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Cypriotness After Postcolonialism

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Goldsmiths College, University of London
Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in Sociology
November 2019
I declare that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Rahme Sadikoglu
Abstract

The relationships between the notion of a resurgent Cypriot identity and the recent social, political, cultural and economic factors associated with Turkish settlement in northern Cyprus have been extensively examined in the social sciences and humanities over the past four decades. However, the cultural traces of British colonialism in the present and its relation to the contemporary dynamics of Turkish Cypriot identity have not received the same level of scholarly attention. This thesis offers a conjunctural perspective of the exploration of Cypriot identity. It provides an account of Cypriotness in reference to the post-postcolonial conjuncture, that is the historical meeting point of the colonial past and the postcolonial and the colonial present. The study also considers the extent to which Cypriot identity is constructed against two distinct constitutive others, namely mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots. The research has been conducted using a mixed-method ethnography, combining auto-ethnography and sensory ethnography. The main data were generated through participant observation, semi-structured interviews and informal/conversational interviews. Using ideas from postcolonial theory (Said, 1978, 1993; Bhabha, 1984, 1994), I provide an analysis of the living of complex dynamics as they relate to the production and negotiation of cultural difference, racism, identity and identifications within a post-postcolonial society. In doing so, the thesis contributes to the current debates on identity politics in northern Cyprus, as well as contributing to discussions in postcolonial studies.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>List of Figures</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1. Starting the Journey</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2. Thesis Outline</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 2: DEBATES ON NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY FORMATION IN CYPRUS</strong></td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1. Theories of Ethnicity and Nationalism</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.1. Defining Ethnicity</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.2. Ethnicity in Cyprus</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.3. Nationalism in Cyprus</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2. Turkish Cypriot Identity After the Division of Cyprus</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3. Conclusion</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 3: FROM POSTCOLONIALISM TO POST-POSTCOLONIALISM</strong></td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1. Moving Beyond Postcolonialism</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1. Defining Post-Postcolonialism and Post-Postcolonial Discourse</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2. Colonial Discourse: Orientalism</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1. The Foucauldian Notion of Discourse</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2. The Discourse of Orientalism</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.3. Orientalism and Post-Postcolonial Discourse</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.4. Turkish Nationalist Discourse</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3. Cultural Hybridity and the Third Space</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.1. The Third Space and Cypriotness</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4. Conclusion: Moving Beyond the Boundaries of Postcolonialism</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY</strong></td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1. Combining Ethnography and Auto-ethnography</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2. Subjectivity, Reflexivity and Shifting Positionalities</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3. Locations, Observations and Interviews</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1. Observations</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2. Semi-structured and Informal Interviews</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.3. Analysing Data: Thematic Analysis ........................................ 113
4.4. Recording and Representing Data ............................................ 116
4.4.1. Language and Photography .................................................. 117
4.5. Ethical Considerations .............................................................. 122
4.6. Conclusion .................................................................................. 123

CHAPTER 5: POST-POSTCOLONIAL RESISTANCE ...................... 125
5.1. Defining the Problematic in Official Discourse and Practices .......... 126
5.2. Perceptions of History Textbooks ............................................. 133
5.3. Perceptions of Discursive Practices ........................................... 140
5.3.1. Commemorative Ceremonies and Bodily Practices ................. 140
5.3.2. Visits to Memorials and Museums ....................................... 146
5.4. Conclusion: A New Way of Thinking About Resistance .............. 157

CHAPTER 6: POST-POSTCOLONIAL INCLUSION ...................... 160
6.1. Family Stories: Memories of the Past and Greek Cypriots .......... 161
6.2. Cultural Festivals in Northern Cyprus ..................................... 168
6.2.1. The Politics of Turkish Cypriot Cultural Festivals ................. 169
6.2.2. Collective Positioning and Post-Postcolonial Inclusion .......... 175
6.3. Exploring the Patterns of Post-Postcolonial Inclusion ................. 179
6.3.1. Minimising Cultural Differences ....................................... 179
6.3.2. Minimising Discrimination ............................................. 184
6.3.3. Othering the other Other ................................................... 191
6.4. Conclusion: Inclusion as a Dimension of Contemporary Racism ... 195

CHAPTER 7: POST-POSTCOLONIAL EXCLUSION .................... 198
7.1. The Decline of Nationalist Discourse and the Rise of Post-Postcolonial
Discourse ....................................................................................... 198
7.2. The Politics of Resistance .......................................................... 206
7.2.1. Turkish Hegemony as an Uncivilising Mission: “A Little Turkey” 210
7.3. The Politics of Exclusion ........................................................... 216
7.3.1. Post-Postcolonial Melancholia .......................................... 221
7.3.2. Melancholic Attachment to Cypriotness .............................. 225
7.4. Conclusion: Exclusion as a Dimension of Post-Postcolonial Melancholia 228

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION ......................................................... 231
8.1. Summary and Conclusions ....................................................... 233
8.2. Cypriotness in Northern Cyprus ............................................. 243

5
Appendix 1: Glossary ........................................................................................................247
Appendix 2: Short biography of interviewees .................................................................249
Bibliography ..................................................................................................................261
List of Figures

Figure 1: The United Nations Buffer Zone, Arab Ahmed area of Nicosia............9
Figure 2: My grandmother praying. Alaminyo, April 2003..................................13
Figure 3: Me, my brother, my grandmother, my mother. Alaminyo, April 2003..14
Figure 4: Nikos Dimou’s map of Cyprus, overlaid with the slogan Δεν ξεχνώ (“we do not forget”).................................................................20
Figure 5: The third space of "Cypriotness ...............................................................95
Figure 6. The image of a martyr’s mother weeping ..............................................136
Figure 7. The image of Turkish Cypriot women and children escaping inter-communal violence .................................................................136
Figure 8: Debris from Cengiz Topel’s Plane .....................................................148
Figure 9: Cengiz Topel Martyrdom .................................................................148
Figure 10. Buhurdanlik ..............................................................................169
Figure 11. Traditional sestas ........................................................................170
Figure 12. Words used by Turkish Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot dialect, displayed on a wall.................................................................170
Figure 13. Ayse Teyze with the handloom ......................................................172
Figure 14. Traditional Cypriot clay oven in traditional Cypriot adobe house ....173
Figure 15. Turkish woman making gozleme .................................................191
Figure 16. The TRNC flag on the Kyrenia Mountains .....................................203
Acknowledgements

I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to my supervisors Yasmin Gunaratnam for her support, timely interventions, patience and incisive feedback throughout my PhD. I must also thank David Hirsh for helping me develop my ideas. I must also acknowledge the assistance provided by the European Union Scholarship Programme for the Turkish Cypriot Community which provided a grant for the academic year of 2016-2017, as well as the people who took part in this project. Thanks to each of you for your time, candidness, trust and hospitality. I would like to thank everyone at Goldsmiths for their enthusiasm and friendship over the years. Also, gratitude must be given to Marvin Heffernan who helped me in the latter phases of my PhD by kindly offering his immensely helpful comments on parts of my thesis. I must also thank Merl Storr for providing me with language support. I would also like to add a special thanks to Vic Seidler and Anna Charalambidou, who examined this thesis. Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank my mother and father for their never-ending love, support and confidence in me. Indeed, without their continued support and love I would not have been able to realise my dream of finishing a PhD.
Before the opening of the Green Line, I used to look from the Turkish side into the distance, across the barriers at the end of Nicosia (Figure 1). Damaged buildings, the Greek flag waving in the wind, church bells, cars, and sometimes people were all I could see and hear. The “other” side was an unknown place to which we could not travel and about which we did not know. It was a blank space where the Greek Cypriots lived. For twenty-nine years, Turkish and Greek Cypriots were not allowed to pass through the United Nations (UN)-patrolled Green Line, which separated the two communities from each other not only physically but also emotionally, culturally and religiously.¹ For a young Turkish Cypriot, this multilayered division, and the sense of mystery surrounding the area, led to wild imaginings. When I was a child, I used to spend two or three hours every day in Nicosia old town, the Arab Ahmet area, located at the end of the Turkish part of Nicosia, right next to UN Buffer Zone. My brother was a player for Cetinkaya Football Club, the professional team located in this area. Often we would take him to training, and I would wait for him to finish, with my mother and sometimes my father. The end of Nicosia was a place where my imagination began to play tricks on me. I remember asking myself as I looked over the fence: what is on the other side? Does it look like Northern Cyprus? What do the people look like? If they were to see me standing here, how would they react? Would

¹ Cyprus was geographically divided between 1974 and 2003.
they want to kill me? Would they try to shoot me down? Or would they smile and wave at me? All these thoughts would consume me every time my eyes rested on the fence.

Like the vast majority of my interviewees, as a young Turkish Cypriot who was born after the division of the island in 1974, I did not have direct experience of the intercommunal violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots that continued from 1963 to 1974. The information I had about the past, and about Greek Cypriots, had been passed on to me from different sources: the narratives of family and friends, and official narratives. Official narratives were propagated through mechanisms including schoolbooks, commemorations and the media, and they reinforced the enmity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (see Chapter 5). In primary school, for example, I remember we visited the Museum of Barbarism (see Chapter 5), which detailed the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots and instilled enmity towards the “other”; this led to my forming a somewhat negative perception of Greek Cypriots. Of course, such official narratives impacted on the younger generation of Turkish Cypriots to a certain extent, but what became clear in the interviews I conducted was that family stories had no less significant consequences for the post-war generation.

Almost every Turkish Cypriot family today has ties with the various distinct periods of violence between the two communities, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots: it may be that one of our relatives lost family members, or was held captive during the 1974 war and is lucky to be alive today, or was displaced from her/his home in 1973 or 1974 and resettled elsewhere, resulting in long-term personal trauma. In my family, it was my mother’s side that suffered all of this: loss, captivity, and the trauma of displacement. My grandmother (b. 1941) and grandfather (b. 1935) were both born in Alaminyo (Alaminos) in the district of Larnaca in southern Cyprus. They married in Alaminyo in 1956; they had five children, Emine (b. 1957), Mustafa (b. 1958), Fevzi (b. 1960), Sadiye (b. 1962) and my mother Ayse (b. 1965); and they both worked as gardeners in the village. On 12 August 1967, my grandfather and two uncles lost their lives due to the explosion of a booby trap left by the Greek Cypriot militia (I talk about this incident in more detail in Chapter 6). My mother was only two years old when she lost her father, and she therefore has no memories of him. My grandmother, on
the other hand, was traumatically widowed, and was left at the age of twenty-six with five children.

Seven years after the incident, in 1974, the women of the village – including my grandmother, mother and two aunts – were held captive by Greek soldiers at the Greek school in Alaminyo. After three days, the UN Peacekeeping Force freed them from captivity. Thereafter, they left the village and moved to Kophinou (Kofunye), a village close to Alaminyo, where they stayed for between fifteen and twenty days in the houses of Turkish Cypriots. My grandmother paid a vast amount of money to secretly bring her daughters and other women of her family (my grandmother’s sisters-in-law) over to the Turkish side on a workers’ bus. They first made their way to Dhekelia (Dikelya, a British Overseas Territory on the island of Cyprus), and from there they went to Pergamos (Pergama) before ending up in Vatili (Vadili). They stayed in Vatili for a month in an abandoned Greek Cypriot house, and then settled in Kythrea (Degirmenlik), where we have lived ever since.

These stories have been present in our daily lives throughout my childhood and up until today. Before my grandmother died in 2012, she would often talk about the past, their life in Alaminyo, the war, their captivity and displacement. For instance, she often mentioned to people who did not know her history that she had lost her husband and two children in a booby trap incident. However, she never divulged any details about the aftermath of the incident. In fact, I only found out what had happened during the aftermath of this traumatic incident from a book (Bozkut, 2002; see Chapter 6) that I discovered during my fieldwork. Compared with my grandmother, my mother talks less about the past. However, she sometimes discusses certain incidents involving attacks by Greek soldiers on their village in 1974 (see Chapter 6).

Despite all their suffering and pain, my grandmother, mother and other family members and friends from the war generation also provided me with alternative stories about Greek Cypriots, revealing a friendship between the two communities. For instance, I remember my grandmother telling me that they had had no problems with Greek Cypriots in the village. According to what she told me, they used to work together and go to each other’s weddings. She always
emphasised the fact that Greek Cypriots had also suffered during the war. Indeed, she was thankful to an old Greek Cypriot acquaintance, Kyriakos,\(^2\) who had helped a number of Turkish Cypriots move to the northern part of the island. The old man had been living in the same village as my grandmother, and had been one of the few people that owned a car in the village of Alaminyo back in the 1970s.

As my reflections above elucidate, there were myriad complexities and inconsistencies in the stories that I heard from my family members and other war generation Turkish Cypriots regarding the past and Greek Cypriots. I was therefore beset by varied feelings, such as confusion and apprehension, prior to the opening of the Green Line in 2003. After visiting the Museum of Barbarism in primary school, for instance, I viewed Greek Cypriots as enemies. However, hearing stories about a “good past” that included friendship between the two communities somewhat challenged my negative feelings and ideas about Greek Cypriots. Indeed, there was a side of me that wanted to believe that Greek Cypriots were not bad people. I felt that they could not be as bad as they were portrayed in schoolbooks and in places such the Museum of Barbarism. However, I was conflicted. My fieldwork reaffirms that many people in my generation grew up hearing contradictory stories about the troubles of the past. The young people I interviewed shared with me the narratives articulated by their parents and other family members during their childhood, which had provided them with competing explanations and contradictory ideas about Greek Cypriots, and had led to their having a tainted perception of Greek Cypriots (see Chapter 6).

It was after the opening of the Green Line in April 2003 that post-war generation Turkish Cypriots like me finally had the chance to confront the physical reality of the “other side” and the “other”. We met Greek Cypriots for the first time, and we saw the places that we had heard about from our family members. Similarly, war generation Cypriots from both communities also began to visit the “other side”, to see their abandoned homes, visit family graves, and meet friends in their former villages whom they had not seen since the division in 1974. With my father, brother, mother and grandmother, I visited Alaminyo, my grandmother and

\(^2\) All names have been changed in order to protect the privacy of individuals.
mother’s home village, right after the opening of the Green Line in April 2003. I remember that day vividly.

After around an hour of driving from Degirmenlik (the village where I live) to the southern part of the island, we reached Alaminyo. My first impressions were that the village was small and deserted, although people still lived there. What also struck me as we entered the village was that my mother’s and grandmother’s moods suddenly changed: from being talkative and convivial, they became more sombre and reserved. We drove through the village until we arrived at the street where my grandmother’s former house stood. My grandmother stated that everything had changed; some of the Turkish Cypriot houses had disappeared and been erased. We parked in the centre of the village, and I saw an abandoned school. This was the school where the women and children of the village, including my mother and grandmother, had been held hostage.

Herbs had sprouted around the school, and nearby there was a mosque, which was in good condition and looked as though it had recently been painted. This came as a surprise, since we had heard from Turkish Cypriot officials that many of the Turkish properties, houses, buildings, graveyards etc. in the south had been demolished. At the front of the school were four martyr graves: the graves of my grandfather, two uncles and cousin, who died in 1967.

Figure 2: My grandmother praying. Alaminyo, April 2003. Author’s photograph.
When my grandmother first saw the graves, she felt relieved, primarily because the graves were intact and had not been destroyed. Ironically, during my research I discovered that the street where the graves and mosque were located had been named after the EOKA\(^3\) leader – “Grivas” – following the war. Despite her feeling of devastation, my grandmother meticulously placed a set of plastic flowers she had brought from the north on each grave. Weeping inwardly, she started to say her prayers, and then watered the graves (Figures 2 and 3).

![Figures 2 and 3](image)

Figure 3: Left to right: me, my brother, my grandmother, my mother. Alaminyo, April 2003. Author’s photograph.

After visiting the graves, we visited the house where my grandmother and her family had lived until 1974. When we knocked on the door, it was a priest who opened, as he was the person currently living in the house. We entered the house, and my grandmother had a quick conversation with the priest, explaining to him that this was the house she had lived in up until 1974, and that the house next door had been her mother’s house. My mother showed me where she used to sit and wait for my grandmother to come back from work. My mother and grandmother both looked upset and teary as they recounted their memories to my brother, my father and me. After a short visit, we left the house and went to visit Kyriakos’s house in the village, not far from my grandmother’s house. He was surprised to see my grandmother, but he was just as happy. When my grandmother pointed to my mother and told him “this is my youngest child, Ayse”, his eyes filled up, and

\(^3\) EOKA (Ethniki Organosis Kyprian Agoniston) is the Greek Cypriot nationalist organisation, which was established in April 1955 by Greek Cypriots in order to fight for the end of British colonial rule.
he started to cry. He remembered my grandfather’s bombing incident. He knew my mother had been two years old when the incident happened. Kyriakos had been a very close friend of my great uncle (my grandmother’s brother). According to what my grandmother said, my great uncle and Kyriakos always used to be together. My grandmother and Kyriakos reminisced about the old days; then we sat down for a while before leaving. We also went to see the fields that my grandmother and grandfather had owned in the village, and we visited the village headman’s brother, Stelio, who had been a friend of my grandparents. All the Greek Cypriots we met greeted us with smiles and appeared quite happy to see us.

As I drew on my own reflections and memories, the interviews I conducted, and previous literature (see Olin, 2012), it emerged during my fieldwork that the experience of visiting the other side evoked different experiences between those who had experienced intercommunal violence and war and those who had had no direct experiences of the war. My interviewee Sermet, for instance, stated that for him, visiting his parents’ villages felt like “visiting a different city”, whereas for his parents it had been an “emotional experience”; this marks an emotional distance between the war generation and the post-war generation of Turkish Cypriots. In a similar way, my own reflections above demonstrate that visiting the other side was a highly emotional and embodied experience for my grandmother and mother, who had had direct experience of 1974, and had left their home and their village behind during the subsequent displacement. Yet for me, the experience of crossing the border evoked different feelings: curiosity, and at some moments a slight sense of anxiety.

Throughout our time on the Greek side of the island, I acutely observed my surroundings, the roads and houses of Greek Cypriots. I also observed Greek Cypriots, their interactions with us, their facial expressions and how they talked. I applied the same observations to my family members. At some moments, there was a strange feeling as I confronted Greek Cypriots in Alaminyo, a feeling that I was venturing into an alien land and had to be wary of what I might discover. At certain times, I also experienced an acute sense of anxiety and prejudice, as I tried to make sense of my personal experience by referring to the official histories I had learned at school and through family stories about the “bad past”.

After that first crossing, we started to visit Alaminyo quite often. We made friends with Demetra and her husband Giorgos, who owned a cafe in Alaminyo. We used to have picnics, go swimming, eat at restaurants together, and meet up at taverns to indulge in delicious food and drink. Notably, when the Green Line opened in 2003, something shifted. I noticed the emergence of a discourse that emphasised notions of cultural similarity and sameness. This discourse emphasised that there was shared culture between the two communities, who wished to strengthen a shared image by generating a “will” to reunite and live together “like before”, at peace on the island. This was a significant contrast to the killing and maiming described in history books and family stories about traumatic events, with a new shift to the “warm” and “loving” nature of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Hence, it was by sharing moments of joy and cultural meanings after the opening of the Green Line, as well as through positive family narratives, that the initial perceptions of Greek Cypriots I had learned at school were challenged, and new positive perceptions were formed.

In September 2007, not long after the opening of the Green Line and the completion of my school education in Northern Cyprus, I came to London to study for a bachelor’s degree in journalism at Middlesex University. When I first came to London, I knew which part of my identity was more significant, and which part I wanted to accentuate: I was not a Turkish Cypriot; I was a Turkish Cypriot. To me this meant that I was a Cypriot person who spoke Cypriot Turkish (a dialect of Turkish; see Chapter 3). Similarly, in my view, Greek Cypriots were Cypriots who spoke Cypriot Greek. Thus, although we spoke different languages, I believed that we were all “Cypriots”, and that we belonged to an imaginary community. Perhaps this view had been shaped by my positive experiences of Greek Cypriots in Cyprus after the opening of the Green Line, as well as the realisation that there were many common words used by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (see Chapter 6). However, the past twelve years of my life, which I have spent in London, have been very different. For example, I have had to endure racism and hostility from Greek Cypriots, who have sometimes shown considerable enmity towards me and Turkish Cypriots in my social network. This has consequently had a profound impact on my identity and self-perception.
In my first year in London, I stayed in the student halls in Hendon, opposite the Middlesex University campus. In the halls, there were around seven Turkish Cypriot and ten Greek Cypriot students. We had shared spaces such as kitchens and common rooms, and hence there were interactions between us on a daily basis. One example was when two Turkish Cypriot friends and I had a conversation with two Greek Cypriot students, Michalis and Pantelis, about the war in Cyprus. During this conversation, it became evident that Michalis and Pantelis felt aggrieved about the consequences of the war. They complained about how much they, as Greek Cypriots, had suffered during the war, and that they had been victims of Turkish “barbarism”. These views were deeply upsetting and disturbing for me. It seemed as if they did not want to acknowledge the wounds and losses of Turkish Cypriots who had suffered similar trauma during the intercommunal violence and war in Cyprus. I did not know how to defend myself: I felt enormous pressure to acquiesce in the narrative that all Turkish Cypriots had been involved in atrocities, and that by default I should take responsibility for this.

In the wake of these intense and emotional arguments with Greek Cypriots, I vividly remember feeling immensely unlucky and helpless to have been born in Cyprus.

These initial racist encounters with Greek Cypriots in London prompted me to look inwards and explore the complexity of my own identity. I felt that I was perceived as an outsider (by Greek Cypriots), marginalised within the imaginary Cypriot community to which I had assumed I belonged when I first came to London. I started to question myself: who was I? Was I Cypriot? Was I Turkish? Was I Turkish Cypriot? These conflicting pressures resulted in my sense of identity becoming more introspective, and from this I wanted to deepen my understanding of how the wounds inflicted by the traumatic experiences of war, displacement and migration had infiltrated the collective psyche of Turkish Cypriots of the war generation.

In the final year of my undergraduate degree, I did a project on the Turkish Cypriot diaspora. I made a conscious effort to include war generation Turkish Cypriots – people who had lived through the war, and who carried its legacy within their embodied selves. These people were from all across London, meaning I made contact with organisations in Haringey, Hackney and Southwark. My
project was intended to create an archive bringing together the histories, stories, memories and experiences of elderly Turkish Cypriots who had immigrated to England between the 1950s and 1980s. At the time, I felt a revival of Turkishness becoming embedded in my identity. In this respect, I “chose” a different strategy from the many young women and men of my generation that I interviewed, who, as we will see in the coming chapters, responded to this pressure (racist encounters or racism from Greek Cypriots) differently, by trying very hard to succeed in being perceived and accepted as “Cypriot”.

Throughout this thesis, I demonstrate that many people in my generation often claim a new shared Cypriot identity, constantly emphasising cultural similarities between themselves and Greek Cypriots by constructing a notion of difference between themselves and mainland Turks. Within this discourse of Cypriotness, stories about the war or intercommunal conflict before the division of the island and its impact on people have a tendency to be minimised (see Chapter 6). Similarly, within this discourse, instances of Greek Cypriots’ hatred and racism towards Turkish Cypriots are often attributed to structural factors, politicians or state agencies (such as schools) that are believed to brainwash people (see Chapter 6). In contrast, within this discourse of Cypriotness, mainland Turks are constantly criticised for being different and “backward” (see Chapters 6 and 7).

Before I began this study, I always wondered why young Turkish Cypriots acted in ways that gave favourable treatment to Greek Cypriots. I asked myself: why did young people want to be perceived as “Cypriot”? Why did they fabricate a common Cypriot identity? Why, even when they were on the receiving end of racism from Greek Cypriots, did they demonstrate leniency towards Greek Cypriots? And why did they constantly want to differentiate themselves from mainland Turks?

At the time, I had not yet understood that there were many conflicting pressures on younger-generation Turkish Cypriots living in Northern Cyprus to act in this manner and to fervently adopt an essentialised Cypriot identity. During this study it became clear to me that young people experience a sense of inferiority or inadequacy when they cross the Green Line and see that the socio-economic and cultural conditions, material resources and standards of living on the Greek side of
the island are superior and cannot be equated with those in Northern Cyprus. The sense of shame or inferiority that young Turkish Cypriots experience can also manifest itself when a hostile Greek Cypriot person implies that Turkishness is synonymous with being “backward” and “barbarian”. Consequently, as I show throughout this thesis, young Turkish Cypriots adopt a Cypriot identity in order to resolve this sense of inferiority, as the notion of Cypriotness provides them with a sense of Western modernity and Europeanness through its association with past British civilisation (see Chapters 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8). However, the tensions arising from the presence of mainland Turks and Turkey in Northern Cyprus (as a colonising power), and the stigmatisation and sense of inferiority Turkish Cypriots experience from the “other” (when entering the “other” side), generate a conflicted identity that is characterised by a sense of in-betweenness (which I describe as “not so Eastern, not so European”\(^4\)).

It became apparent to me during this study that British colonisation still has an impact on young people and their perspectives on self and identity. For instance, as I discuss in Chapter 2, it was British colonialism that created the ethnic identities in Cyprus and reinforced the division between the two communities. However, young people tend to associate British civilisation with Western modernity and the European Union. Therefore, the structural vagaries of British colonisation (see Chapter 2) – which fostered divisions and imbalanced power relations between the different communities – tend to go unrecognised. I found remnants of the legacy of British colonisation within my own personal network in both London and Cyprus, as well as in the group I researched, and in myself. Indeed, I realised that the legacy of British colonialism to some extent had unconsciously influenced my decision to come and study in the UK.

Moreover, it also became clear to me during this project that although at times I felt a re-emergence of my Turkishness during the initial phase of my London experience, I simultaneously felt a deep sense of inferiority about this element of my identity. This feeling of inferiority was in stark contrast to the vast majority of my participants; it emerged gradually with each scenario where I was shown hostility by Greek Cypriots in London. One example of this hostility occurred

\(^4\) I elaborate further on the phrase “not so Eastern, not so European” in Chapter 3 and throughout the thesis.
when Marilena, a Greek Cypriot girl who lived in halls in a room opposite mine during my masters studies, placed a printed graphic (Figure 4) with a map of Cyprus and the slogan Δεν ξεχνώ (“we do not forget”) on her door after she found out that I was Turkish Cypriot.

![Image of graphic](image.png)

Figure 4: This graphic, created by Greek writer and advertiser Nikos Dimou in 1974, has been the symbol of remembrance of the tragedies of the Turkish invasion since 1974.

At the time, I had little understanding of what the graphic represented. I then discovered that it was about the tragedies of the 1974 invasion by Turkey, when thousands of Greek Cypriot people lost their lives, homes, families or liberty. In our subsequent interactions, she attempted to demean me by calling me a “barbarian” because I was Turkish Cypriot. Some of the Greek Cypriots I lived with were relatively friendly. However, Marilena and some other Greek Cypriot students that I met in halls engaged in behaviour that aimed to belittle my Turkishness as backward, barbarian and inferior. I was constantly made to feel inadequate and embarrassed about my Turkishness, even though it was part of my identity and history.

This feeling of inadequacy also manifested itself in London over the years, almost every time I was asked where I was from. For instance, if someone asked me where I was from, I would say, “I am from Cyprus”. The next question was always one of the following: Are you Turkish? Are you Greek? Are you Turkish or Greek? Which part of Cyprus are you from? So do you speak Greek? I had to repeatedly explain that I was a Turkish Cypriot who spoke Cypriot Turkish (see Chapter 4). I also had to explain what Cypriot Turkish meant, or what being Turkish Cypriot meant. An official document, my Republic of Cyprus passport,
declared I was simply Cypriot, and neither Greek nor Turkish. But in London I always had to articulate that I was either one or the other. I could be either Turkish Cypriot or Greek Cypriot.

I subsequently realised that my sense of identity was more conflicted than I had assumed prior to moving to London. In fact, akin to phenomena theorised by Stuart Hall (1994; 1996), my identity became fluid and began to shift in relation to my subjective experiences while living in London, such as racism and hostility shown to me by Greek Cypriots. These experiences were fundamental in shaping a new identity, one that was underscored by a deeper sense of inferiority. While on one hand I felt a huge sense of pride due to the historical narratives articulated by my friends and family, since they often positioned Cypriotness as something to be immensely proud of, I simultaneously also felt a sense of shame and mild repulsion in relation to Turkishness, due to the way my Turkishness was undermined in London. Undoubtedly, these histories and experiences rendered my identity conflicted, leaving me stuck in an in-between space between my Turkishness and Cypriotness.

I strongly believe that the conflict within me and my struggles in negotiating my identity were what awakened my ardent interest in the politics of Turkish Cypriot identity and led me to undertake a PhD in sociology. However, it is important to note that I was drawn to this project not only by my own personal struggles, but also by the struggles of other young Turkish Cypriots, which came to my attention during my observations in Cyprus and London. Therefore, in this thesis, I explore the views and experiences of a specific generation of Turkish Cypriots with certain sociopolitical and ethnic characteristics, and I interweave these with my own experiences, perceptions and memories. The vast majority of my participants were post-war generation Turkish Cypriots who had no direct experience of pre-1974 Cyprus. Like me, all of them had completed their primary and secondary school education in Cyprus. The majority of them had studied in universities in Cyprus, while some had studied in universities in the UK like me, or in universities in Turkey. Thus, the decision to direct my sociological analysis towards a particular generational experience also stemmed from a desire to explore my own sense of self.
Throughout the following chapters, I continue to draw on the personal, and at times I interweave my narratives with those of my interviewees. I do so sparingly, however, and only where I share similar experiences and memories with the participants. These experiences include primary and secondary school education (see Chapter 5), school visits to commemorations and museums (see Chapter 5), and various stories about previous intercommunal violence, most of them told by family members (see Chapter 6). To this end, I wanted to use these myriad experiences to develop a mixed-method approach to my research, combining elements of auto-ethnography and sensory ethnography, and use my epistemological privilege as a fellow young generation Turkish Cypriot to help inform the basis of my sociological analysis into the politics of Turkish Cypriot identity. I believe that these factors enabled me to connect and empathise with my research subjects on both a personal and intellectual level, and in turn, also helped me to construct social scientific hypotheses and glean much sociologically richer empirical data.

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5 My methodological approach is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Hasan is a fifty-seven-year-old Turkish Cypriot man who lives in Degirmenlik, a village in the Nicosia\(^6\) district in Northern Cyprus. I am trying to understand what he thinks about mainland Turks\(^7\) living in Northern Cyprus. When I ask him “what makes Turkish Cypriots different from mainland Turks?”, he sighs and says:

> When I see a person, I know whether she or he is Cypriot or Türkîyeli [Turk]. They [Turkish people] are dark-skinned and rough, more like Gypsies. They are also less civilised. We are more open-minded. The way they dress and think is totally different as well. They are more religious than us. Women wear headscarves but Cypriots don’t; because of this they think we are heathens. Are we happy to live with them? No. But no one knows what’s going on on this small island. No one cares! (Hasan, July 2014)

This is a story about the making of exclusion, difference, identity and resistance. It presents different identities that are seemingly dependent on two separate subject positions: Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks (from Turkey). These two positions are animated through language, religion and custom.

Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks have lived together in Northern Cyprus since 1974, sharing the island and myriad aspects of culture in their everyday lives. However, Hasan claims that Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks are radically different, from the way they look to the way they think. Mainland/Turkish identity is here distinguished by what it is not (see Hall, 1996). To be a mainland Turk is to be “not Cypriot”. In other words, according to this narrative of Cypriotness, if you are a mainland Turk living in Northern Cyprus, you cannot be a Cypriot.

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\(^6\) Nicosia (English), Lefkosia (Greek) or Lefkoşa (Turkish) is the capital city of Cyprus.

\(^7\) In this thesis, I use the terms “mainland Turks”, “Turkish people from Turkey” and “Turks from Turkey” interchangeably to refer to Turkish people who have migrated to Northern Cyprus after 1974 (see Chapter 2).
Mainland Turks are often framed as Others who do not share Cypriot values and have migrated to Northern Cyprus for economic gain. Thus, they are imagined to be a threat to Cypriot culture. Such views are a part of vernacular culture in Cyprus, and have received increasing academic attention. Studies of nationalism and identity in Northern Cyprus have focused on adaptations of ethnic nationalism under British rule (Loizides, 2007; Pollis, 1996, 1998; Kizilyurek, 1999, 2002) and “identity fluctuations” in the Turkish Cypriot community after the division of the island in 1974 (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005; Vural and Rustemli, 2006; Ramm, 2006; Navaro-Yashin, 2006). These studies have demonstrated that since the division of Cyprus, ethnic nationalism (Turkishness) in the Turkish Cypriot community has been in decline, and a civic notion of identity (Cypriotness) has gained ascendancy. Paying attention to the growing distinction between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots (Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Kizilyurek, 2018), scholars have analysed the resurgence of Cypriotness in Turkish Cypriot society, and its relationship with both the presence of mainland Turks and the political, socio-economic and cultural shifts in Northern Cyprus (Christiansen, 2005; Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Ramm, 2006; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a). It has been noted that claims to Cypriotness have become a form of resistance to Turkey’s perceived colonisation of the island (Hatay and Bryant, 2008a; Navaro-Yashin, 2006). Accordingly, it has been argued that Cypriot identity is a political movement that reflects Turkish Cypriots’ desire to regain the political agency that was taken from them with the rise of Turkish immigrant populations in Northern Cyprus (Christiansen, 2005; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a). Scholars have also considered how Cypriot identifications subsume a fear of the loss of culture, a fear that emerges in response to the growing mainland Turkish population in Northern Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots’ assimilation into the culture of Turkey (Christiansen, 2005; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a).

Although the formation of Cypriotness with reference to the presence of mainland Turks and the perceived Turkish domination of Northern Cyprus has been observed from different angles, each perspective has provided only a partial elucidation of the politics of this identity formation. What is lacking in such discussions is a consideration of more complex cultural dynamics, including ambivalence, cultural hybridities and conviviality. First of all, studies often
attribute the emergence of Cypriotness to Turkey’s perceived colonisation of Northern Cyprus, and to the economic, political, social and economic changes that have come with the presence of Turkey (and/or mainland Turks) in Northern Cyprus. In comparison, they tend to understate the impact British colonialism had in producing European narratives of a global heritage (Mitchell, 2000, p.xix), and how it continues to shape the ways in which Turkish Cypriots construct cultural hierarchies. Second, despite the important insights provided by these studies, what is notable in their work is a lack of emphasis on how Cypriotness is produced against two constitutive Others, namely mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots after the division of the island. Third, previous studies of Turkish Cypriot identity have provided mainly normative descriptions of how Turkish Cypriots locate themselves in terms of identity, without adequately questioning the Eurocentric assumptions that underpin the discourse of Cypriotness. Drawing on ideas from postcolonial theory (Said, 1978, 1993; Bhabha, 1984, 1994), this study develops a post-postcolonial approach\(^8\) to provide a new way of thinking about the complexities involved in the contemporary fabrication of Cypriotness, with a specific focus on the post-war generation (I elaborate further on the term “post-war generation” in Chapter 4).

This thesis examines the ways in which the complexity of the relationship between the colonial past and the postcolonial and colonial present – to which I refer as post-postcolonialism – relates to the current dynamics of Turkish Cypriot identity. Second, it aims to investigate how Cypriotness emerges from the tensions and negotiations between three cultures: the culture of Turkish Cypriots, the culture of Greek Cypriots, and the culture of mainland Turks. Finally, it seeks to investigate the claims produced by the discourse of Cypriotness, tracing and analysing their effects. This study therefore makes an empirical and theoretical contribution to studies of identity in Northern Cyprus through its focus on the post-postcolonial epoch and the latter’s impact on the ways Turkish Cypriots negotiate difference in Northern Cyprus. It connects to broader calls for “connected sociologies” (Bhambra, 2014a) informed by decolonising imperatives that recognise the ways in which European modernity has framed knowledge. Bhambra (2014a; see also Bhambra and Santos, 2017, p.6) advocates a

\(^8\) My theoretical approach is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
“connected sociology” that acknowledges the historical processes of colonialism, slavery, and the appropriation and dispossession of land and resources, which have largely been absent from the canon of mainstream sociology. “Connected sociology”, she argues, would allow these subordinate histories to be reclaimed, and would greatly contribute to sociological accounts of the present. She writes:

Sociology needs to be a future-oriented discipline alert to how the world is changing to call into question previous certainties, especially those associated with US-European dominance (including its self-understandings enshrined within sociology). However, we can be certain that those new forms of inequality and injustice will have continuities and connections with the past. (Bhambra and Santos, 2017, p.9)

Bhambra argues that only by recognising the “global colonial” in the historical construction of academic sociology is it possible to make sense of the postcolonial and decolonial nature of the present, and that acknowledgement of these forces is vital for establishing a truly valid, less ethnocentric “global sociology”. In response to Bhambra’s call, this study provides a sociological investigation of Cypriotness – which can be seen as an “alternative formation of the global” (Bhambra and Santos, 2017, p.3) – by questioning the Eurocentric knowledge claims produced by post-postcolonial narratives. A central concern of this study is to explore the challenges associated with the trauma of post-postcoloniality and how those challenges have given rise to an essentialised notion of Cypriotness in Turkish Cypriot society. I argue that the fusions between Eastern and Western cultures, and the sense of in-betweenness, are at the core of cultural conflicts and struggles over definitions and meanings in contemporary Turkish Cypriot communities. This thesis is therefore oriented to discussing the fragmentation and paradoxes of post-postcolonial narratives produced by Turkish Cypriots who were once colonised by the West and are now supposedly living under the governance and control of an Eastern power.
1.1. Starting the Journey

As a Turkish Cypriot born and raised in Northern Cyprus, I grew up hearing stories about social, economic and political problems in Northern Cyprus. Mainland Turks and Turkey were always at the centre of those stories. My impression as I grew up was that mainland Turks and Turkey were to blame for the majority of social problems in Northern Cyprus. There have always been accusations that mainland Turks cause social problems, such as claims that crime is mostly committed by mainland Turks (see Hatay, 2009). For example, on 1 January 2011, Yeniduzen, an established newspaper, published an article with the title “In 10 Years, 59 Murders Committed”. The article stated:

In the last 10 years the number of murders has reached a disturbing peak in Northern Cyprus. [...] Since 2001 there have been 59 murders committed. [...] Interestingly, the majority of both the victims and the convicted murderers are from mainland Turkey, which has drawn a lot of attention and has not gone unnoticed by the locals. (“10 yılda 59 cinayet”, 2011)

Relatedly, it came to my attention that older generations of Turkish Cypriots emphasised the detrimental changes in their lives after the division of the island, when Turks from Turkey started to settle in Northern Cyprus. I heard countless stories from older Turkish Cypriots about how, before the division of the island, they could leave their doors and windows open when they went out; there was no risk of theft or break-ins (see Chapter 7).

I also observed a great deal of criticism of mainland Turks in relation to their religion, gender roles, mentality, language and everyday appearance (see Chapter 7). A popular narrative is that Turkish Cypriots can easily distinguish between themselves and mainland Turks on the basis of appearance (for example, the way they dress). As Navaro-Yashin (2006, p.91) states:

Turkish Cypriots differentiate themselves from people from Turkey particularly on the grounds of lifestyle. They tell “Turks” apart from “Cypriots” through certain symbolic markers that they have come to associate with “the culture of
Turkey.” Veiling, or the many fashions of wearing a headscarf, for example, out of habit or faith (unless done in a particular Cypriot way, with the corners of the scarf tied together at the top), is commonly associated with “the culture of Turkey.” “Cypriot women generally do not tie their heads,” said a young woman, using a common idiom in Turkish for veiling.

I found that those who are indigenous to Cyprus used negative terminology to distinguish themselves from mainland Turks, using phrases such as “less civilised” and “less educated” to refer to them (see Chapter 7). These narratives are common in everyday life in Northern Cyprus, among people of all ages. Such discourses are also apparent in regard to anti-migrant sentiment, where moral judgements are made about immigrants as undeserving citizens (see Anderson, 2013; Tyler, 2013). These observations became the starting point for my development of a series of sociological questions about nationalism and identity formation in Cyprus.

My experiences in Cyprus also pointed to something that went beyond the issue of how the notion of Cypriotness emerges in relation to mainland Turks. The increasing xenophobia in Turkish Cypriot society towards mainland Turks cannot be ignored. However, during my annual visits to Cyprus, I noted a resurgence of interest in Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals, and I observed that cultural practices had become a means of emphasising differences between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks.

Even though I was able to recognise the growing distance between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks during my visits, it usually remained unspoken or a mere “whisper” in everyday life. For example, while walking among the traditional food and handicraft stalls at a cultural festival in Kalavac (see Chapter 6), I overheard a conversation between two Turkish Cypriot men who seemed to be friends:

It’s a beautiful day, it’s a beautiful festival, isn’t it?

Yes, definitely, it is, Ali. They need to organise more festivals like this, to help protect our local culture!
Well said. Protect our culture, protect it from outsiders!

“Outsiders” usually refers to mainland Turks. I decided to join the conversation. “Outsiders? What do you think about them?” I asked Ali, who seemed to have strong opinions on the subject.

“I don’t think anything. What do you want me to think?” he replied.

I was not expecting such a short, sharp answer from him. His response was defensive. I could see that he was holding back his opinions. He might have thought that I had mainland Turks in my immediate family, or that I was working for the government (as a journalist). I decided to reveal my identity as a researcher and my research goals. “I don’t work for the government, I am a Turkish Cypriot student and I am trying to collect data for my thesis. It’s totally acceptable if you don’t want to answer my question,” I said to him.

After I told him this, he seemed quite interested in my research, and even started asking me questions. He was sitting on a chair next to his stall. After a short conversation about my PhD research, he asked me quietly, looking left and right to make sure no one could hear him: “Do you see this crowd of Turkish Cypriots here? Your future children may not be able to see it. We are at the point of extinction. I am sure you already know this.”

Ali’s response came as no surprise to me; nor did his way of thinking. He was not happy. This was what I think of as the “silent scream” of a fifty-seven-year-old Turkish Cypriot man who had been the subject of social, political and economic restructuring since the division of Cyprus (see Chapter 7). It is important to bear in mind that this narrative of ethnic and cultural threat and endangerment did not necessarily represent Ali’s whole experience. What Ali’s narrative highlighted for me was the production of cultural identity as a hybrid object that moves through various sites of meaning-making, including local experiences of sensuality and affect (the things that can be “seen” from Ali’s stall), as well as nationalist and xenophobic discourses.

However, it was my observation at Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals that cultural practices had become a means for emphasising not only distinctions between
Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, but also similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (see Chapter 6). I noticed that Turkish Cypriots would increasingly claim a common cultural identity (Cypriotness) by constantly emphasising cultural similarities (such as food, language, lifestyle, mentality, music, traditional dance) between themselves and Greek Cypriots, or by focusing on how Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots are all the “same”. To put it differently, they were “bridging ties” – developing “ties across ethnic boundaries” (Moroşanu, 2013, p.2177) with Greek Cypriots, on the basis of cultural commonalities (see Chapter 6). Such observations led me to reengage with theoretical debates on identity formation in Northern Cyprus. I soon discovered that little research had been conducted on how Turkish Cypriot identity is produced in relation to Greek Cypriots (see Hamit, 2008).

In this thesis, I am interested in what Hall (2007, p.150) calls the “multicultural question”. How do Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks produce and negotiate difference in post-postcolonial Northern Cyprus? Moving the discussion of identity formation in Cyprus forwards by examining Cypriotness in relation to Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks and with reference to post-postcolonial conjunctures, I provide an in-depth qualitative exploration of the relationships between the notion of Cypriotness and the issues of resistance (Chapter 5), inclusion (Chapter 6) and exclusion (Chapter 7) as they are manifested in post-postcolonial narratives.

Moreover, after reading the literature on nationalism, identity and identifications in Northern Cyprus, I found that although the question of identity and its socio-historical basis in Turkish Cypriot literature (novels, poetry and plays) has received academic attention (see Yaşın, 1990), there is a lack of research on the relationship between Turkish Cypriot identity and Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals. As Hall (2007, p.152) argues, in order to understand “how difference operates inside people’s heads, you have to go to art, you have to go to culture – to where people imagine, where they fantasise, where they symbolise”. Following Hall’s argument, this study attends to Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals as sites that encapsulate wider shifts of cultural identification. I argue that such an examination is necessary in order to understand how cultural distinctions
(between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks) and cultural similarities (between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots) are produced.

My research questions are as follows:

• How do Turkish Cypriots, give meaning to their identity?

• Why do Turkish Cypriots resist nationalist themes and material and sensual practices which are interlinked with nationalist discourse?

• Why is there a desire to bridge difference with Greek Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot Society? Why is there a shift from an exclusionary past to an inclusionary present?

• In what ways are mainland Turks categorised as Other, and what do such practices of Othering achieve?

• Why is there a wave of interest in Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals?

In empirical terms, the study uses mixed-method ethnography, combining sensory ethnography with auto-ethnography. The findings were produced through participant observation (over forty months, from June 2014 to October 2017), semi-structured interviews and informal/conversational interviews. I conducted twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with Turkish Cypriots in different cities in Northern Cyprus (see Chapter 4). The interviewees were chosen during observations at cultural festivals, weddings, cafes and other community gatherings, where spontaneous and insightful informal/conversational interviews also took place. Combining sensory ethnography and auto-ethnography, as well as using qualitative interview methods, allowed me to examine the research questions in greater depth.

I have taken ideas from postcolonial theory, sociology, memory studies and cultural studies. Drawing on a range of theoretical traditions allowed me to investigate the complex relationships between the notion of Cypriotness and the three central themes – resistance, inclusion and exclusion – as manifested in post-
postcolonial discourse. It is important to highlight that Northern Cyprus was once colonised by Britain and is now allegedly dominated by an Eastern power. Thus, my engagement with postcolonial theory – as a way of analysing the living of post-postcolonial dynamics (such as resistance, cultural difference, racism, identity and identifications) – is significant, in that it has allowed me to go beyond postcolonialism and to contribute to discussions in postcolonial studies.

1.2. Thesis Outline

Chapter 2 is divided into two sections. The first part gives a historical background to the evolution of Turkish Cypriot identity in order to contextualise how national identity has shifted with shifting socio-political circumstances and contexts in Cyprus. I present key arguments and theoretical perspectives on the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism that are relevant to the case of Cyprus. I examine ideas about ethnicity within the context of three conceptions of ethnic identity formation: primordialist, instrumentalist, and constructionist/postmodernist concepts. I approach these different theoretical models as partial, and as representing diverse aspects of the cultural production that can be drawn on in identity narratives, creating different “realities” that might (or might not) cohere. I discuss how ethnic consciousness in Cyprus (before the division of the island) was partly promoted by colonial policies and practices, and partly constructed and reconstructed in reaction to changing circumstances. Drawing from literature on nationalism in the context of contemporary sociological theories (primordialism, ethnosymbolism and modernism), I also explain how ethnic consciousness developed into ethnic nationalism, which resulted in ethnic violence and the division of the island in 1974. The second part reviews the key literature by exploring the decline of ethnic nationalism after the division of the island, and the rise of a new form of identity, Cypriotness, as a result of changing political, educational, social and economic structures. I demonstrate how my study builds on previous research on identity (Cypriotness) and also makes an important new contribution to this literature by exploring the politics of identity in relation to the post-postcolonialism of Cyprus.
Chapter 3 describes the conceptual/theoretical framework of the research. I start by introducing and defining the terms “post-postcolonialism” and “post-postcolonial discourse”. By engaging with Foucault’s theorisation of discourse and selected debates over Said’s Orientalism, I define the main features of post-postcolonial discourse and the ways in which it produces its subjects. I then draw on Bhabha’s concepts of cultural hybridity and the third space to provide a framework for a better understanding of post-postcolonialism in Northern Cyprus.

Chapter 4 outlines the methodological framework that I have adopted. I begin by explaining my mixed-method approach to ethnography, which uses autoethnography and sensory ethnography. I subsequently reflect on my own positionality in regard to my fieldwork and its methodology, and I examine various problems related to my research practice. Following a description of the different methods used, I conclude by discussing the ethical challenges of the research. These challenges include those that arise with any research on “sensitive topics” (Lee, 1993), such as varying types and levels of topical threat, and the difficulties of obtaining consent during participant observation. These considerations contribute to the development of a “live sociology” (Back and Puwar, 2012) that uses experimental methods and attentiveness to marginalised narratives to capture the complexities and ambivalences of the social world, and to connect with issues that are of public concern.

Chapter 5 comprises the first of my data analysis chapters. It investigates the politics of post-postcolonial resistance by exploring the stories presented in history textbooks, commemorative ceremonies, and visits to memorials and museums in Northern Cyprus. The chapter discusses how Turkish Cypriots can resist nationalist themes, and material and sensual practices that are interlinked with nationalist discourse. I start with a discussion of how ethnonationalist parties in Northern Cyprus, especially between 1974 and 2003, propagated nationalist discourse in order to generate a national identity based on Turkish nationalism. Through an examination of my participants’ stories, I then consider the ways in which younger Turkish Cypriots resist nationalist narratives and discursive practices, and how they put forward an opposing (post-postcolonial) discourse based on a hybridised notion of Cypriotness. Overall, the chapter investigates the tensions between official discourse and post-postcolonial discourse, providing
novel ways of thinking and conceptualising resistance as it has been explored by scholars in postcolonial studies.

Chapter 6 analyses the politics of post-postcolonial inclusion. Why is there a desire to bridge difference with Greek Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot society? Why is there a transition in participants’ narratives, from an exclusive past to an inclusive present? Why is there a wave of interest in Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals? I start by looking at contradictory recollections about the past and about Greek Cypriots, emphasising the distinction between individual and collective memory. Through observations, conversations and images, I then explore the politics of Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals and the ways in which Turkish Cypriots are bridging difference with Greek Cypriots. Overall, I argue that at the core of post-postcolonial inclusion lies a collective position of inferiority that Turkish Cypriots take up in relation to Greek Cypriots. I also suggest that multiculturalism or multicultural tolerance, as propagated by Turkish Cypriots, is related to Turkish Cypriots’ desire to integrate with the Western world.

Chapter 7 concentrates on the themes of post-postcolonial resistance and post-postcolonial exclusion, with a focus on infrastructures. Building on the arguments developed in Chapters 5 and 6, I discuss the political, social and economic factors that have given rise in Turkish Cypriot society to the discourse that Turkey controls Northern Cyprus. With a focus on stories about Turkey’s funding of infrastructural development in Northern Cyprus, I then look at the ways in which Orientalist discourses inform readings of the physical environment. In Cyprus, such readings can unravel into judgements and comparisons between north and south. What were previously distinct types of value – cultural value, artistic value, monetary value – can become consolidated into a single measure of social progress or backwardness. I reveal that hostility towards mainland Turks and resistance to Turkey’s infrastructural developments in Cyprus is related to post-postcolonial melancholia, which is narrated through Turkish Cypriot relationships with the material environment. The chapter provides a new theorisation of postcolonial melancholia that recognises the role of the material environment as a psychosocial symbol of divisions on the island. It also contributes to discussions in postcolonial studies by suggesting that Orientalist discourse in Turkish Cypriot society – which was once colonised by the West, and is now supposedly colonised
by an Eastern power – may be produced from a position of in-betweenness: a position of simultaneous power and powerlessness.

Chapter 8, the final chapter, re-examines issues related to empiricism and summarises the thesis’s main findings. It considers the theoretical and empirical contributions and implications of the study, and suggests future avenues for related research that might build on my study.
CHAPTER 2: DEBATES ON NATIONALISM AND IDENTITY FORMATION IN CYPRUS

This chapter considers the major debates, arguments and issues pertaining to nationalism, identity and identifications in Cyprus, which have been fundamental in the formulation of my research questions and the development of my sociologically grounded arguments. The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explores the historical evolution of Turkish Cypriot identity by presenting key arguments and theoretical perspectives underpinning concepts of ethnicity and nationalism that are relevant to the case of Cyprus. The second section gives an overview of key literature on the politics of Cypriotness by exploring previous discussions regarding the decline of ethnic nationalism after the division of the island and the rise of a new identity (Cypriotness) as a result of changing political, educational, social and economic structures. I demonstrate the gap in previous research on Turkish Cypriot identity, and I outline how my study critically engages with and builds on these discussions, as well as the contribution it makes to the literature by examining Cypriotness in relation to post-postcolonialism in Cyprus.

It is important to note that the chapter presents scholarly literature and research on the historical conflict in Cyprus that has been written mainly by Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot authors. As such, the literature presented is from a located positionality; the product not only of disciplinary traditions and methodologies but also the authors' respective social and cultural positioning within Cypriot society and its unfolding politics. In this regard the current body of literature and research elucidate a myriad of different ideas, arguments and locations that have informed and constitute the parameters of my sociological research and analysis on the formation of Turkish Cypriot identity.
2.1. Theories of Ethnicity and Nationalism

Ethnicity and nationalism have been significant forces shaping the structure and stability of modern states (Brass, 1991). As I discuss below, ethnicity and nationalism have also been important influences on national identity formation in Cyprus. In this section, I examine the concept of ethnicity within the context of three broad theories of ethnic identity formation: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism/postmodernism. Emphasis is placed on the ancestral ties of both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, and on the ability of political actors to promote ethnic consciousness on the island.

2.1.1. Defining Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a contested term (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). The word “ethnic” is taken from the ancient Greek word *ethnos*, which signified several distinct individuals acting and living collectively. Ethnicity may be defined as the way in which people position themselves – and see themselves positioned by others – in association with various social structures due to their cultural roots. “Ethnic origin” signifies that one has been socialised within an ethnic group, or that one’s ancestors were part of that group. The social structures in question might comprise an individual’s general ethnic society or community, or alternative ethnic communities, societies and divisions, or a mix of all of these. An important point to note is that “ethnicity” has often been used to signify cultural differences. Culture is a significant aspect of ethnicity. It refers not only to clear traditions, convictions, language and food, but also encompasses participation in and identification with the unique experience of a group, which in turn provides a sense of belonging and identity (Jenkins, 1997).

Marxist and modernist theories predict that ethnicity will fade and even vanish as a result of industrialisation and modernity. However, in reality, the importance of ethnicity has been on the rise, and ethnic conflict has intensified throughout the world at certain times and places. For instance, during the early 90’s Yugoslavia was torn apart by a civil war underpinned by violence and conflict between the disparate ethnic groups of Yugoslavia. This conflict subsequently led to the ongoing war in Bosnia, a war that did not end until 1995. “Soviet” identity failed
to overcome ethnic divisions in the former Soviet Union. Moreover, ethnic conflict between Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in India has intensified, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is still ongoing. Similarly, in Cyprus, the importance of ethnicity is undeniable. Ethnic conflict between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities resulted in intercommunal violence and the division of the island in 1974.

What is the basis of ethnicity? How can we understand its emergence and persistence? In academic scholarship, three basic theories of ethnicity – primordialist, instrumentalist and postmodernist/constructionist – attempt to answer these fundamental questions. For the purposes of this thesis, I will now briefly consider these theories and situate them within the context of Cyprus.

2.1.1.1. Primordialism

Primordialism was the earliest theoretical approach to ethnicity, and was commonly used until the mid-1970s. According to Isajiw (1993, p.2), who offers a useful survey:

The primordialist approach is the oldest in sociological and anthropological literature. It argues that ethnicity is something given, ascribed at birth, deriving from the kin-and-clan-structure of human society, and hence something more or less fixed and permanent.

Three factors are integral to this conception, all of which involve forms of essentialism. Firstly, ethnic identity is a given identity that is passed on from one’s forebears. Secondly, ethnic identity is fixed and permanent. Thirdly, history and common descent lays the foundation for ethnic identity formation. Thus, biological, cultural and historical roots connect individuals ethnically (Jenkins, 1996; Yang, 2000). Criticisms of this conception include the observation that it treats ethnic identity is a naturalistic entity and does not acknowledge change. Other criticisms include its failure to accept that people may not regard some symbolic aspects – such as language, convention and history – as significant, and
hence may not pass them on to the next generation. Critics also argue that colonisation and intermarriage weaken the notion that ethnic identity is either static or distinct (Jenkins, 1997; Hutchinson and Smith, 1996).

2.1.1.2. Instrumentalism

Instrumentalism, on the other hand, conceptualises ethnicity as a device or tactical instrument used to gain access to facilities, resources and benefits that would not be accessible if an individual did not assert a specific ethnic identity. The basic notion in this approach is that “ethnicity and race is based on people’s symbolic and historical memory” (Aju and Orugun, 2014, p.49; see also Malesevic, 2004). Proponents of instrumentalism perceive ethnicity as something that one may construct, alter or influence in order to acquire specific political or economic advantages (Eriksen, 2002). Instrumentalists also assert that, like nationality and class, ethnic identity may be employed as a device for political mobilisation (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). Critics of this theory see it as overemphasising the influential and strategic employment of ethnicity. They assert that ethnicity, unlike other political affiliations, is not something that one can freely choose; it is controlled by society. Critics thus draw attention to the characteristically social nature of ethnic identity. Furthermore, instrumentalism fails to account for the psychological and affective features of ethnicity that people might regard as significant, such as emotional contentment, psychological satisfaction and social connection (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996).

2.1.1.3. Constructivism/Postmodernism

Finally, postmodernist/constructionist theories present ethnicity as a multidimensional and vibrant identity that is fabricated, refabricated and occasionally dismantled over time (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998). Constructionists have advanced three main arguments: firstly, ethnicity is created and socially constructed; secondly, ethnicity and ethnic boundaries are not fixed, but are flexible and circumstantial (Jenkins, 1997; see also Nagel, 1994, p.152); lastly, ethnic identifications are determined and constructed by people within particular
social and historical frameworks. Ethnicity is therefore a reaction to the changing social environment.

Barth (1969) asserts that ethnic boundaries are sustained when people increase communications with those inside their own ethnic groups and reduce their interactions with other ethnic groups. He also argues that ethnicity is founded on one’s view of “us” and “them”, rather than on any impartial actuality available in the real world. These ethnic boundaries between groups are indicated by categories such as religious affiliation, language and ritual. Since the latter may alter, boundaries between ethnicities are not static and fixed but subjective and circumstantial (Jenkins, 1997; see also Nagel, 1994, p.152).

Critics of constructionism argue that it tends to overlook ancestry. Ancestry is widely believed to be a fundamental aspect of ethnicity, without which individuals would not be able to claim particular ethnic identities. Opponents of constructionism also suggest that it pays inadequate attention to political, social and economic interests and their impact on ethnic identity formation.

Postmodernist theories focus more on nations and nationalism than on ethnicity, and will be explored in more detail further on.

2.1.2. Ethnicity in Cyprus

Drawing on Yang’s (2000) sociological perspective on ethnicity, I propose that an integrated approach that builds on useful aspects of all three theories is more relevant to the case of Cyprus, because there are three levels of ethnicity and ethnic identity formation in Cyprus. Yang (2000, p.48) suggests that ethnicity is constructed partly on the basis of common ancestry, and that the interests of ethnic groups and others (including outside forces) contribute to the determination of ethnic affiliations. Yang’s argument includes three particular propositions that are relevant to our understanding of ethnic identification in Cyprus: (1) ethnicity is partly ascribed, and partly passed on from one’s forebears; (2) the colonial policies and practices of the ruling group significantly promote ethnic consciousness and identity; (3) ethnicity is largely constructed by society in reaction to changing circumstances.
The case of Cyprus illustrates the importance of the belief in kinship as a factor in ethnic consciousness. During the colonial era, inhabitants of Cyprus identified themselves as belonging to Greece and Turkey, because of their belief that their ancestors had originated from those countries. As Loizides (2007, p.174) writes:

Starting from the late nineteenth century, perceptions of the Greek nation as a perennial and organic entity across time captured the imagination of the Greek Cypriots […]. They increasingly saw their destinies as linked to the ancient Hellenic past of Cyprus and their future to its revival through unification with Greece.

Similarly, Kizilyurek (2002, p.75) argues that the rise of an independent Greek state after the 1821 Greek War of Independence was a turning point in Cyprus’s history, and that it led to the emergence of ethnonationalist consciousness among the Orthodox Christians of Cyprus. A memorandum signed by the archbishop, bishops and a number of other Orthodox Christians in Cyprus was sent to the Greek governor, demanding the unification of Cyprus with the newly established Hellenic state (Kizilyurek, 2002). The Muslim community of Cyprus, on the other hand, had a strong sense of loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and were anxious about these “separatist nationalist movements”, which resulted in resentment between the Muslim and Orthodox elites on the island (Kadioglu, 2010, p.67). Although Turkish Cypriots also drew inspiration from “motherland nationalism”, Loizides (2007, p.174) argues that “nationalism has been driven by reaction to Greek Cypriot demands, insecurity, and fears of marginalization”:

For instance, Rauf Denktas has repeatedly used historical analogies to argue how similar the history of Crete is to the history of Cyprus and to claim that Turkish Cypriots might face the same fate as their co-ethnics in Crete and the Balkans. (Loizides, 2007, p.174)

Although ethnic identifications were partly dependent on ancestral ties or presumed ancestry among both Turkish and Greek Cypriots, British colonial
policies and practices also made significant contributions to ethnic consciousness in Cyprus. For instance, during the first years of the colonial era, the British administration prepared the first constitution of Cyprus. This established a legislative council comprising both Greeks and Turks, whose decisions the British governor could overwrite by decree. A new justice and taxation system and legal equality among the inhabitants were introduced, and the privileges accorded to certain people under the traditional Ottoman system were eliminated. The legislative council represented a significant change for Muslim Turks and Orthodox Christians, since unlike the Ottoman system it did not comprise equal numbers of members from each community (Nevzat, 2005). The British administration selected members of the legislative council to represent the island’s communities in proportion with their share of the overall population: the council therefore consisted of three Muslim Turks, nine Christian Orthodox Greeks, and six British representatives. The replacement of the traditional Ottoman system with this modern British administrative and institutional structure was a transformation for Cypriots. This practice not only caused anger against the British administration within the Orthodox Christian community, but as Pollis (1998, p.93) argues, it also strengthened the creation of different ethnic identities between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots by “pitting each group against the other in competition for resources and power”.

Furthermore, a few decades later, in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire sided with Germany in World War I, the 1878 Convention was annulled by the British authorities, and Cyprus was formally annexed to the British crown that same year. The Ottoman alliance with Germany was regarded as a declaration of war by the British administration, and in 1915 the British prime minister offered Cyprus to Greece. Although the offer was turned down because Greece “preferred to stay neutral”, Kadioglu (2010, p.8) argues that this event heightened ethnic consciousness and fostered nationalism in Cyprus. As Kadioglu (2010, p.8) suggests:

Even if the island stayed under the rule of Britain, this attempt of the British authorities enabled the idea of a future unification of Cyprus with Greece to be perceived as more of a possibility by the Orthodox Christians and fostered the nationalist
tendencies among them. Muslim inhabitants of the island, on the other hand, felt threatened and a public unrest burst out which led to the massive migrations of Muslims to Anatolia.

It was under these circumstances that the sense of a hostile Other began to develop among Turkish and Greek communities on the island. Towards the end of the British era, British administrators wanted to take advantage of this division between the two communities (Stavrinides, 1999). British administrators employed Turks on the island as police officers to assist them in controlling the National Organisation of Cyprus Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston, EOKA), the Greek Cypriot nationalist organisation that fought to end British rule and unite the island with Greece. Following Britain’s proposals for self-determination, anxiety and insecurity of potential marginalisation among Turkish Cypriots increased, which led them in turn to organise for struggle. In 1957 they formed the Turkish Defence Organisation (Turk Mukavemet Teskilati, TMT) to fight EOKA and achieve their goal of taksim (Kizilyurek, 2002). Both the formation of TMT and the plan for partition indicated that Turkish Cypriots were determined to mobilise to promote a nationalist programme.

Thus, according to Tocci (2002), Turkish Cypriots developed ethnic consciousness and a stronger appetite for nationalism due to their anxiety at the prospect of becoming a minority in a state incorporated into Greece. It is argued that the oppression of Muslims – both in Crete post-unification with Greece (1915) and at the time of the invasion of Izmir in Turkey (1919) – also played a critical role in creating that anxiety (Sahin, 2008; Nevzat, 2005; Kizilyurek 2002). Turkish Cypriots had fresh memories of these two events, and they believed that joining Greece would mean the end of their community. Reviving these memories and relating them to the Greek Cypriot movement for enosis created an enemy for Turkish Cypriots to come together and struggle against.

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9 Following World War II, Greek Cypriots “felt eligible for freedom and self-government” (Loizides, 2007), and in April 1955 they established EOKA to wage armed anti-colonial struggle against the British.

10 The word “taksim” or “partition” refers to the concept of the division of Cyprus (see Nevzat, 2005). Such partition was the aim of Turkish Cypriots who wished to see Cyprus divided into Turkish and Greek portions.
Nevzat (2005) points out that the development of ethnic consciousness among Turkish Cypriots was also fostered by the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, and by the Kemalist movement in Turkey, which aimed to modernise the country:

The ideology and reforms of the Republic were increasingly widely adopted in Cyprus (on occasion with the sanction of the Colonial authorities, but often in the face of their opposition), and Turkish nationalist sentiment grew to unprecedented highs, paralleling, sometimes perhaps even exceeding trends in what continued to be referred to as the “motherland”. The date of the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey, the 29th of October 1923, soon came to be celebrated in Cyprus by the Turks, for whom it is still today a public holiday. Likewise other national days proclaimed in Turkey were also celebrated. (Nevzat, 2005, p.258)

The young generation of Turkish Cypriots were influenced by Kemalist reforms at that time; they followed Atatürk’s modernisation project and became critical of the British administration (Nevzat, 2005). They voluntarily adopted Atatürk’s reforms, such as the use of the Latin alphabet rather than Arabic script, secularisation, and the wearing of Western-style hats instead of the fez, although these reforms were not compulsory for the Turkish Cypriot community. According to Bryant (2004, p.233), this was a sign of Turkish Cypriots’ orientation towards their “brothers” in Turkey. Thus, they identified with the Turkish nation after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, which encouraged the construction of a new identity: instead of being referred to as the Muslims of Cyprus, they were now identified as the Turks of Cyprus (Nevzat, 2005).

Thus, an integrated approach to the theorisation of ethnicity can explain the development of ethnic consciousness in Cyprus. However, it certainly cannot explain how ethnic consciousness developed into ethnic nationalism and a secessionist movement. Therefore, I now turn to theories of nationalism, again highlighting what seems relevant to the case of Cyprus. I use nationalism as a
theoretical framework to elucidate how ethnic tensions led to further conflict between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.

2.1.3. Nationalism in Cyprus

It is difficult to approach the study nationalism under one general theory. There are various different conceptions, including within classical and contemporary sociological theories such as primordialism, ethnosymbolism and modernism. Although classical sociological theories discuss nationalism in an abstract way, modern approaches focus on the roots and characteristics of nationalism. The primordialist view is that nationalism is heavily rooted in the relational character of human life. According to primordialism, nations are an ancient, essential and natural part of social organisation. Scholars who take this position claim that there are major continuities between ancient and contemporary ideas about the nation, which span different historical eras and geographical regions. Ethnosymbolists emphasise the role of pre-existing ethnic ties, such as symbols, traditions, values and myths, in the formation and continuation of modern nations. Ethnosymbolists such as Anthony D. Smith believe that these pre-existing ethnic ties are essential for the understanding of nationalism (Özkırımlı, 2000). Modernists, on the other hand, argue that one of the key sociological features of nationalism is that it is inextricably linked to modernity, and that the nation-state is a modern institution. They believe that ethnicity gained significance with modernity; therefore nations do not simply grow out of ethnic groups (Özkırımlı, 2005).

My approach is informed by contemporary sociological theories that posit nationalism as a product of modernism (Gellner, 1964; Anderson, 1995) and ethnosymbolism (Smith, 2001). In the following sections, I examine these theories in more detail, as they provide an important basis for understanding the emergence and development of nationalism in Cyprus.

2.1.3.1. Modernism

In leading modernist Ernest Gellner’s work, primacy is given to industrialisation in the explanation for the origin and maintenance of nationalism. Gellner (1964)
argues that ethnicity cannot be regarded as the direct cause of nationalism as nationalism can only emerge as a product of an industrial society or nation. For Gellner, nationalism and the transformation of human societies are unavoidable outcomes of modernisation, and specifically of industrialisation. In his *Thought and Change*, Gellner (1964) stresses that nationalism must be comprehended within the setting of industrialisation, the opposition between the classes through industrialised stratification, and the simultaneous impacts of education and language. The industrialisation process, for him, not only undermined customary social structures, but also gave power to elements of culture, particularly to communication. The individual’s identity was no longer characterised in relation to his or her position in the stratified social structure, but rather in relation to culture. The sorts of educated and civilised individual that industrialisation necessitated could be provided by the nation-state through language and the educational system. Thus, the Gellnerian model of nationalism strongly emphasises that nationalism has its roots in the new industrial order; before this era we cannot talk about nationalism, because political units were not formed in relation to cultural boundaries.

By contrast, in his *Imagined Communities*, key theorist Benedict Anderson (1995, p.49) defines the nation as “an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign”. The nation is *imagined* in the sense that individuals in a nation do not and will not know most of their fellow nationals, “yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1995, p.49). For Anderson (1995, p.50), the nation is a *community* because, “regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”; it is this unity that creates the pretext for people to be eager to die for their nation. Nations are also imagined as *limited*, because “even the largest of them” have boundaries that separate them from other nations (Anderson, 1995, p.50). Finally, Anderson (1995, p.50) maintains that nations are imagined as *sovereign* because “the concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.” Anderson’s central idea of the nation as imaginary can be applied to Greek Cypriots’ understanding of
themselves as part of Greece (the Hellenic nation), leading to their desire for union with Greece (enosis).

Anderson’s work has also been critical in demonstrating how external factors such as media, language and shared culture can strengthen the shared image of an imagined community – as is the case in Cyprus. The reconstructed conception of Greek Cypriots as part of the Hellenic state and Turkish Cypriots as part of newly established Turkey was greatly aided by the media, language and education. Between 1878 and 1908, there were forty-five newspapers published on the island: twenty-eight in Greek, eleven in English and six in Turkish (Cobham, (1969 [1908]). People became aware of other members of their community through print media. Although Eric Hobsbawm (1992) contends that elites forge nations through “invented tradition”, for Anderson, elites build nations through the power of print and its purveyors. It has been argued that this was also the case in Cyprus, where politicians took advantage of newspapers to control public opinion (Bryant, 2004).

Furthermore, studies argue that language was another factor that helped to gel and disseminate a national consciousness among Cypriots, especially among the Greek Cypriot inhabitants of the island (see Kadioglu, 2010, p.91). As Kadioglu (2010, p.92) suggests:

The use of katharevousa enabled the Christian Orthodox inhabitants to feel deeper attachments to their co-religionists in Greece and created Hellenic consciousness, while distancing them further away from other cultural attachments related to island.

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11 In The Invention of Tradition, Hobsbawm (1992, p.1) posits that “invented tradition” encompasses “both ‘traditions’ actually invented, constructed and formally instituted and those emerging in a less easily traceable manner with a brief and dateable period – a matter of a few years perhaps – and establishing themselves with great rapidity”. Invented traditions, as Hobsbawm (1992, p.1) suggests, are “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past”. They aim to create and solidify a connection to a historical past, but this connection is at best tenuous. Thus, as Hobsbawm (1992, p.2) further argues, invented traditions “are responses to novel situations which take the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own past by quasi-obligatory repetition”. 
English was the main language recognised by the British administration. Later, katharevousa\(^{12}\) for Orthodox Christians and Ottoman Turkish for Muslims were recognised respectively as the main languages, in response to local demands (Kadioglu, 2010, p.91). Although the languages spoken by Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were different, they were not always separate. Many Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek as their first language, as they were isolated from their ethnic communities due to poor transport and communication. The dialects spoken in Cyprus were also different from the official forms of katharevousa and Ottoman Turkish. The Greek spoken by Greek Cypriots was very different from the language used in Greece. As for the Turkish Cypriot dialect, although it was similar to dialects spoken in Anatolia, there were also differences (Bryant, 2004).

Cypriot studies have also found that a change in the curriculum helped to disseminate nationalism after 1925 (Bryant, 2004; Kadioglu, 2010). Under Ottoman rule, education in Muslim Turkish schools had mainly focused on religion, and the teachers had mostly been religious leaders; schools attended by Orthodox Greeks, on the other hand, had focused on national issues (Kizilyurek, 1983). Even though the British authorities endeavoured to introduce English as the medium of instruction in Cyprus when they first arrived, they were confronted with solid opposition from both Orthodox and Muslim religious officials (Bryant, 2004). The negative responses of local people, concern about offending the Ottomans, and the restricted budget allocated by the British Treasury did not permit British administrators to make any noteworthy improvements to the education system (Kadioglu, 2010). In the early period of the British administration, the educators in these schools continued to be Cypriot Orthodox Christian priests and Cypriot hodjas (Islamic clergy), who served religious educational functions (Kadioglu, 2010). Nevertheless, in later years, thanks to the impact of nationalist beliefs on both groups, the education system used teachers and books brought in from Greece and Turkey, in order to teach students in their own languages. In this sense, education and schools became the tools of nationalist projects. As Kadioglu (2010, p.7) suggests:

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\(^{12}\) *Katharevousa* is a form of the Greek language developed during the early nineteenth century (see Kadioglu, 2010).
The British preference of not investing in the area of education and leaving the administration of the schools to local boards led to the creation of antagonistic nationalist understandings between the two groups. Since the local boards were in charge of the schools, the British authorities did not take any measures about the usage of Greek and Turkish flags in the respective community schools, which was a practice that showed the rise of two opposing nationalisms in the island.

Consequently, according to Kadioglu (2010), it is no surprise that nationalism was reinforced among both Orthodox Christians and Muslim Turks of the island through education.

2.1.3.2. Ethnosymbolism

Modernism has attracted considerable criticism from proponents of ethnosymbolism. A major criticism is that modernism tends to downplay ethnicities. In contrast, ethnosymbolism regards ethnicity and community as crucial to the formation of nations and nationalism – and this has certainly been the case in Cyprus. Here I draw upon Anthony Smith’s (2001) ethnosymbolist approach to nationalism, which provides helpful insights for the study of Cyprus.

Anthony Smith’s ethnosymbolist approach is an example of the culturalist or ethnicist school of thought that emphasises the significance of cultural factors (symbols, myths, values and traditions) in the formation and continuity of nations and nationalism. Smith (2001, p.12) emphasises the importance of contemplating social and cultural patterns over the long run (la longue durée) in order to place the analysis of the rise of nations and nationalism “within a framework of earlier collective cultural identities, and especially of ethnic communities”. Thus, Smith’s approach to the investigation of nations and nationalism requires consideration of the nature of ethnic communities (in his term, ethnies) and nations, and their symbolic elements. For Smith, ethnies and nations have a number of shared and unshared attributes. They both have collective names, common origins and descent, and sets of myths. What makes ethnies different is that they have only some common cultural elements, such as customs, language and religion; unlike
nations, they do not have a national history. *Ethnies* have existed since ancient and medieval times; they include a sense of solidarity among most members of the community, a common “homeland” or an association with an ancient homeland, and some shared historical memories of things experienced together (Smith, 1986). Thus, ethnic communities are bonded together by “the sense of continuity, shared memory and collective destiny, i.e. by lines of cultural affinity embodied in myths, memories, symbols and values retained by a given cultural unit of population” (Smith, 1991, p. 29). Smith’s emphasis on the *long durée* and the existence of *ethnies* in ancient times is certainly useful for contextualising the case of Greek Cypriots, who view themselves as having a common ancient history that goes back 3,000 years (Peristianis, 2008).

Furthermore, Smith’s work provides a theoretical basis for understanding how ethnic consciousness can develop into ethnic nationalism and secessionist movements, which again applies to the Cyprus case (Smith, 2008, p. 49). In Smith’s (1991, p. 73) terms, nationalism is “an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’”. Smith (1991, p. 126) states that nationalism embodies the politicisation and territorialisation of a prior ethnocentric sentiment and is marked by an ambition for sovereignty for a cultural/ethnic group. In the case of Cyprus, for instance, Greek Cypriots imagined themselves to be part of the Hellenic nation, and so an ideological enosis movement was established to end British colonisation and unite the island with “motherland” Greece. Drawing on Smith’s work, it can be argued that this mobilisation and nationalist movement had two goals: the expulsion of colonial rulers, and unification with Greece.

Thus, it was not only Britain’s colonial strategies but also the nationalist goals and policies of community leaders that encouraged the development of ethnic nationalism (Kizilyurek, 1988). For instance, the newly founded Republic of Cyprus (1960) was seen as an obstacle to the agendas of enosis (for Greek Cypriot nationalists) and *taksim* (for Turkish Cypriot nationalists) (Landis and Albert, 2012). In 1959, the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers agreed to negotiate, and they met in Zurich to discuss three documents: (1) the basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus, (2) a draft treaty of guarantee and, (3) a draft treaty of
alliance (see Hoffmeister, 2006). Next, the Greek foreign minister Averoff and the Turkish foreign minister Zorlu met at a conference in London and drafted the basic articles of the constitution. According to the Zurich-London agreements, “Cyprus would be an independent state and guaranteed by Britain, Greece and Turkey” (Goktepe, 2013, p.111). The basic amendments to the constitution are summarised as follows:

The Republic was to have a presidential regime under a Greek president and a Turkish vice-president. Executive authority was vested in them, except for communal affairs, and they would have important powers of veto, reference back and recourse to a Constitutional Court. [...] The president and vice-president would have [a] ministerial council of Greeks and Turks in the ratio of 7:3. There would be separate Turkish municipalities in the five towns. Union with any other State and separatist independence were outlawed. (Reddaway, 2001, p.121–122)

The Greek Cypriot leader Makarios and the Turkish Cypriot leader Küçük were brought to London to sign the treaty, without alterations. After the Zurich and London agreements, on 16 August 1960, Cyprus was proclaimed an independent state, and eighty-two years of British rule on the island came to an end. Makarios and Küçük were elected president and vice-president. However, it was suggested that the new republic was not a nation; the Greeks and Turks of the island already imagined themselves as two different communities rather than one, due to their feelings of loyalty and attachment to their respective motherlands (Kadioglu, 2010). As Mirbagheri (2009) points out, the creation of the Cypriot flag and national anthem merely demonstrated this. Turkish Cypriots protested against the use in the Cypriot flag of the blue from the Greek flag, while Greek Cypriots protested against the use of the red from the Turkish flag. This is the reason why yellow and white were used in the Cypriot flag. It should also be noted that the two communities continued to wave Greek and Turkish flags, play the Greek and Turkish national anthems, and celebrate the national days of Turkey and Greece.

Stavrinides (1999) argues that Makarios never had any intention of cooperating with Küçük in a bicomunal state. It has been argued that for Makarios, the constitution was undemocratic, and Turkish Cypriots did not deserve the rights it
gave them because they were a minority (Uslu, 2003). For Küçük, on the other hand, both communities were equal and Turkish Cypriots’ right to not be oppressed by the majority was guaranteed by the constitution (Bryant, 2004). Within three years of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, tensions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in administrative affairs began to manifest (IBP, 2012, p.152). Accordingly, in 1963, Makarios set out to change the constitution “to resolve constitutional deadlocks” (IBP, 2012, p.152), and he proposed thirteen amendments. One of these proposals was to strip Turkish Cypriots of the right of veto. As Stavrinides (1999, p.61) suggests, the idea therefore emerged in the Turkish Cypriot community that “the demand for ‘reasonable’ amendments would be only the first step of reducing the Turkish community to the status of a mere minority unable to effectively control the will of the Greek majority.” Turkish Cypriot community representatives considered this an injustice and withdrew from parliament, encouraging Turkish Cypriots to move into enclaves.

In the meantime, violence and terrorism between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities developed into new and deadly forms. The tensions and violence between the communities continued from 1963 to 1974, ending on 20 July 1974 with the intervention of Turkey. For Bülent Ecevit, then Turkish Prime Minister, the intervention aimed to bring peace to Cyprus, not only for Turkish Cypriots but also for Greek Cypriots (Nesim and Oznur, 2012, p.28). This idea of bringing peace between Turkish and Greek Cypriots became a fulcrum within Turkish nationalist discourse during the early period of the division (Ramm, 2006, pp.526-7). For example, the ‘Peace Operation’ of 1974 aimed to liberate Turkish Cypriot people from ‘Greek terror’. Ramm (2006, p.526) notes how this operation “was welcomed by the Turkish Cypriot nationalist leadership, as it brought them nearer to their aim of partitioning the island (Taksim)”. According to Ramm (2006, p.526; see also Kizilyurek, 2002) the aim or partition “was accomplished with the Turkish military intervention and occupation in 1974 and the establishment of a separate Turkish Cypriot territory in the north”. However, as I demonstrate further in my empirical chapters, contemporary Turk Cypriots are constructing a post-postcolonial discourse which considers this old nationalist discourse to be
obsolete and at odds with the current collective needs and interests of modern Turkish Cypriot society.

Following the invasion, a large population was displaced, Greek Cypriots moving to the southern part of the island and Turkish Cypriots to the north to construct their imagined states (Hatay, 2009). In the north, all place names were converted to Turkish immediately (Hatay, 2009). As Hatay (2009, p.150) puts it: “the landscape was transformed into Turkish territory. Slogans like ‘how happy to say I’m a Turk’ and Turkish flags decorated the mountains and hills of north Cyprus.” The United Nations Buffer Zone, known as the Green Line, was established in 1974, dividing Cyprus and separating the communities (Papadakis, 2006). As I discuss in Chapter 3 and Chapter 7, Turkish Cypriots established the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983. However, TRNC is not recognised as a sovereign state by any inter-governmental organisation such as the United Nations; indeed Turkey is currently the only fully independent sovereign country to recognise TRNC as a self-governing state.

An analysis of recent discourses on the rise of ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflict under British rule is relevant for this research, as it provides a basis for understanding how social structures and processes produced different levels of attachment and loyalty to their motherland (Turkey) among Turkish Cypriots under British rule. However, what has been lacking in the preceding discussion is an analysis of how feelings of ethnic (or motherland) nationalism among Turkish Cypriots have shifted since the division of the island in 1974. The next section reviews the key literature, by applying a sociological lens to how ethnic nationalism has been in decline, since the division of the island, and how a new form of identity, Cypriotness, has risen in tandem with changing political, educational, social and economic structures.

2.2. Turkish Cypriot Identity After the Division of Cyprus

Identity – cultural, national, ethnic, religious – has been broadly hypothesized and scrutinized within a vast array of different disciplines including sociology, anthropology, psychology and cultural studies. The conceptual difficulties and dynamic nature of identity make it somewhat difficult to define. Hall et al. (1996,
p.3) posits that identity is a “too complex, too under-developed, and too little understood in contemporary social science to be definitively tested”. “Identity” may be described as the distinguishing nature that is part of any individual, or common to all participants of a specific social class or division. The phrase is drawn from the French word identité, which has its linguistic origins in the Latin noun identitas, -tatis, on its own a root of the Latin adjective idem signifying ‘the same’. The phrase is therefore relative in character, as it stresses the mutuality of an extent of similarity or oneness with others in a specific division or on a provided point.

It can be argued that most definitions of identity are similar inasmuch they all emphasise that: identity is founded on the ideas of similarity and difference; it is in a continuous state of change as a result of reciprocated interaction and exchange. In this context, Hall suggests that identity is “lodged in contingency” (Hall, 1996, p.3). Hall proposes that we need to fully and unambiguously acknowledge both the ‘impossibility’ and ‘necessity’ of identities as historical and social positions adopted by individuals as a conduit of politics (St Louis, 2009). According to Hall (1996, p.4):

Identities are … constituted within, not outside representation…. They arise from the narrativization of the self, but the necessarily fictional nature of this process in no way undermines its discursive, material or political effectivity, even if the belongingness, the ‘sutting into the story’ through which identities arise is, partly, in the imaginary (as well as symbolic) and therefore, always, partly constructed in fantasy, or at least within a fantasmatic field.

Emphasising the subjective, imaginary and malleable character of identity, Hall argues that identity may never comprise the steady point of reference for the self that it professes to be, and this is the impossibility of ethnic and racial identities. Furthermore, Hall suggests that identities represent and promote politics and governmental issues. In this sense, Hall argues that at our present historical conjuncture, identities have become strategically necessary (See St. Louis, 2009). In his article, On ‘the Necessity and the “Impossibility” of Identities’, which
assesses Hall’s work on identity and ethnicity, St Louis (2009, p.565) states that “the use of identity attempts to provide, amongst other things, narrative accounts for peoples’ arrival at the present through a past that is imaginatively reconstructed and dramatized”. In a way, identities ought to “provide a comforting resource to (re)stabilise individual and collective subjectivities” (St Louis, 2009, p.565). Within this scenario, it would seem then that “identities ought to function as a means to re-imagine and narrate histories, situate people within present, and open up political debate” (St Louis, 2009, p.569). Hall relates this positioning to the modality of difference and argues that identities “emerge within the play of specific modalities of power, and thus are more the product of the marking of difference and exclusion, than they are the sign of an identical, naturally-constituted unity – an “identity” in its traditional meaning” (Hall, 1996, p. 4). Additionally, Hall (1996, pp.4-5) observes that “it is only in relation to the ‘other’, the relation to what is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the positive meaning of any term - and thus its identity can be constructed”. Hall’s (1996) theorisation on identity is relevant to this study as it allows for a better understanding of the dynamics of Turkish Cypriot identity, which is in a continuous state of change and maps onto an exclusivist politics situated within the difference mode (see Ramm, 2006).

As I discussed in the first part of this chapter, during the British colonial years, the ethnic/national consciousness of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities was established from Turkish and Hellenic nationalisms and resulted in both groups viewing themselves as part of Greek and Turkish nations as opposed to a common Cypriot nation. After the colonial era, identity has been a contested issue for the indigenous Turkish Cypriots. An interesting area of work has developed in the sociological studies of nationalism and identity in Northern Cyprus, exploring how identity become a more challenging matter for the Turkish Cypriots after the division of the island (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005; Vural and Rustemli, 2006; Ramm, 2006; Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008; Hamit, 2009; Hatay, 2009; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a; Vural, 2012). These studies argued that although ethnic nationalism continued to shape the Turkish Cypriot society in the early years of the division, the level of attachment to Turkey among indigenous Turkish Cypriots has been in decline and a new form of identity, Turkish ‘Cypriotism’ or
‘Cypriotness’, has been on the rise. Paying attention to “the tentativeness, historicity, complexity, and social construction of identities in Cyprus”, Navaro-Yashin (2006, p.85), for instance, argues that:

The identities of Cypriots have changed and switched in complicated fashions historically, and "Turkish Cypriot" is a relatively new and contingent term for the designation of identity. This is the term commonly used by autochthonous Turkish Cypriots at present for self-identification. The term "Cypriot" (Kibrisli), without the ethnic reference point, is used even more widely. Identity constructs are employed situationally, of course. In the contemporary period, "Cypriots" signifies distinction from "people of Turkey" (Turkiyeliler), as settlers in northern Cyprus are called by Turkish Cypriots.

A key argument is that Turkish Cypriot identity is constructed and reconstructed in relation to the presence of mainland Turks and Turkey's ongoing political, economic, and military presence in Northern Cyprus (Christiansen, 2005; Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Ramm, 2006; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a; Hatay, 2009). For instance, Navaro-Yashin’s (2006) study focused on internal conflicts in Northern Cyprus. In her study, Navaro-Yashin explored the socio-political alignments and dynamics that emerged in North Cyprus post-1974, particularly regarding conflict between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. She concentrated on what she “deliberately” defines as the “political and social conflict between Turkish Cypriots who were autochthonous on the island and immigrants from Turkey who were invited to settle in Northern Cyprus by the "TRNC" regime”” (Navaro-Yashin, 2006, p.84). Navaro-Yashin (2006) argues that when she conducted her research on Northern Cyprus (at the end of the 1990s), the existential matter at the forefront of Turkish Cypriot consciousness was their experience of living alongside Turkish immigrants. These were immigrants who had migrated to Northern Cyprus as a result of Turkey’s and the TRNC’s population policies. As Navaro-Yashin (2006, p.86) writes, “paramount was the expression of a feeling of having been disturbed by settlers from Anatolia”.

Navaro-Yashin (2006, p.92; see also Hatay, 2005) delineates how the Turk population which migrated to Northern Cyprus from mainland Turkey are not
homogeneous; instead they have a “complex composition”:

Most settlers are in Cyprus because they had experienced difficulties, some social, some economic, some political, in Turkey. When they received promises of jobs, land, and free housing in northern Cyprus after 1974 under Turkey's population policies, they came with hopes of better prospects. Although they were categorized as "Turks" by policymakers, settlers are of diverse backgrounds-Laz (from Turkey's Black Sea region), Kurdish, Arabic, as well as Turkish. However, many settlers will identify as "Turkish" (at least officially).

However, Navaro-Yashin (2006, p.91) suggests that “in Turkish Cypriot representations, all immigrants from Turkey are lumped together, as if there were no internal social or cultural differentiation among people arriving in Northern Cyprus from Turkey”. For Navaro-Yashin (2006), under Turkish political and military control in Northern Cyprus post-1974, Turkish Cypriots and people from mainland Turkey have been put into a situation which is complex, contingent, and involves very specific power relations between these two groups. Thus, Navaro-Yashin (2006) makes the contention that “although Turkish Cypriots resort to their local cultural capital when speaking about people from Turkey, they do so through a feeling of resentment about Turkey's policies, whose practices are represented in the presence of settlers in northern Cyprus”. In this sense, according to Navaro-Yashin (2006; see also Hatay and Bryant, 2008a), Turkish Cypriot’s fear of political subordination under Turkey's rulership is symbolically expressed through emotionally loaded and charged ways of commenting on Turkish immigrants.

In a similar context, Ramm (2006, p.524) proposes that although “a unified conception of collective identity most Turkish Cypriots could agree on does not exist […] ‘identity’ has become a significant part of the political struggle” within the post-1974 Turkish Cypriot community. In his work, Ramm (2006, p.525) provides a nuanced historical account of how, after the division of the island, prevailing Turkish nationalism became increasingly problematic in Northern Cyprus by virtue other notions of identity (Cypriotness) “as a result of the growing discontent among the Turkish Cypriot inhabitants”. To elaborate, Ramm
As the unresolved status of northern Cyprus continued and the economic situation failed to improve substantially after 1974, feelings of discontent grew in the Turkish Cypriot community, whose vast majority had initially welcomed the arrival of Turkish troops as a relief from a life in extreme distress. International isolation, a volatile economy almost completely dependent on support from Turkey, Turkish dominance in many sectors of the society, massive immigration from Anatolia (see respective section), and few prospects of improvement made a growing number of Turkish Cypriots feel dissatisfied with their situation.

As such, various studies have emerged which illuminate how this increasing discontent also interconnects to several political, economic and social developments on the local, regional and international level (Ramm, 2006; Lacher and Kaymak, 2005; Hatay, 2009; Kizilyurek, 2018). As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 7, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) is an unrecognised state. Turkish Cypriots are exposed to international embargoes which makes them dependent on Turkey. Until the opening of the Green Line, the only way people and products could flow in and out of Northern Cyprus, for instance, was through Turkey. Turkey have had differing levels of political, financial and military authority in Northern Cyprus, so the ruling parties have been incapable of acquiring recognition of the TRNC. Thus, as Hatay (2009, p.152) points out, Turkish Cypriots experienced “an attempted and only partially successful state-building process”. As a corollary “the nationalist rhetoric of the right began to appear emptier” (Hatay, 2009, p.152).

Moreover, it has been suggested that the banking crisis in 2000 in Northern Cyprus - which led to the first mass demonstrations among those who lost their savings – led to further grievances among the Turkish Cypriots (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). This event was followed by the diminishing capacity of the TRNC to provide jobs to its citizens and frustration to the UBP regime and mainland Turk settlers in Northern Cyprus (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). In turn, Turkish Cypriots accused the settlers for taking their jobs, and increasing
unemployment and crime rates. After the financial crisis in Turkey in 2001, economy of the TRNC worsened and “accelerated the domestic discrediting of the political-economic foundations of the Turkish Cypriot state” (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, p.157). Consequently, a new anti-nationalist movement emerged within the society for self-determination, called ‘this country is ours’ (Ker-Lindsay and Faustmann, 2008, p.245). According to Lacher and Kaymak (2005, p.157) this indicated that Turkey’s control over Cyprus was no more accepted as protection but for its own benefits in anti-nationalist Turkish Cypriots eyes.

The opening of the Green Line in April 2003 is another significant development which led to further disgruntlement amongst Turkish Cypriot people along with ruptures within the political predominance of Turkish nationalism in the Turkish Cypriot society. With the opening of the crossings, Turkish Cypriots had the chance to see the other part of the island, to revisit the homes they had abandoned, family graves, and reunite with friends they had not met with since Cyprus’ division in 1974. This was the first time that the younger generation of Cypriots met with the ‘other’ community. Many Turkish Cypriots indigenous to the island began to find employment in what had been the Greek portion of the island and started utilizing their Republic of Cyprus citizenship rights: for example, accessing health services and Republic of Cyprus passports which in turn enabled indigenous Turkish Cypriots to emigrate to Europe without visas, leading to an increased sense of ‘Europeanness’ and European identity. More significantly, as my study demonstrates (see Chapter 6 and 7) the opening of the Green Line exposed Turkish Cypriot people to the westernization that has come to define the Greek side. As will also be explicated in my empirical chapters, this exposure has led to a collective inferiority complex amongst Turkish Cypriot people (see Chapter 6); insomuch they consider the Greek side to be more economically advanced and were seemingly envious towards their more European lifestyle and infrastructure. This envy often manifested in the form of post-postcolonial melancholia (see Chapter 7).

Relatively, it has been noted that one of the most significant sources of discontent among the Turkish Cypriots is related to the increasing number of mainland Turks in Cyprus (see Hatay, 2009; Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Ramm, 2006; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a; Christiansen, 2005). As Ramm (2006, p.534) notes, “the issue of
immigration from Turkey to Northern Cyprus and its demographic consequences constitutes one of the most sensitive topics on the political agenda in Cyprus. There has also been a “presumed lack of information concerning their numbers, especially those who are citizens” (Hatay, 2009, p.135). Navaro-Yashin (2006, p.94) expounds further on this point by suggesting:

Statistics are politically charged in Cyprus and no one is too sure about the population statistics of settlers against Turkish Cypriots because the censuses in northern Cyprus register all "Muslims" as "Turks," regardless of background. But many Turkish Cypriots feel that they have been outnumbered by the settlers.

It is argued that the increasing population of mainland Turks or “increasing incorporation in the culture of Turkey” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008, p.442) brought with itself a fear of loss of culture among Turkish Cypriot people. Research has noted that, under these circumstances, Turkish Cypriots have developed a longing for the past, for more culturally homogenous Turkish Cypriot society and a movement for a return to the good old days (Bryant, 2012, Hatay and Bryant, 2008a, Hatay and Bryant, 2008b). Hatay and Bryant’s research (2008a), for instance, has been critical in demonstrating that the jasmine flower, in the Turkish Cypriot community, has become the symbol of Nicosia, representing a longing for the past when the city was purer. As Hatay and Bryant (2008a, p.430) state:

Nostalgia for yasemin kokulu Lefkosa (jasmine-scented Nicosia), the Nicosia of a youthful communal past, came to represent the lost hopes of a community whose struggle for self-determination appeared to have been hijacked by those sent to save them. The reference to Nicosia’s narrow streets, to specific shops and the scent of coffee, to the simple pleasures of life together, was also a longing for a different sort of isolation, one of an interdependence that was lost through dependence on Turkey.

The Jasmine flower became a reference to an apparent time of purity, a purity that seemed to have been soiled by Turkey’s intervention and the increasing number of
mainland Turks in Northern Cyprus. Consequently, as Hatay and Bryant (2008a, p.431) argue, Cypriotism emerged as a “cultural resistance to the perceived colonization of the island by Turkey”. Moreover, they further contend that Cypriotism implied “the resurgence of Turkish-Cypriot demands for self-determination, […] posed in opposition to the domination of Turkey” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008a, p.431). I also found that the collective perception of contemporary mainland Turkey plays a significant role in forms of resistance towards the presence of mainland Turkish culture and beliefs in Northern Cyprus. The opening of the Hala Sultan Divinity College or pipeline project (see Chapter 7), for example, demonstrates how young generation Turkish Cypriots are distancing themselves from Turkish ideals and practices. This resistance also manifests itself in opposition to Turkish nationalistic discourse. To expound, as I show in Chapter 5, this resistance is reflected in participants’ narratives about history textbooks, history lessons and commemorative ceremonies.

As discussed, the social, economic and political developments in Northern Cyprus which are interlinked with the perceived Turkish colonization in Northern Cyprus led to an evisceration of the nationalist ideology’s legitimacy. In turn, this also helped form the transformation of identity based on Turkishness into the new one based on Cypriotness. Ramm (2006, pp.529-530) highlights further complications on the notion of Cypriotness by stating that the matter of identity became increasingly politicised and molded by the political affiliations of individuals after the division of the island. As they became more disparaging of their nationalist leadership and the policies of Turkey regarding Cyprus, some individuals and groups of Turkish Cypriots started to separate themselves off from the Turkish ‘motherland’ and mainstream Turkish nationalism. Complications around Cypriot identity first became visible in political discourse in the 1970s when the issue of a shared Cypriot identity became a preoccupation of left-wing intellectuals and political parties (Ramm, 2006; see also Hatay, 2009). Thereafter, from the end of the 1980s onwards, these political parties and groups formulated and promulgated a ‘Cyprus-centered’ identity as the primary focus of their political struggle (see Kizilyurek, 2002) aimed at engendering a shared sense of identity amongst all Cypriots. In the 2000’s the concept of Cypriotness extended to wider sections of the Turkish Cypriot community. Indeed, Ramm (2006, p.529) found that even the
younger generation, who had never experienced life living alongside Greek Cypriots, put precedence on a ‘Cypriot identity’.

My research draws on and builds upon the research cited above, which argued that Turkish Cypriot identity is configured and reconfigured in relation to the presence of mainland Turks. This has however, created a burgeoning undercurrent of frustration among Turkish Cypriot people, an issue that has been further exacerbated by Turkey's ongoing political, economic, and military presence in Northern Cyprus. I also pay close attention to how Turkish Cypriot people position themselves in relation to their Turkish mainland counterparts (see Chapter 7). However, my analysis goes further by arguing that Cypriotness does not merely emerge from tensions between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots but also Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. I suggest that in order to develop a more nuanced understanding of the subjective experiences of Turkish Cypriots and the myriad political and cultural factors which led to divisions between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots, it is also necessary to consider how Turkish Cypriots position themselves in relation to Greek Cypriots. Indeed, their positionality has shifted since the opening of the Green Line in 2003 (see Chapter 6 and 7).

Furthermore, akin to pervious research discussions, I perspicaciously examine through the lens of sociological analysis the relationships between the imaginary domination of Turkey in Northern Cyprus and the feelings of discontent that arises in Turkish Cypriot society. However, my analysis offers an original contribution to the existing body of literature and research by arguing that Cypriotness does not merely emerge in relation to the present day cultural, socio-economic and political influences of perceived Turkish colonization. Instead, it is also the product of a complex interplay between the historical past and postcolonial present (This is a concept I have defined as post-postcolonialism, see Chapter 3). I further postulate that Cypriotness cannot be fully explained in reference to the imaginary Turkish domination of Northern Cyprus. Indeed, as my thesis demonstrates, British colonialism and its cultural and political legacy have created the conditions for the construction of cultural hierarchies in Turkey Cypriot society (see Chapter 3). As I discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, the concept of post-postcolonialism is an original concept which I have embedded
within the theoretical framework of my ethnographic research. This approach has subsequently enabled me to develop a more sociologically sophisticated analysis on the formation of Turkish Cypriot identity.

Previous studies cited above provided sociologically rich descriptions of how Cypriotness locates a shared identity between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. For instance, the Cypriotist approach, as Ramm (2006, p.529) posits, finds a shared Cypriotness in the idea that Turkish and Greek Cypriots had coexisted peacefully before conflict in the late 1950s. The primary line of reasoning is that the prior peaceful coexistence of Cyprus’ two cultural groups was shattered by the interventions of their ‘motherlands’ (Greece and Turkey) in tandem with outside interference from Britain and the United States. Research also noted that in the Turkish Cypriot community (as in the Greek Cypriot community) identification with ‘Europe’ is both strong and widely held (see Ramm, 2006; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a; Hatay 2009; Beyzoglu, 2017). As Ramm (2006) points out, the discourse of Cypriotness is frequently linked to the view that Cypriots (both Turkish and Greek) are more ‘European’ than mainland Greeks and Turks. This idea is arguably what underpinned Cyprus’s intention of joining the European Union, an aim that was achieved in 2004. Cypriots (both Turkish and Greek) are thus considered “more ‘modern’, ‘liberal-minded’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ due to factors such as the experience of British rule, a higher level of education and intensive cultural exchange with the Cypriot diaspora” (Ramm, 2006, p.532). As Ramm (2006, p.532; see also Ramm, 2004; Hatay, 2009) postulates:

Such a Eurocentric understanding of Cypriotism is relatively popular in the Turkish Cypriot community. It tends to a hegemonic concept of Europe seen as ‘civilized’ and ‘culturally superior’, at the same time reproducing stereotypes about the non-European ‘other’, especially the allegedly less civilized ‘Orient’.

Expanding further on this point, Ramm (2006, p.535; see also Hatay, 2009) notes that:
In the Turkish Cypriot community, immigrants from Turkey (Türkiyeli göçmenler) are often approached with a negative attitude and various forms of resentment. Villagers from Anatolia in particular are called karasakal (‘black beard’), and are generally looked upon as ‘very conservative’, ‘strictly religious’, ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘not civilized’.

As I discuss in the empirical chapters, my findings indicate that similar Eurocentric narratives of difference (in Saidian sense) are used by Turkish Cypriots, when producing differences between themselves and mainland Turks through markers of religiosity, looks, dialects and other cultural markers (see Chapter 7). In a similar manner, my participants articulated a shared notion of Cypriotness which is underscored by a sense of cultural similarity between Turk Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, along with a shared sense of cultural differentiation between Turk Cypriots and mainland Turks. However, in response to gaps in previous research, I further problematize my participants’ representations of mainland Turks, as well as Greek Cypriots, by examining the Eurocentric assumptions and narratives that underpin the discourse of Cypriotness. I further deepen the analysis add original contributions to the debate by examining the “after-effects” of British colonialism (Hall, 1996, p.248) and how it left Turkish Cypriots with a fractured identity through the lens of sociological analysis (see Chapter 6 and 7).

This holistic approach to understanding Turkish Cypriot identity has enabled me to add a sociologically valuable contribution to areas of the debate that have been largely unexplored, such as the production of cultural distinctions and similarities through cultural practices. I focus on the ways in which my participants are using culture to emphasise their differences from mainland Turks and assert and strengthen a sense of unity, as well as emphasise their similarities with Greek Cypriots. My concern with cultural practices includes an engagement with the repeated cultural festivals (see Chapter 6) and the ways in which these festivals serve to represent, and reinforce the cultural and political underpinnings of Turkish Cypriot identity. Overall, this examination of cultural practices and post-postcolonial narratives allowed me to develop a sophisticated and multi-
dimensional analysis on the multitude of political and cultural variables that coalesce in the formation of contemporary Turkish Cypriot identity.

It is important to mention that although this thesis makes a distinction between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks who migrated to Northern Cyprus and settled on the island after 1974, when I use the terms “mainland Turks” and “Turkish Cypriots” I am talking about specific groups of people. As Navaro-Yashin (2006) states, the group of Turkish people who migrated from Turkey to Northern Cyprus is not homogenous: it is made up of people from diverse backgrounds, mainly Kurdish, Laz, Turkish. It follows that there are cultural or social differences among them. It should also be noted that there are what we might think of as different levels of “Turkishness” within the Turkish population in Northern Cyprus: a distinction can be made between Turkish people from Turkey that settled in Northern Cyprus between 1975 and 1983 and became dual citizens, and Turkish people who have migrated to Northern Cyprus during the last few years. There are also children of mixed marriages, and children of mainland Turks that were born and raised in Cyprus. These are both official distinctions, made by the authorities; and they are also distinctions which resonate amongst my informants.

The first two groups (Turkish people from Turkey that settled in Northern Cyprus between 1975 and 1983 and became dual citizens, and Turkish people who have migrated to Northern Cyprus during the last few years), regardless of when they arrived on the island or their citizenship status, are categorised as “Turkish” or “Turks” by official policymakers (Navaro-Yashin, 2006). I found that my participants tend to categorise these two groups of people in a similar way, as “Turkish” or “Turks”. However, it should be noted that, on the basis on my observations, I make the assertion that Turkish Cypriots tend to be more critical of the second group (mainland Turks who arrived on Northern Cyprus in the last few years), due to the idea that these people, possessing “little education and few skills” (Bryant and Hatay (2008b, p.8), are in low-skilled occupations such as manual labour. I noted that it is common for Turkish Cypriots to use terms such as fica (dirt in the sea), garasakal (blackbeard), Amerikali (Americans) and fellah (peasant) in every day life to refer to these people. In contrast, I observed that Turkish Cypriots were more welcoming to mainland Turks who had settled on the
island in the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. This group of people is relatively educated by comparison with the mainland Turks who began to arrive on the island from the late 1990s onwards, as described by Bryant and Hatay (2008b, pp.8-9):

While many of the immigrants who arrived throughout the 1980s and early 1990s were relatively educated, immigrants who began to arrive in the late 1990s were manual labourers, often with little education and few skills. Large numbers of these workers were in addition of Kurdish or Arab origin, many from the area of south-eastern Turkey that had experienced economic devastation and social turmoil as a result of the long-term, low-level conflict there.

Children of mixed marriages, and mainland Turks born and raised in Cyprus, on the other hand, are categorised as “Turkish Cypriots” by official policymakers. People who fall into this latter group were categorised as “Turkish Cypriots” by the vast majority of my participants.

In this thesis, however, I use the terms “mainland Turks” or “Turks from Turkey” interchangeably to refer to all Turks who migrated to Northern Cyprus after 1974 – both those who settled in Northern Cyprus between 1975 and 1983 and became dual citizens, and those who have arrived in the last few years. Furthermore, I make a distinction between “mainland Turks” and “Turkish Cypriots”, which is another term I use to refer to research participants who are indigenous or native to Cyprus and whose ancestors settled in Cyprus after 1571. Again, it should be noted that this category is heterogenous, since some Turkish Cypriots deploy the concept of Turkish Cypriot identity with an emphasis on Turkishness, while others place more emphasis on Cypriotness (Sahin, 2008). Lastly, it should be highlighted that my term “mainland Turks” does not include children of mixed marriages and children of mainland Turks that were born and raised in Cyprus, since they do not align with the epistemological objectives of my research.
2.3. Conclusion

Drawing on the existing body of literature, this chapter reflected on the different debates/discussions on nationalism, identity and identifications in Cyprus. The first part mapped the different approaches to the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism that are relevant to the case of Cyprus. I highlighted the sociological value of such research by delineating how ethnic tensions sowed the fabric for further divisions between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, and the construction of new national identities in Cyprus. In the second section, I reviewed key literature on the notion of Cypriotness, showing how Turkish Cypriot identity evolved after the division of the island in tandem with changing political, educational, social and economic structures. I discussed how ethnic nationalism has been in decline, since the division of the island, and how a new form of identity – Cypriotness – has developed. Describing the various ways through which the notion of Cypriotness has been analysed, I drew attention to paucity of research and the timely importance of providing an in-depth and multidimensional examination of Turkey Cypriot identity. By foregrounding both the consequences of the ongoing relationship between Turkey and the residues of British colonialism, I noted how my research develops a post-postcolonial framework/approach to study Turkish Cypriot identity. This approach opens room to further understand the multitude of political and cultural factors that lay the foundation for the formation of contemporary Turkish Cypriot identity. This post-postcolonial theoretical framework will be outlined in next chapter.
CHAPTER 3: FROM POSTCOLONIALISM TO POST-
POSTCOLONIALISM

In this chapter, I give an outline of the conceptual/theoretical framework of this study. I began by looking at “Cypriotness” through a postcolonial lens; however, I discovered that this had limited value in explaining the history and transitions of Cypriotness. As I have already mentioned (in Chapters 1 and 2), a key argument in this thesis is that the notion of Cypriotness is about the complexity of the post-postcolonial conjuncture: it is about the relationships between the colonial past and the postcolonial and colonial present. I have therefore developed a post-postcolonial approach as a mode of thinking about the notion of Cypriotness. The foundational texts that have influenced the formation and development of my argument are Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978) and Homi Bhabha’s The Location of Culture (1994). These texts also have relevance to my empirical work. Therefore, I frame this chapter by engaging with selected debates around Said’s and Bhabha’s work, as well as additional key texts that have helped me to further expand their ideas in new directions.

In the first section, I introduce the terms “post-postcolonialism” and “post-postcolonial discourse”. In the second section, I explore the main features of Foucault’s theorisation of discourse and Said’s use of the concept in his work Orientalism. Drawing upon the arguments of Foucault and Said, I talk about the main characteristics of post-postcolonial discourse and how it produces its subjects. Finally, in the last section, I discuss the work of Bhabha – who used the interrelated concepts of cultural hybridity, the third space and cultural difference to theorise identity in his book The Location of Culture – for the purpose of developing a theoretical framework for my own research material.

3.1. Moving Beyond Postcolonialism

It is very challenging to understand the meaning of postcolonialism or explain exactly what it is. This is predominantly because, for the last forty years, many
different meanings have been given to the term “postcolonialism” (Chattopadhyay, 2017). No standard definition or orthography for the terms “postcolonial” or “postcolonialism” currently exist. There are many questions over whether “postcolonialism” should or should not be written with a hyphen to separate “post” and “colonialism” (Chattopadhyay, 2017). The “colonialism” part of the term is the most important part; however, the prefix “post” is also significant, since it gives an extra and crucial insight into how we understand the term. Typically, the prefix “post” means “after” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2018). If it precedes a noun, then it suggests that the event in question happened after the phenomenon designated by the noun. By this logic, “postcolonialism” would thus refer to a period of time following colonialism. If we try to understand this particular meaning within the context of Cyprus, we are inevitably directed towards a certain date: 16 August 1960, which can be taken as a historical marker (Seth, 2013) or the beginning of “the postcolonial” (Young, 2001, p.191). Cyprus was under the dominion of the British Empire, and was administered sequentially as a British protectorate from 1878 to 1912, a unilaterally annexed military occupation from 1914 to 1922, and a Crown Colony from 1922 to 1960. On 16 August 1960, Cyprus ceased to be a British colony, and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was established. This should mean that the history of the period after the date Cyprus gained political independence is the history of postcolonial Cyprus. This would not be an altogether wrong understanding of the term “postcolonialism”. However, as critics of the concept have pointed out (McClintock, 1992; Ahmad, 1995; Appiah, 1996; Loomba, 1998), there are certain problems if we understand the term “postcolonialism” in this way.

What then are the issues with using “postcolonialism” to mean “post-independence”? In order to understand this further, it is vital to look at the date 16 August 1960 more closely. On this date, Cyprus ceased to be politically governed by the British monarch, and Britain ceased to have any direct political control over Cyprus’s affairs. The political power that Britain exercised over Cyprus until 16 August 1960, however, is only part of what I will understand as British colonialism in this study. The reason for this is that (as postcolonial scholars argue) colonial structures continue to characterise contemporary power relations, a state of affairs that has been defined as “imperialism-without-colonies”
(McClintock, 1992, p.89). For instance, apart from the political domain, British colonialism exerted a large amount of influence on the social, cultural and economic spheres of Cyprus, and this study argues that those influences did not come to an abrupt end when Cyprus achieved its independence on 16 August 1960. Perhaps one of the most profound impacts of British colonialism in Cyprus was the construction of ethnic nationalism (as discussed in Chapter 2). It was arguably only with the advent of colonialism that Cyprus developed any ethnic consciousness. This resulted in the “Cyprus problem”, which boiled down to ethnic conflict and the sense of a hostile Other between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities on the island.

The impact of the colonial influence was such that the Cyprus that emerged after the first effects of colonialism were felt was markedly different from precolonial Cyprus. Instead of being referred to as the Muslims (Nevzat, 2005) and Orthodox Christians of Cyprus, the people of Cyprus began to be identified as the Turks (Nevzat, 2005) and Greeks of the island. Furthermore, each community was determined to fight for its own distinct nationalist goals. Despite the foundation of the new RoC, intercommunal conflict began in 1963. The communities who were psychologically divided under the new federation would soon become physically and demographically divided too. For this reason, Cyprus became separated into two following the Turkish invasion of the island (a response to the Greek coup that took place in 1974). Greek Cypriots now reside in southern Cyprus, in the legally recognised RoC; Turkish Cypriots reside in the north, in an unrecognised, self-declared state called the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

There have been many diplomatic attempts by both domestic and international parties to improve peace and harmony in Cyprus since the onset of the issue. For the past forty years, numerous negotiations and peace talks have started, stopped, been fast-tracked and revisited. Nevertheless, four decades after the division of the island, it is still imperative to find a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem, and the physical division between the two communities remains.

British colonialism in Cyprus has also taken a cultural form. Hatay (2009, p.148) points out that during British colonial rule in Cyprus, British rulers characterised the Turkish islanders’ identities as “Ottoman” or “Muslim”. Some Muslim Turks
were also characterized by members of their own community as “backwards” and incapable of modernisation. Hatay (2009, p.148) writes:

Although the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements of the late Ottoman Empire attempted to trace a path to modernisation, that path was . . . defined by the belief that their own identities were . . . Oriental and in need of Westernisation. At the same time, as Muslims, many in the community found it difficult to accept what they viewed as ethical changes brought by a Western, colonial modernity. For example, when the colonial administration attempted to bring an English schoolmistress to the Muslim girls’ school in 1902, the newspaper Mir’at-ı Zaman protested, “We are not going to make our girls [serve as] English schoolmistresses, or Interpreters in the Government Departments, or let them dance a waltz at a public ball. If the intention of the Government is to drag us into English Civilisation, such things can never be admitted by Moslem Civilisation”. They were, in other words, caught between the rock of “Oriental backwardness” and the hard place of “English civilisation”.

Hatay (2009) goes on to assert that within these contradictions, Muslim Cypriots were excited about Mustafa Kemal’s defeat of the invading forces and the subsequent creation of a new state. They are said to have embraced Kemalist values including secularism, modernisation and Westernisation, which were fundamental aspects of Turkish nationalism and ideology (Bryant, 2004, 2006; Hatay, 2009). As Bryant (2004, p.233) argues, Muslim Cypriots were happy to accept the Kemalist reforms introduced by the state in Turkey (such as the introduction of the Latin alphabet, the adoption of Western dress, and secularisation), “even while their presumed ‘brothers’ in Anatolia were in the throes of cultural upheaval”. According to Hatay (2009, pp.148–149):

At the core of this Westernisation process was a belief that something fundamental in the nationalist self needed to change. The old, “Oriental” traditions and beliefs had to be discarded in the name of modernity and progress . . . The “Orient” for Turkish Cypriots in this sense had become the old traditions and Islam. They perceived Kemalism as the only tool to civilise themselves. Anything to do with Arabic or Persian had to be deleted in their daily lives. In the meantime they demanded, too,
that the colonial authorities recognise their Turkish nationality and that education be of a “national” rather than religious character.

Another important point that needs to be highlighted is that British rule in Cyprus had a profound impact on Turkish Cypriot people’s religious values and beliefs. In a recent newspaper article, Smith (2018, emphases added) writes:

Turkish Cypriots are seen as being among the most liberal Muslims in the western world. Most enjoy alcohol – attributing their penchant for whisky to colonial rule under the British. The majority also abhor the idea of women wearing headscarves and frequently joke they would only go to a mosque to attend a funeral. In such circumstances, Islamisation has been met with trepidation.

Whether through the adaptation of Kemalism or of the coloniser’s cultural habits, attitudes and values, the colonial period in Cyprus gave rise to “something different, something new and unrecognisable” (Bhabha in Rutherford, 1990, p.211), turning the Muslim Turks of the island into what are today seen as liberal Turkish Cypriots. In other words, British colonialism produced a hybrid Turkish Cypriot religion with elements of both Islam and Christianity (elements that are sometimes chosen deliberately and sometimes inadvertently – see Chapters 6 and 7). Indeed, as will become evident in Chapter 7, where I will discuss my research participants’ perceptions of the construction of the Hala Sultan mosque and the first ever Islamic theological college in northern Cyprus, descriptions of “Islam” in the contemporary Turkish Cypriot community form part of a discourse of Orientalism (Said, 1978) whose effects include whipping up ill feeling against the Other (in this case, mainland Turks). It is impossible to know how much of Turkish Cypriot culture was affected under British rule, and how much of it has been deliberately invented and manipulated (as Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983) argue) to provoke feelings of hostility and antipathy against individuals or groups in response to more recent social needs. My argument is that the fusion and mixing of Eastern and Western cultures lies at the core of the cultural conflicts and struggles over meaning in the contemporary Turkish Cypriot community.
Clearly not everything that constituted British colonialism in Cyprus has come to an end. To say that colonialism is “now a matter of the past” or that we have overcome the negative effects of colonialism would be to undermine “colonialism’s economic, political, and cultural deformative traces in the present” (Shohat, 1992, p.105; see also Ahmed, 2013 [2000]). Hall (1996, p.247) argues that “‘post-colonial’ certainly is not... one of those periodisations based on epochal ‘stages’, when everything is reversed at the same moment, all the old relations disappear for ever and entirely new ones come to replace them.” In a similar context, Ahmed (2013 [2000], p.11) suggests that “postcolonial” is about “the complexity of the relationship between the past and present”. As far as understanding the term “postcolonialism” within the Cypriot context is concerned, therefore, a date such as 16 August 1960 does not prove to be very useful for marking the end of colonialism. There are, however, alternative ways of understanding the term “postcolonialism”, other than as signifying the end of colonial rule. For instance, Ashcroft et al. (1989, p.2) use the term “postcolonialism” to refer to “all the culture affected by the imperial process from the moment of colonisation to the present day”; they find “a continuity of preoccupations throughout the historical process initiated by European imperial aggression”. Ashcroft et al.’s use of the term – to signify not the end of colonialism, but what comes after the beginning of colonialism – brings new insights. It is this definition of postcolonialism that is taken up by my research. I will use the term “postcolonialism” to refer to the overall sum of social, political, economic and cultural changes that occurred after the onset of British colonialism. In other words, my argument is that chronologically speaking, postcolonial Cyprus is not the Cyprus after 1960; rather, it is the Cyprus that emerged from the nineteenth century onwards as British colonial power started to spread its influence across the island.

However, an important point that needs to be noted is that the present study is not concerned only with the impact of British colonialism or the concept of postcolonialism in the context of Cyprus. It also looks at another interesting epoch, which I will refer to as post-postcolonialism. This period not only involves the consequences of the ongoing relationship between Turkey and Cyprus, but it also carries with it colonial “after-effects” (Hall, 1996, p.248). I will define the
term “post-postcolonialism” later. Before I do so, an exploration is essential of the economic, political and social relations that have existed in northern Cyprus since 1974.

Since the partition of the island in 1974, Turkish Cypriots have been living in an unrecognised state. They have the last divided capital city in the world (Nicosia), and they lack the capacity to participate autonomously in European Union arrangements for Cyprus. This has caused physical, social and psychological problems for Turkish Cypriots, who have been secluded from the world (Erhurman, 2010). Additionally, the cultural and economic embargoes imposed on the Turkish Cypriot community since the declaration of the TRNC in 1982 have created a relentless and restrictive dependence on Turkey, both politically and economically. In Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey, Bryant and Yakinthou (2012, p.16) state:

Turkey not only controls the TRNC’s security, but it also effectively controls its internal affairs. This control is exercised both through the present TRNC constitution, which puts the police under the control of the Turkish military in the island, and through Turkey’s yearly aid package, via which certain demands are made. . . Turkish Cypriots are also often dependent on Turkey in foreign relations, and any future solution to the island’s division must satisfy Turkish Cypriots’ patron state. As one union leader put it: “On paper the only country that recognises the TRNC is Turkey but in practice when we look at that relationship it’s not anything like that between two states. The relationship between the TRNC and Turkey is not governed by the usual rules of law and international diplomacy. In any case, the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed that it’s not. According to international law and to us, north Cyprus is Turkey’s subordinate authority. There’s no relationship like that between two states, and we don’t believe that there will be one”.

Bryant and Yakinthou (2012, p.16) further explain:

In international media and scholarship, Turkey’s presence in Cyprus is commonly described as that of an “occupying power” or “coloniser,” while relations with Turkish Cypriots have been
seen as those of a patron state with its client, or in the terms now used by the European courts, a “subordinate authority.”

What needs to be highlighted in the above statement is that in international media and scholarship, and also in domestic discourse (among both the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, see Bryant and Yakinthou (2012), the period since the division of the island is *imagined* to be a new era where Turkey has acquired the land that belongs to northern Cyprus and has imposed both intellectual and political domination on the Turkish Cypriot people. My argument is that “Cypriotness” can be fully explained neither with reference to the imaginary Eastern domination of northern Cyprus, nor in relation to British colonialism. Each without the other would provide only a partial elucidation of the notion of Cypriotness and its manifestations. Thus a conjunctural perspective informs my approach to analysing the notion of Cypriotness. Drawing on Gramsci – in particular, the saliency he attributed to relating specific ways of thinking to their historic context, or the set of social conditions which produced them (Rizvi, 2015) – Hall (2010, p.57) notes that a conjuncture “is a period during which the different social, political, economic and ideological contradictions that are at work in society come together to give it a specific and distinctive shape”. A conjuncture, Hall (2010, p.57) suggests, “is not defined by time or by simple things like a change of regime”; rather, it is an intricate historical point where forces meet and lead to drastic change. Following this conjunctural approach, my point of departure in this thesis is a detailed investigation of the conjuncture of the physical and cultural after-effects of British colonialism and the impact of imaginary Turkish colonialism in northern Cyprus.

3.1.1. Defining Post-Postcolonialism and Post-Postcolonial Discourse

There have been 35,000 Turkish troops in northern Cyprus since 1974. The international community regards this as an occupation of a sovereign state. Turkey, on the other hand, is insistent that it is a legal and vital measure, and it refuses to withdraw its soldiers until there is a suitable peaceful agreement for reunification of the island. Turkey insists that it has guarantor status under the
Treaty of Guarantee, signed between the RoC, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom in 1960. The treaty clearly outlines that Turkey, Greece and Britain are entitled to consult each other about Cyprus’s independence, territorial integrity and security if the status quo on the island should collapse. The treaty also allows all three guarantors to act unilaterally if the status quo needs to be re-established, or if coordinated action is not possible. When violence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities took a deadly turn in 1974, Turkey (according to international media and scholarship) “invaded” Cyprus (on 20 July 1974) to keep the Turkish Cypriot people safe. Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit stated that Turkish soldiers had brought peace to Cyprus, not only for Turkish Cypriots but also for Greek Cypriots (Nesim and Oznur, 2012, p.28). Bryant and Yakinthou (2012, p.16) suggest:

In domestic discourse, Turkish Cypriots have historically defined Turkey as a protector with whom they have ties that are often likened to kinship, as in the commonly used description of that relationship as one of a “motherland” and “babyland”.

However, this notion of a “motherland-babyland” relationship between Turkey and northern Cyprus fell by the wayside, because the Turkish Cypriot community began to feel “overwhelmed”:

With 35,000 Turkish soldiers, 30,000 Turkish students, 50,000 Turkish nationals who had acquired TRNC citizenship, and approximately 60–70,000 Turkish workers and their families in the island, it should not be surprising that the small Turkish Cypriot community of approximately 140,000 began… to feel overwhelmed. (Bryant and Yakinthou, 2012, p.20)

After an initial honeymoon period, the feelings of “motherland nationalism” among Turkish Cypriot people have fluctuated. Negative responses have emerged among Turkish Cypriots, for instance, regarding the arrival of large numbers of mainland Turks (see Chapter 7). Another point that I want to stress is that the presence of the Turkish state in northern Cyprus has resulted in a culturally
heterogeneous population: the culture of indigenous Turkish Cypriots has come into contact with that of mainland Turks who moved to northern Cyprus after the division of the island. Thus, Turkish Cypriot culture – which features elements influenced by both Kemalism and British colonial rule, and which combines these elements with local traditions (in common with Greek Cypriots, see Chapter 6) – is now also influenced by Turkish culture. In other words, the indigenous Turkish Cypriot people are going through a new form of cultural assimilation, and this leaves them in an in-between space.

The term “post-postcolonialism” that I propose in this thesis, therefore, comes from the unique and particular case of northern Cyprus and refers to the condition of people who were once colonised by the West and now are supposedly living under the control of an Eastern power. The word “postcolonialism” here signifies the sum total of all the cultural influences that came after the onset of British colonialism. The prefix “post” refers to the sum total of all the various social, political, economic, cultural and infrastructural changes (see Chapter 7) that have come with the imaginary Eastern colonisation; it also means that there are powerful negative effects of such “oppression” on individuals (an issue explored by Fanon (1952, 1961) and Memmi (1957) from a psychoanalytic viewpoint) that need to be considered. Post-postcolonialism, in this sense, is about the complexity of the relationship between the past and the postcolonial and colonial present. I argue that it is through an exploration of this post-postcolonial conjuncture that we can create the building blocks for a material understanding of Cypriotness.

My analysis of the post-postcolonial in this thesis is based on what I will call post-postcolonial discourse. Post-postcolonial discourse is produced by indigenous Turkish Cypriots, and it is underpinned by a highly critical approach towards the nationalistic discourse that considers the relationship between the TRNC and Turkey to be one of “flesh and fingernail” (Bryant and Yakinthou, 2012, p.16). It is produced against two distinct constitutive Others, namely mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots, where mainland Turks are constantly judged for their “Oriental” behaviour (Said, 1978) and Greek Cypriots are praised for their “Europeanness”. As Mbembe (2008) states, postcolonial thinking is about “the recognition of the Other as fundamentally human”, which for him is “all too often forgotten”. In line with this notion, in this study I will explore and challenge the fairness, unfairness,
falsity or validity of claims constructed by post-postcolonial discourse. It is for this purpose that I engage with Said’s (1978) notion of Orientalism, Bhabha’s (1994) notions of cultural hybridity and the third space, and Fanon’s (1952) phenomenologically inflected psychoanalysis of the psychological effects of colonialism. Postcolonial studies has been “integral to the exercise of opening out and questioning the implied assumptions of the dominant discourses by way of which we attempt to make sense of the worlds we inhabit” (Bhambra, 2014b, p.117). I suggest that if we draw from the works mentioned above, it becomes possible to reconfigure different types of colonial discourse as a starting point for sociological research. Said’s and Bhabha’s ideas and arguments are brought to life in the next sections of this chapter, and they are then put to work through original empirical research in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, demonstrating their resonance with the context of northern Cyprus. In the next section, I will turn to the work of Said and rethink the relationship between colonialism and discourse, through which colonial discourse acted as a vehicle of power. I will open up the concept of Orientalism and extract from it the building blocks for a material understanding of the case of northern Cyprus.

3.2. Colonial Discourse: Orientalism

The term “colonial discourse” was brought into currency by the Palestine-born literary theorist Edward Said – widely regarded as the founder of postcolonial studies – in his book Orientalism (1978), which for Hall (2004, p.153) “single-handedly created, and remains amongst the foremost texts of, what is now called ‘post-colonial studies’”. Michel Foucault’s concept of discourse and his theory of power-knowledge provided the theoretical foundation for Said’s analysis of Orientalism. Therefore, I start this section with a brief explanation of Foucault’s theorisation of discourse. Then I explore how Said reconstructed the concept of discourse as a means to promote a severe criticism of Orientalism. Lastly, I elaborate on the concept of Orientalism to arrive at the more nuanced understanding that will be used in this study.
3.2.1. The Foucauldian Notion of Discourse

Oxford English Dictionary defines “discourse” as a set of meaningful written or spoken statements on a given topic (Oxford English Dictionary, 2018). Foucault expands this simple definition, defining discourse as follows: “we shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation” (Foucault, 1972 [1969], p.117). A discourse is a group of statements that provide a language for talking about a specific topic during a specific historical moment (Hall, 1997, p.44). The same discourse can be present in various texts and at various institutional sites within a society (Hall, 1997). Foucault explains that when discursive events or statements support a common strategy or political perspective, then they are part of the same discursive formation. The key thing to consider here is that Foucault largely historicises discourse, representation, knowledge and “truth”. Foucault argues that things were only important or true at a specific point in history (Hall, 1997). That is to say, discourse, for Foucault, is dynamic and changing.

At the heart of Foucault’s theory is the idea that discourse constructs various rules, which serve as preconditions for statements to be considered meaningful and legitimate. Foucault (1972 [1969], p.216) suggests that people do not have the freedom to say just anything; rather, when they wish to talk about something, they are faced with a repertoire of pre-existing statements and ideas that stops them from discussing things freely and creatively. He states that every manifestation of discourse is founded upon an “already-said”, meaning that people have to think in terms of the limits established by things that have been said before (Foucault 1972 [1969], p.25). For this reason, Foucault (1972 [1969], p.226) explains that discourse connects people to various types of utterance while simultaneously barring them from all other types. In other words, prior statements about an object continually impact on how that object is perceived. Foucault thus asserts that knowledge produced by academics is just the outcome of discourse, since discourse inspires and controls what is said regarding an object. This means that the knowledge produced is a mere reformulation of pre-existing ideas. It is Foucault’s belief that academics do not actually produce knowledge, but are mere holders of knowledge produced by discourse.
If discourse does restrict people’s thoughts and views, as Foucault believes, then is it not possible to describe our knowledge of the world as true or objective? Foucault insists that our knowledge is not necessarily representative of the world in its true state, but is rather how we understand the world within the framework established by discourse. It can thus be implied that our understanding of the world is by no means a true reflection of reality, but is something created by discourse. Universal truth and objectivity, according to Foucault’s theory of discourse, can therefore be considered mere illusions, because our perceptions of material objects are never fully objective or disinterested; rather, they are always processed via discursive structures that automatically give them specific meanings and implications (Mills, 1997, p.56). It is thus arguable that discourses do not just describe objects, but construct them. Foucault (1972 [1969], p.49) insists that discourses “systematically form the objects of which they speak… Discourses are not about objects, they don’t identify objects, they constitute them and in doing so, they conceal their own invention”.

3.2.2. The Discourse of Orientalism

The fundamental assumptions that underpin Said’s Orientalism include Europe’s historical and colonial domination over the Eastern world, and the imperialist exploitation that gave European scholars the opportunity to gaze upon the East and investigate the exotic Other for their own purposes. Prior to the eighteenth century, European scholars had little access to the East. Military conquests in the late eighteenth century gave Europeans the chance to explore the East in more depth. In the eighteenth century, Napoleon led a military expedition to Egypt. Said (1978) argues that Napoleon was joined not just by an army of soldiers, but also by an army of academics and scientists desperate to transform the occupied territory into an object of study and to generate systematic knowledge of it. Following the Napoleonic conquest, Egypt was no longer a distant exotic land known primarily through fantasy and rumour. It became an object of study and a place of imaginative exploration. Egypt – once an unknown, dark, sinister, exotic land – is the starting point for Said’s analysis. Said (1978) notes that Orientalism developed in Europe as a tradition and academic discipline when European
powers began to conquer the Orient in the eighteenth century.

Similarly to Foucault, who defines discourse as a certain way of assigning meanings to objects, Said’s main argument in Orientalism is that the expansion of European colonialism after the sixteenth century, especially in Asia, was tied up with a particular discourse about the “Orient”, which he refers to as Orientalism. In Said’s theorisation, Orientalism, or the Western construction of the imaginary Orient, was fashioned by Europeans through writing practices that had the effect of representing the East as Europe’s constitutive Other. As Said (2006, [1978], pp.2–3) states:

Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident." Thus a very large mass of writers, among whom are poets, novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the starting point for elaborate accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs, "mind," destiny, and so on.

The word “Orientalism” is derived from the word “Orient”, which has various other derivatives, including “Oriental” and “Orientalist”. In a general sense, the Orient refers to the lands situated east of Europe. More specifically, the Orient or East refers to the places now known to us as the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. This Orient or East is the opposite of the Occident, which refers to the West or Europe. The Orient and Occident, or East and West, as contrasting conceptual categories inform various texts, including Rudyard Kipling’s (1889) “The Ballad of East and West”, in which he very famously wrote: “East is East, and West is West, and never shall the twain meet.” This line has frequently been taken as the epitome of the fixed East/West binary (Scott, 2011, p.324). This usage of East/West or Orient/Occident as contrasting categories also regularly occurs in more mundane conversations, where the terms are a scripted shorthand to denote not just geographical spaces but also certain cultural values, such as food habits, dress codes, bodily postures or even moral conduct. In these instances, Orient and Occident almost serve as a matrix for conceptualising the
world, dividing it into two exclusive groups where the Occident is the exact opposite of the Orient. If the Occident were to stand for masculinity or maturity, then the Orient would contrast with this and represent femininity or childishness. Likewise, if the Occident were regarded as the pinnacle of civilisation, then the Orient, by contrast, would come to represent deep barbarism and moral and cultural depravity. This particular way of thinking is a vital aspect of what constitutes Orientalism or the discourse of the Orient (Said, 1978).

Said (2006 [1978], p.5) makes it clear that the phenomenon of Orientalism “deals principally, not with a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient, but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient… despite or beyond any correspondence, or lack thereof, with a ‘real’ Orient”. From this point of view, everything that Western scholars have claimed is merely words – language which has created a veil of representation, enabling the East to be talked about from a position of power, not “truth” (Said, 2006 [1978], p.21). Orientalism was nevertheless part of a system of cultural effects that legitimised Western control over an “Oriental” and “backward” area of the Middle East. Thus, for Said, the Orient is not a fact of nature, but a concept created through history – a concept that has unique imagery and vocabulary associated with it. The East is a European concept or invention, developed to justify and enable a relationship of power and domination between West and East. Furthermore, Said outlines how Orientalism developed into a textual grid which allowed the Orient to gradually become part of Western consciousness.

Antonio Gramsci was also highly influential in shaping Said’s understanding of the ubiquity of Orientalist constructs and representations in Western academia and how such discourses are intimately related to the exercise of western power over the “Orient”. In conceptualising the West as the producer of dominant ideologies, Said referred to Gramsci’s (1971) concept of hegemony (Prison Notebooks, 1929–1935). In formulating the concept of cultural hegemony, Gramsci had, in turn, drawn from Marx’s view that the interests and values of the dominant class are reflected in the domain ideologies they produce. Gramsci suggested that the spread of dominant ideologies through institutions such as schools, media outlets, politics, legal systems and family units is crucial for the dominant group to rule successfully. Because institutions do the work of socialising people into the
norms, values and beliefs of the dominant social group, if a group controls the institutions that maintain social order, then that group rules all others in society. Relately, Said (1978) argued that Orientalism was a collective European notion of European superiority. Over time, European scholars implemented a network of discursive structures. The purpose of this was to control and manipulate through the production of knowledge.

Said (1978) asserts that Western writers thus occupy a position of power whereby the texts they produce – collectively, “Oriental Studies” – serve as a strategic discourse regarding the Other. In other words, Western writers took on the task of representing the East on the assumption that since the East cannot represent itself, the West must represent it. As a result of this representation, regardless of the century, the Orient occupies a fixed, timeless location in the Western mind with the Orient’s history conceptualised in terms of their response to the West, and with the West always situated as the arbiter of Oriental behaviour. Said (2006 [1978], pp.333–334) goes on to assert:

My objection to what I have called Orientalism is not that it is just the antiquarian study of Oriental languages, societies, and people, but that as a system of thought it approaches a heterogeneous dynamic, and complex human reality from an uncritically essentialist standpoint; this suggests both an enduring Oriental reality and an opposing but no less enduring Western essence, which observes the Orient from afar and, so to speak, from above. This false position hides historical change. Even more important, from my standpoint, it hides the interests of the Orientalist.

An important point that needs to be highlighted is that although Said’s Orientalism manages to represent the power-knowledge nexus that linked the discourse of Orientalism with Europe’s military and economic domination of the Orient, his main purpose is not just to reveal this connection, but also to disrupt it (Chattopadhyay, 2017). The way in which Said seeks to bring about this disruption is through what he calls the “contrapuntal analysis” or “contrapuntal reading” (Said, 1993) of texts. Contrapuntal reading/analysis, developed by Said in Culture and Imperialism (1993), is an attempt to read Orientalist texts against
the grain of the author’s intentions. It aims for “a simultaneous awareness both of
the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories against which
the dominating discourse acts” (Said, 1993, p.51). As Said (1993, p.78) states:

In practical terms, “contrapuntal reading” as I have called it
means reading a text with an understanding of what is involved
when an author shows, for instance, that a colonial sugar-
plantation is seen as important to the process of maintaining a
particular style of life in England.

Thus, contrapuntal analysis questions the intrinsic assumptions that underpin a
particular text and examines both the imperialist perspective and resistance to this
perspective. To give an example: in “The British Rule in India”, Karl Marx (2008
[1853], p.38) argued that Indians had been “thrown into a sea of woes” and lost
“their ancient form of civilisation, and their hereditary means of subsistence” as a
result of British colonialism. Marx (2008 [1853], p.33) stated:

There cannot … remain any doubt that the misery inflicted by
the British on Hindustan is of an essentially different and
infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindustan had to suffer
before.

However, despite acknowledging the socio-economic devastation that British
colonialism had inflicted on India by destroying its traditional economic and
social structures, Marx justified British rule as a much-needed social revolution –
a blessing in disguise. According to Marx (1953), what had actually been lost was
the Indians’ barbaric customs and ways of living. Marx’s understanding of the
exploitative colonial situation was simultaneously underpinned by his prejudice
that the Orient represented a backward and barbaric society, and that the British
(who brought about these changes) were ultimately representatives of a superior
civilisation (Anderson, 2010). A contrapuntal reading of Marx’s “The British Rule
in India” allows one to point out that his arguments in favour of British rule in
India were (are) hopelessly Eurocentric and Orientalist.
In this thesis, I will provide a contrapuntal analysis of the post-postcolonial discourse manifested in my participants’ narratives. I will point out and critique the participants’ perspectives, and the myths and prejudices that underlie them.

3.2.3. Orientalism and Post-Postcolonial Discourse

In this study, I will develop three central arguments that Said first provided in Orientalism (1978). First, I will engage with Said’s argument that Orientalism is a way or style of thought that pivoted on contrasting the Orient (the East) with the Occident (the West, or Europe). I will engage with the idea that Orientalism generates a view of the Orient that is also a moral structure within which the Orient is criticised, even punished, for not conforming to the strictures of the European community, thus Orientalising the Orient (Said, 2006 [1978], p.67). However, I will apply this line of thinking to the specific context of northern Cyprus in order to discuss a different kind of Eurocentric discourse to which the post-postcolonial condition gave birth: I will talk about post-postcolonial discourse as closely related to the imaginary Eastern domination (by Turkey) of imaginary European/Western subjects (indigenous Turkish Cypriots). Thus I will use the terms “East” or “Orient” to refer to Turkey, and “European” or “Western” to refer to indigenous Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, I will focus on the “Western/European” subjects’ discourse about this “Eastern” power (Turkey) – a discourse that is post-postcolonial and belongs to Orientalism.

Second, following on from Said (1978), I will suggest that the portrayal of Turkey and mainland Turks as Eastern and Oriental by indigenous Turkish Cypriots is a representation which allows mainland Turks to be spoken of from a position of power. It is a position of power because indigenous Turkish Cypriots consider themselves superior to the Eastern Other by virtue of their assumed proximity to Western culture (see Chapters 6 and 7). Yet, I will argue that post-postcolonial discourse, which observes the Orient from “above” (cf. Said, 2006 [1978], pp.333–334), is produced from a position not only of power, but also of powerlessness – because when the other Other (Greek Cypriots) enter the picture, Turkish Cypriots’ feeling of superiority and power is challenged (see Chapter 6). Thus, taking Said’s Orientalism as a starting point, this thesis aims to develop
postcolonial analysis by showing that Orientalist discourse in contemporary Turkish Cypriot society observes and constructs its subjects not only from a position of power, but also from a position of powerlessness.

Finally, I will engage with the suggestion that various institutions, such as schools and colleges, connect power with knowledge and ratify the views/discourses of the powerful as the truth (Foucault, 1969; Said, 1978). In *Orientalism*, Said (1978) talks about a discourse that allows the coloniser to take the throne of civilisation and ratifies the colonised as a den of barbaric customs – in turn enabling the colonial power to justify its rule over the colonised subjects, not because it is profitable, but because it is the morally right thing to do. In this study, however, I will talk about a different kind of institutionally ratified discourse: the Turkish nationalist discourse that was substantially active under the UBP government until 2003 and was propagated through mechanisms including schoolbooks, commemorations (see Chapter 5) and the media (Şahin, 2008). It is against this discourse that post-postcolonial discourse is produced. In Chapter 5 I will also explore my participants’ attitudes towards this nationalist discourse.

3.2.4. Turkish Nationalist Discourse

Between 1974 and 2003, the discourse of the UBP government used constructive strategies to build a Turkish Cypriot identity based on the idea of sameness and solidarity between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, and of separation between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (Erhurman, 2010). Rauf Denktaş, the founding president of the TRNC, consistently vocalised his Turkishness rather than his Cypriotness. During one of his speeches, for instance, he stated that he was a “Turk coincidentally born in Cyprus” (Navaro-Yashin, 2006, p.85). Denktaş further expounded:

I am a child of Anatolia. I am Turkish in every way and my roots go back to Central Asia. I am Turkish with my culture, my language, my history, and my whole being. I have a state as well as a motherland. The notions of "Cypriot culture," "Turkish Cypriot," "Greek Cypriot," "a shared Republic" are all
nonsense. If they have their Greece and we have our Turkey, why should we live under the roof of the same Republic? ... Some individuals are producing fiction about the existence of "Cypriots," "Turkish Cypriots," "Greek Cypriots." There is no such thing as a "Turkish Cypriot." Don't dare to ask us whether we are "Cypriots." We could take this as an insult. Why? Because there is only one thing that is "Cypriot" in Cyprus, and that is the Cypriot donkey. (Navaro-Yashin, 2006, p.86)

Such understandings encouraged the idea that Turkey should be respected at all times, and forbade any criticism of Turkey. During this era, the strategies of ethnonationalist parties were reflected in the Turkish Cypriot press and in school history books. Research conducted by Şahin (2008) showed that the Turkish Cypriot administration and other powerful institutions became the Turkish Cypriot media organisations’ main information providers, and exerted power over them in their own interests. The right-wing press attempted to mobilise the population against the Greek Cypriot community by reinforcing nationalist perceptions. It “strengthen[ed] the stereotype among Turkish Cypriots that ‘all Greek Cypriots are bad and corrupt’ by attaching news value to anything negative about Greek Cypriots” (Şahin, 2008, p.77), and it portrayed Turkish Cypriots “as part of the Turkish nation” (Şahin, 2008, p.78). Moreover, it also disseminated the idea that solving the Cyprus “problem” could only achieve enosis (Şahin, 2008, p.79). Turkish Cypriot school history books propagated an ethnonationalist perspective, reflecting the nationalist demands of Turkey and Greece (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008). They encouraged hatred, mistrust and fear towards Greek Cypriots, presenting the brutality, ruthlessness and mercilessness of the Other “by mentioning violent events” (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008, pp.148–149).

As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, although ethnic nationalism (or motherland nationalism) continued to shape the Turkish Cypriot community in the early years of the division of the island, the level of attachment to Turkey among indigenous Turkish Cypriots has been in decline, and Cypriotism or Cypriotness has been on the increase. Young people have “increasingly felt ever more alienated” from the nationalist discourse, which they consider to be “self-isolationist, chauvinistic, and banal” (Hatay, 2009, p.153). It will become evident that the majority of my participants questioned the school history books and
pointed out the nationalistic and inherent prejudices (assumptions) that underlay them (see Chapter 5). They engaged in contrapuntal thinking in relation to Turkish Cypriot school history books and commemorations (see Chapter 5), and also in relation to a number of other practices that they assumed were hegemonic, such as Turkey’s immigration strategy, the construction of a theological college in northern Cyprus, and Turkey’s water project (see Chapter 7).

Indeed, it is interesting that much of what Turkish Cypriots hailed as the superiority of their cultural identity emerged after the beginning of the TRNC’s dependence on Turkey. During British colonialism, indigenous Turkish Cypriots’ approach to Turkey was not marked by a belief in the binary of “superior Cypriotness” versus “inferior Turkishness”. That is to say, indigenous Turkish Cypriots did not bring with them any ready-made ideas of “Turkish inferiority”, “Cypriot superiority” or an exalted “Cypriotness” shared by both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. My argument is that there is one event that we need to pay close attention to here: the opening of the Green Line on 23 April 2003. As I discussed in Chapter 2, the opening of the Green Line made significant changes to Cypriots’ lives – both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. People from both communities flocked to the “other side” to see their abandoned homes, visit family graves and meet friends they had not seen since the division of 1974. This was the first time that young Cypriots came together with the Other community. With the opening of the crossings, many indigenous Turkish Cypriots started to find jobs and to study on the Greek side, and they began to use their citizenship rights in the RoC. This included enjoying the right to health services and obtaining RoC passports, which allowed indigenous Turkish Cypriots to travel to Europe without a visa and provided them with a sense of Europeanness and European identity.

Hatay (2009) argues that the opening of the Green Line in 2003 offered a new passageway to the southern part of the island and gave Turkish Cypriots a new vision of the island’s crucial European nature. Hatay notes that after their first crossings, Turkish Cypriots encountered boutiques selling global brands and

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13 Obtaining an RoC passport is an option available to indigenous Turkish Cypriots because the RoC claims sovereignty over the whole island and asserts that Turkish Cypriots are its citizens. Mainland Turkish-origin TRNC citizens, however, are excluded from this and treated as outsiders.
shops providing electronics and alternative consumer products that they could not find in the north. For Turkish Cypriots on the northern side of the island, as Hatay (2009, p.158) puts it:

Everything seemed much shabbier, not as new, clean, or progressive as the island’s “other half”… It was very easy to blame this difference on the immigrants who appeared most viscerally to represent it. While Greek Cypriots were “European” – perceived by the cars they drove, the clothes they wore, the type of vacations they took – immigrants had made the north into “the East”, a piece of Muslim Turks.

Following on from the statement above, I suggest that we can identify a number of similarities and differences between Said’s (1978) Orientalist discourse and the post-postcolonial discourse produced by indigenous Turkish Cypriots. In both cases, the Orient is contrasted with the Occident, forming a conceptual binary. What makes post-postcolonial discourse different is that it is not the colonised but the coloniser whose culture is perceived to be backward. Therefore, as will be seen in Chapter 7, Turkey’s presence in northern Cyprus is not understood as a much-needed social revolution, because the mainland Turks who are bringing changes to the island are ultimately representatives of an imaginary “inferior” civilisation. Furthermore, as I will argue in Chapter 6, it is in this historic moment of crossing the border and meeting the Greek Cypriot Other that indigenous Turkish Cypriots begin to discover themselves to be “not so European or Western”. In the same moment, they seemingly realise that mainland Turks are “at the outer edge” (Hall, 1996, p.228) of the Western world. My argument is that with this profound “cultural discovery” (Hall, 1996, p.231), the West or Europe – and more specifically, the “other side” of the island – have become for indigenous Turkish Cypriots the reference point from which differences are repositioned and inclusions and exclusions generated. Last but not least, following this acceptance of the presence of the European Other, the complexity of identity in northern Cyprus has begun to exceed the binary opposition between “superior” Turkish Cypriots and “inferior” mainland Turks (see Chapter 6).
In this study, therefore, I do not deny the argument that Cypriotism/Cypriotness gained ascendancy after the division of the island in line with changing political, economic, social and cultural circumstances (as discussed in Chapter 2). Rather, I add to this statement by suggesting that Cypriotism/Cypriotness is a product of post-postcolonialism: it is produced against two constitutive Others, and it is a melting pot of several disparate elements. Although it is underpinned by a sense of power or superiority (the postcolonial present), it is also informed by a sense of powerlessness (the colonial present). In other words, Cypriotness is about the in-between position to which the post-postcolonial condition gave birth. In the next section, I will turn to the work of Bhabha (1994) to provide a framework for better understanding this post-postcolonial position. I will briefly explain the critical position that Bhabha takes and how his ideas are taken up in this research.

### 3.3. Cultural Hybridity and the Third Space

Bhabha is able to sustain a differential quality throughout his work that Said’s theoretical framework was not quite able to achieve (Chakrabarti, 2012, pp.9–10). Bhabha discusses the challenging issue of binary oppositions (in the sense in which Said uses them). He suggests that the main purpose of colonial discourse was to develop a space for the colonised through the production of knowledge, continual surveillance, and the construction of stereotypes. Bhabha recognises that the colonial condition was based on the colonised and coloniser possessing immutable identities and the cultural differences which resulted from this binary opposition. The “ideological construction of otherness” (Bhabha, 1994, p.93; also see Bhabha, 1983, p.18) – such as in the notion of “superior” and exalted Britishness against “inferior” Indianness, or in the consistent Othering of the colonised – helped the coloniser to develop an administrative system, and to position the West in a superior position. The primary point where Bhabha’s work of differs from Said’s is that Bhabha positions Said’s concept of latent Orientalism in the psychological rather than the political realm. As Chakrabarti (2012. pp.11–12) writes, Bhabha tries to restructure and recreate the problematic of representation “in terms of the ‘Lacanian schema of the Imaginary’”, and by
transforming its simplistic binary logic into a postmodern logic of ambivalence, hybridity and heterogeneity.

The notion of hybridity occupies an integral place in the postcolonial condition (Fanon, 1970; Bhabha, 1994). Many academics have defined and debated the postcolonial concept of hybridity (Gilroy, 1993; Bakhtin, 1981; Young, 1995; Hall, 1990), but Bhabha’s theorisation of the term is the most influential and widely discussed in recent postcolonial studies. In order to understand Bhabha’s account of cultural hybridity, we primarily need to understand that Bhabha does not see culture as a static entity. Opposing the concept of a cultural purity as separate and distinct from foreign cultures which an individual can “return” to, Bhabha (1994) advances the concept of cultural hybridity: there is no innate, pure Indianness, Africanness or Britishness that can be isolated, defined, examined or returned to. He contends that culture is not something that can be fixed in time or space; rather, it is fluid and continually changing. Many elements are involved in culture, with new elements being frequently added and transforming people’s cultural identities. Culture, for Bhabha, is based on a sense of mixedness or interconnectedness. He calls this “hybridity”. Indeed, in his introduction, Bhabha (1994, p.5) clearly defines cultural hybridity and makes a comparison to a stairwell:

The stairwell as liminal space, in-between the designations of identity, becomes the process of symbolic interaction, the connective tissue that constructs the difference between upper and lower, black and white. The hither and thither of the stairwell, the temporal movement and passage that it allows, prevents identities at either end of it from settling into primordial polarities. This interstitial passage between fixed and identifications opens the possibility of a cultural hybridity that entertains difference without an assumed or imposed hierarchy.

14 Although Bhabha subsequently authored a number of important works, such as “The Black Savant and the Dark Princess” (2006), “On Global Memory” (2009) and “Beyond Photography” (2011), his most influential work of postcolonial theory is the collection of essays titled The Location of Culture (1994). The latter deals with not only the slippery notion of culture and its inherent hybridity, but also the liminal and ambiguous place of postcolonial theory within contemporary academic discourse.
Bhabha’s cultural hybridity, therefore, is “discursive and liminal” (Gunaratnam, 2014, p.6). It can emerge from an in-between, liminal space that is free from the structural hierarchies of the entities themselves. Moreover, according to Bhabha (1994, pp.54–55), all colonial and postcolonial “cultural statements and systems are constructed in this contradictory and ambivalent space” that he calls the “Third Space of Enunciation”.

The notion of the third space, as well as hybridity, impacts on our understanding of the post-postcolonial condition in northern Cyprus. A great number of academics, across various disciplines, have stressed the fluidity, flexibility, hybridity, in-betweenness, malleability and unpredictability of the third space (Bhabha, 1994; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1996; Wang, 2004). For instance, Soja (1996, p.57) – inspired by French philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre – develops a theory of the “thirdspace” as a tentative term that contains real and imaginary spaces, embodying a framework of ideas and semantics in flux:

> Everything comes together in Thirdspace: subjectivity and objectivity, the abstract and the concrete, the real and the imagined, the knowable and the unimaginable, the repetitive and the differential, structure and agency, mind and body, consciousness and the unconscious, the disciplined and the trans disciplinary, everyday life and unending history.

For Bhabha, on the other hand, the third space is created through a dialectical tension between two or more cultures. It is not only a juncture of translations and dialogues, but it also concerns the rooted ideas of identity and cultural concepts of the original culture. The third space therefore presents new possibilities in terms of the meaningful identification and productivity that these new identities entail. This newer realm not only brings fixed notions of culture and identity into question, but also offers the possibility of new cultural meaning. The third space is thus a space of opportunity for the construction of new ideas, and it rejects anything that is already established. It creates new space for fresh thoughts, and it provides people with the opportunity to escape the rigidity and limited focus of colonial binary thinking. It allows inclusion and acceptance rather than exclusion and rejection. In an interview with Rutherford (1990, p.211), Bhabha states:
For me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace two original moments from which the third emerges, rather hybridity to me is the “third space” which enables other positions to emerge. This third space displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom.

3.3.1. The Third Space and Cypriotness

Although I draw from Bhabha’s notions of hybridity and the third space, I am mindful that his theories may not directly relate to my research. His subsuming of the social world to that of text, as Dirlik (1994) argues, may involve an abandonment of the complexities and conflictual tension resulting from renegotiation processes in contemporary society (see Zahir-Bill, 2008, p.68; Zahir, 2003). Nevertheless, aspects of Bhabha’s work provide a useful starting point for this study, and help us to understand the complexity of the conditions involved in the formation of cultural identity (“Cypriotness”) in northern Cyprus. Following on from Bhabha, I suggest that indigenous Turkish Cypriots are functioning within a third space where different cultural layers transform, interconnect and constantly change. In this “transformative space” (Wang, 2004, p.16), culturally hybrid Turkish Cypriot people with a secular/liberal orientation come into close contact with “Eastern” culture. To put it differently, the imaginary inferior culture of mainland Turks, and the imaginary superior culture of indigenous Turkish Cypriots – who see themselves as more European/Western – become connected. What makes matters even more complex is that since the opening of the Green Line in 2003, Turkish Cypriots have been interacting with the other Other: Greek Cypriots. I propose that the third space within the context of northern Cyprus, therefore, emerges out of a tension between three cultures – Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots – and that new power relations become reciprocal in this new space where multiple cultures meet.

As I will show, when these three cultures come into contact with one another, there emerge different cultural categories/hierarchies into which people are divided. Hall (2007, p.154) would argue that this is where “the trouble begins”. In Chapter 6, for instance, I will demonstrate that at the top of the cultural hierarchy are the Greek Cypriot Other, who assumedly (unlike Turkish Cypriots, who are
supposedly living under Eastern hegemony) are able to preserve their cultural values – their Cypriotness – which are associated with Westernness/Europeanness. In turn, they are admired by the majority of my participants; in some cases, they are even imitated (see Chapter 6). At the bottom of the cultural hierarchy are the Eastern Other: mainland Turks (see Chapter 7). This group, by Western standards, is considered to be backward and inferior to both indigenous Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. In Chapter 7, I will show how mainland Turks are demonised and excluded by the vast majority of my participants because of their positioning as Oriental and inappropriate subjects who pose a threat to “superior” Cypriot culture. Finally, I will situate indigenous Turkish Cypriots in-between these two groups. I will argue that although my participants consider themselves more European/Western than mainland Turks, their encounters with Greek Cypriots or the “European” side of the island call this sense of superiority into question.

Thus in this study I aim to demonstrate that post-postcolonial discourse may not appear to be ambivalent at all when it is producing its “inferior” subjects (mainland Turks) from a position of power and superiority. However, the moment the other Other (Greek Cypriots) enter into the equation, this sense of superiority is challenged (see Chapter 6). The feeling of superiority becomes replaced by distress, helplessness and powerlessness every time an indigenous Turkish Cypriot, for instance, crosses the border and realises that the island’s “other half” (the Greek Cypriot side) appears more progressive, more European and more “modern” than the northern side. It is also important to note that these feelings are constantly reinforced in everyday life, because people are constantly reminded that they are economically dependent on Turkey and that there is no way out (see Chapters 6 and 7). This is where a new binary opposition – between “superior” Greek Cypriots and “inferior” indigenous Turkish Cypriots – arises, and the complexity of identity in northern Cyprus goes beyond the binary opposition of “superior” Turkish Cypriots and “inferior” mainland Turks. Relatedly, I will suggest that it is from this space or position “in-between” (Bhabha, 1994, pp.1–2) two binary oppositions that there emerges a new post-postcolonial identity, which I will refer to as “not so Eastern, not so European”: something in-between.15

15 Here, I draw from Bhabha’s (1994) essay “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial
My main argument is that Cypriotness (as well as the complexities of resistance, inclusion and exclusion) is closely related to this post-postcolonial or in-between position. As I seek to show in the following chapters, within this post-postcolonial condition, Cypriotness emerges from the tensions and negotiations between three cultures, which can be illustrated in the diagram below:

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5: The third space of "Cypriotness"**

This conceptual framework will underpin the analysis that will make up the main body of this thesis, and it will be used as a point of departure to explore the relationships among the notion of Cypriotness and complex problems such as resistance (Chapter 5), inclusion (Chapter 6) and exclusion (Chapter 7) as manifested in post-postcolonial discourse. The distinction between the “West” and the “Rest” “marks all identities” (Gunaratnam, 2003, p.18). Together, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will demonstrate how this distinction forms the basis of Cypriotness, and how stereotypes become a scene of “fantasy and defence” (Bhabha, 1983, p.27) for the narcissistic pleasure of superiority or, as Bhabha (1983, p.27) writes, for “an originality which is… threatened by the differences of race, colour and culture”.

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Discourse”, where he explores the psychic processes of colonised peoples (“almost the same, but not quite”) and their wish to imitate the coloniser (“a recognisable Other”).
3.4. Conclusion: Moving Beyond the Boundaries of Postcolonialism

When we consider the work of postcolonial critics, it becomes clear that the concept of postcolonialism can be applied to different contexts. In this study I turn to postcolonial literature and postcolonial theory (Said, 1978, 1993; Bhabha, 1984, 1994) as a mode of analysis or thinking about the living of post-postcolonial conditions in northern Cyprus. I am aware that both Bhabha and Said developed their analyses from literary texts. Therefore, their ideas may not translate into the living of complicated axes of difference in contemporary contexts. The case of Cyprus thus offers an interesting example from which to further develop postcolonial analysis. In an earlier discussion (Chapter 1), I pointed out that the field has developed to include various kinds of postcolonialism, highlighting not only the British aspects but also the French aspects of postcolonialism. Northern Cyprus, like other territories (such as Kashmir) that were once colonised by the West and are now supposedly colonised by Eastern powers (an Other to European colonialism), allows us to go beyond the older form of postcolonialism.

My aim is not to override older versions of postcolonial studies, which primarily focused on the discourse analysis of European texts that emerged from parts of the world once colonised by Europe. Rather, I intend to develop the field of postcolonial studies by expanding its ambit, bringing a new perspective to the existing literature and debate. I will step out of the comfort zone of postcolonial literary theory and apply it to the living of deeper and more complex dynamics relating to resistance, cultural difference, racism, power and identity within the post-postcolonial. Issues that link postcolonialism with other fields also emerge at different points throughout this thesis. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I use ideas from sociology, memory studies and cultural studies at different points, bringing them together in a way that is useful for my argument. Drawing on the concepts and approaches embodied within these alternative ways of viewing the world will facilitate the emergence of an inclusive sociological imagination and aid engagement with the complexities involved in researching post-postcolonial spaces (Moles, 2007). In the next chapter, I address some of the methodological concerns at stake in researching formations of cultural identity within this post-postcolonial space.
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodological framework used in the study that is sensitive to the positioning of the research participant and the researcher and to the way that narratives and practices of identity are produced and framed within the research relationship. My methodological approach encompasses auto-ethnography with forty months of ethnography and participant observation at cultural festivals, local coffee shops and weddings, and twenty-seven semi-structured interviews and informal interviews with Turkish Cypriots in different cities in northern Cyprus. I begin by discussing my mixed method approach and then reflect on my own positionality in my fieldwork and the research process, including the challenges of the research.

4.1. Combining Ethnography and Auto-ethnography

To recap, the objectives of this study are the following:

1. To examine the ways in which the complexity of the relationship between the colonial past and the colonial and postcolonial present, to which I refer as post-postcolonialism, relates to the current dynamics of Turkish Cypriot identity

2. To investigate how ‘Cypriotness’ emerges from the dynamic tension between the intersecting cultures of Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Turks from the Turkish mainland

3. To investigate the claims produced by the discourse of Cypriotness, tracing and analysing their effects

4. To examine how practices serve to reinscribe the borders of Turkish Cypriot identity

I suggest that in order to achieve these objectives, it is vital that a researcher spends long periods of time with the people studied, and that through repetitive,
situational observations, conversations, and interviews, initial and emerging interpretations can be developed and tested.

As a researcher I am also a part of the Turkish Cypriot community in my role as a traditional dancer: as such I am bound up in differently situated relationships between people, physical places, and cultural and everyday practices. Drawing on Back and Puwar’s (2012) live methods manifesto, the study considers the multiplicity of forms, objects and concepts available when conducting ‘live’ sociological research. Back and Puwar (2012, p.6) state that “in the early 21st century, sociology can no longer claim exclusive jurisdiction over empirical techniques of investigation.” Hence, they argue for “live sociology” as “a more artful and crafty approach to sociological research” that “embraces new technological opportunities while expanding the attentiveness of researchers”. They emphasise that “despite the institutional threats to sociology […] the discipline is well placed in our current moment to develop creative, public and novel modes of doing imaginative and critical sociological research” (Back and Puwar, 2012, p.6) I suggest that researching identity formation cannot take place through concepts and words alone, but also needs to extend to methodological devices and approaches that can attend to the emotional, fleeting and multisensorial aspects of the social world. Thus, in this study I adopt a mixed-method approach to ethnography, combining elements of auto-ethnography and sensory ethnography, which allows me to attend to the multiple facets and textures of post-postcolonial narratives and understand how they interconnect with the formation of Cypriot identity.

Ethnography – from the Greek words ethnos (folk/people) and graphein (writing) – has its roots in sociology and anthropology. Atkinson et al. (2001, p.4) propose that ethnographic traditions are generally grounded in a shared “commitment to the first-hand experience and exploration of a particular social or cultural setting on the basis of (though not exclusively by) participant observation”. For Cresswell (2009, p.68):

Ethnography is a qualitative design in which the researcher describes and interprets the shared and learned patterns of values, behaviors, beliefs, and language of a culture-sharing
As both a process and an outcome of research, ethnography is a way of studying a culture-sharing group as well as the final, written product of that research.

Ethnographic research aims to examine a group of peoples’ way of life from their own perspective, assuming that beneath superficial appearances lies greater depth of meaning and understanding. Ethnographers undertake extended periods of living embedded within a group to ascertain “social meaning in its full richness” (Woods, 1986, p.5), examining associations and connections, following fragments and tracing orientations and concerns. As the ethnographer passes through her fieldwork sites (which may or may not be physically distinct locations) the identity and positioning of the ethnographer requires re-negotiation; on-going attention must be paid to reflexive self-identification and changing positionality. In a similar way to the arguments made by feminist theorists, this recognition of the entanglement between the researcher and her field, disrupts traditional empirical notions of neutrality and objectivity and complicates simplistic assumptions of commonality and difference in research (see Gunaratnam, 2003).

Ethnography is, therefore, based on participant observation of a group and/or individuals within that group by a researcher who spends extended periods of time by immersing themselves within a social milieu by interacting with group members and participating in their day-to-day lives (Kawulich, 2005). Autoethnography, on the other hand, is most often discussed in regard to the practices of writing and reporting. It is “an autobiographical genre of writing and research that displays multiple layers of consciousness connecting the personal to the cultural” (Ellis and Bochner, 2000, p.739). The interdisciplinary scholar and qualitative researcher Ellis (2004, p.200) – whom is frequently cited as one of the pioneers in originating and developing autoethnography – stresses that what researchers write (their written product) must account for what they share in common with others as well as what is unique to their own narrative. Ellis (2004, p.37) views auto-ethnography as being composed of “multiple layers of consciousness”: 
Back and forth autoethnographers gaze: first they look through an ethnographic wide angle lens focusing outward on social and cultural aspects of their personal experience, then they look inward exposing a vulnerable self that is moved by and may move through, refract and resist cultural interpretations.

The difference between traditional ethnography and auto-ethnography is that in the latter the author does not adopt the methodological convention of the ‘objective outsider’ (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p.6). Additionally, whereas ethnography utilises a variety of fieldwork techniques such as participant observation and interviews, auto-ethnography employs memory work and the “excavation of artefacts via the remembering of experiences of identity formation” (Reed-Danahay, 1997, p.6). Reed-Danahay argues that “an auto-ethnography is more authentic than ethnography and that the voice of the insider can be assumed to be more true than that of the outsider” (p.3). Read-Danahay’s arguments emphasise an area in which the apparent proximity and intimacy that I am assumed to share with the Turkish Cypriots is important and should be explicated as a part of the research process and how research is presented.

Sarah Pink (2009, p.64) maintains that auto-ethnography is in many ways similar to sensory participation, “a method that allows ethnographers to use their own experiences as a route through which to produce academic knowledge”. In a similar way, Ellis et al. (2011, p.4) point out that “when researchers do autoethnography, they retrospectively and selectively write about epiphanies that stem from, or are made possible by, being part of a culture and/or by possessing a particular cultural identity.” Auto-ethnography involves writing about one’s personal experience in relationship to and within the research. Encounters at a personal level are embodied as critical reflections, employing the researcher’s personal emotions, feelings and vulnerabilities as data (Ellis and Bochner, 2000). However, as feminist discussions of reflexivity have made clear, reflexivity and critical reflection, assume a rational subjectivity where a research is able to access their experience (Hollway and Jefferson, 2010). In this thesis, rather than relying solely on my own subjectivity as the only data source, I situate myself, my stories and my memories within the stories of my research participants and the wider social, historical and cultural context so that I am able to interrogate my research
relationships and interpretations, through perspectives other than my own. Thus, I use and experiment with elements of auto-ethnography that “reconceptualise the self as necessarily entangled with other bodies and unconscious experiences” (Cho, 2008, p.45). Through my participation in situations similar to those in which the participants of this study have lived, I try to find ways to ‘create correspondences’ with participants’ past experiences drawing on, but also critically examining and problematising my own experience (see Pink, 2009). Articulating a story so that it captures the imagination of the reader is and disclosing the whole truth of research relationships is certainly ‘not for the faint-hearted’ (Muncey, 2010, p.94).

It is important to highlight that these descriptions of auto-ethnography are prescriptive accounts of the method. Stacey (1991) for example questions whether the appearance of commonality and greater equality between researcher and participants can produce and conceal differences and increase the risk of betrayal or manipulation. Here, the model of a distanced observer can be replaced by one of intimacy, with the implication that intimacy can yield ‘better’ data.

As a research method, auto-ethnography also has epistemological pitfalls. Most commonly, auto-ethnography can be an overly egocentric approach – as the researcher puts herself/himself at the centre of her/his research - which fails to maintain the standards of objectivity expected in academic research. Responding to this criticism, auto-ethnographers emphasise that the choice to put the researcher’s voice at the forefront does not necessarily diminish the validity and overall value of work produced using this method. Bochner and Ellis (2002, p.216), for example, suggest that the self is, by its very nature, a social and relational product. Auto-ethnography is often regarded as fraught with complications, and is not a research method that can be adopted by everyone (Muncey, 2010, p.35). Another way of engaging with the charge of narcissism is that auto-ethnographies express specific commitments to an ethics of co-construction between writers, readers and third parties. As Holt (2003) suggests the accusation of narcissism that is attributed to autoethnography assumes it to be a universal enterprise without attending to the particularities of the research in question.
Furthermore, Chang (2008, p.55) points out that triangulation – employing multiple methodologies as sources of data – can increase the accuracy and validity of ethnographic work. Although the method has significant potential and value, I see my own auto-ethnographic account as one small facet of the wider socio-historical context of Turkish Cypriot identity formation. Indeed, through an intersectional lens, it is the case my own subjective experience as a Turkish Cypriot is not fully representative of how others may have experienced the formation of their identity through differences of gender, age and class. In this sense, although my own subjectivity offers some insights into the process of understanding the formation of Turkish Cypriot identity, a more critical understanding can only be achieved by supplementing this approach with sensory ethnography.

4.2. Subjectivity, Reflexivity and Shifting Positionalities

The use of the self as a research instrument makes it necessary to have a sociological discussion of the challenges and complexities postcolonial feminist frameworks raise for ethnographic and auto-ethnographic research. Relying on the self as a research instrument can mean that “the researcher’s own subjectivity will come to bear on the research project and any subsequent reporting of findings” (Bourke, 2014, p.2). Bourke (2014, p.3) notes that “to achieve a pure objectivism is a naive quest, and we can never truly divorce ourselves from subjectivity”. This can mean that through her own subjective entanglements, the researcher will leave her or his own vagaries on the research. Indeed, from a feminist perspective, as Ozkazanc-Pan (2012, p.578) writes, “the researcher herself is never ‘outside’ the research process or separated from the research subjects as ‘objective’ observer.”

Ellis et al. (2011, p.2) suggest that the "crisis of confidence" engendered by 1980s postmodernism introduced a variety of new opportunities to reform social science knowledge formation and reconceive the objectives and the forms which social scientific inquiry should take. Social science’s ontological, epistemological and axiological limitations have increasingly troubled academics (Ellis et al., 2011, p.2). It was indeed in the 1980s that “the signifier ‘feminist’ was first attached to
‘method’ and ‘methodology’, most prominently” (Gunaratnam and Hamilton, 2017, p.115). Gunaratnam and Hamilton (2017, p.115) argues:

Early discussions suggested that feminist research and knowledge-making demanded a distinct approach to empirical inquiry: one that recognised and overturned systemic gender disparities, validated women’s “experience”, rejected hierarchies between the researcher and research participant, and had emancipation and social change as its purpose.

Additionally, there was an increasing appetite to resist sterile research practices grounded in a colonialist mentality whereby researchers entering a culture, exploited its members through knowledge extraction and then subsequently exited the site to analyse the culture for professional and/or financial gain whilst disregarding all relational ties with cultural members (Ellis et al., 2011, p.3; see also Gunaratnam and Hamilton, 2017). Scholars across the social sciences, therefore, showed a greater interest in auto-ethnography, seeking an alternative methodology which constructively responded to and accounted for critiques of canonical ideas about the nature of research and research practice (Ellis et al., 2011, p.2). Such researchers aimed to produce accessible, meaningful evocative research which was grounded in their own subjective personal experience; research which sensitised readers to identity politics, to experiences hitherto kept silent, and to forms of representation that broaden our ability to “empathise with people who are different from us” (Ellis et al., 2011, pp.2–3; see also Ellis and Bochner, 2000).

Auto-ethnographers recognise the innumerable ways personal experience influences the research process. For instance, Ellis et al. (2011, p.3) suggest that:

A researcher decides who, what, when, where, and how to research, decisions necessarily tied to institutional requirements (e.g., Institutional Review Boards), resources (e.g., funding), and personal circumstance (e.g., a researcher studying cancer because of personal experience with cancer).
Consequently, for Ellis et al. (2011, p.3), autoethnography is capable of acknowledging and accommodating the subjective, the emotional, and the influence which the researcher inevitably brings to the research process rather than hiding from the implications of involvement or denying that such issues exist. Indeed, Ellis et al. (2011) further argue that although some researchers still assume that research can be carried out objectively from a neutral and impersonal position (Atkinson, 1997; Buzard, 2003; Delamont, 2009), most now concede that discourses of objective and impartial study in the social sciences are unattainable (Bochner, 2002; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Rorty, 1982).

Positionality represents a place where objectivism and subjectivism exist in a dialectical relationship (see Bourke, 2014). As Hall (1990, p. 18) argues, “there’s no enunciation without positionality. You have to position yourself somewhere in order to say anything at all.” However, Bourke (2014, p.3) warns us that as researchers we need to recognise “who we are as individuals, and as members of groups, and as resting in and moving within social positions”. Bourke (2014, p.1) states:

Research represents a shared space, shaped by both researcher and participants […]. As such, the identities of both researcher and participants have the potential to impact the research process. Identities come into play via our perceptions, not only of others, but of the ways in which we expect others will perceive us. Our own biases shape the research process, serving as checkpoints along the way. Through recognition of our biases, we presume to gain insights into how we might approach a research setting, members of particular groups, and how we might seek to engage with participants.

Positionality can therefore be seen as the outcome of the imbrication of multiple identities and positions in the field, which constantly change and impact on the ways narratives are produced (Kezar, 2002; Bourke, 2014). In my research, the combination of an ethnographic and an auto-ethnographic approach demands that I think about how “differences in position […] which may take place through gender, ethnicity, and class among other relations” (Ozkazanc-Pan, 2012, p.574) affect the research as well as researcher-participant relationships. I hold Turkish
Cypriot and Cypriot citizenship, and because of my fluent cultural and linguistic knowledge (and also my appearance), I was seen as a native/insider. However, from a postcolonial feminist perspective, “native” is a contested term (Ozkazanc-Pan, 2012; see also Narayan, 1997). As Gunaratnam (2003, p.85) points out, “even when there is a shared language between researchers and research participants, other differences, such as class, can have a significant effect upon communication and the interpretation of meaning.” While I was conducting my fieldwork in Kalavac, Buyukkonuk and Mehmetcik (I discuss these locations in more detail below), multiple identities came into play during the course of the fieldwork. Depending on the context, my educational background in London marked me as part of the upper middle class, in other cases my age served to position elders in the position of authority over me. These dynamics affected the research process in terms not only of my encounters with the participants and the questions asked in the interviews but also influenced the points I ignored and I followed up on, and the writing up of the research. To further illuminate this point, below is a transcript extrapolated from an informal interview with a middle-aged working-class Turkish Cypriot man in Kalavac:

Interviewee: Are you a student?
Rahme: Yes.

Interviewee: Where do you study?
Rahme: In London.

Interviewee: That’s very good. I wanted to send my daughter to London as well. She really wanted to study there but she changed her mind. She knew that we couldn’t afford it.

Rahme: I totally understand you. I come from a working-class family too, money has always been tight. That’s why I have had to work and study at the same time.

Interviewee: Great! I feel so proud when I see that our young people are accomplishing great things. Nice to meet you!

Based on my subjective interpretation, although he seemingly perceived me as middle-class in the first instance, as the conversation progressed, I was able to establish rapport with him due to our shared experiences as working-class Turkish
Cypriots living in Northern Cyprus. I also experienced strong connections with some of the middle-class and upper class participants who were willing to answer my questions. Yet, shifting class identity was not the only one that emerged out of my research interactions. An ethnic position also emerged during my fieldwork. A core aspect of my identity is being Turkish Cypriot. I felt a strong sense of connectedness to the Turkish Cypriots that I interacted with. For instance, during the interviews with younger generation Turkish Cypriots regarding history lessons and school textbooks, school visits to museums and memorials (see Chapter 5) or discussions about family stories about the past and Greek Cypriots (see Chapter 6), the respondents and myself shared similar social and cultural coordinates. This sense of connectedness was expressed through assumptions of shared knowledge such as “I know you understand what I am talking about” and “I know you understand how I feel”.

However, such assumptions of shared understanding need reflexive interrogation. It was for these reasons that I employed ethnographic and auto-ethnographic approaches, both of which refer to a reflexive practice whereby the researcher is embedded in the research context at a material and psycho-social level. Such methods emphasise and recognise the intersections of the researcher’s voice, place and privilege, which need to be made explicit in the encounters with research participants and in writing up the research. This process allows the researcher to consider what she or he attends to and how she or he pays attention to it in terms of what actually becomes data (Ozkazanc-Pan, 2012, p.583; see also Denzin and Giardina, 2008).

4.3. Locations, Observations and Interviews

In many respects, the findings of this ethnographic study are a collection of conversations, observations and images from different times and across different locations: from cultural festivals and weddings, to local coffee houses and other community gatherings. The main data collection techniques that I used were participant observation, semi-structured interviews and informal/conversational interviews.
4.3.1. Observations

Atkinson et al. (2001, p.352) describe participant observation as “establishing a place in some natural setting on a relatively long-term basis in order to investigate, experience and represent the social life and social processes that occur in that setting”. Participant observation is conducted over an extended period of time and involves regular observation, listening to and engaging in conversations, collecting documents, images and voices, and taking field notes (Silverman, 2001). In this study, participant observation enabled me to observe interactions among the communities of Cyprus (Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots) and to grasp how they communicated with each other. Additionally, participant observation allowed me to examine subjects’ everyday lives and cultural practices from their point of view, as well as to observe situations that subjects might otherwise have been unwilling to share. The importance of these interactions is underscored by how they enabled me to contextualise the engendering/formulation of cultural distinctions (between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks) and cultural similarities.

Much of the fieldwork was conducted between June 2014 and October 2017. Observation locations were at social events or gatherings of Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, such as weddings, and cultural festivals in three different locations: Kalavac, Mehmetcik and Buyukkonuk. I attended nine Turkish Cypriot weddings, eleven weddings of mainland Turks and one mixed wedding (between a Turkish Cypriot and a mainland Turk) in the district of Nicosia. It should be noted that my invitation to these weddings did not only come through my own social networks, but also through a chance encounter as they were open weddings being held in location situated next to my abode. Weddings are usually held during the summer months because of the good weather; thus, these observations took place during the summers of 2014 to 2017. Attending these weddings – especially the mainland Turkish weddings and the mixed wedding – was important, since they allowed me to observe interactions between mainland Turks and indigenous Turkish Cypriots. For example, on several occasions I heard comments from Turkish Cypriots such as “they need to turn this annoying music down, we are starting to get headaches”, “all the wedding guests will stay until the free cake has run out,” or “aren’t they hot with their headscarves on this summer
night? We are boiling.” My observations in these weddings provided insights into practices of cultural distinction as exclusionary toward mainland Turks, but also become a site through which I could recruit the participants for my interviews. I also conducted five hours of participant observation at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac (a village in the Nicosia district) in April 2015; four hours of participant observation at the Eco Day Festival in Buyukkonuk (a village in the Famagusta district) in October 2016; and forty hours of participant observation at the Grape Festival in Mehmetcik (another village in the Famagusta district) in August 2016. In addition, I observed and took part in other cultural activities, and I made connections with Turkish Cypriot writers, poets, photographers, artists, and folk dance groups such as the Degirmenlik Municipality Folk Dance Group and the Kalavac Folk Dance Group.

I started the fieldwork with descriptive observations of the field sites. I subsequently followed up these descriptive tours with more focused and selective observations. My overarching aim was to ascertain a sense of the following: (1) activities and practices carried out in their social settings; (2) various forms of expressive culture, such as music, dance, song and art; (3) more specifically, social interactions and conversations between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, and among Turkish Cypriots themselves. In the field, I often walked among the stalls, moving backwards and forwards between activities, eating traditional food, conversing with people, and taking photographs and notes. At weddings, I usually sat in a chair alongside other people while taking notes, which made my presence fairly noticeable. This approach helped to elicit curiosity in those I engaged with during their everyday activities, in addition to piquing the interest of passers-by, who regularly felt compelled to ask me what I was doing.

My verbal communications with participants were predominantly conducted in Cypriot Turkish (a dialect of the Turkish language spoken by Turkish Cypriots, see below). Thereafter, I translated the interviews and field notes (which were mostly written in Cypriot Turkish) into English myself. The field notes included records of what was observed, including informal conversations with participants, conversations that took place among Turkish Cypriots, contextual observations related to non-verbal communications, and my comments, thoughts, ideas, questions and feelings. I used the field notes as evidence to interpret and question
the data. I also used my mobile phone and notebook to take photograph and record audio when necessary. The variety of documents later on allowed me to confirm and contrast the findings and offered different perspectives on the data.

I gained access to the festival locations through a gatekeeper. I conducted the fieldwork as a member of the Hasder Folk Arts Foundation, a non-governmental association whose members became key informants in the course of the fieldwork, allowing me access to key settings. Hasder also developed an appreciation of my study and directed me to events, individuals and situations likely to be helpful to the progress of my research. Having this opportunity allowed me to approach people who would usually be difficult to approach because of the sensitive nature of the research (see Sanghera and Thapar-Bjorkert, 2008). Other types of gatekeeper during this research also included writers, poets, photographers, artists and folk dance groups that I met at the Kalavac Festival. These individuals acted as “unsolicited” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) informants/gatekeepers who provided me with organic accounts, which are always preferable due to their spontaneity and naturalism (Bryman, 2001, p.432).

4.3.2. Semi-structured and Informal Interviews

Besides observing the field sites, I also conducted semi-structured and informal interviews (“conversations”) with indigenous Turkish Cypriots during my fieldwork. Semi-structured interviews and informal interviews with the participants helped me to complement my observations and to understand the complexity and ambivalence of post-postcolonial narratives, as well as the tensions and negotiations among Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots.

Informal interviews constituted one of the most significant and valuable of my data sources. For the most part, informal interviews took place in northern Cyprus between June 2014 and October 2017. Although the informal interviews were unstructured they helped me to orientate to the field and provided opportunities to

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16 Hasder is a non-profit, non-governmental organisation which aims to arrange social, educational and cultural events in order to sustain the traditional values of Cyprus. Not only does it assist and participate in many festive events such as stylistic and authentic folk dances, and organise exhibitions of traditional crafts, but it also gives training to attendees to teach them how to produce such items (see hasder.org, 2019).
identify participant-centred concerns and experiences that informed the semi-structured interview questions.

I conducted a total of twenty-seven semi-structured interviews with indigenous Turkish Cypriots between October 2014 and October 2017 (see Appendix 2 for short biographies of the interviewees). The research participants selected during the fieldwork were recruited using a combination of convenience sampling and snowball sampling techniques (see Bryman, 2016, pp.187–188). One of the epistemological advantages of using semi-structured interviews was that they provided me with a rich plethora of information through the use of open-ended questions. This open-ended approach also enabled my interviewees to talk freely about the issue, and in turn, offered an “insider view of the social world” (Bazeley, 2013, p.27) and provided “compelling descriptions of the qualitative world” (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009, p.48).

The semi-structured interviews took place in interviewees’ homes, and each lasted between approximately one and two hours. All interviewees were made aware of the research project’s ethical guidelines prior to the interview. I decided that interviews would be conducted in the homes of the interviewees because in Turkish Cypriot culture it is considered more respectful for the interviewer to be invited into the participant’s home. I conducted interviews with men and women with a mix of ages. People aged between eighteen and fifty, and the over-fifties, were the initial target groups. I chose these age groups because it was important to examine how experiences might change across generations: people who were born before or after the division of the island, and between people who lived in Northern Cyprus before or only after the arrival of Turkish settlers. Although I conducted interviews with different age groups, as discussed earlier, I focus on a particular generational experience that embodies certain distinct sociopolitical and ethnic characteristics. For example, the vast majority of my research participants belong to the generation born after 1974. Invariably, these people have no direct experience of intercommunal violence or war in Cyprus. Moreover, although a minority of my participants were born prior to 1974, they tend to have only partial memories of Cyprus before that year, because they were in the early stages of their childhoods. Consequently, this might mean that their political views are likely to be at odds with those the older generation who experienced the war and
intercommunal violence (although that is not within the scope of my thesis). The majority of my participants’ political affiliations are aligned with left-wing parties such as Akinci, and are opposed to the policies of ethnonational parties. Further, all of my participants are of middle-class origin and have traditional white-collar jobs (see Appendix 2 for participants’ short biographies). For the purposes of consistency, the rest of my thesis will refer to this specific participant group as the “post-war generation” or “young generation” of Turkish Cypriots. The thesis will refer to people who experienced the war as the “war generation” or “old generation” of Turkish Cypriots.

My semi-structured interviews and conversations with the participants included the following open-ended topics:

- How Turkey’s political strategies and practices regarding Northern Cyprus were perceived
- What Turkish Cypriots thought about nationalist discourse and discursive practices
- What they had thought about the Greek side of Cyprus when they saw it after the opening of the Green Line in 2003
- How they described the differences between the Turkish side and the Greek side of the island
- What they thought about Greek Cypriots when they met them for the first time (after the opening of the Green Line)
- What their general thoughts were about Greek Cypriots
- What their general thoughts were about mainland Turks
- What young Turkish Cypriots had heard from their family members regarding the war years and life with Greek Cypriots before the division of the island
- How elderly Turkish Cypriots described their everyday lives before and after the division of the island
- How their lives had changed after the division of the island

My interviews enabled me to investigate the formation of Turkish Cypriot identity through biographical narratives and the symbolic meanings behind official history and discursive practices – such as national celebration days, and visits to
memorials and museums – that function as mnemonic instruments, revealing the tensions between nationalist discourse and post-postcolonial discourse (see Chapter 5). Secondly, the interviews allowed me to see how Turkish Cypriots positioned themselves in relation to Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks (see Chapters 6 and 7). I was further able to examine the complex and ambivalent patterns and practices of distinction between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks (see Chapters 6 and 7), as well as the patterns and practices of inclusion between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (see Chapter 6). Additionally, these questions permitted me to go beyond contradictory stories about the past and Greek Cypriots, allowing me to understand the politics of remembering and forgetting in post-postcolonial Turkish Cypriot society (see Chapter 6).

An audio recorder was used to record the ongoing conversations. When my use of the recorder and the occasional writing of field notes became intrusive for participants and risked eliciting artificial responses, I stopped recording and took notes. Frequently, participants were curious about the study: they would engage me in questions to find out more about the research, which also gave me an opportunity to continue the conversation.

Chen (2011) argues that possessing an outsider status means that the researcher is in a weaker position than the interviewee which, therefore, makes it easier for the researcher to elicit information from interviewees. Chen (2011, p.119) expands on this by stating that “one reason for this is that the interviewer is obliged to let interviewees define their concepts, deferring to their position as a language authority and recognising one aspect of the power relationship.” It thus makes sense to assume that speaking the same language as the interviewees is likely to put the researcher in a more powerful position (Cohen et al., 2004; Chen, 2011). Yet, as I have discussed above, other differences, such as age, social class and gender, can have an impact on the research process (see Gunaratnam, 2003). Although I am fluent with the language spoken in northern Cyprus, my age and my researcher status produced an array of power relations. Rather than being wholly negative in some cases a power imbalance had a productive impact on the content and form of the interview. For instance, I asked questions about how Turkish Cypriots had lived before the division of the island in 1974, which was before I was born:
Rahme: What was your life like before the division of the island? What was it like to live together with Greek Cypriots?

Ali: I won’t be able to tell you everything in two to three hours. You will need to come here again, so I can tell you everything. Our young people need to learn about the past. You need to learn. It’s so important.

Rahme: I am happy to come again. Let’s start with your village. Where were you living before the division?

Ali: I was living in Larnaca before the division. But let me first tell you about how everything [the conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots] started. I will come to your question after.

This is an extract from an interview I conducted with Ali, a seventy-one-year-old man in Nicosia. It shows that Ali, who was forty-five years older than me, expressed a strong desire to deepen my understanding of the political and cultural factors that led to the division of the island in 1974. Although he chose to take control of the interview rather than to be directed by me, he answered all my questions, also discussed topics that I did not think about asking.

4.3.3. Analysing Data: Thematic Analysis

As I discussed in Chapter 3, this study found a post-postcolonial discourse as a site through which Turkish Cypriot identity was performed and negotiated. The definition of the term discourse varies between scholars but Hollway and Jefferson (2000, p.14) write that discourse

refers beyond language to a set of organised meanings (which can include images as well as words) on a given theme […] The term ‘discourse’ has been used to emphasise the organised way in which meanings cohere around an assumed central proposition, which gives them their value and significance.

The participants of this study provided “shifting, inconsistent and varied pictures of their social worlds” (Wetherell and Potter, 1988, p.171). Each interview varied insomuch the respondents narrated their own perception and experiences of and ways of understanding the world they inhabited and the spaces they occupied. I
ensured I meticulously read through the interview scripts and made separate notes that related to the specific themes which emerged from the material. After coding, I found that each of the participants had told narratives that reflected three broad post-postcolonial themes: resistance, inclusion and exclusion. These themes were then subsequently ordered into the analytical chapters. The data in this research has therefore been approached thematically.

Thematic analysis method was used to analyse the post-postcolonial narratives, by extrapolating from the semi-structured interviews, informal conversations and my observations. Braun and Clarke (2006, p.82) state that:

Thematic analysis can be an essentialist or realist method, which reports experiences, meanings and the reality of participants, or it can be a constructionist method, which examines the ways in which events, realities, meanings, experiences and so on are the effects of a range of discourses operating within society. It can also be a ‘contextualist’ method, sitting between the two poles of essentialism and constructionism, and characterised by theories such as critical realism (e.g., Willig, 1999), which acknowledge the ways individuals make meaning of their experience, and, in turn, the ways the broader social context impinges on those meanings, while retaining focus on the material and other limits of ‘reality’. Therefore, thematic analysis can be a method which works both to reflect reality, and to unpick or unravel the surface of ‘reality’.

The rationale to deploy thematic analysis was vindicated on the basis of its idiosyncratic ability to provide “a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns (themes) within data” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.79). Using thematic analysis was also conducive in helping me contextualise the most sociologically significant themes that emerged from my research, and analyse the wider context within which participants narratives must be understood and interpreted. From this, I was also able to systematize them in a way that enabled me to analyse the interconnectedness between the global, local and universal themes. Indeed, all these themes and concepts are interrelated and were subjected to sociological inquiry within the context of Turkish Cypriot identity.
Furthermore, I found the synthetic approach to discourse analysis advocated by Wetherell (1998; see also Wetherell and Edley, 1999; Wetherell and Potter, 1988, p.169) helpful for my research. This approach is underpinned by insights from two competing theoretical camps. Firstly, it is predicated upon the ethnomethodological tradition (see for example Antaki, 1988; Edwards and Potter, 1992; Widdicombe and Wooffitt, 1995), which highlights the importance of the “action orientation of language use” (Wetherell and Potter, 1988, p.169). Moreover, this tradition illuminates how speakers use discourse as a conduit to make “accusations, ask questions, justify their conduct and so on” (Wetherell and Potter, 1988, p.169). Secondly, the synthetic approach is underpinned by poststructuralism (see Hollway, 1984; Parker and Shotter, 1990; Wetherell and Potter, 1992), which postulates that “we need to modulate and supplement a study of the performative dimensions of language used within work on wider unintended consequences” (Wetherell and Potter, 1988, p.169). I found this approach to be of great value, as it enabled me to pay attention to how speech acts can reflect on the ways in which social discourses are given meaning in situations.

The excerpts I have documented in the empirical chapters provide insights into the struggles between two different discourses: nationalist discourse and post-postcolonial discourse (see Chapter 5). These excerpts also elucidate a politics of remembering and forgetting in Turkish Cypriot society (see Chapters 6 and 7). In addition, they illustrate the tensions between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (see Chapter 6), and the distinctions that are increasingly being drawn between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks (see Chapter 7). Moreover, the ways in which these excerpts relate and connect to each other are also evidenced in the empirical chapters. In this way, the excerpts synthesise a narrative. In using extracts, where possible I have included contextual information and to show how is embedded within the research interactions. I have done this in an attempt to preserve and convey the context of the speech.

I read participants’ talk as neither entirely subjective nor as objective and behavioural, but as communications that are performative and that can be explored in their organisation of meaning and their effects. Therefore, I attempt not to take such accounts at face value or, conversely, to abstract them from the contexts in which they have sense-making connections.
4.4. Recording and Representing Data

Margaret Mead (1995, p.3; see also Back and Puwar, 2012, p.28) argues that the social sciences remain “disciplines of words”. Although social scientists have considered the ways in which they attend to the social world, Law and Urry contest that social scientific methods have resulted in a very limited range of attentions.

Such methods have difficulty dealing with the sensory – that which is subject to vision, sound, taste, smell; with the emotional – time-space compressed outbursts of anger, pain, rage, pleasure, desire, or the spiritual; and the kinaesthetic – the pleasures and pains that follow movement and displacement of people, objects, information, and ideas. (Law and Urry, 2004, quoted in Back and Puwar, 2012, p.28)

Following on from this, Back and Puwar (2012, p.28) suggest that “sociologists should think of themselves as the authors of representations but these representations need not be confined to the written word.” Researchers now have more opportunities to conduct social inquiry using a great variety of tools, such as through multimedia and mobile technologies (Back and Puwar, 2012, p.28). This means that social scientists are not limited to investigating what people explicitly say – thus, they are empowered to attend to tacit forms of coexistence. I was vehemently challenged in employing these new technologies and in creating accessible ways of collecting and representing my findings. I felt that this was mainly due to a lack of accessible techniques when attempting to record the multisensory “texture” of urban space. Following Rhys-Taylor’s (2010, p.31) argument that “‘being there’ and having all senses ‘switched on’ takes on a particular importance in a multisensory ethnography”, I paid specific attention to the sensory aspects of the research.

In ethnographic settings, sensory modes – sound, smell, taste, kinaesthesia – are interconnected and overlap (Pink, 2008). Pink (2008, p.193) encourages the method of becoming intertwined with the sensorial texture of an environment and stresses the significance of aligning the ethnographer’s own “emplacement” with other people’s “bodies, rhythms, tastes, and ways of seeing” in order to
understand and produce sensory knowledge. Following Pink’s (2005, p.29) contention that “attention to the senses [...] offers routes to analysing other people’s place-making practices,” I attempted to employ multi-sensorial experience as a way of conducting and representing sensory data. Data collection was approached through combining a variety of sensory ethnographic methods with digital media. Photography, video and audio recordings were used to record place, movement and speech. To represent the sensoria of the research location, language and photography were used.

4.4.1. Language and Photography

This research combined an ethnographic and auto-ethnographic writing style. The first person voice was sporadically used to “tell a story” (Ellis, 2011) and reconstruct elements of the fieldwork which I regarded as the most remarkable. My descriptions of the sensoria of the research field are, therefore, not just descriptions of situations where I was present (such as cultural festivals, see Chapter 6; or memorials, see Chapter 5) or interactions which I experienced (Ellis, 2011); they are also descriptions of what I considered to be significant in those situations in the light of my understanding and emplacement in the local cultural context.

Language’s status as the most traditional method for capturing and representing sensuous experiences remains. For example, as Rhys-Taylor (2010, p.36) contends:

Noun-cum-adjectives can be the ideal linguistic tools for translating the materiality of a given sensory landscape into an intelligible form, as long as the description works within the sensory repertoire of the reader. [...] Language] provides a separate set of tools for the description of the emotional and physical responses to that landscape. In fact, despite what Michel Serres notes as the apparent lack of sensuousity in much sociological writing on embodied experience, text can provide the ideal media for representing both the materiality and experience of various sensory stimuli.
Although textual description is a popular tool for translating sensory experience, and the relationships between different sensual modes and social formations, in an ethnographic field, Rhys-Taylor (2010, p.35) reminds us that language as a mode of representation has its limitations, arguing that “language still falls short of accurately representing both the multisensory nuances of the ethnographic field, and the complexity of personal responses to it.” Hence, following Back and Puwar’s (2012) insistence that sociological enquiry should be more artful and crafty, I combined text and photographs in order to “structure intertextual possibilities in the production of meaning: to disrupt, to support or reconfigure existing ways of thinking about and seeing the world” (Knowles, 2006, p.516).

Part of this study focuses on the ways in which Turkish Cypriots’ cultural festivals relate to the wider dynamics of Turkish Cypriot identity (see Chapter 6). I ask broader questions about how cultural distinctions and similarities are produced through cultural practices. The Turkish Cypriot cultural practices in focus are recurrent public enactments of Turkish Cypriot culture, and they are generally valued as reconstructions of the past and presentations of cultural memory and identity. Knowles’s (2006) suggestion that race and ethnicity can be photographed made me think about how the tangibility of identity can be captured through images. I decided to use photographs as I walked the streets of Northern Cyprus – especially the festivals, where I was able to capture Turkish Cypriot culture. As Knowles (2006, p.518) suggests:

Photographs capture the social relationships between people and between people and places, all of which are about race and ethnicity as well as other things too. They reveal the intangibilities [...] of social and spatial relationships. Photographs reveal the unspoken and the unspeakable aspects of routine lives. This is a particularly useful research technique at a time when what may be said about race is both guarded by political posturing and insidiously undermined by what is done.

The saliency of using photography as a tool to support my research is based on the notion that photography encourages us to consider social relationships, race, ethnicity and identity as social constructions which transcend linguistic
capabilities. Communities actively construct a collective identity for themselves through the performative enactment of cultural memory. According to Knowles (2006, p.517), “photographs can reveal this vitality, human energy in a flow of life actively working on the production of racialised subjectivities, in ways that words rendered through interviews and observations could never expose.” Similarly, while conducting my fieldwork, I captured people, places and idiosyncrasies of Turkish Cypriot culture as a mobile observer and interviewer. I photographed people and objects in their cultural and social contexts; I photographed moments, movements and identity (Cypriotness) as live performances (such as cooking and handicraft-making, see Chapter 6), “as people do it rather than verbally articulate it” (Knowles, 2006, P.518). Thus, the use of images in this thesis aims to reveal the external realities that I stumbled into. I also photographed the Cengiz Topel memorial, a site that symbolically represents the historical struggles between the post-war generation Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (see Chapter 5), to provide visual material and elicit relevant responses from interviewees whose identity had been impacted on by the events in question.

The selection of images was therefore based on what I considered to be significant to the focus of my research. Drawing attention to Bourdieu’s interest in photography, Back (2009, p.474) writes that photography reveals choices about “judgement and value”. As Back (2009, p.474) argues, “the biography of the photographer is revealed in the choice s/he makes and yet at the same time the image-maker remains visibly absent.” In a similar way, the images I use in this research are also about me and manifest my “embodiment, judgement and relationship” (Gunaratnam, 2007).\textsuperscript{17} It is worth noting that photography is limited to picking out moments in the constant stream of life; therefore, it has limited utility as a “poly-sensory recording device” (Rhys-Taylor, 2010, p.32). However, within these limitations, I feel that photography still conveys a representational significance in capturing and representing both tangible and intangible information, as was the case in this study.

\textsuperscript{17} To more accurately represent the participants in a way they could identify with, I requested most of my participants to review their interview transcripts so that they could add comments, elucidate what they had said, and otherwise share their thoughts and criticisms. However, it appeared to me that the participants trusted my ability to represent them. The extracts I present in this thesis, therefore, have been reflexively constructed and reconstructed following my reflections in the field and the supervisory advice I received.
Moreover, it is important to note that, as mentioned earlier, my verbal communication with participants was predominantly conducted in Turkish Cypriot dialect or Cypriot Turkish, which is mutually intelligible with Standard Turkish (Demir and Johanson, 2006). The concepts of (standard) language and dialect, as Frans van Coetsem (1992, p.16) states, in essence are the “same”. Indeed, drawing on Haugen (1987), Frans van Coetsem (1992, p.15) points out that one person’s language is another person’s dialect. According to Frans van Coetsem (1992, p.16), “the difference between dialect and (standard) language appears to reside primarily in a ranking evaluation, the dialect being viewed as subordinate and regionally confined in relation to the (standard) language as a superordinate or overarching language”. On the basis of this argument, in this study I define Cypriot Turkish as a dialect, for two different reasons.

Firstly, as previously mentioned, Turkish Cypriots lived for many centuries with both British people (colonial rulers) and Greek Cypriots. Hence there were three official languages of government – English, Greek and Turkish – while the national language was underpinned by Cypriot Greek (Κυπριακή) and Cypriot Turkish (Gibrislidja) (Petraki, 2009, pp.22–23). Following the division of the island, Standard Turkish became the official language of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1985 (Demir and Johanson, 2006). Standard Turkish has both written and spoken aspects in Northern Cyprus. It is used in newspapers, educational books, government documents, legal proceedings, police reports, business contracts, etc. Cypriot Turkish, on the other hand, is only used verbally. In fact, as Petraki (2009, p.4) states:

In 2009 it was decided that Cypriot Turkish would no longer be broadcasted on the television or radio of Northern Cyprus, as it was characterised as ‘bad’ Turkish, and that it was going to be replaced by Standard Turkish, which is perceived as a superior linguistic variety.

Secondly, as stated by Demir and Johanson (2006, p.1), Cypriot Turkish is a distinct local dialect “naturally confined to the island”. It arrived in Cyprus around the sixteenth century, when the island was conquered by the Ottoman Empire.
Turkish settlers (ethnic Turks) moved from various regions of Anatolia (Konya, Yozgat, Antalya, Kırmızı and Uşak) to Cyprus with the Ottoman conquest in 1571, “bringing along with them the distinct regional differentiations of their language” (Petraki, 2009, p.19). Previous studies (Eren, 1969; Hakeri, 1986; Pehlivan and Osam, 2010) therefore suggest that Cypriot Turkish is linked to Anatolian dialects. Yet, although it is one of the Anatolian dialects and was most affected by Turkish (spoken in Turkey) after the Tanzimat Edict (see Pehlivan and Osam, 2010, p.232), Cypriot Turkish today is different “from both Anatolian dialects and standard Turkish” (Pehlivan and Osam, 2010, p.231). Cypriot Turkish, for instance, differs from Standard Turkish “in various aspects such as syntax, vocabulary, intonation and so on” (Pehlivan and Osam, 2010, p.233; see also Demir, 2002a, 2002b; Osam, 2002; Vanci, 1990). As Tsiplakou (2006, p.337) states, “not much is known about Cypriot Turkish regional idioms”.

Consequently, in this research, Cypriot Turkish is treated as one dialect that corresponds to the “indigenous Turkish Cypriots” (see Chapter 2) who speak it. The language spoken by mainland Turks who migrated to Northern Cyprus from mainland Turkey between 1975 and 1983 (more than forty years ago), or by those who arrived on the island in the last few years, is different from Cypriot Turkish. Therefore, in this study, I do not consider the language spoken by these two groups of people to be Cypriot Turkish. Moreover, my research participants shared this view, and also did not perceive this language as Cypriot Turkish. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 2, it should be highlighted that in this thesis I make a distinction between indigenous Turkish Cypriots (who speak Cypriot Turkish) and mainland Turks (who do not speak Cypriot Turkish). Although children of mixed marriages, and children of mainland Turks who were born and raised in Cyprus, might speak this dialect, as mentioned, they do not align with the epistemological objectives of this thesis.

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18 The primary reasons for the difference are the isolation of Cypriot Turkish from Anatolian dialects and Standard Turkish for a significant period of time, since Turkish Cypriots lived as a closed society, and “the multicultural and multilingual context of the island” (see Osam and Pehlivan, 2010, p.231).

19 There is no existing research or literature on this topic. Instead, this assertion is based on my own biography as a Turkish Cypriot citizen and the observations I made throughout my research.
4.5. Ethical Considerations

Given the prolonged period of engagement of an ethnographer in a research setting, ethnographic research entails specific ethical issues. In this research, these ethical considerations included the issues of ‘topic threat’, informed consent, use of photographs, confidentiality and anonymity.

Lee (1993) identifies several ethical demands in research on “sensitive topics” specifically varying types and levels of “topic threat”. For Lee (1993, p.4) sensitive research can be seen as threatening in relations to three forms of threat:

1. “Intrusive threat”, which is concerned with areas that are “private, stressful or sacred” (p.4)

2. “Threat of sanction”, which involves the possibility that research may reveal stigmatising and incriminating information

3. “Political threat”, which refers to “the vested interests of the powerful persons or institutions in society”, where researchers can be viewed as trespassing into areas which relate to or may provoke social conflict (p.4)

In order to address these different types of threat, it was imperative that I carefully consider the wording of interview questions, the selection of participants, and the ethical framing of the research with regard to communicating the confidentiality and anonymity of the data. During my fieldwork, I often photographed memorials, as well as other cultural objects and materials such as foodstuffs and costumes presented on stalls. In these contexts, public photography and video-recording were freely permitted and acceptable. In other contexts during my field research, which involved photographing individuals such as well-known locals, I had to obtain formal permission. For instance, in Kalavac I interviewed, photographed and filmed Ayse Teyze in her house. Before the interview, I obtained her and her daughter’s informed consent.

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20 Sensitive research is research concerning a subject or issues, which may potentially pose a threat to those who are or who have been involved in the research process (see, Lee, 1993).
Moreover, when writing this research, I intertwined my own first-person narratives with the narratives of others. Ethical issues and research responsibilities became significantly more complex because I used the narratives of others as the main data sources. For instance, some participants might be portrayed more positively than others. It was, therefore, necessary to respect the privacy of all participants involved. Some auto-ethnographers, such as Ellis (2004), employ composite characters – new fictional identities composed of the characteristics of several actual individuals in an attempt to mask the actual identity of individuals concerned. I chose not to do this, because I wanted to examine the common patterns in participants’ narratives and how they related to broader dynamics in a post-postcolonial society, such as cultural differences, racism, identity and identifications. However, I did disguise the identities of my participants and used pseudonyms. Ayse Teyze was an exception. I made the decision to use her real name because she asked me to do so. Although, it is hard to evaluate the actual consequences of disclosure, in order to mitigate against potential ethical issues I treated the interview with Ayse Teyze more carefully, mindful of protecting her.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter has described and considered the methodological and ethical issue, tools and approach used in the thesis. Connected to the ideas discussed in the Introduction and the Literature Review, I have situated these methods in wider context of the study and its aims. The research has used a combination of auto-ethnography and sensory ethnography and semi-structured interviews and informal/conversations. The combination of these methods has allowed me to examine the research questions from different angles and in greater depth.

Undertaking participant observation and informal interviews at cultural festivals, weddings and local coffee shops, I have suggested, was important in capturing routinised interactions and conversations among Turkish Cypriots (regarding the past and current political and cultural situation/climate in Northern Cyprus) and between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, as well as for highlighting the tensions and negotiations between the different groups. I suggest that by focusing on these forms of social engagement, it is possible to contextualise how cultural
distinctions (between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks) and similarities (between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots) are produced. By combining this data with semi-structured interviews, I was able to elicit the post-postcolonial narratives produced by Turkish Cypriots who were once colonised by the West and are now supposedly living under the governance and control of an Eastern power. The interviews elicited talk on cultural difference, racism, identity and identifications in a post-postcolonial society, and I have sought to connect these themes to wider national contexts. The following empirical chapters will concentrate on the three main themes that emerged from the combination of the literature discussed in Chapter 2 and the data gathered – i.e. resistance, inclusion and exclusion – in order to shed light on how Turkish Cypriot identity is fabricated against two constitutive Others (mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots) and with reference to post-postcolonial conjunctures.
CHAPTER 5: POST-POSTCOLONIAL RESISTANCE

This chapter explores the stories and ideas behind history textbooks, commemorative ceremonies, and visits to memorials and museums in northern Cyprus, shifting our attention from the function of official memory sites to the details of what they actually mean in a post-postcolonial society. In recent years, academics in disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, psychology and history have shown an increasing interest in collective memory and its role in the formation of identity. Within the discipline of sociology, most of this memory work has concentrated on sites of inscribed memory such as monuments, museums, murals, films, songs, books and the like, and on non-inscribed ways of bringing the past into the present such as commemorative ceremonies and bodily gestures (e.g. clothing, manners, musical performances). In my own study, I found that these types of historical consciousness do not always preserve the past, but, rather, address serious cultural and political issues in the present. Although official memory sites have become a significant part of nationalist discourse in Cyprus, throughout this chapter I show that young people interpret them in ways which are located outside of the historical narrative propagated by the government.

Drawing theoretically on Nora (1989, 2001), Gramsci (1971), Foucault (1972) and Hall (1992/1994), I begin by outlining how the hegemony of ethnonationalist parties and nationalist discourse has been exercised through official discourse and practices, and I talk about the problematic of this political programme. Taking this framework as a point of departure, I then move into the stories of my participants Halil, Aldinc, Hakan, Gizem, Mehmet, Gulden, Mine, Emre, Gozde, Miray, Ismail and Meryem. As my analysis of these stories makes clear, by attending to official memory sites we can uncover the oppositions between different discourses and different common-sense\(^2\) values, and reveal the struggle between the official and the vernacular. A key focus of my discussion is the extent to which vernacular stories and ideas illuminate “the hidden ‘point’ that lies ‘behind’” (Connerton, 2001).

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\(^2\) Broadly speaking, for Gramsci (1971, p.323) “common sense means the incoherent set of generally held assumptions and beliefs common to any society.”
1989, p.53) memorial sites in northern Cyprus, providing novel ways of conceptualising resistance as it has been explored by scholars in postcolonial studies.

**5.1. Defining the Problematic in Official Discourse and Practices**

Scholars have written extensively about the relationship between the concepts of memory and history. Some have overlooked the distinctions between these two concepts (Lee Klein, 2000; Hutton, 1993; Crewe, 1999; Lewis, 1975; Bauman, 1982), some have distinguished between them (Nora, 1989), and some have argued that history and memory are mutually constitutive (Burke, 1989; Le Goff, 1992). Among these scholars, French sociologist Pierre Nora (1989, p.8) sees history and memory “to be in fundamental opposition”. Nora (1989, pp.8–9) writes:

Memory and history, far from being synonymous, appear now to be in fundamental opposition. Memory . . . remains in permanent evolution, open to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of its successive deformations, vulnerable to manipulation and appropriation, susceptible to being long dormant and periodically revived. History, on the other hand, is the reconstruction, always problematic and incomplete, of what is no longer. Memory is a perpetually actual phenomenon, a bond tying us to the eternal present; history is a representation of the past. Memory, insofar as it is affective and magical, only accommodates those facts that suit it . . . History . . . calls for analysis and criticism . . . At the heart of history is a critical discourse that is antithetical to spontaneous memory. History is perpetually suspicious of memory, and its true mission is to suppress and destroy it . . . History's goal and ambition is not to exalt but to annihilate what has in reality taken place.

Drawing on the French experience, Nora believes that the nation-state uses the science of history to create a solid and official account in order to offer legitimacy and justification for identity and authority. In Nora’s (2001, p. xvi) words, “history and memory were being brought together in such a way as to become
another point of reference for the nation: in this sense, national history was becoming the French memory”. Nora’s claim resonates with the case of northern Cyprus. The ethnonationalist parties, especially between 1974 and 2003, propagated official history in order to create a national identity based on their political goals, and to maintain the status quo. In Gramsci’s terms, the “hegemony” of the ethnonationalist parties was exercised through historical education to enable their values and norms to be instilled as common sense for all. The common sense of Turkish Cypriots was constructed around the idea of sameness and solidarity between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, and also on the idea of separation between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (see also Erhurman, 2010). This would ideally lead to the formation of a hegemonic form of thinking, shutting down alternative ways of conceptualising the world. Accordingly, history education became “a pernicious element in maintaining divisions between the communities” (Bryant, 2001, p.27) on the island (i.e. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots). As Papadakis (2008, p.1) puts it:

In many societies, especially those divided through ethnonational conflicts, history is often used to propagate a narrative focusing on the suffering of the nation and to legitimate its political goals. The suffering of others is silenced, their historical existence is questioned, and socio-cultural interactions are ignored. This has been how the “History of Cyprus” has been presented in the history schoolbooks of the two parts of the island”.

The official history presented in the Cypriot school textbook History of Turkish Cypriot Struggle (Kıbrıs Türk Mücadele Tarihi), written by Vehbi Zeki Serter and Ozan Zeki Fikretoglu and published in 2002, propagated an ethnonationalist perspective, reflecting the nationalist demands of Turkey in relation to Greece (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008). It accentuated the difference between the two communities by employing identity labels such as “Turks – Greeks” and “Turks of Cyprus – Greeks of Cyprus” (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008, p.142). According to this nationalist discourse, for instance, the voices of Turks were consistently weakened because of the dominance of Greek Cypriots, who constituted the majority population:
Article 123 of the Constitution of Cyprus stipulated that public services should be composed of 70% Greeks and 30% Turks… However, the Greek Cypriot members of the Public Service Commission resisted the implementation of the 70:30 ratio. The discriminatory and arbitrary attitudes of the Greek Cypriot members of the commission persisted. At the last meeting of the Public Service Commission, the President of the Commission directed some deplorable statements at the Turkish members: “...Do not expect to occupy positions according to the 70:30 ratio any longer. You make up 18% of the population. This is your right in public services...” Under the Constitution, the 30% stipulation was one of the Turkish community’s most important rights. However, this right was never enforced, because of the illegitimate behaviour of the Greek Cypriot leadership and the Public Service Commission (Serter and Fikretoglu, 2002, pp.135–136).

Referring to Turkey as the “motherland”, history textbooks also included the idea that “the destiny of Turkish-Cypriots depends on Turkey” (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008, p.144). These textbooks encouraged hatred, mistrust and fear towards Greek Cypriots, presenting them as brutal, ruthless and mercilessly violent (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008, pp.148–149). They claimed that a violent “pro-separation strategy” was followed in order to maintain ethno-racial division (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008, p.134). Here is another extract from Serter and Fikretoglu’s *History of Turkish Cypriot Struggle*:

In Ayvasil (as in many other places), Greek Cypriots slaughtered twenty-one innocent Turks who fell into their hands; then they buried them in a mass grave using bulldozers. Among the bodies found in this mass grave, there was a child around thirteen years old, whose hands were tied behind his/her back. After research was carried out in the village of Ayvasil, it became clear that first the hands and feet of these innocent people had been tied, then they were savagely executed by firing squad, and then they were dumped in a mass pit (Serter and Fikretoglu, 2002, p.162).

Even the names of schools carry this legacy from the past into the present. Şehit Mehmet Eray İlkokulu (Martyr Mehmet Eray Primary School) is a primary school in northern Cyprus, located in the village of Minarelikoy in the district of Nicosia. Its name commemorates Mehmet Eray, a nationalist fighter active between 1963
and 1974. I was a pupil at Şehit Mehmet Eray İlkokulu for five years, and the word “Şehit” (“martyr”) served to remind me about the “murders” the Greek Cypriots had committed during the 1974 war on the island. During my fieldwork I found that the majority of school names in northern Cyprus carry traces of these memories by commemorating such “martyrs” and significant events in Turkish Cypriot history. The secondary school I attended, for instance, was called 20 Temmuz Fen Lisesi (20 July Science Secondary School) to commemorate Peace and Freedom Day, a significant milestone in the history of Cyprus. In nationalist discourse, 20 July is the day when the Turkish people were saved by the mainland army. Thus, the name was given to increase youngsters’ awareness and appreciation of the constructed past and their national identity, along with their connection to the mainland.

Following their victory in the 2003 elections, the new leftist CTP government seized the opportunity to promulgate their view of history as a new official policy (Colak, 2006) by outlining a Cypriot nationalism that was founded on the differences between Turks and Turkish Cypriots and the similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The CTP government emphasised “the common features of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in order to promote the dominant discourse”, which was based the notion of Cypriotness (Erurman, 2010, p.112). The CTP government also changed the history textbooks. Some scholars have argued that these new school history books gave a new and more positive image of the Other that was different from what had been taught in the older books (Papadakis, 2008; Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008; Vural, 2012). The new history textbooks presented Cypriot culture, music and identity that were shared between the two communities, stressing the civic notion of Cypriotness. They encouraged the idea of the unity of Cyprus, presenting Britain and Turkey as the cause of the troubles between the two communities. These new textbooks replaced the term “motherland” with “Turkey” or “the government of Turkey” (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008, p.144), stated clearly that intercommunal relations on the island had been destroyed by nationalism, and avoided the mention of violent events.

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22 Şehit Doğan Ahmet İlkokulu, Şehit Ertuğrul İlkokulu, Şehit Tuncer İlkokulu, Şehit Yalçın İlkokulu, Gazi İlkokulu, Şehit Zeki Salih İlkokulu, Şehit Salih Terzi İlkokulu, Şehit Özdemir Anaokulu, Kurtuluş İlkokulu, Şehit Hasan Cafer İlkokulu and many others.
However, after the victory of the UBP\textsuperscript{23} in the general election of April 2009, these textbooks stopped being printed for the next semester (Latif, 2010).

To return to the discussion of the effects of ethnonationalist parties between 1974 and 2003, it is important to note that there were also material and sensual practices that were interlinked with nationalist discourse. As forms of bodily contact, these practices – which included school visits to museums and memorials, as well as commemorative ceremonies, as I explore later – supported a common strategy and a political goal; they were, in Foucault’s terms, part of the same “discursive formation” (Hall, 1997, p.44). Yet, what needs to be highlighted here is that discourse, as Foucault argued, is radically historical. In other words, things are only assigned the status of “truth” within a specific historic context: discourses produce myriad forms of knowledge – subjects, objects and practices – which oscillate from period to period and with no specific continuity between them (Hall, 1997, p.46). Hence, an alternative discursive regime or episteme\textsuperscript{24} will evolve and replace earlier ones, opening up a novel “discursive formation” and producing new ways of thinking invested with power and authority – the “truth” – to understand and control social practices in new ways (Hall, 1997, p.46). Gramsci (1971, pp.325–326) made a similar point when he said: “there is not just one common sense, for that too is a product of history and a part of historical process.” In other words, irrespective of the strength of the hegemony, it may always be feasible to intervene and disrupt that hegemony, to suggest other ways of looking at the world that may provide an alternative moral and political philosophy. The emergence of post-postcolonial discourse and the rise of new discursive practices (such as Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals, see Chapter 6) mark the emergence of a new hegemonic and cultural movement/formation: Cypriotness.

As I show in this chapter, the problem with nationalist discourse is that it has a very decided ethnic cast to it. Despite ongoing cultural interactions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, nationalist discourse is marked by the idea that Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks are possessors of a distinct, unchanging and

\textsuperscript{23} The UBP is an ethnonationalist Turkish Cypriot party.

\textsuperscript{24} Foucault first employed this term in \textit{The Order of Things}, referring to the “unconscious” structures which underlie the production of scientific knowledge within specific historic and social contexts.
common culture: Turkishness. Culture here is interrelated with ethnicity: it is regarded as “pure”, an “essence”, and as connected to an original and eternally ethnic core (Alund, 1999). Cultural crossings and the emergence of “composite identities” are not recognised (Alund, 1999, p.106). Drawing on the work of Hall, Alund (1999, p.111) draws attention to “the new approach, in which culture, identity, ethnicity and race are viewed as interrelated in a complex fashion”:

Ethnicity, Hall writes (1992/1994: 255), is “constantly crossed and recrossed” with other social categories like race, class and gender. The concept of identity is defined as “fragmented and fractured; never singular but multiply constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions” (Hall and du Gay 1996, p.4). In contrast to an essentialist understanding – “this concept of identity does not signal that stable core of self, unfolding from beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without change” (ibid. p.3) – identity is here understood as variable, “strategic and positional” (ibid, p.3).

If we understand identity as a process in this way, no culture based on an ethnic identity – in this case, the notion of Turkishness – can be regarded as a pure or uncontaminated essence that remains static over time; “new cultures, identities and ethnicities” (Alund, 1999, p.106), as well as new solidarities and alliances, are created (see also Gilroy, 1987, 1993; Hall, 1987, 1992).

As I discussed in Chapter 3, Bhabha (1994, 1996) emphasises the importance of “cultural hybridisation” by arguing people in hybrid cultures are inculcated with “potential for new worldviews, with new ‘internal forms’ for perceiving the world in words” (Bhabha, 1996, p.58). Drawing on the work of Bhabha, Alund (1999, p.112) states that:

Hybrid identities involve the negotiation of a discursive doubleness, 'by which I do not mean [that] duality or binarism engenders a new speech act'. The new 'voice' expresses the formation of strategic solidarities, and the concept of hybridity describes 'the construction of cultural authority within conditions of political antagonism or inequity'. The strategies of hybrids 'deploy the partial culture from which they emerge to construct visions of community, and versions of historical
memory, that give narrative form to the minority positions they occupy, the outside of the inside: the part in the whole'.

In relation to hybrid ethnicities/identities which are still invisible and “erased” (Hall and du Gay, 1996), it is the lack of recognition that constitutes the political challenge (see also Alund, 1999). As I argued in Chapter 3, in the case of Turkish Cypriots, the colonial period in Cyprus gave rise to a new identity (Cypriotness) through the adaptation of either Kemalism or the coloniser’s cultural habits, attitudes and values. Today, Turkish Cypriots identify with a “Cypriot” culture that contains various elements influenced by Kemalism and British culture. These elements are combined with local traditions that are shared with Greek Cypriots (see Chapter 6). Moreover, the culturally hybrid Turkish Cypriot people live out and negotiate their identities within a third space where they come into close contact with mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots. The tensions and synergies between these cultures leave them in a post-postcolonial or in-between space.

Indeed, the current political situation in northern Cyprus may be partially explained by the specific common-sense ideas that tie ethnonationalist parties’ hegemonic interests together. Those who promote official history often streamline the narrative, leaving out moments that would divert attention away from traumatic events and towards the “good times” that existed between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. However, as I will demonstrate below, my research participants were able to resist nationalist themes, deliberately focusing on other controversial elements of the past (see also Chapter 6) and putting forward an alternative way of thinking about the Greek Cypriot Other. The distinction between official and vernacular cultures explored by American historian John Bodnar (1992) become particularly relevant here.

In an enquiry into public memory in twentieth-century North America, Bodnar (1992) researches the meanings behind American commemorations, drawing a contrast between what he terms “vernacular memory” and “official memory”. Bodnar (1992, p.13) stresses that public memory is developed from the “intersection of official and vernacular cultural expressions”. Official memory is created and instilled by elites who want to advance their own vision and values.
through the promotion of past and present interpretations of reality. These “interpretations of past and present reality” minimise the power possessed by opposing parties that would jeopardise the elites’ ability to achieve their desired objectives (Bodnar, 1992, p.13). On the other hand, vernacular memory represents a range of “specialised interests” that are embedded “in parts of the whole” (Bodnar, 1992, p.14). In Bodnar’s words, “they are diverse and changing and can be reformulated from time to time by the creation of new social units” (Bodnar, 1992, p.14). The notion of post-postcolonial resistance that I propose in this chapter resonates with Bodnar’s arguments: it refers to the struggle between official and vernacular interests within the geopolitical formation of northern Cyprus. Post-postcolonial resistance is about a battle between the state and indigenous Turkish Cypriot people, who are situated in-between two constitutive Others (Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks) and two binary oppositions. As will be shown in the following sections, post-postcolonial resistance entails one culture seeking to obscure vernacular hybridity and mixing, and to assert itself as superior or at times equal to other cultural formations (see also Chapters 6 and 7). This is characterised as a cultural supremacy that attempts to draw its legitimacy from the more long-standing division between East and West.

5.2. Perceptions of History Textbooks

The stories that follow illuminate the meanings behind history textbooks and reveal my research participants’ perceptions of nationalist discourse. During my fieldwork, I talked to young generation Turkish Cypriots to find out what they remembered from their school education regarding Greek Cypriots and the period of violent political conflict in Cyprus. The first example comes from an interview with Halil, a thirty-year-old man. In the following excerpt, after a long conversation about the current political situation in northern Cyprus and the state’s practices, I ask him the following question: do you think that you and your

25 As I discussed in Chapter 3, indigenous Turkish Cypriots consider themselves superior to the Eastern Other – mainland Turks. However, their encounters with the European Other – Greek Cypriots – call this sense of superiority into question, and a new binary opposition emerges between “superior” Greek Cypriots and “inferior” indigenous Turkish Cypriots.
friends were taught to see Greek Cypriots as enemies during school years? Halil’s answer is straightforward:

Halil: Yes, always.
Rahme: What kind of information? If you remember, can you share with me?
Halil: They taught us that the Greek Cypriot population was bigger than ours [Turkish Cypriots]. For this reason, Turkish Cypriots didn’t have a voice in the 1960 Republic as much as Greek Cypriots did… They also had more rights than us in the Republic. For example, the Council of Ministers consisted of seven Greek Cypriot Ministers and three Turkish Cypriot Ministers, or public services consisted of 70% Greek Cypriots and 30% Turkish Cypriots. And that this was not fair.

Halil, a young Turkish Cypriot born and brought up after the division of the island in an exiled Turkish Cypriot family, carries the burden of official historical discourse. This is produced through notions of “unfairness”, not having a “voice”, having fewer rights, and through his being taken to the Cengiz Topel Memorial, which functioned as evidence of atrocities against Turkish Cypriots. Halil tells me that he remembers two school visits: one to the Museum of Barbarism, and the other to the memorial to the pilot Cengiz Topel, who according to official discourse was tortured and killed by Greek Cypriots. The storying of this event, together with the textbooks, creates a drive for revenge for what took place in the past. At the same time, it builds a sense of national identity founded upon tragedy and victimhood. (I explore Halil’s account of these school visits in more detail later in the chapter.)

In the following extract, Aldinc, a thirty-year-old man, is responding to my questions about history lessons. Just like Halil, Aldinc is certain that he was taught in school to see Greek Cypriots as enemies during his schooldays. Aldinc believes that the history textbooks provided narrow and one-sided views of the past:

There was a war, and both sides were guilty. But the issue of persecution by the Greek Cypriots was the indispensable topic of Cypriot history lessons. Every time, it was about how they slaughtered so many Turkish Cypriots, and how we were always
tortured. The book contained information in the form of slaughter of the Turkish Cypriots by the Greek Cypriots. There were expressions like only Greek Cypriots were unfair and only they killed. The books could have been based on the real version of the stories instead [emphasis added].

For Aldinc, the textbooks revolved around the state’s political goals, and the aim was to reinforce a binary (Greek Cypriots vs. Turkish Cypriots) by essentialising the past and manipulating it to maintain division and the status quo. Aldinc’s account exemplifies a young Turkish Cypriot’s opposition to nationalist themes. A person without experience of living in a post-postcolonial milieu might have reviewed the same textbooks and come to different conclusions. Yet, the official historical narratives, which Aldinc sees as manipulative, seem to startle him. On the one hand, the nation-building theme – which Bodnar would identify as official history propagated by the government and the institutions it dominates (for instance, schools) – explicitly propagates a discourse that focuses on the suffering of Turkish Cypriots in order to “legitimate its political goals” (Papadakis, 2008, p.1). On the other hand are the vernacular interests and lived experiences of the local people, which I found to be related to and entangled with discourses of cultural supremacy. Aldinc’s opposition to nationalist discourse, for instance, emerges in response to a contemporary cultural crisis. This opposition does not only revolve around the state’s hegemonic strategies and opposition against them. The narrative also reflects a spoken desire to close down the gap between the Self and the European/Western Other (see Chapter 6). As will become more apparent (see also Chapters 6 and 7), what can be identified as a tension between the official and the vernacular within the context of post-postcolonial northern Cyprus should also be understood in a far wider sense, as an ambivalence closely connected with the East/West division.

5.2.1. Memory and Visual Representation

It is important to note at this point that the utilisation of photographs in textbooks was an indispensable part of the materiality of war and an effective authorisation of particular formations of memory. Photographs like those in Figures 6 and 7
have become fundamental components of official state-sponsored memory and serve to produce the materiality of war (Puwar, 2011). Such photographs are used as documentary evidence – incontrovertible proof – of what occurred in the past. They present truth and veracity, seemingly untouched and unmanipulated. In Figure 7, for instance, women are shown fleeing in terror, creating a gendered depiction of suffering. Greek Cypriots are nowhere to be seen, but they are connoted as the invisible terror that is creating the suffering. It is this existential threat that the viewer is incited to connect with.

Figure 6. Caption translation: “Tears of the martyrs’ mothers”. Source: (Serter and Fikretoglu, 2002).

Figure 7. Caption translation: “Our people escaping from the Greek and Greek Cypriot brutality”. Source: (Serter and Fikretoglu, 2002).

Such photographs have “symbolic power”, in the Bourdieusian sense of “a power of constructing reality” (Bourdieu 1994, p.164). This was a concept that Bourdieu developed throughout the entirety of his scientific life. For Bourdieu (1994, p.164), symbolic power is “the power to make people see and believe certain visions of the world rather than others” – “invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it”. I argue that the photographs shown above function in this way, as a modality of symbolic power: they are richly
evocative and have the power of making children imagine and internalise the “cruelty” of the Greek Cypriot Other. However, as Bell (2018, p.135) notes, the power of a photograph is that it both “confirms” and “questions” the events portrayed. Bell (2018, p.135) writes: “there is a power of pictures to ‘stem the flow of time’, interrupting, displacing, escaping.” As I show below, the narrative that the state is trying to impose on children through these photographs is thus “struggling to be heard” (Bell, 2018, p.135); indeed, this official narrative is overshadowed by post-postcolonial discourse.

During interviews, I showed a number of photographs from Serter and Fikretoglu (2002) to the participants. I found that these two images (Figures 6 and 7) generated the most emotional responses, as they represented the brutality and ruthlessness of Greek Cypriots. Hakan, a twenty-nine-year-old man, and Gizem, a thirty-year-old woman, both recollected the images of a martyr’s mother weeping (Figure 6), and women and children apparently running away from Greek Cypriots (Figure 7). The extract below is from an interview with Hakan. Hakan is responding to my question about the photographs:

Rahme: Do you remember any of these photographs?
Hakan: Yes, I recall this one [the image of the weeping mother].
Rahme: What was your emotional response to it? Do you remember?
Hakan: I don’t exactly remember that, but it made me think about my grandmother.
Rahme: How?
Hakan: She lost my uncle in the war in 1974. When I looked at the image, I was curious as to whether that was how my grandmother wept when she heard of the passing of my uncle.
Rahme: Yes, I understand what you mean. We didn’t see those days ourselves. So, in a way, you felt that the weeping mother in the photograph represented your grandmother.
Hakan: Yes, and all the other martyrs’ mothers. It is painful when you think about the things that our grandmothers, mothers, fathers, elders went through.

The next extract comes from an interview with Gizem. Again, the conversation is about the photographs that I showed to the participants. The extract begins after her responses to my standard questions, “do you remember any of these
photographs?” and “which ones do you remember?” For Gizem, the images only partly portrayed the past and the suffering of Turkish Cypriots:

The photographs [in the textbook] made me question what was not shown or not said. For instance, what happened to the women who were running away from the Greek Cypriots? Did they manage to run away? Or, where were my family members that day? Were they feeling helpless as well? These were the questions I asked myself, because we didn’t really know what happened to the people shown in the pictures.

The images did not seem to induce feelings of resentment towards Greek Cypriots in Hakan or Gizem, but instead made them imagine and question the past, and empathise from their own (present) point of view. What I wanted to examine in more depth was whether these images mobilised feelings of hatred towards Greek Cypriots today. Although what Gizem had been taught in school had been based on “true facts”, as we talked I found that she did not describe the images and narratives in the textbook as having played a role in shaping her beliefs about the Other today. In the final extract, Gizem is responding to my follow-up questions.

It seems there is another view, one not entirely conditioned by the imagery in the textbook:

Rahme: You sound very objective when talking about the content of the school textbook. You seem to be unaffected by the pictures.
Gizem: No, I am not affected.
Rahme: Then you don’t feel hatred or resentment towards Greek Cypriots.
Gizem: I don’t. There weren’t only bad incidents between the two communities.
Rahme: Yes, I know. We always hear good stories from our family members or other elderly people.
Gizem: True.
Rahme: Can you share with me some of the stories that you heard?
Gizem: Yes. My parents shared with me their memories of living with Greek Cypriots before 1974. I know that although there was war, they used to live in harmony. So I don’t remember this information [in history textbooks] making me feel hatred or resentment towards Greek Cypriots.
When I drew on my own reflections, I could identify with Gizem’s narrative. Our memories as young Turkish Cypriots in northern Cyprus had been constructed in many ways, through different sites and mechanisms: school education, commemorations, national symbols and rituals, the media, but also social relationships such as family and friendship networks. These mechanisms were interconnected and therefore influenced each other’s functioning. Family stories as oral, vernacular histories provided us with a different version of the past, one that was not mentioned in school textbooks. Some narratives challenged the official history, and they did not necessarily instil enmity towards the Greek Cypriot Other. Thus, “I heard good stories from my family members, I do not hate Greek Cypriots” was a common narrative among my participants (see below). However, it needs to be highlighted that the narratives told by their parents during the participants’ childhoods provided competing explanations and produced contradictory stories about Greek Cypriots. Some narratives, for instance, were parallel to the official history, reinforcing enmity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, just like the school education and museum visits. What this means is that participants like Gizem were selectively internalising the “good” of the past, overriding the “traumatic” part of it. (See Chapter 6 for a detailed discussion of family stories and their effects on young Turkish Cypriots.)

In “Seven Types of Forgetting”, Connerton (2008, p.63) talks about the “forgetting that is constitutive in the formation of a new identity”. He writes:

> Forgetting . . . becomes part of the process by which newly shared memories are constructed because a new set of memories are frequently accompanied by a set of tacitly shared silences. Many small acts of forgetting that these silences enable over time are not random but patterned: there is, for instance, the forgetting of details of grandparents’ lives that are not transmitted to grandchildren whose knowledge about grandparents might in no way conduce to, but rather detract from, the effective implementation of their present intentions.

Following on from Connerton’s argument, I suggest that the absence of negative ideas about Greek Cypriots is such an act of forgetting. It points towards a new hegemonic movement or new cultural formation of Cypriotness, which
necessitates building alliances with the Greek Cypriot Other. Post-postcolonial resistance, or the struggle between official and vernacular stories and remembering, should thus be understood as a move towards reconciliation for particular aims (see Chapter 6). In the next section, I turn to participants’ stories of discursive practices to further explore this point.

5.3. Perceptions of Discursive Practices

The findings discussed in this section highlight cultural sites entangled with discursive practices – such as national celebration days, and visits to memorials and museums – that function as mnemonic instruments. In How Societies Remember, Paul Connerton (1989, p.1) sociologically analyses the relationship between “collective or social memory” and the use of ritual and other mnemonic devices. His analysis is highly relevant to my discussion in this section. Using Connerton’s theorisation as a starting point, I will analyse participants’ stories by moving beyond the symbolic meanings of the mnemonic instruments under analysis and exploring their use and effects in a post-postcolonial society.

5.3.1. Commemorative Ceremonies and Bodily Practices

Connerton has made significant input into the development of a theoretical framework for collective memory scholarship. He draws on the work of sociologist Maurice Halbwachs to resolve the dichotomy between individual and collective memory. Connerton does not reject the collective memory approach put forward by Halbwachs – that is, the notion that people acquire and recite memories through societal group membership (Connerton, 1989, pp.36–37); instead, he considers the issues that Halbwachs fails to address. For instance, asks: “given that different groups have different memories which are particular to them, how are these collective memories passed on within the same social group from one generation to the next?” (Connerton, 1989, p.38). In other words, the key difference between Connerton and Halbwachs is about where the phenomenon of social memory is the most “operative” (Connerton, 1989, p.1).
Connerton (1989, p.4) believes that knowledge of the past is recollected and performed through “(more or less ritual) performances”. Through *commemorative ceremonies* and *bodily practices* societal remembering is ritually enacted and displayed (Connerton, 1989, p.48). Such rituals are significant “in the shaping of communal memory” through repetition and by positioning people in continuity with the event being commemorated. As Connerton (1989, pp.4–5) puts it:

*If there is such a thing as social memory, I shall argue, we are likely to find it in commemorative ceremonies; but commemorative ceremonies prove to be commemorative only in so far as they are performative; performativity cannot be thought without a concept of habit; and habit cannot be thought without a notion of bodily automatisms. In this way I shall seek to show that there is an inertia in social structures that is not adequately explained by any of the current orthodoxies of what a social structure is.*

In dialogue with Halbwachs, Connerton stresses the importance of objects and physical spaces in supporting memory, as they represent perceived persistence and power (Connerton, 1989, p.37). Connerton believes that embodiment is connected to a form of unconscious learning. That is to say, for Connerton, the movement of bodies through anchoring space is a fundamental manner in which society constructs intersubjective and collective knowledge. Some things are unable to be transferred through myth alone but can only occur when embodied in participatory ritual (Connerton 1989, p.54, p.57). In this respect, any commemorative event or bodily practice is essentially a mnemonic instrument. Thus, Connerton (1989, p.102) endeavours to demonstrate that bodily (or incorporated) practices are “not easily susceptible to critical scrutiny and evaluation by those” who are “habituated to their performance”, because much of these practices have no discursive element. In Connerton’s (1989, p.102) words:

*Both commemorative ceremonies and bodily practices . . . contain a measure of insurance against the process of cumulative questioning entailed in all discursive practices. This is the source of their importance and persistence as mnemonic systems. Every group, then, will entrust to bodily automatisms the values and categories which they are most anxious to*
conserve. They will know how well the past can be kept in mind by a habitual memory sedimented in the body.

However, it is important to note that “the inertia associated with incorporating practices” does not indicate that “they are without historical inflection” (Habinek, 2005, p.159). As Habinek (2005, p.159) writes, “incorporating practices… can and do change over time; they interact with and sometimes succumb to political, social and economic developments of various sorts.” For instance, Connerton takes the French Revolution and the Third Reich as examples, and stresses the ways in which those wishing to establish a new social order can replace previous practices with new meanings. A question here is whether Connerton’s theoretical claims can be extended to commemorative acts and other practices (such as museum and memorial visits) in northern Cyprus. I am mindful that trips to museums and memorials do not typically conform to Connerton’s idea of a commemorative ritual. Nevertheless, they are crucial vehicles through which the past is communicated to and preserved in the present day.

Accordingly, in what follows, I focus on two different types of discursive practice, which Volkan (2004) calls “chosen glories” and “chosen traumas”, to explore the struggle between vernacular and official memory in post-postcolonial northern Cyprus. In Volkan’s formulation, the term “chosen glories” describes commemorative celebrations, while “chosen traumas” describes rites associated with death and mourning. In regard to “chosen glories”, Volkan (2004, p.47) claims that “large groups tend to hold on to mental representations of events that include a shared feeling of success and triumph among group members; heavily mythologized over time, such events and the persons appearing in them become elements of a larger-group identity.” The chosen glories are then transmitted across generations “through parental interactions” and by attending ceremonies that celebrate these achievements (Olin, 2012, p.26). Volkan explains that the term “chosen traumas” refers to “the shared mental representation of an event during which the large group suffered loss and/or experienced helplessness, shame and humiliation, in a conflict with another large group” (Volkan, 2001, p.87; see also Volkan, 1998). According to Volkan (2001, p.87), “while each individual in a traumatized large group has his own unique identity and personal
reaction to trauma, all members share the mental representations of the tragedies that have befallen the group”. Chosen traumas are tucked away and nurtured, but they can be used in the future to incite and inspire, as a means of achieving collective action. As Volkan (2004, p.50) suggests:

In what I call a time collapse, the chosen trauma is then experienced as if it has happened only yesterday; feelings, perceptions, and expectations associated with the past heavily contaminate those connected to current events and current enemies, leading to irrational political decision-making and destructive behaviour.

Thus, both chosen glories (such as the establishment of nations, and national peace and freedom days) and chosen traumas (such as martyrs’ remembrance days) have a significant impact on each person’s nationalistic values and sentiments. In the case of Cyprus, Olin (2012, p.18) has argued that “when the Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots reference their historical past, it is very common for one ethnic group’s celebration of victory to be the other ethnic groups tragic loss”; “the message of hatred and the celebration of your own group’s victories (which is usually the other group’s tragedy) eventually becomes each child’s reality,” and “that is how most grow up knowing the history of Cyprus, through the distortions of nationalistic views.” But what do the post-war generation make of these chosen glories and chosen traumas in the present day? The examples below illuminate the ways in which chosen glories become controversial glories, and chosen traumas become controversial traumas, within the context of a post-postcolonial society.

5.3.1.1. Controversial Glories: 20 July and 15 November

Now dubbed Peace and Freedom Day, 20 July is one of the most important national days from the history of Turkish Cypriots. It marks the anniversary of Turkey’s 1974 Peace Operation and is celebrated every year with parades in all the major towns in northern Cyprus. The day is usually accompanied by a symbolic event that commemorates the arrival of Turkish troops on the island: a
civil and military parade, including formation flying, a Turkish Stars aerobatics show, and speeches by the president of northern Cyprus and a representative of the Turkish government. Another significant date in the history of Cyprus 15 November. This day commemorates the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)\textsuperscript{26} in 1983. Similar celebrations are held in all the major cities in northern Cyprus.

Mehmet, a twenty-six-year-old man, and Gulden, a twenty-five-year-old woman, are among those who went to the 20 July and 15 November celebrations held in the capital city Lefkosa (Nicosia) with their parents when they were children. When I asked them to describe how they felt during these ceremonies, both Mehmet and Gulden shared similar accounts with me:

Mehmet: Watching the parades and aircraft always made me feel proud. I admired the way soldiers dressed and how they marched in the parade. I always watched them with admiration because it felt like they were our saviours.

Gulden: As far as I remember, it was a quite exciting experience to be there... to wave flags, to watch the air show performed by the Turkish Stars.

The military has long been and remains the most respected national institution. When Mehmet and Gulden participated in such acts of chosen glory, they were withdrawing from everyday activities and acting together by sharing a common feeling of enthusiasm. They felt a strong connection to Turkey as the motherland, while positioning Greek Cypriots as the hostile Other. In rites associated with death and mourning, on the other hand, there was both a feeling of enthusiasm and a feeling of deep grief and sorrow (see next section). In the following extracts, following long conversations about discursive events (i.e. visits to memorials and museums) in northern Cyprus, I ask Mehmet and Gulden whether they still go to watch the ceremonies in Lefkosa:

Mehmet: I don’t go.

\textsuperscript{26} The TRNC was established on 15 November 1983 by the Turkish Cypriot community. The TRNC is recognised only by Turkey.
Rahme: Why?
Mehmet: I am not a big fan of military parades, and I don’t think that military parades are appropriate while we are still trying to reach a peace agreement with Greek Cypriots.

Gulden provides a similar account:

Gulden: No. I am against them [commemorative celebrations]. They do more harm than good.

Mehmet and Gulden no longer hold onto the feelings of “success and triumph” (Volkan, 2004, p.47) associated with these commemorative ceremonies. Today these practices make them feel alienated from their cultural identity – from Cypriotness. Their alienation is a consequence of the reality created and sustained by discursive practices that promote a static collective identity based on the notion of Turkishness. It is at this point that chosen glories become controversial glories. Connerton (1989, p.45) points out that commemorative ceremonies can provide “value and meaning” in the lives of those who carry them out. Irrespective of whether they are state ceremonies or religious ceremonies, they are more than just continual reappropriations of particular symbols, because they can be “felt” by the people who consider them “obligatory” (Connerton, 1989, p.44). Thus, preventing someone from carrying out a particular commemorative ceremony, or obliging them to recite an unfamiliar set of rites that contradicts their own vision of reality or “truth” (Connerton, 1989, p.44), should be seen as demeaning them. The problem with national celebrations in northern Cyprus is that they are no longer “felt”, because they promote a fixed and permanent ethnic identity (Turkishness) that positions Turkish Cypriots in association with their “ancestors” from Turkey (see also Chapters 6 and 7). In the next extract, following on from our conversation above, I ask Gulden a follow-up question: what do you mean by harm? In response, Gulden produces an account that reveals her certainty that she does not want to follow this trajectory:
Gulden: They [commemorative celebrations] harm our relationships with Greek Cypriots.

Rahme: Is that why you are against these types of celebrations?

Gulden: Yes. I am against the fact that we celebrate Turkish Republic Day as well. I am Cypriot and we are living in Cyprus. An Italian person doesn’t celebrate Norwegian Republic Day. We shouldn’t be celebrating any other country’s national day [emphasis added].

As I discussed in Chapter 3, there are other cultures that Mehmet and Gulden have absorbed that give rise to “something different” and “something new” (Bhabha in Rutherford, 1990, p.211). The ideas of essential unity, integrity, discreteness and fixity are thus felt to be reactionary. Mehmet and Gulden show strong opposition to these commemorative acts because they provoke the Greek Cypriot Other. It becomes apparent that they are thinking about ways to build alliances with the Greek Cypriot Other so that they can achieve an ideal and desired vision of the self, and can refuse to continue a life created and sustained by the influence of alien discursive practices (see Chapter 6). As I show in Chapter 6, there are new cultural styles that Turkish Cypriot people have developed in the search for a new hybrid identity (an issue explored by Gilroy, 1987). Mehmet and Gulden’s resistance to national events and ceremonies, therefore, has particular aims, and is closely related to the new cultural movement of Cypriotness.

In what follows, I explore further instances of post-postcolonial resistance through an analysis of the Cengiz Topel Memorial, the Museum of Barbarism, and their representation in everyday life.

5.3.2. Visits to Memorials and Museums

Many things in Cyprus remind us who “we” are and who “we” should be. From 1966 to 2003, around fourteen national monuments were constructed that symbolised either Atatürk or the martyrs of northern Cyprus (Erhurman, 2010, p.106). The four martyrs’ cemeteries were also built, as well as two mass graves
and four museums that later opened to the public. The purpose of building these sites was to allow the public to remember events in the way that national or religious ideals and political agendas wanted them to be remembered. They were constructed to develop a common understanding of the country’s history by evoking emotions relating to national and religious ideals. While the Atatürk monuments were built to evoke a sense of belonging to Turkey and Turkish identity, the mass graves, martyrs’ monuments and many museums were developed as a means of representing the Other (Greek Cypriots) as violent “barbarians”. They also aimed to immortalise the pain and trauma that had occurred in the past. In this way, they perpetuated the dominance of Turkish nationalist discourse through the formation of concepts of the Self and the Other. Some of these sites were the focus of school trips for my participants when they were aged between nine and eleven. In my fieldwork, two visits in particular stood out: the Museum of Barbarism and the Cengiz Topel Memorial. These will be explored in the next two sub-subsections.

5.3.2.1. Controversial Traumas: Visiting the Cengiz Topel Memorial

The Cengiz Topel Memorial is dedicated to a pilot who was captured by Greek Cypriots and killed under torture in 1964. It is one of the memorials that became a point of school visits for my participants. The memorial contains historical information about Cyprus, an account of Cengiz Topel’s life, debris from his plane (Figure 8), and photographs of his martyrdom (Figure 9). Beside the photographs stands the following text: “This monument symbolises the honourable struggle of the Turkish Cypriot people and Turkish Armed Forces, in the soul of martyred pilot Captain Cengiz Topel”.

27 The Museum of Barbarism (Barbarlık Müzesi), the National Struggle Museum (Milli Mücadele Müzesi), the Peace and Freedom Museum (Barış ve Özgürlik Müzesi) and the Dr Fazıl Küçük Museum.
28 The house of Dr Nihat Ilan, a major in the Turkish army, has been preserved as a museum since 1966. According to the official discourse, Greek Cypriots forcibly entered the house on 24 December 1963 during the intercommunal troubles. The doctor’s wife and three children were machine-gunned to death in the bathroom, where they had tried to hide; their landlady was killed in the toilet. The house remains almost exactly as it was found on that day. However, there is a counter-narrative that Dr Nihat’s wife, three children and landlady were actually killed by Turkish Cypriot fighters to mobilise nationalist sentiment among Turkish Cypriots (see Erhurman, 2010, p.106).
The importance of the Erenköy (Kokkina) battleships and Topel’s martyrdom to the Erenköy (Kokkina) battleships and Topel’s martyrdom29 is also highlighted in Fikretoglu and Serter’s (2002) History of Turkish Cypriot Struggle, the school textbook discussed earlier in this chapter. Indeed, ten pages of this book are devoted to atrocities where the authors depict massacres of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriots in numerous towns and villages. The martyrdom of Cengiz Topel is one of these atrocities, and it occupies a special place in book. The authors write that Cengiz Topel was “murdered” by the “Greeks” after he had surrendered, highlighting how the Turkish people would be treated if they were ever to show weakness. The aim is to solidify social consensus and generate collectivity by operationalising fear and hatred of the Greek Cypriot Other as the murderous out-group. In Fikretoglu and Serter’s (2002, p.169) words, Greek Cypriots were keen to kill any surviving Turks (who fell into their hands) by torturing them. These constantly replayed events and

29 Cengiz Topel was a fighter pilot in the Turkish Air Force. He was shot down on 8 August 1964, during the Erenköy Resistance (also known as as Battle of Tylliria), when there was fighting between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot forces. According to official history, Cengiz Topel landed his F-100 fighter jet in the area. Turkish Cypriot fighters situated in the area unfurled the Turkish flag; however, Greek Cypriots did the same and took Topel hostage. He was first taken to hospital, and then Greek Cypriots brutally tortured and killed him.
narratives, together with school visits to the memorial, play a significant role in delineating common-sense ideas where hatred of the Other can be seen as natural – as part of the hegemony.

In the interviews and informal conversations I conducted with my research participants, I explored the importance of the memorial in the construction of memories of the past and of the Greek Cypriot community. In this instance, Mine (a twenty-seven-year old Turkish Cypriot woman) and Emre (a twenty-nine-year-old man) informed me that the debris from the aircraft and the images of Cengiz Topel’s martyrdom were proof of the suffering and terrible deaths of Turkish Cypriots. Both Mine and Emre’s accounts demonstrate that the memorial visit made them think of Greek Cypriots in a negative light. Mine, for instance, visited the monument when she was around ten years old. In the following extract, she is responding to my questions about Cengiz Topel’s martyrdom and the memorial visit:

Rahme: What do you mean? Did you think differently before?
Mine: Yes. When I was a child, I used to think that Greek Cypriots killed Cengiz Topel ruthlessly.
Rahme: Where did you get this idea?
Mine: It was emphasised in the text I saw at the memorial that that the pilot was tortured before his death. I remember this information from school as well.
Rahme: So does that mean that you saw Greek Cypriots as your enemies when you were a child? And visiting the memorial made you think negatively about Greek Cypriots back then?
Mine: Something like that. The visit in a way told me not to forget the past and the cruelty of Greek Cypriots, which was displayed at the monument.

The next extract is from an interview with Emre. Again, the conversation is about Cengiz Topel’s martyrdom and what Emre remembers from the memorial visit. I ask him to explain how the photographs and aircraft wreckage displayed at the memorial made him feel:

Emre: There were photographs that reflected the day of the incident. Seeing the image of Cengiz Topel’s dead body covered
with blood made me feel uncomfortable. It was a very disturbing image.

Rahme: What about the wreckage of the aircraft?
Emre: The wreckage of the aircraft was the proof of the incident. It was the most astonishing part of the memorial. I could not stop looking at the debris, as it still had the traces of the bullets. This made me construct stories in my mind regarding how the incident actually happened, and how Greek Cypriots shot the plane down.

The memorial connects the past to the present through a discourse of ongoing suffering. It is through the use of such images and memorials that individuals constitute themselves in relation to their pasts, their immediate lives and their potential futures. Mine and Emre were considerably affected as children by the violent and gory content on display at the memorial. The memorial perpetuated the memory of Cengiz Topel, and as they revisit the event in their recollections they re-experience their own childhood distress. However, as they recall the distress in the present, another feeling emerges: an awareness that they had perhaps been manipulated into feeling this emotion.

Rahme: What do you think about the memorial visit? Do you think that it is a right practice?
Mine: I think it is a very sad thing that they took us there. It’s not appropriate for children of that age to see such things.
Rahme: Why do you think that they took you there?
Mine: They wanted impose a sense of hatred against Greek Cypriots.
Interview: Did it work? Do you see Greek Cypriots as your enemies?
Mine: No. They are not our enemies. But this is what I think now.

A similar pattern can be seen in the following extract from the interview with Emre:

Rahme: Can you say that what you saw in the memorial made you think negatively about Greek Cypriots?
Emre: Maybe it did, but I don’t think negatively about them right now. I know that they are brainwashing people into
thinking that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots cannot live together again. I don’t know if they are still taking children there, but if they are, then I believe that they should stop.

As Mine and Emre reconstruct the past within the present, their views shift from seeing the inherent “cruelty” to rethinking the motives behind the memorial visit. Narratives that are disseminated by the state, and how these are interpreted and made sense of, generate a set of feelings around what is “authentic” and what is “fabricated”. Mine and Emre’s critical stance towards the practice of memorial visits represents a new cultural conjuncture, and is a phase within a wider settlement that I am calling the post-postcolonial – a period of emergence of a different set of aims (see also Chapters 6 and 7).

As I discussed in Chapter 3, the post-postcolonial conjuncture is the coming together in a particular articulation of all the complex forces operating in Turkish Cypriot society today. On the one side, there is a common sense that revolves around the idea that Turkish Cypriots are possessors of a distinct and static “Turkish” culture. On the other side, there is another common sense, or a new cultural formation – Cypriotness – that necessitates the building of new solidarities and new alliances between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. This new movement of Cypriotness articulates the struggle of participants who are constantly trying, but never fully succeeding, to be European/Western enough and to assimilate into the European/Western world (see Chapter 6 and Chapter 7). Thus, the struggle between the state and indigenous Turkish Cypriots, as reflected in Mine and Emre’s narratives, should be seen as closely related to the sense of in-betweenness that Mine and Emre experience: the feeling of powerlessness/inferiority that they feel in relation to Greek Cypriots (see Chapter 6), and the feeling of superiority that they experience in relation to mainland Turks (see Chapter 7).

In my final example in this sub-subsection, Halil’s account calls attention to another significant point that reveals post-postcolonial resistance to be located in this in-between space. Although Halil remembers feeling hatred when he saw the mercilessness and savagery of Greek Cypriots displayed at the memorial, as we talk I can see him engaging in “contrapuntal thinking” (Said, 1993):
Rahme: Did the things you saw at the memorial affect you? 
Halil: It would affect any child. And the funny thing is that normally, in other parts of the world, students are taken to art galleries, parks, zoos, but in Cyprus they took us there and to the Museum of Barbarism.

Halil draws attention to the activities put into practice by the ethnonationalist parties in northern Cyprus, and in doing so he somewhat undermines those activities. I found this to be a common narrative used by young Turkish Cypriots to draw attention to the weaknesses in the state’s practices. Similarly, the TRNC was constantly criticised for its inability to be like “other” countries in the Western world. Halil, for instance, was not happy about visiting such places, because he thought that such practices generated “hatred” for the “mercilessness” and “savagery” inflicted on Turkish Cypriots, which would eventually strengthen the “flesh and fingernail” (Bryant and Yakinthou, 2012, p.16) or motherland/child relationship between Turkey and northern Cyprus. For Halil, these practices would never bring the much-needed social revolution to the northern part of the island (see Chapter 7). If there is no cultural/civilisational gap separating Turkish Cypriots from mainland Turks (who are considered backward and inferior to both indigenous Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, see Chapter 7), then for Halil there is no way that the state can be part of the West. Accordingly, speaking from an in-between position (discussed in Chapter 3), Halil cannot construct any positive meanings out of the practices of ethnonationalist parties. Such modes of practice are alien to his thoughts and feelings, since they are based on the desire to build alliances with Greek Cypriots for the pleasure of a “superiority” or “originality”.

In the next sub-subsection, I highlight similar findings from participants’ stories about their memories of the Museum of Barbarism.

5.3.2.2. Controversial Traumas: Visiting the Museum of Barbarism

The Museum of Barbarism acts as a crucial form of commemoration: it depicts everyday wartime experiences, and it supports various state narratives detailing a
“truth” about the death of Muruvvet İlhan, her children and their landlady Feride. I revisited the Museum of Barbarism in 2016 as part of my fieldwork.

At the museum entrance, I see a broken-down door. The writing on the door reads: “this door was broken down on that night and has been preserved in the same state ever since.” Visitors enter through this door, which has been labelled “authentic” by the state. Visiting children can then see the shoes, clothes and other accessories supposedly worn by Muruvvet İlhan, her children and their landlady on that night. Many photographs are displayed on the wall; to demonstrate their authenticity, there is a text underneath them stating that the property belonged to Muruvvet İlhan, her children and their landlady Feride, and that the stains visible on the clothing are blood. Over the course of many years, the blood has faded to a grey-brown. In addition to the photographs, a painted picture can also be seen; this represents the moments after the murder of the woman and her three children. These images prepare visiting children for their view of the bathroom, which is where the murders took place. In the bathroom, the blood of the dead is splattered all over the room. The bathroom ceiling has now been shielded with glass, to preserve the bloodstains and other bodily debris which were thrown up during the killings. The impact is one of horror and revulsion at the violence.

The naturalistic setting of the museum, which is based in the actual house of the deceased family, brings about a connection to everyday life. The museum is organised to create an atmosphere where visitors experience the sensation of being in the house that night (Erhurman, 2010, p.155). As I revisited my own memories, I recalled being repelled and disgusted, in a series of mixed emotions. It was the broken-down door, the painting, the ceiling and the bloodstains on the clothes that shaped my experience as I looked back to make sense of my reactions from my perspective today. In my investigation into the effects of the museum visit on my research participants, I first asked whether they had visited the museum. Then I asked them if they could describe to me what they had seen in the museum. The first extract is from an interview with Gozde, a twenty-eight-year-old woman:

Rahme: Did you visit the Museum of Barbarism at school? 
Gozde: I did. What about you? Did they take you there as well?
Gozde: Yes, me too. How long has it been?… Almost fifteen years? But, yes, I still remember.
Rahme: Could you tell me what you remember?
Gozde: The brain pieces on the ceiling and the clothes with bloodstains.
Rahme: It was a horrible experience to see these things, wasn’t it?
Gozde: Yes! They [the brain matter on the ceiling and the bloodstained clothes] affected me so much, to the extent that I was terrified.
Rahme: And did they [the brain matter and bloodstained clothes] have an impact on your ideas about Greek Cypriots?
Gozde: Yes. I imagined Greek Cypriots as monsters who wanted to kill all the Turks. I had an idea that their greatest goal was to dominate the whole island, and to do that they had to kill all the Turks.

In the next extract, from an interview with Miray, a twenty-nine-year-old woman, a similar pattern can be seen. Following a similar conversation to the one I had with Gozde about the museum visit, I ask Miray: how did the museum visit make you feel?

Miray: I was affected very much by the Museum of Barbarism. It was horrible. The pictures, clothes, the bathroom and all the other objects represented the night of the incident.
Rahme: And did these make you think badly about Greek Cypriots?
Miray: Yes. I felt sorry for the mother and her children. I remember that after visiting the museum, I was convinced that Greek Cypriots were our enemies.

Gozde and Miray’s impressions were shaped by the symbolic representations of violence that detailed the atrocities committed by Greek Cypriots; as a result, they experienced initial feelings of racialised fear. Before encountering life with Greek Cypriots (after the opening of the Green Line in 2003), they had already formed a negative view. Yet, as Gozde and Miray step back into the past and recollect their childhood experiences, there is also a reframing of the past within the present. In the following extract, Gozde is responding to my follow-up question:
Rahme: What about now? Do you still see Greek Cypriots as monsters?
Gozde: No. Now, I think differently. I know that we were taken there for a purpose. They wanted us to hate Greek Cypriots. Nationalist propaganda!

A similar pattern can be seen in the next extract, where I ask Miray a similar follow-up question:

Rahme: What about now? Are you still convinced that Greek Cypriots are “our” enemies?
Miray: No.
Rahme: Why? What has changed?
Miray: As a child, I couldn’t make sense of things. I didn’t know why they took us there. I do now. They wanted to instil hostility between the two communities across generations.
Rahme: And do you think that this is a wrong approach?
Miray: Yes, this is so wrong.

Gozde and Miray are able both to inhabit their childhood terror during the school trip and to reflect upon that terror as adults – to see that it was induced by the use of the objects and the overall atmosphere conjured during the visit. As adults, they are able to view the experience as inauthentic – as having manipulated them into feeling an emotional connection with the suffering of the woman and her three children, not as a genuine experience of understanding another person’s predicament to generate empathy, but as a vehicle for inducing hatred based on that empathic connection. Miray’s stance is clear: she is against this strategy.

Ismail, a thirty-one-year-old man, and Meryem, a twenty-eight-year-old woman, also visited the Museum of Barbarism while they were at primary school. Unlike Gozde and Miray, Ismail and Meryem told me that although there had been disturbing images and objects in the museum, they did not remember feeling fear or thinking negatively about the Greek Cypriot Other. The extract below is from an interview with Ismail:

Rahme: After visiting the museum, did you imagine Greek Cypriots as bad people?
Ismail: I don’t remember thinking that Greeks Cypriots were bad.
Interview: Why is that? Does that mean that the images and objects in the museum did not affect you at all?
Ismail: I believe it’s due to the fact that I also heard good stories about them from my parents and friends.

Similar findings emerge from the final extract below, which is taken from an interview with Meryem:

Rahme: Would you say that what you saw in the museum affected your perception of Greek Cypriots in a negative way?
Meryem: No. I never internalised the stories written about Greek Cypriots in our school textbooks, and I never paid so much attention to what I saw in the museums and memorials.
Rahme: Is there a particular reason?
Meryem: In our family discussions, I heard that the incident was exaggerated unnecessarily and that people from both communities killed each other. It was not only Greek Cypriots who did it.

Although different participants produced these narratives, what groups them together is that each extract represents a resistance against nationalist/official discourse. Similarly to Gizem’s account discussed above, Ismail and Meryem are certain that the narratives they heard from their parents during childhood helped them to remain unaffected by their exposure to propaganda. However, these narratives are contradictory (see Chapter 6); therefore, Ismail and Meryem tell stories of intentionally embracing the “good” of the past, resisting the “traumatic” part of it. In other words, they interpret and reinterpret stories about the past in ways that make sense to them in the present. Understood in this way, post-postcolonial resistance articulates a new cultural politics through which participants question hegemonic narratives. I will further examine the politics of such questioning in the next two chapters.
5.4. Conclusion: A New Way of Thinking About Resistance

Overall, the examples in this chapter show that history textbooks and discursive practices such as commemorative ceremonies and museum/memorial visits do not always function as mnemonic instruments, but rather reveal the contestation of cultural and political dynamics in the present. The participants’ accounts call attention to the social character of contemporary cultural struggles, and the need to acknowledge that the formation of identity and culture is a continual and never-ending process. The examples above, for instance, show that some participants are resisting nationalist discourse and practices and the idea that Turkish Cypriots are possessors of a distinct and uncontaminated cultural essence, “Turkishness”. In turn, they are developing counter-hegemonic strategies in order to build solidarities based on a different type of common sense. However, as I will discuss in more detail in the following chapters, this new common sense may rely upon essentialised notions of “Cypriotness” shared by indigenous Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Thus, in the context of post-postcolonialism, the essentialist understanding of culture should be seen not only as a cause of cultural struggle, but also as a result of cultural struggle.

Moreover, the participants’ accounts suggest a new, alternative way of conceptualising notions of “resistance” explored and theorised by scholars in postcolonial studies. Discourses of resistance tend to be used to explain political and social actions taken by previously colonised peoples in postcolonial societies. Academics in the field of postcolonial studies (such as Bhabha and Spivak) have developed theories to explain how postcolonial people became resistant to the imposition of Western hegemonic ideals. Bhabha (1994), for instance, locates “resistance in the spaces between colonial expectations and the native’s response, so that the ‘disempowered’ can fabricate strategies that change and displace ‘authority’ within these ‘in-between’ spaces” (Shahjahan, 2011, p.276). According to this approach, as Shahjahan (2011, p.276; see also Shahjahan, 2012) writes, “resistance undermines the hegemony and authority of colonial knowledge production by subverting the binary thought and essentialist identities produced by colonial knowledge.” It is possible to subvert colonial authority because the power possessed by this authority is never complete or “absolute”, thanks to hybridity, mimicry and liminality (Shahjahan, 2011). The existing concept of
resistance in postcolonial studies, however, does not go beyond analysing the postcolonial condition. The concept of resistance within postcolonial theory, in this sense, is problematic and does not always engage with the changing settings of what I refer to as post-postcoloniality. The new concept of post-postcolonial resistance that I have proposed in this chapter seeks to address this gap.

It becomes clear that post-postcolonial resistance is located in the spaces between official and vernacular interests, between opposing discourses and different kinds of common sense. This form of resistance challenges the hegemony and authority of ethnonationalist knowledge production by criticising the binary thought and essentialist identities constructed by the state. Therefore, post-postcolonial resistance is both an expression of the distinctive relationship between indigenous people and the authorities, and a step in the direction of reconciliation so that the (Greek Cypriot) Other can be accepted as human. This new/alternative form of resistance should thus be understood not only as a desire to overthrow the nationalist themes and essentialist identities produced by the state, but also as entailing the transformation of values, structures and narratives to create and maintain hybrid identities (i.e. Cypriotness). In other words, resistance within the context of post-postcolonialism is not defined as merely wanting to overcome the hegemony of ethnic nationalism, but rather alters social relations in such a way that those who have been considered as the Other can also be acknowledged as human. However, as Hall (2007, p.154) once said:

I used to think that, basically, we are all human beings, and so what one should do is ignore the differences and find the commonality. Of course we are indeed all human, but I’m afraid I came to think, at a certain point in my life, that our common humanity is not enough.

Following on from Hall’s argument, I argue that post-postcolonial resistance necessitates a concrete enemy or a new Other – in this case, mainland Turks – so that new relations between the Self and the Other (in this case, Greek Cypriots) can be established. Post-postcolonial resistance, then, is a struggle against something for something. It is a struggle against the Eastern or inferior Other that closes the gap between the Self and the European or superior Other. Hence, in the
next two chapters, I further investigate the politics of inclusion and exclusion embedded in post-postcolonial society, and I show how the dichotomies between Europe and the Orient have been reconfigured.
CHAPTER 6: POST-POSTCOLONIAL INCLUSION

This chapter considers the connections and tensions between individual and collective memory. The purpose of this chapter is to build upon themes developed in Chapter 5 regarding the importance of family memories/stories in the formation of young generation Turkish Cypriots’ ideas about the Greek Cypriot Other. In this instance, I focus specifically upon the question: why do my research participants embrace the “good” of the past, resisting its “traumatic” parts? Family plays a major role in the exchange of living memory through ongoing social interactions and communications between children, parents and grandparents (Erll, 2011; Halbwachs, 1980, 1992). Through repeated recall of the family’s past – usually via oral stories that are told in everyday life – those who did not experience past events first-hand can nevertheless share in the memory. In this way, an exchange of living memory takes place between eyewitnesses and their descendants. Indeed, Halbwachs (1992, p.61) argues that it is through family memories that people acquire their “first notions about people and things”. According to Halbwachs (1992, p.61):

For a long time we knew nothing of the external world but the repercussions of outside events within the circle of our kin. If we think of a town, it might recall to us a trip we once undertook with our brother. If we think of a profession, we think of the relation who practices it; or if we think of wealth, we imagine members whose fortune we try to estimate. There is in short no object upon which we reflect that cannot serve as a point of departure, through an association of ideas, to retrieve some thought which immerses us again, in the distant or recent past, in the circle of our family.

But what happens when there are conflicting recollections of “people and things”, as is the case in northern Cyprus? In what follows, I do not reject Halbwachs’s ideas about the significant role family members play in the intergenerational transmission of memory. However, my argument is that the effect of this transmission does not necessarily derive from the content of the memories, but
instead from the position from which the memories are told. By “position” in this case I mean the way Turkish Cypriots categorise the Self in relation to the Greek Cypriot Other on the basis of Eurocentric assumptions and ideas about Europe and the Orient. Gilroy’s (2004) work on “convivial multicultures” and Ang’s work (1996) on “inclusion by virtue of othering” provide a theoretical framework for making sense of Turkish Cypriots’ post-postcolonial experience and some of the ways in which they narrate the past. Throughout this chapter I show that this position is passed down from generation to generation and is closely related to what Turkish Cypriot society remembers about the past and Greek Cypriots. It will become clear that this position provides an understanding of the current dynamics of identity formation (i.e. Cypriotness), and of issues surrounding resistance (see Chapter 5), inclusion (this chapter) and exclusion (Chapter 7) in the context of post-postcolonialism.

The discussion in this chapter is divided into three main parts. Drawing on the work of Halbwachs (1980, 1992), in the first part I look at contradictory family stories about the past and Greek Cypriots, drawing attention to the dichotomy between individual and collective memory. Using my findings from Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals as an empirical focus, in the second section I develop the notions of collective positioning and post-postcolonial inclusion. Finally, I explore the characteristics of post-postcolonial inclusion. Overall, a key focus of my discussion is to investigate the politics of inclusion and exclusion embedded in Turkish Cypriot community, and to offer an analysis of race and racism as cultural forces (Hall, 1997).

6.1. Family Stories: Memories of the Past and Greek Cypriots

When I was a child, my mother used to talk about certain events that had happened in 1974 when Greek Cypriots attacked Alaminyo, her village in Larnaca. Although my mother was only nine years old in 1974, she has vivid personal memories of life during the years of conflict. One event concerned the women of the village who were captured and kept in a school situated in the village centre, opposite my grandmother’s house. She mentioned numerous times that she would never forget seeing women urinating into their shoes because they
were scared to ask soldiers to take them to the toilet. The second incident concerned a Greek soldier who was eating watermelon and tearing down a Turkish flag with his teeth at the same time. In my mother’s words: “the soldier took his time and slowly tore the flag into pieces. He seemed to enjoy it.” I remember my mother saying that this scene would remain with her forever. She also heard soldiers killing a Turkish Cypriot person near the school. Despite these atrocities, my mother always said to me that war is beset by suffering and violence, regardless of which side of the conflict you belong to. Indeed, the untold misery and suffering caused by war also affected the Greek Cypriot community.

I also heard my grandmother tell a story involving my grandfather and uncles. The event in question took place on 12 August 1967 in Alaminyo. Every time she spoke about this event, she relived it. Her voice trembled, her eyes filled with tears, her speech faltered, and she would gaze into space, probably remembering the scenes she was describing. Her telling of this story became filtered through my memory as the following event:

My grandfather was working with my grandmother and their children (my mother, two aunts and two uncles) in the field on the day of the incident. Dervish (who was fifteen years old) and his brother were working in another field. Dervish’s brother found a heavy box which had bullet symbols painted on it. He tried to open it but couldn’t. He asked for help from Altay (who was working in the neighbouring field), but Altay could not open it neither. As Dervish and Altay headed towards the village with their tractor, they saw my grandfather. They stopped and told him that they had found a box which possibly had bullets inside it. When my grandfather heard the word “bullet”, he told my uncles not to follow him, but they did not listen. He approached the tractor and took the box from Dervish and Altay. When he forced open the box, there was a terrible explosion. My grandfather, two uncles and Altay all died. Dervish was thrown forwards and lost his eyes. He was the only person who survived the accident.

My grandmother and the other people of the village believed that Greek Cypriots had not intended to kill my grandfather with the booby trap. While I was
conducting my fieldwork, I discovered that this event is also mentioned in Bozkurt’s *Bir Gun Belki* (2002, pp.248–253). In the author’s words:

There was a big explosion in the valley. A cloud of smoke rose from the ground into the air. As Mehmet, Bayram and Refet came near the scene, they began to hear voices. A woman was screaming.

“My children are gone, my husband is gone, they killed them,” she was saying in Turkish.

What Mehmet, Bayram and Refet saw at the scene was horrifying. Within an area of 100 metres, there lay fragmented and burnt human bodies. Those images haunted them for days. They could not look at or eat meat for a long time.

For me, the book revealed a different dimension of what had happened on that day. In the narratives of my grandmother and other family members, there was no mention of what had happened right after the explosion. That part of the story was kept secret; perhaps no one wanted to talk about it because it was too painful. Stories of the traumatic past such as this occupy the daily lives of Turkish Cypriots. Whether in silence or through secrecy (see Seidler, 2000), or through stories that are told, traumatically overwhelming and unbearable events and experiences pass from one generation to the next. However, as I delineate below, there are also more positive memories about the past, such as peaceful co-existence, friendships with Greek Cypriots that are transposed from older generation (or war generation) to the young generation Turkish Cypriots.

The following excerpt comes from an interview with Fatma, a thirty-three-year-old woman. Similar to my own history, she was born after the division of the island, meaning she has no direct experience of the pre-1974 situation in Cyprus. I asked her to share a story she had heard from her parents or grandparents regarding the war years. In response, she told me about her grandmother’s

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30 Although histories cannot always be articulated, as Seidler (2000) argues in his work ‘*Shadows of the Shoah: Jewish Identity and Belonging*’, they can be transposed across generations. The historic is apparent in the present. Thus, although painful histories are frequently unspoken, silences too can be ‘felt’ by the children of first generation immigrant families.
traumatic war memories, which had been passed on to Fatma through social interactions in everyday life:

My grandmother used to tell me that her father was known to be coming home with his car from Nicosia when Greek soldiers stopped him on the way and killed him. I remember she always said: “all the things that I have experienced are still in my mind as if they happened yesterday.”

Whenever Fatma’s grandmother talked about her father’s death, she seemed upset. She was still affected by what she had experienced during the period of violent political conflict in Cyprus:

Whenever she started talking about the past, her voice changed. I could see that she had anger towards Greek Cypriots. She told me many times that we can never be friends with Greek Cypriots because we can never trust them.

The personal memory of Fatma’s grandmother tallies with public memories and official discourse (discussed in the previous chapter) which imply that Turkish Cypriots were the victims of unjust treatment by Greek Cypriots. A similar pattern can be seen in the following extract from an interview with Aliye, a thirty-year-old woman, who was also born after the division of the island, meaning she also has no direct experience of the inter-communal violence or war. The conversation is about Aliye’s family stories of the war years and life with Greek Cypriots:

Aliye: Whenever my mother talked about Greek Cypriots, she looked mournful. I remember her using words like “cruel people” when describing Greek Cypriots.

Rahme: Was she alive when there was war?

Aliye: Yes, she was.

Rahme: As I understand it, your mother experienced some bad events during the war.
Aliye: Yes. From what she told me, I know that she suffered difficult times during the war.

Rahme: Could you please tell me a little bit about the stories she told you?

Aliye: They were always on alert, because they could be killed at any time. At nights, they would sleep fully clothed, ready to run away in case Greek Cypriots began an attack. What else… One night they were told that Greek soldiers were going to attack their village in Iskele. All her extended family, aunts and cousins, gathered in their house, and they had to put a blanket over the window so that the Greek soldiers could not see they were inside.

What is apparent is that these traumatic events and experiences were passed across generations through stories and affects, in this instance from Aliye’s mother to Aliye. A common characteristic of the war generation’s stories is a switching between opposing discourses: one remembering traumatic war experiences, and another vividly and positively remembering life in “Cyprus before the division”. An example of this narrative splitting can be observed in the following extract, which comes from my interview with Fatma:

Rahme: Have you heard any stories based on positive relations between the two communities?

Fatma: …I remember my grandmother telling me that the Greek Cypriots were not bad people. I also heard her saying that her neighbour was a really nice woman and they used to work together.

Rahme: Is this your other grandmother?

Fatma: Yes, my father’s mother.

This story is a significant contrast to the killing and maiming narrated in the previous extract from my interview with Fatma as well as in the history books discussed in the previous chapter; it shows a shift to a “warm” and “loving” side to “Cypriots”. A similar pattern can be seen in the following extract from my
interview with Aliye. The conversation is about Aliye’s family stories of convivial relationships with Greek Cypriots:

Rahme: Have you heard any story based on positive relationships between the two communities?

Aliye: I have.

Rahme: Could you give me some information about these stories?

Aliye: Yes… although I was deprived of the experience of living together with Greek Cypriots, when I recall what my grandfather told me, I knew that Greeks and Turks of the island lived in the same villages in prosperity. He had a lot of close Greek Cypriot friends. He told me a story about his best friend, Laifi.

Rahme: Can you tell me about this story?

Aliye: So, in 1974, a Greek soldier wanted to execute five young Turkish Cypriot men between the ages of fifteen and twenty by shooting them. And my grandfather’s best friend, Laifi, stopped him. “If you want to kill them, you have to kill me first. And if you decide to kill them before killing me, I will kill you,” Laifi said to the Greek soldier.

Aliye and Fatma’s family stories reflect people’s experiences of surviving hardship: the camaraderie, support and intensity of being alive while also facing death, torture and constant fear. These narrated memories contain various ruptures, breaks and repetitions, showing that the war generation are constantly trying to make sense of their memories within the present. Thus, Fatma and Aliye are caught in a paradox: although they imagine the brutality, ruthlessness and mercilessness of Greek Cypriots and think of them as an antagonistic Other, they are also offered instances of friendship between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, including stories of the communities’ peaceful coexistence before the division of the island. Studies on intergenerational transition of trauma have been based on the atrocities of the Holocaust (see Hirsch, 2008, 2012; Bowers and Yehuda, 2016). Only recently have scholars applied sociological analysis to slavery and intergenerational trauma of slavery (see Graff, 2014). The case of Northern Cyprus relates to a relatively new scholarship, which places a greater
emphasis on the broader level of the politics of memory and transitional justice (see Bell, 2011, 2014, 2018; see also Bell and Paolantonio, 2018). As I will show, the period after conflict ended in Turkish Cypriot society brought with it a “transformative moment” (Aiken, 2013, p.26) for rapprochement. The war generation have contradictory personal memories that are constituted through ongoing social interaction and communication between different generations in everyday life; in these memories, ideas about the past and Greek Cypriots become dominant – and collective – in ways that are related to the needs and interests of Turkish Cypriot society in the present. Halbwach’s dichotomy between individual and collective memory becomes particularly relevant here.

Drawing on Halbwachs, it is possible to suggest that memory becomes dislocated from the individual. In other words, individual memory becomes subsumed beneath the rubric of collective memory. Halbwachs (1992, p.38) maintains that “there exists a collective memory and social frameworks for memory; it is to the degree that our individual thought places itself in these frameworks and participates in this memory that it is capable of the act of recollection.” Thus, our own perception is specific to our group and society helps shape our individual memories, but both are subsumed by collective memory. For Halbwachs (1980, p.48), “each memory is a viewpoint on the collective memory.” This is the viewpoint people tend to take as a result of their cultural influences and socialisation. Collective memory, Halbwachs argues, is turned toward the present day needs and interests of the group and moves forward in a largely selective and reconstructive manner. Thus, memories can become warped and distorted to the extent that they bear a great resemblance to fiction than reality:

A remembrance is in very large measure a reconstruction of the past achieved with data borrowed from the present, a reconstruction prepared, furthermore, by reconstructions of earlier periods wherein past images had already been altered (Halbwachs, 1980, p.68).

In what follows, I show that collective memory in the context of northern Cyprus is “entwined with a future-oriented concern” (Bell and Paolantonio, 2018, p.585)
and oriented towards the needs and interests of Turkish Cypriot society in the present. Although collective memory may encompass individual memories of the traumatic past, it largely remains distinct from them. Collective memory is oriented towards specific interests regarding cultural supremacy and the positions that Turkish Cypriots adopt in relation to Greek Cypriots. In the next section I consider cultural festivals, which provide fertile ground for exploring the relationships between memory, shifting positionalities (Self-Other relations) and notions of Cypriotness.

6.2. Cultural Festivals in Northern Cyprus

The findings discussed in this section revolve around recurring cultural festivals in northern Cyprus, namely the Buyukkonuk Eco Day Festival, the Mehmetcik Grape Festival and the Kalavac Cypriot Culture and Art Festival. These festivals intertwine memory, culture and identity (which Jan and Aida Assmann (see Assmann and Czaplicka, 1995) call “cultural memory”). In recent years there has been a surge of interest in Turkish Cypriot folk arts, with indigenous Turkish Cypriots exploring their “intangible cultural heritage” (UNESCO, 2001) of food, songs, dances, stories, language and cultural practices. The characteristics and significance of this interest in Turkish Cypriot folk arts and how it might be related to wider shifts of cultural identification (i.e. with Cypriotness) have not yet been fully questioned or investigated. As I will show, the meanings of Cypriotness are embedded in cultural practices, which then function as a way of performing contemporary identities. Thus, I suggest that cultural practices are critical sites in which to study identity practices in northern Cyprus.

I am particularly concerned with the following question: why has there been a surge of interest and participation in Turkish Cypriot folk arts and cultural practices? Using observations and images that I collected in Buyukkonuk and Kalavac, I start with a discussion of the role of Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals in northern Cyprus. In commenting on these examples, I develop the notions of collective positioning and post-postcolonial inclusion.
6.2.1. The Politics of Turkish Cypriot Cultural Festivals

Bi-annually, in May and October, Buyukkonuk village turns into a bustling marketplace. Villagers keep themselves busy by preparing the homemade products in which they take such pride in and sell and share at Buyukkonuk Eco Day. Many traditional foodstuffs, such as Cypriot hellim cheese, zeytinli and hellimli (olive and hellim bread), lokma and harnup pekmez (carob molasses) are on display, along with traditional handicrafts. The festival lasts from dawn to dusk and the small village becomes a vibrant centre for celebration. I attended the festival in 2016 for the purposes of this research.

At the entrance to the festival area, I see a huge traditional buhurdanlik (Figure 10). The buhurdanlik occupies an important place in Cypriot culture (Reyhanoğlu, 2017). Both Turkish and Greek Cypriots use it: they burn olive branches in it, and then turn the branches three times above their heads. According to tradition, the smoke will safeguard the home and family from evil spirits.

There is a stall where sestas are on display (Figure 11). Sestas are everyday traditional objects which Greek and Turkish Cypriots serve and eat food from (Erhurman, 2010, p.147). Thus, like the buhurdanlik, sestas embody the cultural artefacts and practices that Greek and Turkish Cypriots used to share when they
co-existed peacefully, particularly during the 1950s.

Figure 11. Traditional *sestas*. Photograph by the author.

Figure 12. Words used by Turkish Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot dialect, displayed on a wall. Photograph by the author.

There is also a display of words on a house wall (Figure 12). Language is a marker of cultural hybridisation in Turkish Cypriot society. The words displayed on the wall, which include *piron* (fork), *potin* (shoes), *iskemle* (chair), *gabira* (toasted bread), *ispaho* (yarn), *belesbit* (bicycle), *lagani* (waterway) and *bavuri* (tin water bottle), are in the Turkish Cypriot dialect; they are not used in standard Turkish. Thus, they serve to represent a symbolic distinction from mainland Turks. Some of these words also represent the linguistic similarities between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot dialects. According to the *Joint Dictionary of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Dialect* (Hadjipieris\(^{32}\) and Kabatas,\(^{33}\) 2017), *piron*, *gabira* and *bavuri* are among the 3,500 common words used by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Kabatas (cited in Vasiliou, 2016) states:

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31 The Turkish Cypriot dialect consists of a blend of Ottoman Turkish and the Yörük dialect spoken in the Taurus Mountains of southern Turkey. In addition, it has absorbed influences from Greek, Italian and English.
32 A Greek Cypriot Turkologist.
33 A Turkish Cypriot teacher of geography and history.
While the mother languages, Modern Greek and Turkish, move in parallel and they do not meet, the local dialects, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot, intercept each other and this is attributed to the elements comprising their common cultural tradition.

A large number of words shared between the two dialects are no longer used by Turkish and Greek Cypriots. For example, instead of *piron* (Turkish Cypriot dialect), a Turkish Cypriot person – especially a young person – would use the word *catal* (standard Turkish) in everyday conversation. Nevertheless, these words – like the smell and taste of foodstuffs – are laden with “broader cultural associations” (Rhys-Taylor, 2013, p.237), and the meanings people attach to them are active in making and remarking cultural similarities and distinctions. The words displayed on the wall at the festival signify and highlight that Greek and Turkish Cypriots shared similar ways of life when they lived together. They may even evoke memories. Each separate word is a representation of memories, a common story, a common place and a joint experience. Each word is also a marker of difference between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots. As Bourdieu (quoted in Swartz, 1997, p.6) would argue, practices such as the display of the *buhurdanlık*, the *sestas* and the words “embody interests” and function to enhance cultural similarities and distinctions. Each practice or symbolic work serves to form an identity (Bourdieu, 1984, p.56) by erecting symbolic boundaries between people who occupy different locations in the cultural structure.

As discussed in Chapter 5, the state has propagated an official discourse in order to create a national identity based on maintaining the status quo. The common sense of Turkish Cypriots has been constructed around the idea of sameness and solidarity between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. The official history found in schoolbooks, for instance, accentuates the difference between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots by employing identity labels such as “Turks – Greeks” and “Turks of Cyprus – Greeks of Cyprus” (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008, p.142). Referring to Turkey as the “motherland”, the official narrative promotes the idea that “the destiny of Turkish-Cypriots depends on Turkey” (Vural and Ozuyanik, 2008, p.142). However, I argue that the rise of discursive practices such Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals marks the emergence of post-postcolonial
discourse and a new hegemonic and cultural movement or formation: Cypriotness. Cultural festivals reflect a new common sense founded on similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, and on differences between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals and practices construct and present a Cypriot culture shared between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, encouraging the idea of the unity of Cyprus and essentialised notions of Cypriotness.

I found that my participants (from both the war generation and the younger generation) focused on other, controversial elements of the past and put forward an alternative way of thinking about the Greek Cypriot Other. An example of this can be seen in a dialogue between a Turkish Cypriot father and daughter that I heard at the Kalavac Cypriot Culture and Art Festival.

I visit the house of the village’s oldest inhabitant, ninety-two-year-old Ayse Teyze. She has become the symbol of Kalavac village, as she is one of the last remaining people in northern Cyprus who knows how to make handwoven carpets and who owns a handloom (Figure 13). She opens her house to festival visitors and talks to them about her life, shows them the handloom, recites Turkish poems and sings traditional songs. Ayse Teyze’s house is a typical traditional Turkish Cypriot adobe house. In the garden of her house, I see a Turkish Cypriot family (father, mother and daughter) standing over a traditional clay oven (Figure 14).
The father, Veli, is telling his daughter Hanife (both these names are pseudonyms) that there used to be poverty, so Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots made their own bread. Hanife was born after the division of the island; by bringing her to cultural festivals, Veli is able to weave his memories into direct conversations with her, in an effort to transpose the cultural history of Cyprus and of life before the island was divided. I join the conversation and ask Veli: “was life not more difficult in the past? There was poverty, people had to make their own bread.” In response, Veli starts telling Hanife and me that life in the past was better:

Veli: Difficult means something else, beautiful means something else. Yes, life was more difficult, but it was more beautiful. Even the taste of bread was better.

Rahme: Why is life no longer that beautiful?

Veli: Everything changed. We used to go to the cinema every weekend. In the areas where there were cinemas. We used to sleep outside in the garden. Now we are scared to do it. At nights, we had long conversations with our family members. Everything was so nice. Nothing can be the same any more.

Rahme: So you come here [to Kalavac] to remember the old days?

Veli: They are trying to make us remember the past, but they can’t do it.

Rahme: Why?

Veli: Cultures are mixed, blended.
Rahme: You mean the culture of mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots?

Veli: Yes. I have no intention of belittling Turkish culture. But the culture of Turkish Cypriots is mixed with the culture of Turks who come from Turkey now. There is diversity. There used to be only the products of Cypriot culture at the festivals. These products are no longer the only products on the stalls. Now there are products that come from Turkey, representing Turkish culture. These are the differences between former festivals and those that they organise now.

Rahme: Which festivals? The festivals that people organised in the past? Before the division of the island?

Veli: Yes. For these reasons, people aged fifty and older are longing for the past. And this longing is increasing day by day. My remarks should not be considered as maligning another culture. But from time to time we experience a feeling of longing.

This specific form of recollected memory refers to a special past, one where positive experiences are emphasised and painful memories played down. There is a consensus within academia that the period since the opening of the Green Line has been a particularly nostalgic time for Turkish Cypriots. As I discussed in Chapter 2, research on Turkish Cypriot identity noted that there has been a growing nostalgia among Turkish Cypriots “for the past of the island” (Sahin, 2008, p.55), for “former villages” (Bryant, 2012, p.21), for “memories of Greek Cypriot friends” (Bryant, 2012, p.15), “for neighbourhoods that they had abandoned” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008a, p.10), “for a purer past” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008b, p.425), “for yasemin kokulu Lefkosa (jasmine-scented Nicosia)” (Hatay and Bryant, 2008b, p.430) or “for the British” Cyprus (Beyazoglu, 2017, p.211; see also Hasturer, 2013). However, it is important to note that although this form of memory is drawn from the past, “it is clearly the product of the present” (Panelas, 1982, p.1425). In reality, life in the past may not have been better than life in the present. This particular memory is representative of present-day fears and anxieties, and it seems to serve the purpose of alleviating fears by “using the past in specially reconstructed ways” (Panelas, 1982, p.1425). Although Veli is saying that he does not intend to malign Turkish culture, in reality, as I show below, there is an anxiety about acculturation to Turkish culture. This anxiety
comes from the idea that Turkish culture is Eastern and backwards (Said, 1978). I therefore argue that the rise of interest in Turkish Cypriot folk arts and cultural practices is closely related to the East/West division, and to the way in which Turkish Cypriots position themselves in relation to Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks (see also Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion of Self-Other relations between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks). Power exerts an influence within and through collective memory, and I found that my participants manufactured an account of collective memory that was opposed to official discourse. In the next section, I outline the ways in which young generation Turkish Cypriots produce Greek Cypriots as superior. I argue that this “imaginary positioning” (Wetherell and Edley, 1999) is crucial for understanding the dynamics of Cypriotness and its relationship to resistance, inclusion and exclusion.

6.2.2. Collective Positioning and Post-Postcolonial Inclusion

According to the theorisation that arose in response to new racisms emerging in Europe, beginning most notably with Barker’s (1981) work, racism is no longer defined and marked by physical characteristics – “knowing by seeing” (Gunalatnam, 2003, p.9; see also Hall, 1997) – but rather via language and culture. Unlike scientific racism, which conceptualises Self and Other on the basis of biological features such as skin colour, hair, bone structure, noses and eyes (DuBois, 1969 [1903]; Gilroy, 2000, p.35) as the main indicators of group differences, cultural racism understands groups according to perceived ideological differences: e.g. the Other’s culture, religion, or “way of life”. Such cultural differences can be objective realities, or socially constructed, subjective fantasies. In Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots tend to use culture rather than biology as a way to categorise and treat people. As discussed in Chapter 3, Turkish Cypriots’ ideas about mainland Turks or Greek Cypriots are usually based on Eurocentric assumptions, or on a distinction between the Orient/East and the Occident/West (Said, 1978). Turkish Cypriots tend to undervalue and despise mainland Turks as inferior to the Self (see Chapter 7). They speak a Turkish Cypriot dialect that is different from standard Turkish, they dance to different traditional songs, they cook different dishes, and they dress differently from mainland Turks. Moreover,
because Cypriotness is associated with being European or Western, Turkish Cypriots consider themselves more European and more Western than mainland Turks (see Chapter 7).

A significant effect of British colonialism in Cyprus was that it gave rise to split subjects. What it means to be a Turkish Cypriot in Cyprus today lies at a complex intersection of Eastern and Western cultures. Turkish Cypriot identity incorporates notions of both Turkishness (which refers to the East) and Cypriotness (which for Turkish Cypriots refers to the West). In other words, Turkish Cypriot identity is positioned in relation to at least two “presences” (Hall, 1990, p.230): the presence of Turkishness and the presence of Cypriotness. Yet, rather than producing an equal hybridisation of cultures, my research participants develop counter-hegemonic strategies (in response to the idea that Turkish Cypriots possess a distinct and uncontaminated cultural essence of “Turkishness” – see Chapter 5) that rely on essentialised notions of a Cypriotness supposedly shared by indigenous Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. My participants apparently became so accustomed to identifying themselves with Cypriotness that when the Green Line opened in 2003, they were hit hard by the reality that they were not as European or Western as they thought. In other words, as Hall would argue, to cross the border was to experience “the shock of the ‘doubleness’ of similarity and difference” (Hall, 1990, p.227). An example of this shock can be seen in the following extracts. Here, Aldinc and Gulden are responding to my question: what did you think of the Greek side when you first saw it? Their responses reveal the ways in which they glorify the Other and the other side:

Aldinc: When I went to the Greek side for the first time, I felt like I had gone from a village to a European city. I realised how beautiful our island is. We don’t know or appreciate our cultural values and heritage. Greek Cypriots have maintained their cultural values. I understood that better.

Gulden: When I visited the other side, I saw how advanced they were and how well everything was organised. The Greek side is developing faster than our side. They are members of the European Union. Their quality of life has increased.
“Reality checks” such as the one Turkish Cypriots experienced during their first crossings are prevalent in their everyday lives. Every time they cross the border, they find the crossing alienating and traumatic. These encounters remind them that they are locked into their Turkishness, that their Turkishness is forever their identifier; they can never gain full acceptance in the Western/European or Greek Cypriots’ world, and they can never be truly equal to Greek Cypriots. This in turn leads young generation Turkish Cypriots to look down on themselves and glorify Greek Cypriots. An example of the ways young people construct Greek Cypriots as superior to the Self can be found in the following extracts from my interviews with Sermet and Aldinc. The extracts come from their responses to my standard question: what are your general thoughts about Greek Cypriots? The responses reflect the ways Aldinc and Sermet produce themselves in relation to the position of Greek Cypriots:

Sermet: I think that they are really modern. The majority of the society can speak English, which is not the case in our society.

Aldinc: They are good people. Although they have small racist groups in their society, they are trying to preserve their culture under the name of Cypriot identity. They are doing what we fail to do.

Here, speaking English appears to be accepted as equivalent to being modern. Since the majority of Turkish Cypriots cannot speak English, and Greek Cypriots can, Sermet produces Greek Cypriot people as more modern. In doing this, he is recognising inherent differences between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. This is a recognition of what Turkish Cypriot identity “lacks” (Hall, 1996, p.4). Similarly, in the case of Aldinc, the emphasis is on the Cypriotness of Greek Cypriots. Unlike Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots are able to preserve their Cypriotness; thus, they are considered superior to Turkish Cypriots. Both Aldinc and Sermet produce Greek Cypriots from a position of powerlessness or inferiority, placing the Self on a lower rank than the Greek Cypriot Other. Yet, it is important to note that this is an imaginary positioning. Drawing on the work of Barthes and Lacan, Wetherel and Edley (1999, pp.342–343) write:
As the human subject speaks, s/he produces herself or himself as full, complete, describable, as coincident with an image, as a fictional unity. In the symbolic, as we begin to utter, the self becomes a character, endowed with substance and unity as we say ‘I . . .’, ‘I . . .’, ‘I . . .’. This process of taking on a character is seen as illusory by Lacan and Barthes because, in their view, it mistakes the actual nature of subjectivity – its restless, incomplete and distributed nature. It is also a false authorship since what feels like authentic self-production, original self-expression and self-description is always ready-made; always social first and personal second. It is a selection from the panoply of selves already available to be donned. An external voice from without is thus misrepresented as a voice from within.

Following on from this, I suggest that Aldinc and Sermet produce the image of Greek Cypriots as whole and complete. What Sermet, Aldinc and Gulden believe to be the Greek Cypriots’ image in relation to the Self, or vice versa, is illusionary: not only is it socially constructed, but it is also based on a Eurocentric worldview or Orientalism. It is imaginary because, as Said (2006 [1978], p.21) would argue, it is a discourse that allows the West to be spoken from a position of powerlessness, “not truth”. This is the discourse that I have dubbed post-postcolonial.

Moreover, there may be a relatively positive valuation of Greek Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot society today. However, as Ang (1996, pp.38–39) puts it:

One problem with such avowedly 'anti-racist' measures (and the discourses that go along with them) is that they tend to be formulated from the implicit assumption that it is possible to make racism disappear […] What is constructed as a consequence is the image of a society which, in the end, will be free of racial prejudice and discrimination. But […] the idealized fantasy of such a purified, squeaky clean utopia only blinds us to the always less-than-perfect messiness of daily life in social space.

Since the opening of the Green Line, divisions between the two communities have ameliorated. For instance, there have been bi-communal events (such as cultural events or talks) to help leave behind and finally bury the violence of the past, nationalistic dogma and intolerance. However, there have been notable incidents
which have attempted to disrupt harmony between the two communities, as in both communities there are people who use their nationalistic tendencies as the pretext for violence. Within the context of Northern Cyprus, Turkish Cypriots encounter cultural racism, for instance, when a hostile Greek Cypriot person tells them that they are Turkish, “backward” and “barbarians” and will therefore never be “real” Cypriots (see below). I suggest that such encounters are sources of distress, and can trigger feelings of inadequacy or inferiority when Turkish Cypriots take up this imaginary position in relation to Greek Cypriots. In attempting to deal with this sense of insecurity, my research participants construct what I call “post-postcolonial inclusion”. At the core of post-postcolonial inclusion lies the collective position of inferiority that Turkish Cypriots take up in relation to Greek Cypriots. As I discuss in more detail below, post-postcolonial inclusion thus reflects my participants’ struggle for cultural equality, which can be achieved through particular fabrications of Cypriotness.

6.3. Exploring the Patterns of Post-Postcolonial Inclusion

In this section, I use the stories of the Green Line and other data I collected at the Mehmetcik Grape Festival as an empirical focus to explore patterns of post-postcolonial inclusion. Attending to these examples makes clearer the negotiation of Self and Other (Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots) in the unique and particular context of Cyprus.

6.3.1. Minimising Cultural Differences

The first characteristic of post-postcolonial inclusion is the minimisation of cultural differences between the Self and Greek Cypriots. I found that my participants often claimed a common cultural identity (Cypriotness) by constantly emphasising cultural similarities between themselves and Greek Cypriots, or by focusing on how Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots were all the “same”. Cultural differences were ignored. There was also a tendency among participants to embrace the “warm” and “loving” nature of “Cypriots”, rather than on the killing and maiming outlined in history books and traumatic family stories.
The first example comes from an interview with Leyla, a twenty-eight-year-old woman. Not long after the opening of the Green Line, Leyla’s father started working on the Greek side as a builder. This led to positive friendships with Greek Cypriots, including a friendship between Leyla’s parents, her father’s boss Sotiri and Sotiri’s family. Within this friendship, a set of cultural rituals was practised that cemented solidarity through shared moments. They all met up regularly, “making kebab” and drinking zivania (pomace brandy) together, which Leyla calls a “Cypriot thing”. The shared ritual became important for the formation of a cultural identity – Cypriotness – that transcended being a “Greek Cypriot” or a “Turkish Cypriot”, allowing the individuals to share a common “Cypriot” identity based on reciprocity.

Sotiri’s daughter evidently became Leyla’s first Greek Cypriot friend, although interestingly Leyla did not know, or did not remember, her name. Since they knew only a few words of English, they tried to find ways to communicate. This led them to invent their favourite game: finding words in common, and teaching each other new words in Turkish and Greek. The bond between the two girls, who were aged around twelve or thirteen, was forged around forms of play that used language to make a connection. For example, afiokinito, which means “car” in English, is a word that Leyla learned from her Greek Cypriot friend – something she remembered from when Sotiri’s daughter was speaking another language. These interactions between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot girls were a version of Bhabha’s (1994) third space (see Chapter 3). Such interactions provide an opportunity for the growth of novel understandings and expressions of cultural meaning and original ideas. This new opening not only rejects fixity, but also includes and accepts.

The following extract comes at the end of a long conversation about Leyla’s first impressions of the Greek side and her memories of Sotiri’s daughter. I ask Leyla about her memories of Sotiri’s family. In response, she produces an account that draws on cultural similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. The differences are underestimated or repressed:

In one instance, we were in the south with Sotiri, his family, with more than twenty people and friends for a kebab party. It
felt like, as if we were celebrating something. Greek music was playing in the background, Sotiri was singing, and the food on the table looked exactly the same as Turkish Cypriot dishes. This scene would look the same if we were making kebab in the north, except there would be some Turkish music playing in the background. I was amazed by the fact that we had so much in common.

Here, Leyla is forming a common cultural identity (Cypriotness) between the Self and the Greek Cypriot Other. This narrative reflects an opposition to the official history and nationalist themes that are fabricated around the idea of separation and difference between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots (see Chapter 5). It is important to note that when a post-war generation Turkish-Cypriot, such as Leyla, takes on a socially constructed Self in relation to Greek Cypriots, there is usually an issue about how similar the Self is to the Greek Cypriot Other or vice versa. Unless asked, this post-war generation do not wish to discuss the cultural differences that exist between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. A similar pattern can be seen in the following example from my interview with Gulden. The conversation is about Gulden’s first interactions with Greek Cypriots and her impressions of the Greek Cypriot Other:

Gulden: After the doors opened, I was very excited to meet the old man who had come to see his former village and where he had lived, which is my current house. Both smiling and crying, he told us his memories of living in his house, how it stood, and the memories he had of feeding his pets in front of the house.

Rahme: As I understand it, you did not experience a feeling of hostility towards him?

Gulden: Not really. I already thought good things about Greek Cypriots, but after meeting him I started liking Greek Cypriots even more.

Rahme: What was your first impression of him? What did you think of him?

Gulden: He was very friendly and genuine. He was like us.
The former occupant of Gulden’s house had returned to view it. The house denotes the ethnic cleansing that took place on both sides in 1974, when Greeks Cypriots were forced from Turkish Cypriot areas and vice versa. This Greek Cypriot man shared his personal memories and broke down at the recollection, leading Gulden to connect and relate to him through his narrative. Like Leyla, Gulden feels no inhibitions about mentioning how similar the Greek Cypriot man was to Turkish Cypriots. But we may ask: why does this Greek Cypriot man no longer occupy the position of Other? As I will go on to show, Gulden’s desire to relate to this Greek Cypriot man is a facet of post-postcolonial inclusion. It can be read as an attempt to close down the gap between the Self and the Other as a way of dealing with or denying a sense of inferiority.

Another example of how participants emphasise their similarities with Greek Cypriots and minimise cultural differences can be found in the following extract. Sermet studied at a university located on the Greek side of the island. Again, the conversation is about his first interactions with and first impressions of the Other. His account narrates the dynamic of positivity that has emerged since the Green Line opened:

Rahme: When you met Greek Cypriots for the first time [after the opening of the Green Line], what did you think about them?

Sermet: When I first chatted with Greek Cypriots, my initial thoughts were that Greek Cypriots were just like Turkish Cypriots, but speaking a different language. As the day went on, I met more Greek Cypriots and my thoughts were confirmed. Greek Cypriots are our clones who speak a different language [emphasis added].

Rahme: How would you describe the similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots?

Sermet: The way we speak, the way we eat, the way we drink, our laid-back attitudes, our friendly and warm nature, these are all common Cypriot features that we share.

Rahme: What about the differences?

Sermet: Except language and religion, we are pretty much the same.

Rahme: Do you have any Greek Cypriot friends?
Sermet: Yes, of course.

Rahme: How is your relationship with them? Do you get along?

Sermet: I have lots of Greek Cypriot friends and we get along very well. Although we do not speak the same language, we use common words, we share jokes with each other that only Cypriots can understand, we laugh, we enjoy each other’s company.

Rahme: Do you communicate in English?

Sermet: Yes, mostly in English. We also use common words, and the Greek and Turkish words that we teach each other, which are mostly swear words.

Rahme: What do you do together?

Sermet: They have shown me around the Greek side, Limassol, Larnaca, Paphos, all the cities I had not seen before. They made me fall in love with Cyprus once again. In a similar way, I showed them the Turkish side... places like beautiful beaches, castles, and not very well-known cafes/restaurants and other places.

Here, Sermet highlights the notion that similarities and cultural sameness are an essential component of cross-cultural understanding. Apparently, there are cultural intersections, such as shared words, which allow Sermet to create new shared meanings. However, I suggest that the emphasis on the idea that there is a Cypriot culture shared by Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots is a pattern of post-postcolonial inclusion, and that it is related to the ways in which Sermet categorises Greek Cypriots and positions himself in relation to the imaginary category of “Greek Cypriot”. Said’s theory of the Other can be applied to the way Sermet views the Greek Cypriot Other. The Greek Cypriot Other is Occidental (Said, 1978): European, Western, more modern and more civilised. Similarly to Gulden, Sermet perhaps dwells on cultural similarities and relegates differences to the realm of “language and religion” in order to close the gap between himself and the superior Other (i.e. Greek Cypriots) so that he can maintain his sense of Cypriotness, which is associated with being European and Western.

Thus, the multiculturalism or tolerance propagated by Leyla, Gulden and Sermet can be seen as an instrument of Turkish Cypriots’ desired integration into the
Western world. However, this does not mean that the Greek Cypriot Other is no longer an Other to the Turkish Cypriot Self. The notion of sameness between the Self and Greek Cypriots is still based on modalities of Othering (Ang, 1996). In her critique of Australia’s official discourse of multiculturalism, Ang (1996, p.39) draws attention to the “limits of the discourse of tolerance”. Drawing on the work of Bauman (1991) and Hage (1994), Ang (1996, pp.39–40) writes:

The structural hierarchy between majority (singular) and minorities (plural) is not nullified by the very elevation of tolerance as a value: indeed, in the ideology of tolerance the dominant majority is structurally placed in a position of power inasmuch as it is granted the active power to tolerate, while minorities can only be at the receiving end of tolerance, or, if they are for some reason (e.g. having the 'wrong' religion) considered beyond the realm of the tolerable, deemed unworthy of being tolerated. This power-laden division between the tolerating and the tolerated lies at the heart of Australian multiculturalism, a division which is all the more pernicious as it generally remains unacknowledged and unrecognized. In other words, while raw and direct expressions of racism are no longer condoned, the attempt to eliminate such expressions by preaching tolerance paradoxically perpetuates the self-other divide which is the epistemological basis of the very possibility for racism in the first place.

From this perspective, the representation of Greek Cypriot people in Northern Cyprus should be understood in more complex terms than simply that of positive inclusion. Whilst the existence of Greek Cypriot people is valued in post-postcolonial discourse on the basis of cultural enrichment their presence provides, such a function simply reinforces their place in the space of an objectified Other (Ang, 1996, p.40). Hence the next section will demonstrate that the notion of Cypriotness does not guarantee the disappearance of cultural differences or racism in Cyprus.

6.3.2. Minimising Discrimination

The concept of conviviality has enabled new ways of considering diversity in
everyday practice (Wise and Velayutham, 2014, p.407). Gilroy (2004, p.xi) uses the term “conviviality” to refer to “the processes of cohabitation and interaction that have made multiculture an ordinary feature of urban life in Britain’s urban areas and in postcolonial cities elsewhere”. Wise and Velayutham (2014, p.407) write that with the concept of conviviality, Gilroy’s aim is:

To give due recognition to what he observed in neighbourhoods where has lived, the ‘creative, intuitive capacity among ordinary people who manage tensions’, not because he feels the problems of racism are over, but because ‘we have to start taking note of the fact that there were spontaneous ways in which many of these problems (problems we are now told are features of a clash of civilisations) melted away in the face of...human sameness’.

That is to say, to acknowledge conviviality, for Gilroy, is not to say that racism has been dealt with. What Gilroy means by conviviality is not so much about masking racism, but is about “something more fleeting, about the many small connections we make with others” (Fincher, 2003, p.57; see also Wise, 2005; Wise and Velayutham, 2014). In a speech presented at the “Rethinking Nordic Colonialism” exhibition, Gilroy (2006) explains it as follows:

It seemed to me that very often, at the interpersonal level rather than structural level, the consequences of racism were banal and ordinary. There were conflicts, but people resolved them. They didn’t always get along with their neighbours, but they overcame those difficulties. I wanted to give the fact of that kind of creative and intuitive capacity among ordinary people, who manage those tensions, some sort of significance. I wanted to give it overdue recognition. I didn’t want to do that because I thought the problems of racism were over or because I believed that somehow just seeing that these things could be worked over, worked around, worked through, meant that there was nothing more to do.

Conviviality is not constrained by time and other factors such as geography; it is a condition which is in a state of flux, determined by the political and cultural
norms of a society. Indeed, in contemporary societies, there will always be certain groups who are more included because their values are more aligned with the current paradigm of civilised behaviour. Similarly, there will inevitably be groups who find themselves excluded, as their behaviour and values are at odds with what is generally considered to be civilised. Nevertheless, conviviality and racism can coexist, and this is the case in Turkish Cypriot society. The different types of racism that people encounter and construct in Cyprus provide an interesting example of this coexistence. I discuss this below (see also Chapter 7).

Paradoxically, the positive interactions that I discussed in the previous section are not bereft of negativity. Although there are examples of convivial interactions between Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriots after the opening of the Green Line, there are also instances of discrimination whereby people from the Greek Cypriot community discriminate against Turkish Cypriots, or conversely whereby people from the Turkish Cypriot community discriminate against Greek Cypriots. More importantly, I found that the discrimination directed towards Turkish Cypriots plays a significant role in how post-war generation Turkish Cypriots position themselves in relation to Greek Cypriots. To expound further, young people do not only feel that they are inferior to Greek Cypriots when they cross the Green Line, due to the perceived superior socio-economic and cultural conditions (see Chapter 7). This feeling of inferiority is also reinforced by cultural racism, which for instance depicts Turkish Cypriots as “barbarians” and “not real Cypriots”. The first example comes from my interview with Leyla. The conversation is about negative incidents between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Leyla: Until I went to study on the Greek side, I didn’t know that there would be young Greek Cypriots who would have a negative attitude towards me.

Rahme: Did you experience a negative event?

Leyla: Yes, in London.

Interview: Could you tell me about it briefly?

Leyla: There was a Greek Cypriot girl, Katerina, in my class. As soon as she learned that I was a Turkish Cypriot, she stopped talking to me.
Rahme: I also experienced similar incidents in London.

[We talk about negative events that we experienced in London.]

Leyla: I felt very bad, I remember. I was thinking to myself, “you didn’t do anything to her, isn’t it unfair that she doesn’t talk to you because you are Turkish Cypriot?” It was very clear from her attitude that she was prejudiced against Turkish Cypriots.

Resonant with Leyla’s narrative, the following excerpts are taken from the interviews that I conducted with twenty-five-year-old Fatma and thirty-year-old Aldinc, both of whom had studied at London universities. Both Fatma and Aldinc had moved to London in 2009 to study, and both had encountered hostility and desires for revenge from Greek Cypriots, who showed considerable enmity towards them. In her first year, Fatma encountered three Greek Cypriot students who expressed their unhealed wounds with some force back in 2009, making Fatma feel wounded in her turn:

Fatma: We were asked to introduce ourselves in the classroom, saying our name, age, country of origin, and what course we were planning to study. When I found out that there were three more students from Cyprus, I was so happy. But they were not as happy as me. When the lecture finished, they started attacking me. “You are not a real Cypriot,” “you are Turkish, not Cypriot,” “you don’t have a real state, you don’t have a flag,” “you occupied Cyprus,” “you killed my grandfather.”

Rahme: Wow. How did you react? What did you do?

Fatma: My English was not very good, so I couldn’t defend myself very well. In fact, I was shocked and I didn’t know what to say. I was thinking to myself, “you were not even alive during the war, why are they blaming you? Why are they angry at you?” And at that moment, I felt like crying.

In the next extract, Aldinc details a negative experience that resonates with Leyla and Fatma’s narratives. The conversation again concerns negative events between the two communities.
Rahme: Did you experience racism, or do you know anyone who did?

Aldinc: Yes, in London.

Rahme: What happened?

Aldinc: We, as Turkish Cypriots, used to not get along with Greek Cypriots in London in the student halls. They always stayed away from us. They had a negative “Cyprus is ours, not yours” attitude towards us.

Rahme: So you never talked to each other, then?

Aldinc: No, we did, of course. But I found myself in quite a lot of debates about historical events, language, where do baklava, halloumi, Turkish/Greek coffee belong. We had many arguments about food, words, whether they originate from Greek or Turkish. For Greek Cypriots, all the words originated from Greek because Greek was… our arguments never ended in agreement. We had long conversations about the Ottoman Empire and what Ottomans did to Greeks. They knew things that I didn’t know. For them, all Ottomans were barbarians.

Me: Have you experienced anything similar in Cyprus?

Aldinc: Yes, once. They attacked our car before an Omonia-Trabzonspor football match. We had to go to the nearest police station to report the event. I didn’t experience any other racist abuse [in Cyprus] after this incident. That was the first and last time.

Although different people constructed these segments of talk, a common thread is that each reflects a participant’s encounter with an overt expression of racism. While Leyla, Fatma and Aldinc identify themselves as Cypriots and are familiar with Cypriot culture, they are not accepted into the Cypriot world by Greek Cypriots. Leyla, Fatma and Aldinc are perceived as outsiders, marginalised within the imaginary Cypriot community to which they – like most Turkish Cypriots – have assumed they belong. Turkish Cypriots thus become the victim of Orientalism – the distinction between the Orient/East and the Occident/West (Said, 1978) – which is the very discourse that they themselves use to categorise, include and exclude people (see below and Chapter 7). Another facet of post-postcolonial inclusion, however, is the minimisation of narratives about discrimination by the Greek Cypriot Other. Although the participants encounter
hostility from the Greek Cypriot Other, this hostility is not always recognised. The participants tend to direct their resentment towards politicians or state institutions such as schools, which are believed to be pressurising the majority into action.

The first example of this pattern can be found in an extract from my interview with Fatma. After a long conversation about the cultural racism we have encountered in London from Greek Cypriots, Fatma tells me why she has come to a new understanding about the resentment directed against her:

When I think about it now, I am aware of the fact that there are those who like us and there are those who don’t like us. I don’t blame them. Some of the Greek Cypriots that I met are friendly. Some of them are cold. For some, we are evil monsters; for some, we are people and friends who live in the same land but who speak a different language. That’s how they are raised. I blame their families, the government and the education system for teaching them to hate us.

This seems to suggest that much of the hatred has been subsumed, worked through or repressed. A similar pattern can be seen in the following extract from my interview with Aldinc:

Aldinc: They are resentful towards us. We are not like that. We are more forgiving. I think that they teach them a more nationalistic version of history in schools, and this has a great influence on their feelings towards us.

Rahme: Do you think so?

Aldinc: Yes, they are brainwashing them.

Rahme: You don’t have Greek Cypriot friends at all?

Aldinc: I made Greek Cypriot friends after the openings, and I also have a Greek Cypriot co-worker who I get along with and have no problem with.

Rahme: I see. Not all Greek Cypriots are resentful towards Turkish Cypriots.

Aldinc: Just a minority.

Rahme: Things will get better. I am sure.
Aldinc: Maybe. I believe that the problems that arise between the two communities are, to a great extent, influenced by the provocation of some politicians. Unless there is a change in the system, we will make no progress.

Putting the blame on the state, state institutions (such as schools), politicians and family members is a strategy people use to bridge differences. This is a strategy of shifting responsibility from the individual to the state, so that it becomes possible to cover up the hostility or prejudice that exists within the Greek Cypriot community. Aldinc and Fatma want to believe that if wider factors and forces did not “brainwash” people, then the two communities would live in peace. More importantly, Greek Cypriots would not look down on Turkish Cypriot people. After all, there is one Cypriotness shared by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. So why would the people of these two communities hate each other? Attributing Greek Cypriot hatred to structural factors and state agencies, therefore, can be read as a desire to ignore issues around difference. This is one way that participants can deal with their sense of inferiority. In other words, this pattern reveals the participants’ struggle for cultural equality, which can be achieved by fabricating a common Cypriot identity “that recognises the many points of similarity” (Hall, 1990, p.225) on the one hand and masks differences on the other.

This focus on conviviality, however, should not obfuscate the gallimaufries of everyday multiculturalism in Cyprus. First, the idea of a common Cypriotness does not eviscerate the ambivalent relations of rejection and acceptance between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. Second, the masking of the cultural and politically charged tensions between the two communities for the sake of a united Cyprus or “oneness” creates problems of its own which need to be addressed if we are to understand Self-Other relations and the politics of inclusion and exclusion in Cyprus. In the next section, I draw attention to the notion that alongside a positive valuation of Greek Cypriots, other things have evolved and become visible in northern Cyprus. While Turkish Cypriots are now interpellated as tolerant and as “seeing tolerance as a virtue” (Ang, 1996, p.39), this discourse of inclusion has by and large relegated intolerance to the other Other. Thus, it becomes palpable that the imaginary formation of “oneness” or Cypriotness
depends on a demonisation of the mainland Turkish Other as much as it does on closeness to Greek Cypriots.

6.3.3. Othering the other Other

The final characteristic of post-postcolonial inclusion is the exclusion of mainland Turks. (I provide an in-depth discussion of this counter-hegemonic strategy in the following chapter.) I found that my participants constantly denigrated mainland Turks as backward people who posed a threat to Cypriot culture. Participants reconstructed, manipulated or reinvented older versions of ethnic boundary formation in order to create new ethnic boundaries where culture was seen to offer advantages in relation to present-day situations, interests and challenges. Any degree of cultural difference is enough to construct new ethnicities.

The examples of this pattern come from my observations at the Mehmetcik Grape Festival. In the main festival area was a food stall where a middle-aged woman made and sold gozleme (Figure 15). The woman wore a headscarf, which for Turkish Cypriots signalled that she was from the mainland. Every day, I visited the festival, bought some food and sat at one of the tables near the gozleme stall. This was where I witnessed interesting conversations about this Turkish woman from the mainland who was selling Turkish gozleme at a Turkish Cypriot cultural festival.
The extract below is from a conversation between two war-generation men named Kemal and Ismet, a young Turkish Cypriot man named Mert and a young Turkish Cypriot woman named Hulya (all these names are pseudonyms). The conversation is about the Turkish woman at the gozleme stall and her customers.

Ismet: Seventy per cent of the visitors who come to the festival are mainland Turks. You see fewer Cypriots.

Kemal: See, they are buying gozleme! Our people are buying kebab.

Hulya: Yes, they go for the cheap [gozleme], we go for the expensive [kebab].

Ismet: This festival is nothing like the festival in Larnaca. It can’t be. There were only samisi and lokma, which belong to our culture. The [Greek Cypriot] men protect their culture, but we don’t.

Mert: The [Greek Cypriot] men are preserving their culture. They’re advancing every day, we are going backwards.

These participants’ xenophobic prejudice, their anxiety about acculturation to Turkish culture and their fear of losing their Cypriotness become clear in this extract. As Rhys-Taylor (2013, p.394) states, “the smells and flavours that migrants carry with them are both sources of anxiety and comfort.” A cultural exchange between a (migrant) Turkish woman and indigenous people provides markers through which “migrant groups’ cultural differences are identified” by local people, “often with negative consequences” (Rhys-Taylor, 2013, p.394).

This cultural exchange, for instance, is a reminder of the inherent differences that exist between not only mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots, but also Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. It is assumed that, unlike Turkish Cypriots – who are supposedly living under Eastern hegemony – Greek Cypriots are able to preserve their own cultural values and Cypriotness, which is associated with Westernness/Europeanness. This difference, however, is “already inscribed” (Hall, 1990, p.227) in Turkish Cypriot identity. It positions Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as “both the same and different” (Hall, 1990, p.227). More importantly, it also relegates the Self to a lower position than the Greek Cypriot
Other. One way for Turkish Cypriots to overcome their sense of inferiority and insecurity is to denigrate the other Other – mainland Turks. In turn, there emerges a fictional conceptualisation of mainland Turks as inferior and backward. The aim is to build alliances and solidarities based on a common sense that rests on an essentialised Cypriotness shared by Greek Cypriots and indigenous Turkish Cypriots. The cultural representation of mainland Turks as backward and inferior thus serves Turkish Cypriots’ quest for the Self.

A similar pattern can be seen in the following extract, which comes from a short conversation between a Turkish Cypriot man named Ali and a Turkish Cypriot woman named Inci (both pseudonyms). Ali and Inci are commenting on the Turkish woman’s participation at the Mehmetcik Grape Festival:

Inci: It’s full of Turkish everywhere. They are even here.

Ali: They are everywhere.

Inci: Soon we will not see a single Cypriot in this island.

Ali: Yes, what did you expect?... Cypriotness soon will be lost.

Similarly to the extract above, Ali and Inci articulate their fear of assimilation into Turkish culture and of losing their Cypriotness. This is not something they want. Turkishness, for Ali and Inci, represents moral and cultural backwardness; by contrast, Cypriotness is considered the apogee of civilisation. If the Turkish Cypriots were ever to become like mainland Turks, then there would be no cultural/civilisational gap to separate them from mainland Turks. This in turn would destroy the logic that Turkish Cypriots are more civilised and European than mainland Turks, or that Turkish Cypriots are just as European or Western as the Greek Cypriot Other. However, as I discuss in more detail in Chapter 7, although Ali and Inci (and Ismet, Hulya, Kemal and Mert) may not like the intrusion of mainland Turks from the outside, and may see it in terms of assimilation into Turkish culture, participants are also profoundly uncomfortable with what they discover about themselves after the opening of the Green Line in 2003.
A common pattern among participants is that they demonise Turkishness by “freezing it into some timeless zone of the primitive, unchanging past” (Hall, 1990, p.231). They appropriate Cypriotness in a similar manner. However, Hall (1990, p.225) warns us that cultural identities are transformed constantly:

[Cultural identity] belongs to the future as much as to the past. It is not something which already exists, transcending place, time, history and culture. Cultural identities . . . undergo constant transformation. Far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, they are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power. Far from being grounded in a mere 'recovery' of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past.

From this point of view, I argue that pure and static Cypriotness or Turkishness does not exist. It cannot be recovered or attained. More importantly, this notion of a common Cypriotness does not guarantee Turkish Cypriots a complete identity; nor does it guarantee Turkish Cypriots acceptance into the Western world. Turkish Cypriot identity, as I discussed above, is “fragmented and fractured” (Hall, 1996, p.4) and incorporates two presences: Turkishness and Cypriotness. This is what Said (1993, p.336) meant when he said that “no one today is purely one thing.”

Imperialism consolidated the mixture of cultures and identities on a global scale. But its worst and most paradoxical gift was to allow people to believe that they were only, mainly, exclusively, white, or Black, or Western, or Oriental. Yet just as human beings make their own history, they also make their cultures and ethnic identities. No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about (Said, 1993, p.336).
Thus the formation of an essentialised Cypriotness by Turkish Cypriots is not merely tied to the fear of becoming like mainland Turks (i.e. not Western enough); it is also entangled with the sense of insecurity and cultural inferiority that comes with the ambivalence of their identity (I refer to this ambivalent position in Chapter 3 as “not so Eastern, not so European”) and the multiplicity of feelings that come with it (see Chapter 7). Hence, although it may look as if Ali, Inci, Ismet, Mert, Hulya and Kemal are all observing mainland Turks from “above” (Said, 2006 [1978], pp.333–334) and from a position of power, in reality their exclusion and ostracization of mainland Turks is closely related to their subjective sense of perceived inferiority or powerlessness. I expound on this point in Chapter 7.

6.4. Conclusion: Inclusion as a Dimension of Contemporary Racism

Overall, the examples in this chapter show that collective memory in northern Cyprus fluctuates in line with the needs and interests of Turkish Cypriot society in the present. Collective memory remains distinct from memories of traumatic events, and confects an alternative version of the past based on convivial relationships with Greek Cypriots. The participants’ accounts highlight the ways in which social power operates in and through collective memory. It becomes apparent that the question of which version of the past is embraced and which is repressed is closely related to the imaginary inferior position that Turkish Cypriots take up in relation to the Greek Cypriot Other. As my chapter illustrates, young people tend to embrace an alternative version of the past based on convivial relationships with Greek Cypriots. In other words, collective memory in northern Cyprus is oriented towards Turkish Cypriots’ need for cultural equality, which can be achieved by constructing an essentialised Cypriotness shared by Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Moreover, as I have shown, it is not only when my research participants cross the Green Line that collective feelings of distress and inadequacy emerge. These feelings are also reinforced by the cultural racism that they encounter in everyday life when a Greek Cypriot person reduces Turkish Cypriots to their Turkishness, as backward and lacking. They are also fostered by ongoing multicultural
interactions among Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots in everyday life, to the extent that these belittling interactions encourage or induce Turkish Cypriots to form the strategy that I have called post-postcolonial inclusion. Post-postcolonial inclusion is about the essentialisation of a version of the rational subject that is caught between a sense of Turkishness (Easternness/non-Europeanness) and a sense of Cypriotness (Europeanness/Westernness). The driving force behind this strategy is the desire to attain cultural equality and acceptance in the European/Western world.

It is therefore important to note that post-postcolonial inclusion as it is enacted through the notion of Cypriotness has two different dimensions. The first is based on an idea of “oneness” and shared culture between the Greek Cypriot Other and indigenous Turkish Cypriots, ignoring differences that exist between the two communities. The second constructs a notion of difference between mainland Turks and indigenous Turkish Cypriots, ignoring similarities between the two groups. Thus, the “unities” or divisions that Cypriotness proclaims are “constructed within the play of power and exclusion” (Hall, 1996, p.5). Cypriotness is “not an essence but a positioning” (Hall, 1990, p.225). Turkish Cypriots decipher their lived reality through an imaginary inferior position; they determine the borders between “us” and “them”; they use these processes of psychosocial border formation as the foundation of their present actions, to their own benefit. Specifically, it is through this imaginary position that mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots are seen. It is this illusionary position that produces Greek Cypriots as more European, more Western and more modern, and mainland Turks as backward, deficient and a threat to indigenous Turkish Cypriots’ culture. In other words, this position underpins the “interconnection between ‘happy’ and ‘hard’ forms of coexistence” (Wise and Velayutham, 2014, p.406), or between conviviality and various forms of cultural racism in everyday life in northern Cyprus.

Post-postcolonial inclusion, or the notion of shared Cypriotness, reflects a culture-based ethnocentrism and xenophobia directed at mainland Turks, and it is also intimately tied to the same kind of discrimination which has been directed towards the Self. This type of inclusion is invariably entangled with cultural prejudices and discrimination against Turkish Cypriots, whereby Turkish Cypriots develop a
strategy to counter racism with racism. However, as next chapter demonstrates, this racist reasoning “has no secure foundation, is incoherent in its development, and is unjustified in its conclusions” (Memmi, 2000, p.21). Racism, for Memmi (2000, p.21), is “called forth and maintained, in its essence and goals, by something other than itself”. In the next chapter, I explore the politics of exclusion embedded in Turkish Cypriot society, building upon themes developed in this chapter.
CHAPTER 7: POST-POSTCOLONIAL EXCLUSION

This chapter builds on the themes of post-postcolonial resistance and inclusion developed in Chapters 5 and 6, but this time with a focus on infrastructures. In this instance I concentrate on patterns of exclusion and practices of distinction between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. I ask the following questions: why does Turkey occupy the position of coloniser? In what ways are mainland Turks categorised as Other, and what do such practices of Othering achieve?

The chapter is divided into three main parts. Using stories about Mustafa Akıncı’s presidential election victory in Northern Cyprus in 2015, I start by describing the discourse of Turkish hegemony in Northern Cyprus. Drawing from the work of Said (1978), in the second part I explore the politics of resistance. The examples illustrate the ways in which Turkey is fabricated as an Eastern country, and how its presence in Northern Cyprus is not considered a civilising mission. Finally, in the last section, using Paul Gilroy’s (2004) concept of postcolonial melancholia, I develop the notion of post-postcolonial melancholia, which makes it possible to explain the complex and ambivalent patterns of exclusion in Northern Cyprus. Overall, my findings reveal that discourses of Orientalism in contemporary Turkish Cypriot society are produced from a site of in-betweeness: a position of simultaneous power and powerlessness.

7.1. The Decline of Nationalist Discourse and the Rise of Post-Postcolonial Discourse

Mustafa Akıncı, an independent leftist candidate, was elected president of Northern Cyprus on 26 April 2015. Backed by the centre-left Communal Democracy Party, Akıncı, who had been mayor of North Nicosia for many years, competed against three other candidates in the elections: Sibel Siber, from the centre-left Republican Turkish Party; incumbent president Derviş Eroğlu, an independent candidate backed by the centre-right National Unity Party and Democratic Party, who had been elected in 2010; and independent candidate Dr
Kudret Özersay, a former negotiator, expert on international law and professor of international relations (Bozkurt, 2015). The first round of elections ended in victory for Akıncı and Eroğlu. The result of the second round signified that the total votes (60.3%) won by Akıncı came from both left-wing and right-wing voters. Akıncı defeated Eroğlu with 60.3% of the votes in the second round (BBC, 2015). Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike greeted Akıncı’s victory with euphoria. Following the declaration of the election results, a carnivalesque celebration was held in Nicosia on 26 April. I witnessed people dancing, singing and crying in the streets. With one voice, people shouted: “Kıbrıs’ta barış engellenemez – peace cannot be prevented in Cyprus.”

The interviews I conducted on that day and the next indicated that voters were united by hope – a hope that had been abandoned years before but had now rekindled. When I asked forty-two-year-old Kerem what he thought about Akıncı’s victory, he said he had been waiting for this day for many years. “I am very happy,” Kerem told me. “Today is the day Turkish Cypriots’ lives are changing. Akıncı is our final hope for peace in Cyprus. If he cannot achieve it, nobody will.”

Similarly, for fifty-three-year-old Hasan from Nicosia, election day marked the beginning of a new era for Cypriots:

Rahme: What do you think about Akıncı winning the election?

Hasan: I think it is quite a big and positive change for our country.

Rahme: Yes, I agree. It is a big change towards peace. And I am assuming you are positive about Akıncı finding a solution to the Cyprus problem?

Hasan: Yes. Mustafa Akıncı has dedicated his life to the unification of the island. His victory means that we are in the best possible position for a solution. In 2004, we were disappointed. But I don’t think most of us were ready for unification, because many still had concerns. We knew that the two leaders at that time, Denktas and Papadopoulos, would not achieve a solution because of their political views. We also knew that in the eleven years that followed, there wouldn’t be a federal solution.
Rahme: It is because ethnonationalist parties were in power, right?

Hasan: Yes. More than a decade later, today, we finally got a second chance. This is very important. I hope everyone is aware of this. I hope we will be celebrating the reunification of our country soon. Peace can’t be prevented in Cyprus.

The Annan Plan was put to referendum in the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 24 April 2004. Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities were asked for their approval of the United Nations proposal (5th revision) for the reuniting of Cyprus. The referendum revealed that the majority of Turkish Cypriots (64.9%) wanted a solution, but huge numbers of Greek Cypriots (75.83%) voted against the plan, which caused disappointment in the Turkish Cypriot community (Kizilyurek, 2005). Kerem’s and Hasan’s responses show that the victory of Mustafa Akıncı eleven years later provided the Turkish Cypriot community with its first rays of hope in more than ten years for peace between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. For Bryant (2015), Akıncı’s triumph meant that the major centre-right parties, which had prevailed in Turkish Cypriot politics for many years, seemed to have failed. However, as I argue below, Akıncı’s success cannot be simply described as the fall of the right and the rise of the left in Northern Cyprus. It is a more complex issue connected with the East/West division.

The new Turkish Cypriot president is renowned within the Turkish Cypriot community for opposing Turkey (Bozkurt, 2015). Akıncı has been a most outspoken critic of Turkish army leaders, envoys and special delegates. He has constantly demanded a “dignified relationship” with Turkey, as well as bilateral links founded on the value of equality (Tastekin, 2015). He has criticised Turkey’s “babylan” and “motherland” behaviour towards the TRNC (Tastekin, 2015). During 2000, while he was serving as deputy prime minister, Akıncı became involved in an argument with Ali Nihat Özyeranlı, a Turkish brigadier general in Cyprus.34 Subsequently, his coalition administration caved in (Bozkurt, 2015).

34 According to TRNC law, the Cypriot police force is not under the control of the TRNC government. Instead, it is directly tied to the Security Forces Command (Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı, GKK). Although the GKK appears to be a subsidiary of the government, it operates under the aegis of the Turkish armed forces (Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) and runs its operations.
Additionally, Akıncı and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Turkish prime minister during that period, traded insults during a conference in Majorca, Spain, in 2003. Speaking after Erdoğan, Akıncı advised that the TRNC’s 2003 elections were “under threat” (Tastekin, 2015):

Rauf Denktas [the first president of the TRNC] and his supporters keep bringing in people from Turkey, giving them citizenship to change the electoral base. By doing this, they are interfering with our will. […] Mr Prime Minister, I’m calling on you to stop this interference. If not, the Turkish Cypriots’ future as well as Turkey’s future in the EU will be under threat. (Tastekin, 2015)

For Akıncı, the 2003 elections needed to proceed without external intervention so that Turkish Cypriots might have the opportunity to join the European Union with the 2004 referendum. Mustafa Akıncı’s negotiations, as well as his campaign emblem of an olive branch, signified his dedication to peace in Turkish Cypriot society. In one of his speeches during the 2015 elections, Akıncı said “let’s live as humans and as a community,” and he stated in all his interviews and speeches that the olive tree signified roots – which, he reassured voters, Turkish Cypriots would finally have (Bryant, 2015). Turkish Cypriots often refer to the olive tree as immortal; Akıncı’s assurances through this allusion to the olive tree thus conjured a particular future: peace on the island (Bryant, 2015). Akıncı promised Turkish Cypriots that he would institute a balanced relationship with Turkey founded on mutual respect (Bozkurt, 2015). During his victory speech, he stated that the relationship between the TRNC and Turkey would change: it would “no longer be that between a ‘motherland’ and a ‘baby motherland’ – as the TRNC is often described in Turkey – but would be an equal ‘relationship between brothers’” (Tastekin, 2015). This assertion evoked the anger of President Erdoğan:

through a TSK-appointed commander. During his term as deputy prime minister (1998–2001), Akıncı undertook an initiative to connect the police to the TRNC’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (a civilian authority), which led to the argument between Akıncı and Turkish Brigadier General Ali Nihat Özeyranlı (see Karabay, 2017, p.65 for more information).
When he [Akıncı] says “two sibling countries” for our relations, then it’s all completely different. Mr President [Akıncı] has to watch his words. There is a sacrifice for a child-motherland relationship. We [Turkey] paid a price in Turkish Cyprus. Also, the amount we spent for the continuing reconstruction of the island is around $1 billion. We never abandoned them. (Solmaz, 2015)

For Erdoğan, Turkey is waging a battle for Northern Cyprus in the international arena – a difficult situation for Akıncı to face on his own. That is why Erdoğan maintains that Turkey will continue to look after Northern Cyprus in the way a mother looks after her baby (Hurriyet Daily News, 2015). Stressing that he had been elected by Turkish Cypriots, Akıncı immediately responded to Erdoğan’s criticism: “I have difficulties understanding this annoyance. Doesn’t Turkey want to see its baby grow up? Should we always stay a baby?” (Misal, 2015). He is also quoted as saying “Turkish Cypriots will continue to hold their love for the motherland, but the time for leaving behind infancy and start crawling has come” (Solmaz, 2015).

Akıncı and Erdoğan’s exchanges reflect a struggle/tension between two discourses. There is a discourse that revolves around motherland nationalism; and there is a new discourse (which I call post-postcolonial discourse) that resists the motherland-babyland relationship between Turkey and the TRNC, and which encourages a new cultural movement (Cypriotness) that requires the formation of new solidarities and alliances between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. As I argue below, the driving force behind both resistance to Turkey and Akıncı’s electoral triumph is post-postcolonial melancholia (I explain this term below). Khalili (2017, p.94) states that “wars, while destructive, are often the engines of economic and political transformations – many of which are not immediately visible.” As I discuss in the next section, the post-war period and the division of the island brought about cultural, economic, political and social transformations in Northern Cyprus. More importantly, I found that the physical environment and its materiality took on new meaning after the opening of the Green Line. As the examples below reveal, my participants express a post-postcolonial melancholia through their relationships with the material and physical environment, which encompasses both the technological environment (such as the pipeline project, see
below) and the natural environment (such as olive trees). Melancholia can be seen through the lens of Paul Gilroy’s (2004) work as a certain structure of feeling. Instead of looking at melancholia within its current sociological configuration, therefore, what I do below is analyse melancholia in relation to both natural and technological signifiers.

7.1.1. Turkish Hegemony and Transformation in Northern Cyprus

As already pointed out (Chapter 2), Cyprus was divided in 1974 as a result of the tensions between two different nationalisms: Turkish nationalism, and Hellenic or Greek nationalism. Although Greek Cypriot society continues to be influenced by the culturally rich narratives of Hellenism, it is argued that Greek Cypriots have moved away from the discourse of Cyprus as the great island of Hellenism (especially since the division of the island) and embraced the RoC (Kizilyurek, 2018, p.31). In Turkish Cypriot society, however, the situation has been quite different. For Kizilyurek (2018, p.32), 1974 marked the beginning of a “fictional homeland”. Turkish names were given to the places from which Greek Cypriots had been expelled. Kizilyurek (2018, p.32) argues that this policy of “toponymy” was put into practice in order to erase traces of both Greek Cypriots and the British Empire. Symbols of Turkish nationalism were placed on mountains; Turkish flags were erected everywhere.

Figure 16. The TRNC flag on the Kyrenia Mountains. Photograph by the author.
The photograph in Figure 16, for instance, depicts a giant TRNC flag painted onto the Kyrenia Mountains in Northern Cyprus, facing south, where the Greeks can see it from around twenty miles away (Olin, 2011). The Kemalist motto “ne mutlu Turkum diyene” (“how happy is he who says he is a Turk”) is painted next to the flag, accompanied by the signature of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of modern Turkey. The TRNC flag is often storied as representing the freedom and independence that Turkish Cypriots gained during Turkey’s “Happy Peace Operation” in 1974 (Erhurman, 2010).

In a similar way, the flags of the TRNC and the Republic of Turkey are flown side by side all over Northern Cyprus, and they are used as symbols of ethnic nationalism. As Erhurman (2010, p.123) writes:

[The flags] appear together in the courtyards of the public and private schools, near the institutional and public buildings, near the monuments and even on the mountains; and their existence in many places provided a continual background for the ruling group in sustaining their discourse which was Turkish (cypriot) nationalism.

According to the dominant historic narrative, the flag of Turkey in Northern Cyprus represents Turkish Cypriots’ liberation from their Greek oppression (Erhurman, 2010, pp.123-124). The Turkish flag acts as a powerful symbol representing the common identity and unity between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots (Erhurman, 2010, p.124). Official history portrays “the flag of Turkey as the flag of the motherland, and the flag of the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ as the flag of the babyland” (Erhurman, 2010, p.124). Kizilyurek (2018, p.32) argues that through this “engineering” of geography, the “possessors” of Cyprus and the Other were determined: Turkish Cypriots were designated the “possessors”, and Greek Cypriots the Other. However, Kizilyurek (2018, p.32) claims that in reality Turkish Cypriots did not become the possessors of any

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35 After the establishment of the TRNC, the government created this flag to promote a new sense of national unity. The flag is based on the flag of Turkey, with the colours reversed and horizontal red stripes added at the top and bottom.

36 This phrase was first used by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in a speech delivered on the tenth anniversary of the Republic of Turkey on 29 October 1933. It was then introduced into the student oath in 1972, and it became a powerful motto of the Republic of Turkey.
territory. Instead, they became “lost/missing subjects” as a result of Turkey’s encompassing presence in Northern Cyprus.

Kizilyurek (2008, pp.94–95) explains that Turkey’s strategies regarding Cyprus (before 1974) were founded on the idea that Turkish Cypriots should have a powerful ruling position on the island. The aim was to eliminate any possibility that Greek Cypriots could determine the island’s future. The formula was simple: if Greek Cypriots became the majority and Turkish Cypriots the minority, then Greek Cypriots would have deciding power. This might mean that the island would likely be united with Greece, threatening Turkey’s interests. Kizilyurek (2008, p.95) writes that starting from the mid-1950s, Turkey therefore established two strategies regarding Cyprus: (1) to prevent the unification of Cyprus with Greece (enosis), and (2) to prevent Turkish Cypriots from becoming a minority on the island. Thus, from the mid-1950s, the aim was to produce sociopolitical circumstances where power and sovereignty would be shared and enosis prevented. For Kizilyurek (2008, p.95), the 1974 war and the division that followed saw the achievement of Turkey’s geosocial goals.

The policies pursued after 1974 prevented the formation of a federal state consisting of a strong Turkish Cypriot community. Instead, Kizilyurek (2018) argues that they created Northern Cyprus, where Turkish Cypriots lost even more power thanks to direct control from Turkey. Because the TRNC was an unrecognised state, Turkish Cypriots began to be exposed to economic embargoes and entered a period in which they were dependent on Turkey. Aydın (2006, p.226) suggests that the TRNC would not survive even a day without Turkey’s heavy tutelage, because the TRNC is a Turkish state that has been artificially institutionalised in Cyprus. The TRNC’s economic dependency on Turkey created the conditions for Turkey to lay claim to Northern Cyprus. Indeed, Uzgel (2004, p.402) claims that although Turkey officially recognises the TRNC, it fails to treat the TRNC as a “state” and sees it as its “province”.

In recent years, Turkey’s strategies in Northern Cyprus have taken a more powerful form (Kizilyurek, 2018, p.95). In the name of privatisation, Turkish Cypriot institutions have been transferred to Turkish companies. The granting of TRNC citizenship to mainland Turks who migrate to Northern Cyprus is
increasing every day. Kizilyurek argues that Turkish Cypriots have fought for power and sovereignty on the island for years, but they are far from attaining either (Kizilyurek, 2018, p.95). For Kizilyurek (2018, p.96), the TRNC is being converted to the “Republic of Turkey” or to a “province” of Turkey, which not only jeopardises the existence of Turkish Cypriots, but also prevents any possibility of a united Cyprus under the rule of one federal republic. These political, social and economic circumstances have given rise to the discourse that Turkey has acquired land that belongs to Northern Cyprus and has imposed both intellectual and political domination on the Turkish Cypriot people. This discourse, in which Turkey occupies the position of coloniser (Bryant and Yakinthou, 2012, p.16), circulates in Turkish Cypriots’ everyday lives. Engaging with stories about infrastructural changes such as Turkey’s water supply project and the opening of Hala Sultan Divinity College in Northern Cyprus, in the following section I look at the ideas and fantasies surrounding the construction of Turkish colonisation in Northern Cyprus. The examples reveal that the post-postcolonial discourse propagated by indigenous Turkish Cypriots pivots on a contrast between the Orient and the Occident (in Said’s sense), and is related to Turkish Cypriots’ desired integration with the Western world as a means of securing ethnic-cultural superiority.

7.2. The Politics of Resistance

When the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey in 2004, it distinguished itself from prior administrations by proposing a “one step ahead” strategy regarding Northern Cyprus (Aksoy, 2015). Since 2004 the AKP has followed a strategy of “progress” for Northern Cyprus that encompasses the construction of four-lane highways, religious learning establishments (in increasing numbers, see Michael 2014), beach front hotels and mosques. Recently, this strategy included an enormous project to bring fresh water to Northern Cyprus through an undersea pipeline from Anatolia (Bryant, 2015). The pipeline project cost Turkey more than 1.5 billion Turkish lira (Deputy Prime

37 Kizilyurek (2018, p.96) argues that a significant number of Greek Cypriots might want to establish a federal state with Turkish Cypriots – but not with a “province” Turkey per se.
Ministry and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016) and was dubbed “the project of the century” by Turkey’s President Erdoğan. The project was completed, and the pipeline was activated on 7 August 2015 by Turkish minister Veysel Eroglu, in the face of criticisms from some Greek Cypriot politicians that the project would give Turkey a greater control over northern Cyprus (Bryant, 2015).

I found that the water project evoked mixed feelings in the Turkish Cypriots I interviewed. Some participants suggested that the project was an example of unsuccessful political and social endeavours by the AKP to apply assimilation strategies within Cyprus. “Our country is a very unlucky state. They are trying to make us believe that the aid provided to Northern Cyprus by Turkey is to develop the country, but I personally don’t believe it,” said Hale, a forty-one-year-old teacher who lived in Nicosia with her husband and son:

Rahme: Why?
Hale: What Turkey has been doing all these years is obvious. They are controlling us. They have placed their institutions here.

Rahme: Like what?
Hale: Like the National Intelligence Coordination Board, the army, the Civil Defence Organisation.

Rahme: The aim is to control the TRNC?
Hale: Yes, exactly. Or, for instance, the water project. The biggest project in Cyprus’s history. As the government officials say, the water from Turkey is of great importance not only for the future of Turkish Cypriots, but also the Greek Cypriots and other countries in the region. It’s all good until now. But I believe that Turkey’s aid has never been employed for the development of Northern Cyprus. In fact, it has always been founded on authority and power. The more aid Turkey provides, the more control it has over Cyprus.

For Hale, Turkey’s projects and strategies regarding Cyprus, such as the water project, are another sign of Turkey’s paternalism and its growing control/presence in Northern Cyprus. Turkey’s paternalism leads Hale to believe that Turkish Cypriot people have no political authority, no arena in which to articulate their
political agency, and that they are the objects of both material and hegemonic practices. My participants shared the feeling that the future of their country was no longer under their control. The pipeline project here is seen as an “infrastructure of occupation” (Khalili, 2017), which for Hale, serves to aid the monitoring and control of Turkish Cypriots. However, although Hale’s account reflects the relationship between the technological environment and current political issues in Northern Cyprus, I argue that infrastructures are also sites through which cultural struggles are narrated. As I demonstrate below, according to post-postcolonial discourse, such projects have disconnected Turkish Cypriots from the Western world.

“Turkey called the water that’s coming from Turkey ‘peace water’. But Turkey doesn’t even know how they will bring peace to the island,” says Mustafa, a fifty-two-year-old man who has been living in Famagusta since 1974. In turn, I ask him: “do you think that Turkey wants a solution to the Cyprus problem?”

Mustafa: Not really. I think that what Turkey wants to do is, they are trying to bring Northern Cyprus to European standards so that they can say to the world that we are a state. This is what the project is about. They want to be our motherland forever.

Rahme: And you don’t want that?

Mustafa: Of course I don’t want it. Do you? Turkey calls itself our motherland. But a mother has to look after her child until she or he becomes capable of looking after themselves without the mother’s help. The TRNC will never become capable enough to stand independently, because it is an illegal state with international embargoes, and Turkey played an important role in this.

Rahme: Yes, we are an unrecognised state. We are obliged to be dependent on Turkey.

Mustafa: Yes, but, I don’t like the term “dependent on Turkey”. A real state should not be dependent on any other country. We are not a real state. We are not in control. We are controlled by others. And day by day, everything is getting worse. Our administration should find a solution to the Cyprus issue as soon as possible. We don’t want to live like this any more. Nobody would.
Similarly to Hale, Mustafa believes that the aim of the project is to further increase Turkey’s control over Cyprus, which in turn creates the fear that the TRNC will never be able to become autonomous. The extract suggests that over time Mustafa has come to a point where he has started to believe that Turkish Cypriots should not extend across the whole of the island, and that Turkish Cypriots should not aspire to dominate the island. I suggest that Mustafa’s and Hale’s accounts here should be understood as instances of post-postcolonial resistance (see Chapter 5), caught in a tension between “official” and “vernacular” interests (Bodnar, 1992) in the geopolitical context of Northern Cyprus. This resistance does not only concern Hale and Mustafa’s opposition to the hegemony and authority of Turkey (or the Turkish Cypriot ethnonationalist parties that have supported the continuation of the motherland relationship between Turkey and the TRNC – see Chapter 5). It is also entangled with their opposition to the nationalist themes and essentialist identities fostered through material and social initiatives such as the water project. As discussed in Chapter 5, there is a desire among participants to contest nationalist themes that are constructed around the idea togetherness or oneness among Turkish Cypriots or with Turkey (and mainland Turks). The participants’ narratives exemplify a new way of thinking about Greek Cypriots through a new cultural movement/formation (Cypriotness) that overcomes the hegemony of the ethnic nationalism produced by the state.

In the next section, through stories about the island’s first religious secondary school (Hala Sultan Divinity College), I show that the driving force behind this change is not limited to economic, social or political circumstances such as Turkish Cypriots’ realisation that they have no control over Cyprus, that Turkish Cypriot institutions are being transferred to Turkish companies, that the Turkish Cypriot population is “shrinking” (see Hatay, 2007), or that they are economically dependent on Turkey. Using Said’s (1978) arguments, I look at the complex and contradictory cultural aspects of this new movement, revealing how Turkey is constructed as an Eastern country, and how its presence in Northern Cyprus is not considered a necessary social revolution.
7.2.1. *Turkish Hegemony as an Uncivilising Mission: “A Little Turkey”*

One of the basic principles – and perhaps the most important – of the TRNC’s constitution is secularism. Article 1 states: “the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a secular republic based on the principles of democracy, social justice and the supremacy of law.” According to Article 23(4), “religious education and teaching shall be carried out under the supervision and control of the State”. Hence, the education system of Turkish Cypriots preserved the largely non-religious identity of the Turkish Cypriot community. Post-2005, new legislation put religious education at the secondary level of primary education and under the jurisdiction of school management committees. Consequently, many schools chose not to include religious lessons in their curricula (Nielsen et al., 2013, pp.182-183). However, recent changes by Turkish Cypriot authorities have put more emphasis on religious instruction both inside and outside of Cypriot pedagogical structures. Michael (2014, pp.16–17) writes:

After the rise of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) to power, the growing role of religion in relation to the political and ideological developments in Turkey created new standards that introduced the Turkish Cypriot community to a new course. This course, generally where the educational system is concerned, is related to the formation of a new Turkish identity, an important component of which, and to the contrary with the past, is religious faith.

In 2009, for example, one hour per week of “religious culture and morality” was made mandatory, although a lack of qualified teachers meant it was not implemented in all schools. Instead, teachers of religious studies were recruited from mainland Turkey. Regardless of opposition from teachers’ trade unions there was no deviation from this policy (Nielsen et al., 2013, p.182-183).

During the period, after the Faculty of Religious Studies at the Near East University (NEU) opened alongside a divinity faculty at Haspolat Vocational High School in 2011, the most important development in 2012 came with the inauguration of the Hala Sultan Divinity College. This was the first high school in Northern Cyprus to offer religious vocational education (in the 2012-2013
academic year) despite this move being opposed by most local Turkish Cypriots (Nielsen et al., 2013, p.184). Several political parties, trade unions and NGOs argued that the AKP was the real force behind Cyprus Science, Ethics and Social Assistance Foundation (Kıbrıs İlim Ahlak ve Sosyal Yardımlaşma Vakfı), and that the project was initiated as a result of pressure from the AKP. In spite of local reactions, the National Unity Party government insisted the project go ahead and on 23 June 2012 the first entrance exam for the College was sat by applicants (Nielsen et al., 201, pp.182-183).

My findings show that the opening of Hala Sultan Divinity College led to the idea among Turkish Cypriots that the Turkish President - Recep Tayyip Erdogan - is cementing political control over the north in the guise of a religious framework, just as he has done in Turkey during his fifteen years of rule. An example of this can be seen in the following extract from a conversation with Levent, a fifty-year-old man who lives in Kyrenia. Here he is answering my question “what do you think about Hala Sultan Divinity College?”

Levent: That’s a good question. To be truthful, we’ve got used to it now.

Rahme: We’ve got used to what?

Levent: Turkish occupation. They built so many mosques that now we have more mosques than schools. Then they opened the Faculty of Religion at NEU. Now they have opened the Islamic college. Next they will build a small mosque inside the parliament building, then they will punish those who don’t go to the mosque to pray every day and those who don’t cover their head. We will turn into a little Turkey soon.

For Levent, the aim of Hala Sultan Divinity College is to further increase Turkish control over Northern Cyprus. Levent tells me that all Turkish government’s interventions and developments are carried out in a religious context and are specifically aimed at altering the identity of the Turkish Cypriot community. The change is framed as being an attempt to accommodate, assimilate and subsume them into becoming a pivotal component of the Turkish nation. The following excerpt from my interview with Melek, a thirty-one-year-old woman who lives in
Nicosia, indicates that the problem with becoming “a little Turkey”, in Levent’s evocative phrase, is caught up with assumptions about Turkey and the Turkish way of life. The following dialogue is around Melek’s ideas about Hala Sultan Divinity College:

Melek: I heard that they are teaching Quran and other subjects there. The teachers are brought in from Turkey.

Rahme: Yes. It is the first Islamic college in Northern Cyprus. What are your thoughts about this? Do you think that the college was needed in Northern Cyprus?

Melek: No, it wasn’t needed. We need more science schools. Our people wouldn’t send their kids to study there. So the college is for Erdoğan’s own people who live here.

Rahme: Why is that?

Melek: It is not for us. Our people prefer to send their kids abroad, to European countries to study. An example is you. Our families want their kids to be modern, not ignorant.

Rahme: So does studying in a religious school make someone ignorant, then?

Melek: Yes, because these people are forced to study in these schools. They are given religious education by force in mosques, not only schools. They are forced to cover their heads. This is not modern.

Rahme: Where? In Turkey?

Melek: Yes. Their lifestyle is different than ours or European countries’, because they are not in the EU. They are trying to do the same here [Northern Cyprus], but we won’t accept that.

Rahme: You mean they are trying to change our lifestyle?

Melek: Yes, they are trying to do that. We pray if we want, we go to mosque if we want, we fast if we want. If they try to force these things upon us, we Cypriots will certainly reject that.

There are two important points in this extract. First, there is a particular representation of Turkey that resonates with Said’s (1978) work on the ideology of Orientalism. As discussed in Chapter 3, in the late 1970s Said published Orientalism, in which he examined and criticised the discursive dualities through
which the West has produced the East as inferior and Other. Said (2006 [1978], p.70) writes that “the Orientalist attitude [...] shares with magic and with mythology the self-containing, self-reinforcing character of a closed system.” In other words, Said argues that Orientalism is self-perpetuating. After the formation of its initial knowledge base, this remained and was reinforced for centuries. Orientalism is a discourse that affirms the colonial power as the seat of civilisation and depicts indigenous cultures as backward, inferior and barbaric. This in turn allows the coloniser to justify its dominance over the colonised, not because that dominance is beneficial, but because the coloniser is morally superior. Thus, Orientalism constitutes an image of the Orient that is also a moral structure. Within this discourse, the Orient is the West’s constitutive unruly Other (Said, 2006 [1978], p.67), outside the constraints of the European community.

In ‘Orientalism’ Said refers to what he sees as a fundamental bias against Islamic nations originating not only from Europe, but also from all modern world powers. As Said (2006 [1978], p.74) states, “Orientalism carries within it the stamp of a problematic European attitude towards Islam.” Similar patterns/themes can be found in the extract above. Melek depicts Turkey as backward and Oriental. What makes this discourse different from Said’s Orientalism is that it is the imaginary coloniser that is perceived to be Oriental; the colonised consider themselves more European/Western than, and therefore superior to, the coloniser. The presence of Turkey in Northern Cyprus is not understood as a needed social revolution, because Turkey signifies an imaginary Oriental and backward civilisation. To put it differently, no matter what changes Turkey brings to Turkish Cypriot society, these changes will most likely fail to satisfy the needs of the Turkish Cypriot people, because the changes will be seen through an Orientalist lens.

Secondly, as becomes evident in Levent’s and Melek’s accounts, the Orientalist discourse in Northern Cyprus is produced from a position of power by people who consider themselves to be in the position of the colonised. Even more interestingly, although Levent and Melek are Muslims themselves, they speak from a position of power and depict Turkey (and mainland Turks, see below) as backward, barbaric and savage. Thus, the case of Northern Cyprus provides an elucidation whereby the modern and geographical imagination have converged in historic and modern eras concurrently to evoke “temporalized-normative
distinctions between ‘modern’ and ‘primitive’ or ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’” (Gunaratnam, 2003, p.11; see also Agnew, 1999). Where does this power come from? Michael (2014, p.20) writes that although the Turkish Cypriot community is “recorded as a Muslim community, in essence it had already distanced [itself] from Islam in the middle of the nineteenth century in a process during which religion played a decreasing role in everyday life”. According to Michael (2014, p.19):

After the establishment of the modern Turkish nation in 1923 and the secularising reformations of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish Cypriot community seemed to enter a course of intense removal from the strict religious framework. The application of the Kemalist reforms to the Turkish Cypriot community, for example, the adoption of the Latin alphabet, appeared to weaken religion and favour the emergence of secular elements. Simultaneously, the previous decades of British modern administration on the island – Cyprus was transferred to the British administration in 1878 – and the loss of power of the religious institutions debilitated the religious feelings of the Turkish Cypriots. In that sense, the Turkish Cypriot secularism has two roots: the British modernity framework and the Kemalist secularism.

The British colonial period on the island gave rise to a novel cultural and discursive hybridity that was “something different, something new and unrecognisable” (Bhabha in Rutherford, 1990, p.211), reconstituting the Muslim Turks of Cyprus into secular Turkish Cypriots. As Yesilada (2009, p.58) states, “Turkish Cypriots are some of the most secular Muslims in the world.” Many elements are involved in the hybrid Turkish Cypriot culture. Turkish Cypriot culture is influenced by both Kemalist reforms and “English civilisation” from the British colonial era. It also melds these elements with local traditions. Accordingly, Turkish Cypriots speak a specific dialect of Turkish. Other cultural elements, such as Turkish Cypriot traditional song, food or dress, further distinguish Turkish Cypriots from mainland Turks. Hence, I suggest that the categorisation of Turkey and mainland Turks as backward and inferior to the Self should not be understood as making a distinction between who is “more Muslim” and who is “less Muslim”. It is more about the distinction between who is Cypriot
and who is not. As discussed in Chapter 6, Turkish Cypriot identity is produced against competing “cultural presences” (Hall, 1990, p.230): Turkishness and Cypriotness. The presence of Cypriotness signifies power, inclusion and exclusion. It “provides a sense of ‘rightful’ audacity to the advance of modernity through the association with past British civilisation” (Beyazoglu, 2017, p.216).

The sense of Cypriotness in this regard bestows power to criticise, judge or exclude what looks inferior and different (i.e. mainland Turks). As I discuss in more detail below, mainland Turks are criticised for their lack of education, their appearance, their mentality and their religiosity.

Such representations of the East by the West, as Said writes (2006 [1978], pp.4–5), are fabrications whereby the Orient is not an inherent fact of nature. It is not merely there, just as the Occident itself is not just there either. We must take seriously Vico’s great observation that men make their own history, that what they can know is what they have made, and extend it to geography: as both geographical and cultural entities – to say nothing of historical entities – such locales, regions, geographical sectors as “Orient” and “Occident” are man-made. Therefore as much as the West itself, the Orient is an idea that has a history and tradition or thought, imagery, and vocabulary that have given it reality and presence in and for the West. The two geographical entities thus support and to an extent reflect each other.

Thus, rather than representing a truth, for Said (2006 [1978], p.5) “the relationship between Occident and Orient is a relationship of power, of domination, of varying degrees of complex hegemony.” The case of Cyprus offers an interesting example of these complex power relationships. Although the notion of Cypriotness places Turkish Cypriot people in an imaginary superior position in relation to mainland Turks through their association with past British civilisation, the presence of Turkishness can imbue Turkish Cypriots with a sense of inferiority and backwardness through their association with Turkish civilisation. Thus, as discussed in Chapter 6 (see also below), feelings of inferiority can circulate when Turkish Cypriots take on “socially sanctioned images of ideal selves” (Wetherell and Edley, 1999, p.342) in relation to Greek Cypriots.
In the following section, I demonstrate that although Levent and Melek are observing mainland Turks from “above” (Said, 2006 [1978], pp.333–334) and from a position of power, in reality their imagining of mainland Turks and Turkish culture as inferior and backward has to do with the sense of inferiority/powerlessness that they feel in relation to Greek Cypriots. Drawing from the work of Gilroy (2004), and using stories about Turkey’s immigration strategy and the problem of Turkish populations in Northern Cyprus, I show that in order to manage this sense of insecurity, Turkish Cypriots develop an affective and discursive strategy that I call post-postcolonial exclusion. This describes Turkish Cypriots’ melancholic attachment to their Cypriotness as a way of asserting their equality with or superiority over other cultural formations. In the end, it becomes clear that mainland Turks are the victims of Orientalist discourse as a result of the confusion that arises when Turkish Cypriots interact with the other Other (Greek Cypriots). At this point, mainland Turks come to symbolise the sense of inferiority that Turkish Cypriots experience in relation to Greek Cypriots, even though mainland Turks themselves do not actually cause this insecurity.

7.3. The Politics of Exclusion

Due to the significance of demography within the Cyprus problem, immigration to Northern Cyprus has become one of the most controversial issues in the island’s history. Population ratios have historically been significant for power-sharing agreements in Cyprus. This issue dates back to the British colonial period, when representative politics and an interest in population ratios were introduced (Hatay and Bryant, 2008b, p.10). As Hatay and Bryant (2008b, p.10) write:

The British colonial period brought not only representative politics but also a concern for demographic ratios to the island. All elected offices on the island, both local and national, were distributed according to ratios of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. When Cyprus gained independence in 1960 those same ratios were inscribed in the new constitution which aimed to protect the minority Turkish community through guarantees and quotas. As a result, the influx of immigrants from Turkey after 1974 has
been officially interpreted by the Republic of Cyprus as an attempt to change the demographic ratios of the island.

After the division in 1974, issues of demography gained new meaning on the island, and also a growing global significance. After the 1974 war, 150,000–200,000 Greek Cypriots moved to the south and 45,000 Turkish Cypriots to the north (Demetriou, 2012). After the division, the Turkish Cypriot administration sought to merge profits and boost the economy of the newly established state. Labourers were needed to run the farms and factories abandoned by Greek Cypriots. The TRNC government made an arrangement with Turkey to enable the relocation of thousands of rural Turks. As part of this agreement, immigrants were given abandoned Greek Cypriot houses and Turkish Cypriot citizenship rights. The increasing Turkish population added a new aspect to the population ratios, changing the demographic challenge on the island.

A large population of Turkish settlers came to Northern Cyprus before 1979. Settlers between 1975 and 1979 were granted citizenship almost immediately upon their arrival, and they now hold dual citizenship with the TRNC.38 As Hatay (2007, p.32) contends, immigration from Turkey, and the increasing numbers of Turks who became Turkish Cypriot citizens, continued but slowed after 1979. Following 1979, mainland Turks came to Cyprus not as part of the official strategy, but by preference. Additionally, unlike those who came to Cyprus before 1979, this latter group were not given citizenship or housing rights on their arrival. However, although the government’s migration strategy was abandoned, census figures showed a rise in the numbers of those who became TRNC citizens during election years (Hatay, 2007, p.32).

According to the first comprehensive census in Northern Cyprus, carried out on 15 December 1996, the total population of the TRNC was 200,587. TRNC nationals made up 82% (164,460 people), and Turkish nationals with no TRNC citizenship made up 15% (30,702 people); other nationalities made up 3% of the

38 After the implementation of a resolution by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) Council of Ministers regarding its citizenship legislation, the relatives of the 498 Turkish soldiers who died in the 1974 war, all Turkish fighters, and former Turkish Peace Forces participants were entitled to TFSC citizenship. However, the majority of the former Turkish Peace Forces opted to stay where they were rather than to come to Cyprus (see Hatay, 2009).
total population. The 30,702 Turkish nationals comprised students studying at various universities (8,287 people) and workers (12,922 people). The remaining 9,493 people comprised entrepreneurs, relatives of the Turkish military, and pensioners who had come to the TRNC. Additionally, according to the 1996 census, the TRNC’s 164,460 citizens included 137,628 people who had been born in Cyprus, 23,927 born in Turkey, 1,322 born in the United Kingdom, and 818 born in Bulgaria (Hatay, 2007, p.29). The 2006 census showed that the TRNC’s de facto population had increased to 265,100; however, the number of TRNC citizens had increased only minimally, to 178,031 (Bryant and Yakinthou, 2012). The latest census results, from 2011, reveal that the population reached 294,906. The number of Turkish nationals with no TRNC citizenship increased to 70,525, and today this number is estimated at 80,000–90,000, excluding the Turkish military and their relatives.

As a result of these demographic developments, two parallel groups have formed in the north of Cyprus: Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. However, the distance between these two communities has gradually grown (Kizilyurek, 2018, p.62). As Kizilyurek (2018, p.62) states, the two groups live side by side, but they do not interact with each other. Indeed, in the interviews I conducted with Turkish Cypriots between October and December 2014 (see Chapter 4), I observed a great deal of criticism aimed at mainland Turks and the presence of Turkey in Northern Cyprus. Most of the research participants claimed that the migration of mainland Turks and the policy to increase the Turkish population in Northern Cyprus were undesirable decisions and constituted a political failure.

My research participants were strongly critical of the 1974–2003 government, which had encouraged mainland Turks to come to Northern Cyprus. I discovered that the main reason for this intolerance of mainland Turks in Turkish Cypriot society was closely related to anxiety about the loss of Cypriotness. One example was articulated in my interview with Umut, a fifty-nine-year-old business manager who lived in the district of Famagusta. In the following excerpt, Umut is responding to my questions about how Turkish Cypriots lived before the division of the island in 1974, and how their lives changed after the division. Predictably, Umut told me that everything had changed after the arrival of mainland Turks:
Umut: Cyprus has changed a lot. I grew up on the streets of Nicosia. I still remember the smell of those streets, so fresh. It had a Cypriot scent. Who could know during those days that the Cypriot scent was going to be replaced by the smell of *lahmacun* and Adana kebab? How I wish we could go back to those days. Those happy days!

Rahme: When did you move to Nicosia? When you got married?

Umut: No. I am from Famagusta. I went to secondary school in Nicosia. My uncle had a shop. You know where the Bandabulya area is?

Rahme: Yes.

Umut: There. I was there all day after school. Most days I stayed with him in Nicosia. And I came back to Famagusta at weekends.

Rahme: I see. Do you go to Nicosia often?

Umut: I only go if I have something to do. Not so often. I wouldn’t want to anyway. I become angry.

Rahme: Angry about what?

Umut: When I see those streets. I become angry. There is almost nothing left of us.

A similar narrative can be observed in the extract below, which comes from my interview with Salih, sixty-four-year-old man from Nicosia. He explained to me that everyday life in Nicosia had changed from how it had been in the past:

Salih: There used to be bicycles, people selling halloumi. If you wanted to buy half, you could buy half. And then, there used to be a lot of things that belong to [Turkish] Cypriots.

Rahme: For example?

Salih: There used to be a festival. They were doing it in the Caglayan area. They were doing it before 1974 as well. They don’t do it any more. What else? There used to be so many restaurants owned by [Turkish] Cypriots. They were making *şefiāli* kebab, roast liver. Now, all of these are replaced by restaurants owned by mainland Turks, restaurants that make Iskender kebab, *lahmacun*, doner, *kelle-paça* soup.
Rahme: What else has changed?

Salih: What else? People used to sit in front of their houses at night, they would make necklaces of jasmine flowers while they sat. Now, they are scared to sit in front of their houses. On every side there are hostels, very low-quality accommodation. Now, you see the same lifestyle that exists in Turkey. Children playing football in the streets barefoot, rowdy men roaming around with tesbih in their hands. When I go to Nicosia, I feel like I’m going to Turkey. Our cultural values are getting lost. Cyprus is becoming like Turkey.

Both Umut and Salih feel that everything is changing in Northern Cyprus. They feel alienated from their cultural identity of Cypriotness. Their alienation is the consequence of a reality that is created and sustained by the material and sensory environment, which is narrated as having changed – from the smell of the streets, to the shops, restaurants and hotels. Kizilyurek explains these identifications by drawing on Bernhardt Schlink’s (2000) Heimat als Utopie and Schlink’s use of the concept of exile as a metaphor for the experience of alienation. Kizilyurek (2018, p.33) argues that Turkish Cypriots are living in exile in Northern Cyprus. As Kizilyurek explains, exile is mainly experienced as individuals’ separation from their homeland: the exile leaves his/her homeland out of necessity or difficulty, and s/he lives in the hope that s/he will return to her/his country one day. However, if Turkish Cypriots have not had to escape from their homeland, nor do they have a homeland to return to. For Kizilyurek, Turkish Cypriots’ feelings of alienation therefore come from changes in the places where they live, over which they have no control because the changes are implemented by others.

Kizilyurek attributes the feeling of alienation to the various social, political, economic and cultural changes that accompany the presence of Turkey (or mainland Turks) in Northern Cyprus. (It is to these mutually constitutive changes that the prefix “post” in post-postcolonialism refers; see Chapter 3.) Kizilyurek’s thesis, however, does not take into account the complexity of the post-postcolonial lives of Turkish Cypriots. To recap, post-postcolonial experience is the historical meeting point of the ongoing “after-effects” (Hall, 1996, p.248) of British colonialism and Turkish colonialism that inhere in the discourses and sensual experience of Turkish Cypriots (see Chapter 3). In the extract from my
interview with Umut, the smell of *lahmacun* and Adana kebab represents the presence of mainland Turks in the city of Nicosia and “the changes within the sensoria and sensibilities” (Rhys-Taylor, 2014, p.55) of the city. As Rhys-Taylor (2014, p.68) argues, “the ability of smells to attract cultural meaning” can leave “aroma amenable to […] highly negative cultural connotations”. Umut, for instance, is not happy about the changes “taking place within the nostrils” (Rhys-Taylor, 2014, p.72) of Turkish Cypriots – the overriding of the Cypriot scent of Nicosia with the smell of *lahmacun* and Adana kebab – because “the odour of the other” (Classen, 1992, p.134) is associated with an inferior civilisation. The increasing number and im/material presence of mainland Turks in Northern Cyprus is therefore a source of anxiety about Cyprus becoming like Turkey, and about Turkish Cypriots losing their sense of Cypriotness. Drawing on the work of Gilroy (2004), what I want to do here is to elaborate on this idea of “becoming” (like Turkey) and anxieties of acculturation with Turkish culture, to show how participants’ anxiety about becoming is also caught up in what they discovered about themselves after the opening of the Green Line.

7.3.1. Post-Postcolonial Melancholia

Building on the work of the social psychologists Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, Paul Gilroy (2004, p.107) introduces the psychoanalytic concept of melancholia as an alternative to the notion of conviviality (see Chapter 6). Gilroy contrasts British youth culture’s positivity regarding cultural diversity with the older generation’s melancholic, morbid obsession with the cessation of Empire. The notion of melancholia comes from the work of Sigmund Freud. In his "Mourning and Melancholia" (1971 [1917]), Freud posits that melancholy and mourning are two ways in which loss can be worked through. According to Freud, mourning serves positive functions as it successfully integrates loss into consciousness. Melancholia, however, serves negative functions because it involves being stuck. Unlike mourning, melancholia does not decline over time but rather eternally haunts the ego. Gilroy takes a Freudian stance, expanding on Mitscherlich’s position that Great Britain has failed in detaching itself from the loss of its Empire. Gilroy (2006, p.2) argues that as a result of this failure to
mourn, Great Britain is beset by the melancholic specter of its imperialist past, insomuch its presence is still felt:

In my own work, I have tried to develop an idea of melancholia, which builds on certain motifs in Freud and the certain ways in which Freud’s work was taken up by later German thinkers, particularly by social psychologists in the period of de-Nazification. I tried to create an argument in which we can understand how the European nations have been in many ways unable to get past their loss of global pre-eminence and how their inability to get past that loss folds into and generates all sorts of pathological features in their contemporary encounters with the strangers, the Others, the migrants who are now within Europe’s borders, within the metropolitan communities.

Thus, Gilroy suggests that the post-imperial, post-colonial melancholia of Great Britain reflects the current polity’s failure to exorcise the nation’s imperial past and that this has resulted in a continuing imperial impulse in the present. Immigrants are at the focus of this imperial impulse is, in many respects. As Gilroy writes (2004, pp.109–110):

It is the infrahuman political body of the immigrant rather than the body of the sovereign that comes to represent all the discomforting ambiguities of the Empire’s painful and shameful but apparently nonetheless exhilarating history. The immigrant is now here because Britain, Europe, was once out there; that basic fact of global history is not usually deniable. And yet its grudging recognition provides a stimulus for forms of hostility rooted in the associated realisation that today’s unwanted settlers carry all the ambivalence of empire with them. They project it into the unhappy consciousness of their fearful and anxious hosts and neighbours. Indeed, the incomers may be unwanted and feared precisely because they are the unwitting bearers of the imperial and colonial past.

Instead of dealing with the loss, Britain mobilises racial violence, which provides opportunities to “purify and rehomogenise the nation” (Gilroy, 2004, p.111). Furthermore, “post imperial and postcolonial melancholia characteristically
intercut this violence and the shame-faced tides of self-scrutiny and self-loathing that follow among decent folk, with outbursts of manic euphoria” (Gilroy, 2004, p.111). The question that I ask here is whether Gilroy’s theoretical insights can be extended to post-postcolonial Turkish Cypriot society. As my empirical examples (the interviews with Umut and Salih) suggest, my participants tell stories that highlight how everything changed in Northern Cyprus after the arrival of Turkish immigrants from Turkey. The presence of an increasing number of mainland Turks on the island has created the anxiety among Turkish Cypriots that Northern Cyprus is becoming like Turkey and that they are on the verge of losing their sense of culture (Cypriotness). I suggest that these anxieties about losing Cypriotness can be read as the loss of a fantasy of power experienced by Turkish Cypriot society (I elaborate on this point below). I am aware that the feeling of loss of power that is evident among Turkish Cypriots is not entirely congruent with the loss of omnipotence that Gilroy (2004) describes. Nevertheless, as I show in the final section, Turkish Cypriots’ hostility towards mainland Turks is intimately tied to this loss.

As discussed in the previous chapter (Chapter 6), when the Green Line opened in 2003, Turkish Cypriots had the opportunity to see what had changed or remained the same on the Greek side of the island. Significantly, Turkish Cypriots – who largely identified with Cypriotness at this historical moment – were confronted with the reality that the Greek side looked more “progressive” (Hatay, 2009, p.158) than the northern part of Cyprus. The idea simultaneously emerged that Turkish Cypriots were at risk of losing their sense of Cypriotness because of the infrastructural and social changes that Turkey and mainland Turks had brought to Northern Cyprus. An example of this idea can be observed in the following extract from my interview with Cem, a thirty-one-year-old man who lived in Nicosia. This part of the conversation is about what Cem thought of the Greek side of the island when he first saw it. He starts his story by revealing how he thinks about the differences between the Turkish and Greek sides of the island:

Cem: There is a stadium in Nicosia called GSP. We went to it to see a match there. Two Greek Cypriot teams were playing against each other. When I saw how beautiful the stadium looked, how perfect the field was, European standards, I made a
comparison with the stadiums where I played in the north. And when we crossed the border back to the northern side, I said to my coach, “the dream is over! Welcome to the Turkish Republic.”

Rahme: How would you describe the stadiums where you play in the north?

Cem: Pathetic. We are amateurs.

The experience that Cem narrates is a reminder that material resources – such as the playing conditions in the stadium – and standards of living on the Greek side of the island cannot be equated with those in Northern Cyprus. This recognition is narrated as a sense of inadequacy/inferiority that Cem experiences when he takes on an imaginary position. However, it is not an imaginary position but a material reality that he is confronted with in relation to Greek Cypriots (see also Chapter 6). At this point, he realises that the power he claims to have – a power that comes from a notion of Cypriotness as shared by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots – might not really exist. This is what I mean by post-postcolonial melancholia. Post-postcolonial melancholia names the patterns of alienating and traumatic experience that come with the realisation that omnipotence is an illusion in a post-postcolonial society. It describes the condition of those who are constantly trying, but never fully succeeding, to be a part of the Western/European world. The materiality of how people see their physical environment in different parts of the island is what produces melancholic patterns. The infrastructures and material conditions that underpin the island are, in a sense, a conduit for the narration of post-postcolonial melancholia.

Cem is accustomed to consider himself superior to mainland Turks through his association with a sense of Cypriotness. However, this sense of Cypriotness does not make him equal to the Greek Cypriot Other. As Hall would argue, the “impossibility” of identity (see St Louis, 2009) is that identity is always a fiction. This means that Cem can never have a pure Cypriot identity (see St Louis, 2009). Accordingly, I argue that the driving force behind the feeling of inferiority (or melancholia) that emerged after the opening of the Green Line was not necessarily that the changes brought by mainland Turks to Northern Cyprus were considered to be uncivilising. Rather, underlying this narrative of inferiority is also the
difference of Turkishness, which is always already a part of Turkish Cypriot
identity, positioning Cem and Greek Cypriots as “both the same and different”
(Hall, 1990, p.227). Within this complex positioning, the discourse that Northern
Cyprus is becoming like Turkey, or that Turkish Cypriots are losing their
Cypriotness, reflects the participants’ struggle to come to terms with the
ambivalence of their identity (a struggle that I refer to in Chapter 3 as “not so
Eastern, not so European”) and the multiplicity of feelings that come with it. I am
not arguing here against the idea that identities are constantly in process and are
“a matter of ‘becoming’ as well as of ‘being’” (Hall, 1990, p.225). However, what
I propose is that as much as the participants’ anxieties about assimilation into
Turkish culture reflect a resistance to this sense of becoming tied to the “colonial”
present, lived experience is also a matter of being that is connected to the colonial
past and the after-effects of British colonialism. This is the trauma of post-
postcoloniality.

As the next section uncovers, it is also the case that differences are repositioned
and exclusions are generated in order to combat post-postcolonial melancholia
and the sense of in-betweenness (“not so Eastern, not so European”).

7.3.2. Melancholic Attachment to Cypriotness

The main characteristic of post-postcolonial exclusion is the maximisation of
cultural differences. During my fieldwork, I found that participants often claimed
a distinct cultural identity of Cypriotness by continuously highlighting cultural
differences between themselves and mainland Turks, or by stating that Turkish
Cypriots and mainland Turks are different. I observed that almost all the
participants used negative terminology such as “less civilised” and “less
educated” when I asked them to describe mainland Turks. The first example
comes from my interview with Mustafa, a fifty-two-year-old primary-school
teacher. He was living in Famagusta, but was originally from the village of
Kophinou (Kofinou/Kofunye/Gecitkale) in the district of Larnaca. Because
Kophinou was a mixed village, he spent his childhood mingling with Greek
Cypriots. In 1974, when violence broke out, he fled on foot to Famagusta.
Mustafa now lived among a huge number of mainland Turks in the Famagusta
district. For him, mainland Turks were very different from indigenous Turkish Cypriots. “They [mainland Turks] are less civilised than Cypriots,” Mustafa told me. “Not only [are they] less civilised, but also less educated. Their attitudes, their clothes, and the way they speak and think; everything about them is different, even the way they look.”

A similar discourse is evident in the following interview with Ayse, a fifty-six-year-old woman who was born and grew up in the district of Larnaca. Similarly to Mustafa, Ayse had fled to Famagusta with her family in 1974 to escape the violence. In the extract below, Ayse has just responded to my question “what makes Turks from Turkey different from Turkish Cypriots?” with one word: “everything”.

Rahme: Can you give examples?

Ayse: For example, we are not murderers like them. We are not backwards like them. We are different. Most people don’t know that we are different from them, though. I went to London last year. When I told people I was a Turkish Cypriot, they thought I was Turkish. They don’t know our difference. They think we are the same. To be honest, this made me feel very bad.

Rahme: Why did it make you feel bad?

Ayse: I don’t know. I think, because we are not like them. The other day a mainland Turk, he came from Turkey three days ago to work, he got depressed, he set a car showroom on fire.

Resonating with Mustafa’s and Ayse’s accounts, twenty-one-year-old Melis highlighted the differences between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks by saying “we are more modern than them. We think differently.” Melis continued:

My parents are scared to let me go out alone at night, especially to the places where Türkiyeli people go or live.

Rahme: Oh, places like Nicosia Old Town?

Melis: Yes, they are never happy when I go there with my friends. They don’t sleep, they wait for me until I get back home.
Mustafa, Ayse and Melis use discourses about mainland Turks’ religiosity, looks, dialects and other cultural differences as a way of maintaining their boundaries. A common theme is that mainland Turks endanger the security of the Turkish Cypriot community, because they are seen as the origin of problems in Northern Cyprus such as increasing crime rates. Mustafa, Ayse and Melis position mainland Turks as foreigners and aliens who have ruined the peace. In this sense, the emphasis on cultural difference is a discursive resource that allows participants to imagine themselves as a community, different and separate from mainland Turks (see Anderson, 1995). This designation of mainland Turks resonates with Said’s (1978) argument that the Orient is viewed in terms of the values and customs of the East, thereby becoming the constitutive Other to the West. Mainland Turks are caricatured as everything that Turkish Cypriots are not: Turkish Cypriots are more educated, more civilised and more modern. In other words, the Orient (mainland Turks) is constructed by Turkish Cypriots through narrative practices of exclusion and categorisation. Here, Mustafa, Ayse and Melis are fabricating an essentialised identity based on Cypriotness (which is shared by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, see Chapter 6). Yet, what they are failing to recognise is that, as Said (1998) once said, “we live in a very complex and mixed world in which you can’t separate cultures and civilisations from each other”:

No one today is purely one thing. Labels like Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American are not more than starting points, which if followed into actual experience for only a moment are quickly left behind. Imperialism consolidated the mixture of cultures and identities on a global scale. But its worst and most paradoxical gift was to allow people to believe that they were only, mainly, exclusively, white, or Black, or Western, or Oriental. Yet just as human beings make their own history, they also make their cultures and ethnic identities. No one can deny the persisting continuities of long traditions, sustained habitations, national languages, and cultural geographies, but there seems no reason except fear and prejudice to keep insisting on their separation and distinctiveness, as if that was all human life was about. (Said, 1993, p.336)
The recognition that there is no pure Cypriotness that separates Turkish Cypriots from mainland Turks is nowhere to be found in the extracts above. As I have already pointed out, Turkish Cypriot identity is manufactured and remanufactured against two cultural presences: Turkishness and Cypriotness. The presence of Turkishness interrupts the discourse of difference between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots, just as the presence of Turkishness interrupts the discourse of similarity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The participants’ insistence on difference (Cypriotness), and their disregard of similarities shared by Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, should thus be understood as a discursive strategy that they build on the way to asserting their cultural supremacy. To put it differently, participants’ melancholic attachment to an essentialised notion of Cypriotness serves the present desires and ambitions of Turkish Cypriots, which at this historical moment are about integration with the Western world, and which thus bestow the pleasures of superiority.

7.4. Conclusion: Exclusion as a Dimension of Post-Postcolonial Melancholia

Ideas and fantasies that circulate around the fabrication of discourses that place Turkey in the position of coloniser and mainland Turks in the position of Other have been a central theme in this chapter. The main questions that I have addressed are: why does Turkey occupy the position of coloniser? Why is there a growing distinction between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots? The examples that I have discussed emphasise the conflicting and complicated culturalism of this discursive shift, which accompanies the traumatic experience of post-postcolonialism.

My participants’ accounts have demonstrated a tendency to position mainland Turks and Turkish culture as inferior and backward. Mainland Turks are demeaned for their perceived rural origins, their looks, dialect, religiosity, mentality and lack of education. Similarly, Turkey is portrayed as an Eastern and Oriental civilisation. Discursive practices that come from Turkey and the presence of mainland Turks in Northern Cyprus are not interpreted as beneficial to the structure of Turkish Cypriot society. Indeed, there have recently been anxieties
about a loss of culture arising from the social, cultural and infrastructural changes that Turkey and mainland Turks have brought to Northern Cyprus.

Drawing on the work of Gilroy (2004), I have argued that participants’ anxieties about the loss of culture (Cypriotness), and their stereotypical depictions of Turkey and mainland Turks as Eastern and Oriental, are symptoms of post-postcolonial melancholia. The concept of post-postcolonial melancholia elucidates Turkish Cypriots’ realisation that the feeling of superiority that they claim when they position themselves against mainland Turks does not guarantee their acceptance by the Western/European world (or the world of Greek Cypriots). As has become apparent, when participants cross the dividing line and see the physical environment in the Greek part of the island, they are confronted with a certain material reality in relation to Greek Cypriots. Additionally, at this historical moment, the complexity of Turkish Cypriot identity exceeds the binary opposition between superior Turkish Cypriots and inferior mainland Turks. Another contrasting category emerges, one constituted through the binary of inferior Turkish Cypriots and superior Greek Cypriots. As Hall (1990, p.225) argues, “we cannot speak for very long, with any exactness, about ‘one experience, one identity’, without acknowledging its other side.” Thus, it is significant that it is through this positioning of Self in relation to two constitutive Others (mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots) that participants discover themselves to be “not so European, not so Western”: not equal to the Greek Cypriot Other, but not equal to the mainland Turk Other either.

Post-postcolonial exclusion, in similar ways to post-postcolonial resistance (see Chapter 6), should be understood as a discursive and affective strategy that participants form in order to battle a sense of in-betweenness that is ascribed into the very constitution of their identities. More importantly, the participants’ discursive positioning of mainland Turks and Turkey comes from an in-between position of hybridity. In this sense, mainland Turks become the victims of Orientalist discourse during the process of Turkish Cypriots encountering the ambivalence of their own identity. Finally, although post-postcolonial melancholia results in racist and racialising discourses among Turkish Cypriots, it also prompts attempts to connect to the Greek Cypriot Other as a way of
managing and negotiating this in-betweenness. This reveals the simultaneous coexistence of conviviality and racism at the heart of Turkish Cypriot society.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION

The complexities involved in the fabrication of a resurgent Cypriot identity within the Turkish Cypriot community in Northern Cyprus have been the focus of this thesis. A core theme has been the relationship between the notion of Cypriotness and its mobilisation in post-postcolonial narratives. As stated in the Introduction, previous scholarship on identity in Northern Cyprus has observed the politics of Cypriotness with reference to the presence of mainland Turks and the economic, political, social and economic changes that come with Turkey’s perceived domination of Northern Cyprus. However, one salient criticism that can be made towards existing research and literature is that it has perhaps not paid enough sociological attention to the after-effects of how British colonialism has impacted the myriad ways in which Turkish Cypriots construct cultural hierarchies and negotiate difference in Northern Cyprus. Similarly, previous studies have paid a disproportionate amount of consideration to the tensions between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots and how these tensions relate to the notion of Cypriotness. Given the paucity of academic research on the topic, this study has sought to establish a theoretically and empirically nuanced understanding of how discourses of Cypriotness are given meaning, with a specific focus on the post-war generation.

The thesis had three aims. The first and central aim underlying my research was to investigate how the relationship between the colonial past and the colonial and postcolonial present – which I refer to as post-postcolonialism – relates to the current constitution of Turkish Cypriot identity. The second was to examine the tensions and interrelated synergies between three cultures – the culture of Turkish Cypriots, the culture of Greek Cypriots and the culture of mainland Turks – and how Cypriotness emerges from the negotiations between the three. The third was to investigate the Eurocentric knowledge claims produced by the discourse of Cypriotness. The thesis therefore contributes to current debates over the politics of identity in Northern Cyprus by adopting a post-postcolonial approach to explore the notion of Cypriotness.
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, I began by exploring the notion of Cypriotness through a postcolonial lens; however, I discovered that this approach offered limited value in explaining the history and transitions of the meanings of Cypriotness. A key argument in this thesis has been that the notion of Cypriotness is about the complexity of the post-postcolonial conjuncture: Cypriotness is engendered through the relationship between the colonial past and the colonial and postcolonial present. Drawing on ideas from postcolonial theory (Said, 1978, 1993; Bhabha, 1984, 1994), I developed a post-postcolonial analytic as a mode of thinking about the hybrid locatedness of contemporary Cypriotness. It is important to highlight that my work applied postcolonial theory to Northern Cyprus – which was colonised by the West and is now supposedly “colonised” by an Eastern power – to analyse the living of post-postcolonial conditions in relation to cultural difference, racism, power and identity. Thus, this thesis has shown that Cyprus provides an interesting case from which to develop a postcolonial analysis.

Drawing on key ideas from postcolonial theory, sociology, memory studies and cultural studies, I have used a multi-disciplinary approach to investigate the relationship between the notion of Cypriotness and three central themes – resistance, inclusion and exclusion – as manifested in post-postcolonial discourse. In order to achieve the objectives of my study, I used mixed-method ethnography, combining sensory ethnography and auto-ethnography. As I discussed in chapter 4, this holistic methodological approach provided greater sociological scope to enhance the involvement and participation by Turkish Cypriots, enabling me to investigate the research questions in greater depth (O’Byrne, 2007).

Here, I gleaned the principal themes and arguments of my research in relation to my original research questions, which enabled me to outline the conceptual and empirical findings of the study.
8.1. Summary and Conclusions

8.1.1. Why Do Turkish Cypriots Resist Nationalist Themes and Material and Sensual Practices Which Are Interlinked with Nationalist Discourse?

This question was taken up in Chapter 5. With a focus on the struggle between vernacular and official memory (Bodnar, 1992) in Northern Cyprus, I explored the ways in which official memory sites and museums have become a significant part of nationalist discourse, and how younger Turkish Cypriots interpret them in ways that transcend the officially prescribed narrative. I considered the ways in which ethnonationalist parties, especially between 1974 and 2003, advocated an official history based on the idea of homogeneity and solidarity between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, in order to create the conditions for a division between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots and to maintain the ethnорacial division of the island. I also paid attention to material and sensual practices, such as school visits to museums and memorials or commemorative ceremonies, which are interlinked with nationalist discourse. My empirical material showed that although official history streamlines a narrative – neglecting moments that shift attention from the traumatic events that took place between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots – a new discourse is emerging within Turkish Cypriot society, which I have called post-postcolonial discourse.

Post-postcolonial discourse symbolizes the emergence of a new hegemonic and cultural movement/formation: Cypriotness. Within this discourse, the policies implemented by the ethnonationalist parties in Northern Cyprus are undermined and constantly criticised. For instance, my data revealed that a common idea among young generation Turkish Cypriots was that textbooks provided biased views of the past in order to fabricate the past, and to maintain ethnocultural divisions and the status quo. Moreover, in dialogue with Connerton’s (1989) work, I explored the symbolic meanings of mnemonic instruments, such as celebrations of national days and visits to memorials and museums, and their use and effects in post-postcolonial Northern Cyprus. My study showed that the post-war generation in the present day do not necessarily retain feelings of “success and triumph” (Volkan, 2004, p.47) affiliated with commemorative ceremonies. I found that such practices can make Turkish Cypriots feel alienated from their
cultural identity of Cypriotness. Their alienation is the corollary of a reality created and reinforced by the influence of discursive practices that promote a fixed ethnic identity of Turkishness and position Turkish Cypriots in relation with their “ancestors” from Turkey.

Although my research participants re-experienced childhood distress when they recalled childhood memories of visiting the Museum of Barbarism and Cengiz Topel Memorial, there was another feeling that emerged within the present: an awareness that they had perhaps been manipulated into having such perturbed thoughts. The narratives propagated by the state, and how these are interpreted and made sense of, produce a set of judgements around what is “authentic” and what is a fallacy. As adults, Turkish Cypriots are able to view the experience of visiting these museums and memorials as fictitious; they feel as though they were manipulated into feeling an emotional affinity with the suffering of Turkish Cypriots, not as a genuine experience of empathy with Turkish Cypriots’ predicament, but as a vehicle for generating feelings of hatred for Greek Cypriots on the basis of that empathic connection.

My findings concur with other studies (Hatay and Bryant, 2008a; Navaro-Yashin, 2006) insomuch there is increasing resistance to the corruption of a nationalist politics that is inextricably linked to the Turkish Cypriot future and the economic and political fate of Turkey. Yet, in contrast to these studies – which suggest that Cypriotness is a political movement that reflects Turkish Cypriots’ desire to regain their own political will – I have illustrated that post-postcolonial resistance is related to and entangled with discourses of cultural supremacy. I have argued that nationalist themes and practices, which promote the idea that Turkish Cypriots are the possessors of a distinct and uncontaminated cultural essence (Turkishness), distance Turkish Cypriots from their Cypriotness. In turn, Turkish Cypriots develop counter-hegemonic strategies to draw closer to their Cypriotness and to distance themselves from their Turkishness, as well as from mainland Turks who are considered to be backward and inferior to both indigenous Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. “Being Turkish”, I have argued, takes on a negative value. In contrast, “being Cypriot” takes on positive value, as it signifies Turkish Cypriots’ connection with the West and the European in popular perceptions. Therefore, post-postcolonial resistance, or the notion of Cypriotness, is
characterized by one culture seeking to obfuscate its own vernacular hybridities and mixing, and to position itself as superior or at times equal to other cultural formations. Cypriotness or post-postcolonial resistance, I have argued, is underscored by historical representations that have racialised certain ethnic and social groups as inferior and uncivilised.

The patterns of resistance in a post-postcolonial society – the ways in which Turkish Cypriots resist nationalist themes and material and sensual practices which are interconnected with nationalist discourse – have been a key finding. The concept of post-postcolonial resistance has suggested a novel, alternative way of conceptualising the resistance explored and theorised by scholars in postcolonial studies (see Bhabha, 1994). Discourses of resistance are commonly employed to explain political and social actions taken by people in postcolonial societies, who were previously colonised, and how these people became resistant to the imposition of Western hegemonic ideals. The notion of resistance that I have proposed in this research extends beyond analysing the postcolonial condition, and engages with the changing settings of what I refer to as post-postcoloniality. Based on my data, I have suggested that post-postcolonial resistance is not defined as merely aspiring to overcome the hegemony and authority of ethnonationalist knowledge production – such as the nationalist themes and essentialist identities produced by the state – but rather transforms social relations in such a way that reconciliation can be achieved with those who have been considered Other (Greek Cypriots). Thus, post-postcolonial resistance does not only involve a desire to form a distinctive relationship between the Self (Turkish Cypriots) and the state, but also entails an aspiration to transform values, structures and narratives in order to create and maintain the cultural identity of Cypriotness.
8.1.2. Why Is There a Desire to Bridge Difference with Greek Cypriots in Turkish Cypriot Society? Why Is There a Shift from an Exclusionary Past to an Inclusionary Present? Why Is There a Wave of Interest in Turkish Cypriot Cultural Festivals?

This threefold question informed the discussion in Chapter 6, which aimed to understand the politics of inclusion and exclusion embedded in Turkish Cypriot communities. To this end, I examined shifting family stories about the past and Greek Cypriots, paying attention to the dichotomy between individual and collective memory (Halbwachs, 1980, 1992). I investigated the politics of recurring Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals. I also explored patterns of post-postcolonial inclusion, which is about the negotiation of Self-Other relations (between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots) in the unique and particular context of Cyprus. As I have already mentioned, the majority of the previous literature on Turkish Cypriot identity in Northern Cyprus has analysed the interplay between the idea of Cypriotness and the presence of mainland Turks and Turkey’s perceived colonisation of the island (Christiansen, 2005; Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Ramm, 2006; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a). In contrast, how Turkish Cypriot identity is produced in relation to Greek Cypriots became a central focus of my study, reflecting my interest in exploring how the notion of Cypriotness informs the identity positions Turkish Cypriots take up in relation to Greek Cypriots.

My research revealed that after the opening of the Green Line in 2003, collective distress and feelings of inadequacy or inferiority emerged among my participants as they took on an “imaginary position” (Wetherel and Edley, 1999) in relation to Greek Cypriots. It is an imaginary position because not only it is socially constructed, but it is also based on the distortions propagated by a Eurocentric worldview and the intellectual underpinnings of Orientalism. The feelings of inadequacy or inferiority are also reinforced by the culturalist racism that Turkish Cypriots encounter in everyday life when Greek Cypriots reduce Turkish Cypriots to their Turkishness, as regressive and inferior. Similarly, such feelings are reinforced by ongoing multicultural interactions between Turkish Cypriots, mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots in everyday life. This imaginary positioning, which is transposed from generation to generation, is crucial for comprehending
the dynamics of Cypriotness and its relationship to resistance, inclusion and exclusion. My work provides significant empirical evidence that Turkish Cypriots understand their lived reality through an imaginary position of inferiority. It is from this stance that they determine the parameters between “us” and “them”; and the subsequent illusionary position from which mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots are seen. More specifically, it is this imaginary stance that produces mainland Turks as deficient, backward and a threat to Turkish Cypriots’ culture, and Greek Cypriots as more Western, European and modern.

My research crystalized how young generation Turkish Cypriots propagate a particular form of recollection that encompasses a special past, one that is embodied by more pleasant experiences that are elevated to prominence within their collective consciousness, in addition to an evisceration of the more painful memories. In other words, there is a tendency among the young generation to embrace the notion of a conviviality between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, rather than adhering to the barbaric postulations outlined in history books and traumatic family stories. Previous studies in Northern Cyprus have noted a growing longing for the past among Turkish Cypriots (Sahin, 2008; Bryant, 2012; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a, 2008b; Beyazoglu, 2017). While my findings resonate with these studies, my work adds to these discussions by showing that collective memory in the context of Northern Cyprus is mediated by how Turkish Cypriots position themselves in relation to Greek Cypriots. My data shows that contradictory stories about the past and Greek Cypriots are reaffirmed through ongoing social micro-interactions between people of different generations in everyday life. Yet, as my findings suggest, the young generations’ proclivity to embrace the moments that define friendships between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, along with the peaceful coexistence of the communities before 1974, can be construed as an attempt to reconcile the gap between Self and Other. In dialogue with Connerton (2008), I have proposed that the absence of negative ideas about Greek Cypriots is an act of forgetting. It is a strategy Turkish Cypriots use to bridge difference so that they can deal with or deny the sense of inferiority that they experience in relation to Greek Cypriots.

Another significant empirical contribution of my research is my investigation of Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals, and their relationship to wider shifts in cultural
identification. My data revealed that the increasing interest in Turkish Cypriot folk arts and cultural practices is attributed to how Turkish Cypriots position themselves in relation to Greek Cypriots and mainland Turks. I found that cultural practices such as Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals have at least two functions: (1) to remake and produce cultural distinctions between the Self (Turkish Cypriots) and mainland Turks, and (2) to close the gap between the Self and Greek Cypriots. In other words, cultural festivals reflect a new common sense based on similarities between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, and on differences between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. They function to create and present a Cypriot culture shared by Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, encouraging the idea of unity in Cyprus and essentialised notions of Cypriotness. Based on my data, I suggest that the growing interest in Turkish Cypriot cultural festivals is intimately tied to the issue of the East/West division, and that it reflects Turkish Cypriots’ desired integration with Western society. Turkish Cypriots seek to close the gap between the Self and the “superior” Other (Greek Cypriots), and to distance themselves from the “inferior” Other (mainland Turks), as a way of valuing themselves and maintaining their sense of superiority (Cypriotness). Therefore, drawing attention to the messiness of everyday multiculturalism, I argue that conviviality and different forms of cultural racism coexist in everyday life in Northern Cyprus.

Thus, two different dimensions of post-postcolonial inclusion, enacted through the notion of Cypriotness, have appeared and are highly relevant. The first establishes a distinction between mainland Turks and Turkish Cypriots, ignoring the similarities between the two groups. The second rests on the shared culture between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, while simultaneously ignoring the differences between the two groups. My findings show that young generation Turkish Cypriots constantly emphasise similarities between themselves and Greek Cypriots by claiming a common cultural identity (Cypriotness). Differences between the two groups are underestimated or repressed. Moreover, although Turkish Cypriots encounter hostility from Greek Cypriots, this hostility is not always reciprocated. Instead, the young generation tend to direct their anger and frustration towards politicians, family members or state institutions such as schools, which are believed to be pressuring the silent majority into action. This
strategy of shifting responsibility from the individual to the state makes it easier to conceal the prejudice that exists within the Greek Cypriot community. These two patterns – minimising cultural differences, and blaming the state, its institutions (such as schools), politicians and family members – reflect the strategy people use to bridge differences. These patterns reveal Turkish Cypriots’ struggle for cultural equality, which can be achieved by manufacture a common Cypriot identity that emphasises similarities on one hand and masks difference on the other. Yet, Turkish Cypriot identity is also manufactured and remade against two cultural presences: Turkishness and Cypriotness. I have suggested that the presence of Turkishness interrupts the discourse of similarity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, although Turkish Cypriots in Northern Cyprus produce Greek Cypriots as the “same”, this notion of sameness is still based on modalities of Othering (Ang, 1996).

8.1.3. In What Ways Are Mainland Turks Categorised as Other, and What Do Such Practices of Othering Achieve?

With a focus on the material and physical environment, in Chapter 7 I examined the complex and ambivalent patterns of exclusion and practices of distinction between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks. I looked at the ways in which Turkish Cypriots categorise mainland Turks as Other. I also investigated the ways in which Turkey is represented as an Eastern country. My data showed that the physical environment and its materiality took on new meaning after the opening of the Green Line. Infrastructures have become sites through which current political issues and cultural struggles are narrated.

Evidence from my investigation shows that Turkish Cypriots believe that Turkey’s projects and strategies regarding Cyprus – such as the water supply project and the opening of Hala Sultan Divinity College – are a sign of Turkey’s paternalism and its increasing control/presence in Northern Cyprus. Such projects are seen as “infrastructure(s) of occupation” (Khalili, 2017, p.97) that facilitate the surveillance and control of Turkish Cypriots. They are framed as part of renewed efforts to make Turkish Cypriots an integral part of the Turkish nation. Turkey’s projects and strategies regarding Cyprus have therefore has facilitated a new
discourse that Turkey has acquired land that belongs to Northern Cyprus and is exerting its intellectual and political domination on the Turkish Cypriot people. This discourse, whereby Turkey occupies the position of coloniser, is present in the daily lives of Turkish Cypriots. There is an undercurrent of frustration amongst Turkish Cypriots due to the feeling they have no political authority and no arena in which to articulate their political agency. Thus, many feel as though they are the objects of both material and hegemonic practices. My findings have revealed that the driving force behind this new (post-postcolonial) discourse is not only the changing economic, social or political circumstances that come with perceived Turkish colonisation, but also the infrastructural changes, and the ways in which those changes are caught up with assumptions about Turkey and the Turkish way of life.

Drawing on Said (1978), my research has shown that the post-postcolonial discourse propagated by indigenous Turkish Cypriots – such as assumptions about Turkey, the Turkish way of life or mainland Turks – hinges on a contrast between the Orient and the Occident. This post-postcolonial discourse is thus related to Turkish Cypriots’ desire to integrate with the Western world in order to secure ethnocultural superiority. Turkish Cypriots constantly depict Turkey as an Eastern, backward and Oriental country. Thus, this study has identified a multitude of similarities and differences between Orientalism in Said’s (1978) sense and the post-postcolonial discourse produced by indigenous Turkish Cypriots. In both instances, the Orient is juxtaposed with the Occident, forming a conceptual binary. What makes post-postcolonial discourse so original is that it is based on the idea that it is not the colonised but the coloniser whose culture is perceived to be backward. Moreover, it is the coloniser who considers herself/himself to be more European/Western, and therefore to be superior to the coloniser. The presence of Turkey in Northern Cyprus is thus not understood as a necessary social revolution, because Turkey signifies an imaginary Oriental and backward national force. In this regard, the infrastructural and social changes that Turkey has brought to Northern Cyprus fail to satiate the needs of Turkish Cypriot people, because those changes are perceived through an Orientalist lens. Similarly, my findings suggest that Turkish Cypriots tend to position mainland Turkish culture as inferior and backward, and Turks as foreigners and aliens.
Mainland Turks are denigrated for their perceived rural origins, their looks, dialect, religiosity, mentality and lack of education. A common theme is that mainland Turks endanger the security of the Turkish Cypriot community, because they are considered to be at the root of social problems in Northern Cyprus such as increasing crime rates. Indeed, the presence of an increasing number of mainland Turks in Northern Cyprus creates a collective anxiety among Turkish Cypriots that Northern Cyprus is becoming like Turkey. In turn, there emerges the fear of a loss of Cypriot culture or cultural identity as a consequence of a subjective reality created and sustained by the material and sensory environment, which is underpinned as having changed – from the smell of the streets, to the shops, restaurants and hotels.

Turkish Cypriots’ representations of Turkey and mainland Turks as backward and Oriental, as well as their anxieties about losing their Cypriotness, can be read as the loss of a fantasy of power, which I suggest is a mode of post-postcolonial melancholia. As my data shows, after the opening of the Green Line in 2003, Turkish Cypriots had the opportunity to discover what had changed or remained the same on the Greek side of the island. Significantly, Turkish Cypriots – who at that historical moment largely identify with Cypriotness – were confronted with the reality that standards of living and material resources on the Greek side of Cyprus were seemingly superior in comparison to Northern Cyprus. This recognition is articulated as a sense of inadequacy/inferiority experienced by Turkish Cypriots. I have suggested that this recognition is not only an imaginary position, but is also a material reality that Turkish Cypriots are confronted with in relation to Greek Cypriots. Consequently, my research reveals that infrastructures and material conditions become sites through which post-postcolonial melancholia is narrated. My examination of melancholia in relation to both natural and technological signifiers also led to another important contribution. If one draws on Paul Gilroy’s (2004) work, melancholia can be seen as a certain structure of feeling. However, the infrastructural is an aspect of melancholia that has not previously been investigated. Developing Gilroy’s notion of postcolonial melancholia, I have proposed the concept of post-postcolonial melancholia to name the patterns of alienating and traumatic experience that accompany the realisation that omnipotence is an illusion in a post-postcolonial society. This
concept describes the condition of contemporary Turkish Cypriots who are constantly trying, but never fully succeeding, to be part of the Western/European world. While my research has attempted to provide an understanding of the relationship between melancholia and the physical environment, I discovered this relationship through serendipity. Future researchers might think about the ways in which post-postcolonial infrastructures can be researched. This new theorisation might be a key strand in developing future work on post-postcoloniality.

While examining the growing distinction between Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, I highlighted that hostility shown towards mainland Turks is related to post-postcolonial melancholia or melancholic reactions to the loss of power (Cypriotness). Yet, based on my data, I have argued that one driving force behind these feelings of inferiority and melancholia since the opening of the Green Line is not merely the changes that mainland Turks and Turkey have brought to Northern Cyprus, or the fact that these changes are considered to be uncivilising. Rather, underlying this narrative of inferiority is underpinned by the notion of Turkishness, which is ascribed to Turkey Cypriot identity. Already cemented as a part of Turkish Cypriot identity, this Turkishness positions Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots as simultaneously both the same and different (see also Hall, 1990, p.227). Within this complex positioning, I have suggested, the discourse that Northern Cyprus is becoming like Turkey, or that Turkish Cypriots are losing their sense of Cypriotness, reflects Turkish Cypriots’ struggle to come to terms with the ambivalence of their identity (a struggle I have summed up as “not so Eastern, not so European”) and the multiplicity of feelings that accompany this ambivalence. I have called this struggle the trauma of post-postcoloniality. In this context, cultural difference is a discursive resource that enables Turkish Cypriots to imagine themselves as a separate community, different from mainland Turks. Turkish Cypriots’ insistence on difference (Cypriotness), and their apathy toward the similarities shared by Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks, should be understood as a discursive strategy that allows them to distance themselves from the category of “being Turkish” and reaffirm their Cypriotness. This strategy of post-postcolonial exclusion, and the melancholic attachment to an essentialised notion of Cypriotness, therefore serves Turkish Cypriots’ present desires and
ambitions, which at this historical moment are about integration with the Western world, and the perceived socio-economic and cultural benefits this brings.

Consequently, my research has highlighted that mainland Turks become the victims of Orientalist discourse as a result of the confusion that emerges when Turkish Cypriots interact with Greek Cypriots. At this point, mainland Turks come to symbolise the inferiority that Turkish Cypriots feel in relation to Greek Cypriots, even though mainland Turks themselves did not contribute to this collective sense of insecurity amongst Turkish Cypriots. Although it may appear as if Turkish Cypriots are observing mainland Turks from a position of power, feelings of inferiority/powerlessness also underpin that positioning.

8.2. Cypriotness in Northern Cyprus

Taking the findings above into account, I argue, enables us to provide a deeper understanding of the complexities involved in the formation of a resurgent Cypriot identity within Turkish Cypriot society in Northern Cyprus and its relationship to complex issues such as resistance, inclusion and exclusion reflected in post-postcolonial narratives. The majority of prior research on Turkish Cypriot identity in Northern Cyprus has concentrated on the relationship between the notion of Cypriotness and the social, political, cultural and economic factors associated with Turkish settlement in the northern part of the island (Christiansen, 2005; Navaro-Yashin, 2006; Ramm, 2006; Hatay and Bryant, 2008a, 2008b; Hatay, 2009). These studies have a proclivity to offer sociologically grounded descriptions of how Turkish Cypriots locate themselves in terms of identity, without adequately interrogating the assumptions that underpin the discourse of Cypriotness. A further criticism that can be levelled against previous studies on Turkish Cypriot identity is their lack of critical analysis on the traces of British colonialism in Cyprus, or to the ways in which Cypriotness emerges from interactions among multiple cultures (Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and mainland Turks) in Cyprus. This previous literature has therefore provided only a partial explanation of Cypriotness and its manifestations.
My research contributes to debates over the politics of identity in Northern Cyprus by proposing that Cypriotness is a product of post-postcolonialism. By engaging with post-postcolonial discourse – produced by Turkish Cypriots who have suffered forms of injustice, domination and oppression caused by British colonialism, and who are now supposedly living under the control of an Eastern power – I have revealed that Cypriotness is about the historical collision caused by the ongoing “after-effects” (Hall, 1996, p.248) of British and Turkish colonialism, which inhere in the discourses and sensual experiences of Turkish Cypriots. Focusing on the continuing “after-effects” of British colonialism in Cyprus and the living experience of the colonial present, my work reveals the fragmentation and paradoxes of post-postcolonial narratives.

My research has elucidated that although Cyprus is no longer under British rule, the cultural and political residues of British colonialism in Cyprus are still prevalent within the ideological fabric of Turkish Cypriot society. Indeed, the profound impact of British rule in Cyprus left Turkish Cypriots with a hybrid culture. Thus, many elements are involved in the hybrid culture of Turkish Cypriots. Turkish Cypriot culture is influenced by the “English civilisation” of the British colonial era and Kemalist reforms and also coalesces these elements with local traditions. Turkish Cypriot identity, like all identities, is “fragmented and fractured” (Hall, 1996, p.4), but it specifically incorporates two cultural presences: Turkishness and Cypriotness. The presence of Cypriotness signifies power, inclusion and exclusion. It provides a sense of ‘rightful’ temerity to the advance of modernity by virtue of its historical affiliation with British civilisation (Beyazoglu, 2017, p.216). The sense of Cypriotness, in this regard, leveraged greater power to criticise, judge or exclude mainland Turks who are considered to be inferior and different. In Europe, marginalised populations continuously fall victim to racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia; thus, as Santos (2016) argues, colonialism still continues through the exclusion of marginalised populations. Similarly, in Northern Cyprus, xenophobia and racism “are among the modalities in which we can see colonialism at work” (Santos, 2016, p.18).

Yet, although the notion of Cypriotness places Turkish Cypriot people in an imaginary superior position in relation to mainland Turks by way of their association with past British civilisation, the presence of Turkishness can also
imbue Turkish Cypriots with a sense of inferiority and backwardness based on their association with Turkish civilisation. More significantly, this sense of inferiority can manifest when Turkish Cypriots position themselves in relation to Greek Cypriots. It can also circulate when Turkish Cypriots cross the dividing line and realise that the physical environment and standards of living in the Greek or European part of the island can never be equal to those in Northern Cyprus. Thus, the “epistemologies of the south” and the “epistemologies of the south” (see Santos, 2016) may be present in Turkish Cypriots’ struggle against imaginary Turkish/Eastern colonisation and the political, social, cultural and infrastructural changes that come with it. To expound further, Turkish Cypriots narratives and self-perceptions are tied to the theorizations of the “epistemologies of the south” insofar these narratives and perceptions of the Self have been shaped by the systematic injustices created by the perceived colonisation of Turkey. Moreover, the perception of their identity is also linked to the “epistemologies of the north” in the sense that their association with British colonization still impacts their own perspective of the Self and identity.

My work provides important empirical evidence that it is through the positioning of the Self in relation to two constitutive Others (mainland Turks and Greek Cypriots) that Turkish Cypriots discover themselves to be “not so European or Western”: not equal to the Greek Cypriot Other, but not equal to the mainland Turk Other either. The trauma of post-postcoloniality is that Turkish Cypriots can never fully belong to the Western/European world, but they cannot fully belong to the Eastern world either. This recognition blurs cultural boundaries. As a consequence, there emerges an essentialised notion of Cypriotness. Thus, I have argued, the notion of a resurgent Cypriotness, as well as the discursive and affective strategies of resistance, inclusion and exclusion, should be seen as the essentialisation of a version of the rational subject who is locked between a sense of Cypriotness (Westernness/Europeanness) and a sense of Turkishness (Easternness/non-Europeanness). My data shows that Turkish Cypriots constantly demonise Turkishness by “freezing it into some timeless zone of the primitive, unchanging past” (Hall, 1990, p.231). They appropriate Cypriotness in a similar manner. Turkish Cypriots resist nationalist discourse and discursive practices that revolve around the idea that Turkish Cypriots have inexorably inherited a distinct
and rigid “Turkish” culture. However, we should not be afraid to challenge the Eurocentric knowledge claims produced by the discourse of Cypriotness, by suggesting that cultural identities are constantly transformed. Thus, although Cypriotness is premised upon distinctions between people who are seen as “civilised enough” and those who are seen as backward and Oriental, a pure and impermeable Cypriotness or Turkishness does not exist. Cypriotness is necessary, insofar as it enables Turkish Cypriots to connect with Greek Cypriots in order to attain cultural equality and acceptance in the European/Western world. However, the impossibility of Cypriotness is that it is a fiction: it cannot be recovered or attained. Post-postcolonial discourse and the notion of Cypriotness have been created by the post-postcolonial epoch. It has created a veil of representation that enables East and West to be talked about from a position of in-betweenness, but not as “truth” (Said, 2006 [1978], p.21).

The deeply ingrained political, socio-economic and cultural residues of colonial legacies still play a salient and significant role in the ways in which differences are repositioned, and inclusions and exclusions are generated, in Turkish Cypriot society. This thesis thus responds to broader calls for “connected sociologies” that acknowledge the significance of the “colonial global” in the pantheon of sociology and more satisfactory sociological accounts of the present (see Bhambra, 2014a). Studies of nationalism and identity in Northern Cyprus, I suggest, need to engage with the colonial, postcolonial and decolonial present, which means taking into account how legacies of British colonialism continue to reproduce and restructure categorisations among multiple cultures manufactured in the post-postcolonial era. Instead of providing normative descriptions of such processes, scholars can then analyse how people in post-postcolonial societies negotiate difference and position themselves in terms of identity, thereby challenging Eurocentric knowledge claims and racialised categories.
Appendix 1: Glossary

Aftokinito: Car
AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi): The Justice and Development Party, a conservative political party in Turkey
Alaminyo: A village in the Larnaca district of Cyprus
Amerikali: American
Avdimou (Evdim): A village situated in the Limassol district
Agios Nikolaos (Aynikola): A village in the Paphos district of Cyprus
Bandabulya: Market in North Nicosia
Barbarlık Muzesi: The Museum of Barbarism situated in North Nicosia
Barış ve Özgürlik Muzesi: The Peace and Freedom Museum
Bavuri: Tin water bottle
Belesbit: Bicycle
Buhurdanlik: A vessel used to burn olive branches in it with the belief that it a protection from evil eye
Buyukkonuk: A village in the Famagusta district of Cyprus
Caglayan: An area in North Nicosia
Degirmenlik (Kythrea): A village in North Nicosia
Dhekelia (Dikelya): A British Overseas Territory on the island of Cyprus
Doner: A type of kebab, consisting of meat cooked on a vertical rotisserie
Famagusta (Gazimagusa): A city on the east coast of Cyprus
Fellah: Peasant
Fica: Dirt in the sea
Gabira: Toasted bread
Garasakal: Black beard
Gozleme: A traditional savory Turkish flatbread (filled with ingredients often including ground beef, spinach, cheese, potatoes, and parsley) and pastry dish
Hala Sultan Divinity College: A high school giving religious education in North Nicosia
Harnup pekmez: Carob molasses
Haspolat (Mia Milia): An industrialised village in North Nicosia
Hellim (Halloumi): A traditional cheese from Cyprus made from goat and/or sheep’s and/or cow’s milk
Hellimli: A Cypriot savoury pastry stuffed with halloumi cheese
Iskemle: Chair
Iskender: A Turkish dish from northwestern Turkey, which consists of doner kebab laid on a layer of bread and drizzled with yogurt, tomato sauce and melted butter
Ispaho: Yarn
Kalavac (Kalyvakia): A village in North Nicosia
Kelle-Paca: A dish containing either boiled cow or sheep parts
Kibris İlim Ahlak ve Sosyal Yardımlaçma Vakfı: Cyprus Science, Ethics and Social Assistance Foundation
Koilani: A village in the Limassol district of Cyprus
Kophinou (Kofinou/Kofunye): A village in the Larnaca district of Cyprus
Kyrenia (Girne): A city on the northern coast of Cyprus
Lagani: Waterway
Lahmacun: An Anatolian and Middle Eastern dish usually comprised of a round, thin piece of dough supplemented with minced meat
Larnaca (Larnaka): A city on the south coast of Cyprus
Limassol: A city on the southern coast of Cyprus
Mari: A village in the Larnaca district of Cyprus
Mathiatis (Matyat): A village located in the southern part of Nicosia in Cyprus
Mehmetcik (Galateia): A village in the Famagusta district of Cyprus
Milli Mücadele Müzesi: The National Struggle Museum
Morphou (Güzelyurt): A town in the northwestern part of Cyprus
Moutallo: The Turkish Cypriot neighborhood of Paphos town in Cyprus, which was abandoned by the Turkish Cypriots and inhabited by Greek Cypriot in 1974
Nicosia (Lefkosa): The capital city of Cyprus
North or Northern Nicosia: The capital city of the de facto state Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Palaikythro (Balikesir): A village in the Nicosia district of Cyprus
Pergamos (Pergama): A village in the Larnaca district of Cyprus
Piron: Fork
Potin: Shoes
RoC: Republic of Cyprus
Samisi: A Cypriot filo pastry
Seftali Kebabi: A traditional Cypriot food
Sesta: A traditionally salient and symbolic handicraft within Turkish Cypriot culture
Sinta (Inonu): A village in the Famagusta district of Cyprus
Souskiou (Susuz): A village in the Paphos district of Cyprus
Taksim: The concept of the division of Cyprus (see Nevzat, 2005). Such partition was the aim of Turkish Cypriots who wished to see Cyprus divided into Turkish and Greek portions
Tesbih: Prayer beads
TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
Türk veya Türk, someone who is a citizen of Turkey
Türk veya Türk, someone who is a citizen of Turkey
Vatili (Vadili): A village in the Famagusta district of Cyprus
Vounos (Taşkent): A village in the Kyrenia district of Cyprus
Zeytinli: A Cypriot savoury pastry made with olives
Appendix 2: Short biography of interviewees

1. Halil

Name: Halil
Age: 31
Gender: Male
Occupation: Civil Servant
Political Affiliation: TDP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: First encounter was at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Nicosia

Born in 1988, Halil works as a civil servant at Nicosia Turkish Municipality. He was brought up on an exiled Turkish Cypriot family. In 1974, his parents and grandparents fled from Paphos to Nicosia to escape the war. Halil completed his primary and secondary education in Northern Cyprus. He obtained a BA in International Relations from Near East University in Northern Nicosia, the capital city of the de facto state Northern Cyprus.

2. Aldinc

Name: Aldinc
Age: 31
Gender: Male
Occupation: Civil Servant
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Eco Day Festival in Buyukkonuk in October 2016
Interview Location: Nicosia

Born in 1988, Aldinc works as a civil servant at the Cyprus Turkish Electricity Authority. He completed his primary and secondary school education in Northern Cyprus. He graduated from Near East University in North Nicosia (Cyprus) with a bachelor's degree in Business Administration and obtained his master’s degree in Business and Management from the University of Westminster in London. Aldinc is also an owner of a bar in North Nicosia.

Similar to the majority of my research participants, Aldinc was raised in an exiled Turkish Cypriot family. His father and grandparents are from Kofinou (Kofunye), a village situated in the district of Larnaca, but they resettled in Lefkoniko (Gecitkale) village in the Famagusta district during the 1974 conflict. Her mother and grandparents, on the other hand, are from Mari, a village situated in Larnaca, but they fled to Akanthou village in the Famagusta district.

3. Hakan

Name: Hakan
Born in 1989, Hakan completed his primary and secondary school education in Northern Cyprus. He obtained a bachelor’s degree in Turkish Language Teaching from Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta. After much difficulty in finding a job, he decided to follow his mother’s footsteps and study pharmacy. This decision was influenced, in part, by the opening of the faculty of Pharmacy at Cyprus International University in the 2011-2012 academic year. Hakan completed his degree in Pharmacy from Cyprus International University in 2017. He now works as a pharmacist and owns his own pharmacy in North Nicosia.

4. Gizem

Name: Gizem
Age: 31
Gender: Female
Occupation: Teacher
Political Affiliation: TDP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Grape Festival in Mehmetcik in August 2016
Interview Location: Nicosia

Born in 1988, Gizem finished her primary education at Sehit Ertugrul Primary School, her lower secondary school education at Sehit Huseyin Ruso Secondary School and her upper secondary school education in Lekosa Turkish High School (Lefkosa Turk Lisesi) in North Nicosia. Thereafter, she completed her Pre-School Teaching Programme at Ataturk Teacher Training Academy. Gizem now works as a teacher in a private pre-school in Kyrenia.

Akin to the majority of my research participants, Gizem was brought up on an exiled Turkish Cypriot family. Her father is from a small town called Poli (Polis) in the district of Paphos, but resettled with his family in Nicosia in 1974. Gizem’s mother, on the other hand, is from Vuda (Kalo Chorio), a village situated in the Larnaca district. However, she fled to the northern part of the island with her family in 1974.

5. Gulden

Name: Gulden
Age: 27
Gender: Female
Occupation: Musician
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)
Born in 1992, Gulden studied in Northern Cyprus all her life. She graduated from Eastern Mediterranean University in Northern Cyprus with a bachelor's degree in Music Teaching. She gives private guitar lessons at home, and also occasionally performs in cafés and bars in North Nicosia.

Gulden’s childhood was on an exiled Turkish Cypriot family. Her mother was born in Limassol, but was resettled in Nicosia in 1974. Gulden’s father, on the other hand, was born in Larnaca, and resettled in Vounos (Taşkent) village in the Kyrenia district.

6. Mehmet
Name: Mehmet
Age: 27
Gender: Male
Occupation: Civil Servant
Political Affiliation: TDP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at Mustafa Akinci’s presidential election victory celebrations in Nicosia in April 2015
Interview Location: Nicosia

Born in 1992, Mehmet completed his primary and secondary school education in Northern Cyprus. He started studying Physical Education and Sports Teaching course at Near East University, but left the course in his second year. After completing his military service, he started working at Nicosia Turkish Municipality as a civil servant.

Mehmet’s family is among the Turkish Cypriots who moved to north from south Cyprus in 1974. Mehmet’s mother and grandparents were residing in the Larnaca district before 1974, before moving to Limnia (Mormenekse), a village in the Famagusta district of Cyprus. Conversely, Gulden’s father is from Malia, a village in the Limassol district. He resettled in Nicosia after 1974.

7. Mine
Name: Mine
Age: 28
Gender: Female
Occupation: PhD Student/Research Assistant
Political Affiliation: HP (centrist party)
Relationship to the Researcher: First meeting with Mine was during my fieldwork at a Turkish Cypriot wedding in Degirmenlik in July 2014
Interview Location: Nicosia

Mine is a PhD student and a research assistant in the psychology department at Near East University in Northern Cyprus. Born in 1991, Mine completed her
primary education at Gazi Primary School in Famagusta, where she was born and grew up. She moved to Nicosia with her parents when she was twelve years old. She completed her secondary school education in North Nicosia. Mine got her BS and MS degrees in Psychology from Near East University, where she is currently completing her PhD in Psychology.

8. Emre
Name: Emre
Age: 29
Gender: Male
Occupation: IT Technician
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: First became familiar with Emre during my fieldwork at a Turkish Cypriot wedding in North Nicosia in August 2014
Interview Location: Nicosia

Emre was born in 1990 in Nicosia. He studied Information Technology at Sedat Simavi Industrial Vocational High School, before working for his uncle’s private company as an IT technician, providing support to computer and internet users in Northern Cyprus. Emre also owns an Internet Café in Nicosia.

Emre was born and raised on an exiled Turkish Cypriot family. Both her father and mother were living in Larnaca until 1974. Then they moved to northern part of the island.

9. Gozde
Name: Gozde
Age: 29
Gender: Female
Occupation: Chemistry Teacher
Political Affiliation: HP (centrist party)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Eco Day Festival in Buyukkonuk in October 2016
Interview Location: Nicosia

Gozde was born in 1990 in Nicosia. After completing her primary and secondary school education in Northern Cyprus, she got her bachelor’s degree in Chemistry from Hacettepe University in Turkey. After finishing her undergraduate degree in Turkey, Gozde returned back to Northern Cyprus and started working as a Chemistry Teacher in a private secondary school in North Nicosia.

10. Miray
Name: Miray
Age: 30
Gender: Female
Occupation: Accountant
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Grape Festival in Mehmetcik in August 2016
Interview Location: Nicosia

Miray has been working as an accountant in a private company in North Nicosia. Born in Nicosia in 1989, Miray finished her primary education at Necati Taşkıın Primary School, her lower secondary school education at Bayraktar Secondary School (Bayraktar İlkokulu) and her upper secondary school education at Bulent Ecevit High School in North Nicosia. She, then, got her bachelor's degree in Marketing from Near East University in Cyprus.

11. Ismail

Name: Ismail
Age: 32
Gender: Male
Occupation: Dentist
Political Affiliation: HP (centrist party)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Nicosia

Born in 1987, Ismail finished his primary and secondary school education in Northern Cyprus. Thereafter, he acquired his bachelor's degree in Dentistry from Istanbul University in Turkey. He has been working as a dentist in a private health clinic in North Nicosia since 2011. He is also currently completing his PhD in Orthodontics at Near East University in Cyprus.

Ismail was brought up on an exiled Turkish Cypriot family. His father was born in Paphos, before resettling in Nicosia after 1974. Similarly, Ismail’s mother was born in Larnaca, and resettled in North Nicosia in 1974.

12. Meryem

Name: Meryem
Age: 29
Gender: Female
Occupation: Lawyer
Political Affiliation: TDP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Grape Festival in Mehmetcik in August 2016
Interview Location: Nicosia

Born in 1990, Meryem completed all her education in Northern Cyprus. She graduated from Near East University with a bachelor's degree in Law and obtained her master’s degree in Law from the same university. She currently works as a lawyer for a private law firm in Nicosia.
Meryem was brought up on an exiled Turkish Cypriot family. Her parents are from Souskiou (Susuz), a village in the Paphos district of Cyprus. They resettled in the Nicosia in 1974.

13. Fatma

Name: Fatma
Age: 34
Gender: Female
Occupation: Banker
Political Affiliation: HP (centrist party)
Relationship to the Researcher: First meeting was at the Grape Festival in Mehmetcik in August 2016
Interview Location: Nicosia

Fatma was born in 1985 in Nicosia. She completed all her education in Northern Cyprus. She studied Banking and Finance at Near East University. The economic situation upon completing her degree was somewhat bleak. Thus, she struggled to find a job for almost 2 years after completing her degree. Later, Fatma was able to find a job in the capital city Nicosia, and she is currently working as a banker in North Nicosia.

Fatma’s father and grandparents are from Avdimou (Evdim), a village situated in Limassol, but they resettled in the Girne (Kyrenia) in 1974. Fatma’s mother, on the other hand, is from Larnaca, but she resettled in North Nicosia in 1974.

14. Aliye

Name: Aliye
Age: 31
Gender: Female
Occupation: Interior Designer
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: First encounter was at the Grape Festival in Mehmetcik in August 2016
Interview Location: Nicosia

Aliye was born in 1988 in Nicosia. She completed all her education in Northern Cyprus. She studied architecture at Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta. She is currently working for a private interior design firm in Nicosia, while saving money to start her own business.

Aliye’s father and father’s parents are from Agios Nikolaos (Aynikola), a village in the Paphos district of Cyprus, but they were resettled in Girne (Kyrenia) in 1974. Similarly, Aliye’s mother is from Larnaca (Iskele), but she resettled in Nicosia with her family members after 1974.

15. Sermet

Name: Sermet
Age: 30  
Gender: Male  
Occupation: Musician (producer)  
Political Affiliation: None  
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Grape Festival in Mehmetcik in August 2016  
Interview Location: Nicosia

Sermet was born in 1989 in Nicosia. He completed his primary and secondary school education in Northern Cyprus. Sermet obtained his bachelor's degree in Computer Science from the University of Nicosia (located in the southern part of Cyprus). He then got his MSc in Computer Science in Belgium. He is currently pursuing his dream as a music producer/sound engineer both in Belgium and in Cyprus.

16. Leyla

Name: Leyla  
Age: 28  
Gender: Female  
Occupation: Master’s Student  
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)  
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Eco Day Festival in Buyukkonuk in October 2016  
Interview Location: Nicosia

Leyla was born in 1991 in Nicosia. She completed her upper secondary school education in the English School Nicosia which is a bi-communal secondary school in south Nicosia, with students from both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. She then obtained her bachelor's degree in Biochemistry from Imperial College London. Leyla has been working in a private medical assay laboratory in Nicosia. She is also currently completing her master’s degree in Biochemistry at Near East University in Cyprus. She is considering pursuing a PhD in London after the completion of her master’s degree.

Leyla’s mother was born in Limassol, a city on the southern coast of Cyprus. Leyla’s father, on the other hand, was born and raised in Nicosia. He worked in the Greek side as a builder after the opening of the Green Line in 2003.

17. Fatma

Name: Fatma  
Age: 26  
Gender: Female  
Occupation: English Teacher  
Political Affiliation: HP (centrist party)  
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Grape Festival in Mehmetcik in August 2016  
Interview Location: Nicosia
Born in 1993, Fatma finished her primary and secondary school education in Northern Cyprus. After finishing her secondary school, she came to London to improve her English. She did an IELTS preparation course at EF International Language School in London. She passed her IELTS test and enrolled at Queen Mary University of London, where she obtained her bachelor’s degree in English. She also obtained a master’s degree in English Language Teaching from Eastern Mediterranean University in Northern Cyprus. She is currently working as an English teacher in North Nicosia.

18. Hale
Name: Hale
Age: 42
Gender: Female
Occupation: Teacher
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Nicosia

Hale was born in 1977 in Nicosia, Northern Cyprus. She obtained her bachelor's degree in Turkish Language and Literature from Trakya University in Turkey. She worked in several secondary schools all around Northern Cyprus as a Turkish Literature teacher. She has been living in Nicosia with her husband and son, and she currently works in a public secondary school in Nicosia as an Assistant Director of Teaching and Learning.

19. Mustafa
Name: Mustafa
Age: 53
Gender: Male
Occupation: Primary School Teacher
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Famagusta

Mustafa was born in 1966 in the village of Kophinou (Kofunye) in the district of Larnaca. Because Kophinou was a mixed village, he spent his childhood mingling with Greek Cypriots. In 1974, when violence broke out, he fled to Famagusta. Since then, Mustafa has been living in Famagusta. He obtained his Primary School Teaching degree from Atatürk Teacher Training Academy in Nicosia. Mustafa worked in various primary schools all around Northern Cyprus. He is currently working in a primary school in Famagusta.

20. Levent
Name: Levent
Age: 51
Levent was born in 1968 in Nicosia, the capital city of Cyprus. He completed his primary and secondary school education in Northern Cyprus. After finishing his secondary school, he went to Turkey for his university education, but due to economic difficulties he had to leave his course and return to Cyprus. Mustafa has been interested in politics since young ages and his biggest dream was to complete a university degree in politics. He satisfies his interest in politics by writing articles and columns in Turkish Cypriot newspapers. He has also been the owner of a bar in Kyrenia for ten years. Although Levent was born before the violence broke out in 1974, he has little recollection due to being only six years old at the time.

21. Melek

Name: Melek
Age: 32
Gender: Female
Occupation: Lawyer
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Nicosia

Melek works as a lawyer in North Nicosia. Born in 1987, she completed her education in Northern Cyprus. Melek got her bachelor's degree in Law from Girne American University in Kyrenia.

Melek’s father and mother both have their origins in southern Cyprus. Melek’s father was born in Moutallo, the Turkish Cypriot neighborhood of Paphos town in Cyprus, which was abandoned by the Turkish Cypriots and inhabited by Greek Cypriot in 1974. He was displaced from Moutallo to the district of Morphou (Güzelyurt) in 1974. Melek’s mother, on the other hand, was born in Mari, a village in Larnaca. She was displaced from Mari to Kyrenia (Girne), a city on the north coast of Cyprus, in 1974.

22. Umut

Name: Umut
Age: 60
Gender: Male
Occupation: Business Manager
Political Affiliation: HP (centrist party)
Relationship to the Researcher: First encounter was at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Famagusta

Although Umut was born in 1959 in Famagusta, he spent most of his childhood in the streets of Nicosia. He went to secondary school in Nicosia. During his studies, he stayed with his uncle during the weekdays and only came back to Famagusta at weekends to see his parents. Umut has been the owner and the manager of an estate agent in Northern Cyprus. He has two daughters and three grandchildren.

23. Salih

Name: Salih
Age: 65
Gender: Male
Occupation: Policeman (Retired)
Political Affiliation: CTP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Nicosia

Salih was born and raised in Nicosia, Northern Cyprus. He studied at the Police Academy in Northern Cyprus. Until his retirement, he worked as a policeman. He also worked in the narcotics branch of TRNC Police Headquarters.

24. Cem

Name: Cem
Age: 32
Gender: Male
Occupation: Civil Servant and Footballer
Political Affiliation: TDP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Nicosia

Cem was born in Nicosia in 1987 and resides in Palaikythro (Balikesir), a village in the Nicosia district of Cyprus. He has been playing football since he was around eight years old. Due to his interest in football, Ali chose not to go to university after finishing his secondary school education. Instead, he completed his military service, and started working in the Nicosia Turkish Municipality upon his return from the military service. He is currently playing football on a Turkish Cypriot team in the first league while working in the municipality at the same time.

Cem’s mother is from the village of Mathiatis (Matyat) located in the southern part of Nicosia. His father is from Koilani, a village in Limassol. They both left their villages and moved to the northern part of the island when the inter-communal violence began in 1974.
25. Ayse

Name: Ayse
Age: 57
Gender: Female
Occupation: Business Owner
Political Affiliation: TDP (centre-left)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Famagusta

Ayse was born and lived in the district of Larnaca until she was twelve years old. She had fled to Famagusta with her family in 1974 to escape the violence. Due to the loss of her father during the war and her family’s economic situation, she had to start working at a very young age. Accordingly, she could not complete her secondary school education. Ayse and her husband currently own a café in Famagusta. Ayse is a mother of two children.

26. Melis

Name: Melis
Age: 22
Gender: Female
Occupation: Dentistry Student
Political Affiliation: HP (centrist party)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Famagusta

Melis was born in North Nicosia in 1997. She completed all her education in Northern Cyprus. She is currently completing her bachelor’s degree in Dentistry from Near East University.

Melis’s parents are originally from Northern Cyprus. Her mother was born in Famagusta in 1975 and her father was born in Sinta (Inonu), a village in the Famagusta district of Cyprus, in 1973.

27. Ali

Name: Ali
Age: 72
Gender: Male
Occupation: Civil Servant (Retired)
Political Affiliation: UBP (centre-right to right-wing)
Relationship to the Researcher: Became acquainted at the Culture and Art Festival in Kalavac in April 2015
Interview Location: Nicosia

Ali was born in 1947. He lived in Larnaca before the division of the island. He was around twenty-seven years old when he had to flee to the northern part of the
island in 1974 to escape the violence. Since 1974, Ali has been living in North Nicosia. Ali was working as a policeman before 1974. He continued to work as a policeman in the north, while also working as a mukhtar for a significant period of time.
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273


