Throughout the mid to late 1960s, women’s groups began forming across Britain. Meetings chiefly took the form of small, informal gatherings in kitchens and church halls, but as the idea of ‘women’s liberation’ as a collective politics gained momentum, increasingly larger venues were needed to accommodate rapidly growing numbers. On 27 February 1970 these groups congregated together for the first time at the inaugural National Women’s Liberation Movement (WLM) conference at Ruskin College, Oxford. With upwards of 500 women attending, the conference marked a significant moment for British feminism in Britain, heralding a growing activism that consolidated around campaigns for free contraception, abortion rights, equal pay and access to education and equal employment opportunities.\(^1\)

A well-known, even notorious writer, regarded by detractors and devotees alike as the embodiment of the progressive spirit of the Swinging Sixties, Brigid Brophy was not among their number. Despite her almost indefatigable work on behalf of animal rights and the Public Lending Right (PLR), Brophy’s social activism did not extend, as might have been expected, into any formal commitment to the burgeoning feminist movement.

While Brophy was not easily persuaded by the doctrine of the wider WLM, she did consider herself to be a ‘natural’ feminist insofar as she was convinced of the innate equality between women and men, particularly concerning questions around the sovereignty of biology in the production and regulation of the nuclear family. She was publicly outspoken on the restrictions of monogamous marriage, declaring that matrimony was only one of an ‘infinitely flexible’ number of ways in which human sexual and kinship relation might be arranged.\(^2\) I suggest here, then, that although Brophy was broadly in agreement with some of feminism’s aims, she was sceptical towards feminism as a homogeneous doctrine, especially when it
involved questions of cultural and aesthetic authority; however, such scepticism did not hinder her from writing insightfully, if controversially, about what she called the ‘sex war’. Not so much an anti-feminist as a non-conformist one, Brophy’s innate intellectual scepticism and commitment to what she regarded as rigorous logical inquiry habitually won out over any unreserved commitment to ideology.

In distinctively contrarian style, Brophy seemed to suggest that she was and yet was not a feminist. On the one hand, she was not committed to any systematic ideological project of feminism, and in some of her non-fiction writing her ideas might in fact be regarded as conspicuously, even startingly, anti-feminist. On the other hand, elsewhere in her work Brophy expresses a distinctly feminist awareness, one demonstrated rather circuitously in her fiction but far more explicitly in some of her journalism. Looking at both these dispositions in her writing, I suggest that Brophy was less an anti-feminist than a maverick or dissident feminist who, while agreeing with sexual equality, was nevertheless not easily corralled into the involuntary extension of ideology into artistic and intellectual domains. Thus, we get two sides of Brophyism; someone who wrote that society ought to ask ‘whether it is natural for women to be kept in the kitchen’ and that the ‘normal and natural thing for human beings to do is […] to reform society and to circumvent or supplement nature’, but who also wrote that ‘[f]eminism may lack allure for individual bookbuyers, but the posse of jackboot feminists can no doubt be counted on to bully institutions’.

Despite Brophy’s ambivalence towards feminism, especially in the 1970s and 1980s when its effects began to take more discernible hold on culture and politics, it has become commonplace to read that Brophy was not only an animal rights activist, which she most emphatically was, and a campaigner for PLR, which she also was, but also a devoted feminist. Accompanying the Faber and Faber reissues of Flesh and The Finishing Touch, Richard T. Kelly describes her thus: ‘In hindsight Brophy still cuts a singular figure as novelist, critic,
feminist, pacifist, campaigner for the rights of authors and of animals and connoisseur of art and opera.\footnote{Similarly, in the anthology \textit{Modern British Women Writers}, she is described as a ‘vociferous’ supporter of feminism.}\footnote{Elsewhere, Cambridge University Press’s Orlando project observes that Brophy became ‘notorious for her politics’ in the 1960s, no mean feat in an era renowned for its cultural iconoclasm.} Brophy is described here as ‘a vegetarian, a sexual liberationist, an animal rights activist, a feminist, a writers’ rights activist, a pro-pornography activist’.\footnote{In an obituary in \textit{The Independent} we learn of Brophy’s deep ‘commitment to causes that were worth fighting for’, namely, ‘feminism, pacifism, vegetarianism, Public Lending Rights, pornography, and the Vietnam War’; such causes, it is claimed ‘rarely found a better spokesperson’.

More recently, in what might be legitimately called a critical revival in Brophy’s work, critics seemed to have retained this unchallenged assertion of her feminism. Jennifer Hodgson writes that among her ‘myriad political commitments’, Brophy was ‘pro-human, animal, women’s, gay and writer’s rights’.\footnote{In \textit{British Fiction of the Sixties: The Making of the Swinging Decade}, Sebastian Groes describes Brophy as a writer of ‘minor literature’ whose sexual politics represented a radical challenge to the ‘masculine, humanist “majoritarian” tradition’.} A more tempered approach, however, is to be found in \textit{The Encyclopedia of British Writers}, where we read that although ‘Brophy wrote much that could be described as feminist’, she ‘never fell into any particular school of feminism’.\footnote{A renowned literary agent and close friend of Brophy, Giles Gordon (1940–2003), also contributed to this myth of Brophy’s feminism but added an important caveat concerning her intellectual practice. While Brophy was, he says, a ‘feminist; lover of men and women’, she was ‘ever the Aristotelian logician, and ‘above all’ she was an ‘intellectual’.}

In distinct contrast to the above, Janet Todd notes that Brophy was, in fact, well known for her ‘acerbic anti-feminism’.\footnote{In addition to Brophy’s reference to ‘jackbooted’ feminists,
Todd may be referring here to her critical demolition of *The Handbook of Non-Sexist Writing*, edited by Casey Miller and Kate Swift, in the *London Review of Books* in February 1982, reprinted as ‘He/She/Hesh’ in her last collection of non-fiction, *Baroque-’n’-Roll* (1987). At the time Brophy wrote this review, feminist debates around the politics of language and representation were at their height, but this did not deter Brophy’s scathing assessment. She disagrees with the feminist assertion at the centre of Miller and Swift’s project – one now widely acknowledged – that language has a direct effect on the ways in which we understand the world, and that it has a disproportionately powerful effect on the interpellation of the subjectivity of girls and women: ‘Every language reflects the prejudices of the society in which it evolved.’ In this they are engaging with a contemporary feminist debate on the politics of language and representation that had begun with *The Second Sex* (1949), and continued with Betty Friedan’s *The Feminine Mystique* (1963) and Dale Spender’s *Man Made Language* (1980). Spender’s work was significant to the feminist debate regarding the ways in which language conducted ideology even when it seemed apparently neutral and denotative. Language was, argued Spender, ‘a symbolic system constructed by men’, and as such worked to maintain the subordinate status of women.

The argument that everyday language enforces gender stereotypes was fundamental to the feminist claim that the personal is the political and, further, that the idea of what constitutes the political needed to be extended to encompass, as Kate Millett said in *Sexual Politics* in 1968, ‘powerstructured relationships, the entire arrangement whereby one group of people is governed by another, one group is dominant and the other subordinate.’ In the context of this feminist work on the relationship between language and wider networks of oppression and inequality, it may seem contrary, to say the least, to read Brophy’s précis of Miller and Swift’s arguments:
They remark that people often resist linguistic change but that changes do happen […] These truisms are not enough to establish whether language can and, if so, should be nagged into changing in a programmatic direction […] Even if you accept the assertion, it does not follow that by changing the language you can change the prejudices.20

A rather curious assertion, surely, by a writer whose gender-fluid protagonist Pat/Patricia O’Rooley in *In Transit* experiments with gender roles and examines the function of language to influence subjectivity.21 In her review, however, Brophy unreservedly rejects the notion that language use has any real or lasting effect on the ways in which we perceive and represent gender:

There is not the smallest reason to expect that Britons and residents of the USA will turn non-sexist overnight should Ms Miller and Ms Swift succeed in persuading the ‘writers, editors and speakers’ for whom their book is confusedly designed (why do speakers need a handbook of writing?) to scrap the ‘he’ in sentences like ‘Anyone who converses with émigré Hungarians will soon find that he is bewildered by their pronouns’ and replace it by ‘he or she’ or one of the other formulae that carry Miller-Swift approval.22

Miller and Swift argue that the ‘vocabulary and grammar’ of English asserts a world view that upholds a ‘white, Anglo-Saxon, patriarchal society’ given to ‘excluding or belittling women’, a claim, Brophy assures us, that must be taken ‘with a pinch of salt’.23 But in the very next sentence, she adopts a quite contrary position on linguistic sexism insofar as it pertains to her own experience. She does not at all mind ‘craftsmanship’ or ‘chairman’ as do the authors, but was once ‘driven to public expostulation’ when introduced as an ‘authoress’.24 In a concluding remark that is commensurate with the idea that feminism equals humourlessness, comparable to
Sara Ahmed’s concept of the ‘feminist killjoy’, Brophy reproaches the two authors for trying to ‘denature’ anything in the English language that ‘might pass for a joke’. A lifelong advocate of the dextrous pun, Brophy seems here to privilege the right of language to be humorous over any political responsibility, observing that the authors’ solutions have the ‘depressive effect of sucking the imaginative content out of material that can ill spare it’.

Brophy’s ambivalence towards the cultural politics of feminism is also evident in her review of Germaine Greer’s *The Obstacle Race: The Fortunes of Women Painters and their Work* (1979). An overtly feminist recuperation of female painters in history, Greer’s project salvages women painters who have been lost or overlooked in cultural history for reasons of lack of education and training and patriarchal prohibitions on women’s labour outside of the domestic sphere. Describing her feminist methodology as a ‘singularly squinting vision of our culture’, Brophy complains that Greer’s one ‘shut eye excludes painters who were men, except where they impinge, as teachers, lovers or parents, on painters who were women’. By pointing up the fact that men are missing from Greer’s account, Brophy misses or, more likely, refuses the point that Greer’s is a study of the various obstacles that *women* painters have encountered, and that these hindrances have historically included men, or rather patriarchy, not unlike the ways in which Virginia Woolf talks of the absence of women writers from the canon in *A Room of One’s Own* (1929). To complain that Woolf neglects to talk at length about William rather than Judith Shakespeare parallels Brophy’s quibbling critique of Greer’s scholarly undertaking.

Brophy demonstrably repudiates the fundamental feminist premise of Greer’s work:

If you had nothing to go on except her chronicle of women painters whose works were later attributed to better-known (masc.) names, sometimes to the point where the woman’s whole oeuvre was lost, and no guide but her saga of daughters apprenticed to painter fathers by whom they were exploited as assistants and prevented from
developing artistic individualities of their own, then you might swallow her claim that women painters suffered these fates because a society run by men dominated them either directly or by training them to think self-sacrifice a virtue.  

Greer’s project, she insists, should be a wider act of recovery: ‘If lost oeuvres are worth rescuing, whether for justice[Q] sake or aesthetics’, surely the duty to rescue them must fall on men and women by the tens of thousand – and apply, of course, to the oeuvres of men as well as women painters?’ Greer’s point is, of course, not about lost oeuvres tout court but points to a more comprehensive silencing and loss of women’s talents. Undaunted by the justifiably piqued readers’ letters regarding her review, Brophy responds by describing Greer’s book as ‘equivalent to a book that documents all the women in London who have had ’flu this autumn and then argues that ’flu is an illness to which only women are susceptible’. While the Aristotelian/Brophyan logic here is technically unimpeachable, it mulishly misses the point about women’s intellectual exclusion and subsequent invisibility as cultural producers.

In much the same vein, Brophy ventures into feminist-baiting territory in an excoriating review of Colin MacCabe’s now seminal critical study, James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word (1979). Referring to his chapter on Finnegans Wake and what he calls the ‘impact’ of feminine narcissism [AQ] on ‘phallocentric male discourse’, Brophy is withering:

‘Can we categorise the text as a feminine discourse despite its articulation by a male pen or must that pen be accounted for?’ Alas, Mr MacCabe doesn’t go on to say what a female pen is like and whether it manages to assume a non-phallic shape. Perhaps he has misunderstood ‘la plume de ma tante’.  

In a letter to the London Review of Books, a reader responds, perhaps unsurprisingly, by
pointing up the narrowness of Brophy’s definition of what constitutes the political: ‘Ms Brophy’s concept of politics and the political role of writers revolves around them being or doing no more than nagging to death Arts Ministers over PLR.’

Brophy’s unconstructive attitudes towards feminism in these critical reviews of scholarly work are, however, frequently undermined, even contradicted, elsewhere in her non-fiction writing. Witness a newspaper article for the Saturday Evening Post from 1963, entitled quite simply ‘Women’, in which Brophy discusses the coercive power of the ‘confidence trick’ of biology that has been perpetrated on women:

Women are free. At least, they look free. They even feel free. But in reality women in the western, industrialised world today are like the animals in a modern zoo. There are no bars. It appears that cages have been abolished. Yet in practice woman are still kept in their place just as firmly as the animals are kept in their enclosures. The barriers which keep them in now are invisible.

Presciently locating a problematic that would form the foundation of much feminist theory in the next three decades, Brophy identifies, in her habitually succinct, provocative style, the ways in which nature, imperceptibly doing the work of culture, is used to keep women in invisibly barred cages, and, further, persuades them to acquiesce to the idea that they ‘are by nature unfit for life outside the cage’, thus maintaining, she says, one of the ‘most insidious and ingenious confidence tricks ever perpetrated’. The invisibility of the bars is distressing for a woman, she argues, as she is ‘unable to perceive what is holding her back’ and thus may accuse her ‘whole sex’ of ‘craven timidity’ as they seem have not ‘jumped at the appearance of an offer of freedom’. Women are comforted by reassurances that there is ‘nothing shameful in not wanting a career, to be intellectually unadventurous is no sin, that taking care of the home and
family may be personally “fulfilling” and socially valuable’; all of which would be perfectly valid, Brophy says, were it not for the fact that such arguments are ‘addressed exclusively to women’ and as such constitute ‘anti-woman prejudice revamped’.  

Three years later, in ‘Women: The Longest Revolution’, Juliet Mitchell writes:

Like woman herself, the family appears as a natural object, but it is actually a cultural creation. There is nothing inevitable about the form or role of the family any more than there is about the character or role of women. It is the function of ideology to present these given social types as aspects of Nature itself. Both can be exalted paradoxically, as ideals.

Here, Mitchell and Brophy share a strikingly similar position on the ways in which biology has been used as the tool of patriarchal ideology, whereby women have been kept subordinate to men. Brophy’s concludes in ‘Women’ that society has ‘contrived to terrorise women with the idea ‘that certain attitudes and behaviours are ‘unwomanly’ and ‘unnatural’. Again, her words resonate with those of prominent feminist thinkers, such as Kate Millet, who argued at length in Sexual Politics that

patriarchy’s greatest psychological weapon is simply its universality and longevity […] While the same might be said of class, patriarchy has a still more tenacious or powerful hold through its successful habit of passing itself off as nature […] When a system of power is thoroughly in command, it has scarcely need to speak itself aloud.

And yet, despite this clear affinity with feminist principles, Brophy continued to prevaricate over any identification of herself as a feminist: ‘What is a feminist?’ , she asks
Leslie Dock. ‘I mean there are many women writers that I admire and I certainly admire any woman who gets on with the job as though she were not a woman. I may have a very slight dislike for, and contempt for, women who make a profession out of being women.’ In this interview she compares feminists to Frenchmen who live in England and ‘make a profession out of being Frenchmen’. Whether Brophy is being intentionally antagonistic here in her suggestion that nationality is comparable to biological sex is not entirely clear, but the possibility that this is indeed the case is reinforced by her next statement in which she complains about feminists who insist on talking about women: ‘Perhaps I have the feeling that, if one has no subject matter except feminism, then one is trading on nothing, as though one were to make a career out of proclaiming that grass is green.’

Brophy wrote these words in the mid-1980s, a time when second-wave feminism was at its peak, reaping the intellectual and academic benefits of the previous decade of feminist theory and increased political activism. Considering this context then, for Brophy to talk of feminists as ‘trading on nothing’ might sound, to our contemporary sensibilities, markedly un-feminist; the position becomes more complicated still when she later states in the same interview that she does, in fact, consider herself to be a feminist, but one of her own definition. She believed, she said, in women leading by example rather than by any kind of consciousness raising or, worse, didacticism: ‘I basically think that the point of Women's Lib is better made by having more Jane Austens and George Eliots, and high-powered civil servants and so on, than by constantly reiterating a truism when you have nothing else to say.’ Political movements such as ‘Women’s Lib’ and ‘Gay Lib’ are most successful when they facilitate rather than dictate: change happens, she argues, ‘by people simply living their lives and being talented’.

While this is accurate to a certain extent, it might be argued that ‘people simply living their lives’ does not necessarily produce legislative change, nor does it account for those women who do not happen to be ‘natural’ feminists like Eliot and Austen, and whose quotidian lives are
blighted by economic discrimination, sexual violence and political invisibility.  

Brophy’s dissident attitudes towards feminism might valuably be compared to Angela Carter’s maverick libertarian take on sexual politics as demonstrated in The Sadeian Woman and The Ideology of Pornography (1978). Both Brophy and Carter reacted against the Anglo-American feminist aversion to both psychoanalysis and pornography; the latter an important register of broader ideas of social liberty for Brophy. In response to the Longford Report on Britain’s obscenity laws in 1972, Brophy wrote a lengthy, intellectually compelling essay, ‘The Longford Threat to Freedom’, in which she replies to the committee’s findings on the morally corrosive nature of pornography and the problem of addiction; for most people, she argued, ‘pornography does them no large harm and no large good either, move on to types of books or films that are less repetitive and predictable’.  

Carter viewed pornography as useful for women in so far as it allowed them to examine femininity as a set of mythologies equally reviled and revered, and to explore ‘their own complicity with the fictional representations of themselves as mythic archetypes’. Like Carter, Brophy was in ‘the demythologizing business’, and her creative work articulates this: ‘I feel that mythology is a denial of imagination which I think one has to counter.’ Her novels abound with strikingly independent and sexually unconventional women who refuse the sexual morality of their times, in particular the myth of the faithful wife and mother. Actively desiring subjects, Brophy’s women are educated, sardonic and witty in their approach to sex, adultery and marriage – Susan in The King of a Rainy Country (1956); Nancy’s female Pygmalion shaping of her husband in Flesh; the queerly erotic repartee of middle-aged Anna and young Ruth Blumenbaum in The Snow Ball; and the gender-indeterminate Evelyn Hilary (Pat) O’Rooley of In Transit (1969). The latter work gleefully unpicks the founding myths of masculinity and femininity, poking fun at them both, and suggests a keen feminist perspective at work, one preoccupied with the limitations of gender and how these are enacted within
language.

There were other reasons, perhaps, for Brophy’s resistance to feminism. An avid devotee of Freudian thought, she wrote a substantial (five hundred densely footnoted pages) study, *Black Ship to Hell* (1962),\(^{55}\) pointing up Freud’s enduring relevance for the mid-century. But Freudian psychoanalysis, in particular the concept of penis envy and Oedipal dynamics, was denounced by Anglo-American feminism in the 1970s, which regarded it as fundamentally misogynist, beginning from the premise that women represented a psychic and physiological lack.\(^{56}\) While French feminism was inclined towards a sustained engagement with psychoanalysis, Brophy seems not to have registered its effects in her writing, perhaps evidence of its narrow dissemination, remaining, as Jane Gallop noted, as a network of ‘stubborn polemic that circulated between ‘various exclusive little circles’.\(^{57}\) [AQ]

Despite Brophy’s own vacillating attitudes to feminism, she was nonetheless regarded by the more reactionary sections of the British media as explicitly influenced by ‘women’s lib’. Consider, for example, the ways in which *The Spectator*’s Simon Raven discusses her work. Conceding that on the whole Brophy’s journalism in *Don’t Never Forget* is ‘scrupulously and seriously written round a point which is of serious import’, Raven nonetheless goes on to mockingly identify what he sees as two distinct aspects to her writing; one is the rational masculine voice of Brophy – ‘tough, incisive and direct’ – which dissects its themes with a masterful aplomb; the other, the feminine, ‘faddy and finnicking prig’ that is Brigid.\(^{58}\) Unsurprisingly, the latter, in what he terms the ‘asinine interruptions of the deplorable Brigid’, is the ethical advocate, he mockingly suggests, of animals’, women’s and writers’ rights:

> It’s not as if the fussing ends with animals: Brigid is also much exercised about women’s rights, about the selfishness of people who actually want to keep some of their own property, about the crudity of Kingsley Amis’s jokes, and about the waste of
domestic abilities in the male – why don’t more men stay at home and help with the
nappies, Brigid wants to know, instead of rushing off to make money?59

Raven refers here to Brophy’s 1965 article in the Sunday Times, ‘The Immorality of Marriage’,
in which she elaborated on ideas of sexual equality from the ‘Women’ article, arguing that
‘traditionally marriage has been regarded as the price men had to pay for sexual intercourse,
and sexual intercourse was the price women had to pay for marriage’.60 Brophy upbraids
reactionaries who only cite ‘nature as an ideal’ when they are arguing against sexual equality:
‘They are to be heard nowadays complaining that our psychological and technological advances
have produced an “unnatural” state where it is increasingly hard to distinguish men from
women.’61 Curious, then, to read these words from a writer who objected to the idea of non-
sexist language or to a project that might recover lost female artists.

Brophy’s relationship to the burgeoning second wave of feminism in the 1960s was
marked by an intellectual scepticism that regarded the world, as A. S. Byatt noted, ‘quite in her
original way’.62 Regarding feminism less as a political undertaking than a sensibility, one that
was, for her, wholly instinctive and therefore in no need of doctrinal proclamation, Brophy did
not take at all kindly to what she regarded as ideological imperatives and was resistant towards
feminism as an organised political movement. At its most intense, this resistance was a defiance
of creed and dogma, even when these involved ideas that she herself put into practice in much
of her writing. Such recalcitrant attitudes to the feminist movement of her day do not, however,
invalidate Brophy as a notable, even important, figure in the history of British women’s writing.
As Patricia Waugh has noted, not all women writers who experiment with concepts of gender
and sexuality in their work have aligned themselves explicitly with contemporary feminism;
indeed, some of them ‘have refused to confine themselves to a narrow feminist agenda and have
often taken up positions that are antithetical to those of the dominant feminist politics of their
time’. Brophy might best be viewed, then, not as an adversary of feminism but as a dissident or non-conformist feminist thinker whose provocative challenges to its doctrines have not always been endorsed by history, yet exist as valuable reminder of the diverse intellectual landscape of her times.

Notes


8 Orlando [online].


Todd, *Feminist Literary History*, p. 11.


Miller and Swift, (eds), *The Handbook of Non-Sexist Writing*, p. 4; Brophy, ‘He/She/Hesh’, p. 63. Many of Swift and Miller’s suggestions are now uncontroversial; for example, their suggestion that the term ‘chairman’ be replaced by ‘chair’ or that the pronoun ‘he’ should not stand for the universal subject have been widely adopted.

Brigid Brophy, ‘He/She/Hesh’, p. 63.


Brigid Brophy, ‘He/She/Hesh’, p. 62.

Brigid Brophy, ‘The One-Eyed World of Germaine Greer’, review of Germaine Greer, *The Obstacle Race: The


29 Brophy, ‘The One-Eyed World of Germaine Greer’, p. 3.

30 Ibid., p. 3.


36 Ibid., p. 38.

37 Ibid., p. 39.

38 Ibid., pp. 39–40.


40 Brophy, ‘Women’, p. 43.

41 Millett, Sexual Politics, p. 58.


43 Ibid., p. 164.

44 Ibid., p. 164.


46 Ibid., p. 165.

47 The Married Women’s Property Act was only revised in 1964 to allow women to keep the money they earned as well as the right to inherit property. Prior to this, everything a woman owned or earned became her husband’s
property once she was married. This revision allowed married women to keep half of any savings from housekeeping money that they received from their husbands.


59 Ibid.


61 Ibid., p. 23.
