on the temporal dimension as something that is constitutive of geography, I consider temporal suspension as one of the ways in which containment is enacted. More precisely, the EU border regime is not only formed by spatial restrictions but also by temporal borders, meaning by that deadlines that migrants are forced to comply with - for instance, in order to enter the channels of the asylum or to receive special protection etc. - as well as migrants’ indefinite temporal suspension (Amilhat-Szary, Giraut, 2015; Tazzioli, 2018).

The invisibilisation of migrants who pass through these border-zones and who are ‘bounced’ many times from one side of the border to the other – being pushed back by the French and Swiss police – contrasts with a representation of the border spectacle that has been enacted by states and mobilized by scholars in the past for narrating the “crisis” and the “emergency” of migrants’ presence. According to the Italian Red Cross, around 9000 migrants have transited through Ventimiglia since the opening of the transit camp in the town and about 3000 have passed through Como. Swiss authorities reported that 17,500 migrants were pushed back from Switzerland to Italy from June
2016 until the end of the year. However, as Sander Rajan points out, official statistics lead to “certain forms of blindness as a part of the rationality of a certain mode of seeing and accounting for the population” (Rajan, 2006: 99). “Seeing like a state” conceals practices, such as the ones recounted to me by activists in Como in December 2016: migrants who are apprehended at the border at night are taken back by force to Italy and dropped in Como without notification of their expulsion.

On this point, it is worth highlighting the articulations and the discrepancies between legal and formal regulations on the one hand, and informal police measures on the other. As Cetta Mainwaring and Margaret Walton-Roberts have remarked, while migration scholarship “has tended to focus on formal laws as enacted by the sovereign states”, there is a need to shift the attention to “the geopolitical margins of the state” (Mainwaring, Walton-Roberts, 2018: 2); and, in parallel to this, I suggest, we should reorient the analysis towards the margins of the formal law and jurisdiction, in order to investigate how administrative measures and local decrees are impact on migrant’s lives and movements. If we consider the spatial strategies enforced by the police at the Italian-French border and at the Italian-Swiss one, these should be read as frantic attempts on the part of the states to regain control over migration movements, more than as a planned strategy of migration management. Thus, in order to grasp the spaces of control that are opened up by using mobility as a technology of government, we need to shift the attention from the official legal channels of asylum and migration policies towards administrative measures that determine migrants’ convoluted geographies. In this regard, Tugba Basaran has compellingly noticed that, “the undefined multiplication of border zones” does actually take place “by administrative regulation” (Basaran, 2008: 346). However, in this case the spaces of control are not narrowed to delimited border zones; in fact, they exceed territorially bounded places and include migrants’ forced displacements as well. Measures for dispersing migrants and keep them on the move do not involve constant monitoring nor they can be analysed in terms of direct surveillance. Far from being constantly tracked, migrants are governed through invisibilisation, and their movements are restricted through material obstacles and also through tactics of deterrence or by preventing them from settling in a given place. July 2016, Ventimiglia: the first forced transfers by bus of migrants from the French-Italian border to the hotspot in Taranto, 1200 km from Ventimiglia, took place. In September these internal deportations became a weekly routine, and the same measure was extended to Como: migrants who have been pushed back from France and Switzerland are then taken by the Italian police to the South of Italy, with the final goal not of hindering their further

---

6 Data given by the Red Cross of Como, January 2017.
movement but of lengthening and diverting their journeys\(^7\). Migrants are not kept in detention. After being fingerprinted and identified again, they are released: both the humanitarian and the security ‘hold’ over migrant lives is withdrawn. Although many of the pushed back migrants return to Ventimiglia and Como in a matter of days, it is possible to understand their forced ongoing movement as a form of containment. Extenuating migrants by moving them across or forcing them to move away is at the same time a strategy of deterrence and a way to empty critical border zones and divide migrant multiplicities: “we cannot leave any group of migrants to assemble here, we must lighten and empty the frontier”\(^8\), the Director of the Italian Police, Franco Gabrielli, declared significantly. This illustrates that the interventions conducted in informal encampments and hotspot-like spaces are not about control in terms of surveillance, nor about detention. Rather, they consist in scattering migrants across spaces, generating containment through forced mobility and removing “dangerous” migrants from the others: together with the migrants “bounced back” at the border, those who take part to visible protests are removed from the cities that have become frontiers. Thus, the government of mobility as a government through (forced) mobility brings to the fore the effects of containment generated beyond constant surveillance and physical detention. The forced internal transfers to the South of Italy and the consequent lengthening and rerouting of migrants’ journeys show the effects of containment generated on migrants’ movements and lives through forced mobility.

Containment entails a certain degree of constriction, that is of forced mobility, which is well illustrated in the context of internal transfers from Como and Ventimiglia. Push-backs, internal deportations, decrees of expulsion but also migrants who are forced to reroute their journeys or to escape a place, due to rising controls: all these mobilities generate effects of containment of migrants’ geographies that do not necessarily involve detention and that are predicated upon a certain constrictive dimension. On both sides of the French-Italian border, national authorities prevent any possible formation of collectives, dividing and scattering migrant multiplicities. This strategy of dispersal – which consists in scattering and dividing migrant groups across space – is combined with exclusionary criteria of access to both the camps and the asylum procedure. The institutional channels of asylum are at the same time spatial traps for many migrants – demanding protection entails leaving one's own digital trace and involves a sort of “geographical

\(^7\)https://www.ilsalto.net/migranti-ventimiglia-stamp/
fixation” (Foucault, 2016: 23) – and what states try to restrict access to, preventively hampering some migrants from laying the asylum claim.

The politics of migrant dispersal in France:

The current French migration context represents an advantageous viewpoint for grasping the government of migrant mobility through mobility and how this affects migrants’ lives and journeys. This is in part due to the geographical position of France, which is not a first country of arrival. For many migrants France is a country of transit that, however, turns out to be a twofold spatial trap. Indeed, for some migrants it is a space where they remain stranded and where they end up in claiming asylum because they do not manage to go to the UK, while for others it is a place from which they are returned by force to other European states, as “Dubliners”, or to their country of origin. In particular, the government of mobility through (forced) mobility can be closely analysed here by following the strategies of migrant dispersal across space put into place by French authorities. By speaking of politics of dispersal I refer to a series of measures of deterrence and internal transfer through which migrant multiplicities are divided and scattered across the territory. My take on the politics of dispersal resonates with the work done by Jonathan Darling about the “(en)forced immobility of asylum seekers through dispersal” (Darling, 2016b: 230) in the UK. Research on the politics of refugee dispersal has been conducted also from the standpoint of the deprivation and mistrust that it generates on asylum seekers (Hynes, 2009). Yet, I analyse this not through the lens of the privatisation of migrant reception centres, nor by looking at the production of social exclusion, but as part of a political strategy to divide migrant multiplicities in order to prevent the formation of collective subjects. Dispersal, I suggest, is one of the ways in which the governing of migrant mobility through mobility is effectively enacted, with a twofold purpose: disciplining migrants individually - discouraging them to come back - and, at the same time, dividing and neutralising temporary migrant multiplicities (Tazzioli, 2016). Importantly, bringing attention to the politics of dispersal entails considering both direct and indirect modes of forced displacement. Direct modes of forced mobility consist in the ways in which migrants “are moved” (Biao, Lindquist, 2014: 131) by national authorities – e.g. forced internal transfers – while by indirect modes of forced mobility I mean migrants ending up undertaking erratic geographies –

9Through the expression “migrants multiplicities” I build refer to the presence of temporary and heterogenous groups of migrants, who assemble at border-zones or in the cities and that are usually divided, selected and scattered across space, as they represent potential collective political subjects.
in order avoid to be returned on the basis of the Dublin Regulation. The strategy of spatial dispersal should be seen in the light of a “hold” over migrant lives that addresses and affects migrants both individually and as part of temporary multiplicities: individual migrants’ geographies are subjected to temporal interruption, blockages and diversions; at the same time, the same strategies of dispersal prevent and neutralize the transformation of migrant multiplicities into political subjects.

In this way, migrants are not only kept on the move and forced to partly restart their journey, they are also invisibilized, both individually and as part of temporary groups. Yet, what characterizes the politics of migrant dispersal in France is not exclusively the spatial scattering and the division of migrant multiplicities, nor the effect of hypermobility that this generates on migrants, but the traps of humanitarianism through which these measures have been enacted in France between 2015 and 2016. Traps of humanitarianism refer to the ways in which humanitarian discourses and interventions are mobilized to convince migrants to move from Calais or from Paris – which are considered by French authorities the most critical migration sites – to hosting centres, located in the countryside or in remote places, from where they are deported. Migrants have in fact been cheated by French authorities, who encouraged them to move to those centres with the promise of not being transferred back to other member states and not being allowed to claim asylum.

October 2015, Calais: French authorities start a series of migrant raids and arrests in Calais and in the so called “jungle” – a migrant camp – which was located about three kilometres away from the city centres. These raids were made with the purpose of “emptying Calais” in the face of the increasing number of migrants stranded there, and initially migrants were taken by force in small groups to detention centres located across France. At that time, I was based in Marseille, where some of the migrants arrested in Calais were transferred and put into the detention centre of LeCanet, situated in a peripheral neighbourhood of the city. In this case, internal transfers from the North to the South could appear as modes of containment through detention, insofar as migrants were put in detention. Yet, building on a literature that in the face of migrant deportations we should investigate what happens after the spectacular and violent act of removal (De Genova, 2018; Khosravi, 2016), even in the case of forced internal transfers it is fundamental to gesture towards an analysis of the “afterwards” of detention and control, meaning by that an investigation that moves

---

10 Since the majority of the migrants who entered France “illegally” had been fingerprinted for the first time in Italy or in other EU member states, and so on the basis of the Dublin Regulation they can be returned to these countries.

11 This is the expression used by the former French Ministry of the Interior Bernard Cazeneuve.

away from the punctual and visible moment of migrants put in detention. Indeed, after no more than five days, migrants taken to LeCanet were usually re-leased and “dropped” out of the gate of the detention center. Migrants had to find their own way to the main rail station of Marseille St-Charles, and from there they took the train to go back to Paris in order then to reach Calais again. At the rail station, migrants were unofficially allowed to board TGV train, and for a limited period of time the French rail company SNCF gave the migrants free tickets to Paris. Some migrants undertook that counter-route from Calais to Marseille on buses rented by the French authorities and then came back to the jungle of Calais, under their own means, two or three times in the span of two months.

Thus, similarly to the migrants dropped out in the countryside of Taranto after being taken there from Ventimiglia and Como, the purpose and the outcome of migrants’ forced transfers in France was not at all detention as such. Rather, being moved back – through channels of internal forced transfers – to the South of France, migrants were de facto forced to move around, that is to enact erratic geographies across the country. Migrants’ exhaustive repeated journeys produced a mixed effect of deterrence and obstruction of their geographies. Measures of containment through mobility disrupted and interrupted migrants’ movements across Europe but also troubled their spatial presence and their permanence: thus, migrants are hampered not only from moving but also from staying. In fact, the politics of dispersal, characterized by modes of government of mobility through forced mobility, impacted on individual migrant lives, producing effect of deterrence and disrupting their geographies and, at the same time, generating a twofold temporary invisibility. First, through tactics of dispersal, migrants are spatially invisibilized being moved away from the Calais “border spectacle” (De Genova, 2013). Second, and connected to the former point, migrants are politically invisibilized as one of the main targets of tactics of dispersal consists in dividing and partitioning migrant multiplicities as potential collective subjects.

After the first series of arrests, in November 2015 French authorities changed their strategy to temporarily “emptying” Calais and Paris: instead of being transferred by force to detention centres, migrants in Calais and in Paris had been approached by local Prefectures and humanitarian organisations, such as France Terre d’Asile, who encouraged them to move to “Centres de répit” – literally, “centres of rest” – a new nomenclature introduced by France in October 2015 to designate hosting centres for asylum seekers. Nevertheless, whilst migrants were convinced to go there with the promise of receiving assistance and protection, actually a few of them, after arriving in the “centres de répit”, were in fact returned by force to Italy under the Dublin Regulation.
“Mise à l’abri” – literally, giving a shelter – is the French expression used in official discourses and institutional documents to justify the eviction of temporary migrant encampments – namely, self-organised spaces of refuge and transit, in particular inside the city of Paris – such as the occupation of the square at La Chapelle, the self-organised tent camps near the metro of Stalingrad and the metro Jaures. Thus, migrants’ displacement was not only the result of forced internal transfers but also of the promises of asylum. At the end of November 2015, French authorities estimated that out of the 6000 migrants based at that time in the jungle of Calais, around 2000 had been moved to hosting centres and detention centres across France.\footnote{In 2015 the number of the migrants in the jungle of Calais raised from 2000 to about 7000. However, it is remarkable that, actually, there are no exact statistics but only estimations of the migrant population in Calais.}

The nexus between humanitarianism and mobility (as a technology of government) emerges at the core of modes of containment through displacement. The strategy of migrant dispersal and the captures of humanitarianism were also decisively enacted during the massive eviction of the Jungle of Calais, which took place in October 2016. The eviction was presented in the media as a mix of police, security and humanitarian interventions: migrants were ordered to leave the jungle and the police entering the camp starting to remove the tents. After being identified by the police with the support of humanitarian actors, migrants were divided in groups and transferred by bus to hosting centres across France, previously “Centres de répit” which had by then been renamed “Centres d’Accueil et Orientation” (CAO) – “Centres of hosting and orientation”\footnote{This is the denomination given by the French Home Office: https://www.gisti.org/IMG/pdf/min_int_logement_2016-07_charter_fonctionnement_cao.pdf.}. After few days, the eviction of the jungle was declared completed by the authorities, after the migrants who had been the most reluctant to move away were convinced by the French Minister of the Interior Bernard Cazeneuve that they would be allowed to claim asylum, even if their fingerprints had already been stored in EURODAC by Italy, thus making an exception to the Dublin Regulation: “no Dublinage”\footnote{http://www.ouest-france.fr/monde/migrants/calais-cazeneuve-donne-des-garanties-sur-l-avenir-des-migrants-4586411}. In fact, CAOs turned out to be humanitarian traps for the migrants who consented to be moved there: upon arrival on the CAO, about 43% were considered by the local Prefectures to be people subject to the Dublin Regulation\footnote{http://www.lacimade.org/dublin-vers-un-durcissement/}. However, then only the 24% of the asylum applicants in France have been effectively put in the Dublin procedure in 2016. More than fixing migrants to a place or detaining them indefinitely, both
forced and “voluntary” transfers of migrants from Calais and Paris to reception centres and then to the CAOs\textsuperscript{17} boosted a generalized (forced) mobility and multiplied migrants’ erratic geographies across France, as well as towards other member states like Belgium. Marseille, March 2017: in the peripheral thirteenth arrondissement of the city, the named “Vento Mai”, in a building close to a residential area which is about forty minutes away from the city centre by public transport. That is, given the remote location of the CAO, migrants are kept out of sight by French authorities, and they are subjected to government through “opacity” (Pinelli, 2017). In this case, opacity does not refer to the invisibilization of migrants nor to the partial invisibility of forced transfers per se, but to a sort of legal and procedural confusion through which migrants are often managed. 47 migrants were hosted there, among which three had been transferred from Paris in November 2016, while all had been taken there from Calais by bus, a few days after the eviction of the “jungle”. “When the first group of migrants arrived from Calais in October, after the first night three of them escaped”, the manager of the CAO explained to me; indeed, none of them wanted to claim asylum in France, in particular because they did not believe the promise made by the government – that nobody would be taken back to Italy on the basis of the Dublin Regulation. They knew that it could be a trap”.\textsuperscript{18}

Hence, a focus on the French context enables us to see that the government of migrant movements through forced mobility and by dispersing migrants across space, generates containment, meaning substantial disruptions of autonomous migrant movements and of the possibility to stay in a place. Thus, firstly, the taking away of terrain from migrants subtraction and the obstruction of autonomous geographies are two simultaneous and mutually related effects of the measures of containment through mobility. Secondly, the politics of dispersal that is visibly at stake in France shows that modes of containment through mobility do not only target migrants on an individual basis but also as part of multiplicities. To put it better, the government of mobility through (forced) mobility does not affect only individual migrants, whose routes are diverted and disrupted, but also migrants as part of multiplicities, insofar as they appear as potential collective political subjects.

\textit{Conclusion:}

“This is my fourth return to Ventimiglia, in fact I was taken to Taranto by bus twice in November, after being pushed back by the French police at the border, and then again two times this month.

\textsuperscript{17}There are no statistics about the presences of migrants in these spaces of transit and of temporary refuge, as migrants constantly move, and can return in those places more than once, as a result of the forced displacements and of migrants’ erratic geographies.

\textsuperscript{18} Interview with the manager of the CAO “Vento Mai”, Marseille, 24 March 2017.
The last one I didn’t even manage to cross the border; the Italian police arrested me while I was hanging around, together with other mates, near the rail station of Ventimiglia. I know about people who went up to ten times, back and forth from Ventimiglia to Taranto; every time is the same, we are taken there by bus, it takes one day to go there, and then we have to find the money to come here, under our own means, by train”19. The direct testimonies of the migrants who have undertaken the same route from Taranto to Ventimiglia after being taken there by force, have enabled NGOs and human rights organizations to reconstruct the functioning of the relatively invisible channels of forced transfers across Italy20. The story that I reported above of the repeated forced movements faced by M., a 26-year-old man from Sudan, tells us that the strategy of deterrence employed by states to discourage migrants from continuing their journeys, often generates a condition of forced and convoluted hyper-mobility. In fact, the government of migrant mobility through mobility is predicated upon measures of containment that do not consist (only) in producing conditions of immobility and strandedness, nor in migrants’ decision to give up: indeed, migrants’ unruly movements are contained insofar as they are disrupted, decelerated and diverted.

Through this insight into the ways in which migrants are kept on the move or forced to undertake erratic geographies at the internal frontiers of Europe, this paper has pointed to the need of disjoining mobility and freedom, investigating how mobility is not only an object and a target of governmentality but also a political technology for regaining control over unruly and unauthorised migrants. In other words, the fact that migrants are not only governed through blockages and detention but also by keeping them on the move, entails challenging liberal understandings of mobility - which equate mobility with freedom - as well as analyses that oppose free mobility and forced mobility. In fact, as the above-mentioned migration contexts show, it is not a question of forced mobility in the sense of being transferred by force nor of being in a condition in which flight is the only solution. Rather, if in some cases mobility as a technique of governmentality consists in forced transfers made by the authorities, in many others it is about extenuating migrants - by making some spaces unliveable for them, by forcing them, also in an indirect way, to divert their routes or to do the same journey multiple times. This involves moving beyond the opposition between immobility and mobility, exploring instead how these two are differently and strategically played by migrants and by state authorities.

19Interview with a Sudanese migrant outside the church of Ventimiglia, December 27, 2016.

20In 2016, about 123 000 migrants have claimed asylum in Italy, while the total number of asylum applicants in 2015 was of 82 000 and 63 000 in 2014. If we confront the number of asylum applications in 2016 and in 2015 with migrant arrivals (153 000 in 2015 and 173 000 in 2016), there has been an increased of more than 20 000 asylum claims between 2015 and 2016. The number of asylum seekers who have been denied of protection has increased, from 58% to 65%.
A future research agenda could engage in rethinking the articulation between freedom and mobility in light of convoluted movements that are generated by state measures for regaining control over unruly migration.

List of references:


Bojadzijev M and Mezzadra S (2015) Refugee crisis or crisis of European migration policies, *Fo-
caalblog*. Available at: [http://www.focaalblog.com/2015/11/12/manuela-bojadzijev-and-sandro-


Conlon D Moran D and Gill N (Eds.) (2013) Carceral spaces: Mobility and agency in imprison-
ment and migrant detention. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd..


De Genova N (2013) Spectacles of migrant ‘illegality’: the scene of exclusion, the obscene of in-


Jensen O B and Richardson T (2004) Making European space: mobility, power and territorial


Schuster L (2011a). Dublin II and Eurodac: examining the (un) intended (?) consequences. Gender, Place & Culture, 18(3): 401-416.


