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Title: Superficial in-group love? Collective narcissism predicts in-group image defense, outgroup prejudice and lower in-group loyalty.

Short title: *Superficial in-group love*

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Keywords:

collective narcissism, in-group identification, prejudice, defensiveness

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The data that support the findings of this study are available here: https://osf.io/7wkmx/?view_only=1b0c229daf9741cbb18fef3ba58684d7.

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Abstract

We examined the associations between the need for personal control, different types of in-group commitment and group-related outcomes: 1) defensive responses to in-group criticism, 2) in-group disloyalty, and 3) out-group attitudes. We assumed that collective narcissism (i.e., a belief in in-group's greatness which is contingent on external validation and stems from frustrated individual needs) should be concerned with defending the in-group image and derogating out-groups, but not necessarily with being loyal to the in-group. Secure in-group identification (i.e., a confidently held in-group evaluation, which stems from satisfied needs), in contrast, should predict greater in-group loyalty and positive out-group attitudes. We expected these effects to be especially strong once we account for the overlap between collective narcissism and group-level self-investment—a key component of in-group identification. In a nationally representative sample of Polish adults ($n=1007$), collective narcissism (net of group-level self-investment) mediated between low personal control and in-group image defense, lower group loyalty and less positive out-group attitudes. Secure in-group identification (group-level self-investment net of collective narcissism) mediated between high personal control and in-group loyalty and positive out-group attitudes. It was not associated with in-group image defense. Implications for understanding the role of identification in inter- and intragroup relations are discussed.

Keywords: collective narcissism, in-group identification, prejudice, defensiveness

Superficial in-group love?

Collective narcissism predicts in-group image defense,

outgroup prejudice and lower in-group loyalty.

“I am absolutely certain that generations from now, we will be able to look back and tell our children that this was the moment (...) when we came together to remake this great nation so that it may always reflect our very best selves”

Barack Obama (Pitney, 2008, para. 37)

In his nominations victory speech in 2008, Barack Obama called for re-creating the nation on the basis of one’s own very best self. His approach suggests that national identity can reflect individual’s strengths, rather than weaknesses and inadequacies. Such a view is not necessarily consistent with classic social psychological theorising (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) according to which social identity serves a compensation for the frustration of individual needs. People’s commitment to social groups is thought to manage feelings of uncertainty (Mullin & Hogg, 1998), existential threats (Castano, Yzerbyt, Paladino, & Sacchi, 2002), or low personal control (Agroskin & Jonas, 2010; Fritsche et al., 2013; Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011). For example, research on the latter motive demonstrated that those who perceive low personal control show increased in-group favouritism (Fritsche et al., 2013) and in-group defense expressed as derogating critics of the in-group (Agroskin & Jonas, 2013). Arguably, these strategies help re-gain perceptions of power and control. These findings suggest that resulting in-group identity should be compensatory and defensive.

However, recent work shows that Obama’s ideals might also find reflection in social reality. A stable and satisfied self may in fact promote in-group commitment. For example, Van Veelen, Otten and Hansen (2011) showed that the projection of one’s own attributes on to the group can strengthen in-group identification, and that this effect is stronger among

individuals with a stable self-concept. Other research showed that self-esteem (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019), self-efficacy (Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997) and intrinsic motivation (Gagné & Deci, 2005) are also linked to positive commitment to the in-group. However, group identity built on the foundations of a stable and secure self is likely to be less defensive (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018).

Thus, both frustrated and satisfied individual motives can affect one's in-group commitment, but result in a more defensive or more secure in-group identification, respectively (Amiot & Aubin, 2013; Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka, Golec de Zavala et al., 2018; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Golec de Zavala, Dyduch-Hazar, & Lantos, 2019; Jackson & Smith, 1999; Marchlewska, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, & Batayneh, 2018; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). Defensive in-group identification can be operationalised as collective narcissism—a grandiose image of the in-group that is contingent upon external recognition of its worth (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). Secure in-group identification can be defined as an unpretentious investment in the in-group, independent of the recognition of the group in the eyes of others (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Both defensive and secure in-group identifications reflect positive in-group attitudes. In the first case, however, these attitudes mainly refer to emphasizing special importance and positive uniqueness of an in-group and seeking constant positive attention, while in the second case the focus is on a general satisfaction with being a member of a particular group (Cichocka, 2016). This distinction is inspired by research on self-evaluation where individual narcissism—an inflated view of oneself that requires continual external validation (e.g., Crocker & Park, 2004; Emmons, 1987; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001) is differentiated from secure self-esteem—a realistic pride people take in their strengths (e.g., Kernis, 2005; Marchlewska & Cichocka, 2017; Stronge, Cichocka, & Sibley, 2016; 2019).

In order to observe unique effects of narcissistic versus secure feelings of self-worth, researchers often co-vary out the variance shared between narcissism and self-esteem (Cichocka, Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2016; Locke, 2009; Marchlewska, Castellanos, Lewczuk, Kofta, Cichocka, 2018; Paulhus et al., 2004). Similarly, to distinguish the unique effects of collective narcissism and secure in-group identification in our research, one can account for their shared variance. In this way, we check for suppression effects, in which inclusion of a third variable (e.g., in-group identification) in the model should strengthen the initial link between the predictor (e.g., collective narcissism) and the outcome (e.g., out-group attitudes; Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). As a consequence, we are able to observe the unique effects of collective narcissism, minus its overlap with in-group identification and, the unique effects of secure in-group identification, that is in-group identification, minus its overlap with collective narcissism.

In line with the hypotheses about the compensatory nature of collective narcissism, research showed that it increases in response to the frustration of individual and collective needs. For example, Cichocka, Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2018) examined the relationship between personal control and collective narcissism in longitudinal and experimental studies (relying on the procedure previously used by Kay, Gaucher, Napier, Callan and Laurin; 2008). Results revealed that collective narcissism increased in response to low feelings of personal control. Specifically, they showed that those participants who retrieved memories related to past events over which they did not have control scored higher on collective narcissism (net of in-group identification) than those who retrieved memories related to events over which they did have control. Further, Marchlewska and colleagues (2018) demonstrated that collective narcissism may also increase in response to perceptions of a long-term disadvantage to the in-group, while Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2019) found it to increase in response to social exclusion of in-group members.

Collective narcissism is also linked to defensive intergroup attitudes. It predicts increased perceptions of threats to the in-group and hostile responses to such threats. Those who score high in collective narcissism are chronically predisposed to see out-groups as threatening. For example, they are more likely to perceive insult to the in-group image “even when it is debatable, not perceived by others and not intended by the other group (Golec de Zavala, Peker, Guerra, & Baran, 2016, p. 2)”. They also tend to believe in out-group members conspiring against the in-group (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, Marchlewska, & Olechowski, 2015; Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & Olechowski, 2016; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). These exaggerated perceptions of threat result in the need to defend the image of the in-group, usually by means of hostile and aggressive behaviours (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Dyduch-Hazar, Mrozinski, & Golec de Zavala, 2019; Gries, Sanders, Stroup, & Cai, 2015; Klar & Bilewicz, 2017; Marchlewska, Cichocka, Łozowski, Górski, & Winiewski, 2018). Because of the lack of trust towards other groups, collective narcissism also predicts generalised prejudice towards members of groups that tend to be perceived as threatening by in-group members. For instance, American collective narcissism predicted prejudicial attitudes towards Chinese (Cai & Gries, 2013), Arabs (Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010) and undocumented Latinos (Lyons, Coursey, & Kenworthy, 2013), while Polish collective narcissism predicts lower concern for refugees (e.g., Górski et al., 2019), anti-Semitism (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012) and prejudice towards ethnic minorities more broadly (Cichocka, Dhont, & Makwana, 2017; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; for evidence from longitudinal research see Cichocka, Golec de Zavala et al., 2018). These effects of collective narcissism are usually observed when controlling for in-group identification.

Secure in-group identification has different antecedents and consequences than collective narcissism. In-group identification (net of collective narcissism) increased (rather

than decreased) in response to feelings of high personal control (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018). Presumably, because secure in-group identification reflects a strong individual self, it is also associated with lower vigilance and less destructive responses to threats to the in-group. For example, Cichocka and colleagues (2016) examined perceptions of threat from conspiring out-groups. They found non-significant correlations between measures of national in-group identification and convictions that other groups were conspiring against the in-group. However, when collective narcissism was included in the model, the remaining in-group identification net of the narcissistic component predicted belief in out-group conspiracies negatively (see suppression effects; Cichocka et al., 2016).

Similar effects were obtained for out-group attitudes. In five cross-sectional surveys, Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Bilewicz (2013) examined identity predictors of attitudes towards salient out-groups. Both in the context of national and university peer groups, after co-varying out collective narcissism, in-group identification net of the narcissistic component predicted more positive out-group attitudes. This effect was confirmed in longitudinal research (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018). At the same time, in-group identification seems to be resilient to threats to the image of the in-group. Four experiments conducted by Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, and Iskra-Golec (2013) examined responses to in-group criticism. In none of the studies did in-group identification predict hostile response to criticism, suggesting that it is not associated with defensive retaliation in response to threats. It has been theorised, but not yet tested, that this is due to in-group identification without the narcissistic component reflecting satisfied individual needs (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018).

These past findings can be integrated within an overarching framework that allows for making predictions in terms of what sort of inter- and intra-group outcomes we should expect from collective narcissism versus secure in-group identification (Cichocka, 2016). While past

research extensively examined out-group attitudes and image protection associated with collective narcissism and in-group identification, less is known about how it can impact intragroup outcomes, such as loyalty to in-group members. Collective narcissism (net of in-group identification) stems from the frustration of the need for personal control (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018). As such, it can be considered a compensatory response to different types of threat. Thus, it should be associated with a greater concern with how the image of the group reflects on the individual and a lesser concern with benefiting other in-group members or contributing to the in-group well-being. We then expect collective narcissism to predict negative out-group attitudes and higher willingness to defend the in-group in response to image threat, but also lower in-group loyalty, especially once we control for in-group identification. In-group identification (net of collective narcissism), in contrast, should be associated with a lesser concern with how the group reflects on the individual and a greater willingness to realize one's potential by benefiting the group. We then expect in-group identification to predict more positive in-group and out-group attitudes, and overall higher in-group loyalty, especially once we control for collective narcissism.

In such a way, we aim not only to replicate previous findings on the positive links between collective narcissism and out-group hostility or defensiveness (e.g., Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Marchlewska et al., 2019), but also test a novel hypothesis according to which people high in collective narcissism should be more prone to leave the group for a personal gain. Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (1997) showed that leaving own group to gain membership in a group with a higher status mainly referred to those individuals who weakly (vs. strongly) identified with their groups. In line with this logic, only those members who feel committed to their common identity should stick together instead of opting for membership in more attractive groups. However, this research did not differentiate between in-group identification versus collective narcissism. We propose that it is only the

secure forms of in-group identification (net of collective narcissism) that should predict stronger in-group loyalty. Because collective narcissism is compensatory, it is likely to predict in-group disloyalty, operationalized as changing the group for a personal gain, especially once the overlap with in-group identification is controlled for.

In past research, the effects for secure versus defensive forms of in-group commitment were observed by co-varying out the variance shared between collective narcissism and measures of in-group identification or its subscales (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). These measures usually captured “the Tajfelian definition of identification” (Postmes, Haslam, & Jans, 2012, p. 9), by including various combinations of centrality of in-group identification, solidarity with in-group members and satisfaction with group membership (Cameron, 2004). According to Leach and colleagues (2008), these components correspond to the group-level self-investment, which in their model are captured by the components of solidarity, satisfaction, and centrality (for a discussion of the slight differences between the two scales see Leach et al., 2008).

Another component is group-level self-definition, captured by two additional components (i.e., individual self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity). Importantly, self-investment is strongly related to general positive feelings about being a member of a particular in-group (Leach et al., 2008). In contrast to self-definition, which is a strictly a cognitive dimension, the self-investment scale refers more generally to in-group identification, capturing not only its cognitive aspect, but especially the affective and evaluative ones (Roccas & Berlin, 2016). In line with this logic, just as high self-esteem means experiencing general positive feelings about the self (Rosenberg, 1965), self-investment (but not self-definition) usually refers to experiencing general positive feelings about one’s in-group. For this reason, we predicted that the defensive character of collective

narcissism and secure in-group identification should be best observed when we control the overlap between collective narcissism and group-level self-investment (rather than group level self-definition).

Overview of the current research

The aim of this research was twofold. First, we sought to replicate and extend past research by examining whether collective narcissism (net of group-level self-investment) versus secure in-group identification (i.e., group-level self-investment net of collective narcissism) differentially mediate the effects of personal control on attitudes and intentions towards the in-group and out-group. We examined three theoretically relevant outcomes: 1) in-group image defense, 2) group (dis)loyalty, and 3) attitudes towards a salient out-group.

We conceptualized in-group image defense as adverse and hostile reactions to potentially constructive in-group criticism. According to Agroskin and Jonas (2013) low personal control is linked to in-group image defense. Based on previous research showing collective narcissists' hostile responses to in-group image threat (e.g., Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013), we predicted that collective narcissism (net of in-group identification) should mediate the relationship between low personal control and defensive rejection of in-group criticism. Given that less is known about the kind of responses to in-group criticism that might be inspired by secure in-group identification, we considered two possibilities: that in-group identification would be related to defensive rejection of in-group criticism similarly (but perhaps less strongly) to collective narcissism, or that it would not predict defensive responses (as in the studies by Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013) as it might be linked to more constructive ways of dealing with criticism. Thus, we did not have a specific hypothesis about the association between in-group identification and defensive responses to criticism.

We also measured in-group disloyalty conceptualized as a willingness to leave the in-group for personal gain (e.g., emigrate). We hypothesized that if—in line with our theorizing—collective narcissism (net of in-group identification) is defensive and serves to compensate individual needs, it should be negatively associated with personal control and with showing in-group loyalty, especially if lower loyalty can benefit the individual. At the same time, if indeed in-group identification (net of collective narcissism) is secure, it should be associated with higher personal control and greater in-group loyalty. Collective narcissism and in-group identification might then mediate between personal control and in-group loyalty.

Finally, we measured attitudes towards a salient out-group. Prior research showed that low personal control predicted out-group derogation (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018; Fritsche et al., 2013), and that collective narcissism mediated the relationship between low personal control and less favorable attitudes towards out-group, while secure in-group identification mediated the relationship between high personal control and more favorable out-group attitudes (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018; see also Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). We sought to conceptually replicate this pattern of results in the current study.

The second aim was to explore the effects of two dimensions of social identification proposed by Leach and colleagues (2008). We expected that once we co-vary out collective narcissism, group level self-investment would be associated with higher personal control reflecting a secure in-group identification. We did not expect similar effects for group level self-definition because, as we argue, it reflect a cognitive dimension of in-group identification that does not capture the positive evaluation of the group or in-group commitment—the aspects that are especially likely to reflect in-group engagement stemming from increased personal control.

Method

Participants and procedure. The study was conducted as part of a larger nationwide, statistically representative sample of the Polish adult population in 2014¹. The survey did not include a separate question about nationality. However, all recruited participants were Polish citizens. The sample consisted of 1007 respondents (472 men) between the ages of 18 and 87 ($M_{age} = 47.59$, $SD = 17.59$). Data was collected by the Public Opinion Research Centre (CBOS) as computer-assisted face-to-face interviews (CA), with the use of address-based sampling. Any missing data were due to participants' explicit refusal to respond to specific items. Data used in the current analyses as well as supplementary information are posted at: https://osf.io/7wkmx/?view_only=1b0c229daf9741cbb18fef3ba58684d7.

Measures.

Group level-self-investment was measured with Leach and colleagues' (2008) social identification scale. This dimension includes 10 items measuring satisfaction with the in-group, e.g., "I am glad to be Polish", centrality of the in-group, e.g., "Being Polish is an important part of how I see myself", and solidarity with other group members, e.g., "I feel a bond with Polish people". We used a Polish adaptation of the scale (Jaworska, 2016). Participants were asked to think about their national group while responding to these items using a scale from 1 = *definitely disagree* to 6 = *definitely agree* ($\alpha = .94$, $M = 4.90$, $SD = 1.01$).

Group level self-definition. We also measured the second dimension of social identification proposed by Leach and colleagues (2008), which includes six items measuring individual self-stereotyping (e.g., "I have a lot in common with the average Polish person")

¹ This sample was also used by Cichocka, Górska, Jost, Bilewicz & Sutton (2018) in a paper on system justification and political engagement. Attitudes towards Ukrainians were used as a control variable in those analyses.

and perceptions of in-group homogeneity (e.g., “Polish people have a lot in common with each other”) using the same adapted version of the scale. Participants were asked to think about their national group while responding to these items using a scale from 1 = *definitely disagree* to 6 = *definitely agree* ($\alpha = .88$, $M = 4.71$, $SD = 1.04$).

Collective narcissism was measured with a 5-item version of the Collective Narcissism Scale (based on Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; see also Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013) used with respect to the national group, e.g., “The Polish nation deserves special treatment”. Participants responded on a scale from 1 = *strongly disagree* to 6 = *strongly agree* ($\alpha = .87$, $M = 3.90$, $SD = 1.27$).

Personal control was measured by four items: (1) “I feel I have little control over my life” versus “I feel I have great control over my life”, (2) “I have little influence on my fate” versus “I have great influence on my fate”, (3) “There are many things in my life I cannot influence” versus “There are few things in my life I cannot influence”, (4) “Things that are happening in my life are simply a matter of coincidence” versus “Things that are happening in my life are not a coincidence”. Participants responded on a scale from -3 = greater agreement with a low-control item to + 3 = greater agreement with a high-control item. Responses were recoded into a 1-7 scale, with higher scores indicating higher control ($\alpha = .63$, $M = 5.06$, $SD = 1.17$).

In-group image defense. As our study was conducted in Poland, to measure defensiveness we used the context of recent popular films that depicted Polish mistreatment of Jews during and after WWII. Such films (e.g., the 2012 “Aftermath”) tend to trigger defensive reactions in Poland, where reminders of anti-Jewish crimes committed by Poles are often considered as in-group-directed criticism, threatening to Polish national identity (Witkowska & Bilewicz, 2014). We operationalized image defense in terms of responses to

such films. Participants were first reminded that in recent years several films about difficult Polish-Jewish relations appeared and then asked to indicate their agreement on a scale from 1 = *definitely disagree* to 7 = *definitely agree*, with the following three items: “Such movies are full of distortions depicting Poles in a bad light”, “Such movies are a malignant anti-Polish propaganda” and “I would protest against movies that violate the name of Polish people” ($\alpha = .80$, $M = 4.07$, $SD = 1.76$).

In-group disloyalty was measured as a willingness to leave the country for personal gain. We used one item: “If I could earn much more in another European Union country, I would leave Poland for good”. Participants were asked to indicate their agreement with the item on scale from 1 = *definitely disagree* to 7 = *definitely agree* ($M = 3.71$, $SD = 2.36$).

Positive out-group attitudes. We measured attitudes toward Ukrainians—a salient national out-group in Poland when the survey was conducted. Ukraine is one of the largest countries neighboring with Poland and currently one of the largest immigration groups to this country perceived as detrimental to the Polish society (Wenzel, 2004). Attitudes toward Ukrainians are affected by the history of ethnic cleansing committed by Ukrainians on Polish population of the Volhynia region during WWII. At the same time Russian intervention in Ukraine has evoked large public interest and support for Ukraine in Poland (Kowalczyk, 2014). In the survey, we first presented a short reminder about the ongoing conflict in the Ukraine and information that this might be followed by an influx of Ukrainian refugees to Poland. Attitudes towards Ukrainians were measured with three items: “I feel respect towards Ukrainians”, “I feel trust towards Ukrainians”, or “I feel aversion towards Ukrainians” (reverse coded). Participants were asked to respond to the items on a scale from 1 = *definitely disagree* to 7 = *definitely agree* ($\alpha = .70$, $M = 4.98$, $SD = 1.28$).

Results

Analytic strategy. We first conducted correlational analyses to examine zero-order correlations between manifest variables. We then tested a structural equation latent variable models in *MPlus7*, using maximum likelihood for estimation and FIML (which is the *MPlus7* default) for missing data treatment. We used scale items as indicators for each latent variable. We treated group-level self-investment and group-level self-definition as separate hierarchical variables (cf. Leach et al., 2008). Group-level self-investment was predicted by its three components composed of four (in case of satisfaction) or three (in case of centrality and solidarity) indicators. Group-level self-definition was predicted by its two components composed of three indicators each (for self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity). Because in-group disloyalty was measured with one item only, we treated it as a manifest variable. We examined the effects of personal control adjusting for the overlap between collective narcissism and the two components of in-group identification: group-level self-investment and group-level self-definition. We then examined the associations with the three outcome variables: defensiveness, disloyalty, and out-group attitudes. In addition, we examined indirect effects to test whether 1) collective narcissism and in-group identification acted as mutual suppressors in their relationship with personal control and the three outcomes and 2) whether collective narcissism and in-group identification mediated the effects of personal control on the three outcomes. We used bootstrapping with 5,000 resamples to generate 95% bias corrected bootstrapped confidence intervals for each of the indirect effects.

Unadjusted analyses. As can be discerned from Table 1, collective narcissism was significantly positively correlated with the two components of in-group identification: group-level self-investment and group-level self-definition. Personal control was not significantly associated with collective narcissism but it was significantly positively associated with group-level self-investment and marginally associated with group-level self-definition. Personal control was negatively, albeit not significantly, correlated with in-group image

defense, negatively and significantly correlated with in-group disloyalty, and significantly positively correlated with positive out-group attitudes and. Collective narcissism, group-level self-investment and group-level self-definition were all positively correlated with in-group image defense and negatively correlated with in-group disloyalty. Positive out-group attitudes were significantly correlated only with group-level self-investment. They were negatively but not significantly correlated with collective narcissism and positively but marginally with group-level self-definition.

Table 1

Correlations among Variables

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Personal control	--					
2. Group-level self-investment	.09**	--				
3. Collective narcissism	-.004	.60***	--			
4. Group-level self-definition	.05 ⁺	.76***	.57***	--		
5. In-group image defense	-.05	.35***	.52***	.36***	--	
6. In-group disloyalty	-.07*	-.35***	-.13***	-.23***	-.07*	--
7. Positive out-group attitudes	.11**	.13***	-.02	.06 ⁺	-.03	-.06 ⁺

⁺ $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Structural equation analyses adjusting for the other overlap between collective narcissism and in-group identification. We examined structural equation models, in which we tested the relationships taking into account the variance shared between collective narcissism and the two components of in-group identification.

Associations between personal control, collective narcissism and in-group identification. We first sought to examine the relationships the two components of identification and collective narcissism have with personal control. A latent variable model including these variables had good fit, $\chi^2(264) = 812.10$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .96$, $RMSEA = 0.05$, $SRMR = .04$. We observed 82 missing data patterns with all covariance coverage $\geq .92$.

In the first set of analyses we included latent personal control as the predictor, group-level self-investment as the outcome, and collective narcissism as a covariate. We obtained a significant positive effect of personal control, $B = 0.13$, $SE = 0.03$, $\beta = .13$, $p < .001$, for the whole model $R^2 = .46$. This relationship remained significant when we included group level self-definition as a second covariate².

We also conducted an analysis in which we considered group-level self-definition as the outcome variable. When only collective narcissism was included as a covariate, the effect of personal control on group-level self-definition was significant, $B = 0.06$, $SE = 0.03$, $\beta = .08$, $p = .03$, for the whole model $R^2 = .46$, but when we added group-level self-investment as a second covariate, the effect for group-level self-definition became non-significant, $B = -0.02$, $SE = 0.02$, $\beta = -.02$, $p = .41$, for the whole model $R^2 = .84$.

When we conducted a similar analysis for collective narcissism as the outcome variable, and group-level self-investment as a covariate, we observed a negative effect of personal control on collective narcissism, $B = -0.12$, $SE = 0.05$, $\beta = -.09$, $p = .01$, for the whole model $R^2 = .45$. This relationship remained significant when we included group level self-definition as a second covariate. However, when self-definition was included as the only

² Due to the high correlation between the two dimensions of Leach's social identification scale, we conducted multicollinearity diagnostics in similar regression analyses in SPSS (using manifest variables). No problems with multicollinearity were identified (all indices of $VIF < 2.40$).

covariate, the effect of personal control on collective narcissism was not significant, $B = -0.08$, $SE = 0.05$, $\beta = -.06$, $p = .10$, for the whole model $R^2 = .45$.

Because we observed a non-significant total effect of personal control on collective narcissism, $B = -0.01$, $SE = 0.06$, $\beta = -.01$, $p = .86$, we examined whether this effect was suppressed by the two components of identification. Indeed, the effect was suppressed by group-level self-investment, estimate = 0.11 [0.04, 0.19], standardized estimate = .08, indicating that the effect of personal control on collective narcissism became stronger and significant once we accounted for the overlap with group-level self-investment. We did not observe a similar suppression effect for group level self-definition, estimate = 0.07 [-0.02, 0.15], standardized estimate = .05.

Overall, these results suggested that the effects for secure in-group identification predicted by higher personal control were best captured by including group-level self-investment in the model (but not group-level self-definition). In addition, including it in the model allowed us to observe the effects of personal control on collective narcissism. Thus, in the subsequent analyses we focused on in-group identification measured by the group-level self-investment dimension only.

Associations with image defense, (dis)loyalty and out-group attitudes. We next examined whether the relationships between personal control and intragroup and intergroup attitudes are driven by collective narcissism and group-level self-investment. To this end, we ran a structural equation model with latent variables (Figure 1) in which we included personal control as a predictor³, collective narcissism and group-level self-investment as mediators, and defensiveness, in-group disloyalty, and positive out-group attitudes as the dependent

³ When personal control is not included in the model, we observed almost identical associations between collective narcissism and group-level self-investment and the three outcomes as the ones presented in Figure 1.

variables⁴. This latent variables model had good fit, $\chi^2(282) = 738.18$, $p < .001$, $CFI = .96$, $RMSEA = 0.04$, $SRMR = .04$ ⁵. We observed 140 missing data patterns with all covariance coverage $> .77$.




Figure 1. Structural equation model with latent variables of the indirect effects of personal control on in-group disloyalty, in-group defensiveness and out-group attitudes via the two types of in-group identification. CEN = centrality. SAT = Satisfaction. SOL = Solidarity. Entries are standardized coefficients.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

⁴ Note that in the model collective narcissism is regressed on group-level self-investment to adjust for the shared variance between these concepts and observe the effects of collective narcissism without the variance shared with group-level self-investment for the relationship with personal control. When this path is reversed (see Figure S1 in the Supplement), we can observe the effects of personal control predicting group-level self-investment without the narcissistic component (i.e., secure in-group identification). This results in a very similar pattern of indirect effects via group-level self-investment as those obtained with model represented in Figure 1.

⁵ We also tested a model in which we restrained all non-significant paths to 0.00. All other paths remained significant and the model fit did not change significantly, $\Delta\chi^2(2) = 0.09$, $p = .96$. Thus, the model excluding the paths from group-level self-investment to defensiveness and from personal control to in-group disloyalty is preferred as more parsimonious.

Table 2

Estimates and Confidence Intervals of the Indirect Suppressing Effects of Group-level Self-Investment and Collective Narcissism on In-Group Image Defense, In-Group Disloyalty, and Positive Out-Group Attitudes

Outcome	Suppressor: collective narcissism			Suppressor: group-level self-investment		
	Estimate	95% CI	Standardised Estimate	Estimate	95% CI	Standardised Estimate
1. In-group image defense	0.63	0.49, 0.78	.41	0.01	-0.08, 0.09	.01
2. In-group disloyalty	0.34	0.18, 0.51	.14	-0.63	-0.79, -0.52	-.34
3. Positive out-group attitudes	-0.19	-0.31, -0.09	-.15	0.20	0.13, 0.29	.21

Note. CIs for the unstandardised estimates are bias-corrected and bootstrapped with 5,000 resamples.

Table 3

Estimates and Confidence Intervals of the Indirect Mediating Effects of Personal Control on In-Group Image Defense, In-Group Disloyalty, and Positive Out-Group Attitudes

Outcome	Mediator: collective narcissism			Mediator: group-level self-investment		
	Estimate	95% CI	Standardised	Estimate	95% CI	Standardised
			Estimate			Estimate
1. In-group image defense	-0.08	-0.15, -0.02	-.06	0.002	-0.02, 0.03	.001
2. In-group disloyalty	-0.05	-0.10, -0.01	-.02	-0.15	-0.26, -0.05	-.07
3. Positive out-group attitudes	0.03	0.01, 0.06	.02	0.05	0.02, 0.10	.04

Note. CIs for the unstandardised estimates are bias-corrected and bootstrapped with 5,000 resamples.

The model explained 39% of variance in in-group image defense. In-group image defense was significantly positively associated with collective narcissism, but was not significantly associated with group-level self-investment (see Figure 1 for standardised direct effects). We checked whether group-level self-investment and collective narcissism acted as mutual suppressors in predicting image defense (see Table 2). The suppressing effect of group-level self-investment was not significant, meaning that the direct effect of collective narcissism on in-group image defense ($B= 0.70, SE=0.07, p < .001$) did not change (total effect: $B= 0.71, SE=0.05, \beta = .61, p < .001$) when group-level self-investment was included in the model. We also did not observe a significant suppressing effect of collective narcissism: although we observed a significant indirect effect via collective narcissism (Table 2), the direct effect of group-level self-investment ($B= 0.02, SE=0.08, p = .84$) was weaker (rather than stronger) compared to the total effect ($B= 0.64, SE=0.06, \beta = .42, p < .001$)⁶. We also checked whether collective narcissism and group-level self-investment mediated the association between personal control and image defense (total effect: $B= -0.16, SE=0.07, \beta = -.11, p = .02$). We found that only collective narcissism mediated between personal control and in-group image defense (see Table 3).

The model explained 17% of variance in disloyalty. Group-level self-investment and collective narcissism acted as mutual suppressors in predicting disloyalty (Table 2). When group-level self-investment was included in the model, the negative effect of collective narcissism on in-group disloyalty (total effect: $B= -0.26, SE=0.06, \beta = -.14, p < .001$) became significantly positive (direct effect: $B= 0.38, SE=0.09, p < .001$). When collective narcissism was included in the model, group-level self-investment was even more strongly negatively associated with disloyalty (total effect: $B= -0.92, SE=0.09, \beta = -.37, p < .001$; direct effect:

⁶ This pattern is more indicative of a mediating effect, in which any association group-level self-investment had with image defense was due to its overlap with collective narcissism.

$B = -1.26$, $SE = 0.12$, $p < .001$). We also checked whether collective narcissism and group-level self-investment mediated the association between personal control and in-group disloyalty (total effect: $B = -0.18$, $SE = 0.09$, $\beta = -.08$, $p = .06$). Both mediating effects were significant (Table 3).

The model explained 8% of variance in out-group attitudes. Group-level self-investment and collective narcissism acted as mutual suppressors in predicting out-group attitudes (Table 2). When group-level self-investment was included in the model, the non-significant effect of collective narcissism (total effect: $B = -0.01$, $SE = 0.04$, $\beta = -.01$, $p = .80$) became significantly negative (direct effect: $B = -0.21$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < .001$). When collective narcissism was included in the model, the positive effect of group-level self-investment (total effect: $B = 0.21$, $SE = 0.05$, $\beta = .17$, $p < .001$) became even stronger (direct effect: $B = 0.40$, $SE = 0.08$, $p < .001$). We also checked whether collective narcissism and group-level self-investment mediated the association between personal control and out-group attitudes (total effect: $B = 0.18$, $SE = 0.06$, $\beta = .15$, $p = .002$). Both mediating effects were significant (Table 3).

Discussion

In this research, we examined the associations between personal control, collective narcissism, in-group identification and various group-related outcomes. We tested the relationship of personal control with collective narcissism and two dimensions of social identification proposed by Leach and colleagues (2008): group-level self-investment and group-level self-definition. We expected that secure in-group identification should be best captured by the group-level self-investment component when the variance shared with collective narcissism is adjusted for. Indeed, personal control was significantly positively associated with secure in-group identification conceptualized as group-level self-investment,

even when accounting for its overlap with self-definition as a group member. The positive link between personal control and group-level self-definition was weaker, and became non-significant when group-level self-investment and collective narcissism were accounted for. These results are in line with our assertion that satisfied individual needs would be associated with positive emotional investment of the self in the in-group characterized by feelings of satisfaction and commitment to the in-group (see Postmes et al., 2012), rather than with mere self-definition as the group member which refers only to the cognitive dimension of in-group identification. As in previous research (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2018), personal control was negatively associated with collective narcissism, although this effect only became apparent when in-group identification operationalized as group level self-investment was adjusted for, indicating a suppression effect.

The results also demonstrate the effects of personal control on intergroup outcomes are differently mediated by collective narcissism and secure in-group identification. In line with our predictions, collective narcissism (net of group-level self-investment) mediated the relationship between low personal control and defending the in-group image in response to criticism. This research extends previous findings of Agroskin & Jonas (2013), by demonstrating that low personal control predicts in-group defense via collective narcissism (see also Klar & Bilewicz, 2017). We argue that in this case in-group image defense is not aimed to serve to protect the well-being of the in-group, but rather to satisfy the needs of the individual to be part of a strong group. At the same time, we did not find a significant relationship between secure in-group identification (net of collective narcissism) and hostile reactions to movies depicting a difficult intergroup past. Possibly, high secure in-group identification would be linked to a different type of reaction, such as willingness to engage in a more constructive dialog about history, which could benefit the in-group in the long run.

Collective narcissism (net of group-level self-investment) also mediated the relationship between low personal control and in-group disloyalty. Although collective narcissism was negatively correlated with in-group disloyalty, when the overlap between collective narcissism and group-level self-investment was accounted for, collective narcissism was a positive predictor of disloyalty (see also Benson, Jeschke, Jordan, Bruner, & Arnocky, 2018 for similar effects of narcissistic rivalry). This finding is again in line with our prediction that collective narcissism is a type of in-group commitment that primarily serves the self, rather than the in-group. Moreover, personal control positively predicted secure in-group identification (i.e., group-level self-investment net of collective narcissism), which in turn predicted lower readiness to leave the nation for personal gains. This finding renders further support to our assertions about secure in-group identification predicting greater concern with the in-group.

Results also corroborate past research the role of collective narcissism and secure in-group identification in driving the relationship between personal control and out-group attitudes. Higher personal control predicted more positive out-group attitudes. This result is in line with findings linking low personal control with prejudice (Agroskin & Jonas, 2010; Aydin, Krueger, Frey, Kastenmüller, & Fischer, 2014; Fritsche et al., 2013). The link between personal control and out-group attitudes was differentially mediated via collective narcissism and group-level self-investment. This finding is consistent with previous work demonstrating that collective narcissism and secure in-group identification have opposite links with prejudice towards salient, especially threatening out-groups (e.g., Cichocka et al., 2016; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013).

Although this work replicated and extended past research, it is not without limitations. Importantly, it relied on a cross-sectional survey, which restricts our inferences about causality. However, the order of the variables in our model is based on past experimental and

longitudinal work. Cichocka, Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2018) demonstrated that 1) changes in personal control affected levels of collective narcissism and in-group identification and 2) that these two forms of in-group commitment predicted out-group attitudes in a longitudinal study, while the reverse effect was not observed: out-group attitudes did not predict collective narcissism or in-group identification. Still, our results should be treated with caution as neither we, nor past research, has experimentally manipulated collective narcissism or secure in-group identification per se. Future studies should also check for different factors related to both types of in-group commitment. For example, in their recent work, Golec de Zavala, Federico and colleagues (2019) found that personal control was not significantly associated with collective narcissism after its overlap with self-esteem was accounted for. The authors concluded that these are the deficits in self-esteem, rather than the need to restore personal control, that underlie collective narcissism. At the same time, they found that personal control and self-esteem were positively related to each other ($r = .61$; Golec de Zavala, Federico, et al., 2019; Study 3). Thus, it may be possible that experimental boosts to personal control (see Cichocka et al., 2018; Study 3) may increase state self-esteem and, in turn, led to decrease in collective narcissism. In line with this logic, state self-esteem would serve as a potential mediator between personal control and collective narcissism.

In general, more research is needed to better understand the nature of the relationship between in-group commitment and group attitudes. For example, it seems crucial to better understand the novel finding that collective narcissism might be associated with lower in-group loyalty. It may be possible that inducing in-group loyalty (or positive out-group attitudes) can lower collective narcissism and strengthen secure in-group identification. Thus, further experimental investigation is recommended to better establish the causality of the

observed relationships (especially the b-paths of our proposed mediation models; see Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010).

Future work would also do well, to examine the effects of collective narcissism and secure in-group identification on other outcomes longitudinally. A potentially fertile ground for future research would be to examine other consequences of collective narcissism and secure in-group identification, especially for intragroup processes. Overall, we expect collective narcissism to predict less concern about the well-being of other group members and greater concern with maintaining a positive image of the in-group for the outside world (Cichocka, 2016; Cislak, Wojcik, Cichocka, 2018; Cichocka & Cislak, 2019). While secure in-group identification might predict concern with how the in-group is received by others, this should be trumped by being concern about the well-being of other group members. By benefiting their in-group those with secure in-group identification might express their satisfied and secure ego. In this case, the in-group can indeed reflect people's "very best selves".

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that there are no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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