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MIGRATION, SOLIDARITY, AND THE LIMITS OF EUROPE

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Introduction

The editors of a recent special edition of Citizenship Studies draw attention to the proliferation of grassroots migration political movements. ‘Over the past decade, we have witnessed an upsurge of political mobilization by refugees, irregularized migrants, and migrant solidarity activists in the countries of the European Union, at its external borders... and in other parts of the world...’ (Ataç et al 2016: 527-8). In this essay we propose to examine aspects of this movement from the angle of one of its key political concepts: solidarity. The idea of solidarity offers a promising entry point for a critical analysis of the limits of Europe precisely because it is hotly contested, both as a political value and a practice. From grassroots activists to EU officials, actors on many sides of Europe’s migration struggles act in the name of solidarity. But what do they mean by solidarity and how does it bring the question of limits into focus?

Reference to solidarity has become widespread in migration scholarship in recent years, in part reflecting the prominent place this notion has come to occupy in political movements connected to migration (Rygiel 2011; Millner 2011; Johnson 2015). But solidarity is also a common referent in EU studies. The notion of solidarity has represented one of the political backbones of the EU since its creation. For instance, the Schuman Declaration (1950) stresses that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity”\(^1\). A critical appraisal of solidarity pushes us towards the limits of Europe. Indeed, in the current context of economic backlash, European solidarity appears also to be in a state of crisis. Nevertheless, even beyond the contingent situation, speaking about solidarity within and in relation to the EU is not a straightforward issue: is solidarity a state-oriented activity or is it enacted towards citizens? What are the asymmetries - among states, as well as between European citizens and states - upon which solidarity is built? The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) illustrates a considerable range of meanings and inflections of solidarity, such as solidarity between member states, solidarity between women and men, solidarity between states around issues of migration, borders and asylum, as well as solidarity among generations\(^2\). Therefore, on a EU level the fuzzy catchword of solidarity encapsulates a huge variety of practices and interventions, any one of which involves different configurations of power relations - e.g. the horizontal solidarity among citizens vs more hierarchical forms of solidarity (between rich and less-wealthy EU member states, as well as state solidarity towards some minorities).
As far as migration is concerned, the term ‘solidarity’ has a particular meaning in the EU political lexicon: the solidarity among member states to share the ‘refugee burden’ in a time of economic crisis has been in fact flagged as a cornerstone of the EU and, at the same time, a goal to be pursued. Yet, on an EU level the notion of solidarity has been fundamentally mobilised according to a state-based logic and not directly towards migrants. For example, in the controversy ignited by the EU’s attempt to agree quotas for the resettlement of refugees, and the refusal of states like Poland and Hungary to acknowledge these quotas, it is solidarity as a relationship between member states that is primarily at stake (BBC 2017). In this essay we speak in fact about the bordering of solidarity that the EU’s discourse on migration (considered largely as a burden to be shared) generates.

In fact, over the last four years we have witnessed a remarkable shift in the use of the term ‘solidarity’. While in 2015 in some EU official documents the need to act in solidarity with the refugees was mentioned and some member states, like Germany, promoted for few months a refugee welcome policy, from 2016 onwards, solidarity towards migrants was de facto expelled from the EU discourse and practices.

But at the same time that solidarity is being expunged from official attitudes towards refugees the opposite is happening at the level of citizen initiatives. While there are clearly very powerful currents of anti-immigrantism and xeno-racism within European publics, and far-right anti-migrant social movements are palpably active, here we highlight citizen movements of support. We emphasize the multiplication of citizen initiatives that, in the name of migrant solidarity, build networks of support across Europe - such as ‘Refugees Welcome’ - to assist and host the refugees in transit. However, grassroots networks have been increasingly targeted by police measures, local decrees and national laws that have criminalized infrastructures and acts of solidarity towards migrants. It is this conjuncture that commentators and activists have recently given the name ‘crimes of solidarity’, a conjuncture in which individuals or groups who merely offer water, food, sleeping bags, or a lift to migrants in transit, face police harassment and sometimes prosecution on the grounds that they are ‘enabling’ irregular migration (Fekete 2017: 2). There has been an explosion of debate on this topic, especially in France and Italy. The term stands not just for a narrowly legal but a wider movement on the part of governments and political movements to harass, deter, penalize and suppress support for migrants (Fekete 2009, 2018; Carrera et al 2016; Baudet 2004; Tazzioli 2018).

In this paper we propose to analyze solidarity in Europe in the specific context of these movements to criminalize solidarity practices. This enables us to pursue two goals. First, this conjuncture offers us an opportunity to deepen the analysis of solidarity within the context of European and migration politics. While reference to solidarity has become widespread in political life, it has a somewhat minor status within political theory compared with, say, justice or equality (Carrebregu 2016). Likewise, despite the ubiquitous talk of solidarity within EU political discourse, the term has rarely been critically examined by scholars of European integration (Greiner 2017: 837). Whereas, say, citizenship is a widely recognized site of theory, solidarity is
somewhat residual and taken for granted. It tends to function as a placeholder: we think we all agree what it means. The first contribution of the paper is therefore a fuller account of solidarity which we consider a useful end in itself.

The second goal of the paper is to use the analysis of the criminalization of solidarity to reflect on certain limits of EU-ropew. Solidarity is claimed by the EU as one of its core values, as it is in some of its member states (Ross and Borgman-Prebil 2010). Yet within EU politics and EU studies it would seem that migration has put a particular notion of solidarity at stake. ‘Just as the debt crisis threatens to destroy the painstakingly cultured solidarity of the EU, the disintegrating state of its patchwork asylum regime could prove fatal to the principles of mutual trust and cooperation that theoretically bind its member states’ (Langford 2013: 217). A number of policies and frameworks have been developed with the express aim of promoting European / EU solidarity. Studying solidarity and its criminalization within the migration field allows us immediately to expose the boundaries of these official invocations of solidarity. They reveal that solidarity in Europe’s migration field is in fact a highly contested concept and value. Solidarity with whom, for what ends, why? Is solidarity only something to be fostered amongst member states? Can solidarity operate on other scales, temporalities, vectors? Could it be the case that the crisis of EU solidarity in the area of asylum (Langford 2013) is a crisis from the point of view of the member states but actually a time when solidarity movements - other forms of solidarity - are not waning but growing? Does the fact that solidarity movements are being actively suppressed suggest that European solidarity is not universal in its scope but a practice that is to be bounded and contained. Solidarity amongst European states and European citizens but not for others? Clearly then solidarity is a privileged point at which to investigate Europe and its limits.

Our claim that solidarity represents a limit or a boundary where paradoxes in the very idea of a European project find acute expression can be illustrated if we consider a very recent EU initiative. In 2016 the European Commission launched the European Solidarity Corps, a framework that is to offer young people opportunities to work and volunteer on projects that might benefit communities and people across Europe. Read against the backdrop of the criminalization of solidarity movements and acts one might see this Corps not so much as an expression of solidarity per se, but an attempt to appropriate, control, limit and even brand what forms of relationship, and what forms of affiliation are to count as solidarity, and what are to be negated and suppressed as something else (Pallister-Wilkins 2018: 13-14).

The rest of this chapter is organized into three sections. In the first section we sketch out an analytics of solidarity as a contribution to furthering theoretically-informed empirical research on this topic. We highlight the three themes of the time-space of solidarity, the work of solidarity, and the others of solidarity. We propose these analytics as a way to sharpen understanding of solidarity and migration politics. In the second section we introduce the idea of mobile commoning. We do this in order to highlight how solidarity practices enacted in certain places over time, are shared and reactivated in the present. We build on literature on the mobile commons to question
whether and how the political memory of struggles travels over time and is appropriated by locals. In our final section we play this analytics through a particular case-study: the criminalisation of migrant solidarity practices at the French-Italian border. We show how the increasing criminalisation of solidarity practices in support of the migrants in transit highlights the limits of Europe.

We should stress from the outset that we do not regard solidarity in terms of an essential referent. For example, at particular time specific policies like social insurance have been associated with solidarity. But we do not regard these associations as fixed. Instead, building on Laclau, solidarity is better seen as a ‘floating signifier’. Offering food is in some cases a staple of humanitarian action. What happens when this becomes organized and identified as an act of solidarity? Do ‘crimes of solidarity’ provide an analytical lens for better defining solidarity practices as such?

An analytics of solidarity

The genealogy of solidarity reveals it is important as a way to ‘imagine commonality in difference’ (Hunt-Hendrix 2018; see also Kellilher, 2018), affiliation under conditions of social asymmetry, and particular ways of relating to the other (Kelz 2015: 10-13). For this reason, we argue it deserves to be more closely examined. Within European political discourse solidarity only really emerges in the mid 1800s. Whereas older ideas of fraternity spoke in terms of bonds of brotherhood and blood, the appeal to solidarity found a resonance amongst labour movements as they grew beyond localities and single trades. Sociologists like Durkheim puzzled over the ties that held complex industrial societies together, and political movements as they sought to negotiate difference in heterogeneous struggles. Often solidarity occupied a space between the individualism of liberalism and the collectivism of communism, and found expression in policies like social insurance that sought to foster the social while simultaneously supporting (and indeed individualizing) workers and families (Donzelot 1991). But solidarity could take more radical inflections too. In the 1970s and 1980s the idea of solidarity found a resonance in the context of independence and anti-imperialist struggles (Foucault, 1994). Here solidarity invited communities living in, say, Kansas, to take an interest and offer support to communities struggling for human rights in, say, El Salvador. The political logic of solidarity was that there existed elements of interconnection and responsibility across great distances and inequality of status and situation (Hunt-Hendrix 2018). In contemporary migration politics the idea of solidarity is once more activated and now finds new expressions. In today’s migration struggles near and far have been scrambled. Solidarity and internationalism may be expressed not only through support for distant struggles but engagement with the human subjects of those struggles now they are much closer to home, for example crossing the borders of France and Italy.

While it is important to grasp solidarity as a concept that emerges under specific conditions, and undergoes particular transformations, in order to better mobilize solidarity as a research object we propose three analytics.
1. The time-space of solidarity.

The idea of solidarity has always carried a strong temporal aspect. The legal scholar Stjerno (2011) points out that the term was for many centuries a legal concept denoting the common responsibility for debts borne by each member of a group of borrowers. Hence from the outset it carried an orientation to risk and the future. But at the end of the 18th century this notion of implicatedness and shared responsibility binding the individual to the group would shift into the social and political field. In the early 19th century utopians and social philosophers like Fourier would see it in relation to mutual sympathies and shared responsibilities amongst a community. Fourier was the first to associate solidarity with social policy: measures to share resources and govern need, such as family support and guaranteed minimum incomes. This connection between solidarity and the social, a bond outlined in the early sociology of Durkheim, would be strengthened and given institutional basis by the middle of the twentieth century through mechanisms like social security (Donzelot 1991).

If we start by stressing temporality it is because we feel it is a neglected element in many discussions of migrant solidarity. We suggest that critical works on migrant solidarity have focused primarily on the spatial dimension of solidarity - either speaking of solidarity across borders, or the enactment of solidarity through the production of spaces like the sanctuary and the camp (Millner 2011). While scholars have certainly been attuned to the disruptive power of struggles - that is, to the way in which solidarity can involve sudden political interruptions - the wider field of temporality has been rather overlooked (Isin, 2012; Nyers, Rygiel, 2012; Ranciere, 1999). In order to counter an exclusive spatialisation of solidarity as a concept, we want to reinsert temporality, analysing how the sedimented knowledges of political struggles as well as of solidarity practices have been inscribed in spaces over time. As Khelliher has suggested, more attention should be paid to collective memory of solidarity practices, in order to show “how history continues to shape contemporary practices of solidarity” (Kelliher, 2018: 2). We do not want to treat time and space separately so we speak of the time-space of solidarity.3

We argue that the idea of the time-space of solidarity enables us to grasp practices of solidarity at the juncture between on the one hand the specificity and situatedness of the current solidarity acts and, on the other, a longstanding history of struggles which they in part draw upon and whose political memory they reactivate. As we will show later in the paper, migrant solidarity practices enacted by locals in the Susa Valley and in the Roya Valley at the French-Italian border represent a case in point: indeed, the networks of support for migrants that have been put into place in those valleys do not come out of thin air but draw on the practices, knowledges, understanding, ethos that has been sedimented over many decades, and which to some extent includes and reflects the geography, and even the very geology of the space. More broadly, speaking of time-space of solidarity also allows us to move beyond a focus on individual gestures of solidarity, highlighting the networks of practices, disputes and shared knowledges through and in light of which single acts are framed as solidarity prac-
tices. Nevertheless, the political memories of solidarity struggles are far from being a solid terrain; on the contrary, they have to be laboriously and actively awakened, re-activated into the present.

The idea of a time-space of solidarity also lends itself to analysis of the very forms of solidarity practice, capturing elements of its ‘morphology’ (Dijstelbloem, in press): the assistance offered to people ‘passing through’, the people ‘en route’, ‘on the road’, and in transit, just as it attunes us to the mediating presence of the natural environment - mountains, sea and deserts - and how these mould the practices and the strategies of solidarity. Finally, by foregrounding the time-space of solidarity we can better identify the ephemeral nature of certain spaces of solidarity - like a camp, or a room - that seem to come and go.

2. The work of solidarity

Building on Chandra Mohanty’s analysis around “political solidarity”, we want to rescue solidarity from its liberal conceptualisation: this latter tends to neutralise both the political memory of solidarity movements and struggles that shaped the European space over time, and the “common differences” (Mohanty, 2003: 518) at play in solidarity networks. In fact, the language of solidarity tends to be used in pro-migrants discourses for flattening asymmetrical and racialised power relations in the name of an unconditional support to human beings whose survival, presence and social life in a space is under threat for disparate reasons (Mezzadra, Neumann, 2017). Instead, via Mohanty, we point to the need of reinscribing the notion of solidarity within the “fabric” of social and political struggles. Such an analytical angle enables a perspective on current solidarity acts and networks in Europe less as gestures of hospitality towards the migrants than as the laborious and ongoing production of temporary common terrains and safe spaces.

Indeed, the forging of horizontal alliances between undocumented people and local citizens is a quite difficult task. First, this is due to the discrepant temporalities of the struggles: if we consider solidarity practices at the internal borders of Europe, it is noticeable that migrants are there temporarily, ‘in transit’, and their goal is usually to move away from the border as soon as possible. Second, the question of ‘what is the best for the migrants’ that people who act in solidarity tend to raise, in order not to do something which is counter-productive for the migrants themselves, is by no means a straightforward one - because of the constantly changing political situation, as well as the difficulty of ‘seeing like a migrant’. In other words, acting in solidarity with the migrants often confronts people with the dilemma between migrants’ self-determination and the need to act for their best. This becomes particularly glaring in contexts where migrants’ risk of death is considerably high, due to border enforcement measures. This is the case of migrants who try to cross the Italian-French border climbing the Alps, that we talk about in the paper: locals involved in migrant solidarity networks in the Italian villages of Bardonecchia and Claviere debated around the opportunity of bowing to migrants’ will to cross at any cost or discouraging such actions because of the risk of dying or getting lost in the snow.
3. The others of solidarity

A fuller analysis of solidarity within migration struggles and movements requires us to clarify its others. It demands that we think solidarity in relation with the heterogeneous sites and fields where solidarity practices are enacted. What fascinates us when we approach solidarity historically is that its appearance as a rallying cry, a social philosophy, or a practice, always happens in a field of struggle. What we call the work of solidarity is shaped and defined in part by the presence of other ways of relating. Whatever solidarity might mean at a particular moment is shaped by these antagonistic relationships of alterity. When solidarity was taken up by workers’ movements it was oriented by the danger of social fragmentation and atomization, certainly, but also the models of charitable assistance, as well as the penal models of governing the poor which stood as alternative modes of governance. In this paper we insist it is important to consider the others of migrant solidarity. Seen from this angle, ‘crimes of solidarity’ is given new intelligibility. The time-space of migrant solidarity is a carving out and securing of safe space amidst ongoing attempts to generalize a hostile environment; to govern migration through a combination of paternalistic humanitarianism, and repression. A solidaristic mode of action acquires some of its consistency from the way it opposes these other ways of acting.

The field of tensions produced out of migrant solidarity practices has given rise to a politicisation of humanitarianism (Fassin, 2017; Tazzioli, 2018). In this regard, it is important to trace a distinction between solidarity and humanitarianism, which ultimately relies on the inequalities of lives that the latter is predicated upon, as well as on the asymmetrical, see hierarchical, power relations that humanitarian interventions entail and foster. Notably, solidarity practices that until recently had been discredited by activists as charity or humanitarian interventions are now considered unacceptable by the states and have become objects of controversy, as long as these solidarity practices have been put into place by independent organisations or individual citizens. However, speaking of a politicisation of humanitarianism does not mean positing humanitarianism as the opposite pole of state-led interventions and of security measures (IRR, 2017). On the contrary, what the ongoing criminalisation of solidarity practices have fostered is a multiple split of humanitarianism: independent and grassroots movements as well as individual acts are under attack, while established NGOs and IGOs take part more than ever to the governing of migration, reinforcing the entanglement between security and humanitarianism. The conflation of solidarity with humanitarianism, in this case strengthened by the kind of acts and gestures that people engaged in (giving food, opening a temporary shelter etc.) ultimately risks overshadowing the asymmetrical relationships that humanitarian interventions rely upon and enforce in contrast with the more horizontal alliances played out through solidarity practices (Fassin, 2010). The partially overlapping of the “shrinking space of solidarity” and of the criminalisation of humanitarian acts is telling of the relational quality of solidarity: that is, far from being a neatly defined category, solidarity has to be historically grasped within the field of power relations.
Unstable Mobile commoning

Retracing a genealogy of solidarity practices enables us to move beyond the “containerization” of migration as a self-standing field and to connect the history of migrant solidarity with a much wider and longer history of social struggles that shaped the European space. Relatedly, to reactivate the historical memory of solidarity practices and struggles, as partial it may be, allows investigating how certain practical knowledges have been transmitted over time and how they circulated across spaces. In particular, we draw attention to those specific places where solidarity acts and networks and have been mobilised by exploring the political history of those spaces—that is focusing on the struggles and political experiences that have shaped those spaces over time.

In this way, we can look at the current migrant solidarity practices within the European Union as embedded within what can be called sedimented mobile commons. We borrow the concept of mobile commons from Papadopolous and Tsianos, who coined the notion for designating “the shared knowledge, affective cooperation, mutual support and care between migrants when they are on the road” (Papadopolous, Tsianos, 2013: 179; see also Trimiklionitis et al. 2014). “Mobile commons” is introduced by these authors to account for spaces of sociability and the practical knowledges generated by migrant movements and fostered by migrants’ use of digital technologies: far from being just ephemeral moments, these spaces of sociability can be seen as “processes that define socialities of mobile commons generating alternative modes of livelihoods” (Trimikilioniotes, 2014: 16). In this way, “the precarious migratory praxis […] becomes inscribed in the sociality it generates while in motion” (15). Such a perspective on mobile commons constitutes a fruitful analytical angle for grasping how some practical knowledges get sedimented, crystallised and can be potentially reactivated in the future. Mobile commons allows us to make sense not only of the constitutive mobility of migrant practices, but also of their deep instability and precariousness.

However, what the concept of mobile commons partially fails to capture are, first, the temporal dimension and, second, the transversal alliances that solidarity practices strengthen. In order to counter an exclusive spatialisation of solidarity as a concept, we want to reinsert temporality in it, analysing how these shared knowledges have been inscribed in spaces over time. Indeed, if on the one hand these mobile commons are predicated upon a certain level of unpredictability and precariousness, on the other they get also sedimented in those spaces and get transmitted over time. On the point of traversal alliances, what is of interest to us are precisely the ways in which migrant solidarity practices to some extent manage - although often only in a very temporary and precarious way - not only to create connections between migrants and citizens but also to build common terrains - in terms of political claims and strategies.

In this sense, building on Peter Linebaugh (2009), we can speak of unstable commoning generated through a certain complicity between migrants and citizens acting in
solidarity; the use of the verb helps in giving a sense of the laborious work of translation across spaces of practical knowledges and of their reactivation over time. Unstable commoning are not produced by migrants’ practices alone but, rather, through transversal alliances of solidarity, which get adapted to the specific political moment, and partly reanimate the historical memory of struggles and shared knowledges that characterise some places.

**Crimes of solidarity across the Alpine migrant passage**

The newspaper chronicles of the last year are characterised by the multiplication of “crimes of solidarity” in particular at the French-Italian border but also in Calais as well as in other locations in Europe. The case that became a prominent cover story in the media has been the one of Cedric Herrou, the French farmer from the Roya Valley accused by the French authorities of hosting migrants and of giving lifts to them across the border. Just to mention a different example of criminalised acts of solidarity, citizens in Calais who allowed the migrants to take a shower in their houses or to recharge their phones, or who gave food to them, have been subjected to fines. In the same area, a French ski patrol, Benoit Ducos, had been accused in March for assisting a pregnant migrant woman who was crossing the Alps.

Our geographical focus in this paper is on the French-Italian frontier, one of the zones in Europe where locals extensively engaged in solidarity practices in support of the migrants in transit, and, as a consequence of that, they have been under attack and criminalized both by the French and the Italian authorities. This space across the two side of the frontier has become a proper border-zone over the last few years, due to France’s suspension of Schengen - first in April 2011, and then again since May 2015. The Susa Valley, located in the Italian Northern region of Piemonte, is one of the places through which migrants pass in their attempt to cross the French-Italian border. Due to the implementation of police patrolling along the borders in the vicinity of the coastal city of Ventimiglia, migrants now have few alternatives than trying to cross further north, climbing the Alps.

The Susa Valley is characterised by a longstanding history of struggles against different forms of occupation. During World War II, the inhabitants of the valley mobilised for liberating the territory from the German occupation, and the valley itself played a crucial role for the infrastructures that connected Italy to France. In the 1980s, repeated mobilisation and occupations of the main roads took place against the construction of highway. Then, in the early 1990s, the NoTav movement against the high-speed train started and it is still very active. This latter, which is quite heterogeneous in its composition, has deeply informed the political practices, shared knowledges and culture of the valley over the last twenty years, in terms of struggles against the violence of infrastructures and the dispossession from the territory. Very much grounded in the valley, the NoTav movement has however been supported by activists and movements from across the world; in turn, the persons involved in the NoTav have mobilised in solidarity with struggles and social movements that were taking place elsewhere, in particular those against the privatisation and militarisation of the terri-
Importantly, many of the people involved in the NoTav actions have also most recently mobilised in support of the migrants in transit. As one of the volunteers who mobilised to support the migrants in transit in the city of Bardonecchia highlighted: “in order to understand how the spontaneous migrant solidarity started in 2017 and how, little by little, it became more organised, we need to bring in mind the political culture that the NoTav experience contributed to create and spread in the valley over the last twenty years. The NoTav is by no means related to migration, but social justice claims have definitely driven the movement and are today also raised in relation to the migrants”.

Similarly, the Roya Valley, has an important history of resistances against infrastructures. Both valleys are today considered critical border-zones by the migrants as well as by the police that obstructs their passage. The reactivation of the political memory of the struggles should not be seen as a mere transposition of crystallised tactics and practical knowledges into the field of migrant solidarity support. Indeed, the presence of illegalised migrants further complicates the way in which solidarity practices are enacted, due to the asymmetric relationships between migrants and locals - e.g. in terms of legal status. In this sense, migration constitutes an analytical lens through which we can test and highlight the limits of Europe. NoTav activists stressed that “the difficulty consists precisely in reinventing and readapting acquired practical knowledges in different spaces paying attention to the specificities of the different political contexts”. In fact, as Sandro Mezzadra has aptly noticed, “any kind of radical imagination of a new European space has to be rooted in the material fabric of these practices of mobility [...] as the result of an accumulation of struggles”, and it is precisely this latter that can constitute “an important weapon” (Mezzadra, 2013).

Which migrant solidarity practices have been mobilised in these valleys? And why have they faced criminalization? The Alpine migrant passage has been almost silenced and invisibilised until Autumn 2017. The migrants’ presence was quite scanty in numbers at that time and, together with that, the “border spectacle” (De Genova, 2013) was repeatedly produced in Ventimiglia, where migrants used to gather to try to cross along the coast. In 2017 the Alpine migrant passage has been mediatized and, simultaneously, securitised: the French and the Italian police increased the joint border patrolling activities in the snow and push back operations at the frontier became a daily routine. The securitisation of the border unsurprisingly meant the migrants took more dangerous and insecure passages who tried to cross marching in the snow. On the Italian side, the small cities of Claviere and Bardonecchia located a few kilometres away from the border in the Susa Valley, have become the two main chokepoints for the migrants. From there, they try to cross at night, on foot, climbing the mountains. The municipality of Bardonecchia has adopted a non-hostile politics towards migrants, in partial opposition to the Italian government, and allowed the NGO Rainbow for Africa to use a room next to the rail station for hosting at night the migrants in transit. The NGO is formed of doctors and medical personnel whose position about migration is different from the one of the NoTav activists: they do not claim for freedom of movement, they rather give temporary protection and medical assistance to the migrants in transit. However, what could have appeared as a mere humanitarian inter-
vention and discourse, in that context contributed to shape a non-hostile environment. Importantly, the presence of a small and independent NGO has been perceived as an element of disturbance by the French authorities who occasionally disrupted their activity.

Solidarity practices at the French-Italian border have been played out both in the form of mobile logistical support and as spatially fixed ones. As far as the mobile ones are concerned, it is worth mentioning the group of Guide Sans Frontieres, formed by Alpine guides that decided to help migrants who were trying to climb the Alps, showing them the right path and conducting them throughout the border. In terms of spatially fixed support, in the small Italian city of Claviere, locals and NoTav activists occupied a big room inside the main Church, despite the opposition of the priest, and strategically named it “Chez Jesus” - thus, declaring it a sort of sanctuary space. In that place migrants also get legal support and organise themselves to cross the border. Notably, the occupation has been supported by a narrative that undermines the register of the “emergency” and seeks to denaturalise the image of the Alps as a risky and deadly frontier for the migrants (Del Biaggio, Heller, 2017): “the snow is not an emergency, the mountains are not the problem, the problem is the frontier that exists for some people only”. In which way has migrant solidarity been conceived and enacted in Claviere? Notably, the locals involved in the activities of Chez Jesus refused the vocabulary of “hospitality”, preferring to speak instead of a safe space opened and temporarily shared by migrants and by those who want to support their struggle for movement.

The expression “crimes of solidarity”, which actually appears as an oxymoron in terms, is not enshrined in any national law and it is rather used by activists and human rights organisations to designate the criminalisation of acts in support of the migrants that state authorities carry on on the basis of both national and European laws (Baudet, Carrere, 2004; Fekete, 2009). Both French and Italian governments refer to the 2002 EU Facilitation Directive which prevents and penalises “the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence” of migrants. The Directive includes a clause for not sanctioning those who provide humanitarian assistance; however, the clause is non-binding and therefore discretionary to member states if applying it or not (Carrera et al. 2016). In France, the article 662 of the Code of Entry and Residence of Foreigners and of the Right to Asylum (CESEDA) has been at the core of political and legal disputes. Notably, citizens who help migrants to cross national borders can be prosecuted in Italy under the same law that punishes smugglers - that is people who make economic profit by asking money the migrant who want to cross, inducing a sort of generalised “smugglerisation” (Garelli, Tazzioli, 2018) of people acting in solidarity with migrants. Nevertheless, we contend that the legal background of “crimes of solidarity” should not be overstated.

Instead, the “crimes” that are in question, concern an ethical and political dimension which exceed the legal one: why do solidarity practices effectively disturb states’ politics and actions? What does the overused word “facilitation” - (“facilitation of irregular migration”) - overshadow? In other words, what is effectively criminalised and targeted? Taking into account the above mentioned experiences of solidarity, to
be under attack are the mobile, “clandestine” and precarious infrastructures deployed to support migrant movements - helping them to cross the borders, giving them lifts; what the term “facilitation” does not enable us to capture is the targeting of practices that more broadly de-securitize spaces and undo hostile environment policies. Indeed, the ongoing criminalisation of solidarity should be situated within state politics aimed not only at obstructing migrants’ movements but also “at creating a hostile environment both for would-be refugees and for those supporting them” (Webber, in Fekete 2018: 68). In fact, the solidarity practices we illustrated do not just support movements, they also engage in opening safe spaces, as temporary and precarious they could be, or what migrants in Calais call “lieux de vie” (spaces of life).

On the one hand the ambiguous and equivocal legal definition of “smuggler”14 paves the way for stretching the notion by de facto including people who support migrants without making economic profit; on the other, we cannot narrow the analysis on crimes of solidarity to the smuggling debate for two main reasons. First, this would reiterate the state-based narrative on the criminalisation of smuggling, opposing the “good” European citizens acting in solidarity to the wicked smugglers. Second, the ongoing criminalisation of solidarity practices in Europe concerns less the acts and gestures per se - than the autonomous channels and logistics of support - independent from state-led humanitarian - that these small groups, spontaneous networks, like ‘Refugees Welcome’ and individual citizens put into place. The criminalised solidarity practices escape the codification within the register of state-led humanitarianism. Drawing on Foucault’s analysis on the criminalisation of “popular illegalisms” (Foucault, 2016), we suggest that a similar methodological sensibility should be mobilised in this case in a way that engages with the limits of Europe: instead of relying on juridical approach that analyses the legal basis upon which European citizens have been accused of facilitating “illegal” immigration, we interrogate how in a specific political context some gestures and acts started to be criminalised.

Discussion

Through such a focus on the criminalised migrant solidarity practices that some local citizens engaged in at the border-zones of Europe, we have not sketched a general theory of solidarity. Rather, this paper has pointed to the need of politicising solidarity, both in the scholarship and in the public debate - showing when solidarity practices become a ‘problem’ for states. By taking it as a constitutively relational concept, we have put solidarity into motion, drawing attention to the “play of dominations” (Foucault, 1971: 85) that the criminalisation of solidarity practices reveals. The unstable commoning generated through sedimented shared knowledges and through the reactivation of the political memory of struggles is in itself mobile in a twofold sense: on the one hand, we have been witnessing the periodical “eruption” of practices and spaces of solidarity across Europe; on the other, the specificity of the migrant solidarity practices that we have taken into account in the paper concern their being moulded and adapted to the condition of migrants being en route, in transit. However, a clarification is needed about our engagement with crimes of solidarity. By focusing on the increasing criminalisation of migrant solidarity practices in Europe we
do not want to corroborate a legal and moralistic view on smuggling that would trace neat partitions between the ‘fake and good’ smugglers - the European citizens who support migrants in transit - and the ‘true and bad’ smugglers - who ask money from the migrants in order to make them cross. Rather, through this paper we argue that a de-criminalisation of solidarity practices should be coupled with a critical appraisal of the global economy of migration that produces the very ‘figure of the smuggler’ as a crucial subject for the migration logistics of crossing.

While solidarity, as one of the main political and social values of the European Union, is essentially codified by European politicians as a bordering notion - e.g. solidarity among member states to share the “refugee burden” - independent groups that mobilise in solidarity with migrants appear as troubling to the politics of states. Yet, in considering how solidarity becomes a contentious political terrain, we caution against subsuming the heterogenous practices and experiences we illustrated in the article within the vocabulary of citizenship. Nor do we think that “the language of citizenship is that which best encapsulates the language of political subjectivity” (Nyers, Rgyiel, 2012: 11). Rather, in the paper we engaged in a methodological opening-up gesture that contributes to subvert and overcome the limits of EUrope. This consists in bringing attention to the political spaces generated by local practices and temporary transversal alliances between migrants and citizens which are not fully legible through the language of citizenship, further exploring the modes of collective subjectivities that emerge out of that. Thus, this paper has shown how these solidarity practices contribute to subvert and partially overcome the limits of EU-rope.

On the one hand, a focus on the criminalisation of solidarity practice makes possible to repoliticize the notion of solidarity and to rethink it as a relational concept. On the other hand, we should caution against the rebordering of solidarity as a neatly defined political space and the tracing out of clear-cut boundaries with humanitarianism, with state politics as well as with forms of struggles that cannot be easily described in terms of solidarity. By engaging with the time-space of solidarity, we have focused the attention on work of solidarity, meaning by that the ways in which the memories of political struggles as well as the mobile commoning formed by shared practical knowledges have been reactivated and put to work in the present. The laborious work of solidarity practices to support migrants en route opens up the very notion of solidarity to its politicisation. As long as practices and acts of solidarity with the migrants are criminalised, obstructed or labelled as a threat to social cohesion, a focus on solidarity enables highlighting EUrope at its limits.

References


Trimikliniotis, N., Parsanoglou, D., & Tsianos, V. 2014. Mobile commons, migrant digitalities and the right to the city. Springer.

1https://www.cvce.eu/content/publication/1997/10/13/9cc6ac38-32f5-4c0a-a337-9a8ae4d5740f/publishable_en.pdf


3 We borrow the idea of time-space from May and Thrift (2001: 1-46) who develop the concept to avoid the binaristic separation of time and space that marks much social theory after the spatial turn. [T]he picture that emerges is less that of a singular or uniform social time stretching over a uniform space, than of various (and uneven) networks of time stretching in different and divergent directions across an uneven social field - think, for example, of the uneven dissemination of the mechanical clock through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries or of railway time in the mid to late nineteenth century’ (5). Particular ‘senses of time’ are embedded in different social practices and spaces.


5http://www.saradura.org/INTERVISTE/2-Nicoletta%20Dosio.pdf

6 For instance, within Italy, the NOTav supported the NoDalMolin movement, against the establishment of a US military basis near the Italian city of Vicenza. Notably, the NoTav has politically supported the Zapatista movement.

7 Interview with S.M., coordinator of the association Liberament Insieme, Bardonecchia, May 19, 2018.

8 Interview conducted with two NoTav activists in the city of Claviere in the occupied room in the Church, March 30, 2018.

As this would introduce hierarchical relationships, between hosts and guests, instead of opening up a common terrain of struggle.

In fact, it has been mobilised by the Court to condemn French citizens who gave a kind of humanitarian support to the migrants while, in turn, the humanitarian clause enshrined in the article is used by human rights organisations to defend those citizens.