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Fall, Repetition and Freedom revisited: ‘Taking Notice’ of religious themes in Kierkegaard’s aesthetic writings with references to St. Augustine, Kant and Schelling

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Abstract

This thesis explores the interrelationship between the notions of the Fall, repetition and freedom with references to the writings of Kierkegaard and secondarily those of Kant, St. Augustine and Schelling. Kierkegaard’s aesthetic texts and his concept of ‘taking notice’ are the indispensable background to the question of the different possible interpretations in regard of the relation between these three concepts. This primary interest is furthermore linked to an investigation of the emergence of different aspects of human singularity and of the divine that arguably emerge alongside each one of the different interpretations. The thesis consists of four chapters, the first and last on Kierkegaard, the second on St. Augustine and Kant and the third on Schelling. The first chapter investigates the place of the concept of anxiety in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, discussing at the same time his understanding of time, freedom and the Fall through his appropriation of the story of Adam. Particular attention is paid to a discussion of the author’s subsequent call to ‘take notice’ of the importance of the possibility of a distinction between a time before and a time after the Fall. This paves the ground for the second chapter, which is an investigation of St. Augustine’s radical distinction between the time before and after the Fall and Kant’s account of the Fall and the unfolding of history. The third chapter discusses the possibility of postulating some sort of continuity between the two modes of time mentioned above through an interpretation of Schelling’s treatment of divine and human freedom, time, history and repetition.

In the fourth chapter, Schelling’s elaborations on time, freedom and contemporaneity provide the ground for a reinterpretation of Kierkegaard’s insights on repetition, faith and contemporaneity. This discussion is primarily conducted through a revaluation of three biblical motifs, namely Job’s ordeal, Abraham’s sacrifice and the coming into existence of the God-man. These narratives are instrumental in allowing us to ‘take notice’ of the articulation between the notions of Freedom, repetition and the Fall emerging from Kierkegaard’s aesthetic writings.
To my family
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Declaration: This thesis is all my own work and contains original material, and has not been submitted for a degree at any other university.
## Abbreviations

**Kierkegaard’s writings:**
- **PF** *Philosophical Fragments*
- **CA** *Concept of Anxiety*
- **PA** *Present Age*
- **CUP** *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*
- **SUD** *Sickness unto death*
- **JC** *Johannes Climacus*
- **PC** *Practice in Christianity*
- **The Difference** *Of the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle*
- **EUD** *Eighteen Upbuilding discourses*
- **NSBL** *Notes of Schelling’s Berlin Lectures*
- **CI** *Concept of Irony*

**Schelling’s writings**
- **AGW 1813** *Ages of the World (second draft)*
- **AGW 1815** *Ages of the World (third draft)*
- **OHF** *Of human freedom*

**Kant’s writings**
- **CPR** *Critique of Pure Reason*
- **Religion** *Religion within the limits of reason alone*
- **CBH** *Conjectures on the Beginning of Human history*
- **CJ** *Critique of Judgement*
- **IUH** *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*
- **CF** *The Contest of the Faculties*
- **RHIPM** *Reviews of Herder’s Ideas on the philosophy of the History of the Mankind*

**St. Augustine’s writings**
- **Free Choice** *The Free Choice of the Will*
- **Grace** *Grace and Free Will*
- **City** *City of God*
Introduction

The title of this thesis may seem at first sight both ambitious and ambiguous since it promises the exploration of religious themes such as the themes of the Fall, of repetition and of freedom through Kierkegaard’s aesthetic writings, with references also to the writings of St. Augustine, Kant and Schelling. The question that arises concerns not only the choice of aesthetic writings instead of the religious ones but also the reasons behind the choice of the three other thinkers. In order to give an adequate reply to these questions we have to discuss first Kierkegaard’s own view of his oeuvre and the distinction that he makes between the aesthetic and the religious writings. Kierkegaard’s book *The Point of view of my work as an author: A report to history* \(^1\)will serve as a guide in this brief exploration. Kierkegaard himself urges us to treat this book as an occasion of inwardness by calling it ‘a report to history’. Anticipating somehow the analysis of the fourth chapter of the present work we

\(^1\) Even if one wishes to endorse Walter Lowrie’s argument that Kierkegaard’s book *The point of view of my work as an author: A report to history* is quite elliptical as a self-evaluation of the author’s oeuvre as a whole, one might still wish to treat this feature of this book as a virtue rather than a vice. Lowrie’s embarrassment (to borrow Nelson’s words) as to how to characterize this book is obvious in the following words: “[Kierkegaard] solely intent upon emphasizing the religious categories: the contrast between the aesthetic (eudemonistic) and the religious points of view; the concept of the individual; the notion of divine providence; indirect communication (which he defends here lamely because he had already detected the daemonia which lurk in it); the absoluteness of the Christian claim, &c., &c. So here all but ignores the profound psychological concepts which he had presented in his pseudonymous work.” (PVWA: xxiv-emphasis added). Nelson disagrees with Lowrie’s argument as he finds the book in question “an authentic map of his[Kierkegaard’s] labyrinthine world from his own hand and even if not true down to the last detail, it is an indispensable interpretation of the anguished pilgrimage of an extraordinary spirit” (Nelson 1962:xiii). Indeed, one cannot but agree that the very notion of pilgrimage entails longing, and it can never grasp the whole; for if it did, then it would be self-annihilating.
should remark that genuine contemporaneity is not identical for Kierkegaard with immediate contemporaneity. Thus, in order for someone to become a genuine contemporary with historical events a ‘report’ is needed as the ‘occasion’ of inwardness.

Kierkegaard’s use of pseudonyms is a topic that intrigues not only most of Kierkegaard’s scholars but also many of the contemporary philosophers like Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas and Derrida to name but a few prominent figures being influenced, directly or indirectly, negatively or positively, by his work. Many issues such as the question of authorship/authority, the question of the possibility of communication, etc have consequently been raised. Although the abovementioned issues are of great importance for a proper evaluation of Kierkegaard’s philosophy, their discussion will be approached indirectly, along with a discussion of our main topic, that being the space that opens up between Kierkegaard’s so-called religious works (signed by the author himself) and the non-religious ones (signed by the pseudonymous authors).

As we will see, the religious element is always present in Kierkegaard’s works even when it seems that his development as an author follows a linear path towards the attainment of a more pure or a more consistent religious dimension. The latter serves either as the invisible ground of the aesthetic works or, in the case of Kierkegaard’s “purely” religious works as the pre-eminent element to be discovered by the reader.
Kierkegaard himself maps his own works in the following manner:

First group (aesthetic works): *Either / Or; Fear and Trembling; Repetition; The Concept of Dread; Prefaces; Philosophical Fragments; Stages on Life’s Road*—along with edifying discourses which were published successively.

Second group: *Concluding Unscientific Postscript.*

Third group (religious works): *Edifying Discourses in Diverse Spirits; The Works of Love; Christian Discourses*—along with a little aesthetic article, *The Crisis and a Crisis in the Life of an Actress.* (PVWA :10)

Regardless of the apparent incompleteness of this enumeration it is important to point out that Kierkegaard wants to make clear that his development as an author does not follow a linear route. In other words Kierkegaard does not see himself as an aesthetic author who subsequently with the passing of time became a religious author. On the contrary, he insists that, right from the beginning, he was and still is, in the time of the book’s writing, a religious author. The religious dimension was thus arguably present from the start and this is evident in the *Eighteen Edifying Discourses* signed by him, and which accompany his purely aesthetic works. At the same time, the aesthetical dimension is present again “at the last moment”. The brief aesthetic article *The crisis and a crisis in the life of an actress* was published in a period where

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2 Joakim Garff points to the omission of certain books such as *The concept of irony, From the Papers of One Still Living, etc.* He argues that the alleged “totality of authorship” that Kierkegaard promises to us is not identical with “the total production”. According to him, this divergence between the “totality of the authorship” and the “total production” is mainly due to an intended symmetry between the two groups. (Graff 1998: 80-1).

3 This is not to suggest that Kierkegaard remains the same person, with a fixed identity (in that case the identity of a “religious author”) that underlies his whole work knowing clearly from the beginning his intentions. This would exclude the possibility of a continuous development and metamorphosis of his personhood.
Kierkegaard was publishing solely religious works (PVWA: 12). In his own words

The little article serves as a testimony in the confrontation of witnesses, in order to make it impossible at the end (as the Two Edifying discourses did at the beginning) to explain the phenomenon by supposing that there was an author who first was an aesthetic author and later changed and became subsequently a religious author – for he was a religious author from the beginning and was aesthetically productive even at the last moment (PVWA: 12-3)

What is of crucial importance is that the distinction between aesthetic and religious works is not a clear-cut one. Moreover, it is necessary to underline the centrality attributed by Kierkegaard to the intersection of these domains, which is furthermore seen as always remaining blurred. Indeed, one has to keep in mind that Kierkegaard, either under the disguise of the pseudonymous authors or using his proper name, is constantly attacking every approach that considers human existence as a fixed whole or, in other words, as possibly being subjected to the pre-established categories of an absolute system. What constantly intrigues Kierkegaard's pseudonymous authors is the attempt to trace and face the paradox of human existence and - even in those cases where the individual is not him/herself aware of it- its encounter with the divine⁴. Kierkegaard's detestation of closed systems and his love of the flux allegedly characterizing humans is one of the possible, conscious or unconscious, reasons urging him to use pseudonyms.

⁴ And it is exactly this encounter with the divine that is the ground and precondition of the religious leap; the latter being the always-deferred telos.
In the introduction of *The Point of View*, Kierkegaard almost in a confessional manner, explains "once and for all, as directly and frankly as possible, what is what: what I as an author declare my self to be" (PVWA: 5).

Kierkegaard feels that the moment for him to speak has come: "The moment (however unpropitious it may be in another sense) is now appropriate...there is a time to be silent and a time to speak" (PVWA: 5).

The usage of language in this passage is indicative. It is obvious that it constitutes a direct reference to the biblical language mainly of the second part of verse 7 of the book of the Old Testament entitled *Ecclesiastes* (more specifically, see chapter 3 of *Ecclesiastes*, verses 1-8) where there is a constant repetition of the words "a time to". More...
specifically, this chapter of the *Ecclesiastes* reads: “To every thing there is a season, and a time [kairos] to every purpose\(^6\) under the heaven: a time to be born, and a time to die... *a time to keep silence and a time to speak*” (*Ecclesiastes* 3.1-2 &7-emphasis added).

It has to be remarked that the biblical usage of the notions of *kairos* and *moment* is not restricted to the Old Testament. In addition to the aforementioned usage of the terms “time” and “moment” one has also to bear in mind their usage in the New Testament. According to Tillich, the New Testament has called the moment “at which history, in terms of a concrete situation, had matured to the point of being able to receive the breakthrough of the central manifestation of the Kingdom of God”, *the fulfilment of time*\(^7\), or “in Greek, *kairos*” (Tillich 1963: 369). Leaving aside for the time being the theological connotations borne by the concepts of the “moment”, of “kairos”, and finally of the “fulfilment of time”, we will focus mainly on the importance of the aforementioned notions regarding Kierkegaard’s account of his own work. Both the notions of the proper

\(^6\) The last words of the aforementioned verse remind us one of the mottos of the book *The point of view*, that being: “In everything the purpose must weigh with the folly” (PVWA: 4; see Shakespeare: Henry IV, Part II, ii.2). One has to admit the complexity and the different levels of purposes that pervade most of Kierkegaard’s books. We will endorse Nelson’s reading of the motto in question. Accordingly: “the reader is given notice that the author intends to judge himself and hopes to be judged by others in the light of his perplexing purposes as well as his all too evident follies” (Nelson 1962: xiv). Interestingly enough, judgement according to follies seems to us as an indirect reference to the biblical book of Job: “Now therefore take seven bulls and seven rams and go to my servant Job and offer up for your selves a burnt-offering, and my servant Job shall pray for you, for I will accept his prayer not to deal with you *according to your folly*...” (Job 42.8-emphasis added).

\(^7\) Kierkegaard uses the term “fullness of time” when he speaks of the appearance of God *in time* perceiving this event as a tremendous one, since it is conceived as being both a historical point of departure and the beginning of eternity.
“time” and “the fulfilment of time” imply the conclusion of a previous stage and maybe, the potential transition to a new one.

Thus, Kierkegaard’s public attestation signals the conquest of a certain point in his development as an author. Indeed, it seems that he felt with almost absolute certainty that his authorship had reached a point of completion, not in terms of quantity but mainly in terms of quality. The previous stage was described as a period of silence, the latter being perceived as a “religious duty”:

But the reason I considered silence my duty was that the authorship was not yet at hand in so complete a form that the understanding of it could be anything but misunderstanding (PVWA: 5).

It is surely striking that two years before he wrote *The Point of View* Kierkegaard offered us another “once and for all explanation”. At that time it was an acknowledgment of him being the author of the pseudonymous books. In February 1846, he wrote: “For the sake of form and order, I hereby acknowledge ... that I am the author of [a list of books] ...My pseudonimity or polyonymity has not had an accidental basis in my person...but an essential basis in the production itself...” (A First and Last Explanation: 625). Let us pause for a moment in order to reflect upon the relation between the two terms which, by the place they

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8 This can be conceived either in temporal terms or in terms of a qualitative change.

9 Kierkegaard conceives his declaration as a “public attestation” and not as a “defence” or as an “apology”. It is at this point that he compares his action with Socrates’ attitude in his trial. According to Kierkegaard, when Socrates was accused and judged by the crowd, “his daemon forbade him to defend himself”. If Socrates had done the opposite then in Kierkegaard’s eyes this would have been self-contradictory and inappropriate (PVWA: 6).
occupy in the very construction of the sentence (Pseudonymity or Polyonymity), are presented as interchangeable: In fact it is this or that both links and separates them that suggests the possibility of substituting one for the other without inflicting a major change in the production of the oeuvre itself.

How are we then to think of them? Do these two words mean the same? Do they point to the same state of affairs?

Pseudonym, in ancient Greek Ψευδόνυμος (ψευδής + ονυμα) means "under a false name or falsely called", while Polyonymity, in ancient Greek Πολυώνυμος (πολὺς + ονυμα), means either "having many names" or "worshipped under many names" or "of great name, famous". In Kierkegaard's work the many pseudonyms do not imply a differentiation between truth and falsity or between the one and the many. On the contrary, Kierkegaard attempts to grasp

...the psychologically varied differences of the individualities, [which] poetically required an indiscriminateness with regard to good and evil ...despair and overconfidence...etc., which is ideally limited only by psychological consistency, which no factually actual person dares to allow himself or can want to allow himself in the moral limitations of actuality" (loc. Cit).

Polyonimity and Pseudonymity acquire their proper meaning if they are discussed in relation to the space that opens up between the aesthetic and religious works. By declaring to always be a religious author, Kierkegaard points to the hidden religious element of his aesthetic or
pseudonymous works. Before exploring this further, we have first to clarify two things.

First, it has to be remarked once more that for Kierkegaard, authorship and personal life are not identical in the sense that being a religious author is not synonymous with being a religious single individual. Thus, even in his pure religious writings where he could express himself directly and discuss openly religious issues, Kierkegaard never alleges that he attained the state of what we would call a religious individual. Indeed, this becomes clearer, if we bear in mind that the only thing that is left aside in his own evaluation of the whole of his authorship is his "purely personal inwardness", since as he emphasizes

...I cannot explain my work as an author wholly, i.e. with the purely personal inwardness in which I possess the explanation of it. And this in part because I cannot make public my God-relationship...In part because I cannot wish (and no one can desire that I might) to obtrude upon any one what concerns only my private person - through naturally there is much in this which for me serves to explain my work as an author (PVWA: 9).

Out of respect for this Kierkegaard's wish, the present work refrains both from exploring Kierkegaard's own inward religious experiences and also from systematically discussing details of Kierkegaard's personal life. Indeed, the reader might feel struck by the absence of such references especially given that Kierkegaard being regarded as the father of existentialist philosophy, his personal circumstances are vested with great significance by many a scholar. We would nevertheless wish to avoid the slippery path of psychologism that would detect in Kierkegaard's insights nothing but the traces of events in his personal
life, like his unfortunate relationship with Regina, his ever-present guilt about his father's allegedly tremendous sin, etc.

Secondly, it has to be remarked that although Kierkegaard declares to be a religious author, he never professes to be an Apostle. For him, the specificity of being an Apostle consists in the fact that an Apostle is an individual to whom God gave extraordinary gifts and more importantly, the authority to speak about religious matters. According to Kierkegaard the Apostle differs from the genius in various many ways. First of all, the author readily points out, the apostle belongs to the sphere of transcendence and of the paradox. The apostle is called and appointed by God to accomplish a mission; furthermore, the apostle has been granted divine authority, the latter being conceived as the decisive, qualitative factor that differentiates the apostle from the genius.

the man who is called by a revelation and to whom a doctrine is entrusted, argues from the fact that it is a revelation, from his authority. I have not got to listen to St. Paul because he is clever, or even brilliantly clever; I am to bow before St. Paul because he has divine authority... (The difference: 108-9).

Kierkegaard warns us that he is not an Apostle. He begs the reader not “to think of revelations and or anything of that sort, for with [him] everything is dialectical” (PVWA: 83). He characterizes himself as a “poor insignificant person” that is one “who himself has been educated, or whose authorship expresses what it is to be educated to the point of becoming a Christian” (ibid: 75). More emphatically, he declares himself a fellow student (loc. Cit), describing thus his task in the following
manner: "Without authority to call attention to religion, to Christianity, is the category of my whole activity as an author" (My activity as a writer: 151). 'To call attention to religion' then, becomes the significant feature of his whole authorship, characterizing then both the aesthetic and religious writings. Although the religious writings express in a direct manner the point of view of the author (PVWA: 42), this is not the case with the aesthetic writings. What is especially of interest in the context of the present thesis is exactly the special form that Kierkegaard's attempt to 'call attention to religion' acquires in his aesthetic writings.

Kierkegaard emphasizes that a religious author should first start with aesthetic writings so as not to destroy abruptly the illusion in which according to him- the majority of the human beings live, namely that they are truly Christians (PVWA: 26). Kierkegaard argues that "no illusion can ever be destroyed directly"\(^\text{10}\), and only by indirect means can it be radically removed" (ibid: 24), employing consequently as his method what he calls 'deception'. Under this light, the use of pseudonyms acquires a "deeper significance". Moreover, as Kierkegaard points out "the aesthetic work is a deception" but

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\(^{10}\) Since by using a direct attack the result is the strengthening of one person's illusion and her embitterment (PVWA: 25).
The aim of aesthetic writings then is pre-eminently to avoid beginning directly "with the matter one wants to communicate, but [to begin] by accepting the other man's illusion as good money" (loc. Cit). Indeed, Kierkegaard clarifies, one should rather start talking about aesthetics instead of beginning a communication with the following words: "It is Christianity I am proclaiming; and you are living in purely aesthetic categories" (ibid: 41).

The task of the author then, is not to pedantically persuade and compel someone to accept a belief but through the aesthetic writings to compel someone to 'take notice' (PVWA: 35). The author can neither foresee the result of such an action, nor can she determine it, but rather leaves the reader free to encounter her own troublesome inwardness.

What follows after this, however, no one can tell beforehand. But at least he is compelled to take notice. Possibly he may come to his senses and realize what is implied in calling himself a Christian. Possibly he may be furious with the person who has taken this liberty with him; but at least he has begun to take notice, he is on the point of expressing a judgement. Possibly, in order to protect his retreat, he may express the judgement that the other is a hypocrite, a deceiver, a dunce – but there is no help for it, he must judge, he has begun to take notice (PVWA: 37).

Thus, Kierkegaard's concept of 'taking notice' has for us tremendous significance not only regarding the evaluation of his authorship as a whole but also -and most importantly- concerning the challenges that the process of 'taking notice' itself brings to the fore. Indeed, Kierkegaard's attempt is not to impose to his readers his own personal
view on religious themes but rather to compel them to 'take notice' of the religious themes and to attempt their own journey of inwardness and discovery.

While Kierkegaard himself does not seem to elevate the category of 'taking notice' to the proper level of a concept, in the present work this very category will serve as a device for the articulation of disparate elements in Kierkegaard's own works. In effect, it is argued that Kierkegaard's writings acquire existential and conceptual coherence and articulation through the category of 'taking notice' although in an implicit and often unacknowledged manner. We have seen it as our task to give an explicit function to this principle and to extend its application to the writings not only of Kierkegaard but also of St. Augustine, Kant and Schelling.

It has to be made clear from the outset that our exploration of Kierkegaard's thought does not exhaust all of Kierkegaard's aesthetic writings, but focuses primarily on those writings that in our opinion best highlight Kierkegaard's attitude towards the issues investigated in the present thesis. In this sense, it can be argued that since the category of 'taking notice' is a primarily existential one, the selection of texts is but the very exemplification of this principle. In any case, even on the occasion that we refrain from giving direct references to celebrated Kierkegaard's works, they still inform our investigation albeit in an indirect manner. This is perhaps best exemplified in the case of Either/
Or, which although not explicitly referred to in the present work, is nevertheless omnipresent as the **primordial resolution** and the fundamental distinction that cuts across all the levels of human life.

Having this in mind, we have started this thesis by exploring Kierkegaard’s concept of anxiety, alongside a preliminary discussion of his conception of time and freedom.

The first part of the first chapter focuses on finding the proper topos of the concept of anxiety in Kierkegaard’s *oeuvre*, challenging at the same time the validity of theorizing anxiety as a concept. Anxiety is mainly defined as the dizziness that precedes the moment of Adam’s fall, or in other words, it is conceived as the alien power that “takes hold of the individual” and keeps her momentarily captive (Journals III A233: 105). Anxiety’s ability to take hold and capture the individual makes it eligible to be considered among the notions that Kierkegaard urges us to ‘take notice’ since they open up the space for the religious experience to emerge. As Kierkegaard claims in his *The Point of View*, “this is what is achieved by the indirect method, which, loving and caring arranges everything dialectically for the prospective captive, and then shyly withdraws” (PVWA: 25). The association of Adam’s fall with anxiety moves us to the second part of the first chapter where we deal with Kierkegaard’s appropriation of the biblical story of Adam and the Fall, conceived not as an event that took place once and for all, but rather as an event also taking place in the life of each individual. Kierkegaard
emphasizes in his whole authorship the importance of the single individual *vis-à-vis* the race or the whole of humanity. What he advocates is the inner history of every single individual beyond any achievements and progress that may characterize the whole generation. Whilst being in the dreaming state of anxiety, the single individual for the first time senses the imminence of the emergence of spirit and freedom. Adam’s story then, allows us to take notice of the possibility of different approaches of time and freedom that furthermore could be linked with the emergence of different aspects of individuality or personhood. To be more explicit, the question occupying a pivotal place in the present work concerns the very possibility of a distinction between a time before and after the Fall. Furthermore, taking into account the interrelation of anxiety with the Fall and the emergence of sin in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre, the question can be formulated thus: Even if the time before and after the Fall is different, is there any possibility of reconciling the gap between those two postulated times ‘in’ time or not? It is argued that central to Kierkegaard’s rather unclear view on the issue is the following passage from his book *Repetition*, which is often cited –by way of repetition- in strategic moments of the present work.

If God himself had not willed repetition, the world would not have come into existence. Either he would have followed the superficial plans of hope or he would have retracted everything and preserved it in recollection. This he did not do. Therefore, the world continues, and it continues because it is repetition (*Repetition*: 133).
This passage makes us take notice of other dimensions of the story of the Fall, namely the problem of divine and human freedom, of human and divine will, and finally of time and creation. Repetition—defined as the true movement of freedom, i.e., a free movement of recollection forwards—is another Kierkegaardean notion described as having this magic power to capture the individual and her freedom (Repetition: 301).

Although a proper discussion of the Kierkegaardean concept of repetition is suspended until the last chapter of this thesis, the passage mentioned above is appropriated in such a manner as to provide us with the ‘occasion’ to ‘take notice’ and subsequently discuss relevant issues in the philosophies of St. Augustine, Kant, and Schelling.

Indeed, although by no means ‘necessary’ the discussion of these thinkers in relation to the works of Kierkegaard is arguably both challenging and promising, since it opens up the possibility of a fruitful dialogue between Kierkegaard and two philosophers—St. Augustine and Kant—whose elaborations on time and morality haunt modern European philosophy. Schelling is even more instrumental for the purposes of the present thesis as discussed in detail below in the presentation of the third chapter, where a juxtaposition of his so-called middle period with Kierkegaard’s writings is attempted.

Thus, the second chapter of the thesis is again divided into two parts, the first dealing with St. Augustine and the second with Kant. If for
Kierkegaard anxiety is not applied only to the Adamic condition preceding the Fall but also to the life of every consequent individual, inaugurating thus a novel understanding of the Fall that excludes a rigid distinction between the time before and after the Fall, by denying the abysmal difference between Adam and the subsequent individuals, this is arguably not the case for St. Augustine and Kant. It is actually argued that both thinkers, directly or indirectly, share an understanding of the Fall that inevitably makes us wonder whether they believe in the actual existence of a pre-fallen state of Adam or whether the Fall is simply viewed as a ‘fantastic beginning’ of human history. On the one hand, by advocating a radical split between what it is called biblical time and the historical time after the Fall, St. Augustine presents us with an account that devalues the power of the exercise of human freedom after the Fall. According to St. Augustine, Adam’s fall resulted into his losing the supernatural gift bestowed to him by God. In other words, if before the Fall, gratia operans was in effect, after the Fall only gratia cooperans is effective since the individual is able to do ‘good’ only with God’s cooperation. Furthermore, although St. Augustine retains the possibility of bridging the gap between the biblical and the fallen time through the introduction of theological time, he nevertheless seems to argue that fallen time is ontologically connected with theological time, implying thus that only death can completely liberate the individual.
On the other hand, Kant's approach to the Fall takes the form of a narrative based on the rule of the 'as if', namely of an imaginary narrative where the pre-fallen state is conceived 'as if' it had taken place. In the same line of thought, Kant further discusses the narrative of the Fall, prioritizing its 'origin in reason' instead of its 'origin in time'. This becomes clearer after a discussion of the nature of the Kantian antinomies and moreover of his distinction between regulative and constitutive principles. The chapter concludes with an exploration of what can be termed Kant's two-dimensional approach to history. One dimension of Kant's thoughts on the issue understands humanity as a whole as being the ultimate purpose of nature, while the other points to the individual human being in itself as being the final purpose of creation. The attempt is furthermore made to trace at the same time Kant's attitude towards human freedom and the problem of evil. It is argued that to a lesser or greater degree both St. Augustine and Kant transform God into a lifeless and empty entity, depriving the deity of its personal character. In the case of St. Augustine this is effected by the radical separation of the biblical and fallen times that makes God inapproachable, whereas in Kant's case this state of affairs is seen as resulting by the thinkers attempt to conceptualize God as a hypothetical, regulative principle, i.e. in terms of the 'as if'.

Having established this, we turn in the third chapter to Schelling who offers us a quite different approach to the problems of divine and
human freedom, of time and creation, and of good and evil. We mainly focus on Schelling's texts 'Of human freedom' (1809) and the 'Ages of the World' (1813 & 1815), that belong to the philosopher's so-called 'middle period', where he is often seen (see e.g. Goudeli 2002) as trying to differentiate himself from his previous system of identity while at the same time laying the foundations for the philosophy of mythology and revelation. One could object to the choice of the specific texts by arguing that Kierkegaard's main reference to the philosophy of Schelling concerns the latter's late period, i.e. his philosophy of religion and revelation and not to the middle one. It has to be emphasized though, that in the same way as in the cases of Kant and St. Augustine, the choice of discussing certain aspects of the work of a specific thinker is not based on Kierkegaard's own discussion of the text or the thinker in question. If this were the case, then the list of thinkers discussed in the present work would be radically different. Instead, we are rather concerned with the indirect references made by the author and more importantly with his non-prescriptive attempt to make us 'take notice' of certain issues. With regard to our choice of Schelling's writings, it has to be reminded that Kierkegaard felt an enormous disappointment when he attended Schelling lectures in Berlin, where Schelling expounded his late philosophy of mythology and religion. A letter Kierkegaard wrote to a

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11 See Notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures. It goes without saying that Kierkegaard occasionally refers to both The Ages of the World and to Of Human Freedom.
friend is indicative of his disappointment with this phase of Schelling’s philosophy:

Schelling talks the most insufferable nonsense... I shall leave Berlin as soon as possible. I am coming to Copenhangen. A stay there is necessary for me so that I can bring a little order into my affairs again. You see how strange it is. I have never in my life felt like travelling as much as I do now. I owe that to Schelling. Had Schelling not lectured in Berlin, I would not have gone, and had Schelling not been so nonsensical, I would probably never have travelled again (CI: xxiii).

If we take into account that a huge disappointment is usually preceded by the existence of great expectations, then what inspired Kierkegaard - directly or indirectly-¹² and prompted him to travel to Berlin should have been Schelling’s middle period writings. It could be further argued that Kierkegaard’s severe critique of Schelling’s middle period writings is the result of a retrospective reflection occasioned by Kierkegaard’s disappointment with Schelling’s Berlin Lectures of 1842-43.

Having thus constructed our argument, the third chapter is structured in the following manner: The first part of the chapter is dedicated to the exploration of Schelling’s radical conception of identity and freedom, which is conducted alongside a discussion of his notions of faith and religiosity. By advocating a living relationship with a living and personal God, Schelling arguably escapes the fallacies associated with the postulation of an abstract and consequently non-existent God. The second part of the third chapter focuses on Schelling’s account of the theo-cosmo-gonic process, where God is viewed both as original nature

¹² Directly by having read Schelling himself and indirectly by attending Martensen’s university lectures during 1838-1839 (CI: xix).
and original freedom, the two notions being thought in a relation of identity without nevertheless being collapsed to each other. It is argued that under this new conception of identity, Schelling presents us with an unprecedented account of good and evil, where God is conceived primordially and evil is presented as having its root "independent of God but in God". Moreover, specific emphasis is placed on Schelling's idea of the simultaneity of different aeons or times (eternal past, eternal present and eternal future), which arguably inaugurates a breakthrough conception of history, time and eternity. This moves us to the third part of this chapter where we focus mainly on Schelling's account of human freedom as the possibility of both good and evil. For Schelling, only the human being, among the visible creatures, retains an analogical relation with the divine, having thus a peculiar relation with the history of the cosmos and with the eternal past. Indeed, Schelling's idea of the eternal aeons\textsuperscript{13}, as developed in the \textit{Ages of the World}, places the notion of repetition under a new perspective. In our view, Schelling's notion of the human being's ability to relate with the eternal past informs not only Kierkegaard's notion of repetition but also his account of contemporaneity. More specifically, in his treatise on freedom Schelling argues that each human being, by its being contemporaneous with the eternal act of creation, breaks the limits of the conventional treatment of time.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{13} Unfortunately, this work is unfinished and the only part published concerns only the Past.}
The insight into the importance of the relationship between Schelling's middle philosophy and Kierkegaard renders a more detailed analysis of Kierkegaard's notion of repetition - attempted in the fourth and final chapter of the present thesis - indispensable.

The first part of this chapter focuses mainly on an assessment of Kierkegaard's discussion of the concept of repetition in the homonymous book. Repetition is shown to have a special relation with the future and with eternity, being thus qualitatively distinct from the notion of recollection, since it is established that for Kierkegaard repetition is in effect a religious movement towards faith. Two biblical figures, Job and Abraham provide us with the indispensable background for a proper discussion of the Kierkegaardian notion of faith 'by virtue of the absurd'. Job's ordeal makes him in the eyes of the Danish philosopher the prototype of the whole of humanity, whilst Abraham's 'silent' sacrifice prompts Kierkegaard to name him the 'father of faith'. By calling us to follow the prototypes of Job and Abraham, Kierkegaard urges us implicitly to become 'genuinely contemporaneous' with those biblical figures. In the last part of this chapter the notions of repetition and contemporaneity are brought even more explicitly together and the inextricable link between the two notions is hopefully established beyond doubt. Attention is brought to the fact that Kierkegaard himself develops his notion of genuine contemporaneity in relation to the paradoxical moment of God-man's coming into existence. Furthermore it is reminded
that the moment of God's coming into existence acquires eternal validity and that in the philosophy of Kierkegaard contemporaneity with this moment expresses repetition in its eminent form. Contemporaneity refers therefore not only to the single individual's free resolution to become contemporaneous with God-man so as to receive the 'condition' and the 'truth', but also to God's own resolution to come into existence purely out of love. In the present work and in order to depict as accurately and vividly as possible this state of affairs, we will be using the term 'double contemporaneity' in order to refer to this reciprocal movement.

The themes of divine and human love, of repetition, freedom and the Fall are thus brought to the fore for the final time in the conclusion to the present work through a discussion of Andrei Tarkovsky's elegiac film *The Sacrifice*. This compelling piece of artistic creation serves as the most effective -though indirect- incentive to 'take notice' once more of the fundamental religious themes discussed in this thesis.

It is with paying due heed to this paradoxical, thought-defying, startling, sacrificial expression of divine and human love that the thesis concludes, or rather that the author of this 'unconcluding' work wishes to retreat again to silence.
Chapter One

The Challenge of Anxiety

Introductory remarks

In this chapter we will attempt an exploration of Kierkegaard’s treatment of the concept of anxiety. Thus, we will focus mainly on a close analysis of his celebrated book The Concept of Anxiety, published in 1844, which provides the basis for a proper understanding of the notion in question. The pseudonymous author Vigilius Haufniensis, whose name means “watchman of Copenhagen”, is the person that signs the book. Importantly, Vigilius Haufniensis can be interpreted as “the Watchman of the Marketplace”, since Copenhagen means ‘marketplace’ in Danish (Palmer 1996: 58).

Although the Concept of Anxiety belongs to the group of the so-called aesthetic writings in Kierkegaard’s famous distinction of his own work, it is debatable whether it should be treated as an aesthetic work. One of the many peculiarities of this book is undoubtedly that Kierkegaard himself signed the original draft, impoverishing consequently the strength of pseudonimity (see Thomte 1980:222; CA: 177).

Moreover, in the book that is seen as providing the bridge between his aesthetic and religious works- the Concluding Unscientific Postscript- Climacus characterizes the Concept of Anxiety as being essentially
different from the other pseudonymous works “in that its form is direct and even somewhat didactic” (CUP: 269-70; CA: 221). Numerous and quite significant consequences follow such a definition, especially given that in Kierkegaard’s terminology, direct communication points to direct authorship while indirect communication to pseudonimity. Thus, in our treatment of The Concept of Anxiety, we will attempt to leave the ambiguity and the oscillation between pseudonimity and direct authorship open, since it would be arguably unfair to both the author and to the works if hasty conclusions were drawn at the outset. It furthermore seems that paying heed to this ambiguity is more than consonant with the “spirit” of the book in question, the very title of which is but a provocation.

Moreover in this chapter we also consider many of Kierkegaard’s other works, while specific emphasis is placed on his books Sickness Unto Death and Johannes Climacus in an attempt to ‘take notice’ of the Fall and anxiety, of inwardness and pseudo-Christianity. In this respect a fruitful comparison is drawn with Nietzsche’s announcement of the death of the divine in the heart of European Civilization.
1.1 Placing anxiety

Can anxiety be treated as a concept? This is a compelling question facing everyone attempting to come to terms with Kierkegaard’s philosophy. In effect, it can be argued that only provisionally can anxiety\(^ {14}\) be said to be a pivotal concept in Kierkegaard’s thought, since to treat anxiety as a concept proper, would amount to fail taking into account its “abysmal\(^ {15}\)” qualities that compelled Jean Wahl to suggest that the very title the Concept of anxiety is a provocation (as discussed in Sartre 1974: 164). Sartre too did not fail to acknowledge the peculiar status anxiety occupied in Kierkegaard’s thought in his argument against its treatment as the object of a concept. This is because anxiety so far as it is “the source of a free and temporalising choice of finitude, it is also the non-conceptual foundation of all concepts”(Sartre 1974:164). In Haufniensis own words, “anxiety makes its appearance [as] the pivot upon which everything turns”(CA: 43). Thus, anxiety is conceived as a pivot around which all of existence, actual or possible is revolving. The full title of the

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\(^ {14}\) In the English translations of Kierkegaard, anxiety is used as synonymous with dread.

\(^ {15}\) It is almost impossible to give a proper definition of anxiety since in its very nature it is beyond definitions. This is consonant even with Kant’s analysis of concepts. Kant remarks that one should not attempt a definition of the concepts for on the one hand in the case of empirical concepts one is never sure about their limits and originality and on the other hand, in the case of a priori concepts, one is never certain about the completeness of her analysis. Thus, definition can only be applied to “invented concepts” where, since I am the inventor I certainly can set their limits (CPR: 587). It is evident that anxiety is not at all an invented concept, so even under the scrutiny and strictness of Kant’s analysis, the concept of anxiety can only be exposed (see Kant’s discussion regarding ‘invented concepts’ in CPR: 587). Accordingly, it resembles some chaotic kinesis; it is dizziness, since “he whose eye happens to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy”; it is the dizziness of the possibility of freedom (CA: 61). It appears also as a γραφος, as a “witch’s letter, which is a magic-like set of picture segments of people and animals that recombine when unfolded and turned” (ibid: 254).
book significantly reads *The Concept of Anxiety: A simple psychologically orienting deliberation on the dogmatic issue of hereditary sin.*

It is important to note from the outset that by being described as a "simple deliberation" the book is designed with the intention to keep the maximum possible distance from any kind of speculative and systematic philosophical knowledge. Once again, in his criticism of Hegel's elaboration of "actuality" in the *Science of Logic*, Hegel's speculative science becomes the constant target\(^{16}\) of Kierkegaard's thought.

Accordingly, Kierkegaard argues that entitling the last section of *Logic* as *Actuality* gives Hegel "the advantage of making it appear that in logic the highest has already been achieved, or if one prefers the lowest". While actuality is not served when it is treated within the limits of Logic, because actuality has contingency as an essential part and the latter cannot be admitted within the realm of logic, logic is not served either if it incorporates actuality since "it has included something that it cannot assimilate, it has appropriated at the beginning what it should only praedisponere (presuppose)" (CA: 10). The main point of Haufniensis's discussion of the relation between actuality and logic concerns not only the dynamics of actuality that transgress the limits of logic and necessity

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\(^{16}\)The main accusation being that a philosophy such as Hegel's, that claims that it can explain and incorporate the "whole" and the "universal" does not leave space for the "single individual" and for the absurd. Thus, according to anti-Climacus, the important category is the category of particularity and "the particular individual cannot be thought speculatively; the particular human lies below the level of the concept; one cannot think an individual human being, but only the concept 'man'". This is why, according to the author, "speculative philosophy promptly alludes to the doctrine of the generation's superiority over the individual; for one cannot expect speculation to acknowledge the concept's powerlessness in relation to actuality" (SUD: 152).
but also and as a consequence the boundaries of each "science\(^{17}\)" and the confusions that any failure to observe this rule may bring. Indeed, the introduction to the *Concept of Anxiety* focuses mainly on an explanation of the author's intention to explore anxiety within the field of psychology\(^{18}\).

Under the heading *Introduction*, in the form of a subtitle, Haufniensis delineates thus his own project: "The sense in which the object of our deliberation is a task of psychological interest and the sense in which, after having been the task and interest of psychology, it points directly to dogmatics" (CA: 9).

So, although the background for his treatment of anxiety is the third chapter of the book of Genesis (loc. cit; Genesis 3) where "the Fall" of human beings is narrated, and making it a proper subject of dogmatics, Kierkegaard emphasizes that although he will be touching upon a dogmatic issue, he will treat it within the field of psychology. This is further explained if we take into consideration that although the predominant concept of the book in question is obviously anxiety, Haufniensis sets as his task to treat it in such a way as constantly to keep in mind and "before its eye the dogma of hereditary sin" (CA: 14).

Thus, the concept of sin is introduced as both the prerequisite and the

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\(^{17}\) The usage of the term "science" can be seen as a further ironic remark towards all the thinkers that taking themselves seriously conceive of their corpus as a scientific contribution. Thus, although he opts in favour of the limits of each science, at the same time he treats the term "science" ironically.

\(^{18}\) It seems important that psychology offers the topos for the treatment of many concepts in Kierkegaard's work. This can be seen if we take into account the headings of some of his books, e.g. *Repetition* is described as "a venture in experimenting psychology", *The sickness unto death* as "a Christian psychological exposition for upbuilding and awakening" etc. (Thomte 1980: xv).
complementary dimension of any analysis of the concept of anxiety.

Indeed, Kierkegaard’s attempt to deal with “a dogmatic issue while being psychologically oriented” is mainly in order to emphasize sin as possibility instead of sin as actuality (Thomte 1980: 221).

In order to understand clearly the aforementioned distinction, and before proceeding to a proper analysis of the concepts of anxiety and the sin as possibility under the light of psychology, it is also important to notice that although the concept of anxiety can be well treated within the field of psychology, this is not the case with the concept of sin as actuality. Kierkegaard emphasizes once again his argument regarding the boundaries of each science, insisting that we have to be very careful in the treatment of the concepts. Thus, according to him, each concept belongs to a certain “place”, while to each place corresponds a mood. Sin therefore has its “specific place”, or more accurately,

It has no place, and this is its specific nature...When sin is treated in a place other than its own, it is altered by being subjected to a nonessential refraction of reflection. The concept is altered, and thereby the mood that properly corresponds to the correct concept is also disturbed, and instead of the endurance of the true mood there is the fleeting phantom of false moods (CA: 15)

The proper mood that corresponds to sin is “earnestness19”. For Kierkegaard thus, the peculiarity of sin consists mainly in that “its idea

19 The theological and even mystical connotations of the notion of earnestness are evident if one takes into account the central place this notion occupies in Boehme’s The Way to Christ. As an example of one of his numerous references to earnestness, one can refer to his brief introduction to the First Treatise on True repentance, where Boehme describes how a man should “arise himself in his will and mind, and what his consideration and earnest resolution are to be when he wishes to powerfully repent...” (The Way to Christ: 27). The affinities with Kierkegaard are more explicit if one bears in mind the relation between sin and repentance that permeates all of Kierkegaard’s works (e.g. in The Concept of Anxiety; p.17). Moreover, as
is that its concept is constantly annulled"(CA: 15). The task then becomes the overcoming of sin in earnestness. Consequently, Haufniensis concludes, the proper topos of dealing with sin is not to be found in any of the known sciences, but it nevertheless consists the subject of a sermon20, “where the single individual speaks as the single individual to the single individual” in earnestness (ibid: 16).

In the following paragraphs we will briefly present Kierkegaard's objection to the treatment of sin within the field of certain sciences21. It seems that he provides us with a strict methodological rule according to which a distinction between sciences and a classification of them has to be made. Accordingly, Haufniensis sets the limits of each science in a manner reminiscent of Kant. Although in a completely different context and without making a similar distinction between the sciences22, Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason, makes a clear-cut distinction between the concepts/categories of the understanding and the transcendental ideas.

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20 Haufniensis found that contemporary pastors were tricked by scientific self-importance and they consequently become “something like professional clerks who also serve science and find it beneath their dignity to preach” (CA: 16). What he thinks that is lacking in the sermons is the element of appropriation, the latter being regarded by the thinker as the secret of conversation. In order to ground his view he takes recourse to a famous saying of one of his favourite thinkers, Socrates, who in his critique of the Sophists, claimed that “they indeed knew how to make speeches but not how to converse” (loc. cit). Appropriation and Inwardness always go side by side in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre.

21 It may be the case that Kierkegaard’s ironic usage of the term science is not only an allusion to Hegel’s employment of this term but also to Kant’s definition of science. According to the latter, science is “the...knowledge of our ignorance, which is possible only through criticism of reason itself...” (CPR: 606). As we are going to see, ignorance for Kierkegaard is a fundamental feature of the human existence.

22 Nevertheless, Kant speaks of a general and fundamental distinction between mathematics and philosophical knowledge. Accordingly, the former kind of knowledge “is gained by reason from the construction of the concepts” whilst the latter “is the knowledge gained by reason from concepts” (CPR: 577). Furthermore, although he did not mention the same sciences that Kierkegaard enumerates, Kant as we are going to see later, speaks about the different subject matter of different sciences, e.g. of psychology, theology etc.
of reason, warning against any kind of intermingling the two faculties and fields. Thus, according to Kant, the pure concepts of the understanding (i.e. unity, reality, etc) deal with possible objects of experience, whilst ideas (i.e. God, soul, etc) are nothing but regulative principles, which... indeed prescribing greater unity than the empirical employment of understanding can achieve...if, on the other hand they be misunderstood, and be treated as constitutive principles of transcendent knowledge, they give rise, by a dazzling and deceptive illusion, to persuasion and a merely fictitious knowledge, and therewith to contradictions and eternal disputes"(CPR: 569)

Consequently, for example any employment of the transcendental ideas in the field of experience could lead into illusions, paralogisms, antinomies, etc. (CPR: 318 & 555).

Indeed, the function of the transcendental ideas of reason is restricted; they act as if they were what they are supposed to be. For example, in Kant’s view, “we declare ...that the things of the world must be viewed as if they received their existence from a highest intelligence” (CPR: 550).

Kant further discusses three sciences that are psychology, cosmology and theology that make transcendental ideas, i.e. the ideas of soul, world and God respectively, their subject-matter; all of those sciences should base their analysis on an “as if” (CPR: 551). It has been remarked that Kant mainly re-formulates in a critical way, Wolff’s distinction between the branches of “metaphysics”, i.e. ontology\textsuperscript{23}, cosmology, theology and

\textsuperscript{23} Ontology has as its object being-in-general. In Kant’s formulation, ontology “is replaced by transcendental analytic” (Caygill 1995: 338).
psychology\textsuperscript{24} and their respective objects (Caygill 1995: 338). Whilst Wolff's system presents us with an inevitable dialectical confusion between the \textit{a priori} and \textit{a posteriori} elements of those sciences, Kant attempts to secure the limits of each science, and constructs his very own metaphysics. Accordingly, in his \textit{Architectonic of Pure Reason}, Kant defines architectonic “as the scientific in our knowledge”, or as the art of constructing systematic unities, while systematic unity is exactly “what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science” (CPR: 653). Thus, philosophy “is the science of the relation of all knowledge to the essential ends of human reason” or in other words “the legislation of human reason” (CPR: 658). As such, it has a twofold function, that is firstly as a \textit{propaedeutic}, “which investigates the faculty of reason in respect of all its \textit{a priori} knowledge and is entitled \textit{criticism}” and secondly, as the system of pure reason. The latter is conceived as the “science which exhibits in systematic connection the whole body of philosophical knowledge arising out of pure reason (true as well as illusory) and which is entitled \textit{metaphysics}\textsuperscript{25}” (CPR: 659). More explicitly, the philosopher presents us with his four-partite distinction of the sciences that constitute \textit{metaphysics}, and which are ontology, rational physiology, rational

\textsuperscript{24} Psychology, cosmology and theology - for Wolff they consist “the branches of special metaphysics”- have as their respective objects the soul, the world and God and they constitute in Kant’s formulation the transcendental analytic. Furthermore, if one does not critically set the limits of those sciences, they are “ridden with dialectical inferences- theology with transcendental ideas, cosmology with antinomy, and psychology with paralogism” (Caygill 1995: 338).

\textsuperscript{25} However, in the wider sense, \textit{metaphysics} can include the whole of pure philosophy, that is \textit{propaedeutic/critical} philosophy as well. Another distinction that Kant makes is between \textit{metaphysics} in the strict sense that comprise only the speculative employment of pure reason and \textit{metaphysics} that includes also the \textit{practical employment of pure reason}, that is \textit{metaphysics of morals} (CPR: 659).
cosmology and rational theology, whilst rational physiology is divided into *physica rationalis* and *psychologia rationalis* (CPR: 663-4).

Does Kierkegaard develop a similar distinction to that of Kant’s systematic distinction between sciences and concepts/ideas? On the one hand it would be outrageous to succumb to the argument that Kierkegaard, the exponent of “indirect communication” would ever even attempt to develop a proper theory of knowledge. How can one really believe that the criterion of the limits of each science has to do with moods? It would be fairer to ascribe an ironic tone to his analysis; does he really want us to be tricked in believing that he develops a strict theory of knowledge? Or is he playing with his readers, confusing them with contradictory statements, such as criticizing on the one hand Kant and Hegel’s so-called science and on the other hand discussing the possibility of different sciences? Irony for Kierkegaard is a way of life, a sign of inwardness; as such it is synonymous with the phrase *know yourself* which in his interpretation means “separate yourself from the other” (CI: 177).

So, he may be seen as urging us to separate ourselves from him as a thinker, excluding then any possibility of adopting any of the theories he develops. Quite to the contrary, this is not tantamount to a repudiation of what he says. He wants us to “take notice”, to feel that behind the words something is hidden; he invites us to behold, not in the sense of discovering a hidden truth but in the sense of noticing that
there is something that can trigger the movement of inwardness. Thus, the adoption of an ironic tone is not an indication of something “false”. The interplay is neither between the two poles of falsity and truth nor does it point to a reconciliation of the two of them into something higher. The emphasis is put on the more or less of interiority rendering useless any kind of external criteria. Indeed, the help of interiority and inwardness are of crucial importance, since they make the connection of concepts with moods more intelligible. Indeed, Kierkegaard explains in an ironical manner

...that science, just as much as poetry and art, presupposes a mood in the creator as well as in the observer, and that error in the modulation is just as disturbing as an error in the development of thought, have been entirely forgotten in our time, when inwardness has been completely forgotten, also the category of appropriation, because of the joy over all the glory men thought they possessed... (CA: 14)

On the other hand, to return to Kierkegaard’s affinities with Kant, it can be argued that Kierkegaard substitutes inwardness for reason, thus making existence the central theme of his philosophy while this can be verified by his employment of “moods”. Thus, to expand this argument further, we can say that Kierkegaard develops a Critique of Inwardness instead of a Critique of Pure Reason, in the sense that he sets limits and even, as Wahl formulated it much later, he furnishes us with “categories of existence” (Wahl 1969: 19-29). Similarly, Ricoeur although

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26 It should be noted though that the “grade” (if we are justified to use such an expression) of interiority is not at all measurable and that one single individual is only sure about oneself. See the fourth chapter of our thesis.
acknowledging that Kierkegaard is not a critical thinker and "had no interest in conditions of possibility, at least not as an epistemological problem" in the Kantian sense, he nevertheless points to some affinities between the two thinkers (Ricoeur 1998: 16). Firstly, advancing the argument that both the thinkers draw a limit to "knowledge", he parallels the "philosophical function of paradox in Kierkegaard ... to that of limits in Kant" (loc. cit). Secondly, Ricoeur even argues that

Kierkegaard's categories of existence constitute a different kind of critique, a critique of existence, that they address the question of the possibility of speaking about existence. The existence of the singular individual is not a mystical experience that must be passed over in silence. Kierkegaard was far from being an intuitionist; he was a reflective thinker. (Ricoeur 1998: 16)

We should leave the question concerning how Kierkegaard wants us to read his introduction in The Concept of Anxiety open. Strangely enough his thought seems contradictory even when he tries to give us a strict and systematic account. Nevertheless, he claims that "a contradiction is always the expression of a task, and a task is a movement..." (CA: 28). Such a task can never be achieved but this does not lessen its dynamics since as an aporetic movement, it opens up infinite possibilities.

Let us now return to the parading of the sciences/suitors that flirt with the concept of sin, the first science that Haufniensis examines being esthetics. Accordingly, if sin is treated in the field of esthetics the mood is altered and it becomes either "melancholy" or "light-minded"; this is

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27 This is debatable though, since the mystical element in Kierkegaard's philosophy cannot be eliminated. As remarked above the usage of the mood of earnestness has its root in the mystical theology of Boehme.
because in his perception of esthetics, tragic or comic are the two poles of the contradiction that is peculiar to the category in which “sin lies” under esthetics. Thus, although “according to its true concept, sin is to be overcome”, in the case of esthetics sin becomes either something that endures and causes grief to the individual, or something “nonessential that is annulled” and as such causes laughter.

Now is the turn of metaphysics. If sin is dealt within the field of metaphysics the mood becomes that “of dialectical uniformity and disinterestedness, which ponder sin as something that cannot withstand the scrutiny of thought” (CA: 15). The problem with metaphysics lies mainly in the fact that it does not offer an active, vivid account that by touching the heart of each individual would make sin a matter of life concern for any human being. On the contrary, even in its attempt to overcome sin, metaphysics restricts itself in doing this “...as something to which thought is unable to give life” (CA: 15). More clearly, sin and its proper mood, earnestness, “cannot be thought”. As anti-Climacus explains “one cannot think a particular human being, so neither can one think a particular sinner” (SUD: 152). Indeed, because of this, “there can be no seriousness [earnestness] with sin- when it is only

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28 When Haufniensis discusses metaphysics, it seems that he has in mind both traditional metaphysics and metaphysics in the Kantian reformulation of the term.

29 Climacus in the De omnibus dubitandum est classifies metaphysics and aesthetics among all the disinterested knowledge. This is why they mainly use categories of reflection, the later being always disinterested. Shortly we'll discuss reflections' relation with consciousness. In advance we can remark that consciousness does not belong to the “disinterested knowledge” but is described as being “interest”. “Interest” to be understood as having its root in the word “interesse” which means “being between” (JC: 170).
to be thought. For seriousness is precisely that you and I are sinners. Seriousness is not sin in general..." (SUD: 152). On the contrary, thought concerns the whole of humanity as the writer clearly points out: "To be a particular human being is to be nothing; just think- and then you are the whole of humanity, cogito ergo sum" (SUD : 152).

Regarding the possibility of ethics\textsuperscript{30} being the proper topos of dealing with sin, Kierkegaard argues that this is impossible due to the fact that ethics is an ideal science. He furthermore explains that its ideality is not confined only to the natural ascription of ideality into every science. Ethics on the contrary aims at "bring[ing] ideality into actuality", whilst, it is not "the nature of its movement to raise actuality up into ideality" (CA: 16). Consequently, its movement is a movement from above and downward and as such it is never complete and thus Kierkegaard concludes, sin can belong to ethics only "insofar as upon this concept it is shipwrecked with the aid of repentance. If ethics is to include sin, its ideality comes to an end" (ibid: 17).

Furthermore, Kierkegaard examines the possibility that another science, namely dogmatics, could be the proper topos for studying sin, since in opposition to ethics, dogmatics follows the opposite movement that is from actuality to ideality. This science, although it does not deny the concept of sin, it cannot act as the proper topos where sin could be addressed, since it can only offer an explanation only in so far as

\textsuperscript{30} By ethics, Kierkegaard means traditional ethics.
“hereditary sin” is presupposed, and this in Kierkegaard’s eyes is a far cry from an adequate explanation (ibid: 19-20).

There is only one, so called science, the “second ethics” that can deal with the manifestation of sin, but not “with its coming into existence” (ibid: 21). This new science has its point of departure in the science of dogmatics:

Here ethics again finds its place as the science that has as a task for actuality the dogmatic consciousness of actuality. This ethics does not ignore sin, and it does not have its ideality in making ideal demands; rather, it has its ideality in the penetrating consciousness of actuality, of the actuality of sin, but note carefully, not with metaphysical light-mindedness or with psychological concupiscence (CA: 20).

It seems that Haufniensis’s task converges with that of Johannes de Silentio’s, who in his book Fear and Trembling, ...

...allows the desired ideality of esthetics to be shipwrecked on the required ideality of ethics, in order through these collisions to bring to light the religious ideality as the ideality that precisely is the ideality of actuality, and therefore just as desirable as that of esthetics and not as impossible as the ideality of ethics (CA:17n*).

Thus, “second ethics” are completely different from what is commonly perceived under the name of ethics. In order to make it clearer,

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31 “Second ethics” is said to have dogmatics as its point of departure in the same sense “that immanental science begins with metaphysics” (CA: 20). This shall be explained later.
32 This is debatable though especially if one takes into consideration that by second ethics Kierkegaard means mainly Christian ethics. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that for Kierkegaard, second ethics do not point to an external imposition of moral rules. On the contrary, he points mainly to an existential ethical view. Thus, it seems that for him, inwardness, “authentic” existence, appropriation and transcendence are more or less synonymous with a proper ethical existence. So, “love as duty”, “sacrifice” etc, do not take the form of Kantian maxims, for they do not claim objective validity and universality, but on the contrary they are subject to individual experience, inwardness and appropriation. Second ethics’ demands are, “specified by genuine divine commands and not merely by a moral law that can also be thought of as a divine command” (Quinn 1998:352). Until those demands have been appropriated, they
Haufniensis reformulates Aristotle’s canonical distinction of the sciences. He includes under what Aristotle has called πρωτή φιλοσοφία, “the totality of science which we might call *ethnical*[^33], whose essence is immanence and is expressed in Greek thought by *recollection*”. Under the name *secunda philosophia*, he understands “that totality of science whose essence is transcendence or repetition” (CA: 21). So, *secunda philosophia*, and within it *second ethics* provide the place for sin to emerge (ibid: 182).

Although *second ethics* are dealing with the manifestation of the *existence* of sin, we have seen that there is a residue that is left unexamined, that being sin’s coming into existence.

At this very point, psychology comes into play. If sin is dealt with from the point of view of psychology, the mood “becomes that of persistent observation, like the fearlessness of a secret agent, but not that of the victorious flight of earnestness out of sin” (CA: 15). Indeed,

[^33]: *Ethnical* (ἐθνικός) is the Greek word for pagans.
psychology has been one of the many suitors offering a possible “place” wherefrom sin could be dealt with, although in the end it too fails to succeed. One of the main drawbacks of psychology is exactly that following what Haufniensis considers its main feature, that being “persistent observation”. According to Haufniensis, psychology, in order to study a phenomenon, has first to take hold of it, like taking a photograph, and then to stick to this very moment and to make it static. In Haufniensis’ words, “the subject of which psychology treats must be something in repose that remains in a restless repose, not something restless that always either produces itself or is repressed” (CA: 21). Therefore, if the concept of sin were treated within the field of psychology, then it would suffer the consequence of being transformed into another concept, due to the fact that its main characteristic, namely that it is continually annulled, is cancelled. Thus, sin becomes a state, and as such “de potentia, it is not, but de actu or in actu it is, again and again” (ibid: 15). Moreover,

The mood of psychology is that of discovering anxiety, and in its anxiety psychology portrays sin, while again and again it is in anxiety over the portrayal that it itself brings forth...That this state has its truth is certain; that it occurs more or less in every human life before the ethical manifests itself is certain. But in being considered in this manner sin does not become what it is, but a more or less. (CA: 15)

Since the main concern of Haufniensis is to grasp the moment before the human being commits sin, namely the moment where anxiety reaches its peak, it follows that sin will be dealt as a possibility; if we keep our gaze
fixed to the moment just before the manifestation of sin then we will
grasp the possibility of sin:

...but this abiding something out of which sin constantly arises, not by necessity
(for a becoming by necessity is a state, as, for example, the whole history of the
plant is a state) but by freedom – this abiding something, this predisposing
presupposition, sin’s real possibility, is a subject of interest for psychology (CA: 21).

Furthermore, one has to bear constantly in mind that there is a
qualitative difference that splits the “before” and the “after” of sin’s
coming into existence, and therefore psychology is thought to “bring its
concern to the point where it seems as if sin were there, but the next
thing, that sin is there, is qualitatively different from the first” (ibid: 22).

It is evident, then, that in his treatment of anxiety, Haufniensis focuses
mainly on the “moment” preceding sin’s coming into existence, for this
very moment is the home place for anxiety.

The importance of the introduction of anxiety and its centrality for an
interpretation of the biblical corpus is tremendous regarding the
possibility of a different understanding of the individual, time, and
history. The lack of a proper treatment of the concept of anxiety can be
said to result in the adoption of a clear-cut distinction between a
postulated “before” and an “after” regarding the event of “the Fall”, which
was indeed adopted by numerous philosophical and theological
interpretations based on the third chapter of Genesis. Kierkegaard offers
us instead a somewhat different account in the sense that the difference
between Adam and the subsequent individual human beings is not seen as abysmal in qualitative terms.
1.2 Anxiety and the Fall

Kierkegaard does not offer us a distinctive analysis of the time before the Fall, and seems to be indifferent to any distinction between cosmological and fallen time. But in his analysis on anxiety where he seems to oscillate between two conceptions of time, one that could not be considered temporal in the familiar sense of the term, i.e. the time just before Adam’s qualitative leap of sin, and a strictly speaking temporal one, the time just after the Fall.

Kierkegaard’s narrative of the Fall differs radically from the respective narratives of previous and contemporary philosophers in the sense that he does not present us with a “myth of understanding”. The paradox of the “present age” is - for Kierkegaard - that although it struggles to get rid of all myths at the same time it is incomparably more skillful- in comparison to the previous ages- in “producing myths of the understanding” (CA: 46). By “myths of the understanding” the thinker means mainly Kant’s story of the Fall and most importantly Hegel’s treatment of it. Hegel, according to Kierkegaard, treats the story of the Fall as a myth of understanding, in the sense that “such a myth is based on the assumption that it adequately expresses the eternal in temporal qualities and that its truth can be grasped by the understanding”. If for example, the Genesis story makes us face the question of how sin enters the world and the reply is “sin came into the world by a sin”, that is that

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34 Although it can be argued that the whole analysis of anxiety is a proper and distinctive treatment of the time before the fall.
“sin presupposes itself” and it came into world “as the sudden, i.e. by a leap...[that] also posits the quality” then the understanding conceives it as an offence, “ergo it is a myth”. Understanding’s reaction to this paradox is to invent its own myth which denies the leap and explains the circle as a straight line, and now everything proceeds naturally. The understanding talks fantastically about man’s state prior to the Fall, and, in the course of the small talk, the projected innocence is changed little by little into sinfulness, and so there it is (CA:32)

On the contrary, what Kierkegaard advocates is the “paradoxicality” of the narrative of the Fall since it “involves a transcendence that is incapable of being grasped by reason” (Thompte 1980: 233 n.22).

Furthermore, it has to be noted that for Kierkegaard, myths though are not true stores they nevertheless contain an element of truth: “the myths are not true, though they are supposed to contain truth; they are fabricated, though not by reflection” (CI: 102 f *). Moreover, Kierkegaard is not objecting to a usage of the term “myth” if it is to be conceived as something that “allows something that is inward to take place outwardly” (CA: 47). That inwardness is the presupposition of outwardness makes evident the significance and the meaning of “psychology” in Kierkegaard’s thought. It reminds us also Schelling’s similar remark in the Introduction of his Ages of the World which reads:
Everything, absolutely everything, even that which by nature is eternal, must have already become internal to us before we can present it externally or objectively. If the writer of history does not awaken in himself or herself the past age whose image they want to project to us, then they will never present it truly, nor vividly, nor in a lively fashion (AGW 1815: xxxvii).

Thus, let us see Kierkegaard’s story as a similar procedure and focus our attention on his narrative of Adam’s fall as it is developed in the *Concept of Anxiety*, in order to address the problem concerning how temporality and sin “enter” the world. The notion of the *moment* plays a central role in his analysis. The *moment*35, as he defines it, is “that ambiguity in which time and eternity touch each other, and with this the concept of *temporality* is posited, whereby time constantly intersects eternity and eternity constantly pervades time” (CA: 89). Thus the moment should be construed as residing beyond temporal definitions, but it is exactly because of its being posited that the division between present time, past time and future time acquires its significance (CA: 89). This is why the *moment* is not to be conceived as a point in a line, that is, as a limit that

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35 It will be better understood in the last chapter how the exemplary form of the “moment”, that is the moment of Christ’s incarnation is, in Wahl’s words, the centre of history according to Kierkegaard (Wahl 1969: 56). This very “moment” exemplifies the fusion of eternity and time; it also signifies the inauguration of a new era where both the *moment* and *eternity* acquire different and essential significance from the one that they had in paganism. This will explain Kierkegaard’s critique of Plato’s treatment of the *moment*, since until the emergence of Christianity (it will be discussed later if Christianity in his perception has a temporal beginning), eternity had a different and non-essential meaning. If we look briefly at Kierkegaard’s treatment of Plato’s reference to the *moment* (the Greek word is εὐγένεια - it was due to Schleiermacher’s translation that it was rendered as *Augenblick* in German that is as *moment*), it will become evident in Kierkegaard’s perception, Plato in *Parmenides*, remains in the level of abstraction (CA: 82*; Ruin 1994: 182). Accordingly, Plato discusses the category of transition (μεταβολή) from the many to the one, of likeness to unlikeness etc and focuses on the *moment* of the transition where there is neither one nor many, etc. Although Kierkegaard acknowledges Plato’s contribution to the development of the notion of the moment, he finds that it remains an “atomistic abstraction” (CA: 82).
although disrupting the continuity of time still retains its immanence\textsuperscript{36} and thus belongs to temporal definitions. On the contrary, the moment signals a passage\textsuperscript{37} to a qualitatively different kind of living/existing where eternity and time are intermingling. It signifies a rupture of the immanence of time, or in other words "it is an atom of eternity...the first reflection of eternity in time, its first attempt, as it were, at stopping\textsuperscript{38} time" (CA: 88). What is of crucial importance is the very fact that Kierkegaard insists that "only with the moment does history begin", while for nature time has no significance at all (loc. Cit). Here there is a possible hint to the existence of a different time, preceding that of the Fall, where history had not yet begun. It is interesting to note, that

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{36} Haufniensis criticizes harshly Hegel’s treatment of the concepts of passage, moment, negation and mediation. According to Haufniensis, they are presupposed uncritically and they belong to the sphere of becoming, which on his interpretation of Hegel, remains to the level of logic. Thus, such a logical movement that comprises negation, passage and the moment remains in the sphere of immanence and as such is not a proper movement (CA: 12-13; Ruin 1994: 182).

\textsuperscript{37} It seems interesting that many years after Kierkegaard wrote his Concept of Anxiety, Nietzsche in his Zarathustra gives us an image of a two-faced gate, the name of which is "Moment" and which is the point where two different paths touch each other. Both of them have no ends and thus represent two kinds of eternity, the one that is behind us and the other that is ahead us (Zarathustra: 178-9). Those two modes of eternity do not collapse to the common held distinction between a past that has been and a future that will be. On the contrary, in this passage Nietzsche reinforces his idea of the eternal return of the same that is built upon this notion of the moment. As he wonders: "Must not all things that can run have already run along this lane? Must not all the things that can happen have already happened, been done, run past?" (Zarathustra: 178). Thus, it may be the case that his perception of those two eternities has implicitly something in common with Schelling’s conceptions of the eternal past and eternal future that are best exposed in his Ages of the world. Additionally, although Nietzsche ridicules Kierkegaard’s leap of faith – that is an example of a moment- characterising it as a death-leap (p.59) one cannot fail to question whether Kierkegaard’s concept of repetition (and the circular perception of time that it entails) informs and shapes Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal recurrence.

\textsuperscript{39} In order to show the “power” of the moment, Kierkegaard cites a fragment from St.Paul where he says "the world will pass away in a moment, εν δευτερου και εν ρυθμη οφθαλμω [in the twinkling of an eye]"(CA: 88*). It is notable that etymologically, St.Paul’s expression of the moment is closer to the German (Augenblick) and Danish (Oieblick) word for it. Ruin notices that this maybe the first time that a literal equivalent to the German word is used in the Greek language. He also points to the apocalyptic connotation of St.Paul’s fragment - enhancing thus the argument that the moment is related with kairos, that is a theological concept that among its fourth (according to Bauer) uses, the fourth one denotes "the last day, the time of the return of the Lord, ...the moment when this time will come to an end" (Ruin 1994: 181 & 181 n.18).
\end{footnote}
although nature seems not to have a proper history since only human beings can posit the moment, Kierkegaard speaks of the leap, which is defined as a “diminutive moment”, in terms of Aristotelian physics. The aporia consists in the fact that he tries to define Aristotle's notion of κινησις in terms of historical freedom. Let us follow his thought more closely.

For Kierkegaard freedom is a movement, a κινησις, that being a transition from possibility to actuality. In the Concept of Anxiety he adds that “transition belongs in the sphere of historical freedom, for transition is a state and it is actual” (CA: 82). Therefore, he continues, “when

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39 The question of nature's relation with history is a complex one. Climacus, in the Philosophical Fragments, considers the past as the “distinctively historical” since “…(it is gone; whether it was years or days ago makes no difference), and as something bygone it has actuality, for it is certain and trustworthy that it occurred” (PF: 79). On the other hand, nature as “spatial determination” exists only immediately and the question is “how, then can nature, although immediately present, be said to be historical…?”(ibid: 76). Nature's imperfection is “that it does not have a history in another sense, and its perfection is that it nevertheless has an intimation of it (namely that it has come into existence, which is the past; that it exists, which is the present)” (loc. Cit). It seems therefore that there is a definite distinction between human beings that can come into existence within their own coming into existence and nature that has come into existence in the past. If this is the case one could not but reflect on the implications it has for nature and its relation with human beings. Could we here point to the possibility of nature being somehow affected – and in a certain sense even “transformed” - by this second coming into existence that human beings are capable of? In this respect, one could evoke that in the Concept of Anxiety, Haufniensis explicitly points to the existence of what he terms objective anxiety, where it is emphatically stressed that “[b]y coming into the world, sin acquired significance for the whole creation. This effect of sin in nonhuman existence I have called objective anxiety” (CA: 57).

40 This is not to suggest that the notion of physis in Aristotle is synonymous with that of nature. Arguably, quite the opposite is the case, and Kierkegaard was well aware of that. See for example his reply to Professor’s Heiberg’s (a Hegelian, contemporary with Kierkegaard) accusations that he applies to concepts such as repetition a "concept from natural philosophy, namely, movement" (Repetition: 308 &379-382 n.14). Additionally, one could even argue that physis for Kierkegaard signifies a continuous emergence from a possibility, by means of freedom, towards an actuality that “emerges as transcendence” (Repetition: 310).

41 The notion of movement, as we are going to see later, is understood neither in spatial nor in logical terms but rather in qualitative ones, mostly following Aristotle’s point of view that the movement or change should not be conceived only in spatial terms but also in terms of substance, quantity or quality (Physics 200b32).
Aristotle says that the transition from possibility\textsuperscript{42} to actuality is a καινησις, it is not to be understood logically but with reference to historical freedom" (CA: 82, n. *; Repetition: 310). In Kierkegaard’s thought, this transition is mainly qualitative; it consists of a qualitative leap. It is this very notion of the qualitative leap that excludes the possibility of predestination\textsuperscript{43} and brings into play the importance of freedom. The new is brought about through the leap and “if this is not maintained, the transition will have a quantitative preponderance over the elasticity of leap” (CA: 85). The first qualitative leap that Kierkegaard mentions was that of Adam, and in contradistinction to the following leaps\textsuperscript{44} that depend solely upon the individual’s will (in совершение with God’s will and call), the first leap was somehow present to all the creatures that according to Haufniensis are endowed with spirit. It is exactly because of that first leap, that the human race\textsuperscript{45} and the individual are bound together and separated at the same time while in the case of the religious

\textsuperscript{42} Kierkegaard mainly uses Tennemann’s reading of Aristotle who paraphrases Aristotle’s words as following “...change, motion, is the actualization of the possible insofar as it is possible” (PF: 298, n.8).

\textsuperscript{43} More emphatically put: “...reflectiveness is a predisposition that, before the individual becomes guilty, signifies essentially nothing; whereas when by the qualitative leap he becomes guilty, it is the presupposition by which he goes beyond himself, because sin presupposes itself, obviously not before it is posited(which is predestination) , but in that it is posited” (CA: 62).

\textsuperscript{44} As for example the leap of faith.

\textsuperscript{45} The relation of the history of the human race and of the history of the individual is simultaneously parallel and separated, or as Adorno puts it “the inner history of the person is bound anthropologically to external history through the unity of the race” (Adorno 1989: 33). In the Concept of Anxiety Vigilius Haufniensis states: “at every moment, the individual is both himself and the race. This is the individual’s perfection viewed as a state. It is also a contradiction. A contradiction, however, is always the expression of a task; a task however, is a movement; but a movement that as a task is the same as that to which the task is directed is an historical movement. Hence the individual has a history. But if the individual has a history, then the race also has a history” (CA: 28-29). And he concludes by saying that while the history of the human race is continuous, the person starts always da capo and it is exactly this that prevents him her of considering himself inferior or superior in comparison with people of other generations.
leap Johannes de Silentio points out that: "...the highest passion in a person is faith, and here no generation begins at any other point than where the previous one did. Each generation begins all over again" (F&T: 121-122).

The archetypal figure of the first qualitative leap was Adam, although for Haufniensis the difference between Adam and the following generations is solely quantitative\(^{46}\). Every individual as a single individual "posits sin by the qualitative leap" (CA: 61). It is exactly the fusion of the first and the subsequent individuals that makes Sartre to remark that Haufniensis's development of the concept of anxiety could be seen as an attempt of a "displacement of the beginning" (Sartre 1974:154).

\(^{46}\) The relevant passage reads: "let us now consider Adam and also remember that every subsequent individual begins in the very same way, but within the quantitative difference that is the consequence of the relationship of generation and the historical relationship. Thus the moment is there for Adam as well as for every subsequent individual" (CA: 90). Or more emphatically: "since the race does not begin anew with every individual, the sinfulness of the race does indeed acquire a history. Meanwhile, this proceeds in quantitative determinations while the individual participates in it by the qualitative leap. For this reason the race does not begin anew with every individual, in which case there would be no race at all, but every individual begins anew with the race" (CA:33-34).
In the same vein, Rose notices that

the beginning or first task of discovering anxiety is to dethrone two customary beginnings: the concept of hereditary sin and the first sin, Adam’s sin, which, preceding the history of the human race, would give it a fantastic beginning...(Rose 1992: 92)

Haufniensis does not provide us with a theological argument of how sin enters into the world, rather he provides us with a psychology of the possibility of sin, since “how sin came into world, each man understands solely by himself” (CA: 51&21)). According to him, every individual is a synthesis of body and soul, while the element which unifies the two is spirit47. In innocence, Adam (and every consequent Adam) was a spirit48, although a spirit in a dreaming state. Moreover, since “the combining factor is precisely the spirit, and as yet this is not posited as spirit”, the synthesis of the physical and the psychical is not yet actual” (ibid: 49). The spirit is for Haufniensis eternal, and what follows the first synthesis is a second one, a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal. In innocence, where the spirit is qualified as a dreaming spirit, the “eternal appears as the future” (ibid: 90-1). The quasi-presence of the spirit is in a sense a hostile power, for it “disturbs the relation between soul and body, a relation that indeed has persistence and yet does not have endurance, inasmuch as it first receives

47 Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto death defines the human being as a spirit and identifies it with the self. The latter, “is a relation which relates to itself, or that in the relation which is its relating to itself” (SUD: 43). It is not simply a relation, since if a synthesis of the two terms (i.e. of body and spirit, temporal and eternal, etc) is a relation, then the human being is not yet a self. This is because in a relation between two things “the relation is the third term in the form of a negative unity, and the two relate to the relation, and in the relation to that relation; this is what is from the point of view of soul for soul and body to be in relation”. On the other hand, if “the relation relates to itself, then the relation is the positive third, and this is the self” (loc. Cit).

48 For even in innocence, man is not merely animal for “if he were at any moment of his life merely animal, he would never become man...so, spirit is present, but as immediate, as dreaming” (CA: 43-4).

49 Quite interestingly, also possibility is presented as a dreaming state.
the latter by the spirit" (loc. Cit). At the same time, the spirit is a friendly power, "since it is precisely that which constitutes the relation" (ibid: 44).

At this state, the spirit "projects its own actuality, but this actuality is nothing, and innocence always sees this nothing outside itself" (ibid: 41). Therefore the question regarding the effect of nothing is raised, only to be followed by the answer that: "It begets anxiety" (loc. Cit). According to Wilhelm Anz, Kierkegaard defines anxiety more profoundly than St. Augustine. The latter, sees anxiety as developed out of fear, as being a limit case of fear, "fear which has lost its object, fear trapped within itself" (Anz 1998:46). Haufniensis does not identify anxiety with fear, for fear is about something definite, it has an object, whilst anxiety's object is nothingness and this hardly consists of an object proper. Anxiety has "an ontologically fundamental meaning" (loc. Cit). Thus, according to Tillich, it would be best to understand anxiety in the context of the interplay between nonbeing and being that troubles philosophy for years. Tillich describes anxiety as "the existential awareness of nonbeing" whilst he takes the term existential to mean, "not the abstract knowledge of nonbeing which produces anxiety but the awareness that nonbeing is part of one's being" (Tillich 1980: 35). This explains why anxiety lacks any definite object; its object, this "threatening nothing" is not the unknown as it is commonly perceived, that is as something that ultimately will be revealed. On the contrary this unknown is "of a special type which is met with anxiety. It is the unknown which by its very nature cannot be known, because it is nonbeing" (ibid: 37).
Anxiety nonetheless is the opening to an infinite *pelagos* of possibilities, where certainty\(^50\) is almost violently removed and the *possibility of possibility* emerges. There lies freedom, since for Haufniensis anxiety is “freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility” (CA: 42).

If we follow his thought more closely, we will be able to pay heed to his identification of innocence with ignorance, while ignorance should not be understood as “animal brutality” but as “ignorance qualified by spirit”. Such an innocence is then conceived as anxiety, or rather is “precisely anxiety, because its ignorance is about nothing” (ibid: 44). When God prohibited Adam to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, Adam did not understand this word, for “how could he understand the difference between good and evil when this distinction would follow as a consequence of the enjoyment of the fruit?”(loc. Cit). In that point, Berdyaev would agree with Kierkegaard, since he holds that Paradise “is the state of being in which there is no valuation or distinction”, where not everything was revealed to man and “ignorance was the condition of the life in it”. Therefore the Paradisic state is for him “the realm of the unconscious”, while in this state, Berdayev concludes, “man’s freedom was not as yet unfolded, it had not expressed itself or taken part in creation”(Berdyaev 1937: 36-38).

Thus, when this word was spoken by God, anxiety “caught its first prey” and instead of “nothing, it now has an enigmatic word” (CA: 44). God’s prohibition did not awake Adam’s desire, for if this were the case,

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\(^{50}\) Such certainty is conceived as the pre-adamic state of peace and repose (CA: 41).
one should have to presuppose the pre-acquisition of the foreknowledge of freedom because of Adam's desire to use it. On the contrary, the prohibition "induces to him [i.e. Adam] anxiety" for it was exactly this that "awakens in him freedom's possibility" (CA: 44). The nothing of anxiety has entered Adam but it has not been transformed into something. It remains nothing but now it appears in a higher form of ignorance, in the form of "the anxious possibility of being able\textsuperscript{51}" (loc. Cit). The character of anxiety is exactly its ambiguity, and this is why Haufniensis defines it as a "sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy" (CA: 42).

In an entry to his Journals Kierkegaard observed:

The nature of the original sin has often been examined, and yet the principle category has been missing – it is dread (anxiety), that is what really determines it; for dread is a desire for what one fears, a sympathetic antipathy; dread is an alien power which takes hold of the individual, and yet one cannot extricate oneself from it, does not wish to, because one is afraid, but what one fears attracts one. Dread renders the individual powerless, and the first sin always happens in a moment of weakness; it therefore lacks any apparent accountableness, but that want is the real snare (Journals III A 233: 105).

The characterisation of anxiety as an alien power which takes hold of the individual is striking. One cannot help thinking of another relevant passage, this time to be found in the book entitled Repetition.

Constantius discusses there the history of the concept of repetition, as

\textsuperscript{51} Although the fall and the alleged end of innocence have been seen as the initiation to knowledge, Rose, in her reading of the Concept of Anxiety, emphasises the importance and role of prohibition: "Adam's innocence does not provide the beginning yet innocence is ignorance. The beginning is not, however the end of innocence understood as initiation into knowledge. The fall or beginning involves initiation into prohibition: it was the prohibition itself not to eat of the tree of knowledge that gave birth to the sin of Adam" (Rose 1992:92)
long as it is applied in the sphere of individual freedom. Freedom “passes through several stages in order to attain itself”.

In the first stage, where one can easily compare it with the first emergence of freedom as it is developed in the Concept of Anxiety.

Freedom is qualified as desire or as being in desire. What it now fears is repetition, for it seems as if repetition has a magic power to keep freedom captive once it has tricked it into its power. But despite all of desire’s ingenuity, repetition appears. Freedom in desire despairs. Simultaneously freedom appears in a higher form (Repetition: 301)

Adam was oscillating between his longing to surrender himself to anxiety and to its nothingness, and his simultaneous fear of the possibility of freedom that was thereby generated. Simultaneously, repetition makes its appearance, for the time being as a possibility. Adam in his dreaming state has to face a dilemma; but one that does not fall under the category of liberum arbitrium, that is of the freedom of indifference or “the ability of the will to choose independently of antecedent factors” (CA: 48-9 & 236 n.58). Kierkegaard compares a perfect disinterested will with a chimera, a nothing. Anxiety, described as entangled freedom that is freedom that “is not free in itself but entangled, not by necessity, but in itself”, has captured Adam, and since spirit has not yet posited itself, there is no question of a possibility of a rational choice (CA: 49). But even after spirit’s positedness, Kierkegaard’s main concern remains “freedom for possibility” to the detriment of “freedom of choice”. As Stack puts it Kierkegaard emphasises “man’s primordial freedom”, freedom for
possibility, since “a choice, before it is made, is a possibility” (Stack 1977: 50).

Freedom’s actuality as the possibility of possibility comes closer when God continues: “You shall certainly die”. Although these words were again incomprehensible to Adam’s ears because finitude had not yet entered the world, anxiety has reached its peak point, for “the infinite possibility of being able that was awakened by the prohibition now draws closer, because this possibility points to a possibility as its consequence” (CA: 45).

Although in the biblical narrative God appears as the one who speaks to Adam, Haufniensis proposes that this is not the case. The voice of who prohibits (i.e. not to eat from the tree of knowledge) and judges (i.e. if you eat, then you certainly die) is not exoteric to Adam. If this were the case, then the narrative would be incomplete for “how it could have occurred to anyone to say to Adam what he essentially could not understand” (CA: 47). According to Haufniensis, one has to bear in mind that “the speaker is language, and also that it is Adam himself who speaks” (loc. Cit). But he concludes

> From the fact that Adam was able to talk, it does not follow in a deeper sense that he was able to understand what was said. This applies above all to the difference between good and evil, which indeed can be expressed in language but nevertheless is only for freedom...[because]...innocence can indeed express this difference, but the difference is not for innocence...(ibid:45-6).

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52 We will see in the next chapter the transformations that the voice of God undergoes in Kant.
One cannot but wonder, whether there are similarities to be drawn with Johannes’ de Silentio’s account according to which God has asked Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, if in the present account it is considered as an imperfection to assume that God said something to Adam that the latter could not essentially understand, or was it again language itself? If so, then the question is what Kierkegaard means by language. On the one hand, one has to assume that what Haufniensis means by language is God in his hypostasis as Logos in which hypostasis Adam was participating and consequently Logos, the Word was not something external to Adam but on the contrary Adam was and lived (participated) in it.

On the other hand, if one takes into account Johannes Climacus’s account on his unfinished De omnibus dubitandum est, s/he will face an interesting and challenging treatment of language conceived as thought and ideality. In this book, Climacus ironically discuses Descartes’ assertion that the “mind”, the I, escapes the threat of doubt and

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53 If the “existence” of the voice of God is under question then the question of the “existence” of such a God arises. This is best understood if we take into consideration that the whole philosophy of Kierkegaard is grounded upon the suspension of the ethical, a suspension which according to Wahl is “prompted by the fact that I hear the voice of God, and God can absolve us from our moral obligations”. But how I know that I hear the voice of God, or how Abraham knew that it was the voice of God “bidding him to go and sacrifice Isaac?” asks Wahl (Wahl 1969: 58). There is no definite reply, neither a definite sign that assures the individual that s/he hears the voice of God. The lack of any certainty, the faith in the absurd, is the fundamental stone in Kierkegaard’s thought. It is solely upon and through our inwardness and subjectivity and “independently of all established values, independently of all determined essences”, that we “shall decide that what we hear is the voice of God” (loc. Cit). Thus, if what I decide to be the voice of God is “language”, do I not exclude the possibility of any relation with such a God?

54 It is questionable if Kierkegaard makes a distinction between the ‘language’ before and after the Fall as for example does Benjamin (see next chapter). Nevertheless, Kierkegaard points out repeatedly the shortcomings of human language: “What kind of miserable invention is this human language, which says one thing and means another?” (Repetition: 200). Taking into account Benjamin’s distinction, then one may even argue that the account on the Concept of Anxiety represents the language of the creation and the account on De omnibus dubitandum est the fallen language.
establishes certainty at least regarding itself. According to Descartes "this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind" (Descartes 1996: 17). Descartes further clarifies this I am, saying that it is a thing that primarily thinks, "a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing... etc (ibid: 19). Thus, the thinking I is perceived as the substratum upon which understanding, doubt, etc are grounded. Kierkegaard on the other hand considers doubt as inherent in thought, or in other words as belonging into the primordial features of the self. If for Descartes the immediacy of 'the I secures it against uncertainty, for Kierkegaard such immediacy is questionable and there is only a volatile self, emerging in the midst of a dreaming state. Quite interestingly, Descartes in his first meditation, describing the different aspects of doubt compares human's contact with the external world as being in a dreaming state, whilst Kierkegaard on the other hand speaks of the dreaming state as the necessary passage into existence, through the emergence of spirit and the turmoil that anxiety brings into play. This will become clearer if we follow his thoughts more closely. According to Kierkegaard, there is interplay between ideality and reality, mediacy and immediacy, where language, the word, is juxtaposed to reality that is to immediacy. The consequence of the encounter between ideality and reality is the emergence of possibility, since "not until the moment that ideality is brought into relation with reality does possibility appear". This is because in reality
(immediacy) everything is actual and true, i.e. "the most false and the most true are equally true...the most possible and the most impossible are equally actual" (JC: 168)). For Climacus, consciousness is not yet present; before the establishment of the relation, we are still within the categories of reflection that are always dichotomous, i.e. "ideality and reality, soul and body, to know the true...God and the world..." (ibid: 168-9). Furthermore, to the extent that for him "reflection is the possibility of the relation" then "consciousness is the relation, the first form of which is contradiction". Consciousness presupposes reflection, and its categories are always trichotomous, for they include also the relation, or more clearly, the "third, which places the two in relation to each other" (loc. Cit). If we consider either reality or ideality in themselves, we could not possibly account for doubt, since doubt comes into play along with the emergence of consciousness. Consequently, alongside the emergence of spirit, consciousness comes into existence through the collision of ideality and reality, for "the moment I make a statement about reality, contradiction is present, for what I say is ideality" (ibid: 168-9). The collision between ideality and reality brings repetition into play since when someone sees something in the moment55 "ideality comes into play and will explain that it is a repetition56" (ibid: 171). Thus, for

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55 Here moment is used in its everyday usage, pointing to someone who lives carelessly, only for the present, or in Kierkegaard’s term aesthetically.
56 At this context repetition is better to be understood as synonymous with recollection. Indeed, as Climacus explains: "Here the question is more specifically one of a repetition in consciousness, consequently of recollection" (JC: 172).
Kierkegaard *doubt* is an existential category that questions even the certainty of the *I*. According to Hannah Arendt, Kierkegaard may offer us the "deepest interpretation of Cartesian doubt" in the sense that he puts doubt in the heart of human existence (Arendt 1989: 275n.32). If *doubt* is to be seen as the "beginning of the highest form of existence", it is because every human existence requires the constitution of consciousness, of self, and thus the emergence of spirit in order to differ from a simple body and soul combination (JC 170). Indeed, what for Descartes is an epistemological and methodological problem becomes in Kierkegaard an "existential one" and as such "the solution of doubt lies not in reflection but in resolution" (Thompte 1980: ix). Descartes's insistence on the prioritisation of reflection (as thought) over act (as will) consists the focal point of Kierkegaard's reaction. As he writes in his *Journals*

Since Descartes they have all thought that during the period in which they doubted they dared not to express anything definite with regard to knowledge, but on the other hand they dared to act, because in this respect they could be satisfied with probability. What an enormous contradiction! As if it were not far more dreadful to do something about which one is doubtful (thereby incurring responsibility) than to make a statement. Or was it because the ethical is in itself certain? But then there was something which doubt could not reach! (as quoted in Thompte 1980: ix; JP 1 774).

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57 Although one has to notice that Kierkegaard's criticism is mainly against those philosophers that interpreted and used (i.e. Hegel) Descartes for their own specific reasons and in a certain manner. According to Arendt, Kierkegaard's book *De omnibus dubitandum est* consists a spiritual autobiography where the thinker explains how he became aware of Descartes' work through Hegel and how then he felt sorry that he did not start his journey in philosophy with Descartes oeuvre (Arendt 1989:274n.32).

58 Descartes, in his fourth meditation, discusses the possibility of error and concludes that neither the power of willing nor the power of understanding- if they are taken separately- are to be blamed. Thus, he argues that the source of error is the following: "the scope of the will is wider than that of the intellect, but instead of restricting it within the same limits, I extend its use to matters which I do not understand...” (Meditations: 40).
Johannes Climacus, the hero of *De omnibus dubitandum est*, took seriously and followed the homonymous maxim of Descartes, doubting everything in his life. This brought him unto the utmost depths of doubt that is unto despair:

By means of the melancholy irony, which did not consist in any single utterance on the part of Johannes Climacus but in his whole life, by means of the profound earnestness involved in a young man’s being sufficiently honest and earnest enough to do quietly and unostentatiously what the philosophers say...Johannes does what we are told to do- he actually doubts everything- he suffers through all the pain of doing that, become cunning, almost acquires a bad conscience...If he abandons this extreme position, he may very well arrive at something, but in doing that he would have also abandoned his doubt about everything. Now he despairs, his life is wasted, his youth is spent in these deliberations. Life has not acquired any meaning for him, and all this is the fault of philosophy... (JC: 234-5).

The lack of any certainty is what torments Johannes Climacus and it seems that only a leap would redeem his despair.

This is going to be a leap from doubt since for Johannes Climacus, appearing this time as the author of *Philosophical Fragments*, “all coming into existence occurs in freedom”(PF: 75) and not by way of necessity. Thus, the emergence of consciousness happens in freedom, and by

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59 The necessary, on the contrary “...cannot suffer the suffering of actuality-namely, that the possible (not merely the possible that is excluded but even the possibility that is accepted) turns out to be nothing the moment it becomes actual, for possibility is annihilated by actuality” (PF: 74)

60 Thus language, that is ideality the appearance of which is the presupposition of the emergence of consciousness, is one of the fundamental and primordial features of existence, or in another sense it is existence.

61 According to Berdyaev, the human being freely rejected the “bliss and wholeness of Eden” preferring instead the world of suffering, of death, “the pain and tragedy of the cosmic life in order to explore his destiny to its innermost depths”. This was the “birth of consciousness with its painful dividedness”, the inauguration of a new epoch where “man began to make distinctions and valuations, tasted the fruit of the tree of knowledge and found himself on this side of good and evil”. Moreover, since consciousness is born in pain and suffering, all the “distinctions and valuations made by consciousness always cause pain” (Berdyaev 1937: 36 &38).
way of its belonging to the category of “coming into existence”, it is
defined as suffering (ibid: 74).

As Hannah Arendt has noticed, Kierkegaard’s contribution to the
exploration of the Cartesian doubt consists mainly on that he discovered
the true dimensions of it “when he leaped –not from reason, as he
thought, but from doubt- into belief, thereby carrying doubt into the very
heart of modern religion” (Arendt 1989: 275). If the motto of the modern
philosophy was cogito ergo sum, Kierkegaard instead re-formulates the
scriptural sayings “as thou hast believed, so be it done unto thee” and
“as thou believest, so art thou” into “to believe is to be” (SUD: 126). Still,
doubt is for Kierkegaard the point of departure and penetrates his whole
theology. Interestingly enough, Tillich concludes his book entitled The
courage to be with the following words:

The courage to take the anxiety of meaninglessness upon oneself is the
boundary line up to which the courage to be can go. Beyond it is mere non­
being. Within it all the forms of courage are re-established in the power of the
God above the God of theism. The courage to be is rooted in the God who appears
when God has disappeared in the anxiety of doubt” (Tillich 1980: 190)

Naturally, in the case of Kierkegaard, the question concerning the nature
of such a God arises. How can a human being escape doubt and “believe"
when all his/her certainties have been removed? A recurrent phrase in

Fear and Trembling is the following

...either there is a paradox, that the single individual as the single individual
stands in an absolute relation to the absolute, or Abraham is lost (FT: 120-
emphasis added)
Or Abraham is lost: a meaningful phrase that introduces us to the either/or opposition, where the two parts are of equivalent power and importance. So, what if Abraham is lost? It seems that in Kierkegaard's thought no one can remove this possibility, so as to remove doubt completely. In a peculiar way, Kierkegaard's attempt to avoid necessity and to emphasise "contingency" and the existence of "infinite possibilities", leads him into the opposite direction. Making possibility the presupposition not only of his thought but also of his existence, he nevertheless concludes to the necessity of the existence of the infinite possibilities, or in other words to the necessary existence of different possible "or's". As a consequence, despair, in all its disguises, is always present.

No one can escape from despair in the same way as no single human being enjoys perfect bodily health. Thus,

...there is not a single human being who does not despair at least a little, in whose innermost being there does not dwell an uneasiness, an unquiet, a discordance, an anxiety in the face of an unknown something, or a something he doesn't even dare strike up acquaintance with, an anxiety about a possibility in life or an anxiety about himself... (SUD: 52).

At the same time, to be able to despair is conceived as an infinite merit, although the actual fact of being in despair is conceived as a misery. As anti-Climacus himself notices, in contrast to the common perception of the relation between possibility and actuality that attributes a greater
merit to actually be something than, to be able to be something, in this specific relation the opposite is the case. This is because, although the actuality of despair is not at all desired, the possibility of being in despair is tantamount if not identical with the possibility of spirit's emergence and as such is conceived as a merit.

We have seen how the self (i.e. spirit) is a synthesis of temporality/finitude and eternity/infinity whereas the dissolution of this synthesis is unattainable, for although the synthesis occurred at the moment of sin, it was already present as a possibility before, when anxiety reached its highest point. Thus, according to Anti-Climacus, ...

Despair does not stem from the synthesis, the latter is just the possibility, or in other words “the possibility of the imbalance lies in the synthesis”. According to anti-Climacus, “despair is the imbalance in a relation of a synthesis, in a relation which relates to itself...if the synthesis were itself the imbalance, there would be no despair” (SUD: 45). In that case, the imbalance would have taken the form of something that happens to a person, and which “lay[s] in human nature itself” (ibid:

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62 For Anti-Climacus there is another couple of seeming oppositions that are constitutive of the self as a result of a conscious synthesis. This is the couple of possibility and necessity. As he writes: “For the purpose of becoming (and the self must become itself freely) possibility and necessity are equally essential. Just as infinitude and finitude (αορισμός & περιοχή) belong to the self, so also do possibility and necessity. A self that has no possibility is in despair, and likewise a self that has no necessity.” (SUD: 65).
45-6). Thus, this something acquires for example the form of death

“which is the fate of everyone” or of a sickness one succumbs to. On the contrary, despair

lies in the person himself. But if he were not a synthesis there would be no question of despairing; nor could he despair unless the synthesis were originally in the right relationship from the hand of God (ibid: 46)

Even death is not the ultimate resolution as it is in St. Augustine, for the consequences of the despair may result to the opposite direction and one may suffer from the inability to die. Indeed, Kierkegaard acknowledges that for the Christian understanding “death is itself a passing into life” and due to this “no earthly, physical sickness is unto death” (ibid: 47). More emphatically put, the physical death is not considered as absolute death, for it points to a new existence. On the contrary death is simply considered as “another minor event” (ibid: 38). Thus, Lazarus is not to been seen as suffering from a sickness that led him into death because his physical sickness was not “a sickness unto death” but quite the opposite. As anti-Climacus explains the reason that Lazarus’s sickness is not unto death is that “Christ exists” and not that he (Lazarus) was risen from the dead since in that case “in the end he must die anyway” (SUD: 37).

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61 Kierkegaard seems to distinguish between “human nature” and person; the first being what is common to all people as a ground, the latter what emerges from a synthesis which although was perfect originally, it longs for its former state now.

62 See Chapter Two.

63 “The sickness is not unto death” reads John’s Gospel (11.4); this fragment paves the ground upon which anti-Climacus builds his Sickness unto death (SUD: 37).
“Sickness unto death” is despair; it is exactly this sickness that distinguishes the human being from the “beast” in a different way than standing in an upright position\textsuperscript{66}. This is because “it bespeaks the infinite erectness or loftiness of his being spirit”. So, despair is a sickness of the spirit, uneasiness, and an “inexplicable” anxiety. Although in this chapter we have focused on the first instance of anxiety’s emergence and consequently a proper analysis of the consequent forms of anxiety that would allow a thorough discussion of its relation with despair has to be put aside, we can nevertheless remark that both anxiety and despair are bound with possibility. It is not only the relation of anxiety with the possibility of the awakening of spirit, that is a possibility that puts anxiety temporally\textsuperscript{67} before\textsuperscript{68} despair, but is also the possibility of salvation from “nothing” that binds both anxiety and despair together.

The educative role of possibility points to the liberation of the “death” of the spirit, that is the ultimate form of despair; the possibility of such a death is already present in the possibility of spirit’s emergence. Thus, the worst kind of despair is the “inability to die”, that is the inability to pass through the earthly death in order to be re-born.

\textsuperscript{66} There are other thinkers that give great importance to the erect position of the human being. For example, as Kant argues that for Herder the erect position is the essence of being human since he even acquires reason because of it. In Herder’s own words as quoted by Kant: “Let us pause for a moment to contemplate with gratitude this sacred work of art, this blessing which enabled our race to become human, and to wonder at it as we perceive the new organisation of forces which arose out of man’s erect stature, and as we see that it was through this alone that man became man” (RHIPM: 204).

\textsuperscript{67} Although in Kierkegaard’s eyes temporality has not yet entered the world.

\textsuperscript{68} Or one can also say that anxiety and despair made simultaneously their appearance since despair can be clearly seen as one of the possibilities anxiety faces, the other being freedom.
More emphatically put,

...the torment of despair is precisely the inability to die...Thus to be sick unto
death is to be unable to die, yet not as though there were hope of life. No, the
hopelessness is that even the last hope, death, is gone. When death is the
greatest danger, one hopes for life. But when one learns to know the even more
horrifying danger, one hopes for death. When the danger is so great that death
has become the hope, then despair is the hopelessness of not even being able to
die (SUD: 48).

According to Tillich, even the etymology of the word *despair* indicates its
meaning a state of being “without hope” (Tillich 1980: 54). It also points
to the threat of “nothingness”, or “in religious terms of eternal death”
(ibid: 38), that is of the death of the spirit. This is furthermore the same
kind of death as that dreaded by Adam and every consequent “Adam”.

But if we take into account anti-Climacus words, according to which

> Only the Christian knows what is meant by the sickness unto death. As a
Christian he has acquired a courage\(^69\) unknown to the natural man, a courage
he acquired by learning to fear something even more horrifying...When one fears
a danger infinitely, it is as if the others weren't there at all. But the truly
horrifying thing which the Christian has learned to know is the sickness unto
death (SUD: 39),

then the question arises: How can despair be a fundamental and
constitutive characteristic of the self from time immemorial and at the
same time acquire its full significance only in Christian consciousness?

In other words, did the people before the coming of Christ *despair*?

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\(^69\) Anti-Climacus argues that the Christian needs a kind of courage “unknown” to the natural human being
in order to learn the meaning of the *sickness unto death*. This Kierkegaard’s assertion might seem all the
more paradoxical or even absurd, given that it runs counter to Nietzsche’s now almost canonical attack on
Christianity—which might very well be an unacknowledged attack on Kierkegaard—that is fundamentally
premised on the claim that Christianity “needs sickness almost as much as Hellenism needs a superfluity of
health—making sick is the true hidden objective of the Church’s whole system of salvation procedures...one
must be sufficiently sick for it [i.e. Christianity]...We others, who have the courage for health and also for
contempt, what contempt we have for a religion...” (Anti-Christ: 179).
Furthermore, if as already remarked anxiety makes its appearance in Kierkegaard’s analysis before the moment of sin’s emergence, whilst “the consciousness of sin” is considered to be a Christian category, then the manner in which the people living before the coming of Christ were subject to anxiety has to be deemed problematic.

Furthermore how can we adequately conceptualize Adam’s relation to the categories of anxiety, sin and despair? It seems that Kierkegaard makes a twofold distinction concerning the eras before and after the coming of Christ. Firstly, he draws a temporal line, distinguishing the two periods in a conventionally temporal sense. In this case the first period is called Pagan and the latter Christian age. Secondly, he focuses on the latter period making yet another distinction between true Christianity and a mode of paganism, which thinks of itself as a representative of Christianity. Needless to say that Kierkegaard on the one hand repudiates the last form of paganism since he considers it responsible for

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70 One may wonder why Kierkegaard claims that the “consciousness of sin” is a Christian category instead of inscribing it to the wider context of Judaism-Christianity. Interestingly enough, Nietzsche claims quite the opposite. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss Nietzsche’s account on Judaism—the “first period” of which he seems to appreciate—his understanding of Judaism and Christianity, it should be remarked that he finds that the concepts of guilt, punishment, and sin were pre-eminent concepts of the Old-Testament and they were abolished in the “entire psychology of the Gospel” (Anti-Christ: 157). As Nietzsche ironically points out this is because the Gospel, as already indicated by its very name, presents us with the “glad tidings” and as such any kind of relation (e.g. sin) that implies distance between God and man is excluded (loc. Cit). Contrary to Nietzsche, Kierkegaard affirms the existence of a qualitative abyss between human beings and God, an abyss that is furthermore based on sin (SUD: 155); moreover the specificity of the “consciousness of sin” is precisely that it signals the beginning of an inward movement where the human being, in a qualitative way, stands and sins before God. As Kierkegaard claims “what made sin so terrible was its being before God” (SUD: 112), that is before “god in time” (PF: 111). Under this light, one can more clearly understand Kierkegaard’s abovementioned remark, i.e. that only a Christian knows the true meaning of the sickness unto death.
the pseudo-Christianity\textsuperscript{71} of his days. On the other hand, he favours
some aspects of ancient paganism, especially one of its most important
exemplifications, that is the thought of Socrates. Thus, we can assume
that for Kierkegaard sin, despair, anxiety were always present but only
with Christianity they acquire their full and significant meaning; we
could even say that until then they were only in the level of the
unconscious, explaining thus the different forms they acquired
throughout time. If we take \textit{despair} and \textit{sin} as an example, it could be
argued that although the “consciousness of sin” had not yet fully
developed, a form of sin manifested itself in Socrates\textsuperscript{72}’s age, mainly in
the form of ignorance (SUD: 120). If we focus on anxiety, we have to say
that Adam has to be seen, as we have already pointed out, as an
archetypal figure and in this sense one can understand better his
connection with the whole of humanity and human history. Kierkegaard
is not as naïve as to believe that anxiety has the same manifestation in
Adam and in every subsequent individual. This is why he spends a large

\textsuperscript{71} Anti-Climacus even argues that the centrality that modern philosophy puts on \textit{cogito ergo sum} that is on
“thought” is mainly due to the fact that it follows paganism but it alleges that it is Christian. This is what he
calls “the whole secret of modern philosophy” (SUD: 126).

\textsuperscript{72} The problem that anti-Climacus with the Socratic definition of sin is that it does not examine the origins
of ignorance. He thus asks: “...even if sin is ignorance...which is in a sense undeniable, are we take it to
be original ignorance? Is the state of ignorance then that of someone who has not known, and has hitherto
been unable to know, anything about the truth? Or is it an acquired, a later ignorance?” The latter case
presupposes an activity “whereby the person has worked at obscuring his knowledge”, and the question of
the conscience of the person arises. Was s/he conscious of obscuring his/her knowledge? If not, then the
knowledge was already obscured and then sin cannot be ignorance. If yes, then the emphasis is put not on
knowledge but on the will (SUD: 121). Although on the one hand anti-Climacus acknowledges that the
Socratic definition of sin has little to do with such objections since Socrates was an ethicist and not an
intellectualist, on the other hand he points out that the missing component in the Socratic definition is “the
will, defiance”. He also argues that the Greek mind “posits an intellectual categorical imperative”,
meaning that the Greeks consider understanding as the faculty responsible for the spontaneous conduct of
human beings (SUD: 122; Hannay 1989: 175 n.64).
part of his book on anxiety "as the consequence of sin". Leaving aside the
other forms that anxiety takes on in different ages, we shall briefly
discuss the form that anxiety takes in paganism.

Accordingly, paganism is identified with sensuousness but it is a
"sensuousness that has a relation to spirit, although spirit is not in the
deepest sense posited as spirit" (CA: 96). Thus, this possibility, namely
the possibility of a relation with spirit, is called anxiety. The object of
anxiety is nothingness and the latter in paganism signifies fate (CA: 96).

Fate

is a relation to spirit as external. It is a relation between spirit and something
else that is not spirit and to which fate nevertheless stands in a spiritual
relation. Fate may also signify exactly the opposite, because it is a unity of
necessity and the accidental (CA: 96-7)

This unity of the accidental and necessity has not been, according to
Kierkegaard conceptualized before, while the predominant73 conception
of fate identified the latter solely with necessity. Indeed, as Kierkegaard
argues, due to the previous conceptions of fate as necessity, “a vestige of
this necessity has been permitted to remain in the Christian view, in
which it came to signify fate, i.e., the accidental, that which is
incommensurable with providence” (CA: 97). Thus, for Kierkegaard the
expression “fate is blind” is an ingenious one since it summarizes the
aforementioned unity. According to him, someone who walks forward
blindly “walks as much by necessity as by accident” (CA: 97). Fate, as
the nothing of anxiety, is cancelled at the same time that anxiety is

73 At this point Kierkegaard mainly attacks Hegel’s paganism.
cancelled, that is when spirit is posited and providence takes over fate's place (loc. sit). Thus, fate and providence are conceived as incommensurable, especially under the light of Christianity. This is not to suggest the elimination of the element of fate, but mostly to pronounce that in effect fate has never existed. Kierkegaard suggests that in the case of fate one has to use the same words that St. Paul used in speaking about the idol: “there is no idol in the world; nevertheless, the idol is the object of the pagan’s religiousness” (CA: 97)

The problem of the pseudo-pagan-Christianity is of crucial importance for Kierkegaard and he consistently shows the danger that it entails. Thus, he even asserts the non-existence of true-Christians:

In the beginning there was no Christian at all. Then everyone became a Christian - and that's why once again there is no Christian. That was the end. Now we are at the beginning again. (Papers and Journals 1854 xi i A505 [23])

Kierkegaard offers us one of the most powerful critiques of his contemporary form of Christianity, accusing the so-called Christians in the most severe fashion, of not being Christians at all. Kierkegaard challenges his contemporaries, gives them the opportunity to exercise inwardness, but they were happy endorsing an external and formal Christian façade and they “just laugh” at him (Papers and Journals 1851 x 4 A 33). Quite interestingly, Johannes Climacus, in his book Philosophical Fragments, speaks of the historical appearance of God as
being “the news of the day in the market square, in homes, in council meetings in the ruler’s place”. The news of the day “is the beginning of eternity” (PF: 58). In a similar way Nietzsche in his parable of the madman in “The Gay science” speaks of a madman who run into a market place and like a town crier brought to the people the news of the day: “...God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.” (Gay Science 125:185). There is a parallel between those two thinkers although in a form of an obvious opposition (Is it a sign of an indirect communication? between them?). Kierkegaard speaks of the appearance of God in time perceiving this event as a tremendous one, since it is conceived as being both a historical point of departure and the beginning of eternity. At the same time Kierkegaard acknowledges the very fact that the objective knowledge of God’s birth in time does not guarantee an internalisation of this event, while most of the time it is objective

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74 According to Jaspers, Nietzsche had not read any of Kierkegaard works although he intended to study the “psychological problem of Kierkegaard” after Brandes’ instigation in 1888. Moreover, Jaspers argues that there is a unique relationship between those two thinkers although they never met or read each other’s work (Jaspers 1956: 151 n.b). It is striking though, that in addition to a possible notional affinity between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, one can also notice, as we have already seen, some hidden textual references in Kierkegaard’s work by Nietzsche. Besides the already mentioned references, we can also pay attention to a phrase, written in italics, whereas one can discern a hidden reference to Kierkegaard’s already mentioned claim that “... there was no Christian at all”. Thus, Nietzsche writes: “To reduce being a Christian, Christianess, to a holding something to be true, to a mere phenomenality of consciousness, means to negate Christianess. In fact there have been no Christians at all” (Anti-Christ: 163). Moreover, Kierkegaard is equally ironic and trenchant towards most of the clergy. Although Nietzsche’s metaphor according to which the love that the priests show to their flock is similar to the love that the wolves show to the sheep seems unprecedented, one can find a very similar one in Kierkegaard’s work. Indeed, Kierkegaard describes the pastors as cannibals “in the most abominable way”. He shows in a detailed manner how the true cannibal is much better than the pastor since “the cannibal eats his enemies. Not so the pastor. He gives the appearance of being exceptionally devoted to those whom he eats. The pastor, specifically the pastor, is the most devoted friend of those glorious ones...The pastor... hides as carefully as possible that he is a cannibal...”(Moment: 322-323).
knowledge which sets obstacles in the procedure of the appropriateness and internalisation of an event. As Johannes Climacus writes

...[the book Philosophical Fragments] is far from being written for nonknowers, to give them something to know, that the person I engage in conversation in this book is always knowledgeable, which seems to indicate that the book is written for people in the known, whose trouble is that they know too much. Because everyone knows the Christian truth, it has gradually become such a triviality that a primitive impression of it is acquired only with difficulty (CUP: 275 n*).

So, what is striking in the comparison of Nietzsche with Kierkegaard is that they both announce something not directly themselves but in an indirect way, under the name of a madman the first, under the name of Johannes Climacus the second. The madman addresses his “God is dead” to those who do not believe in God and Johannes announces the appearance of God to those who believe are Christians. But nobody understood the madman who after his announcement fell silent, only to comment: “I have come too early ...my time is not yet. This tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached the ears of ...this deed is still more distant from them than the most distant stars ... and yet they have done it themselves” (Gay Science 125:182).

Johannes’s answer to the objective announcement of the appearance of God is also a temporal one. One can only appropriate and internalise the event of the appearance of God when one decides to be contemporary75 with the historical birth of God and it is exactly this moment of decision that “intends to be the condition of one’s eternal happiness”(PHF : 58).

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75 We will deal later with the problem of contemporaneity and its relation with repetition.
This movement towards the eternal cannot be urged, it is a unique moment, which for Johannes has a special name: "the fullness of time" (loc. Cit)).
**Concluding remarks**

We have seen so far how anxiety - presented as “sympathetic antipathy and antipathetic sympathy” - expresses on the one hand the longing of the human being to become a self and as such to explore the infinite possibilities that are open to her, and on the other hand the dread and terror that accompany such an encounter with these possibilities. It seems that for Kierkegaard, if “nothing” in its various main disguises is the ultimate expression of this terror, then the possibility of the death of the spirit (i.e. the ultimate form of despair) is already present as a possibility even before the emergence of spirit and the constitution of the self. Thus, if possibility is what the individual faces in the first place, then, according to Kierkegaard possibility is what could also save the individual, only this time it acquires the form of faith. Kierkegaard conceives both anxiety and possibility as playing an edifying role in the development of the spirit:

Whoever is educated by anxiety is educated by possibility, and only he who is educated by possibility is educated according to his infinitude. Therefore possibility is the weightiest of all categories...in possibility all things are equally possible, and whoever has truly been brought up by possibility has grasped the terrible as well as the joyful...However, in order that an individual may thus be educated absolutely and infinitely by the possibility, he must be honest towards possibility and have faith (CA:157).
Indeed, for Kierkegaard faith transforms the individual and the world; faith is beyond temporal limitations\(^76\) and was always present as a possibility, in all ages\(^77\). The path that Kierkegaard suggests to his readers is full of dangers, the worst being suicide, as he readily admits. This happens because the individual may misunderstand anxiety "so that it does not lead him to faith but away from faith", which for Kierkegaard means that the individual is 'lost'. Indeed, it seems that the interaction of possibility and anxiety has effects similar to those of a whirlwind. We have already seen how anxiety is presented as dizziness; this is also the case with possibility:

> In actuality, no one ever sank so deep that he could not sink deeper, and there may be one or many who sank deeper. But he who sank in possibility- his eyes become dizzy, his eyes became confused ...his ear was closed so he could not hear what the market price of men was in his own day...He sank absolutely, but then in turn he emerged from the depth of the abyss lighter than all the troublesome and terrible things in life...[CA: 158].

Thus, the close "cooperation" of possibility and anxiety is of tremendous importance. The role of possibility is to discover all the possible finitudes and then to idealize them "in the form of infinity", whilst anxiety has the capacity to "overwhelm the individual" until s/he "again overcomes them [i.e. the finitudes] in the anticipation of faith" (loc. Cit). Moreover, Kierkegaard claims that the individual who is educated by possibility stays with anxiety since she does not allow herself to be tricked "by its

\(^76\) Such as the time before and after Christ.
\(^77\) We are going to see – in the last chapter- how the biblical figure of Abraham is the exemplification of the "knight of faith".
countless falsifications and *accurately remembers the past*" (CA: 157-emphasis added). This past, which arguably takes the form of *eternal past* in Schelling’s\(^{78}\) terminology, includes the whole journey of anxiety as recounted by Kierkegaard:

> Anxiety discovers fate, but just when the individual wants to put his trust in fate, anxiety turns around and takes fate away, because fate is like anxiety, and anxiety like possibility, is a magic picture...(CA: 159)

The next “nothing” that according to the philosopher anxiety encounters is “guilt”, while it is postulated that when guilt is limited in the sphere of the finite then

> Whoever learns to know his guilt only from the finite is lost in the finite, and finitely the question of whether a man is guilty cannot be determined except in an external, juridical, and most imperfect sense (CA: 161)

According to the author repetition and faith were always part of this journey, which in its unfolding reaches eventually the point where the “finitudes” begin to disappear. In what is described as the ‘third stage’ of this journey, freedom as possibility “breaks forth in its highest forms” and its supreme interest is “precisely to bring about repetition”. Thus, the question for Constantius, the pseudonymous author of *Repetition*, arises: “*Is repetition possible?*” (Repetition: 302).

Any attempt to answer this question should not fail to take into account anti-Climacus statement that “the question is whether he [i.e.

\(^{78}\) For a discussion of Schelling’s account of eternal past see chapter three.
the individual] will believe that for God everything is possible, that is, whether he will have faith", so that freedom and possibility would acquire a new, this time infinite meaning. For God everything is possible and as Constantius emphasizes:

If God himself had not willed repetition, the world would not have come into existence. Either he would have followed the superficial plans of hope or he would have retracted everything and preserved it in recollection. This he did not do. Therefore, the world continues, and it continues because it is repetition (Repetition: 133).

If this is the case, then what is the relation of the will of God and the will of the human beings? This quite significant question should remain open until a proper discussion on repetition in Kierkegaard’s oeuvre in the last chapter opens the path for its proper evaluation.

The present chapter might well conclude with the citation of the last words of The Concept of Anxiety, offered here as a possible trace of the puzzling relationship between the human and the divine, of philosophy and theurgy, of the meeting point between human endeavours and divine creation:

Yet the hypochondriac is only an imperfect autodidact when compared with the person who is educated by possibility...The true autodidact is precisely in the same degree a theodidact, as another author has said, or to use another expression less reminiscent of the intellectual, he is αὐτοῦργος τις τῆς φιλοσοφίας [one who in his own cultivates philosophy] and in the same degree θεουργος [one who tends the things of God]...(CA: 162)

Indeed this passage is a quite ‘strong’ conception of the relationship between the human and the divine and compels us to ‘take notice’ of –
and further explore its dynamics. Thus, in the next chapter the postulation of a radical gap between the human and the divine is discussed and assessed through a reinterpretation of St. Augustine and Kant, while a more ‘open’ account of this relationship based on a radical conception of theurgy is given by Schelling and discussed in the third chapter of the present work.
"Misconceptions like this are unavoidable", he said, "now that we've eaten of the Tree of Knowledge. But Paradise is locked and bolted, and the cherubium stands behind us. We have to go on and make the journey round the world to see if it is perhaps open somewhere at the back"... "Does that mean...we must eat again of the Tree of Knowledge in order to return to our state of innocence?" "Of course" he said, "but that's the last chapter in the history of the world" (Kleist: 5 & 10).

Introductory remarks

The tree of knowledge, the alleged state of innocence, a postulated journey towards freedom, the knowledge of good and evil, etc, are the common representations that can be found in most narrations of the theme of the Fall of human beings. A hypothetical state of natural man is presupposed and is the shared underlying feature of all these narratives. What follows then, is an understandable urge to escape from such a 'confining' state and a longing for freedom and knowledge, with all the consequences that this last entails. What is more, in the majority of these stories the inescapability of the Fall is treated as being almost

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79 Since at this state, the human being is seen as being deprived of freedom.
80 Even Augustine- who did never come to speak of the inescapability of the fall but argued quite the contrary- leaves open the possibility- in our reading of him- of the "good aspect" of the fall. More specifically, when he speaks of the creation of the first man, arguing against those who claim that he would have been created either wise or folly, he proposes the existence of an intermediate state "which could be
obvious, despite the vast amount of conceptual problems that this postulation brings to the fore and among which one could undoubtedly include the emergence of evil, the beginning of suffering, etc. In the course of the ages many explanations of the Fall have been given, and many attempts to "situate" and to adequately explain the origins of evil have emerged, all of them related not only to the philosophical and/or theological background of each thinker but also to the historical period s/he was born. The questions that arise are innumerable, and from this same story many completely different accounts have arisen; there are some that find the possibility of salvation in the progressive unfolding of history, others that see it as a return to the state of a lost Paradise. Kleist suggests, maybe in an ironic manner, a return to the state of innocence, but with one condition, that is to eat again of the "Tree of Knowledge". How should we interpret this enigmatic vision? Is this an indication that the thinker accepts the inescapability of the unfolding of history, or is he suggesting the possibility of a return to a pre-fallen state for humanity? Moreover, if the latter is the case, then why do we have to eat again from the Tree of Knowledge? Is the repetition of the same act tantamount to a restoration of the former state? If Kleist wishes to refer here to a higher state, why does he name it "state of innocence"? It is beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt to "answer"

called neither folly nor wisdom" (Free Choice: 229). Thus, the first man being not yet wise has, in a sense, the longing to become wise.  
81 Such a return would be seen as tantamount to what Kierkegaard calls "recollection"
these questions, not only because of the chapter’s more confined thematic horizon, but mainly due to the fact that they belong to questions that function as the always annulled -and perpetually renewed- points of departure for thought.

The Cherubiums –let us recall- stand in front of the gate of paradise, in order to prevent us eating from the Tree of Life, to prevent time from prematurely becoming eternity. Kleist’s story proposes to his readers a journey round the world to “see if [the gate of paradise] is perhaps open somewhere at the back”. In what follows we intend to follow his suggestion and start off for a journey where we would come across many ‘meeting points’ of time and eternity.

As part of this journey the aim of this chapter - as well as of the next one - will be to suspend for a while our direct analysis of Kierkegaard and to explore divergent accounts of the creation and the Fall, in order to “take notice” of the issues that Kierkegaard has opened up and consequently to deepen our understanding of their importance.

In the last pages of the previous chapter, we came briefly across another concept than that of anxiety, namely the concept of repetition. Repetition will play a concomitant –although latent- role in our exploration, until the last chapter, where we will attempt a more complete analysis of it. The exemplary form of repetition is often described by Kierkegaard or/and his pseudonymous authors as the “religious leap”. Thus, the religious leap is for the individual the always-
deferred telos and in this respect it might seem at first glance that the pseudonymous authors provide us with a linear conception of time and consequently with a conception of both the history of human race and of the human individual as tending towards an end. If this were the case though how could one explain the importance that Kierkegaard attributes to radically new beginnings? His choice and employment of the concept of repetition⁸² implies in itself a conception of cyclical⁸³ time where the interplay between eternity and time⁸⁴ is always present. Constantius defines repetition as a “transcendent, religious movement by virtue of the absurd- when the borderline of the wondrous is reached”, eternity being true repetition” (Repetition: 305).

Constantius then focuses his attention on the repetition as exemplified in the life of a human individual (ibid: 287), his main interest being its relation with freedom (ibid: 297), since for him repetition is “a task for freedom”. In its individual manifestations, repetition is shown by the author to presuppose the consciousness of sin and in its higher form to signify atonement (ibid: 313).

We have already cited before the following passage:

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⁸² The development of the concept of repetition is elaborated in the book Repetition written by Constantin Constantius.
⁸³ To be more precise, one has to speak better of a both linear and cyclical conception of time since a progressive element is also implied in the conception of a new beginning.
⁸⁴ The interplay between eternity/infinity and time/finitude is arguably discernible both in linear and cyclical conceptions of time. The aforementioned interplay is pivotal to Kierkegaard’s thought, as we have already seen. (e.g. in the Concept of anxiety where the person is presented as a synthesis of finitude and eternity (CA : 102).
If God himself had not willed repetition, the world would not have come into existence. Either he would have followed the superficial plans of hope or he would have retracted everything and preserved it in recollection. This he did not do. Therefore, the world continues, and it continues because it is repetition (Repetition: 133).

This passage allows us to “take notice” of the almost inexhaustible variety of possible interpretations to which it may be subjected and which may furthermore lead to the development of radically different viewpoints. In addition to a whole sequence of questions that arise concerning the nature of God, of God’s will, of God’s power to will repetition, of existence, of continuation and conservation of the world, there is also a pivotal question that arguably provides the “ground” for all the others to emerge. This question is certainly the one concerning the proper meaning of Kierkegaard’s phrase “if God had not willed repetition”. How is this to be interpreted? Does Kierkegaard refer to the primordial act of the creation of the world or does he simply point to the human act of repetition that can save a human being after the Fall? Is repetition an act of God, a human act, or a combination of both?

If, as we have seen- the introduction of the “concept” of anxiety by Kierkegaard signifies a different understanding of the Fall according to which not only there is neither a rigid distinction between the “before” and “after” of the Fall, nor an abysmal difference between Adam and the postulated subsequent human beings, it would be of interest, in this

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85 The allusion to Leibniz is more than obvious at this passage; a more detailed discussion on this we will attempt in the last chapter of this thesis.
chapter, to attempt a presentation of two accounts that in one way or another, implicitly or explicitly, favor the opposite interpretation of the Fall. The first account to be discussed in this context is that of St. Augustine, the second that of Kant. On the one hand, St. Augustine presents us with the conception of a radical split between the time before and after the Fall. On the other hand, Kant explores the issue of the Fall according to the rule of the "as if", that is according to the imaginary dimension that the "as if" conveys to such postulations as an allegedly pre-fallen state of humanity, etc. Thus, it seems to us that in the case of Kant, repetition acquires the form of functioning exclusively on the level of the individual's being-into-the world, whilst in the case of St. Augustine it is seen as functioning mainly -but not exclusively- on the level of cosmological time. Both thinkers can be seen as following, explicitly or implicitly, the strategy of attributing to history a merely hypothetical or "fantastic beginning", which made Kierkegaard wonder whether a condition such that of pre-fallen Adam had any actual currency for them.
2.1.1 St. Augustine & the possibility of time before the Fall

St. Augustine's analysis of time and his radical separation of the time before and after the Fall, points to the extrapolation of a qualitative difference between Adam before the Fall and every subsequent individual. Thus, according to Kierkegaard, even a theological approach as such of St. Augustine⁸⁶, presupposes a "dialectical-fantastic" beginning:

The history of the human race acquired a fantastic beginning. Adam was fantasticallly placed outside this history. Pious feeling and fantasy got what they demanded, a godly prelude, but thought got nothing.”(CA: 25)

Although Kierkegaard did not make at this point a direct reference to St. Augustine, quoting Aquinas's remark that "Adam lost donum divinitus datum supranaturale et admirable [a supernatural and wonderful gift bestowed by God Unauthorized (CA: 25), one has to remember that it was St. Augustine's analysis that brought forward what was to become later the cornerstone of Catholicism. Indeed, it was St. Augustine, in his attempt to oppose Pelagianism who stated that “in fallen man freedom to do good was completely annihilated; the grace of God is everything” (S. Rose 2000: 601). In brief, Pelagians emphasise the importance and power of human

⁸⁶ Kierkegaard characterises as “dialectical-fantastical presupposition” mainly Catholicism's presupposition. Although Augustine lived before the schism of the churches and as such we cannot consider him as a pure representative of Catholicism, we have to emphasise that he is considered among the Doctors of the Catholic Church and he was among the first to present us with a narrative like the one that Kierkegaard much later characterises as a dialectical-fantastical.
will. Thus, contrary to St. Augustine, Pelagianism starts "from a fiercely optimistic vision of our nature" since it recognises the possibility of 'good will' on the part of the human being (Cioran 1987: 108). Pelagius's fundamental claim concerns firstly the repudiation of the traditional doctrine of the original sin, arguing instead "[that]...every man, like Adam before the Fall, is born without sin". Secondly, it concerns the belief that the human being, unaided by the grace of God and by her pure free will, could comply to the commandments of God and "merit grace" (CA: 231 n.12 ; City: xiv). Moreover, the Pelagians, in St. Augustine's formulation,

likewise assert that God's grace, given through faith in Christ, and which is neither the Law nor nature, has power only to remit past sins and does not help us avoid future sins or to overcome temptations (Grace: 279)

Thus, the Pelagians are denying the help of God – except in the case of the remission of past sins- in the attempt of a human being to attain salvation. On the contrary, they put major emphasis on human will and on its sole journey towards redemption and salvation. Indeed, the centre

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87 One has not to confuse Pelagius assertion regarding the pre-Adamic state of each human being and that of Kierkegaard's. We have already seen in the previous chapter that although Kierkegaard favours the notion of "qualitative difference" to the detriment of the quantitative one, he nevertheless does not forget to emphasise also the importance of the latter dimension of difference as well. If in qualitative difference the centre of gravity lies in the individual, then in quantitative difference it lies in the human race. This is evident in Kierkegaard's claim that "anxiety will be more reflective in a subsequent individual than in Adam, because the quantitative accumulation left behind by the race now makes itself felt in the individual" (CA: 52). Moreover, Kierkegaard has a clear stance against Pelagius, accusing him of leaving aside completely the dimension of "race" in his analysis: "...man is individium and as such simultaneously himself and the whole race, and in such a way that the whole race participates in the individual and the individual in the whole race. If this is not held fast, one will fall either into the Pelagian, Socinian, and philanthropic singular or into the fantastic" (CA: 28 –emphasis added).
of their theology becomes the "human being" and its moral sufficiency. Although it is beyond our current interest to discuss in detail St. Augustine's controversy with Pelagius, we find quite interesting and useful for our further exploration to emphasise the importance that St. Augustine attributes to God's grace.

According to St. Augustine, grace is not given by God in proportion to human being's merit, as Pelagius has argued, since in that case it would no longer be called grace (Grace: 303). The cooperation of God in everyday human conduct is much more effective after the Fall. Thus, if before the Fall, there was in action a supernatural gift bestowed by God, then after the Fall everything radically changed and salvation was possible only through gratia cooperans. St. Augustine further distinguishes between gratia operans and gratia cooperans (Grace: 289, n.7).

The former can be seen as the presupposition of the latter, or in other words, human being's will to act towards good is only possible in cooperation with God's grace, as the following passage makes plain:

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88 The problem of the origin of evil emerges at this point. How, is it possible for God to be responsible for every good act of our will, to give us the power to will and then not to be responsible for evil? Augustine replies in detail to this multidimensional and perplexing question. Augustine answers: "a perverse will... is the cause of evil". By "perverse will" he means a will that desires immoderately and as such it is synonymous with avarice and cupidity (Free Choice: 209-210). The relation of avarice with the Fall is evident, and makes Augustine speak of the avarice of the mind. As Alliez emphasises "it should be remembered... that in Genesis original sin is that sin of the mind that consists in promoting the appetite for knowledge and, consequently, in turning away from God. It follows that according to the book of Genesis original sin is "avarice of the mind" (Alliez 1996: 269 n.100).

89 In order to overcome the issue of compatibility of freedom of the will and of God's intervention, Augustine claims that "the choice of the will, then, is genuinely free only when it is not subservient to faults and sins. God gave it that true freedom, and now that it has been lost, through its own fault, it can be restored only by him who had the power to give it at the beginning" (City XIV. c.11: 569). This leads us to
God, then works in us, without our cooperation, the power to will, but once we begin to will, and do so in a way that brings us to act, then it is that He cooperates with us. But if He does not work in us the power to will or does not cooperate in our act of willing, we are powerless to perform good works of a salutary nature (ibid: 289).

The distinction between these two kinds of grace is analogous to the distinction that was made few sentences before by St. Augustine, namely the distinction of imperfect and perfect love (Grace: 289, n.7). By "imperfect" love he means the love that Peter showed to Christ when he denied him thrice, whilst "perfect" love is exemplified in John the Evangelist's saying that "there is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear" (ibid:288). Quite interestingly, St. Augustine considers the love that Peter expresses towards Christ when he declared "I will lay down my life for thee" as not yet "perfect love" but being still superior from "imperfect love" and indicating Peter's intention to "do what he had the will to do" (loc. Cit). Thus, the task to attain "perfect love" becomes for St. Augustine, almost impossible in the limits of the earthly city that is the

the Augustinian concept of 'conversio'. Girard points to the peculiarity of the fact that Augustine did not use the term 'conversio' in his autobiographical text par excellence, that is his Confessions, but he used it only in The City of God, when he speaks about "Satan's efforts to prevent us from achieving our conversion to the true God" (Girard 1999: 37). Girard further shows that in the classical [Christian] view conversion "is not something of our doing but the personal intervention of God in our lives". Because of that Christian "conversio" is not a circular phenomenon as the latin etymology of the term and its pagan significations suggest, but it rather points to a 'linear open-ended phenomenon' that "is moving toward a totally unpredictable future" (ibid: 37). Leibniz converges with Augustine at this point, as it is evident in the following words: "For Conversion is purely the work of God's grace, wherein man co-operates only by resisting it", whilst he lives open the space for speaking of 'lesser' or 'greater' degree of co-operation when he clarifies that "...human resistance is more or less great according to the persons and the occasions" (Theodicy: 69). We will see the affinities of Christian "conversio" and Pagan 'conversio' with Kierkegaard's 'repetition' and 'recollection' in our fourth chapter.
city of men. The origin of the earthly city is not to be found in Adam\(^{90}\) and Eve, but in their son Cain, whilst Abel, who is considered by the author as a "pilgrim" did not find another\(^{91}\) earthly city, for "the City of the saints is up above, although it produces citizens here below, and in their persons the City is on pilgrimage until the time of its kingdom comes" (City XV ch.2: 596). Thus, for St. Augustine the attainment of "perfect" love and the consequent absolute abandonment of self-love\(^{92}\) is a tentative process, a pilgrimage that can not bring forth the reconciliation of those two Cities, and of cosmic and human time within the limits of temporality and historical existence.

According to St. Augustine, the cosmic\(^{93}\) time of creation is not the same time in which the human beings exist and which they experience daily. The latter time is "not God's but humanity's since the latter rejects God's time as the time of the world" (Alliez 1996: 98).

\(^{90}\) Although, if we want to be more precise, we have to notice also that for Augustine the human origin of the two cities is to be found in the first-man, that is Adam, since it is him that represents the beginning of all mankind. Thus, "in this first-created man we find something like the beginning, in the human race, of the two cities; their beginnings, that is, in the foreknowledge of God, though not in observable fact" (City XII ch.27: 508).

\(^{91}\) As it is the case with the twin brothers Remus and Romulus. Augustine considers their quarrel as being an exemplification of the division inside the earthly city. On the other hand, Abel and Cain "did not both entertain the same ambition for earthly gains." (City XV Ch 6: 600).

\(^{92}\) The different kinds of love that correspond to the two cities is clear in the following: "The earthly city was created by self-love reaching the point of contempt for God, the Heavenly City by the love of God carried as far as contempt of self. In fact, the earthly city glories in itself, the Heavenly City glories in the Lord" (City XIV ch.28: 593).

\(^{93}\) In the City of God Augustine refers to the simultaneous creation of cosmos and of time, emphasising that the cosmos was created with time and not in time for the latter implies a creation taking place in a specific point of time, that being measured in terms of before or after a length of time. (City XI ch.6: 296)
In other words, that time is

that of human beings, who, since the fall of the angel and the twin sins of Adam and Cain at the origins of the earthly city, put self-love in opposition to the love of God, by turning [their will] away from immutable and universal good and towards [their own] particular good (Alliez 1996: 98).

The introduction of sin into the world either in the form of the original sin as described by St. Augustine or as the almost inexplicable subsequent qualitative leaps following Adam’s first leap as described by Kierkegaard, points towards the problem of the transition from cosmic time to historical\textsuperscript{94} time. In Alliez’s formulation

\textsuperscript{94} Mircea Eliade nicely elaborates the consequences of this split between history and cosmology in his study \textit{The Myth of the eternal return: Cosmos and history}. What for Eliade is one of the fundamental concepts of the “archaic societies” (The question of whether Eliade’s distinction between archaic and modern societies and more specifically his conception of a pre-Socratic(or traditional) man (Eliade 1991 : x) can be justified is beyond the scope of our presentation. It seems though that Eliade follows Nietzsche’s perception of Socrates as the first “theoretical man”) is their “revolt against concrete, historical time, their nostalgia for a periodical return to the mythical time of the beginning of things...” (Eliade 1991: ix). One of the common features of most of these societies is that not only their rituals but everyday life situations are acts of recreation, of repetition of the primordial act, or in other words “[of] the transformation of chaos into cosmos by the divine act of creation” (ibid: 10). Through that act of repetition, these societies were “granted freedom each year to begin a new, a pure existence, with virgin possibilities” (ibid: 157). On the contrary, the modern man affords “the type neither of a free being nor of a creator of history” (loc.Cit). This is, according to Eliade, mainly because Christianity, the religion of modern man (that being the historical man), introduces not only a linear/continuous conception of time (instead of a cyclical one) but also a new category, that of faith. Consequently, “Since what is involved is a religious experience wholly different from the traditional experience, since what is involved is faith, Christianity translates the periodic regeneration of the world into a regeneration of the human individual (ibid: 128)...for the Christian too, history can be regenerated, by and through each individual believer, even before the Saviour’s second coming, when it will utterly cease for all Creation” (ibid: 130). Not only in Christianity but also in Judaism and in Iranian religion, there are still reminiscences of the archaic periodic regeneration of the world. The argument runs, that those religions share a common feature in that although they “have limited the duration of the cosmos to some specific number of millennia and affirm that history will finally cease in illo tempore, there still survive certain traces of the ancient doctrine of the periodic regeneration of history” (Eliade 1991 : 130).

Specifically, in Christianity history can also be abolished and renewed numerous times “before the final eschaton is realized”. In conclusion, the author states that: “...the Christian liturgical year is based upon a periodic and real repetition of the Nativity, Passion, death, and Resurrection of Jesus, with all that this mystical drama implies for a Christian; that is, personal and cosmic regeneration through reactualization in concreto of the birth, death and resurrection of the Saviour” (loc. Cit). Nevertheless, one could point to
...with sin, time becomes the number of a “violent” motion, one that is forced and no longer natural, the movement of a will that moves away from God—and everything is as if carried away by the fleeting moment, and things flow like the rush of a torrent...The irreversibility of time, which turns sin into the engine of history, dates from the fall (Alliez 1996: 99).

Thus, this perfect cosmos that God created does not exist anymore, and as Kierkegaard cries out in exasperation:

Happy the person who saw the world in all its perfection when everything was still very good; happy the person who with God was witness to the glory of creation... (EUD: 62)

Thus, in the case of St. Augustine, one can possibly apply the category of repetition solely to God’s creative activity, to the action of his free will as belonging solely to “his substance” to create a perfect cosmos. At the end of Genesis we read: “And God saw everything that he had made,

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95 Although the application of the categories of repetition, recollection and hope to God points to an anthropomorphic perception of divinity one can understand them via eminences (in a higher sense). Even in that case one has to perceive them not as being attributes of God but as aspects of his will’s revelation. We have already seen that hope and recollection were the two choices that according to Kierkegaard God had if “he had not willed repetition”. In Kierkegaard’s thought, there are essentially two kinds of illusion that are hope and recollection. As he characteristically comments, “the adolescent’s illusion is that of hope” and “that of the adult recollection” (SUD: 89). God would never have followed the path of hope, which for Kierkegaard is a superfluous path in which the “uneasy adventurousness of discovery” is pre-eminent (ibid: 131). If one takes into consideration that independently of any approval of the doctrine of pre-destination, the Christian theologians seem to agree on God’s foresight then the possibility of hope is excluded for God has nothing new to discover. See for example St. Augustine’s Confessions: “For if in God any new development took place and any new intention, so as to make a creation which he had never made before, how then can there be a true eternity in which a will, not there previously, comes into existence? For God’s will is not a creature, but is prior to the created order, since nothing would be created unless the Creator’s will preceded it” (Confessions: XI x (12) p. 228). For Kierkegaard, the possibility of recollection is also excluded, for recollection is a movement backwards towards the eternal which lies “behind as the past that can only be entered backwards” (CA: 90). But if one wishes to take seriously this consideration, one has to see it as being relevant to the question “What was God doing before he made heaven and earth? If he was unoccupied...and doing nothing, why does he not always remain the same for ever, just as before creation he abstained from work?” (Confessions XI x (12): 228). But, even the utterance of this question implies the imposition of the categories of the infinite succession of time (past, present, future) to God, and this renders the question impossible both for Augustine (Confessions: xi(13): 228ff) and Kierkegaard(CA: 81ff).

96 In his Confessions Augustine explicitly claims that God’s will “belongs to his very substance” (Confessions XI x (12): 228).
and, behold, it was very good..." It could be said of biblical time that it follows a repetitive pattern either in the form of the repetition\(^{97}\) of the day one of the creation or in the form of the repeated sequence "And the evening and the morning..." that accompanies the days of the creation. I am using the term repetitive pattern in order to differentiate it from a purely cyclical\(^{98}\) pattern and consequently to avoid any possible confusion.

In opposition to all accounts that consider Christianity as introducing a purely linear\(^{99}\) conception of time, one can juxtapose the possibility of an alternative account of the story of creation where the role of repetition could be pivotal. More specifically, this could be traced in one of St. Basil's writings entitled «Εξαεδήμερον » (the six days), which is a series of nine sermons on the day of creation.

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\(^{97}\) Although in Augustine one cannot find an explicit reference to the repetitive aspect of the biblical time, for he speaks of time as a variable movement of the arrangement of the days of the creation (City XI.ch.6: 296). It has also be argued that Augustine, in his book The literal meaning of Genesis, even suggests (but not insist on that suggestion) that "the days of creation were not periods of time but a literary device to describe the angels contemplating all the works of creation, which in reality occurred totally in one instant" (S. Rose 2000: 102 n *). On the contrary, St. Basil offers an elaborate analysis on the issue in question in his book Heaximeron.

\(^{98}\) Augustine repudiates any cyclical theory of time, especially, if it is to be seen as a "cyclical theory of the world's history" after the Fall. Augustine sees it as a burden of the soul that is almost obliged to alternate its state from misery to happiness and conversely. Indeed, the cycles of ages are unable, for Augustine, "to rescue the immortal soul from this merry-go-round, even when it has attained wisdom; it must proceed on an unremitting alternation between false bliss and genuine misery" (City XII ch.14: 487). Interestingly enough, the cyclical conception of time after the Fall, is not considered as the best possible path not only for the official Christianity but also for most of the Gnostics. As one can see in Hoeller's (2001) Jungian account of Gnosticism, the Gnostic soul is imprisoned by the aions in a cyclical wheel on earth that makes them inert and passive and make them forget their origin.

\(^{99}\) For example, Mircea Eliade emphasises that the Christian conception of time is linear, and he points to its first being outlined by St. Irenaeus of Lyon (2nd century) and its being "taken up again by St. Basil and St. Gregory and be finally elaborated by St. Augustine"(Eliade 1991 : 144). Contrary to this assumption, one has to pay attention to the fact that it is exactly in St. Basil that one can find both a linear and a cyclical conception of time.
Just few pages before the end of the second speech, St. Basil is commenting on the day one of the creation, which is described in Genesis as follows:

> And God said, let there be light; and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good; and God divided the light from the darkness. And God called the light Day and the darkness he called Night. And the evening and the morning were the first day [day one-ἡμέρα μιᾷ].

The question arises: Why is the text referring to the first day as day one of the creation and not simply as the first (πρῶτη) day of an event which will be completed in seven days? Day one (μιᾷ), a unique day among the others, not simply the prior one in temporal or in hierarchical terms, but the day where time came into play, the day which repeats itself, which leaves and returns in itself seven times (i.e. in a week’s duration). And because of this cyclical (Ἀνασκόλουθαι) movement, the day one, the head of time as St. Basil calls it, resembles eternity (αἰωνιοί):

> ὡς αὐτῷ τὴν χρόνου φυσιν κατασκεύασε θεὸς μετρα αὐτῷ καὶ σημεῖα τὰ τῶν ἡμερῶν επεβαλεὶ διαστήματα, καὶ εβδομάδι αὐτὸν εκμετρῶν, αἷς τὴν εβδομάδα εἰς εαυτὴν αὐν αὐξάλουσθαι. κέλευε, εξορθίουσαν τῷ χρόνῳ τὴν κινήσιν. Τὴν εβδομάδα δὲ παλιν εκπλήρων τὴν ἡμέραν μιᾷ.

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100 Philo of Alexandria also emphasises the pre-eminence of day one: “...a measure of time was forthwith brought about, which its maker called Day, and not first day but one, an expression due to the uniqueness of the intelligible world, and to its having therefore a natural kinship to the number One” (Philo’s On the creation IX 33-36: 27). Thus, as Philo claims, whilst the Creator assigned to each day “some of the portions of the whole”, he names the very first day, day one for He “discerned in it and expressed by the title which He gives it the nature and appellation of the unit or the one” (ibid III 14-17: 15). Moreover, “day one” is conceived by Philo as the God-like prototype, or the “seal” in God’s mind, according to which the rest of the days are brought into the fore (ibid: IV 16-17: 15).
So, the prominence of the day\textsuperscript{103} one is evident, for it is exactly this image (εἰκόνα)\textsuperscript{104} of eternity that moves the person into an experience of the future life, while this day will repeat itself eternally. What is more interesting is that St. Basil does not make a hint that this eternal repetition of this day will cease after “the final eschaton is realized”\textsuperscript{105}.

\textsuperscript{102} “God, the creator of the nature of time, put measures and signs of time’s measurement the intervals (diastemata) of days. Measuring time by the week, he orders that the week should constantly recycle in itself, so as to count the movement of time. The week is fulfilled by the day one, for the latter returns to itself seven times; for the pattern (schema) is cyclical, starting from itself and leading to itself. This is also the characteristic of the aion, namely to return to itself and never come to an end [or alternatively - and have no limits]. For that reason, he called the head of time day one and not first day. So that even its name would denote its affinity to the aion” (my translation).

\textsuperscript{103} On the contrary, St. Augustine dissociates the ‘notion of day from any cosmological support’ (Alliez 1996: 111).

\textsuperscript{104} There are two meanings of the Greek word εἰκόνα. The one has its roots in the ancient greek language and the other in the biblical one as a translation of the Hebraic word celem. The first meaning is analogical and is etymologically deriving from the verb εἰκάω, εἰκόνα. It means image, copy, presentation, or analogical representation of the form. By contrast, the second meaning has different connotations. It means emergence, coming-into-being, representation, and equality in relationship or/and substitution. So, it is argued that the second meaning preserves a living, active relationship, that it is a σχέσις λογοποιησις between the two parts while the first is more static and it more or less exhausts itself in a formal and logical correlation between the two terms (Yannaras 1988: 77 n.2; See also W. Eichord, Theologie des Alten Testaments, Teil 2/3, Stuttgart 1961, p.79). This is all the more evident if one takes into account the word συγγενεία that St. Basil uses in order to express this relationship. It is also of utmost importance to clarify that when St. Basil is referring to συγγενεία, he does not identify it with God who is eternal (αἰωνιός) but he means by this term the created σώματα for an elaborated analysis on this issue see Matsoukas Dogmatics and Symbolic Theology 1985 : 180-193). One has also to consider with caution the similarities and dissimilarities between St. Basil’s use of the term and Plato’s one in Timaeus that reads: “The nature of the living Being was eternal, and it was not possible to bestow this attribute fully on the created universe; but he determined to make a moving image of eternity, and so when he ordered the heavens he made in that which we call time an eternal moving image of eternity which remains for ever at one (Timaeus 37de).

\textsuperscript{105} He only names as the eighth day, the day of the kingdom of God which lies beyond the weekly measured time (ST.Basil : Exaimeros B44). It is interesting that Nicholas Berdyaev calls the "eighth day” “the Third Epoch". Berdyaev could see the coming of a time when our creative potential will be more developed. We will then be in a position to collaborate with God to re-create the world (Internet Berdyaev’s home page; http://members.xoom.com/dirkkerdyacv/bp.htm). Thus, “in the religion of the Spirit, the religion of freedom, everything ... will be founded, not upon judgment and recompense, but on creative development and transfiguration, on likeness to God”. (Berdyaev 1947: 222)
The final eschaton that is the second coming of Christ is the consequence of the Fall of Adam. But how could one say with certainty that an event which is posterior to the act of creation, can determine the future of the creation? Were one willing to admit this, one would face the danger of assuming that the life of a human person is predestined from eternity, thereby annihilating any notion of human freedom.

By this we do not mean to ask a question such as “What if Adam had not sinned?”, a question that Kierkegaard himself would never want us to ask. Under one of his pseudonyms, Kierkegaard warns us: “Were I allowed to make a wish, then I would wish that no reader would be so profound to ask: What if Adam had not sinned? In the moment actuality is posited, possibility walks by its side as a nothing that entices every thoughtless man. If only science could make up its mind to keep men under discipline and to bride itself” (CA: 50). On the other hand, St. Augustine writes mercilessly: “if he had not been a man...he [Christ] could not have been to death” (Alliez 1996:94).
2.1.2. Human or psychological time in St. Augustine

After the Fall, God's activity is still present but has a different nature, or in other words, it alters – according to the theologians of the late Augustinian school- from *gratia versatilis* ("inefficacious grace") into *gratia efficax*\(^{107}\) ("efficacious grace"). The former "was sufficient for man in the state of innocence" whilst the latter "is necessary for man after the Fall" (Grace: 289, n.7).

St. Augustine seems to deny any objective definition or measurement of time as it is exemplified in an ascription of time to "the movements of sun, moon, and stars" (*Confessions* XI xxiii (29): 237). He denies the connection between physical movement and time developed by Aristotle, according to whom " time is neither movement nor independent of movement...For time is just this – number of motion in respect of before and after" (*Physics* 219a2&219b; Ricoeur 1988: 15-6). St. Augustine's\(^{108}\) anxiety to distinguish between the time before the Fall and the subsequent time of the decay points to an exclusion of the physical reality concerning the analysis of time and to a development of a purely

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\(^{107}\) Augustine himself also uses similar terminology when he speaks of the "efficacious power" of God upon our will (Grace: 287).

\(^{108}\) According to Ricoeur, Augustine's perception of time is aporetic and it does not exclude completely any notion of cosmology. As he points out: "Augustine has no other resource when it comes to the cosmological doctrines than to oppose them the time of a mind that distends itself. This mind has to be that of an individual soul but by no means that of a world soul. Yet his meditation on the beginning of Creation leads Augustine to confess that time itself had a beginning along with created things. This time must be that of every creature, therefore, in a sense that cannot be explicated within the framework of the doctrine in Book XI of the *Confessions*, a cosmological time...In short, the physical definition of time by itself is incapable of accounting for the psychological conditions for the apprehension of this time" (Ricoeur 1988: 244). For Alliez the Augustinian aporia as developed by Ricoeur vanishes as soon as "the split between original-Adamic time and the derived time of the Fall , between the time of creation and the time of the decay is taken into account" (Alliez 1996: 127).
psychological conception of it. In this account, past, present and future would not be admitted an objective reality in themselves. Neither the past can be for “it is not now present”, nor the future can be since it “is not yet present” (Confessions xiv (17): 230). In addition, although among them only the present can be, this is also an untenable position, for as long as you try to catch the present it has become already past, while what “remains to it is future”. St. Augustine concludes that “If we can think of some bit of time which cannot be divided into even the smallest instantaneous moments, that alone is what we can call present” (ibid: xv (20): 232-emphasis added). He nevertheless, confesses that although he cannot give a definite answer to the question of time, at least he knows that wherever the past and the future are, “they are not there as future or past, but as present”. Thus, the soul is considered to be endorsed with the three abovementioned aspects, which are then described in the following manner: “...the present considering the past is the memory, the present considering the present is immediate awareness, the present considering the future is expectation” (ibid: XI xix (25): 235).

Consequently, the perception of time becomes solely subject to personal experience, for the memory\footnote{It has to be noted that Augustine does not provide us with a radical theory of memory as for example Philo (see next chapter), but he rather uses the term in its everyday usage.} and the expectations\footnote{For Kierkegaard, the distinction between past, present and future cannot be possible if “it is considered to be implicit in time itself” (CA: 85). In his words: “If in the infinite succession of time a foothold could be found, i.e., a present, which was the dividing point, the division would be quite correct. However, precisely because every moment, as well as the sum of the moments, is a process (a passing by), no moment is a present, and accordingly there is in time neither present, nor past, nor future” (loc. cit). Kierkegaard seems also to disregard Augustine’s solution of time as present past, present, and present} of each person.
differ radically. Time is defined as a *distentio* of the soul, while this experience of "the spreading out of the soul in successiveness and in diverse directions is a painful and anxious experience, so that [one can speak]...of salvation as deliverance of time" (Chadwick 1992: 240, n.27).

Consequently, parallel to the perception of *distentio* as "the natural movement of the soul after the original sin", and its dialectical relation with *intentio* and *extentio*, St. Augustine attributes to the latter two notions also spiritual/theological potentialities.

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future, with the help of memory and expectation. Accordingly: "If it is claimed that this division[past, present, future] can be maintained, it is because the moment is *spatialized*, but thereby the infinite succession comes to a halt, it is because representation is introduced that allows time to be represented instead of being thought. Even so, this is not correct procedure, for even as representation, the infinite succession of time is an infinitely contentless present (this is a parody of the eternal)." (ibid: 85-6).

111 The history of *distentio* is long but as Alliez argues, the originality of Augustine's contribution consists in that he offers us specifically a "psychological theory of time". On the contrary, accounts similar to St. Gregory of Nyssa's account of diastema, memory and time "can easily be found in all the great Greek philosophers, historians, or poets - who were not more ignorant of linear time than of the unique capacity of humans to project themselves into past and future" (Alliez 1996: 111). Furthermore, Alliez- discussing St. Gregory - adds that it "should be remembered that the metaphysical time of universal distention would become psychological only in the sense that humans would become conscious of it" (Loc. Cit). St. Gregory of Nyssa perceived time as a "truly universal *diastema* that becomes self-conscious in man" and to some extent he perceives it "as the mark of the creation as creation". On the other hand, Alliez remarks that while the notion of *diastema* tends to be for St.Gregory of Nyssa "synonymous with the condition of being a creature, be it a spiritual one (perfection does not consist in escaping *distention* but in following a distention continuous with a high order), in his commentary on the Song of Songs Gregory is led to assert that the *diastema* is a consequence of the fall of man" (Alliez 1996:111). Although it has be suggested that St.Gregory of Nyssa collapses into an "unconscious lapse into Plotinian views"(loc.cit) or relapse to an Augustinian conception of time, this is arguably not the case if one takes into account the distinction between God's *ousia* and God's *energeia* (for a detailed analysis on this distinction see Lossky's *The Mystical theology of the Eastern church*). Taking this into account, time and in St. Gregory's case *diastema*, can be seen as an exemplification of the relation between God's *energeia* and His creature. Then, one can understand time as a continuous questioning of the relation of a human being with God, that being similar to a "measurement" of human's existential failure or success in accomplishing this relationship (Yannaras 1988:351-355). More explicitly, Staniloae argues in a similar vein that *time* should neither be seen as a fallen state, nor as he characteristically says "a sin against eternity". Quite to the contrary, time is set to carry "within itself the possibility of eternity which can be realised in communion with God by his grace". Eternity for Staniloae is Life, and "life is movement". Indeed, God is not to be seen as an unmoved being since in that case –and at this point Staniloae agrees with Karl Barth- "God is to be dead" (Staniloae 2001: 2-3). So, diastema or time is to be conceived as being for God "the interval of waiting between knocking at our door and the moment when we will open it to wide to him" (Staniloae 2001: 5).

112 The dialectics of *distentio* (stretching out of the soul), *intentio* (as gathering together of past, future and present) and *extentio* (soul's extension/ its ecstatic experience) points to a psychological analysis, that being to the thesis of "*praesens intentio*, of the present intention that makes the future pass into the past and
More specifically:

The soul reaching toward God, fixing its attention-intention on the eternal, is unified and extended beyond itself; it grows larger and makes itself greater...Only the purpose [intentio] that proceeds from faith is the right one; only the gathering together of the inner man identified with intentio allows the soul torn to shreds by distentio to be reunited by bringing it back to God (Alliez 1996: 109; De Trinitate IX, 1, 1).

Thus, for St. Augustine there is hope for the human being to return to God, and this hope is projected in the future. Intentio and Extentio are the vehicles of this conversion and the future is not seen as synonymous with distentio, that being solely as expectatio futurorum, but as extentio ad superiora. It follows that the future is not conceived in accordance with its common everyday perception of it, but simultaneously as a hope of liberation of the human being from the burdens of time and a disruption of time in time.

The impossibility of reconciling biblical with fallen time even with the introduction of theological time (in the guise of intentio, extentio, hope of return to god, etc) is nonetheless evident provided that theological and fallen time are seen as interconnected ontologically after the Fall and therefore it is impossible to separate them completely.

This explains why, as Alliez argues, there was "but one way of attaining the supreme ecstasy: by separating, once and for all, these two axes of

confers onto the present an enlarged sense" (Alliez 1996:109; Confessions xxii(28)&xxviii(38):236&243). But intentio and extentio have also theological connotations as the following passage shows: "...leaving behind the old days I might be gathered to follow the One, forgetting the past and moving not towards those future things which are transitory but to the things that are before me, not stretched out [distentio] in distraction but extended [extentio] in reach, not by being pulled apart but by concentration [intentio]" (Confessions XI xxix (39): 244).
time, so as to leave only the totally pure; and that was by death" (Alliez 1996:107).
2.2 Kant, History & The Fall

Kant famously wrote his essay *Conjectures on the Beginning of Human History* in an attempt to attack Herder’s view on the same matter, namely on the interpretation of the book of Genesis. Although an explicit reference to Herder is poignantly missing, Kant still manages to show in an ironic manner that by interpreting “the origins of mankind as a narration along biblical lines, it is possible to arrive at the opposite conclusion from that drawn by Herder in the tenth book of the Ideas” (Reiss 1991: 196).

Kant sketches a *hypothetical* narrative of human history, a narrative that pays certain attention to the very first steps of human beings on earth. Although Kant offers an adequate -in logical terms- account of Adam’s fall, he arguably fails to expand it beyond the boundaries of *ethics*. Furthermore, Kant dares to admit that his narrative is a *hypothetical* one, implying that the biblical story of the Fall can be simply seen as an educative myth.

He justifies his choice to ascribe a conjectural character to this narrative by arguing that such a history, namely one encapsulating the “first development of freedom from its origin as a predisposition in human

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113 It seems that according to Haufniensis, Kant is among those thinkers that solved the difficulties that thought met in its encounter with the problem of the relation between Adam’s sin and hereditary sin in a peculiar way. Thus, as Haufniensis explains, thought “in order to explain at least something, a fantastic presupposition was introduced, the loss of which constituted the fall as the consequence. The advantage gained thereby was that everyone willingly admitted that a condition such as the one described was not found anywhere in the world, but that they forgot that as a result the doubt became a different one, namely, whether such a condition ever had existed, something that was quite necessary in order to lose it” (CA: 25).
nature" is something different from history based on historical records and facts (CBH: 221). Thus, in this "mere pleasure trip", Kant is offering his version of the biblical myth of the Fall from Paradise, using for this purpose "the wings of imagination - although not without the guidance of experience as mediated by reason" (CBH: 222). The employment of Reason is of crucial importance since with its help the narration would not only amount to a mere invention\(^\text{114}\) but it could additionally be deduced by experience under the assumption that "what was experienced at the beginning of history was no better or worse than what is experienced now" (ibid: 221). Furthermore, the very beginning of human history is not conceived in terms of "an origin in time" but rather in terms of an "origin in reason". According to Kant, if it had been conceived as an origin in time, that is if we focused on its "occurrence" and hence on its relation "as an event to its first cause in time", then we would have ascribed to ourselves the contradictory task to "seek the temporal origin of free acts as such". Kant formulates more explicitly the contradictory status of this conception in the following manner:

\(^{114}\) Although Kant insists that his narrative, as a conjecture, should not be seen as a "serious activity but merely as an exercise in which the imagination, supported by reason, may be allowed to indulge as a healthy mental reaction" (CBH: 221) and because of this it cannot be compared with a genuine historical account. Philo of Alexandria, one of the eminent proponents of the allegorical interpretation of the Bible, proposes a different account, one that in our opinion falls under the category of "myth proper" in Kierkegaard's distinction (see previous chapter) whilst the Kantian one is to be seen as a "myth of understanding". Philo, in his book *On the Account of the World's creation given my Moses*, reinforces Plato's account on Timaeus of "εἰκότα τὸ μυθό" arguing that although only God knows the true cause (ολὴσθαι τὴν αἰτίαν) behind the creation, one has not to conceal the cause "which by probable conjecture seems plausible and reasonable (ἡν δὲ εἰρθεὶς στοχασμὸς πιθανὴν καὶ εὐλογὸν εἶναι δοκοῦσαν οὐκ αποκρυπτεῖν)" (Philo *On the creation* XXIV 72-73).
It is also a contradiction to seek the temporal origin of man's moral character, so far as it is considered as contingent, since this character signifies the ground of the *exercise* of freedom; this ground (like the determining ground of the free will generally) must be sought in purely rational representations (Religion:35).

Thus, it becomes evident that history's *origin in time* does not play a great role in Kant's narrative, whilst its *origin in reason* focusing on the "existence of the effect" is vested with utmost significance. (Religion: 34). Kant, in an effort to avoid an excess of imagination that could lead his thought into "wild conjectures", begins his venture with "something which human reason cannot deduce from prior natural causes-that is, with the *existence of human beings*" (CBH: 222).

Kant's approach of the very beginning of human history as not having an "origin in time" reminds us of a similar account by Aquinas, although the latter thinker refers mainly to the creation of the world and not specifically to the first beginning of human history. Whilst it is not our intention to undermine the important difference in scope between the two thinkers, we would like to express our feeling that Aquinas's introduction of the "imaginary" element in the understanding of creation squares with Kant's emphasis on the dimension of "as if" (as we have already seen) and to the centrality he attributes to reason against time in his account. This is more evident if we look at the first antinomy in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where Kant shows the conflict that arises if a

\[115\] Kant argues that even the manner of presentation in the Scriptures agrees with his line of thought: "The foregoing agrees well with that manner of presentation which the Scriptures use, whereby the origin of evil in the human race is depicted as having a [temporal] *beginning*, this beginning being presented in a narrative, wherein what in its essence must be considered as primary (without regard to the element of time) appears as coming first in time" (Religion :37).
transcendental idea is conceived not as a *regulative* principle but as a *constitutive* principle. Thus, the idea of "absolute completeness of the composition of the given whole of all appearances", if it is treated as a "constitutive" principle results to the following antinomy: "The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space" versus "The world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space" (CPR: B443&A426/B454: 390&396). Interestingly enough, Aquinas in his attempted refutation of the argument that opposes the Christian understanding of "creation *ex nihilo*" and which sees creation as a sort of change, argues that such a position cannot be maintained since Aristotle does not include creation among the six kinds of change and also because a basic feature of change is that the extremes "have to have something in common" and this does not happen in the case of creation. He further explains the different ways in which two extremes can have something in common, i.e. a) to have an actually existent common *subject*, b) to have a potentially existent common *subject*, c) when there is no common subject but

only a single continuous time in the first part of which one opposite exists and in the second part another, as when one thing is said to come after the other in the sense of coming after it like afternoon from morning and this is change not properly but metaphorically.... (Aquinas: 258)

Aquinas does not conceive creation to belong to any of these kinds of change, although, he opens up the space for an interesting imaginary conception of creation as change as the following passage indicates:

...there is no common time, since before the world there was not time. The only thing in common is imaginary; a single common time imagined to exist before and after the world was made...and for this reason creation truly and properly
speaking is not a change, though it can be imagined to be one, not properly but metaphorically” (Aquinas : 258).

This is best understood, if we look at the same text by Aquinas, where he makes a distinction between real and imaginary time, the latter being the time before the creation, the former the time after. In thinking the postulated transition of imaginary to real time, he furthermore argues that “the two moments [the first moment of being and the last moment of non-being] don’t exist in the same time, since real and imaginary time are not continuous with one another” (ibid: 256). Although the problem of speaking of “time” before the creation occupied the mind of many Fathers of the Church, theologians or philosophers, who most of the time conclude that one has better not touch upon this issue since one can never know the answer, Aquinas, proposing “imaginary time”, takes a step further. In the same way as Kant centuries later, Aquinas refuses to leave the question regarding the time preceding creation open since he senses that this would inevitably lead reason into antinomies. In a sense then, the proposition of an imaginary time can be said to have a similar function to that of the Kantian antinomies, namely the delimitation of the range of questions to be ‘legitimately’ ascribed to the jurisdiction of reason. Consequently, the attribution of an imaginary character to a
period, event, etc, the urgency to "name" the unknown, arguably conceals a tendency to hinder a further investigation of the question.

Returning to the Kantian problematique concerning the ‘existence of human beings’, it has to be remarked that the first human being is conceived as being fully developed, and further as not being alone but having a partner. So, the first human beings forming a pair, are conceived by the philosopher as having the abilities to stand, move and speak “with the help of coherent concepts” that is to think (CBH: 222). It is important to note that Kant does not conceive those abilities, as being innate to the first human beings, for this would be tantamount to arguing that the abilities were inherited, which would not square with experience. Contrary to his understanding of Herder’s argument, that sees mankind as “had been given language and reason by a transcendental power”, Kant claims that the first human beings acquire those abilities and skills by themselves (Reiss 1991:196; CBH: 222).

Nevertheless, it has to be clarified that Herder does not endorse the point of view according to which language has a divine origin. On the contrary, Herder insists that “it was not God who invented a language for man, but that man himself had to find a language by operating his own power” giving also as an example the same text (i.e. Genesis) invoked by the supporters of the “divine origin” thesis (Herder 1986:138). Thus, Adam

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116 Is this kind of naming that Benjamin, as we are going to see shortly, conceives as “naming” after the fall?
117 The reason being that they do not have any parents to support them (CBH: 222).
118 Thus, procreation has been secured.
and not God names the animals, placing thus in Herder's view "the origin of language in the human mind". It has to be remarked in this context that Herder follows here a long tradition preceding him, exemplified for example by Philo of Alexandria and many others.

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119 Walter Benjamin emphasises also the importance of "naming". According to him, naming is characteristic of the human language (in its pre-Fallen state), although one has to bear in mind that "the true speculative condition of the discrete languages is the creative word of God which establishes the languages of things and animals as well as human language" (Caygill 1998: 19). Thus, in the first book of Genesis, God's word manifested itself: "...the rhythm by which the creation of nature (in Genesis 1) is accomplished is: Let there be- He made (created) - He named...language is therefore both creative and the finished creation, it is word and name. In God name is creative because it is word, and God's word is cognizant because it is name". So, Benjamin concludes that although "God made things knowable in their names...man, however, names them according to knowledge" (Benjamin 1986: 322-323). If language denotes a communication of mental activity, in the case of a human being this happens in naming: "It is therefore the linguistic being of man to name things" (ibid: 317). Moreover, one has to be very careful since such a communication is reciprocal. The animals also communicate themselves since otherwise Adam could not communicate with them by naming them (loc. Cit). Thus, as Caygill claims, human language in Benjamin's understanding is not identical with language as such but "remains...a particular infinite linguistic surface whose limits are determined by translation". If the human being tries to exceed (as it is the case after the Fall) the limits that allow him either to translate "other languages into itself, or transform them by translating itself into other languages" and attempt to create names (after the Fall, human language creates "spiritual essences"), then it denies "the otherness of different languages" and "...introduces a damaging division between itself and the language of nature and God, as well as one within itself" (Caygill 1998: 19).

120 In brief, for Philo, Adam who symbolises the mind, names the animals and this consists the beginning of language. According to him, the act of naming was widely conceived as the origin of language: "...Greek philosophers said that those who first assigned names to things were wise men" (Philo Allegorical II.14-16: 235). The prevalence of Moses' account over the ones that speak of wise men in general is that Adam could not communicate with them by naming them (loc. Cit). Thus, as Caygill claims, human language in Benjamin's understanding is not identical with language as such but "remains...a particular infinite linguistic surface whose limits are determined by translation". If the human being tries to exceed (as it is the case after the Fall) the limits that allow him either to translate "other languages into itself, or transform them by translating itself into other languages" and attempt to create names (after the Fall, human language creates "spiritual essences"), then it denies "the otherness of different languages" and "...introduces a damaging division between itself and the language of nature and God, as well as one within itself" (Caygill 1998: 19).

The symbolism of Philo seems to us really interesting. According to him, Adam symbolises the mind (nous) and Eve 'sense perception'. In his interpretation of Genesis, Philo points out that God firstly announced to Adam that He was going to create a helper (βοηθος), to accompany him, and then before He created Eve, He asked Adam to name the animals. Why is it asks Philo that Moses inserts the paragraph presenting the naming of the animal, between God's announcement of the creation of Eve and the actual act of it? The answer is, according to Philo, that there are two species of a helper: "the one has its sphere in the passions, the other in the sense perception", wild beasts and Eve respectively. Both of them are helpers that "correspond" to Adam, and "sense-perception and passions are parts and offspring of one soul with it" (Philo Allegorical II.8-11: 231). Although passions may well become the enemies of the mind, Philo points also to the good use of them; it may be the case that the naming of animals indicates a control of them by the mind (ibid: II 16-19:237). What seems strange to us is that although Philo uses the naming of the animals as representing a "helper" he did not emphasise language itself as such a helper. It might well be the case that Moses puts the emphasis on "language" when he speaks of the helpers of the first man and not to the animals.

The second helper, the woman, representing sense-perception is a proper helper since according to Philo "beasts...are not properly called our helpers, but by a straining of language" (ibid: II.8-11: 231). Thus, after the naming of the animals God repeats the same phrase he said immediately before the naming:
Thus, for Herder the development of language in the case of the human beings is “both essential and natural” (Herder 1986: 161) although the thinker admits that one cannot philosophise on “the first moments of reasoning and self-direction” since they must “have been governed\textsuperscript{121} by creative Providence”. He furthermore explains that

It is... not the task of philosophy to explain the supernatural of these moments, just as philosophy is not in a position to explain man’s creation; it accepts him in the state in which he can first act voluntarily, when he enjoys for the first time the exuberance of a healthy existence; and it thus interprets these situations on a purely human basis (Herder 1986: 155).

Indeed, both Herder and Kant start their analysis “with the existence of human beings” but they have different perspectives as regard the skills that the first human beings have.

Since Kant is mainly interested in the development of the human being “from the ethical point of view”, he is not really keen in providing us with an explanation concerning the path that the first human beings followed in order to acquire those skills, that furthermore presuppose the presence of reason\textsuperscript{122} (ibid: 223). He only assumes that in the very

\textsuperscript{121} Maybe at this statement lies Kant’s objection.

\textsuperscript{122} If for Kant there is a progressive movement leading to the acquirement of reason, for Herder reason is neither a special gift in “preference to the animal” nor a disconnected power. Herder harshly criticizes any attempt to speak of reason in this manner- he even characterises those attempts as “philosophical nonsense”. Let us follow his thought, which seems as directed against Kant’s conception of reason: “It matters not what one may call the entire disposition of his powers: reason, intellect, consciousness, etc, as long as these names are not to denote disconnected powers or merely a higher degree of animal powers. \textit{It is the totality of the organisation of all human powers, the entire economy of man’s perceptive, cognitive and volitional nature, or rather, it is the sole positive power of thinking which, combined with a certain}
beginning the whole life of the human being must have been guided by
instincts, "that voice of God which all animals obey" (loc. Cit). As long
as the first human beings were solely under the laws of nature, Kant
extrapolates, their fate was a happy one, a state radically altered once
they became aware of their reason. Kant notices that the peculiarity of
reason consists in the fact that it is able "with the help of imagination, to
invent desires which not only lack any corresponding natural impulse,

organisation of the body, is called mind in man just as it becomes natural aptitude in animals: in man it
gives rise to freedom, with animals it constitutes instinct. The difference, however, is not one of degree or
of a more or less of given faculties or powers, but rather that of a wholly dissimilar direction and
development of all powers...” (Herder 1986: 131). 

The identification of instincts with "that voice of God" seems really striking. Few lines later in the text,
Kant, referring to the battle of instincts with reason, says: "nevertheless this [i.e. reason’s ability to extend
beyond the confinement of instincts] was enough to give reason the initial inducement to quibble with the
voice of nature (III. 1), and despite the latter’s objection, to make the first experiment in free choice-an
experiment which, since it was the first, probably did not turn out as expected” (CBH: 224).

It seems to us that what Kant suggests is a provisional identification of God’s voice and consequently of
God’s prohibition with the so-called “voice of nature” and furthermore with “natural” instincts. The
designation of this identification as provisional points first to the already emphasised fact that a purely
natural state is not to be conceived in temporal terms, and secondly to a complementary identification of
God’s prohibition with “the moral law”, which according to the philosopher human beings failed to
incorporate as their maxim therefore provoking their Fall (Religion: 37). Leaving aside for the time being a
further discussion of the second point, we can only suggest that Kant may be pointing to a more “inward”
endorsement of God’s prohibition and to a disapproval of a merely instinctual compliance with the “moral
law”. What is of tantamount importance in the passage concerning the “voice of nature” is that Kant’s
background reference is the first verse, third chapter of Genesis that reads: “Now the serpent was more
subtil than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made. And he said unto woman, Yea, hath God
said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden?” (Genesis III.1), where it is arguably difficult to observe a
direct correspondence between Eve and the serpent -the agents of the biblical narrative- and the two
conflicting elements in Kant’s interpretation, namely instinct and reason. Is it then feasible to identify the
serpent with the voice of nature or, on the contrary it has to be interpreted as representing the voice of
reason? It has to be remarked that despite appearances the latter interpretation could stand true, since in the
biblical context the serpent is considered the more subtle and clever animal in the Garden of Eden. It
repeats God’s prohibition in an attempt to persuade Eve to disobey. Thus, the serpent may symbolise in
Kant’s eyes, the “non-yet purified” reason, which instead of focusing completely on the “severity of the
commandment”, includes “the influence of other incentives” (Religion: 37). Also, the choice of the serpent
as a representative of the animals may point to that part of human beings that is confined to the senses, to
instincts, etc, although, as we are going to see later, in Kant’s thought animality in itself cannot be
conceived as a source of evil.

It is interesting that Kant describes this further step in the following words: “...but reason soon made its
presence felt...” (CBH:223). The almost gradual emergence of reason reminds us of Kierkegaard’s
conception of the dreaming state of the emergence of spirit just before the Fall.

Those desires, primarily known as “lustiviousness, gradually engender a whole host of superflous or
even unnatural inclinations to which the term luxuriousness applies” (CBH: 223). In order to better
understand the function of the desires known as lasciviousness, we have to turn our gaze to Kant’s book
but which are even at variance with the latter" (CBH:223). Adam and Eve made their first experiment in using their ability of choice, only to discover that the process they triggered was thereby irreversible. According to Kant, once they had tasted this new state of freedom, it was inconceivable for them “to return to a previous state of servitude under the rule of instinct” (CBH: 224).

Eating from the tree of knowledge, the first human beings discovered in themselves the ability of choosing their own way of living and they became capable of anticipating the future.

Furthermore, according to Kant, the last step that “reason took” in order to complete its task to raise the human being from her animality is by allowing her to realise that she is the true end of nature and to look on every non rational being as a means (CBH: 222-225 ; Jaspers,1962:104). Additionally, the philosopher clarifies that this realisation was “obscure”, thus indicating to the thenceforth-narrow path that human beings ought to follow if an elevation of their reason to the state Kant

*Religion within the limits of Reason alone.* In this book, whilst speaking about the first division of the “original predisposition to Good in Human Nature”, he characterises this division as “the predisposition to animality in mankind, taken as a living being” which as such “may be brought under the general title of physical and purely mechanical self-love, wherein no reason is demanded”. Consequently it can be inferred that this predisposition is present even in animals. Certainly, what one cannot apply to animals, are certain vices - beastly vices in Kant’s terminology- among them lasciviousness, that come into the fore when human beings use their predisposition to animality contrary to its real end. This does not mean that those vices “spring themselves from this predisposition itself as a root” but that they can be grafted from the three main stems of the predisposition to animality, i.e. self-preservation, propagation of the species, community with other human beings (Religion: 22). In a more emphatic formulation Kant argues that “... as reason grew more cultivated, vices emerged which were quite foreign to the state of ignorance and hence of innocence” (CBH: 225).

126 So, a return to the "state of nature" seems impossible and even disastrous in Kant’s eyes. Albeit the gradual cultivation of reason may lead the individual to certain vices and be therefore responsible for several calamities, this state of lost innocence urges the mankind to unfold all its abilities (Jaspers 1962:105)
calls a “reason, which dictates laws unconditionally\textsuperscript{127}” is to be accomplished (Religion: 225).

In Arendt’s interpretation of Kant, the Fall from Paradise was not God’s revenge for the sin of the human being, but rather the release of her by nature, which drives her “away from the garden”, in order for history to unfold, the historical process being thence called either culture or freedom (Arendt 1982:8). Kant considers the dawn of history as beneficial for the human species, namely a progression to the better, while this is not the case as regards the individual, for whom such a change represents a loss. Thus,

\[\text{The history of nature begins with goodness, for it is the work of God; but the history of freedom begins with evil, for it is the work of man. For the individual, who looks only to himself in the exercise of his freedom, a change of this kind represented a loss; for nature whose end in relation to man concerns the species, it represented a gain. The individual therefore has cause to blame himself for all the ills which he endures and for all the evil which he perpetrates (CBH: 227).}\]

The tension between the specific human being and humanity as a whole permeates the whole oeuvre of Kant and shows the importance of drawing a line between the \textit{final purpose} of creation, which has the individual as its object and the \textit{ultimate purpose} of nature, which applies to the destiny of the whole human race, and therefore posits explicitly

\textsuperscript{127} Although the suggested path is a narrow one, one should not forget that for Kant, the capacity “for respect for the moral law as in itself incentive of the will” is designated as “the predisposition to personality”. The latter, is ranked as the highest of the three divisions of the \textit{Original Predisposition to Good in Human Nature}- the term \textit{original} signifying that “they are bound up with the possibility of human nature” (Religion: 23).
the problem of history. The former concerns the development of the individual considered primarily as a moral being, whereas the latter refers to what Kelly includes under the concept of culture, i.e. “the maximal accomplishment of man’s phenomenal or historical purpose viewed from the perspective of education and legal organisation” (Kelly 1969: 142; Yovel 1974: 118-119; CJ: 317-323). Kant’s usage of the term “ultimate purpose of nature” points to “all the natural capacities of a creature [that] are destined sooner or later to be developed completely”, keeping in mind that all these capacities “could be fully developed only in species, but not in the individual” (IUE: 42-43). Thus, Kant argues that due to the short length of human life it is really impossible for an individual to learn how to use completely all her natural capacities. This will require innumerable generations, each communicating its enlightenment to the next, in order for the human species to achieve “nature’s original intention”. Moreover, the thinker conceives of the rational beings to be “mortal as individuals but immortals as a species” (IUH: 42-3).

If we are going to speak about the ultimate purpose of nature we should first try to make clear what Kant means when he uses the term natural purpose. In order to ‘judge’ a thing as a natural purpose, we should do it on account of its intrinsic form, moreover it must “relate to itself in such a way that is both cause and effect of itself” and therefore we can call it an organized being, or more specifically a self-organizing being. This concept of natural purpose guides us to consider
the whole of nature as a system in terms of the rules of purposes and therefore we must subordinate the mechanism of nature to this consideration that means to a system that functions according to the principles of reason. In that point it is important to clarify that the aforementioned principles apply to the latter idea only subjectively, under the maxim “Everything in the world is good for something or other; nothing in it is gratuitous”. This means that we cannot judge nature according to these principles (judging teleologically\textsuperscript{128}), without having in mind that we can apply them only to reflective but not to determinative judgment, which means that they are regulative and not constitutive principles\textsuperscript{129} (CJ: 258-59; McFarland 1970: 112-113). It is important to clarify at this point, that when Kant speaks about the ultimate purpose of nature he does not refer to a principle of blind, natural teleology (which may be called the cunning of nature) as it is the case with some of his interpreters who take into account solely Kant’s articles Idea for a Universal History and Perpetual Peace. Consequently, those interpreters, are led astray, ignoring the methodology that Kant develops in his third critique, concluding that such a purposiveness seems dogmatic and “incompatible with Kant’s critical philosophy” (Yovel 1974:119).

\textsuperscript{128} According to Kant, “a judgment about the [kind of] purposiveness in things of nature that we consider the basis for their possibility (as natural purposes ) is called a teleological judgment (CJ,421)

\textsuperscript{129} Kant uses the term determinative judgment as the judgment which subsumes the particular under the universal where the latter is given, while when only the particular is given and the universal is to be found then this judgment is a reflective one. (CJ: 18-19 ) Reflective judgment, beginning from the particular “never slipping into the abyss of the insensible and unintelligible”, acts under the guidance of the Ideas and consequently it serves principles of thought to us, but not new objects.(Jaspers:1962:62)

Hence, according to Kant “the purposiveness of nature is a special a priori concept that has its origin solely in reflective judgment. (CJ: 20)
According to Kant there are certain types of phenomena (organized beings, development of culture), which cannot be perceivable for us if we fail to consider that there are causal laws (those of final causes), different in kind from mechanical laws, that means that there are also teleological laws, which according to Kant exist subjectively, and due to their subjective existence their causality is not contradictory with the causality derived from mechanical laws (CJ: 267; Yovel 1974:119). It follows that the idea of considering nature in that way cannot be proved or disproved by scientific examination, but it is an idea which is indispensable to us, so as to understand nature (Collingwood 1994: 94-95).

Returning to the ultimate purpose of nature and having already seen that human being, as the only creature on earth which has understanding and as a result an ability to set himself purposes, we can add that among the other organized beings on earth, we judge him (reflectively) to be the ultimate purpose of nature, the “purpose by reference to which all other natural things constitute a system of purposes” (CJ: 317). Furthermore, if we are to consider nature as a teleological system, his vocation to be the ultimate purpose of nature is under the condition to have the understanding and the will to refer himself and nature to a higher purpose which can be independent of nature and self-sufficient, namely to a final purpose (CJ: 318).

In order to further our analysis, let us try to examine Kant’s question “But where in man must we posit at least that ultimate purpose
of nature?” Kant’s answer to this question is to posit culture as the only alternative, in stark contrast to happiness, which cannot be considered as the ultimate purpose. This is due firstly to the fact that man himself draws the concept of happiness so diversely and changes its concept so often that nature could not adopt a fixed universal law in harmony with that unsteady concept. Secondly because man’s absurd predispositions place him in further troubles, to such a degree that he often turns against his own species (CJ: 317-19).

The second dimension of the historical unfolding is freedom, which opens the space for a discussion of the “final purpose of creation”. We can see now more clearly how in Kant there is a simultaneous existence of two different kinds of perceiving the historical process, the first having the whole of humanity as its subject, the second focusing on the individual and consequently referring to the moral aspect of possible developments of the human being.

The latter development is essential though not necessary for the fulfilment of the former. If the final purpose of creation is to be understood as the existence of man under moral laws, that is man considered as noumenon and as far as we suppose a purposiveness in creation (Korsgaard 1996: 242; CJ: 338), then we come across the main meeting place of the two dimensions of human existence.
This idea of *purposiveness* is compatible with the idea of *progress* that orients history towards the attainment of a goal implied by the very idea of purposiveness as such.

According to Kant we have to consider the *final purpose* as "a purpose that requires no other purpose as a condition of its possibility... [and] nature would therefore be incapable of achieving it and producing it in accordance with the idea of this purpose " (CJ: 322).

Man, is considered to be the only creature in nature that is endowed with the supersensible ability of *freedom* and has a *teleological causality*, that means that he is able to determine his purposes, independently of natural conditions, so that he can be cognized as the law and the object of this *causality*, that means as "the object that this being can set before itself as its higher purpose (the highest good in the world) "(CJ: 323).

But if we follow Deleuze's assumption that a *natural purpose* is "a foundation for possibility" an *ultimate* purpose is to be understood as " a reason for existence " and a *final purpose* is "a being which possesses the reason for existence in itself", then we will also have to follow him in the recognition of a paradox : " How can man who is only final end [purpose] in his suprasensible existence and as a noumenon, be the last [ultimate] end of *sensible nature *?"(Deleuze 1984: 71-73). In order for that to be possible, we must assume that there is a kind of connection between the supersensible and the sensible world, which is mediated by the concept of *freedom*. Thus, man as the only potentially *free agent* in the sensible
world is to be considered as the link between the final purpose of the intelligible world and the ultimate purpose of nature. Without his existence on earth, “all creation would be a mere desert, gratuitous and without final purpose” (Jaspers 1962: 109).

Accordingly, if we consider historical progress from the perspective of the ultimate purpose of nature, and even if we apply only reflective judgement to it, we are nonetheless limiting our scope to the external field of legality that is to the accomplishment of political and juridical order, ideally realisable in the context of civil society and cosmopolitan unity. But, as Y.Yovel claims, the crucial aspect of history for Kant is the creation of an “ethical community, defined by the quality of the inner attitudes of its members to each other” (Yovel 1974: 119)

It seems then that natural purposiveness cannot provide us with adequate explanation as regards the final purpose that the supersensible as its substratum, imposes on it. This difficulty reveals the importance of human being, as well as the importance of what Deleuze calls, the ruse of supersensible nature. If the latter had a direct effect on the sensible world, human history would have to be determined by reason; and since the latter exists also individually in man as noumenon, the events of the world would be then reduced to a mere manifestation of “individual rational purpose of men themselves”( Deleuze 1984: 74-75). This does not seem to be the case though, since far from being a manifestation of reason, history is disclosed to our eyes as its opposite, an endless series
of irrational conflicts. The human being is therefore disclosed as possessing a two dimensional mode of existence, both noumenal and phenomenal existence, as being simultaneously the ultimate purpose of nature (a goal attainable through the history of the species) and the final purpose of the supersensible (a rather unattainable goal which serves as an Idea of perfection).

Furthermore, the final purpose is unattainable due to the nature of its components, namely happiness and morality. As regards the former, it is permissible that we consider it as final purpose, "subject to the objective condition that man be in harmony with a law of morality, [since] our worthiness to be happy consists in that harmony" (CJ: 339).

Morality anyhow, is not to be realised on earth, not even in the ideal case where the cosmopolitan order has brought about the ultimate purpose of nature, since Kant himself posits that

Such developments [i.e. cosmopolitan society] do not mean, however, that the basic moral capacity of mankind will increase in the slightest, for this would require a kind of new creation or supernatural influence" (CF: 188)

Does Kant's last statement about a "new creation" or a "supernatural influence" is an indirect allusion to St. Augustine's notion of efficacious grace? Moreover, what is the place that Kant attributes to evil?
For Kant, "moral evil" is connected with free-choice, and as such cannot have as its underlying basis "the Propensity to Evil in Human Nature" but rather "it [does] start from sin (by which is meant the transgressing of the moral law as a divine command)" (Religion: 23 & 37). Thus, the role of the propensity to evil is restricted to its being "the subjective ground of the possibility of an inclination (habitual craving, concupiscentia) so far as mankind is liable to it" (Religion: 24). In his attempt to secure human freedom of choice, Kant places the root of sin not on the influence of desires and inclinations on the original exercise of human will (willkur), which questioned the severity of the divine nature.

\footnote{Kant distinguishes between propensity and predisposition when he names the human inclination to good and to evil predisposition and propensity respectively. Thus, propensity is distinguished from predisposition "by the fact that although it can indeed be innate, it ought no to be represented merely thus; for it can also be regarded as having been acquired (if it is good), or brought by man upon himself (if it is evil)" (Religion: 24).}

\footnote{Once more the term original points to the “original predisposition to good in human nature”. We have already briefly discussed the predisposition to animality and the predisposition to personality – what is left is the predisposition to humanity, namely the one grounded on a non-pure practical reason that is a “reason....subservient to other incentives” (Religion: 23). Thus, the usage of the term Willkur instead of Wille can now be explained. Caygill distinguishes between the usage of the terms Wille and Willkur in Kant’s text, in the sense that the latter signifies mainly the “capacity for choice”, whilst the former consists the ground for “determining choice to action” and, as such it is “practical reason itself” (Caygill 1995: 414).}

The tremendous importance of such a distinction is obvious in the discussion of moral evil. When Kant speaks about the corruption of ‘the ground of all maxims” by radical evil, he does not refer to the pure ground of all maxims, but to the subjective Willkur, indicating consequently the reversibility of the human situation. What is interesting in the aforementioned distinction between Wille and Willkur is its similarity to Augustine’s distinction between the “power to will” and the “will” and the placement of the root of sin unto subjective will. Although both thinkers start from a seemingly similar presumption, they reach a different conclusion regarding the possibility of human freedom of choice. If for Augustine, God is the one that made the “power to will” and also the only one that can save, through his grace, the human being and to change her will, for Kant pure practical reason substitutes for God.

Furthermore, returning to Kant, in order to better grasp the relation between the so-called "predisposition to humanity" and what we can term the “non-yet pure” practical reason, we have to look at Kant’s definition of the former, namely that “the predisposition to humanity can be brought under the general title of self-love which is physical and yet compares (for which reason is required)” (Religion: 22). According to Kierkegaard’s reading of Kant and Hegel, both philosophers found the root of evil and sin in self-love, which can also be seen as an allusion to Augustine’s earthly city. Kierkegaard disagrees with such a position mainly due to the fact that the category of the self is strongly connected with the “single individual” and as such cannot be put and explained under universal categories. For him the meaning of self is elusive, the real self being “posited only by the qualitative leap” (CA: 78-9).
commandment “which excludes the influences of other incentives” (Religion: 37).

At this point, Kant’s thought converges with that of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard strongly emphasises that concupiscência cannot introduce sin and guilt, whilst it can be conceived as “a determinant of guilt and sin antecedent to guilt and sin” (CA: 40). Kierkegaard strongly opposes any approach to sin that distinguishes between Adam and every subsequent person, having in mind mainly the protestant doctrine which in presupposing “an essential distinction between the innocence of the subsequent person...and that of Adam” claims that “all men begotten in a natural way are born with sin, i.e., without the fear of God, without trust in God, and without concupiscence” (ibid: 41). He notices further that if one regards “evil desire” or “concupiscence” as innate to human beings, then one removes “the ambiguity in which the individual becomes both guilty and innocent” (ibid: 73). It seems that both Kierkegaard and Kant reach an agreement not only concerning the power of concupiscência but also regarding the fact that Adam is not placed outside humanity as a whole. This is evident in Kant’s belief “...that we daily act in the same way [as Adam] and that therefore in Adam all have sinned and still sin” (Religion: 37). It has to be remarked though that the differences between the two thinkers have to be also acknowledged especially in regard of Kant’s refusal to accept for the first human being a state of being originated in time, while on the contrary attempting to
reinterpret the biblical narrative in a “logical” manner, as the
continuation of the previous quote suggests:

...except that in us there is presupposed an innate propensity to transgression, 
whereas in the first man, from the point of view of time, there is presupposed no 
such propensity but rather innocence; hence transgression on his part is called 
a fall into sin; but with us sin is represented as resulting from an already innate 
wickedness in our nature (Religion: 37-8).

Thus, Kant presents us with a more linear perception of Adam’s fall 
based mainly on a logical succession of events, while Kierkegaard focuses 
on the dizziness and dreaminess that signify and determine the 
qualitative leap that breaks any concept of temporal succession.

In conclusion, one can argue that although Kant’s conception of 
evil and sin leaves open the possibility of a conceptualisation of history in 
terms of progress from the worse to the better, through “the culturing of 
the will” (Caygill1995: 182), one still has to admit that this “progress” 
should be seen as always inconclusive. The emergence of reason signifies 
a shift in the course of human affairs, since it orients humanity towards 
the attainment of a higher goal (i.e. moral and physical perfection), 
compared to which, any stage of its spatio-temporal existence will remain 
forever an evil, as Kant spells explicitly out in an article entitled “The End 
of all things”:

If we accept the moral-physical condition of man here in life even on the best 
terms, that is to say, of a perpetual progression ...to the highest good...he still 
cannot...unite contentment with the prospect of his condition...For the condition 
in which man now exists remains ever an evil, in comparison to the better 
condition into which he stands ready to proceed... (as quoted in Arendt: 1982 :9)
We have seen so far that, that albeit Kant was not very interested in history in its strict sense (as a part of nature, that means as the history of human species in contrast to the history of man as a moral being), he refers to it in an attempt to show us that the aforementioned history serves the *final purpose* of creation, a purpose which although being inconceivable and unattainable for us, also urges human agents to seek for its accomplishment. Kant hinges in all his work on the distinction between how things are ("radical evil", "unsocial-sociability, etc.) and how they ought to be ("civil society", "kingdom of ends", etc.), a distinction that leads to contradictions that seem almost irreconcilable on earth, since it is beyond any hope that a person would cease to have desires, to express antagonisms, etc., or to put it in other words, it is impossible for the human creature to belong solely to the world of *noumena* (Kelly 1969: 146). This unachievable and inconceivable demand, the *final purpose* of creation which purportedly urges us to act, is bound with the establishment of a pure *Kingdom of ends* on earth, the union of the spectactor and the actor, the place where "the maxim of the actor and the maxim, the standard, according to which the spectactor judges the spectacle of the world, become one" (Arendt 1992:75; Riley 1992:311). As Riley observes, concerning the history of mankind as much as the history of the individual human being, "a purely moral kingdom of ends will not be raised on earth -though it ought to be - but
one can reasonably hope for a legal order that is closer to morality than are present arrangements” (Riley 1992:312).
Concluding remarks

If we attempt to 'translate' the Kantian problematique in Augustinian terms, we can claim that even though Kant does not speak explicitly about time in the texts discussed above, it can nevertheless be inferred that he dismisses the possibility of a cosmic time, hoping for a proper "existence" in theological time, whilst accepting at the same time the inescapability of historical time. It can be argued that the meeting point of Kant and St. Augustine is that they both 'culminate' in advocating an inescapable ontological separation between cosmic and historical time, and consequently an ontological breach between God and human beings. More specifically, it has been shown that St. Augustine's account of time could lead to the adoption of a philosophical position advocating the existence of an impassable abyss between God and human beings after the Fall, while one cannot but agree with Alliez that St. Augustine's topic is not that of a sage, but that of a saint, separated from the world because God separates him from it, because Unity is the subversion of revelation. What it is exactly is an abstract God who forbids religion in the etymological sense of a living link with God (Alliez 1996:92).

We have argued that in the heart of St. Augustine's theology lie his conception of time and its correlative notions of intentio, distentio and extentio. In Alliez's account, St. Augustine is presented as playing an important part in the process of "a secularisation of a religious idea"
(Alliez 1996:112). According to him, this is due to St. Augustine's conception of time as "the profound instance of the decision" (Alliez 1996:112). Decision is furthermore intertwined with choice and in this respect it has to be remarked that it is in Schelling's treatise on Human Freedom that a genuine definition of religiosity could be arguably uncovered. As we are going to see in the next chapter, this definition captures the "original...meaning of the word", its being "the highest commitment to the right without choice" (OHF: 71).
Chapter Three

Schelling on Freedom, Time & Eternity

"It is equally deadly for the system to have a system and not to have a system. It must therefore resolve itself to combine both" (Schlegel132).

"Everything divine is human and everything human is divine" (Schelling133)

Introductory remarks

We have seen in the previous chapter how Kant and St. Augustine's perceptions of God are instrumental in representing God as an abstract entity that moreover forbids "religion in the etymological sense" of the term. It was argued that the view – endorsed by both thinkers- that the time before the Fall is radically and irretrievably different from the time after the Fall makes such an abstraction almost inevitable. This is mainly due to the fact that with such conceptions of the deity, God ceases to be seen as a living Being relating himself with human beings and becomes instead an impersonal and lifeless being. It is not an accident that the philosophical God, that is first and foremost the abstract God, is for Heidegger, perhaps less close to the divine God than god-less thinking: "god-less thinking is more open to Him than onto-theo-logic would like to admit" (Heidegger 1974: 72).

117 As quoted by Wirth (2000: xxiv)
118 In Schelling's formulation of the old saying by Hypocrites (AGW 1815: 67).
The proper name of the god of philosophy is for Heidegger 'causa sui': "Man can neither pray, nor sacrifice to this god. Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance before this god" (loc. Cit). Although in Heidegger's view not even Schelling entirely escapes the trap of the ontotheologic, one could argue that his approach is much closer to a primordial relation with the divine and that therefore his God is not the abstract philosophical god. Schelling wonderfully posits the issue of the abstract God when he discusses Kant's Critique, as indicated by Kierkegaard's notes of Schelling's Berlin Lectures cited below:

If one so desired, this system could be called an emanation system, if one keeps in mind that it is reversed, since God is the final logical emanation of the system; here the God-concept has only regulative role, not constitutive. In this science, one cannot begin with God (NSBL: 341 - emphasis added)

Schelling's account offers us an alternative narrative that focuses both on a different account of time and its dimensions, namely of the past, the future and the present, and on the importance of a living link between the human beings and a living God. Religiosity thus acquires for Schelling a dynamic meaning, involving thus the highest form of commitment, namely one that excludes choice:

We understand religiosity in the original, practical meaning of the word. It is conscientiousness, or acting in accordance with one's knowledge, and not acting contrary to the light of understanding. A man to whom this latter is impossible, not in a human, physical or psychological way but in a divine way, one calls religious, conscientious in the highest sense of the word. He is not conscientious who, in a given case, must first hold the command of duty before himself in order to decide to do right because of his respect for it. By the very meaning of the word, religiosity allows no choice between alternatives no aequilibrium arbitrii (the bane of all morality) but only the highest commitment to the right without choice (OHF:71).
Therefore, the expulsion of choosing between alternatives elevates *religiosity* into a higher plane where one of the classic—and up to the time of Schelling's writing unchallenged—oppositions of philosophy, namely the opposition between necessity and freedom is overcome. *Religiosity* is for Schelling “the exercise of *true freedom* that operates in consonance with a *holy necessity*” (Wirth 2000: xxix). In the course of this chapter we are going to discuss Schelling’s reformulation of the definition of those concepts, which in their higher form are seen by the thinker as united but not collapsed to each other.
3.1 Identity and the conception of Freedom

In the opening pages of his treatise on freedom, Schelling sets as his task first to define the concept of freedom, if the latter can be regarded as a concept at all and secondly to relate this concept "to a whole scientific world view" (OHF: 7). This is because, the concept of freedom in Schelling, in the same way as the concept of anxiety in Kierkegaard, eludes any definition, acquiring a primordial meaning, in the sense that it can also be seen as the "pivot upon which everything turns" (CA: 43). Indeed, as we can see in the following passage, freedom is a central concept in Schelling’s philosophy, or, in Heidegger’s interpretation of Schelling’s work, freedom is “the centre of Being as a whole” (Heidegger 1985: 20). Thus, it is for this reason that for Schelling,

...no conception can be defined in isolation and depends for its systematic completion on the demonstration of its connection with the whole. This is especially the case in the conception of freedom, for if it has any reality at all it cannot be a merely subordinate or incidental conception but must be one of the dominant central points of the system (OHF: 7).

Thus, freedom is perceived as the dominant central point of Schelling’s system. We come across the term ‘system’ many times in Schelling’s text, whilst towards the end of his treatise the philosopher, insists - as Kierkegaard would repeat many years later although significantly in a

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134 As Heidegger puts it (Heidegger 1985:14).

135 We have already seen the close relation of anxiety and freedom in Kierkegaard’s thought. Shortly we see that in Schelling, anxiety and freedom have a similar relation. In Wirth’s reading of Schelling “the origin of human evil is anxiety before the Good, that is, anxiety before freedom as the source of one’s life and the source of one’s destruction” (Wirth 2000: xxvii).
different way-on the importance of attributing to each concept a definite place: “in a philosophic system every concept has its definite place where alone it is valid and which determines its significance and circumscribes it” (OHF: 93). Why does Schelling speak about system? Are the notions of freedom and system really incompatible - as philosophy before Schelling perceives them?

Heidegger warns us against any attempt to give to the terms ‘science’ and ‘system’ (as they were used in the context of German idealism), contemporary meaning. Indeed, according to him, in Schelling’s philosophy both of these terms retain their primordial meaning. Firstly, ‘science’ or Wissenschaft in German was synonymous- at Schelling’s time- with philosophy, ‘that knowledge which knows the last and first grounds, and in accordance with this fundamental knowledge presents us what is essential in everything knowable in a reasoned-out essential connection” (Heidegger 1985: 16). Thus, for Schelling ‘science’ means philosophical knowledge, and in wider scope it also means history, as it is stated in the second draft of his Ages of the World.

Science [Wissenschaft], according to the very meaning of the word, is history [Historie] (τὸ σῶμα). It was not able to be [history] as long as it was intended as a mere succession or development of one’s own thoughts or ideas. It is a merit of our times that the essence has been returned to science; indeed, this essence has been returned in such a manner as to assure us that science will not easily be able to lose it again. From now on, science will present the development of an actual, living essence (AGW 1813: 113)

The statement regarding science as ‘history’ may be omitted in the same paragraph of the third version of the same book
that knowledge is the simple consequence and development of its own concepts was a valid representation [Vorstellung] until now. Its true representation is that it is the development of a living, actual being [Wesen] which presents itself in it. It is an advantage of our time that this being has been given back to science and, indeed, it may be asserted, in such a way that it may not be easily lost again. It is not too severe to have judged that, in the wake of the now awoken dynamic spirit, all philosophy that does not take its power from it can still only be regarded as an empty misuse of the noble gift of speaking and thinking (AGW 1815: xxxv).

but the close relation between a historian and a philosopher permeates the whole introduction of the third draft where Schelling constantly describes the philosopher as a certain kind of historian who narrates 'what is known', namely the 'past': "the past is known, the present is discerned...the known is narrated, the discerned is presented..." (AGW 1815: xxxv). Thus, science or knowledge is for Schelling something living and internal, it is "the striving towards anamnesis [Wiederbewusstwerden] and hence more of a striving toward knowledge than knowledge itself" (ibid: xxxviii). It is interesting to note that Kierkegaard quotes a similar position by Daub concerning the relation of the past, the historian and the philosopher. Accordingly, in Kierkegaard's interpretation of Daub, the past "that has come into existence", is _eo ipso_ historical, and the one that apprehends the past.

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136 We have seen briefly in our first chapter how the philosopher in Schelling is also a historian and a psychologist.

137 In his discussion on the possibility of a _system_, Schelling argues against those who are unsympathetic towards science because they "regard it as a kind of knowledge which is quite external and lifeless like conventional geometry" (OHF: 8).

138 Daub's passage, published in 1836, shows many similarities with Schelling's text: "The act of looking backwards is, just like that of looking into the future, an act of divination; and if the prophet is well called a historian of the future, the historian is just as well called, or even better, a prophet of the past, of the historical" (PF:309 n.33).
a *historico-philosophicus*, is therefore a prophet in reverse (Daub). That he is a prophet simply indicates that the basis of the certainty of the past is the uncertainty regarding it in the same sense as there is uncertainty regarding the future, the possibility...The historian once again stands beside the past, stirred by the passion that is the passionate sense for coming into existence, that is, wonder (PF: 80)

Secondly, the origin of the word 'system' goes back to the Greek word *synistemi* which means 'putting together'. The word *systema* can signify a host of things; it can mean 'a mere external accumulation' or an orderly gathering, or 'a framework' that is neither an 'inner order' nor an 'external manipulation' (Heidegger 1985: 26). Heidegger, in his reading of Schelling, does not argue in favour of an external system that is tantamount to "the mere arrangement of a finished body of doctrine for the purpose of simply teaching beginners in the sciences", but on the contrary he sees- in Schelling's text- the possibility of a system that is the inner jointure of what is comprehensible itself, its founding development and ordering. Even more, system is the conscious joining of the jointure and coherence of Being itself (Heidegger 1985: 28).

More importantly, as Heidegger emphasises, the system is not to be seen as the absolute task of philosophy. Greek philosophy for example although it would not constitute a system, yet,

or rather especially for that reason, this philosophising was thoroughly systematic, that is directed and supported by a quite definite inner jointure and order of questioning, that questioning which in general created the essential presupposition for all systematics and a possible system (ibid: 27).

Thus, one can argue that for Schelling the importance lies mainly in the journey towards a possible system rather than in its accomplishment, which seems impossible. The process of questioning and answering is an
integral part of this journey. If science, seen as the striving towards anamnesis, is the presupposition of a possible system, then what is required is what Schelling calls "an internal cision and liberation" in order for the light of knowledge to rise (AGW 1815: xxxvii). This cision, this doubling of ourselves, this secret circulation in which there are two beings, a questioning being and an answering being, an unknowing being that seeks knowledge and an unknowing being that does not know its knowledge, this silent dialogue, this inner art of conversation, is the authentic mystery of philosophy (ibid: xxxvi).

In both his books Of human freedom and The Ages of the world, Schelling attempts an exploration of 'what is known', but in this case the known is not something finished, completed, "at hand since the beginning" (AGW 1815: xxxvii), and ready to be discovered and revealed. "Past" is not something fixed and dead but is still in the process of becoming, namely it is 'eternal past'. Also, knowledge is not synonymous with completion, but it means questioning, discovery, longing, desire, etc.

Indeed, what Schelling attempts to show, is exactly the 'inevitability of the question about the system of freedom' since he regards the "connection between the concept of freedom and a total world view" as the subject-matter of an inevitable problem which

If it is not solved, will leave the concept of freedom ambiguous and philosophy indeed, totally without value. For this great problem alone constitutes the unconscious and invisible mainspring of all striving for knowledge from the lowest to the highest... (OHF: 9).
The philosopher is well aware of the long tradition preceding him according to which system and freedom are incompatible notions, and this despite the fact that

...according to an ancient but by no means forgotten tradition, the idea of freedom is said to be entirely inconsistent with the idea of system, and every philosophy which makes claim to unity and completeness is said to end in denying freedom (OHF: 7).

Schelling considers this statement as belonging to the category of "general affirmations", meaning that there were many unknowable restricting notions that were attached to the word system itself "so that the assertion declares something which, to be sure, is very true but also very commonplace" (loc. Cit). Indeed, what is meant by this 'general affirmation' is the commonplace statement that since system is something concrete, rigid, and complete then it is almost synonymous with necessity, excluding thus any notion of freedom, for the latter cannot survive within the limits of unity and completeness but on the contrary freedom needs expansion and infinity. If one goes a step further in the same line of thought, then one could argue against the

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139 Completeness and unity- as they are commonly understood- are not for Schelling necessarily the presuppositions of a system. We will see shortly how Schelling’s redefinition of the law of identity excludes such misinterpretations and allows the co-exploration of the so far antithetical couples, e.g. unity and freedom, etc. Kierkegaard also thinks of the notions of system and conclusiveness as being one and the same, arguing that “if the system is not finished, there is not any system” (CUP: 107). Although Kierkegaard’s position is targeting all the ‘systematicians’ one has to point out that his main target is Hegel’s system, which arguably strives for union and completeness. It has been argued that Kierkegaard’s view against any kind of ‘system’ should not be confused with Nietzsche’s repudiation of ‘system’. Accordingly, in Heidegger’s words, “Kierkegaard does completely reject the system, but (1) by system he means only the Hegelian system and misunderstands it at that; (2) Kierkegaard’s rejection of system is not a philosophical one, with philosophical intention, but a religious one. What Kierkegaard brings against the ‘system’ from the standpoint of a Christian believer is ingenious...but unimportant philosophically because the ‘system’, especially in Hegel’s supposed version of it, is dogmatically taken as something self-explanatory in philosophy” (Heidegger 1985: 24).
compatibility of the concept of freedom and the concept of system
"altogether and inherently" (OHF: 7). It this case, Schelling points out,
there are two possible options, the first being to deny the possibility of a
system even in the mind of the primal being, and the second being to
explain the extraordinary fact that "some sort of system must be present
and coexist with freedom at least in the divine understanding" (OHF: 8).
Those who adopt the first view and therefore only accept the
existence of individual wills "each being a centre for itself", are nevertheless urged, by reason's inevitable striving towards unity, to
succumb to a kind of inadequate form of unity that leads them to many contradictions.

Thus, in the first pages of his treatise, Schelling sets the 'grounds'
of his further analysis. He explores mainly the second view and through
its shortcomings, questioning once again the possibility of the
compatibility of freedom with system even in human understanding. The
question of the contradiction between the notions of freedom and system,
or freedom and necessity as it would read later, is a higher formulation of

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140 In an interesting passage, Kierkegaard discusses and repudiates the possibility of a system of existence,
arguing that such a system exists only in the mind of God: "a system of existence cannot be given. Is there,
then, not such a system? That is not at all the case. Neither is this implied in what has been said. Existence
itself is a system- for God, but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit. System and conclusiveness
correspond to each other, but existence is the very opposite. Abstractly viewed, system and existence
cannot be thought conjointly, because in order to think existence, systematic thought must think it as
annulled and consequently as not existing. Existing is the spacing that holds apart; the systematic is the
conclusiveness that combines" (CUP: 118). The metaphors that Kierkegaard uses in order to describe the
"existing" and the "systematic" remind us of the similar metaphors that Schelling uses- as we are going to
see later in this chapter- in his description of cosmogony, theogony, etc, namely of the coming into
existence.

141 Having in mind mainly Fichte, Schelling argues that even Fichte's attempt to conceive of each ego as an
absolute substance did not help him escape the longing for unity and thus he developed a- inadequate in
Schelling's eyes- form of moral order that was full of problems and contradictions (OHF: 9).
the earlier contradiction between nature and freedom. Freedom, as a qualification of spirit, has been traditionally\textsuperscript{142} conceived as being in opposition with nature, the latter mainly perceived as 'mechanical nature':

This way of looking at the matter was adequately justified by the firm belief that reason is found only in man, the conviction that all thought and knowledge are completely subjective and that Nature altogether lacks reason and thought, and also by the universally prevalent mechanistic attitude, -even the dynamic factor which Kant revived having passed over into a higher mechanism and being in no sense recognised in its identity with the spiritual (OHF: 3).

Schelling questions the nature of the term 'contradiction' as well as that of the term of 'identity'. He also questions the de-spiritualization of nature and provides us with a radical conception of the 'law of identity', and consequently of a new dynamic definition regarding the nature of the copula is in judgement. Accordingly, when we utter the proposition that “this body is blue\textsuperscript{143}”, this does not mean “that the body in and by reason of its being a body is also a blue body, but only that the object designated as this body is also blue though not in the same sense”(OHF: 13). Moreover, Schelling argues, if the law of identity is even

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\textsuperscript{142} For example, Descartes's distinction between \textit{res extensa} and \textit{res cogitans} is a formulation of the distinction between nature, seen as mechanical nature and freedom, seen as spirit or as the 'thinking spirit'(Heidegger 1985: 59).

\textsuperscript{143} Heidegger's formulation of the same proposition is the following: When we say that 'this body is blue' it does not mean that body and blue are the same thing (as traditional thought would have it) but that although body and blue are two different things, their identity shows "their belonging together of what is different in one; still more generally expressed, the unity of a unity and an opposition"(Heidegger 1985: 77). Although, the thought of 'belonging together' in the customary way puts the emphasis on 'together' in order to highlight the 'unity' and the placing 'into the order of together'. Heidegger on the contrary, puts the emphasis on 'belonging', indicating, in the case of the encounter of Man as being with Being, the reciprocal response to each other and the event of appropriation taking place in the context of this reciprocal relation (Heidegger 1974: 31).
misinterpreted when it is applied into empirical concepts, then it is inevitable that it will be also misinterpreted with respect to its higher application. Thus, if we take for example the couple of opposite words ‘Imperfect’ and “Perfect’ and we argue that ‘the Imperfect is the Perfect’ then the common interpretation of the law of identity would be that Perfection and Imperfection are equivalent and identical, that is that “everything is one and the same, the worst and the best, folly and wisdom” (ibid: 13). On the contrary, in Schelling’s formulation, a proper application of the law of identity would read: “the Imperfect exists not by means of those attributes in and through which it is imperfect, but by means of the perfection which it contains” (loc. Cit). Similarly, the proposition “the Good is the Evil” that means “evil has no power to exist in itself; that which is real in it, considered in itself, is good” is usually interpreted as meaning that “the eternal difference between right and wrong, between virtue and sin, is being denied” and consequently as being “from the point of view of logic...the same” (loc. Cit). The same in the case of the proposition ‘necessity and freedom are one’, which is interpreted so as to mean that “freedom is nothing but a force of nature, a mainspring which like all others is subordinate to mechanism” instead of being rightly understood as meaning that “in the last instance the essence of the moral world is also the essence of the world of nature” (loc. Cit).
One of the examples that Schelling uses in order not only to illuminate the law of identity and its many misinterpretations but also to further explore the main task of his treatise, is the argument according to which “pantheism is the only possible system of reason but is inevitably fatalism” (ibid: 10), implying thus that ‘system’ is incompatible with ‘freedom’ but compatible with ‘necessity144’.

Although one cannot deny that some trends of pantheism can be connected with fatalism, this is not always the case, since, as Schelling points out, there are many people that are driven to pantheism because of “the liveliest sense of freedom” (loc. Cit).

This is because most of the people find human freedom and the attributes (e.g. omnipotence) of the Highest Being as incompatible notions. Thus, in order to secure human freedom without restricting God’s omnipotence or without arguing that it is God that permits freedom, they are instead “placing man and his freedom in the divine being, by saying that man exists not outside God but in God...” (loc. Cit).

This is the point where mystics, religious thinkers or lovers of the unknown contravene, namely the unity of God with man, which—according to Schelling— is a belief that “seems to appeal to our inmost feelings as much as, or even more than, it does to reason and speculation” (OHF: 11).

144 This is an exemplification of the contradiction of ‘freedom and necessity’, which is also an advancement of the previous contradiction between ‘nature’ and ‘freedom’. 
There is also another interpretation of pantheism, i.e. that of Spinoza, that although it is generally considered to be the classic example of pantheism, by constituting "a total identification of God with all things, a confusion of creature and creator", for Schelling on the contrary, it posits a complete differentiation between things and God (loc. Cit). Thus, in Spinoza,

God is that which is in itself and is conceived solely through itself; whereas the finite necessarily exists in another being and can only be conceived with reference to it. Manifestly, in consequence of this distinction, things are not different form God merely in degree or because of their limitations...but they differ from God toto genere (OHF: 12).

Even when Spinoza claims that "each object is a modified God" this is not an indication of a possible identification of God with an object, because a "modified, that is to say a derived God, is not God in the real, distinctive sense" (loc. Cit). What is responsible again for such confusions and accusations is the misapplication of the law of identity.

Thus, if we have a closer look at the statement of pantheism according to which "God is everything" (Heidegger 1985: 72), then we can also venture the statement that "God is man". Consequently, this does not mean that man and God are identical but on the contrary it reads:

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145 This Spinoza's statement is to be seen as an exemplification of the second possible interpretation of pantheism according to Heidegger's classification of Schelling's discussion on pantheism: More specifically, Heidegger argues that there are three interpretations of the central 'sentence' of pantheism "God is everything", that are as following: "1) everything is God 2) every individual thing is God 3) all things are nothing". None of the three interpretations are permissible since they falsely interpret pantheism. The first two "dissolve the concept of God so that there is no longer any support left to speak of pantheism in any sense, that is, of theism in general". Regarding the third interpretation, it "removes all beings outside of God so that again, but from the reverse side, pantheism is impossible since everything is after all nothing" (Heidegger 1985:72-3).
God is man. God as ground allows man to be consequence. But man is then after all something dependent and not at all what is required, something free and self-contained. But dependence initially means only that what is dependent is dependent on its ground in that it is at all, but not in what it is. That a son is, for this a father is necessary. But what is dependent, the son, need not, therefore, be what the ground is, a father (Heidegger 1985: 87).

Dependence, thus, acquires a different meaning and one can possibly read Spinoza’s following remark accordingly:

Whatever their [i.e things's] relation to God may be, they are absolutely differentiated from God through the fact that they can exist only in and dependent upon another being (namely himself), and that their concept is a derivative one which would not even be possible without the concept of God (OHF: 12)

Indeed, Schelling argues, the problem with Spinoza’s pantheism, that does not allow it to be considered as pantheism par excellence, is not to be found in an alleged identification of things with God, neither in his position that ‘all things are posited in God” but solely in his conception of the “things” that brings forth a lifeless, rigid and mechanistic system that, can be also be defined as fatalism. When the encounter with the Other, either God or human beings, or nature etc, takes the form of an encounter with ‘things' then, for Schelling, the unity of the law of identity loses its “intrinsically creative kind”(ibid: 18):

Spinoza must then be a fatalist for another reason...the error of his system is by no means due to the fact that he posits all things in God, but to the fact that they are things- to the abstract conception of the world and its creatures, indeed of eternal Substance itself, which is also a thing for him. Thus his arguments against freedom are altogether deterministic, and in no wise pantheistic (OHF: 22)
In the course of this chapter, we will come across the interplay between different couples of two seemingly opposite poles exploring thus ‘identity’ and ‘freedom’ in their human, divine and cosmic dimensions. Schelling’s solution to admit that there is some sort of a system at least in the divine understanding should be seen neither as a relapse to onto-theology\(^{146}\) as in Heidegger’s argument, nor as a claim to have this knowledge [which] arises from boastfulness and a sense of superiority towards others, qualities which should be foreign to anyone who has had even a slightest training in philosophy (OHF: 8).

The latter claim is based on a misinterpretation of Schelling’s claim according to which an argument that would say that such a “system can never be revealed to human insight” means nothing at all. This is because this argument may as well be true or wrong depending “on the

\(^{146}\) Although a proper discussion of the issue of onto-theology is huge and beyond the scope of this chapter, we will briefly explain Heidegger’s definition of it. Accordingly, in the case of Schelling, the philosopher’s recourse to the divine understanding as a possible source of a system is for Heidegger ‘a theological turn’. \(\Theta\epsilon\omega\lambda\gamma\tau\alpha\), or theology, Heidegger reminds us, is not firstly used within the framework of ecclesiastical faith, but within philosophy, including thus also “the mytho-poetic utterance about the gods” (Heidegger 1985:50; Heidegger 1974: 54). Indeed, the entrance of God into philosophy and metaphysics makes any philosophy to be also a theology (Heidegger 1974: 55) that “questions beings as a whole” (Heidegger 1985:51). At the same time, the questioning of beings as a whole has as its counterpart the question of beings as such, the latter being ontology (loc. Cit). Consequently, Heidegger concludes, the questioning of philosophy is always and “in itself both onto-logical and theo-logical in the very broad sense. Philosophy is \textit{Ontotheology}. The more originally it is both in one, the more truly it is philosophy, and Schelling’s treatise is thus one of the most profound works of philosophy because it is in a unique sense ontological and theological \textit{at the same time}” (Heidegger 1985: 51). What is lacking in \textit{ontotheology} is the oblivion of the difference between beings and Being, and consequently the unity of the “essential nature of metaphysics”, that is the unity of theology and ontology is still unthought, that means, it is taken for granted (Heidegger 1974: 50&55): “The problem here is obviously not a union of two independent disciplines of metaphysics, but the unity of \textit{what is} in question, and in thought, in ontologic and theologico-beings as such in the universal and primal \textit{at one with} beings as such in the highest and ultimate. The unity of this One is of such a kind that the ultimate in its own way accounts for the primal, and the primal in its own way accounts for the ultimate. The difference between the two ways of accounting belongs to the still-unthought difference we mentioned” (Heidegger 1974: 61). If Heidegger’s is right in considering also Schelling among those who did not think about this difference, is to be decided towards the end of this chapter.
definition of the principle by virtue of which man in any wise attain knowledge” (loc. Cit).

Schelling acutely recognises the incompleteness of our knowledge and consequently our inability to capture the whole at once:

*We do not live in intuitions. Our knowledge is incomplete [Stuckwerk]; that is, it must be produced piecemeal [stuckweiss] in sections and degrees, and this cannot occur in the absence of reflection (AGW 1813: 117).*

Thus, one should not interpret Schelling’s attitude towards knowledge as overoptimistical. Even when Schelling endorses the metaphor that sees man as *microtheos*¹⁴⁷, this is not in order to elevate man into the place of God. Quite on the contrary, Schelling uses this analogy in order to trace this longing that urges the philosopher to maintain “the existence of this (divine) knowledge, because he alone comprehends the god outside him through the god within himself by keeping his mind pure and unclouded by evil” (OHF: 8). This is not to say that God in Schelling is something static and lifeless. Most importantly Schelling argues that the journey that philosophy longs for is not to be completed since *it is not a lifeless one.*

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¹⁴⁷ This metaphor, that means literally “little god” is borrowed not only from Boehme but also from the long mystic and Gnostic tradition preceding Schelling. More specifically, Boehme sees the human being as *microcosmos and microtheos*, emphasising thus that a person is the metaphysical point of connection between God and the world. Accordingly, the human being “comprises in himself all the constituents of the creation, and reflects in his own structure the structure of God” (Brown 1977: 40).
The philosopher, when he speaks of the possibility of evil in relation to God, emphasises the difference between system and life, or existing:

In the divine understanding there is a system; God himself, however, is not a system but a life, and this alone constitutes the answer to the question as to the possibility of evil in relation to God... all existence must be conditioned in order that it may be actual, that is personal, existence. God's existence, too,... (OHF: 79).

Thus, Identity becomes in Schelling synonymous with

the becoming of creation out of the contrary intercourse between a will that strives for infinite expansion and the will that tries to form longing and to incorporate it in the nexus of beings. Identity also stands for the moment of formation of the longing, a moment of transient fulfilment. The copula is then signifies both the process of expression and the moment of actualisation. This double significance of Identity refers also to God's double meaning. Accordingly, God is conceived both as the becoming of the oppositional vital powers in him and as the moment of the celebration of love (Goudeli 2002: 111).

Let us follow Schelling's journey back to the cosmogonic process which as an eternal past never passes away. Let us also keep in mind the tentative character of this journey that could never be completed in temporal terms and consequently never properly^narrated, as the following passage indicates:

We must not misjudge our time. Heralds of this time, we do not want to pick its fruit before it is ripe nor do we want to misjudge what is ours. It is still a time of struggle. The goal of this investigation has still not been reached. We cannot be narrators, only explorers, weighing the pros and cons of all views until the right one has been settled, indubitably rooted forever (AGW 1815: xl).

148 Although one has not to underestimate the importance of Schelling's statement according to which, there is the hope that someone will come that could sing heroically the poem of past, future and present: "Perhaps the one is still coming who will sing the greatest heroic poem, grasping in spirit something for which the seers of old were famous: what was, what is, what will be" (AGW 1815: xl).
3.2 Theo-cosmo-gonic process & the conception of the eternal past

3.2.1 The nature of God in Schelling’s Ages of the World

If for Kant the discussion of the two alleged kinds of causality, viz. of nature and freedom, is destined to lead thought into antinomical assertions even when it is limited to the realm of phenomena (CPR: 409), then Schelling’s attempt to place nature, necessity and freedom in God is a breakthrough movement, since in a sense it places this antinomical relation in the realm of noumena. God, as we are going to see, is both original nature and original freedom. The human being can be free as well and human freedom is seen as the possibility\(^{149}\) of good and evil. The importance of Schelling’s definition lies on this “and” that adds evil to the definition of freedom. Heidegger points out the radical change that Schelling effects to the traditional definition of freedom.

Indeed, Descartes’ statement that “\textit{libertas est propensio in bonum}” encapsulates the definition of freedom that most of the thinkers before and after him endorse, according to which freedom is the capability of good. The addition of evil into the aforementioned proposition inaugurates a new horizon for thought. Evil is not seen as a simple supplement to the concept of freedom but rather “freedom is freedom for good and evil”\cite{Heidegger 1985: 97}. Thus, the discussion of evil eludes the boundaries of mere morality and acquires a metaphysical, ontological and even theological meaning. Before discussing more specifically the

\(^{149}\) We have seen in the first chapter Kierkegaard’s similar definition of freedom.
case of human freedom and the possibility of evil in detail, we will explore
Schelling's account of theogony in order to address the question of how
God permits evil to come forth. The old and recurrent question of the
compatibility of evil with goodness and God takes a new form in
Schelling's thought. By arguing that "freedom... as ... a power of
evil... must have a root independent of God", Schelling does not find
recourse- as it may seem at first glance- to the common claim of dualism,
according to which there are two opposite and equal powers, namely
Good and Evil being in continuous conflict with each other. The problem
with dualism is according to Schelling, that by accepting the existence of
"two absolutely different and mutually independent principles, it is only a
system of self-destruction and the despair of reason" (O HF: 28). Even if
one considers evil as being in a sense dependent on good, so as to
concentrate one's thought into a single being, the difficulty is not
diminished but rather increased. Furthermore, Schelling does not
endorse either the view according to which God is conceived as actus
purissimus\textsuperscript{150}, that is God devoid of possibility.
Possibility is part of God's becoming and in a sense Schelling has to
explore the contradiction that evil must have its root independent of God
but in God:

\textsuperscript{150} According to Berdyaev, the conception of God as actus purus, is an attempt to secure God's actuality
against any intermingling with the natural world. Accordingly, God is conceived as being without
potentiality "for potentiality is an imperfection of created being, a proof of its confusion with non-
being" (Berdyaev 1935: 50). Thus, God's action upon the world "operates by means of grace and by the
official channels which have been established by the Church" (loc. Cit). The only case that Schelling uses
and endorses the Godhead's definition as actus purus is when he wants to describe the Godhead as being
only 'pure freedom' (see AGW 1815: 26).
But if freedom as the capability of evil must have a root independent of God, and if God, on the other hand is to remain the one and sole root of beings, then this ground of evil independent of God can only be in God. There must be in God something which God himself ‘is’ not. God must be conceived more primordially (Heidegger 1985: 103).

To face a contradiction is for Schelling a task that is usually neglected by most of people

Although men- in both living and knowing- seem to shy away from nothing so much as contradiction, they still must confront it, because life itself is in contradiction. Without contradiction there would be no life, no movement, no progress; a deadly slumber of all forces. Only contradiction drives us- indeed forces us to action. Contradiction is in fact the venom of all life, and all vital motion is nothing but the attempt to overcome this poisoning (AGW 1813: 124).

Thus, contradiction, although in an implicit and not always active way, is even to be found in the Highest being since God, for Schelling, is also life, participating thus in becoming. A counterpart of contradiction is noncontradiction, and only through the acting of the unity of contradiction and noncontradiction, contradiction becomes intelligible.

More explicitly, noncontradiction is the permanent background behind all life and all living things “were...attended by an immediate presentiment of this background, driving them to demand a return to it”(ibid:125). Schelling argues that if contradiction is seen as ‘motion in time’ then noncontradiction is ‘the essence of eternity’ and consequently

151 As we have seen in the first chapter, Kierkegaard also endorses this point of view.
"if all of life is truly only a movement to raise itself up from contradiction, then time itself is nothing but a constant yearning for eternity" (loc. Cit).

Moreover, Schelling asks, how can contradiction be resolved in the case of the Highest Being?

Everything longs for eternity. But how can there be something without contradiction, and hence Eternal? Is it not the case that the Highest is necessarily a thing-that-is, and yet can we deny it being? But if it is a thing-that-is, then that contradiction which we have shown to exist in everything that is will necessarily exist in it as well. The same holds true if the Highest is a being, or has a being, and is thus both [a being and a thing-that-is] at the same time (AGW 1813: 125).

Thus, the Highest, or the Unconditioned as Schelling would name it a few lines later, is necessarily a 'thing-that-is' and a 'being' and thus it can be thought at the same time 'as what posits' and as 'what is posited'. Schelling uses the term 'necessary' for he acknowledges both necessity and freedom in God.

Necessity is already recognised when a necessary existence is ascribed to God. To speak naturally, there is necessity insofar as it is before freedom, because a being must first exist before it could act freely. Necessity lies at the foundation of freedom and is in God itself what is first and oldest, insofar as such a distinction can take place in God, which will have to be cleared up through further consideration. Even though the God who is necessary is the God who is free, both are still one and the same (AGW 1815: 5).

The relationship of freedom and necessity in God is not easily captured in words due to its complexity. In the course of this chapter this paradoxical relationship will unfold gradually but we can indicate some preliminary features of it.

Before discussing further God as freedom and as necessity, it is important to make some preliminary comments concerning Schelling's
account of time and eternity in order to avoid any confusion regarding God's actualisation, God's birth, etc.

Indeed, what God is primordially is not to be thought in sequential and temporal terms. First, it is important to clarify that Schelling speaks about the internal life of God who although has no actual beginning outside itself, it nevertheless has a beginning within itself. This will enable us to understand firstly how something independent of God can be in God and secondly to comprehend the so-called birth of God as an internal process that is still happening. Schelling emphasises the difference between an internal and an external beginning

The beginning that a being has outside of itself and the beginning that a being has within itself are different. A beginning from which it can be alienated and from which it can distance itself is different than a beginning in which it eternally remains because it itself is the beginning (AGW 1815: 17).

Consequently, the theogonic process is to be understood as being internal to the divine being. In Schelling's account, we therefore come across many different beginnings, i.e. first, the 'absolute first beginning' that is 'pure freedom', second, the 'eternal beginning' that is the negating will commencing the wheel of birth within the limits of 'nature' or third, the eternal birth of God (AGW 1815: 78) that is the beginning of God's actualisation and revelations, etc. Indeed, one can easily confuse and

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152 We are now speaking about the complete idea of God and thus, we are not yet able to speak about God as a He (that is a personal God) but rather we have to restrict ourselves to God as an it (see AGW 1815:39).
conflate the different ‘beginnings’ if one fails to see them as internal processes. This observation moves us to the second point we wish to make. Accordingly, the eternal birth of God— for example— is not to be taken as an absolute although internal act that happened once and for all. Quite on the contrary, Schelling postulates the existence of a ‘system of times’ (AGW 1813:123) while he elaborates in an interesting way not only on the intermingling of time with eternity but also on the very nature of eternity. Thus, Schelling, trying to explain both the succession of the potencies that exclude each other with respect to time, he argues that

We express it intentionally in this way for the relationship cannot be of the kind such that if the posterior, say A, has being, then the posterior, hence, B, would be sublimated, or simply ceased to have being. Rather, is always and necessarily abides as having the being of its time. If A is posited, then B must simply still persist as the prior, and hence in such a way, that they are nonetheless, at the same time, in different times. For different times... can certainly be, as different, at the same time, nay, to speak more accurately, they are necessarily at the same time. Past time is not sublimated time. What has past certainly cannot be as something present, but it must be as something past at the same time with the present. What is future is certainly not something that has being now, but it is a future being at the same time with the present... Hence, the contradiction only breaks with eternity when it is in its highest intensity and, instead of a single eternity, posits a succession of eternities (eons) or times. Hence, eternity opens up into time in this decision (AGW 1815: 76).

Thus, eternal past, eternal present and eternal future are parallel aeons that ‘necessarily’ exist simultaneously. The inauguration of time ‘begins’— in the sense that time becomes actual— with the ‘eternal birth’ of God, for this is the moment where God is posited as Yes and separates Himself from No, positing thus nature as His ‘eternal past’. Before exploring further this, a more detailed presentation of the “Past” is needed, and
consequently of the relationship between God’s nature and Godhead as freedom.

For Schelling, what is necessary in God is also called ‘the nature of God’.

Freedom is not a distinct principle of God in addition to ‘being’ and to the ‘thing-that-is’. Schelling compares the relationship of the nature of God with freedom to the relationship between the natural and the spiritual life of the person according to the Scriptures.

What is understood here by ‘natural’ is not simply the by and large ‘physical’, that is, the corporeal. The soul and the spirit, as well as the body, if not born again, that is elevated to a different and a higher life, belong to the ‘natural’ (AGW 1815: 5).

Indeed, freedom can be seen in Schelling’s thought as the element that energises, breaths life to the whole of cosmos, to God and eventually to the human being, elevating them into a higher plane. Without freedom, Schelling argues, there would be no creation, for God would not be able to create beings outside of itself from a blind necessity in God’s nature, but rather with the higher voluntarism. To speak even more exactly, if it were left to the mere capacity of God’s necessity, then there would be no creatures because necessity refers only to God’s existence as God’s own existence. Therefore, in creation, God overcomes the necessity of its nature through freedom and it is freedom that comes above necessity not necessity that comes above freedom (loc. Cit).

Without freedom, God would be only what is by necessity that is God as necessarily a thing-that-is and a being.

Schelling acknowledges the difficulty not only to affirm but also to deny these features of the Highest. for we cannot argue that the Highest
"cannot possibly be what-is-not [ein Nichtseyendes], [and] cannot possibly not be" (AGW 1813:125). The solution that Schelling proposes to the seeming difficulty of the placing of contradiction in the Highest is in the same line with the one that he used regarding the law of identity.

Now, he applies this law in the primordial theo-cosmo-gonic becoming. Concerning the nature of God, Schelling reformulates Leibniz’s remarks on the falsity of the commonly perceived rule according to which “disparate things can neither be predicated of each other nor of a third thing”(AGW 1813: 128). Leibniz uses the example of body and soul in order to clarify this

One $= X$ is soul and body, which is to say one is the expressing of both, and to the extent that it actually expresses them, it is actually both as well. But to the extent that it is only their expressing—without taking into account the fact that it actually expresses them—it is neither the one nor the other (AGW 1813: 128).

Schelling, accordingly, applies this conclusion in the nature of the primordial being:

The same thing holds true here. One and the same $= X$ is the expressing of both, of what-is and of being. As such, it is neither the one nor the other; it is therefore simply one. But if it actually expresses them both then it is both, though not as the expressing but rather with respect to the expressed, just as it was both before as well, not as the expressing but indeed with respect <to the expressible> [dem Aussprechlichen] (ibid: 128).
In the stage of pure necessity both the principles\(^1\), that are 'being' and a 'thing-that-is' have not yet overcome the state of blind opposition and blind necessity where all the forces were captured into the wheel\(^2\) of birth. This wheel of birth is conceived as "a life that eternally circulates within itself, a kind of circle because the lowest always runs into the highest, and the highest again into the lowest" (AGW 1815: 20). The forces, which are "reciprocally repressing and excluding each other in an incessant circulation" within the limits of the wheel of birth are to be brought "from succession into simultaneity"\(^3\) (ibid: 76). In the state of succession of the two opposite forces\(^4\), 'being' (i.e. the negating will, the "equivalently eternal force of selfhood, of retreat into itself, of Being in itself") and 'what-is' (i.e. the affirming will, "the outpouring.

\(^1\) It is important to say that one cannot conceive of this stage as absolutely independent of God as freedom, so such an analysis will inevitably be incomplete and one-dimensional. The two principles, and also a third as their unity, are already present "in what is necessary of God" (AGW 1815: 6).

\(^2\) The 'wheel of birth', or the 'sanctuary' or 'the hearth of life', or the Heraclitean 'tireless fire', are for Schelling possible descriptions of the necessary incessant repetitive movement of the forces. Even in the Old Testament there is a similar image: "For the LORD your god is a devouring fire, a jealous god" (Deuteronomy 4:24: AGW 1815: 20 & 138 n.22). This perpetual movement resembles diastole and systole. A visible remainder of this movement is the example of visible nature. Schelling offers as an example the tree: "the tree, for example, constantly drives form the root to the fruit, and when it has arrived at the pinnacle, it again sheds everything and retreats to the state of fruitlessness, and makes itself back into a root, only in order again to ascend...Yet all of visible nature appears unable to attain settledness and seems to transmute tirelessly in a similar circle" (ibid: 21). Thus, the repetitive movement of nature, the succession of forces is not the movement of freedom. On the contrary, as we are going to see shortly, Schelling narrates the transfiguration of forces from succession into simultaneity and the opposite although in a higher form with the intervention of freedom. Freedom is what makes qualitatively different the first kind of succession and the last one. In the last chapter, we will encounter a similar account by Kierkegaard. He also uses the example of nature in order to indicate the differences between repetition as a necessary movement and true repetition as a movement of freedom.

\(^3\) We will see shortly how the movement from simultaneity to succession, that follows the movement of inert opposition, opens up the space for a radical discussion of the dimensions of time.

\(^4\) Schelling uses the terms powers, potencies, principles, forces, etc in order to describe the function of the affirming will, of the negating will and of their union. Although he clarifies that he uses the term principles when he speaks about the steadfast Being characterised by simultaneity and the absence of contradiction, whereas he uses the term potencies when he refers to contradiction, opposition and succession, the case is that most of the time he is inconsistent with the usage of the words. In the paragraph under consideration for example, he terms the affirming and negating wills both principles and powers.
outstretching, self-giving being") both exclude each other with respect to time (AGW 1813: 143; AGW 1815: 6). Both these powers, in addition to the third power that is their unity are equally primordial beginnings and struggle to subjugate each other.

Each of these powers can be for itself. Hence the unity is a unity for itself and each of the opposite powers is a whole and complete being. Yet no one of them can be without the others also being and hence, only together do they fulfil the whole concept of the Godhead and only that God is necessary. Not one of them is necessary and by nature subordinate to the others. The negating principle is with regard to that inseparable primordial being, as essential as the affirming potency. And the unity is in turn, not more essential than each of the opposites are for themselves. Therefore each also has fully the same claim to be the being, to be that which has being. Not one of them can bring itself by nature only to Being or not to be that which has being (AGW 1815: 11).

Thus, God is both the eternal No\textsuperscript{157} that longs for retreat to itself, the eternal Yes\textsuperscript{158} that longs for expansion and communication, and also the union of Yes and No. In the course of Schelling's account we have not yet reached the point where all the three powers remain inactive and therefore "the contradiction itself could remain in concealment" and consequently the three powers can be simultaneous. Rather at this point we still concern ourselves with the succession of the potencies. How then, is it decided which potency will initiate the cycle and which will follow?

But precisely that one commences and one of them is the first, must result from a decision that certainly has not been made consciously or through deliberation but can happen rather only when a violent power blindly breaks the unity in the jostling between the necessity and the impossibility to be. But the only place in which a ground of determination can be sought for the precedence of one of them and the succession of the other is the particular nature of each of the

\textsuperscript{157} God as the eternal No is the indispensable principle of individuation and personhood for otherwise, God as a personal God would not be possible.

\textsuperscript{158} Although God as No is the ground of existence, God as eternal Yes is the principle of love that makes God's revelation actual.
principles, which is different from their general nature which consists in each being equally originally and equally independent and each have the same claim to be that which has being. This is not like saying that one of the principles would absolutely have to be the one that proceeds or the one that succeeds. Rather, just that, because it is allowed by its particular nature, the possibility is given to be the first, the second or the third (AGW 1815: 13)

Thus, although each of the potencies is co-primordial and co-original, in the state of necessity, each of them, is subject to its own features that enable it to posit and be posited. Indeed, the negating will comes first and is the ‘eternal beginning’, followed by the affirming and complemented finally by their union, that is ‘the eternal end’ (ibid: 19).

We are still discussing primordial being from the perspective of pure necessity and therefore the three powers constitute “the necessary nature, the being that is not allowed not to be, that absolutely must be”(AGW 1815: 11). At this stage of pure necessity, the goal has been achieved, and “there is nothing higher to be produced in this course” (ibid: 19). How then, could the incessant wheel of birth be broken in order for actual existence to come to the fore? Schelling points out that an end must be brought into this state of necessity where

They [i.e. potencies] must all strive to be in one and the same locus, namely, in the locus of that which have being and hence, so to speak, to be in a single point. A reciprocal inexistence is demanded because they are incompatible and when one has being, then the others must be without being (AGW 1815: 22).
Thus, if this incessant motion is represented as a single point\textsuperscript{159}, what is needed for a space to open up? There is only one solution according to Schelling: if all the principles strive to be 'that which has being for itself' then

No other solution is thinkable other than that they all communally and voluntarily (then by what would they be coerced?) sacrifice being that which has being and hence, debase themselves into a simple Being (AGW 1815: 22).

All the principles must sacrifice being then in order for space to open up and for the blind necessity of 'reciprocal existence' to metamorphose "into a relationship of a free belonging together" (loc. Cit). Indeed, a transfiguration has taken place and there was a movement from "succession into simultaneity". How is this possible, or in other words, why did all the principles sacrifice being what "has being" and "sank together to the expressible" (ibid: 77)? This voluntary sacrifice can only be possible with respect to something higher, an Other

that is outside of it and wholly independent of it and exalted above it. Since it ought therefore to acknowledge itself as mere Being and not as having being before that other, this is not possible without recognising at the same time its truly having being in that Other (ibid: 23).

This Other cannot be posited as a potency by this eternally commencing nature/necessity. It has to be outside and above all potency, or in other words it is a lack of potency. The potencies of the primordial Being in the state of necessity suffer from anxiety when facing pure and eternal

\textsuperscript{159} The introduction of space reveals the movement from the One to All (or Many) that is the result of the cision. This cision "is primarily based on the relationship of that steadfast but inexpressible unity in which each potency, which should be that which has being, that is, that which should be the same and therefore, so to speak, should be in one place and one point, is transformed into the relationship of a totality" (AGW 1815: 29).
freedom and its possibility. The encounter with the Other gave the wheel of birth a possibility, that is “either to accept this cision and thereby redeem itself from the annual drive or not to accept it and thereby again fall prey to that blind obsession and craving” (AGW 1815: 23). Needless to say that such a possibility is not a conscious choice between alternatives not only because consciousness has not yet arisen but also because this decision is one that is beyond choice. It is exactly this cision that will inaugurate the dawning of the consciousness and the consequent positing of the unconsciousness as the eternal past.

The question arises regarding the nature of this Other, the mere Presence of which makes the necessary wheel of nature to pause, to move from the One to All/Many. In other words what is it that makes the potencies to sacrifice their struggle to become the one and urges them to separate, or to use Schelling’s terminology, to divorce? What is this ‘pure freedom’ that even in its Indifference magically rouses in that incessant wheel of life “the yearning for freedom” (AGW 1815: 28)?

\[160\] In a similar way that human beings suffer from anxiety when they face the possibility of freedom in Kierkegaard, although the latter dismisses Schelling’s account on the basis that he put anxiety even in God, whereas Kierkegaard finds this unacceptable. More explicitly, Kierkegaard, speaking of ‘objective anxiety’, argues that Schelling’s usage of the terms anxiety, anguish and anger should be treated with suspicion since he confuses “the consequence of sin in creation” with “[what Schelling calls] the states and moods in God (CA: 59 n*).
3.2.2 Pure Freedom, Inexpressibility and the emergence of God

This cision, "this inner divergence, the work of true yearning is the first condition of every rapport with the divine" (AGW 1815: 28).

Schelling recalls the mystic teaching preceding him, the 'higher and finer teaching' as he calls it, in order to emphasise that this Other, the Highest,

is exclusively above all Being. The feeling is present in all of us that necessity follows from all existence as its grim fate. The only thing actual or the only thing that strives to be actual is precisely thereby in contradiction and contradiction is the cause of all necessity. An inner feeling tells us that the true, eternal, freedom only dwells above Being (AGW 1815: 23).

In other words, the Other, that is the expressing (das Aussprechende) or the Highest is to be identified neither with the 'being' nor with the 'thing-that-is' since it is none of them in particular, it cannot be both at the same time and furthermore it "is above both" (ibid: 126). The expressing can be also seen as the copula, namely the 'is' that links the subject and the predicate in judgement\[161\]. Thus, the 'is' attains a cosmological meaning and it becomes the 'ungrounded ground' that unites and gathers the different principles in God but also in cosmos and in all the creatures (AGW 1815:8). Thus, the expressing is what underlies the two principles viz. 'being' and the 'thing-that-is'. At this moment, both these forces and their unity are in a state of inert opposition and are both inactive, meaning that in their unity it is not yet the case that one of

\[161\] In the Ages of the World, Schelling many times interchanges the words cision and crisis (e.g 68-69, etc) and taken into account that in his treatise on freedom, he speaks of judgement in its greek etymology that is as κρίσις (crisis) that is as the separation and differentiation that freedom brings into the basis (OHF: 85), one wonders about the cosmological dimensions of judgment and its primordiality.
these two is inactive and the other active. In other words, their unity is one "in which the opposites are indifferent to each other" (AGW 1813: 128-9). The expressing is indifferent towards the initial opposition between the two potencies, and is called in Schelling's terminology the 'absolutely First'.

The expressing is present as well, but it does not attend to the opposition; it is indifferent towards it. This indifference that we have also considered elsewhere under the name of absolute Indifferenz of subject and object, we call the absolutely First (AGW 1813: 131).

Since the expressing does not attend the opposition it is not yet actual. This means that the expressing is not 'what-is' and 'being' with respect "to itself or in deed" but with respect to "the expressible, to the possible". In other words, both 'being' and a 'thing-that-is' are expressibles of the expressing, they only exist as possibilities but at this moment they are not yet expressed, they do not actually exist. Schelling investigates further the nature of the Highest by asking what could be something that can both express itself as 'what is' and as 'being' and refrain from expressing itself as both? The philosopher replies that the only thing that can both freely exist and not exist, 'by itself and with respect to its essence, can only be will'.

For only pure will is free to become active (that is, to exist) or to remain inactive (that is, not to exist). It alone is allowed to stand in the middle as it were, between being and nonbeing. Thus, that expressing which is free (with respect to its essence) to attend or not to attend to opposition, to affirm or not to affirm itself as what is and as being- this can only be pure, unmitigated will (AGW 1813: 132).

Schelling warns us against any attempt to conceive of this opposition/unity in Hegelian terms, as "if one wishes to think all duality as sublated". On the contrary, Schelling repeatedly emphasises that "one and the same thing is both what-is and being" (AGW 1813: 131).
Now, the expressing is 'the will that wills nothing'. It is not to be identified with the 'negating will' that opposes the 'affirming will', for the 'negating will' is a will that wills a 'determinate nothing whilst the expressing

it is indeed nothing, but in the same way that pure freedom is nothing. It is nothing in the same way as the will that wills nothing, that desires no object, to which all things are equal, and which is therefore moved by none. Such a will is nothing, and yet it is everything. It is nothing to the extent that it neither desires to become active nor craves any actuality. It is everything, because all strength comes from it alone as the eternal freedom; because it has all things under it, and because it rules all things and is ruled by none (AGW 1813: 133-emphasis added)

Interestingly enough, Schelling claims that- contrary to what is often argued- the First is not a deed, 'an unconditioned activity or action'. If this was the case, then contradiction would be eternal, but according to Schelling, “all movement is only for the sake of rest” and thus

Only an immovable, divine- indeed, we would better to say supradivine-indifference is absolutely First; it is the beginning that is also at the same time the end... For the absolutely First can only be that which the absolutely Last can be as well (AGW 1813: 132-3).

Thus, if we want to speak more rigidly, the 'will that wills nothing' is above God, for it is “neither this nor that, neither good nor evil, neither what-is nor being, neither affection nor aversion, neither love nor wrath, and yet the strength to be all of them” (AGW 1813: 135). The characterisation ‘above God’ is not to be taken literally, that is as meaning that there is another being that ‘precedes’ God or is

163 And thus is not to be confused with the ‘eternal beginning’.
hierarchically above Him and consequently absolutely distinguished from
God. On the contrary, this proposition is an urge, a call to ‘think’ of
Godhead beyond and ‘above’ any names, preconceptions etc. It is an
indication of the inexpressible, the eternally mysterious and the never-to-
be revealed side of the divine nature that is beyond any name,
description, predicate, etc. However, it is not a rejection of any possibility
of naming the divine nature. Dionysious the Aeropagite for example, the
great apophatic theologian, before approaching the apophatic nature of
God, gives us an account of the ‘names’ of God. Those names are the
best possible descriptions\(^{164}\) of the revealed parts of God, but they

\(^{164}\) This does not mean that the divine names are simple approximations of the divine nature, implying thus
that either the human understanding is so limited that could never grasp deity or that in the passing of time
someone may reveal God in a better and more complete way.
In contradistinction to the commonly perceived ‘apophaticism of the essence’, St. Dionysius points towards
a different kind of apophaticism. Interestingly enough, most of the western theologians and philosophers
interpret the texts of St. Dionysius under the light of the first kind of apophaticism. In brief, the
apophaticism of the essence or being is based on the assumption that God is essentially unknowable and
inapproachable, and consequently, one can secure, via apophatic propositions, His unknowability.

Anselm(+1109) and Aquinas(+1274) are commonly believed to be the ‘founders’ of the apophaticism of
the essence but according to Yannaras, not only scholastics but also most of the great mystics such as
Eckhart, Duns Scotus, Cusanus, etc, did not manage to escape the trap of this kind of apophaticism. In the
theology of St. Dionysius, the divine names are not imperfect predicates that should be corrected by the
negative theology in a dialectical way, as St.Thomas would assert. The latter claims (and his interpretation
would shape also Derrida’s reading of St. Dionysius) that “theology is characterized by its positive
statements about God; negative theology is required only to draw attention to the imperfections in the
predicates we attach to God. In the vocabulary we have developed, negative theology supplements positive
theology; it comes to fill a lack in positive theology, a lack which results from the use of improper
predicates” (Hart 1989: 200-1 & 193). On the contrary, in the apophaticism of St. Dionysius, the divine
names are the names of the divine energies and consequently they are perfect descriptions of the ways that
the Holy Trinity communicates itself to human beings. Nonetheless, apophaticism is a way and because of
this it is quite distinct from descriptions and names, explaining thus why St. Dionysius gives a higher place
to apophaticism rather that to positive theology. The danger of the ‘apophaticism of the essence’ is that it
creates an insurmountable gap between God and human beings. As we have already mentioned in the
previous chapter, in Aquinas for example, the problem starts from the suggested identity of the divine
essence and divine energies. On the contrary, what the theology of the East proposes is the apophaticism of
the person. This kind of apophaticism focuses on the personal God that communicates, that is presents and
relates his Three Persons to the human persons. Yannaras argues that in the Eastern Church, when one
speaks of God, he speaks specifically of the God of Abraham Isaac, of the God of the Jesus Christ, of the
Trinity of the Three Persons that is of a personal God etc. On the contrary, when one prioritizes the
common essence that the Three Persons share (as it is the case with the ‘apophaticism of the essence’).
nevertheless do not exhaust his unfathomable depths and heights. In a beautiful passage in his *Mystical theology*, St. Dionysius writes:

Αὐτὸς δὲ ἀνιόντες λέγομεν, ὡς ὕστερ ψυχὴ ἐστιν, ὑστερ νοῦς...ὑστε ὁμοιότης η αὐ cognition; ὑστε ἐστηκέν ὑστε κινεῖται, ὑστε ἁπαξαλός σχεί, ὑστε ἐχει δύναμιν, ὑστε δύναμις ἐστιν...; ὑστε ζῆ, ὑστε ζωή ἐστιν; ὑπὸ ὁμοια ἐστιν, ὑστε αἰων, ὑστε χρόνος...ὑπὸ λόγος αὐτής ἔστιν, ὑστε ονόμα, ὑστε γνώσις; ὑπὸ σκοτος ἐστιν, ὑπὸ φως; ὑστε πλάνη, ὑστε ἀλήθεια... (Mystical theology Ch. E: 253)

Indeed, in his discussion of the names of God in the Old Testament, Schelling distinguishes between Jehovah, that is the *inexpressible name* of the God, the name of the essence, the expressing I, that can say of itself “I am the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end” (AGW 1813: 135&164n.4; AGW 1815: 52), and Elohim that is the name of the

165 'Whilst we are ascending we utter: He is neither soul nor nous...neither equality nor inequality...He is neither standing, nor moving, nor resting...He is neither potentiality (or strength, or power), He is nor potential...He is not alive, He is not Life; He is neither essence, nor eternity, nor time...There is neither account (logos) for Him, no name, no knowledge. He is neither darkness, nor light, nor delusion, nor truth...'(my translation).
'divine effects'. Jehovah is not a common name, since in the primordial language He is the name:

Jehovah was in an equally originary way posited as Elohim in this relationship of the expressing, of the name or the word. "What should I answer the children of Israel," asks Moses, "when I say to them, 'The Elohim of your fathers sends me to you' and they ask me: 'What is his name?'" And Jehovah answered, "hence, you should say, 'Jehovah, the Elohim of your fathers, sends me to you. That is my name for eternity.'" (Exodus 3:15)...

It was always noticed how this name, whose true pronunciation is unknown, consists of pure breath. From this it was concluded that it indicated that the Godhead was pure breath, pure spirit (AGW 1815: 52).

At this point we have already moved into another stage of Schelling's exploration of the past. Accordingly, the 'will that wills nothing' that necessary is 'what-is' and 'being' expresses itself and both 'what-is' and being are no more expressibles but are rather expressed, that is they have moved from the realm of possibility into the realm of actuality. The history of revelations has eternally started. In this transformation a part of the expressing, remains inexpressible, and this is Jehovah

We can therefore see that in the very moment when the Highest is supposed to express itself, it becomes the inexpressible. Let no one be mistaken about this, or waste time in debate against those who deny it. One must in fact insist on this very inexpressibility, because it is necessary for the highest life. If what wills to express itself in all life were not inexpressible by nature...how could there be an absolutely Highest that never becomes the expressible, but eternally remains only the expressing? (AGW 1813: 170).

Indeed, the expressing as the pure I of divinity cannot be fully expressed but remains as the groundless ground of all existence that no language can ever grasp. But language cannot also grasp nature's dimension as the dark and inscrutable being, which is also the mother and receptacle
of all. Indeed, God’s resolution\textsuperscript{166} to reveal Himself is simultaneous with the decision, according to which He as the eternal No should be “the ground of the existence of the eternal Yes” (ibid: 77). The living God, is the Godhead both as a pure spirit/pure freedom and as its Other (in this case Schelling means the nature of God), and this explains how something can be in God but being distinct from Him,

For since God is not the cause of the Other through a special volition but through God’s mere essence, the Other is certainly not the essence of God, but it belongs to God’s essence, indeed in a natural and inseparable way. It therefore follows that if the pure Godhead=A, and that the Other=B, then the full concept of the living God which has being is not merely A, but is A+B. (AGW 1815: 42).

At this moment, His nature is posited as ‘eternal past’, in a cision that is still happening: “…that dark, inscrutable, and inexpressible being becomes the All in a subjugation and cision that does not happen once and for all, but in a moment that is eternally, always, and still happening” (ibid: 29).

The eternal past is not a fleeting moment but has duration, the latter being the meeting point of eternity with time (ibid: 80). This is the duration of the unconsciousness where the two simultaneous but also successive creations have taken place. Two simultaneous creations have happened, the first being the separation of darkness from light and the second the separation of nature from spirit. In the first, the three

\textsuperscript{166} This resolution, for Schelling, is only comparable with the similar act of a human being that we will explore in the last part of this chapter: “This resolution [Ent-Schliessung], coming out of the innermost unity, is only comparable to that incomprehensible primordial act in which the freedom of a person is decided for the first time”(AGW 1815: 77).
potencies, voluntarily, in the face of pure freedom, sank into the expressible and then moved from *simultaneity* into *succession* once more although now in a different form. The cision, inaugurating the spatial dimension where a true *over* and a true *under* emerges for the potencies, did not happen once and for all. After the positing of a true *over* and a true *under*, each potency acquires its proper topos and there is a mutual nurturing of each other. The first potency is the possible substratum of external nature, the second potency is the substratum of the spiritual world and the third potency is the link between the Godhead and nature, for although it was captured in the wheel of birth, in its freedom it is the closest to God and is the universal soul. The wheel of life still continues to rotate but enriched with freedom's energy that transforms it into an *incessant theurgy*:

...this constantly repeated movement of eternal nature, always beginning again, can be regarded as an incessant theurgy. The meaning and goal of all theurgy is nothing other than to draw the Godhead down to what is lower..., to produce the guiding concatenation, so to speak, through which the Godhead would be able to act in nature (AGW 1815: 72).

The second creation is the emergence of God as spirit and his positedness as Yes, which is Love. If we want to present it schematically, in the *eternal moment* of first creation the dark side of nature voluntarily withdraws, refrains from being actualised, becomes what it was\(^{167}\), the

\(^{167}\) In the sense that even before the separation of forces and the first realisation of the divine being it was again *chora*, the receptacle of all things. For example, Schelling compares the primal longing of the depths with the Platonic *chora* that 'follows some dark, uncertain law, incapable of forming anything that can endure. In *Timaeus*, the name *chora* means space, implying thus that in a sense *chora* provides the needed
Platonic chora, "the mother and receptacle of all visible things" (AGW 1813:31), and light emerges. At this moment the realm of nature opens up for Schelling, which in external fashion could be seen as being best presented in the Old Testament where the law\textsuperscript{168} was pre-eminent (O HF: 92). God's revelation is continuous and at this moment He is both Elohim and Jehovah\textsuperscript{169}, the latter being his inexpressible side. In the second creation, where the will of depths, or in other words the will that denies expansion and is seen as the eternal force of selfhood that longs particularity retreats in front of the will of love that longs expansion and universality and God as spirit and love emerges. He reveals himself as a personal\textsuperscript{170} God, as a He instead of an It (AGW 1815:39), uniting in himself selfhood and expansion, elevating thus particularity into spirit. 

In order for this to happen, He has to say No to his eternal ground, and thus a side of the pure I of divinity (i.e. pure freedom) remains inexpressible and unspeakable. Thus, the eternal past, that is the unconsciousness, incorporates both (viz. pure freedom and pure necessity) the unspeakable sides of God that are united and function together. The expressibles, or in other words the archetypes, continue

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\textsuperscript{168} This is why in a similar fashion, in the first creation every potency is described as following its own inner law (see AGW 1815: 30ff)

\textsuperscript{169} This is why Jehovah is presented as consuming fire, etc.

\textsuperscript{170} The example of personal God is for Schelling Christ, the God-Man that inaugurates the new covenant. We will see in our next chapter the importance that Kierkegaard gives to the revelation of Christ.
incessantly their theurgic transmutation and inform any creative act that springs from the unconsciousness (AGW 1815: 66-68). Even perceived in their blindness, as the necessary wheel of birth, the incessant movement of the potencies is seen by Schelling as a source of inspiration and creativity, or as divine and holy madness.

When inspiration appears in poetic and other kinds of works, a blind force must also appear in them. For only a blind force is capable of inspiration. All conscious creation presupposes an unconscious creating. Conscious creating is just the unfolding and setting into opposition of unconscious creating (AGW 1815: 102).

Indeed, God's ground that is separate from Him but in Him is the ground of the creation of cosmos, of external nature and inevitably of human beings. Surprisingly enough, Schelling names this 'ungrounded ground' of God that comprises nature and 'pure freedom', His personality, his ipseity (AGW 1815:107). On Of Human Freedom, Schelling calls God the highest personality, meaning that within him there is the perfect connection of the ideal principle with the independent ground, implying thus that God's personality should be seen as relational, that is as expressing both the relation of ground and existence and the inexpressibility of the divine. His personality is what differentiates Himself from the other creatures.

...already in the language of ancient philosophy, personality is explained as the ultimate act or the ultimate potency by which an intelligent being exists in an incommunicable fashion. This is the principle that instead, of confusing God with the creature, as was believed, eternally divides God from the creature. Everything can be communicated to the creature except for one thing. The creature cannot have the immortal ground of life in itself. The creature cannot be of and through itself (AGW 1815: 107).
Only the human beings are somehow exempted from this rule, through their special relation with God's ground not only as spirits, but also as having this essence that attributes to them the possibility of inexpressibility as well.

Man must be granted an essence outside and above the world; for how could he alone, of all creatures, retrace the long path of developments from the present back into the deepest night of the past, how could he alone rise up to the beginning of things unless there were in him an essence from the beginning of times? Drawn from the source of things and akin to it, what is eternal of the soul has a co-science/consciousness [Mitt-Wissenschaft] of creation (AGW 1813: 114).

Thus, if -as we have seen- science is for Schelling the striving towards anamnnesia, then co-science or con-sciousness could be seen as the restoration of memory that needs anamnnesia (recollection) as its presupposition. This recalls Philo's wonderful account on the function of memory. Philo, describing the way the mind is set in motion, explains that this happens “by occasion of that which is not present as well, if past, by way of memory, if future, by building hopes and expectations” (Allegorical II ch.XII 43-46 : 253). Although, it seems that Philo has a very similar account to that of St. Augustine, it transpires that his conception of memory opens up the space for a radical theory of time. Thus, when he discusses the difference between memory and recollection, he argues that memory possesses the superior position. This happens because recollection presupposes forgetfulness, the latter being described as a “maimed and blind affair”. On the contrary, memory is
represented as “unbroken and uninterrupted”, keeping everything “that it
has apprehended fresh and distinct” (ibid III Ch. XXX 90-93:363).
Consequently, recollection, although being inferior, can also be seen as
older than memory, since it is its presupposition. As Philo
characteristically claims, “...as the result of repeated forgetting and
repeated recollecting an unfalling memory shall subsequently win the
day” (loc. Cit). Thus, one can argue that for Schelling, memory would be
the retrieval of the relationship with the \textit{duration} of the ‘eternal past’
through \textit{anamnesis}. 
3.3 Human freedom & the possibility of good and evil

Human freedom is defined by Schelling as the 'possibility of good and evil' and we have already emphasised the importance of the 'and' in the above definition. Before exploring the dimensions of human freedom, an inevitable question arises: Is also divine freedom a ‘possibility of good and evil’? Or put differently, what is the relationship of God with evil, taking into account that the root of evil, that is freedom, is independent of God but nevertheless in God? In the description of the theogonic process we came across a two-faced resolution: firstly, the potencies decided to sacrifice themselves, that is to accept the cision instead of falling again in “blind obsession and craving” (AGW 1815: 23). Secondly, the same decision means that God resolves that He wants to give birth to Himself, uttering consequently No to His nature. We have seen that this act is repeated eternally, within the duration of eternal past. Although, the abyss freely decides to retreat and allows God’s revelation to happen there is still in the abyss the will of depths that longs for realisation. This reaction that comes from the depths is said to be the root of universal evil

There is, therefore, a universal evil, even if it is not active from the beginning but is only aroused in God’s revelation through the reaction of the basis, and indeed never reaches realization, but is nonetheless constantly striving towards it. Only after recognising evil in its universal character is it possible to comprehend good and evil in man too (OHF: 58).

171 This is another name for the abysmal side of God’s nature (AGW 1815: 31).
This is not to mean that God consists of two opposite equal powers that are in constant fight with each other until one finally prevails. On the contrary, Schelling insists, the succession and concatenation of potencies is "indissoluble in divine life" although it is "dissoluble in human life" and that makes evil possible in human life but impossible in the divine life (AGW 1815: 43). Similarly enough, as Schelling argues in his treatise on freedom, the unity of the potencies, or in other words of the 'will of love' and of the 'will of depths' is indissoluble in God and dissoluble in man.

If, now, the identity of both principles were just as indissoluble in man as in God, then there would be no difference – that is, God, as spirit would not be revealed. Therefore that unity, which is indissoluble in God must be dissoluble in man- and this constitutes the possibility of good and evil (OHF: 39).

As Schelling characteristically argues, among the visible creatures only the human beings are in God, and via this 'very being-in-God' are capable of freedom. In this sense, the human being is also the 'redeemer of nature', meaning that by her connection with God, "God...also accepts nature and takes it to him" (OHF: 92). The importance that Schelling ascribes to human beings is striking. The dissolubility of the forces in the human beings proves their freedom and the independent relation they have with God and with His ground. Even with respect to God, the human being is free and thus she is primordially capable of evil. For Schelling, in the human being there are also two principles, namely the
principle of light and the principle of darkness, and consequently two centres, “the deepest pit and the highest heaven” (ibid: 38). The principle of darkness, if it is taken separately, is the negating will or the self-will whilst the principle of light is the affirming will or the universal and expanding will. Similarly to the theogonic creation, although the self-will opposes reason as the universal will, the latter “makes use of the former and subordinates it to itself as a mere tool” and consequently, through the “progressive transformations and division of all forces”, the self-will unites with the universal will, without losing its individuality. In the same way as in God, in the human being the elevation of the self-will and its union with the universal will is described as the “the elevation of the most abysmal centre into light”. Indeed, the will of the human being

...to the extent to which it is individual, is also a particular will, though in itself or as the centre of all other particular wills it is one with the primal will or reason (OHF: 38)

Human being’s rise from the depths makes her contain a principle “relatively independent of God” but since this principle is transfigured

\[^{172}\text{Reason as universal will is the expression that Schelling uses in his treatise on freedom. It is quite interesting that in his description of the cosmo-anthropo-gonic process in this book, Schelling claims that because of the longing of the depths, there was born in God an imaginative response to it and through this response, “God sees himself in his own image, since his imagination can have no other object than himself”. This image, Schelling calls reason or the logic of that longing. He furthermore emphasises that the first “effect of reason in nature is the separation of forces” or in other words “…reason, in the light which has appeared in the beginnings of nature, rouses longing…to divide the forces…and this very division brings out the unity enclosed in what was divided, the hidden light” (OHF: 36). The function of reason reminds us the function of pure freedom in the Ages of the World, making us think the possibility of a different approach of reason as including also the unconsciousness, the divine and human madness, etc. Furthermore, in the Ages of the World, in an indirect reference to the first verse of the first book of Genesis, Schelling describes the power that pacifies the potencies not only as ‘pure freedom’ but also as the ‘word’: “The forces of that consuming fire still slumber in life, only pacified and, so to speak, exorcised by that word by which the one became the all” (AGW 1815: 49).\]
into light then the 'spirit' arises in human being. The union of the two principles brings forth 'spirit' and the very relationship of the human being with God constitutes her personality.

That principle which rises up from the depths of nature and by which man is divided from God, is the selfhood in him; but by reason of its unity with the ideal principle, this becomes spirit. Selfhood, as such, is spirit; or man as an egocentric, particularised being (divorced from God) is spirit- the very relation [to God] constitutes personality (OHF: 39-emphasis added).

As far as the two principles are in union, and in a similar way with that of God, the human being utters Yes to light and No to her dark depths, that is insofar as the self-will remains subordinate to the universal will, then the principles are indissoluble, and evil has not yet appeared. However, selfhood as spirit is beyond the two principles and free from them and thus selfhood can separate itself from light and consequently dissolution of the principles is possible where the self-will demands to be in itself what it was in its union with the universal will. Indeed, the emergence of spirit is what differentiates the human beings from the other visible creatures. For example the animals, by not having spirit, can never escape from the unity of forces whilst "man can deliberately cut the eternal nexus of forces" (OHF: 49). This last observation makes Baader to utter that "unfortunately man can only stand above or beneath animals" (loc. Cit). The consequence of the elevation of self-will into an autonomous position inaugurates the reality of a false life, of disease and of sin. If, Schelling says "a genuine life could only exist in the original relationship, there thus arises a life which is indeed a life, but is false, a
life of lies ..." (OHF: 41). The most “appropriate comparison” is disease, which for Schelling is a disorder that entered nature through a misuse of freedom, and this is why it is a counterpart of sin and evil. Sickness is a false life that longs for its elevation from not-being into being, it is a “nothing that endeavours to be something” (AGW 1815: 48), or in other words it endeavours to be God in place of God. More specifically, Schelling claims that in the second creation that is the creation of spirit, there were also two principles that were acting, in a similar fashion with the creation of light out of darkness. Indeed, in the second creation, the spirit of evil has been awakened through the arousing of ‘the dark natural basis’ and has as its opposition the spirit of love, that arises in the centre and in a similar way as did light before, it controls and subjugates the spirit of evil (OHF: 54). But when the two principles, that are light and darkness are at strife in a human being and their unity has been dissolved, then

Another spirit occupies the place where God should be. This is namely the reverse of God, a being which was roused to actualisation by God’s revelation but which can never attain to actuality from potentiality, a being which never exists but always wishes to be, and which like the matter of the ancients, can thus never be grasped as real (actualised) by perfect reason but only by false imagination (λόγος μεθονήμουō) which is exactly what sin is (OHF: 68).

Schelling’s comparison of the ‘spirit of evil’ with chora or matter is indicative of his intention to emphasise the fallacy of the ‘false imagination’, although it should not be interpreted as an identification of
chora or matter with evil. Schelling refrains from identifying evil with the ‘initial blind life’ in itself whose “nature is nothing but conflict, anxiety, and contradiction”. If this initial life were ever for itself or were it not engulfed since eternity by something higher and placed back into potentiality, it could neither be called a sick nor an evil life. For these concepts first become possible after life is subjugated by the mollifying unity but at the same time is still free to emerge, to withdraw itself from the unity and enter into its own nature (AGW 1815: 48).

Thus, Schelling emphasises once more, evil does not spring forth either from the depths or from God because evil is a spiritual issue and thus connected with the emergence of selfhood. Evil can only arise “in the innermost will of one’s own deed” and in the same way as religiosity, it requires highest commitment. Selfhood - that comes from the depths - is not evil in itself, in the sense that “in the good the reaction of the depths works towards goodness, in the bad towards evil” (OHF: 80). Indeed, using the law of analogy, in a similar way to God’s resolution to say Yes, positing thus His eternal past, the human being is called to a similar primordial resolution that is beyond time. The relationship between God’s personality and human being’s personality plays an important role to the direction (i.e. Yes or No) of this primordial resolution in the sense

\[\text{173}\] It has to be remarked that in Timaeus, Plato never identifies chora with matter. Aristotle was the first to propose such identification and since then the neo-platonic school endorses his terminology although without endorsing his analysis. Moreover, Plato never identifies chora with evil for the former is the complete privation of all qualities and thus we cannot attribute to it the quality of being evil. Although Plotinus follows the platonic tradition he has concluded that since matter (endorsing the Aristotelian terminology) is having no content then it must “necessary be evil” (Enneades ii.4.16: 149). But even in Plotinus this does not mean that the receptacle is a source of evil affecting the things that are in it. Nevertheless, since chora neither affects the things that are in it, nor it is affected by the things that are in it and which are good in virtue of their likeness to the Ideas, then chora, in Plotinus, is identified with evil because it does not participate in good (ibid iii.6.11: 255).

\[\text{174}\] As we have seen in the beginning of this chapter.
that both God and the human being reveal themselves in a relational way. It is relational in the sense that both the human and divine beings meet and relate to each other in their comportment. At this point it is important to emphasise that Godhead’s depictions as Yes, No and their union are not to be seen as a characterisation of His essence but rather as “distinctions...only of the comportment, [that is] of the relationship of the one essence with respect to Being”, and this is a feature of God as eternal freedom (AGW 1815: 74). Human being’s exercise of freedom is revealed in her comportment that forms her existence.

The human being is a creature, but nevertheless a creature of the ‘centrum’, and thus she is placed outside time

Man, even though born in time, is nonetheless a creature of creation’s beginning (the centrum). The act, which determines man’s life in time, does not itself belong in time but in eternity. Moreover it does not precede life in time...but as an act eternal by its own nature. Through it man’s life extends to the beginning of creation, since by means of it he is also...free and himself eternal beginning (OHF: 63-4-emphasis added).

This means that the human being, among the other visible creatures, is the one that participates both in God’s eternal past and her own eternal past, or in other words we can say that her ‘resolution’ in relation to God’s eternal past, that is to His abyss\(^{175}\), constitutes her personality and moreover her eternal past. The human being participates in God’s eternal past due to her presence in the centre in the moment of creation and to her special affinity with the third potency that is the “universal

\(^{175}\) One can also argue that the distinction between God’s ‘eternal past’ and human being’s ‘eternal past’ is similar to the Jungian distinction between personal and collective unconsciousness.
soul". It can also be argued that the third potency, the union of love and selfhood, is the human being because this potency, in the same way as the person, provides the link between God and the world (AGW 1815:37). Thus, the human being primordially acts both at the level of universal soul and at the level of her individual soul, in collective and in personal eternal past. Indeed, Schelling conceives the human being as playing a 'central' role in creation and this is why the 'histories' of God, cosmos and person are intermingled. Fackenheim claims that in Schelling's positive philosophy the third potency, by virtue of being the only one among the three potencies that is free to will or not to will is the 'original man' or in other words 'man-in-God' in the sense that the human being's primordial freedom "consists in the bare choice between willing and not-willing. For any particular decision presupposes the decision to will at all" (Fackenheim 1996: 119). The proper meaning of religiosity that we have encountered in the beginning of this chapter becomes now more transparent and the identity of a higher form of necessity with that of a higher form of freedom- not only in the case of God but also in the case of the human being- is now explicable. Faith, in a similar way with Kierkegaard's conception of it as we will explore in the next chapter, means "confidence in what is divine, which excludes all choice" (OHF: 73).

Furthermore, in the same line of thought, Schelling suggests an interesting and radical account of the doctrine of predestination, where
the responsibility lies in the aforementioned human being's primordial resolution, introducing at the same time his notion of 'contemporaneity' which was destined later to inform Kierkegaard's homonymous notion:

The greatest obstacles to the doctrine of freedom has ever been the relation of the assumed accidental nature of human conduct to the unity of the world-whole as previously planned in divine reason. Thus there came the assumption of predestination, since neither God's prescience nor actual providence could be relinquished. The authors of the doctrine of predestination felt that human conduct must have been determined from eternity. However they did not seek this determination in the eternal act contemporaneous with creation, which constitutes the being of man itself, but in an absolute (i.e. wholly unfounded) decision of God through which one individual was predetermined to damnation, the other to blessedness; and thus they destroyed the root of freedom (OHF: 65-6-emphasis added).

On the contrary, for Schelling, each human, in its contemporaneity with the primordial act of creation, breaks the limits of time, and repeatedly "participates" and "acts" in the 'eternal past' which is simultaneous with the 'eternal present' and the 'eternal future'. Thus, every human being 'determines' herself in its contemporaneity with the act of creation and in a sense it takes its 'stance' before time but in eternity.

It seems that Schelling's conceptions of 'highest commitment', 'eternal resolution', and 'predetermination' provide us with a really strong account of the person's responsibility and of her deed 'beyond time' that determines her further life. Thus one can argue that in Schelling there is no possibility of conversion from evil to good after the primordial resolution where the human being herself determines her life. But if we have a closer look at Schelling's text, we come across a different account. Accordingly, Schelling claims that through the dissolubility of potencies
that is always possible in the human being, evil is always a possibility in human life and in a sense ‘radical evil’ is for Schelling, “an evil which attaches to us by our own act, but does so from birth” (OHF: 67). The possibility of a change from evil to good, and the repetitive reunion of potencies, is possible for the human being even in the case that the good principle in him seems to be –but is not- dead:

However, if it happens that human or divine aid- for some aid man always needs-determines him to change his conduct to the good, the fact that man accepts this influence of the good, and does not positively shut it out from him,- this fact is also to be found in that initial act because of which he is this individual and not another. In the man in whom this transmutation has not yet taken place but in whom, too, the good principle has not completely died, there is that inner voice of his own better self (OHF: 67).

One has to admit that of the many unsurpassable difficulties implied by Schelling’s account of creation, the most important concerns the status of this ‘intelligible’ act that allegedly determines the life of a human being. Is this though conceived as a definite act that determines ‘irretrievably’ the human life? Schelling is careful not to suggest that even due to their own determination human beings are divided into good and evil ones. Quite on the contrary, the philosopher secures himself against such misunderstandings, in arguing in favour of the possibility of conversion.

Thus, it seems to us that what Schelling implies is that if the person has not suffered what we have called in the first chapter ‘spiritual death’ then there is always the possibility of change and transmutation. The human
being is actively taking eternally part to both\textsuperscript{176} successive and simultaneous creations, that are the emergence of light and the emergence of spirit, and even in the case that he affirms light instead of darkness, there is always the possibility that, in her freedom\textsuperscript{177}, she can also suffer a conversion from good to evil. If one wants to further Schelling's argument, employing the terminology of the \textit{Ages of the World}, one can argue that the possibility of the dissolubility of potencies makes the \textit{duration} of human being's eternal past quite different from that of the divine being in the sense that although God's resolution in relation to eternal past is always one that confirms life and love, in the case of the human being this is a versatile relation since it can oscillate and change its position in a dramatic way.

\textsuperscript{176} Because even within the limits of the eternal past there are parallel eternities that exist \textit{at the same time but in different times}.

\textsuperscript{177} Interestingly enough, Schelling argues that human freedom is secured even in the case that it is truly argued that "however man be constituted, it is not he himself but either the good or evil spirit which acts in him" (OHF: 68). This is because "...this very letting-act-in-him of the good or the evil principle is the consequence of the intelligible deed, through which man's being and life are determined" (loc. Cit).
Concluding remarks

In this chapter I attempted to present a different account of creation, freedom, time and theurgic repetition, and last but not least of God, through an interpretation of the works usually classified as belonging to Schelling’s middle period. It was argued that Schelling offers us an account of a living and personal God qualitatively different of the representations ensuing from the writings of St. Augustine and Kant.

It was furthermore shown how Schelling’s innovative concept of identity provided the ground for an original account of evil and good that places the root of evil ‘independent of God’ but ‘in God’. Schelling’s idea of freedom as a possibility of good ‘and’ evil considered together with his account concerning the simultaneity of different times (i.e. eternal past, eternal present and eternal future) inaugurates a radical conception of the collision of time and eternity, that relates intrinsically the notions of repetition and contemporaneity.

Finally, the person’s ability to intervene and relate in different ways with the duration of her eternal past was considered in this chapter.

More importantly as we have shown in the introduction of this thesis Schelling’s writings of the middle period pave the ground for a revaluation and reinterpretation of the religious themes emerging from Kierkegaard’s aesthetic writings and of which the latter urges his readers to ‘take notice’.
Accepting the challenge, we undertake a fresh discussion and interpretation of the religious themes of contemporaneity, repetition, freedom and the Fall in Kierkegaard's works in the next and final chapter of this study.
Chapter Four

Kierkegaard on Repetition, Faith and Contemporaneity

If God himself had not willed repetition, the world would not have come into existence. Either he would have followed the superficial plans of hope or he would have retracted everything and preserved it in recollection. This he did not do. Therefore, the world continues, and it continues because it is repetition (Repetition: 133).

Introductory remarks

In this chapter a further elaboration of the notions of faith, repetition and contemporaneity in Kierkegaard’s thought will be attempted. The first part of the chapter concerns the discussion of repetition as a religious movement towards faith as it can be derived from Kierkegaard’s homonymous book. Furthermore, two celebrated biblical stories Job’s ordeal and Abraham’s sacrifice are also discussed as examples of true repetition, while they serve as instances for the development of a primordial understanding of repetition. In the second part of this chapter, we attempt to relate the concept of repetition with Kierkegaard’s idea of being contemporaneous with the paradox of God’s coming into existence. This allows us to re-address, under a new light, the meaning of the passage quoted above and in strategic moments of this thesis.
4.1 Repetition as a transcendent movement towards faith

In the previous chapter we have discussed Schelling’s treatment of the notions of human and divine freedom, of time and history, and of repetition and contemporaneity. In his vivid narration of cosmogony and theogony as well as anthropogeny, we have seen the interrelation of the aforementioned concepts and the intermingling of the divine, the human and nature, which makes us have a strong intimation of the mystic relation that permeates the cosmos as a whole. For Schelling, the human being is an active part of the cosmic becoming, communicates with the cosmic powers and thus she does not suffer from the loneliness in the “physical universe of modern cosmology” wonderfully described by Pascal in the following words: “Cast into the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which know me not, I am frightened” (Jonas 1992: 322; Pascal fr.205). Although unlike Schelling, Kierkegaard seems to be indifferent to the development of a holistic narrative, he nevertheless still employs a terminology that looks similar to that of Schelling in order to express the highest forms of religiosity, namely the notions of repetition, faith and contemporaneity. As already mentioned in the introductory remarks, in this chapter we will explore Kierkegaard’s conceptualisation of those notions and we will attempt to challenge the

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178 Kierkegaard’s main interest is the single individual and therefore he does not develop any philosophy of nature, etc. On the contrary, he seems to endorse and to follow a far-fetched (in the sense that in our view Socrates himself retains a mystical relation with the whole) description of Socrates according to which “when he [Socrates] perceived that the study of physical things was not our concern...began to philosophize in the workshops and in the marketplace about ethical matters” (Repetition: 300).
boundaries of his thought that according to his self-understanding is
focused solely on the single individual. Jonas, commenting on Pascal's
fragment, points out that among all the features of this chaotic universe
that isolates the human being, the worst and most frightening is "silence,
that is, the indifference of this universe to human aspirations..." (Jonas
1992: 322). Let us recall that silence is also the term that Kierkegaard
uses in order to express the sole company of Abraham in his ascent of
the mount Moriah. Was Abraham experiencing the mystic silence that
precedes every religiously ecstatic experience or was he suffering from
the indifference of "this universe" towards him? Or to put it differently,
was Abraham suffering from the indifference of God towards his
paradoxical suffering? Although this question has to remain open, we
should still attempt to come up with some sort of response. Abraham's
story will serve as the vaulting horse of a proper discussion of
Kierkegaard's conception of faith in the course of this chapter.

Schelling's conceptions of faith as "confidence in what is divine, which
excludes all choice" (OHF: 73) and of religiosity as being the "highest
commitment to the right without choice" (ibid: 71) certainly inform
Kierkegaard's account of the same notions.

If for Schelling the moment of this highest commitment retains its
primordiality for it is tantamount to being contemporaneous with the
eternal act of creation, then one has to look again, under this light, to the
texts of Kierkegaard that refer to repetition and contemporaneity. In the
following passage, Johannes Climacus, in an attempt to emphasise the importance and the decisive significance of the moment, insists that

...it was also once, when man could buy freedom and unfreedom for the same price, and this price was the free choice of the soul and the surrender of choice. He chose unfreedom, but if he then were to approach the god and ask whether he could make an exchange, the answer presumably would be: Undeniably there was a time when you could have bought what you wanted, but the curious thing about unfreedom is that once it is purchased it has no value whatsoever, even though one pays the same price for it (PF: 16 n.*).

So, there was a moment, prior to freedom and unfreedom, where the human being could have committed herself to the surrender of the choice. We have seen in our first chapter that this was not a moment of rational decision. Adam's qualitative leap happened under the spell of anxiety and thus, if we want it to put it in Schelingean terms, Adam's commitment to unfreedom was a result of the dynamic relation between his inner potencies and not just a rational decision. Thus, this quote, as well as the recurrent quote cited again in the beginning of this chapter, can be interpreted in various ways. One can argue- following mainly St. Augustine- that Kierkegaard conceives of the Fall as being an irretrievable situation separating permanently God and human beings. Salvation then becomes solely an issue of God and his grace, excluding consequently any active role of the human beings. On the contrary, one can argue that freedom, can 'be bought' again, in its eminent form, but the price is qualitatively different. This does not mean, as Kant would have it, that human being's fall was necessary in order for her to make
the transition from the state of nature to the state of freedom. In our understanding of Kierkegaard, the difference in 'price' lies in the fact that the human being has first to restore her fall and then, or simultaneously, to attain freedom through her surrender of choice, that is through faith. For Kierkegaard, this restoration is not to be seen as a return to a Paradise lost. In that case it would be synonymous with the Greek understanding of recollection, which "begins at the end instead of at the beginning, with the 'loss' instead of the task" (Repetition: 136; Caputo 1987: 14; SV III 178/R 136). To begin with a loss is for Kierkegaard a great advantage for in that case the subject "has nothing to lose" whereas in the case of repetition the whole existence is at risk\(^\text{179}\) (loc. Cit). Kierkegaard wrote his book *Repetition* in 1843, under the pseudonym Constantin Constantius. The choice of this pseudonym is indicative for it is in itself not only a repetition but it also "recreates eponymously the tension between something constant (an element to be repeated) and motion (something repeated)" (Mooney 1998: 285). Constantius applies the concept of repetition mainly to the sphere of individual spirit, leaving aside any discussion of repetition in nature or in the sphere of world- or universal- spirit. What is of crucial importance for Kierkegaard is neither the contemplation of the repetitive movement of nature nor the meaning of repetition in the sphere of world-spirit, nor even the contemplative study of the existence of repetition in the world of

\(^{179}\) We will shortly come back to the difference between repetition and recollection.
the individual spirit. In his response to Professor Heiberg's comments on his book on repetition, Kierkegaard emphasises that his main interest is the life and existence of the single individual. Movement in life and movement in thought are for Kierkegaard two completely different things and their conflation introduces illusory elements into theorisation. Repetition is for him a task for freedom and not an issue for the contemplating spirit as it was for Heiberg\(^\text{180}\) (Repetition: 312). Repetition is a task that transforms the individual's life and, as we have seen in the first chapter, the journey of freedom, or more specifically the journey towards pure freedom and eternity has three stages, the highest and last being the religious leap of faith. Seemingly, the story of the book on repetition is mainly an erotic narrative where a young man, in love, decides not to marry the object of his affection, but to rather become a poet. Even before the beginning of his erotic relationship, the young man found a silent confidant, under the guise of Constantin Constantius, the author of the book. Both men ask the same question, namely if

\(^{180}\) Ironically enough, Heiberg accused Constantius of suggesting that the concept of repetition "would be able to bring about a reconciliation between the Eleatics and Heraclitus, that is to say, between two opposing philosophical schools, one of which denied motion while the other saw everything in motion" (Repetition: 379-81 n.14). The irony lies in the fact that Kierkegaard's last paragraph of his Fear and Trembling shows in a wonderful way quite the opposite, i.e. how in the level of pure contemplation, a certain point of view may be transformed into its opposite: "One must go further, one must go further". This urge to go further is an old story in the world... Heraclitus the obscure said: One cannot walk through the same river twice. Heraclitus the obscure had a disciple who did not remain standing there but went further - and added: One cannot do it even once. Poor Heraclitus, to have a disciple like that! By this improvement, the Heraclitean thesis was amended into an Eleatic thesis that denies motion, and yet that disciple wished only to be a disciple of Heraclitus who went further, not back to what Heraclitus has abandoned" (F&T: 123).
repetition is possible. The first\textsuperscript{181} part of the book is a parody of examples and incidents in search of an answer to this question. Constantin Constantius arranges a trip to Berlin so as to explore if the trip that he had made years ago could be repeated. Trying to explore, in an exoteric manner, if repetition is possible, he is repeating exactly the steps that he followed in his previous trip, combining thus farcically repetition with regard to time and to space, or in an ironic manner Heraclitus and the Eleatics. In his reply to Heiberg, Constantius points out that

\begin{quote}
Movement is dialectical, not only with respect to space...but also with respect to time. The dialectic in both respects is the same, for the point and the moment correspond to each other. Since I could not name two schools in which the dialectic of motion with respect to time is expressed as explicitly as Heraclitus and the Eleatics express it with respect to space, I named them. In that way, I also managed to cast a comic light over the journey I took to Berlin, because movement thereby become a pun (Repetition: 309).
\end{quote}

Indeed, the simple repetition of the same trip did not bring any transformation to the inner existence of the author. On the contrary, although the young man did not experience the highest form of repetition where the collision of eternity and time would have come from higher levels acquiring thus eternal consciousness\textsuperscript{182}, he still nevertheless attained a level of repetition, when he learned that his former fiancée got married with another man. Before his former fiancée got married, he was

\textsuperscript{181} That means up to the page 179 in Hong’s translation. Kierkegaard himself makes this distinction between the two parts of the book. In a supplement - that according to Rose is a decoding of the story "philosophically in the ‘sphere of individual freedom’" (Rose 1992: 24) - to his book, Kierkegaard harshly attacks Professor Heiberg’s misinterpretation of him. Kierkegaard accuses him of taking seriously only the first part of the book (that is the one not to be taken seriously), implying at the same time that Heiberg completely ignored the second part, where one can find at least an “authentic statement about repetition” (Repetition: 295).

\textsuperscript{182} This will be discussed later. Please note in advance that eternal consciousness is attained through recollection and is not a definite sign of repetition.
tortured by the responsibility he was feeling towards her for letting her
donw and not marrying her. His anxiety was accentuated by his inability
to communicate the reasons behind his actions to her. He conceives of
her wedding then as an act of generosity: He then felt free to follow his
call as a poet and he exclaimed: "Here I have repetition; I understand
everything and life seems more beautiful to me than ever"
(Repetition: 220). Indeed, although the young man did not elevate his
consciousness into the religious level, he nevertheless raised his
consciousness to the second power (ibid: 229).

The archetypal religious hero that functioned as young man's compass
was Job. Two biblical figures, Job and Abraham, would be the occasion
to explore another dimension of the citation from Kierkegaard placed in
the beginning of this chapter, viz. one that could be related with the
function of repetition in-the-world, leaving aside, as far as it is possible,
any discussion of a pre-Adamic situation. The function of repetition into-
the-world, is not to be seen as movement towards immanence. On the
contrary, repetition is a "transcendent, religious movement. by virtue of

183 This passage is also repeatedly cited various times in this thesis.
the absurd when the borderline of the wondrous is reached" (Repetition: 305). If, as we have seen in the first chapter, according to Rose the “fall or the beginning involves initiation into prohibition” (Rose 1992: 92) then one can argue that the reversal of this, although in the form of repetition, is initiation into ἀφηνεῖν (leaving completely oneself) in God’s hand, by virtue of the absurd. For Kierkegaard, exemplary figures of this kind of repetition are Abraham and Job. In other words, if Adam, and every subsequent Adam, did/does not listen to God’s command, then Abraham and Job listen, by virtue of the absurd, to whatever God commanded them.

Indeed, they followed the path of repetition that is a recollection forwards and not that of recollection, that being of a repetition backwards (ibid: 131). They did not attempt to restore the past by a conversion back to eternity, but on the contrary they followed God’s order as sinners before him, and this consisted their movement towards the future.

Kierkegaard considers Leibniz to be the only modern philosopher that had an intimation of repetition as a movement forwards. Indeed, Leibniz in his Theodicy, discusses one of the rules of his system of pre-established harmony, according to which “the present is big with future” (Theodicy (360): 341). It has to be emphasised that the context of Leibniz’s writing is quite different. For Leibniz, God, among the
infinitude of possible \(^{184}\) worlds, has chosen the best possible world, whereas he called World “the whole succession and agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be said that several worlds could have existed in different times and different places” (Theodicy (8): 128).

Thus, when Leibniz refers to the relation of present with future, he speaks about God’s ability to foresee in every part of the universe the whole universe “owing to the perfect connexion of things” and thus the present is not the immediate present, but is enriched with future and past (Theodicy (360): 341). This is not to suggest that Leibniz argues in favour of the principle of pre-destination in the sense that God pre-determined everything, eliminating thus human freedom. What he suggests is that every monad or every part of this world contains in itself or herself, the whole cosmos. Thus, if we want to stretch Leibniz’s argument and put it in Schellingean terms, not only God but also every human being, could elevate her con-sciousness and share with God not only her individual history but also the history of the cosmos.

Furthermore, the problem that Constantius finds in the Greek conception of recollection is not only the theological issue of future which we will explore shortly, but also the discrepancy between thought and life. He argues that for the Greeks “all knowing is a recollecting” whilst he foresees that the main teaching of modern philosophy will revolve around

\(^{184}\) Having in mind also Kierkegaard’s polyvalent quotation regarding God and repetition, we have also to remark that for Leibniz possibility acquires a different meaning. Thus, “what are mere possibilities of thought for us are possibilities of action for God” (Farrer 1985: 31).
repetition and that indeed the latter will advocate that “all life is a repetition” (Repetition 131). For Kierkegaard, repetition then is an action, a *deed*, and it can easily be argued that since both Schelling and Leibniz—in their own ways—render dynamically the past into the future, they have an intimation of repetition in the Kierkegaardian sense.

The difference between repetition and recollection could also be seen in the relation of the two notions with the past. Haufniensis provides us with a thorough analysis of the differences between the pagan’s relation to the past and their supplementary notion of recollection with the Christian view where the future is pre-eminent (see CA: 81-110; also in Repetition: 131-133&149). There are some affinities to Kierkegaard’s approach towards paganism with what Alliez, in his paper on St. Augustine, discerns to be the difference between the Plotinian and the Christian conception of time. Alliez points out that “while Plotinian conversion ... was dominated by the primacy of the past, Christian conversion projects humanity into the future, the biblical time of hope\(^{185}\). For ever since the real Fall alone subsists, *the return can only be carried out by going forward*” (Alliez 1996: 117). But, one has to be careful not to assign to Kierkegaard an eschatological conception of time where almost deterministically, the future is presented as the time where the *deliverance from time* will occur for humanity. On the contrary,

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\(^{185}\) We have seen, mainly in chapter two, that Augustine’s perception of hope implies death and the cancellation of time, because for him the fallen and the biblical times are irreconcilable *in* time. In the same chapter we have also shown that Kierkegaard sees hope as a kind of illusion.
Kierkegaard's main concern remains the individual, and its encounter with the future, the latter viewed as transcendence and not as a linear succession between the reified moments of past, present and future. In *The Concept of Anxiety* he writes:

...the future can in a certain sense signify the whole. This is because the eternal first signifies the future or because the future is the incognito in which the eternal, even though it is incommensurable with time, nevertheless preserves its association with time... (CA: 89).

Returning to the discussion of the oft quoted passage regarding repetition, we have to consider that when Constantius speaks of the world that came into existence, the usage of the word "existence", or the verb to "exist" may not refer to the first creation of the cosmos (human beings included) but to what could be conceived of as a re-creation of the world after the Fall. If God would have not willed to give a second chance to the world, then he could have "retract[ed] everything and preserved it in recollection". Or alternatively, He could have left everything to chance, "to the superficial plans of hope" (Repetition: 133). It is important to notice that Kierkegaard's employment of the word existence instead of that of essence is of major significance, since for him existence can be only attributed to the particular individual.

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186 Moreover, this becomes even clearer if we take into consideration Leibniz's clarification that "Its [God's] understanding is the source of essences, and its will is the origin of existences" (Theodicy P.1: 128).

187 In his thesis, Kierkegaard is particularly indebted to Schelling's distinction between *quid sit* (what it is) and *quod sit* (that it is), although he was later disappointed by what he interpreted as Schelling's abandonment of this distinction (NSBL: 335; CI: xxiii).
In addition to that, the latter's existence is subject to time and because of that it is considered to be always *incomplete* (PF: 72-88). More importantly, Kierkegaard distinguishes between two different meanings of the term "to exist", one which "touches on the ordinary meaning (temporal and spatial actuality)" and another which has a "special meaning (qualitative becoming, in view of which ordinary existence could more accurately be termed *subsistence*)" (PF: 298, n. 6). Thus, the coming into existence of the world, mainly perceived as the world of human individuals, is posited in the moment of the sin, which as we have seen indicates the beginning of history. Moreover, as Constantius is eager to clarify, history can have two meanings. It can be the history of humanity, measured in quantitative terms, or it can be the history of the individual, the latter being Kierkegaard's main concern (Repetition: 287).

Accordingly,

Sin is the new existence medium. *To exist* generally signifies only that by having come into existence the individual does exist and is becoming; now it signifies that by having come into existence he has become a sinner...the special qualitative meaning of *to exist* is expressed as a **redoubling, a coming into existence within its own coming into existence** (PF: 76&298 n.6).

In turn, the notion of **redoubling** could be interpreted in various ways. It could either be understood as the coming into existence of the world after its original creation, or it could alternatively be interpreted as the inherent (due to its re-creation after the Fall) possibility for an atonement of the world. Each interpretation is supplementary to the other, and the
task of each individual is to attain the highest form of repetition, that is the repetition sensu eminentiori.\textsuperscript{188}

There is but one pregnant repetition, and that is the individuality's own repetition raised to a new power. You [i.e. Heiberg] do not mention this repetition at all, despite its being repetition sensu eminentiori and freedom's deepest interest (Repetition:294).

Let us now briefly explore the stories of Job and Abraham, so as to deepen our analysis on the issue of repetition and faith.

\textsuperscript{188} Although one could say that by means of repetition God gave the world a second chance, one cannot draw a direct analogy with regard to the functioning of repetition as it is ascribed to human beings. In the latter case, sin plays a significant role and one has to pay attention to what anti-Climacus writes in the \textit{Sickness unto death}: "Sin is the only one of the attributes ordinarily ascribed to a human being which can in no way be said of God, either \textit{via negationis} or \textit{via eminentiae}. To say of God that he is not a sinner (as one says that he is not finite and is therefore \textit{via negationis} infinite) is blasphemy. As a sinner, man is separated from God by the most yawning qualitative abyss" (SUD: 155).
### 4.1.1 Job's ordeal

Both Abraham and Job were tested\textsuperscript{189} by God, although not in the same manner. God, according to the biblical narrative, let Satan tempt Job's righteousness and faith, resulting in Job's being deprived of family, belongings, etc., only for Job to reply "The Lord gave, and the lord took away; blessed the name of the God" (Job:1,2). Those words made a significant impression on both Constantin Constantius and on the young man. Job, endured the trial and he thereby "received everything double", or as the biblical text says "...the Lord gave to Job twice as much as he had before" (Job 42:10). Few lines below, it reads: "So the Lord blessed the latter end of Job more than his beginning..." (Job 42.12). This, according to Constantius "is called a repetition" (Repetition: 197 & 212). In Job's case, repetition is not exhausted by the fact of the redoubling of his material possessions\textsuperscript{190}, as we are told that he originally owed seven thousands sheep, and three thousand camels, while at the end of his ordeal he possessed fourteen thousand sheep and six thousand camels. More importantly, repetition takes the form of Job's courage to stand before God without betraying his faith.

\textsuperscript{189} For the different meanings of the words "test", "tempt", "try", "ordeal", see Fear and Trembling: 341 n.2. There it is stated that all those terms have "essentially the same meaning: to try by way of a test or an ordeal" (ibid:341). Nevertheless, there are different ways of 'testing', which will be explored further in the course of this chapter.

\textsuperscript{190} For Kierkegaard, the fact that Job did receive everything in double except his children shows once more that "a human life cannot be redoubled that way" (Repetition: 221).
What strikes Kierkegaard even more is the very fact that Job entered into a purely personal relationship, one “of opposition with God, in a relationship such that he cannot allow himself to be satisfied with any explanation at second hand” (ibid:210). Job questioned God’s testing of him in an immediate way and defended his position, believing that God would eventually do him justice.

The category that in Kierkegaard’s philosophy places the individual in an immediate and personal relationship with God is that of the ordeal.

Although Abraham also suffered an ordeal, Job is the exemplary figure of this category. Thus, for Kierkegaard, Job was not a hero of faith as Abraham\(^{191}\), but the one that “gives birth to the category of the ordeal” (Repetition: 210). The category of the ordeal is not, according to the young man, an aesthetic or ethical or even dogmatic category. On the contrary it is an “altogether transcendent” category although a temporary one in the sense that it “is defined in relation to time and therefore must be annulled in time” (loc. Cit). Job’s confrontation with God overcomes the boundaries of time since it denotes a meeting of the finite with the eternal, but at the same time the resolution of this confrontation happens in time:

For this reason Job does not bring composure as does a hero of faith, but he does give temporary alleviation. Job is, so to speak, the whole weighty defence plea on man’s behalf in the great case between God and man, the lengthy and appalling trial that started with Satan’s creation of discord between God and Job and ends with the whole thing having been an ordeal (loc. Cit).

\(^{191}\) Actually Abraham is the ‘father of faith’.
One might wonder if Job had any other option than to surrender to this ordeal. The answer is yes, since he could follow his wife’s advice not to retain his integrity but to curse God and then die (Job 2. 9). His reply to her suggestion is indicative of Job’s attitude towards God: “Thou speakest as one of the foolish women speaketh. What? Shall we receive good at the hand of God and shall we not receive evil? In all this did not sin with his lips” (Job 2. 10).

Thus, Job’s surrender to this ordeal was not a compulsory one. On the contrary,

...in freedom he still has something of greatness, has a consciousness that even God cannot wrest for him even though he gave it to him. Furthermore, Job maintains his position in such a way that in him are manifest the love and trust that are confident that God can surely explain everything if one can only speak with him (Repetition: 208).

His stance towards God made Job a prototype for the whole humanity, whilst nobody refers to Job’s wife (EUD: 123). Kierkegaard reserves for Job one of the highest places in the history of individuals and even names him a teacher of humanity and a guide. Job acts as an archetype of action for the whole humanity, and although his words also have a captive power, nevertheless it is the immediacy of his actions that can make everyone that has also been tested in her life to understand him.

Only the person who has been tried and who tested the saying in being tested himself, only he rightly interprets the saying; Job desires only that kind of pupil, only that kind of interpreter...we quite properly call Job a teacher of humankind and not of individuals, because he presents himself to everyone as his prototype, beckons to everyone with his glorious example... (EUD: 112-3).
Indeed, Job’s action incited everyone to the terror and anxiety of life (EUD: 110), but also to his personal relationship with God. Job got everything back in double, not only in material terms but mainly in inwardness. In his rebirth, he managed the impossible, namely to encounter God face to face: “I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear; but now mine eye seeth thee” (Job 42.5). It is written in the Old Testament that the human being that will see God, will certainly die: “Thou canst not see my face; for there shall no man see me and love” (Exodus 33. 20). Nevertheless, not only Job but also Jacob is another biblical archetype of the human being that saw God but did not die. After passing his two wives, two womenservants and his eleven sons over the ford Jabbok, Jacob stayed behind and as the story goes, he fought in his tent with someone who is first called man and at the end is revealed as God, as Jacob’s exclamation at the end of the encounter indicates: “...I have seen God face to face but my life is preserved” (Genesis 32. 30). Faros considers Jacob’s story as a description of the resistance of the unconsciousness to inwardness and self-knowledge. Accordingly, the inward metamorphosis of Jacob made him able to face God not externally but internally. The ford is for Faros, a symbol of the boundaries that Jacob has to overcome in order to elevate his con-

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192 Interestingly enough, God did not free Job and did not give him back everything immediately after Job’s understanding of his ignorance regarding the mystery of creation and of the world (Job 42. 1-6). Job regained his freedom when he prayed for the salvation of his three friends who instead of comforting him were torturing him with their judgemental words. It seems that this was the last task that God assigned to Job. The success in this task denoted the end of the ordeal: “And the Lord turned the captivity of Job, when he prayed for his friends; also the Lord gave Job twice as much as he had before” (Job 42. 10).
sciousness into a higher level. The fight before Jacob’s personal passing over the river is necessary for the leap of faith to occur (Faros 1998: 184-7). In his struggle with God, the latter “touched the hollow of his thigh; and the hollow of Jacob’s thigh was out of joint” (Genesis 33. 25). Jacob sacrificed his thigh in order to gain greater inwardness and to become a “hero of faith”, indicating perhaps that inwardness is only attained at the cost of a sacrifice. This realisation makes it necessary that we should turn our gaze to Abraham’s narrative, so as to explore his sacrifice that make Kierkegaard to name him the “father of faith”.
4.1.2 Abraham's silent sacrifice

"I long to know how Jacob saw you fixed above the ladder...That climb, how was it? ...What is the mode, what is the law joining together those steps that the lover has set as an ascent in his heart?...He who discovered Your struggle and Your vision has spoken to us of the guides. But he would not-perhaps he could not-tell us any more" (The Ladder of the Divine Ascent: 289).

Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling* narrates the story of Abraham, who was also tempted by God, and who ascended to the mount Moriah to sacrifice his only son, Isaac. The book is written under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silentio, which points to a very important theme of this book, namely to the 'silence' that accompanies Abraham in his journey. The name Johannes de Silentio is also a strong allusion to one of the most recurrent Kierkegaardian pseudonyms, namely that of Johannes Climacus. Interestingly enough, this is the only pseudonym that corresponds to a historically existent person. Indeed, St. John Climacus was a monk that lived in the desert of Sinai, born around 579 and died around 649 (Ware 1982: 1-2). His major work, called *The...
Ladder of Divine Ascent, is a description of the steps that a person has to take in her ascent towards God. This is the same ladder that Jacob dreamed of:

And he dreamed, and behold a ladder set up on earth, and the top of it reached to heaven; and behold the angels of God ascending and descending on it. And, behold, the Lord stood above it, and said, I am the Lord, God of Abraham thy father... (Genesis 28. 12-13).

The eleventh step of this ladder entitled "On Talkativeness and Silence" where silence is praised and where talkativeness is characterised as a sign of ignorance (Ladder: 158). According to St. John Climacus, "the lover of silence draws close to God. He talks to Him in secret and God enlightens him" (ibid: 159). Thus, the choice of this specific pseudonym could be seen as a Kierkegaard's attempt to point to the mystical inward ascent of Abraham. Abraham is described by Silentio as the father of the faith, for he followed God's order to sacrifice Isaac without questioning his ordeal. The mystical journey of Abraham undergoes the following stages: God ordered Abraham to take his son to the land Moriah and then to ascend to a mountain there and to offer his son as a burnt offering.

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195 St. John Climacus concludes his book by expressing his longing to know 'how' Jacob saw God.
196 In his Present Age, Kierkegaard also speaks about the difference between talkativeness and silence. Similarly with St. John Climacus, Kierkegaard identifies talkativeness with ignorance in the sense that it ignores one of the main distinctions between talking and non-talking: Talkativeness "is the result of doing away with the vital distinction between talking and keeping silent" (ibid: 78). On the contrary, silence is the "essence of inwardness, of the inner life" and only one who can keep silent, can 'talk' and 'act'
necessarily (loc. Cit).
197 As for example Job did.
Without any questioning,

Abraham rose up early in the morning, and took two of his young men with him, and Isaac his son and clave the wood for the burnt offering, and rose up and went unto the place of which God had told him...Then on the third day Abraham...saw the place afar off... (Genesis 22. 2-4).

Then, he left behind his two young companions and ascended the mountain with his son. The expression "Abraham rose up" has been interpreted as pointing to the day of resurrection meaning thus that for Abraham this day denotes a joyful occasion. For Gaitanis, Abraham rose up in the morning in a festive mood, like having a premonition that this day was a day of resurrection (Gaitanis 1994: 321). Furthermore, Abraham rose up 'early in the morning' and this signifies for Boehme the kairological aspect of the call of God, i.e. the inward voice that "breaks forth as the dawning of the day" and calls the human being to "return, amend and truly repent; then it is time" (Mysterium Magnum: 520).

Silentio is also astonished with Abraham's cheerfulness and confidence in his encounter with God. If someone else were in his place, Silentio wonders, then, when God called him by his name, he would have hidden or replied in a whisper

Not so with Abraham. Cheerfully, freely, confidently, loudly he answered: Here I am. We read on: "And Abraham arose early in the morning". He hurried as if to a celebration, and early in the morning he was at the appointed place on Mount Moriah. He said nothing to Sarah, nothing to Eliezer- who after all, could understand him, for did not the nature of temptation extract from him the pledge of silence? (F&T: 21).

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196 Or in Greek ἀβραὰμ ἀναστάς, where ἀναστάς also means resurrection.
Abraham's personal relationship with God could not be communicated in words; he rather stands as a single individual before God. Silence permeates the whole story and is reciprocal. Neither does God, as Derrida points out, reveal the reasons behind his order but he rather keeps silent and everything happens in secrecy (Derrida 1998: 154). Mystical silence accompanies the three days of Abraham's journey, reminding us the three-day descent of Christ into Hades before his resurrection. For St. John Climacus, in contradistinction to talkativeness that is a sign of "a dissipation of recollection", "intelligent silence is ...a sure recollection of death...hidden progress, the secret journey upwards..." (Ladder: 158). For St. John Climacus the recollection of death could have two meanings: first it could be interpreted as μελετή θανατοῦ (study of death) in the Platonic sense, or secondly as a continuous recollection of the death and resurrection of Christ. In the case of Abraham, who lived before the coming of Christ, this recollection takes the form of recollection forwards, i.e. of repetition. To become more precise, for Boehme, Abraham's testing by God sets forth "the Figure of Christ's Offering in his Suffering and Death" (Mysterium Magnum: 517). Thus, this passage can be said to have also a futural or prophetic character since "Abraham in the spirit saw the

199 For Boehme, this passage also signifies the resurrection of Christ after three days in Hades, and the consequent lifting up of our human eyes "out of the grave, from the dead unto God" (Mysterium Magnum: 521).

200 Or, it can also be argued that Abraham has an intimation of the event that precedes time and the creation of cosmos, namely that "the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world" (as cited in Berdyaev 1935: 174).
offering of Christ afar off, viz. above two thousand years to come” (Mysterium Magnum: 521).

At this point, it seems important to clarify that although Kierkegaard indicates the shortcomings of the notion of recollection, he nevertheless considers it as the indispensable movement before that of repetition. Thus, although recollection is not to be considered as the highest stage of existence, it is nevertheless its presupposition. The movement of recollection, in a similar mode with Philo’s and Schelling’s conceptions of it, provides the human being with what Kierkegaard calls the ‘eternal consciousness’ (F&T: 15 & 342 n.2). Kierkegaard wonders what would have happened if a human being did not have an eternal consciousness, “if underlying everything there were only a wild, fermenting power that writhing in dark passions produced everything” or in other words, “if there were no sacred bond that knit humanity together” (ibid: 15). The emergence of the eternal consciousness enables the human being to make the movement of resignation and thus to reside in infinity. This movement, as every movement of infinity, requires passion, the lack of the latter being the most important problem of Kierkegaard’s own generation201 (ibid: 42). Thus, before the movement of

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201 Kierkegaard detects one of the major negative features of his contemporary age, namely the lack of passion: “our age is essentially one of understanding and reflection, without passion, momentarily bursting into enthusiasm, and shrewdly relapsing into repose” (PA: 33). Whereas Kierkegaard sees the age preceding his own age as an age of passion and action, this one is void of enthusiasm and feeling. Enthusiasm was the unifying principle of the previous age, whereas the unifying principle of this age is envy (ibid). Thus, anticipating Nietzsche, Kierkegaard uses the term ressentiment to describe the negative outcome of the accentuation of the envy, through the suppression of feeling, passion and action. Although, one could find traces of ressentiment even in ancient Greece under the disguise of ostracism, the specificity
faith, there is the movement of infinite resignation, the steps of which are as follows. First, the individual has to "to concentrate the whole substance of his life and the meaning of actuality into one single desire".

and then to "have the power to concentrate the conclusion of all his thinking into one act of consciousness" (F&T: 43). Then, the human being or the 'knight' as Silentio calls it is ready to make the movement of infinite resignation. Now, Silentio asks, will the knight forget everything since forgetfulness is also a kind of concentration? The reply is negative since the knight is not inclined to forget himself and to become another person. On the contrary, the knight will connect himself with his 'eternal past' and "will recollect everything, but this recollection is precisely the pain, and yet in infinite resignation he is reconciled with existence" (loc. Cit). In contradistinction to what is possible in the finite world, spiritually "everything is possible", and thus the advantage of the movement of infinite resignation is that it offers peace and rest. In his residing to the infinite, the knight "makes the impossibility possible by expressing it spiritually, but he expresses it spiritually by renouncing it" (ibid: 44).

of ressentiment in the modern age lies in the fact that it is based on the process of levelling of any differentiation and enthusiasm. Thus, "while a passionate age storms ahead setting up new things and tearing down old, raising and demolishing as it goes, a reflective and passionless age does exactly the contrary: it hinders and stifles all action; it levels" (PA: 56).

202 Silentio points out that "only the lower natures forget themselves and become something new. The butterfly, for example, completely forgets that it was a caterpillar, and may in turn so completely forgets that it was a butterfly that it may become a fish. The deeper natures never forget themselves and never become anything other than what they were" (F&T: 43). So, it seems to us that -in the same way as in Schelling- the human being has the potentiality to recollect and then restore the duration of her 'eternal' past. This would be discussed more thoroughly in the last part of this chapter, together with Kierkegaard's notion of 'contemporaneity'.
Nevertheless, although the movement of faith differs radically from that of infinite resignation since the latter does not require faith\textsuperscript{203}, one cannot have faith if she has not made first the movement of infinite resignation\textsuperscript{204}.

Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that anyone who has not made this movement does not have faith, for only in infinite resignation do I become conscious of my eternal validity, and only then can one speak of grasping existence by virtue of faith (F&T: 46).

The next movement, that is the leap of faith or, in other words, the movement of true repetition, requires taking a further step, since after the movement of infinity, one has to make again the movement of finitude. This is a paradoxical movement requiring faith by virtue of the absurd. This means that although on the one hand one accepts that in the finite world not everything is possible, on the other hand, taking into account that for God "all things are possible" (ibid: 46), one believes that everything is consequently possible also in the finite world by virtue of the absurd, that is when eternity and time collide through repetition.

For Silentio, the category of the absurd is not to be taken as synonymous with "the improbable, the unexpected, the unforeseen", because the latter notions belong to the sphere of understanding whereas the absurd

\textsuperscript{203} What someone gains from the act of resignation is her eternal consciousness and this does not require faith since it is a purely philosophical movement. The two movements, i.e. resignation and faith, are often confused since it is wrongly understood that faith is required "in order to renounce everything" while in actuality this is the movement of infinite resignation (F&T: 48).

\textsuperscript{204} In his Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard alters slightly his terminology and speaks about Religiousness A and Religiousness B, the first being the "dialectic of inward deepening" equivalent to infinite resignation and the latter being the decisive Christian movement of faith equivalent to true faith. Religiousness A is the presupposition of Religiousness B (CUP: 557).
does not belong, “to the differences that lie within the proper domain of the understanding” (ibid: 46). Thus, the knight of faith “acknowledges the impossibility, and in the very same moment he believes in the absurd” (ibid: 47). In the case of Abraham, even “in the moment when the knife gleamed he had faith- that God would not require Isaac” or even if He would, then He would certainly give him an new Isaac ‘by virtue of the absurd’ (F&T: 18-9 & 36 & 115-emphasis added). The actual sacrifice never occurred, but Abraham’s ascent and ordeal is still a sacrifice. As we have seen in our analysis in the first chapter regarding the emergence of sin, the crucial category is that of the possibility of being able to. In this respect, it is important to note that Abraham was able to sacrifice Isaac. Additionally, he was not trying to find external justification for his faith that God would not require Isaac. He simply had faith by virtue of the absurd (ibid: 34). Abraham made both movements, first the movement of resignation where he “gives up Isaac, which no one can understand because it is a private venture” and then the movement of faith (ibid: 115). What is great about this movement, Silentio emphasises, is that the knight of faith, after making the movement of infinitude he then makes also the movement of finitude, for he belongs to this world\(^\text{205}\) (ibid: 39). It has to be remarked that there is a significant qualitative

\(^{205}\) Caputo argues that Kierkegaard, by opposing existential repetition to recollection and mediation, inaugurates not only “the delimitation of the metaphysical tradition” but also the “destruction of the history of ontology” and hence anticipated the central ontological argument of Being and Time...” (Caputo 1987: 32). The movement towards finitude denotes—in Caputo’s interpretation of Kierkegaard—“our ability to take our stand in the flux, to press forward in the element of actuality and becoming rather than to seek some way around it” (ibid:32-3).
difference between hope as experienced by the knights of faith and St. Augustine's conception of it. Silentio compares the knights of faith with the knights of infinite resignation. He characteristically describes the knights of infinite resignation as ballet dancers "that have elevation" and "they make the upward movement and come down again" (F&T: 41). Every time they make the latter movement, "they are unable to assume the posture immediately, they waver for a moment and this wavering shows that they are aliens in the world" (ibid: 41). On the contrary, the knights of faith have the special gift to make the downward movement in such a way "that instantaneously one seems to stand and walk, to change the leap into life into walking, absolutely to express the sublime in the pedestrian" (loc. Cit).

More importantly, Abraham's faith is not a projection to a future life.

Abraham had faith. He did not have faith that he would be blessed in a future life but that he would be blessed here in the world. God could give him a new Isaac, could restore to life the one sacrificed. He had faith by virtue of the absurd, for all human calculation ceased long ago (F&T: 36).

Thus, Abraham got both himself and "a son a second time" (ibid: 9).

In order to deepen our analysis of Abraham's story let us turn our gaze and discuss briefly the three problems that -according to Silentio- Abraham's story brings to the fore. The first deals with the possibility of a teleological suspension of the ethical, the second questions the existence of an absolute duty to God and the third asks if it was "ethically defensible for Abraham to conceal his undertaking from Sarah, from Eliezer, and from Isaac" (F&T: 54 & 68 & 82).
The common underlying question of all these problems is the following: Are we justified to speak of a single individual that is beyond the boundaries of the universal and the ethical, and whose actions are incommunicable and untranslatable in the ethical sphere? On the one hand, the ethical as it is commonly perceived, is for Silentio, synonymous with the universal and as such not only it “applies to everyone” but also it “applies at all times” (ibid: 54). On the other hand, the single individual as the knight of faith is higher than the universal for her action cannot be mediated and communicated

Faith is namely this paradox that the single individual is higher than the universal-yet, please note, in such a way that the movement repeats itself, so that after having been in the universal he as the single individual isolates himself as higher than the universal (ibid:55).

Thus, the knight of faith stands in an ‘absolute relation to the absolute’ and this, for all eternity, “cannot be mediated” (ibid: 56), and this is what differentiates Abraham from a tragic hero like Agamemnon. Agamemnon faced a similar dilemma with that of Abraham, that is to sacrifice his own child or not. The difference lies in the fact that Iphigenia’s sacrifice would bring benefit to the ethical level and thus everyone could compassionate with him, while he also could communicate his grief and find consolation (F&T: 57-59& 114-115).

If Abraham’s action is translated to the ethical level, then it would be rendered that “he meant to murder Isaac” whilst in the religious level it means that “he meant to sacrifice Isaac” (ibid: 30).
The incommensurability of those two levels signifies the lack of external\textsuperscript{206} certainty that the single individual experiences in her encounter with the absolute. This conflict, according to Silentio, makes "a person sleepless and yet without this anxiety Abraham is not who he is" (loc. Cit).

By mediation, in this context, Silentio refers to the untranslatability of singularity into universality. Abraham cannot speak and express his action in so far as communication and speech are features of the universal. Thus, speech is excluded and the ethical is teleologically suspended for Abraham since his telos is an absolute one and thus it is outside\textsuperscript{207} any immanence (F&T: 59). Existential pathos is defined by Johannes Climacus as the action or/and the transformation of existence whereas the appointed task is "simultaneously to relate oneself absolutely to the absolute τελος ...and relatively to relative ends" (CUP: 431). The absolute telos at this case is God, and Abraham, suspends the ethical so as to fulfil his absolute duty to God. Abraham acts both for his sake and for God's sake, both being for him identical. For the knight of faith, Silentio argues, wish and duty are almost identical whereas a tragic hero has to sacrifice his wish so as to comply with his duty. The knight of faith has to give up both duty and wish and to succumb to God, fulfilling thus his absolute duty (F&T: 78). He acts, for God's sake

\textsuperscript{206} And even internal certainty, since, as we have seen in the first chapter, doubt lies in the centre of religious experience in Kierkegaard's thought. If doubt was completely removed, then Abraham would not have experienced anxiety and sleeplessness.

\textsuperscript{207} See Philosophical Fragments p.80.
“because God demands this proof of his faith” and for his own sake “so that he can prove it” (F&T: 60). For Johannes de Silentio, the unity of those two premises is best expressed with the term ‘ordeal’ or ‘temptation’ since a person is tempted by something that prevents her from doing her duty. In Abraham’s case, his duty is to comply with God’s will, but the ethical is tempting him thus holding him back (ibid: 60). Temptation is for Kierkegaard the state of affairs when the lower tempts and “wants to lure the individual” (CUP: 458-9). If Abraham had succumbed to this temptation then he would have abandoned his absolute duty to God and declared that “his situation is a spiritual trial” (F&T: 60). ‘Spiritual trial’ in contradistinction to ‘temptation’ is when the highest, “seemingly envious of the individual” tempts him and wants “to frighten him back” (CUP: 459). According to anti-Climacus, spiritual trial is a characteristic of the religious sphere where the single individual can relate herself absolutely to the absolute. It also “increases in proportion to the religiousness” since the single individual has found the upper limit or boundary and the spiritual trial “expresses the response of the boundary against the finite individual” (CUP: 459). For anti-Climacus, although the individual is not innocent in relation to temptation, she is nevertheless innocent concerning the ‘spiritual trial’ and she bears terrible suffering (loc. Cit). Spiritual trial signifies “the

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208 Climacus dismisses all previous theoretical attempts of proving the existence of God as ‘the most terrible spiritual trials’ in the sense that in theory one cannot have a true experience of the divine (PF: 36-45).
absolute's own resistance" and emerges as a nemesis "upon the intense moments in the absolute relation" (loc. Cit). The danger of spiritual trial is great since it can mislead the single individual, making her believe that she is in an absolute relation with God. This is why, for Kierkegaard, the movement of repetition entails risk and danger. Silentio emphasises that only the single individual herself can decide whether she is "actually...undergoing a spiritual trial or is a knight of faith" but the outcome of this decision is incommunicable (F&T: 79). This great possibility of doing the wrong thing made Kant disregard Abraham's story and "banish such acts of reason-blind faith" from the sphere of religion" (Agacinski 1998: 141). Indeed, Kant argues, that it is a moral principle that "we ought to hazard nothing that may be wrong (quod dubutas, ne feceris!)" (Religion: 173-4). Abraham's story then falls under this category since even if it seems that God commanded Abraham to "slaughter his own son like a sheep...it is at least possible that in this instance a mistake has prevailed" (ibid: 175).

This paradoxical absolute duty to God that surpasses the boundaries of ethical life and universality urges Abraham to keep silent and not inform anyone about his act. He could not speak not only because nobody could 'understand' his ordeal but also because he does not speak the language that belongs to the sphere of immanence but "a divine language" (F&T: 114). Abraham spoke just once, when Isaac asked him "where the lamb is for the burnt offering". His reply was "God himself will
provide the lamb for the burnt offering, my son” (ibid: 116). As it is evident from those words, Abraham’s ironic reply to Isaac is not an untruth. It would have been an untruth if Abraham had answered that he knew nothing since he already knew what God had ordered. Abraham’s paradoxical answer then, signifies once more the absurdity of the movement of faith, since by virtue of the absurd it was possible for God to provide the lamb for the burnt offering (ibid: 119).

For Silentio himself, Abraham’s story is also a paradox that could happen either in the demonic or in the divine sphere. Silence and hiddenness can be - for Silentio- both demonic and divine. Thus, interiority is not a certain sign of “divinity’s mutual understanding with the single individual” but it can also be “the demon’s trap” (F&T: 88). Consequently, there are for Silentio, two kinds of paradoxes, a divine and a demonic (loc. Cit). By relating to the divine paradox one is saved, whereas by relating to the demonic paradox, one is definitely lost (ibid: 106).

Encountering with fear and trembling Abraham’s ordeal, Silentio concludes his final chapter with the following words: “either there is a paradox that the single individual as the single individual stands in absolute relation to the absolute, or Abraham is lost” (ibid: 120). This paradoxicality that makes Abraham’s inner truth incommunicable and ambivalent, urges Levinas to emphasise the importance of what he calls

209 Since for Kierkegaard, “it is always irony when I say something and still do not say anything” (F&T: 118).
persecuted\textsuperscript{210} truth that is beyond misinterpretations and misunderstandings but rather retains, in its secrecy, an element of revelation within the sphere of singularity.

In the first pages of \textit{Fear and trembling}, Silentio speaks of a man who was so absorbed by Abraham’s story that his sole craving and longing was to follow Abraham in his three-day journey to mount Moriah. This man, being neither a scholar, nor a thinker, was free from any need to go ‘beyond faith’ (F&T: 9). He wanted to repeat Abraham’s movement and thus to be able to make himself the movement of repetition. Being \textit{contemporaneous}\textsuperscript{211} with Abraham is a task that could make someone a single individual. Silentio himself declares that he lacks the courage to follow Abraham, and by being \textit{contemporaneous} with him, to make the leap of faith. Once again, Kierkegaard emphasises the self-evident but concealed, namely that each generation starts from the beginning. Thus, every generation has “no task other than what each previous generation

\textsuperscript{210} In his second comment on Kierkegaard, Levinas argues that for Kierkegaard the importance does not lie in the distinction between ‘faith and knowledge’ or ‘uncertainty and certainty’ but rather in the difference between “a victorious truth and a persecuted one” (Levinas 1998: 35-6). As Levinas writes: “A persecuted truth is not a truth that happens to have been mistreated and misunderstood. Persecution, and the humility that comes with it, are themselves the modalities of truth...Perhaps a Revelation which proclaims its own origin would be incompatible with the essence of transcendent truth, of a truth which can have no authentic manifestation unless it is persecuted. Perhaps the only possible mode of true revelation is the incognito, and perhaps a truth which has been spoken must therefore appear as one of which nothing has been said” (Levinas 1998:35-6). As we are going to see shortly, there is another dimension of truth that makes the notion of persecuted truth more comprehensible. Thus, for Kierkegaard ‘truth’ is synonymous with the coming of God-man and his sufferings. Moreover, the task of every individual is to become an ‘imitator’ of God-man, and thus to inwardly understand that “the truth must suffer and be mocked and derided” (PVWA: 52).

\textsuperscript{211} To be more precise, we have to clarify that Kierkegaard uses the term contemporaneity strictly in relation to single individual’s task to become ‘contemporaneous’ with God-man’s appearance. We took the liberty to extend his notion of being contemporaneous with Christ to being contemporaneous also with other exemplary figures (e.g. Job, Abraham and even Adam) because we think that this notion captures in an exact way the interrelationship between the single individual and those archetypal figures.
had, nor does it advance further...” (ibid: 121). By being contemporaneous with Adam, every human person makes the first leap, whilst being contemporaneous with figures like Job or Abraham, prepares the human being for the leap of faith. Let us not forget, that this second task, even in case of Abraham is a tentative task, and thus, “is always adequate for a person’s lifetime” (ibid: 122).
4.2 Contemporaneity & Repetition

Contemporaneity with the biblical figures of Abraham and Job presupposes contemporaneity with Adam, who – according to Kierkegaard – symbolises also the possibility that every single individual becomes an Adam. Thus Adam and every consequent Adam, has the logic-defying task to make the free movement of repetition and to become contemporaneous with Abraham212, 'the father of faith'.

Let us now turn our gaze to what are for Kierkegaard the exemplary forms of repetition and contemporaneity, namely their Christian manifestations. Although, as we have already seen, Abraham and Job function as predecessors of Christ in a prophetic way, they nevertheless belong to the pre-Christian era. Although Kierkegaard asks us to follow inwardly Abraham and Job and thus to be contemporaneous with them, he nevertheless refrains from calling them teachers213 of the single individual.

Johannes Climacus, in his book *Philosophical Fragments*, reserves the characterisation of teacher only for God. In contradistinction to Socrates who served as a midwife so as to show to people their ignorance and then, via recollection, to help them restore what they have already known, God gives to the people the 'condition' and the 'truth' (PF: 15).

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212 In Boehme's symbolism, Abraham stands in Adam's stead and Isaac "is represented in Christ's humanity". Moreover, "Abraham, that is Adam, should offer up his person in Isaac, that is in Christ, to the voice of God in the fire of God, that so the humanity might be proved in the fire of God" (Mysterium Magnum: 518). Thus, by asking Abraham to sacrifice his son, God called Adam in Abraham, namely to all human beings, and called them to repeat this sacrifice (loc. Cit).

213 Job was named the 'teacher of humanity' and Abraham 'the father of faith'. Moreover, SilentiO emphasises that "the true knight of faith is a witness, never the teacher" (F&T: 80).
Climacus argues that Socrates was the exemplary figure of the relation between one human being and another and that ματαιωτάτα is the highest expression of this relationship. 'Giving birth' though 'belongs to God' and Socrates himself emphasises that "god forbade him to give birth" (ibid: 10-11). Thus, Socrates is presented as the 'occasion' of inwardness for every person in the sense that he prompts them to seek for self-knowledge and inwardness. The relationship between two human beings is reciprocal. Thus, Socrates as teacher "is the occasion for the pupil to understand himself" but at the same time "the pupil is [also] the occasion for the teacher to understand himself" (ibid: 24). This reciprocity renders the relationship equal so as "in death the teacher leaves no claim upon the pupil's soul, no more than the pupil can claim that teacher owes him something" (loc. Cit). It becomes evident then, that Socrates, being the exemplary figure of the human teacher, did not provide his students with the 'positive' by learning them the truth, not mainly because he was aware that he did not possess the absolute truth, but because truth, being a 'persecuted' truth, cannot be imposed, but presupposes the learner's transformation (ibid:14). So, Climacus argues, a human being cannot transform but only reform another human being, denying thus the possibility of a human teacher.

What differentiates God as teacher from Socrates or any other human being is the fact that God can effect the necessary transformation to the single individual so as to make her able to receive the condition and the
truth. Such a teacher is called by Climacus a ‘saviour’ since he “does indeed save the learner from unfreedom”, a ‘deliverer’ since he “does indeed deliver the person who had imprisoned himself” and a ‘reconciler’ because he “takes away the wrath that lay over the incurred guilt” (ibid: 17).

Indeed, as we have seen in the beginning of this chapter, unfreedom was bought by Adam and every consequent individual with a certain price, while it cannot be re-sold, for it has lost its value. Only God then, according to Kierkegaard, can lift up the individual from her unfreedom. This does not mean though that the single individual after the Fall is devoid of power, totally subject to the help and grace of God. In our reading of Kierkegaard, although God is allowing ‘repetition’ to happen, he nevertheless cannot impose it. To be more specific, God, first prompts the individual to acquire the consciousness of sin, that is to become ‘consciously contemporaneous’ with Adam and then God gives her the condition and the truth, through her being contemporaneous with Christ, the historically existent God. Only then, the single individual can become a person of a different quality or in other words “a new person”. This change is called by Climacus, a ‘conversion, and the sorrow that accompanies it, is called ‘repentance’ (ibid: 19). By this ‘rebirth’, i.e. the highest form of repetition, the single individual “enters the world a second time just as at birth” (loc. Cit). Contemporaneity with Abraham and Job also make the individual able to make the leap of faith, by virtue
of the absurd. What differentiates the notions of the absurd as depicted in *Fear & Trembling* and of the paradox or absurd in the *Philosophical Fragments*, is the fact that the first “is the purely personal definition of existential faith” and the second “is faith in relationship to a doctrine” (CUP II: 163). More specifically, Abraham and Job were human beings that function as archetypes of faith and they urge everyone to follow them and to be contemporaneous with their ordeal, by virtue of the absurd. On the contrary, the absurd in *Philosophical Fragments* becomes tangible, obtains a face and the task becomes to believe the *absurd* or the *paradox* and to become *contemporaneous* with it (ibid: 164). Indeed, the paradox is the event of the Incarnation of God and the latter’s historical existence. Accordingly, the task ascribed to every single individual is to become contemporaneous with the existence of God in time, and thus to believe in the paradoxical collision of time and eternity. We have seen briefly in our first chapter, the importance and the decisive significance of the notion of the moment, both in its human and divine dimensions. Accordingly, the moment\(^\text{214}\), becomes for Kierkegaard, the instance of the collision of time and eternity not only in the sense that God, as eternity, invades time by acquiring a historical existence, but also since *in the*...

\(^{214}\) It would be also important in connection to Kierkegaard’s conceptualisation of Christ’s moment of incarnation, to point out that St. Dionysius the Aeropagite, speaks of the *moment* using the platonic term of έξαφνης, that means the unexpected, the sudden in order to describe Christ’s transition from concealment into unconcealment: “έξαφνης εστι το παρ ελπίδα, και εκ του τεως αφανους εις το εμφανες έξαφρομενον” (Epistle C : 266).
moment' the single individual "becomes aware of the rebirth, for his previous state was indeed one of 'not to be'" (PF: 21).

Before further exploring the notion of contemporaneity, let us first discuss briefly the encounter of the single individual's understanding with the paradox of God's existence. It seems to us important to point out that neither Johannes de Silentio nor Johannes Climacus declare themselves to be religious thinkers or believers (in the Kierkegaardian sense) and thus although their understanding of the absurd does not entail a collapse to the sphere of understanding, it could be said to acquire the form of what is beyond the upper boundary of thought and understanding. Indeed, the paradox is called the 'passion of thought', the ultimate paradox being "to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think" (PF: 37). As we have seen in the Introduction of this thesis, Kierkegaard does not present himself as an Apostle with 'divine authority', declaring emphatically that his whole authorship, even in his religious writings, remains within the sphere of reflection (My Activity as a Writer: 143 n*). Not being an Apostle has a double effect, both to him and to his readers. Deprived of divine authority, he is also deprived of the chance to communicate himself, and thus of speaking. As a consequence, what troubles most of his readers, is the very fact that one can not be certain if the author remains truly within the sphere of understanding and reflection, having also an admiration of the 'absolute
Other' (PF: 45) that lies beyond it- and is called the 'unknown' that is continually colliding” with the paradoxical passion of the understanding- or if he had actually made the leap of faith, but is unable to speak, like another Abraham. If the former is the case, then one can argue that his whole authorship is an attempt to prove to himself that there is a God that exists ‘existentially’ and that this God has not become “the most terrible deceiver through the understanding's deception of itself” (PF:46). If the second is the case, then one has the task to try herself, to make the leap of faith and become contemporaneous with the absolute paradox that transcends the limits of the understanding.

We cannot risk deciding which one of the two cases is true, for to judge someone’s interiority is beyond our intuitive capacity. Whatever the judgement would have been, one should emphasise that authorship implies linguistic expression and thus the terms that Kierkegaard employs, i.e absurd, paradox, etc are bound to be translations in the sphere of the ethical and the universal, thus tempting him and his readers in their encounter with the divine. Indeed, Climacus pinpoints the difficulty of a mutual understanding between the paradox, namely the God-man and the understanding of the human being, on the basis of their qualitative difference (ibid: 49). If mutual understanding was possible, then their encounter would be a happy one, whereas in the opposite case, it would be an unhappy one that is termed “offense”: 
If the paradox and the understanding meet in the mutual understanding of their difference, then the encounter is a happy one, like erotic love’s understanding... If the encounter is not in mutual understanding, then the relation is unhappy, if I dare call it that... we could more specifically call offense (PF: 49).

We have seen in our first chapter that for Climacus “all existence is suffering”. Now, he claims that “all offense is suffering”, implying thus that offense, or the unhappy relationship between the understanding and the paradox is inevitable (loc. Cit). The historical appearance of the paradox is fundamentally linked with the emergence of the offense, since for Climacus “all offense is in its essence a misunderstanding of the moment, since it is indeed offense at the paradox, and the paradox in turn is the moment” (ibid: 51). Interestingly enough then, the emergence of the offense is directly linked with the moment, around which-as Climacus argues- “everything indeed revolves” (loc. Cit). Let us pause for a moment and recall another Kierkegaardian concept i.e. that of anxiety, around which everything was also said to revolve. To become more explicit, in the same way as the dizziness of anxiety confuses every human being before the moment of the Fall, offense confuses her in her encounter with the paradox of God’s historical existence. It seems to us that a suspension of the understanding is necessary for a primordial resolution to take place. Thus, the moment signifying the Fall, at another level becomes the moment that sets the ground for atonement. Or, in other words, one can argue that for Kierkegaard the moment one becomes again- as an outcome of a redoubling of her existence-
contemporaneous with Adam, acquiring thus the consciousness of sin, is simultaneous with the moment one encounters with the paradox and becomes contemporaneous with it. The 'consciousness of sin' is the presupposition and the condition of such an encounter and never leaves the individual, but always reminds her of her untruth.

Through the moment, the learner becomes untruth: the person who knew himself becomes confused and instead of self-knowledge he acquires the consciousness of sin etc. for just as soon as we assume the moment everything goes by itself (ibid: 51).

In this inward journey of 'contemporaneity' thus, the category of the offense is the indispensable accompaniment, since, in a sense, it acts as the safety valve against any improper intrusion of the understanding. To be more precise, Kierkegaard advocates the unbridgeable abyss separating the paradoxical existence of God-man and the single individual, arguing against any theoretical interpretations of it. According to anti-Climacus, only faith can save the individual from the possibility of offense, as indicated by the following passage:

The possibility of offense...is present at every moment, confirming at every moment the chasmic abyss between the single individual and the God-man over which faith and faith alone reaches...the possibility of offense is the stumbling block for all, whether they choose to believe or they are offended (PC: 139).

It follows that Offense -or σκόνδαλον- emerges every time the paradox makes its appearance and that it can be fittingly called the scandal of the
understanding. Nevertheless, for anti-Climacus, the possibility of offense, or the repulsion that the understanding feels towards the paradox in the beginning of their relationship, confirms and retains the impossibility of direct communication between the God-man and the human being (ibid: 139). Let us now turn our gaze to Kierkegaard’s conception of *contemporaneity* with Christ, so as to better understand his conception of the paradox. Does Kierkegaard’s conception retain an element of a mystical union between the two parts, or, is this union precluded by the acceptance of the chasmic abyss that separates man and God-man and the impossibility of direct communication between them?
4.2.1 The paradoxical double movement of contemporaneity: God-man and the single individual

In our reading of Kierkegaard, contemporaneity with God-man and repetition in the eminent sense are ‘identical’ in his works in the sense that they both express the highest form of freedom and ‘earnestness’. Contemporaneity, as we are going to see shortly, is not to be understood literally, namely as a reference to the actual historical contemporaries of Christ, but as a task for every single individual.

We can take the liberty to express the peculiar quality of higher repetition with the term double contemporaneity, a term not used by Kierkegaard but in our view essentially faithful to the spirit of his writings. As already mentioned in the introduction, with this term we wish to capture in further accuracy and detail the state of affairs where not only the single individual but also God resolves to be contemporaneous with every human being and to give her, in Climacus expression, ‘the truth and the condition’. This double movement of contemporaneity seen also as a double movement of repetition makes the passage with which we begin this chapter clearer. God wills repetition, and that is why He freely chose to come into historical existence and to appear as a God-man. On the other hand, the single individual has also the chance, by virtue of her freedom and in ‘earnestness’ to make the movement of repetition.
Contemporaneity with the paradox is a very special category for Climacus since it allows for a transgression of the boundaries of time, which nevertheless happens 'in' time. The paradox of God's coming into existence unifies the contradictories, or if we want to put it in Schellingean terms, it is the 'identity' of the eternity and the historical: "...the paradox specifically unites the contradictories\textsuperscript{215}, is the eternalising of the historical and the historicising of the eternal" (PF: 61).

Climacus at this moment does not refer exclusively to God-man's appearance who although belonging to eternity, resolves nevertheless to come into historical existence, not only acquiring thus a historical form but also eternalising the 'moment' of his appearance. The author also refers to the 'moment' of human being's transformation - by virtue of the appearance of the paradox - in which eternity enters in her life and eternalises her 'moment' of decision to become contemporaneous with the God-man.

Contemporaneity thus acquires in Kierkegaard a primordial character very similar to the one we have encountered in Schelling's narrative.

Indeed, for Kierkegaard, the importance does not lie in the immediate contemporaneity with the paradox, but mainly in the contemporaneity beyond any temporal restrictions where it is possible for everyone to

\textsuperscript{215} Anti-Climacus, in his \textit{Practice in Christianity}, calls the God-man a "sign of contradiction". By sign he means the "denied immediacy" or in other words, "the sign is not immediately something but that it is a sign, and it is not immediately that which it is a sign or as a sign is not the immediate that it is" (PC: 124). Moreover, a sign of contradiction contains for him an intrinsic contradiction. In the case of God-man the contradiction lies in the fact that although God-man in immediacy seems to be a human being, he is also and mainly God (ibid: 125-6).
attain it. Consequently, every human being can existentially be 'at the same time' but in different times. At the case of Kierkegaard, the moment of the emergence of paradox, prompts every individual to render her eternal past to her eternal future by being contemporaneous with the 'moment', making thus possible the ascribed task of "the eternalising of the historical and the historicising of the eternal" (PF:61). Furthermore, one can possibly argue that Kierkegaard's conception of being 'contemporaneous' with God-man is very close to Schelling's conception of 'contemporaneity' with the eternal act of creation. As we have previously noticed, although the sacrifice of God happened 'in' time, retains its eternal dimension and its intrinsic connection with the eternal act of creation since "the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world" (Berdyaev 1935: 174). Thus, it can be argued that even for Kierkegaard, to be contemporaneous with the paradox of God-man's appearance is tantamount to being contemporaneous not only with Adam's or Abraham's historical existence but also, or simultaneously, with the eternal act of the creation of cosmos.

It becomes evident then why immediate contemporaneity is not synonymous with genuine contemporaneity in Kierkegaard's work. In his Philosophical Fragments, Climacus distinguishes between those two kinds of contemporaneity arguing that immediate contemporaneity, if lacking the earnest relation with God-man, could be synonymous with noncontemporaneity:
But what does it mean to say that one can be contemporary without, however, being contemporary, consequently that one can be contemporary and yet, although using this advantage (in the sense of immediacy), be a noncontemporary- what else does this mean except that one simply cannot be immediately contemporary with a teacher and event of that sort, so that the real contemporary is not that by virtue of immediate contemporaneity but by virtue of something else (PF: 67).

By virtue of something else: What differentiates the genuine contemporary then is this 'something else' that Kierkegaard calls 'faith'. Accordingly, faith is for Kierkegaard what transforms the unhappy encounter between the understanding and the paradox to a happy love affair. More explicitly, this happens when the understanding, in its encounter with the paradox, steps aside and the "paradox gives itself", and "the third something, the something in which this occurs ...is that happy passion", namely faith (ibid: 59). Indeed, faith is what overcomes not only the limits of understanding but also of knowledge, since knowledge, for Climacus is either the knowledge of the eternal, excluding thus temporality and the historical, or the knowledge of the historical, eternity being in this case excluded. As a consequence, no knowledge of the absurdity "that the eternal is the historical" is possible (ibid: 62). God-man, being the sign of contradiction, becomes then the object of faith, and his appearance as a teacher is far more important than his teaching. If we also take into account the fact that God-man appears quietly, as a simple man and not gloriously as a king, then one can understand, by virtue of the importance of God-man's unrecognisability, the importance of indirect communication. For anti-Climacus, God-man
is not the jealous God that, acting as a judge, wants to punish the human beings for their sin, denying thus direct communicability. Direct communicability, as we have seen already in the case of Abraham, implies the use of understanding and the disclosure to the ethical. On the contrary, God-man, being qualitatively different from the human beings, cannot disclose himself, for it is impossible for the human beings to directly understand him. Direct recognisability, is for anti-Climacus a feature of the idol, but God-man is not an idol but a teacher (PC: 136).

Idols need admirers and Kierkegaard is harshly attacking admirers for they develop what he calls a pagan relationship with Christ. Admirers (according to the terminology of Practice in Christianity) or followers at second hand (according to the terminology of Philosophical Fragments) do not relate themselves with the real suffering of the historical existence of the God-man but they retain an external relation with him and consequently with the ‘moment’. Furthermore, the admirer is only “spinelessly or selfishly infatuated with” whereas when “there is any inconvenience or danger, he pulls back; if this cannot be done, he becomes the traitor” (ibid: 246). According to anti-Climacus then, Judas is an exemplary figure of an admirer, for when he realised that what he was expecting from God-man were not to be realised, he became ‘impatient’ and a traitor (loc. Cit). Thus, for Kierkegaard, there are no admirers or followers at second hand of God-man, since they lack what he calls the ‘autopsy’ of faith:
...there is not and cannot be any question of a follower at second hand, for the believer (and only he, after all, is a follower) continually has the autopsy of faith; he does not see with the eyes of the others and sees only the same as every believer sees- with the eyes of the faith (PF: 102).

Only a genuine contemporary can experience continuously an autopsy of faith; on the contrary, for the admirer, faith is based on the immediacy of direct communication and recognisability. Anti-Climacus further argues that faith is a choice in the sense that it is not “direct reception- and the recipient is the one who is disclosed, whether he will believe or be offended” (PC: 140). Once again we have to emphasise that choice is not to be conceived as being a rational decision stemming from the understanding, but quite on the contrary, it retains its Schellingean meaning by being identified with primordial resolution\textsuperscript{216} that excludes all doubt: “The conclusion of the belief is no conclusion but a resolution, and thus doubt is excluded” (PF: 84). Thus, in the presence of the sign of contradiction, i.e. of God-man, the single individual can only relate herself with Him by virtue of indirect-communication, namely with inwardness. The contradiction thus, serves as the mirror where the single individual reflects herself and makes the decisive choice, that is compared with a riddle that sets free the inner potencies of the individual

\textsuperscript{216} It has also to be noticed though, that Kierkegaard argues that faith is “not an act of will, for it is always the case that all human willing is efficacious only within the condition”, showing thus the crucial importance of the presence of the ‘condition’, without which all willing “is of no avail” (PF: 62-3). Although using a terminology within the Augustinian tradition (i.e. efficacious and inefficacious grace), Kierkegaard does not argue in favour of a pre-Adamic state where only inefficacious grace was in effect.
A contradiction placed squarely in front of a person- if one can get him to look at it- is a mirror; as he is forming a judgment, what dwells within him must be disclosed. It is a riddle, but as he is guessing the riddle, what dwells within him is disclosed by the way he guesses. The contradiction confronts him with a choice, and as he is choosing, together with what he chooses, he himself is disclosed (PC: 127).

Thus, it becomes clear that although the genuine contemporary has as his point of departure the occasion of the historical existence of God-man, that gives him the eternal consciousness, he nevertheless makes a further step. More explicitly, he freely and inwardly considers this historical event to be “the condition of his eternal happiness” (PF: 58). If we want to summarise Kierkegaard’s argument then, we shall say that no matter if someone’s is really\(^{217}\) contemporary with God-man or not\(^{218}\), he can be genuine contemporary with God-man by receiving by Him the condition (ibid: 100). What is this ‘condition’ then that on the one hand repulses the mere admirers and on the other hand attracts the genuine believers? According to anti-Climacus, what the God-man offers to every believer is the same condition, that is “to become just as poor, despised, insulted, mocked, and if possible even a little more...” (PC: 241). Indeed, for the author, genuine contemporaneity is synonymous with inward repetition or imitation of the sufferings of the God-man which “no admirer has ever wanted to join” (loc. Cit). A mere admirer- in contradistinction to the imitator who “is or strives to be\(^{219}\) what he

\(^{217}\) Where in that case the real historical event becomes the occasion for him to become a follower (PF: 100).

\(^{218}\) Where in that case the report of the contemporaries play the role of the occasion.

\(^{219}\) Arguably enough then, Abraham and Job can be conceived as imitators of the God-man.
admires" is detached from the object of its admiration, giving thus no attention to the claim that the God-man has laid upon him (loc. Cit).

Only the individual who "personally receives the condition [and the truth] from the god" truly believes and between this person and the god-man a special relationship develops (PF: 69).

The person who received the condition received it from the teacher himself, and consequently that teacher must know everyone who knows him, and the individual can know the teacher only by being himself known by the teacher (ibid: 68-9).

This reciprocal knowledge between the single individual and the God-man is not communicable to those outside this relation, since for the human eyes that are uninitiated to the mystery of inwardness "untruth has exactly the same range as truth", making thus direct communication between individuals impossible.

The God-man functions as the true prototype, leaving behind him footprints so as to become possible for the imitator to join Him in the various stages of His earthly existence. According to anti-Climacus, Christ's intention to leave those traces and become the prototype has a clear soteriological dimension (PC: 238).

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220 A classic and insightful elaboration of the notion of trace and its relation with the notion of face is that of Levinas who, in a theologico-ethical manner relates the notions of face and trace with the breaking of any continuity, which results, to the disarrangement of some kind of order. (Ricoeur 1988: 125). In Levinas's own formulation: "The Other proceeds from an absolutely Absent, but his relationship with the absolutely Absent from which he comes does not indicate, does not reveal, this Absent; and yet the Absent has a meaning in the face... The beyond from which the face comes signifies as a trace" or, "a face is of itself a visitation and a transcendence...To be in the image of God does not mean to be an icon of God but to find oneself in his trace...To go toward Him is not to follow this trace, which is not a sign; it is to go toward the Others who stand in the trace of illiety"(Levinas 1996: 60, 64). Despite Levinas's critique of
Consequently, the God-man resolves to be born and live as “poor, abandoned, abased...” so as to indirectly show to everyone the contradiction of being simultaneously so high and so low.

...he who is truly to be the prototype and be related only to imitators must in one sense be behind people, propelling forward, while in another sense he stands ahead, beckoning. This is the relation of loftiness and lowliness in the prototype...Thus in one sense the prototype is behind, more deeply pressed down into abasement and lowliness than any human being has ever been, and in another sense, ahead, infinitely lifted up (ibid: 238-9).

Having discussed so far how the single individual resolves to be contemporaneous with the God-man and thus to make repetition- in freedom and in earnestness-possible, we now shift our attention to the God-man’s resolution to become contemporaneous with the human beings, allowing thus repetition to acquire its full meaning. The question is more precisely this: Why does God resolve to come into existence and to suffer? In other words, why did He decide to continually become contemporaneous with every human person by allowing her at the same time to become contemporaneous with the God-man?

According to Climacus, God needs “no pupil in order to understand himself, and no occasion can act upon him in such a way that there is just as much in the occasion as in the resolution” (PF: 24). Only love.

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any conception that relates sign and trace and regardless of whether Kierkegaard would endorse Levinas’s approach as far as the problem of the person being the image or icon of God is concerned, one can say that for Kierkegaard the struggle to touch upon the mystery of the human existence is an attempt to trace the face of the others or/and of God. The impossibility of a direct communication/communion with God or with people is not only an urge of inwardness but it also indicates an attempt to escape the superficial, the seemingly present and to move into the absent where only traces can be touched upon.
Kierkegaard argues, could move God to make his appearance and to acquire historical existence.

What then, moves him to make his appearance? He must move himself and continue to be what Aristotle says of him, ἀκινήτως παντα κινεῖ [unmoved he moves all]. But if he moves himself, then there of course is no need that moves him...But if he moves himself and is not moved by need, what moves him then but love, for love does not have the satisfaction of need outside itself but within (PF: 24).

For Kierkegaard then, God is not an unmovable being that only 'is' but does not 'exist'; He rather is life. His love, Climacus argues, is procreative, because, as we have already said above it is God's distinctive quality to be able to beget. It needs be reminded that in Schelling's narrative too, the personal God comes into existence out of love in an instant that has eternal validity and duration. For Kierkegaard also, God's resolution to appear freely out of love has eternal validity, making thus contemporaneity and repetition possible.

Out of love, therefore, the god must be eternally resolved in this way, but just as his love is the basis, so also love must be the goal, for it would indeed be a contradiction for the god to have a basis of movement and a goal that do not correspond to this. The love, then, must be for the learner, and the goal must be to win him, for only in love is the different made equal... (PF: 25).

Thus, God, out of love, resolves freely to leave concealment and to come-into-existence, becoming a personal God that loves, sacrifices and suffers. For both Climacus and anti-Climacus, God-man suffers not only because he was mocked, crucified, etc but also because he
undergoes the secret suffering of inwardness, when he wanted to make himself understood by humankind, knowing at the same time that this task is "not so easy if he is not to destroy that which is different" (PF: 25; PC: 136-7).

Suffering and love then are two inseparable notions not only in Kierkegaard's account but also in Schelling's, who argues that God is 'a life, not a mere being' and

All life has a destiny and is subject to suffering and development. God freely submitted himself to this too, in the very beginning, when, in order to become personal, he divided light and the world of darkness...All history remains incomprehensible without the concept of a humanly suffering God, a concept which is common to all the mysteries and spiritual religions of ancient times (OHF: 84).

A humanly suffering God then makes history comprehensible and inaugurates an era when the moment of his historical appearance becomes synonymous with the 'fullness of time' (PF: 58).

In conclusion to the present chapter it has to be remarked that in the first chapter spirit was shown to be a crucial category in Kierkegaard's theorisation of Christianity. It was argued that in Kierkegaard's account spirit could furthermore drive the human being either to the state of 'sickness unto death' or to that of divine freedom. Similarly, it was argued in the previous chapter that in Schelling's narrative spirit is what differentiates human beings from the other visible creatures of the cosmos. In this case spirit is again seen as potentially leading either to false life and sickness or to true life and freedom. It has to be reminded that for Schelling, whilst in God the spirit of love
subjugates the spirit of evil once and for all in what the philosopher terms the second creation, this does not occur in the case for human beings.

It could therefore be argued that for both thinkers, God, resolves out of love to appear in history as a humanly suffering God, leaving behind him the traces a person should repeat in a unique manner. Moreover, this movement of repetition grounds the very possibility of becoming truly and freely contemporaneous with the paradox of God's coming into existence. Being regarded as the 'fullness of time' this paradox bears in it not only the dimension of the eternal past that Schelling has masterfully narrated but also the two moments he never had the chance to explicitly address, namely the eternal present and the eternal future.
Concluding Thoughts

The present work promised to challenge the interrelationship between the notions of the Fall, repetition and freedom, mainly through the aesthetic writings of Kierkegaard and secondarily through the writings of St. Augustine, Kant and Schelling. Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘taking notice’ served as the vehicle in our attempt to show the importance not only of ‘rethinking’ but also of experiencing or ‘living anew’ the moment of the collision of time and eternity, that signifies repetition and freedom in their eminent form. It should be established by now that the choice of Kierkegaard’s so-called ‘aesthetic writings’ was based on our belief that they express in a perfect way the workings of his notion of ‘taking notice’. To put it more explicitly, in his aesthetic writings the philosopher does not attempt to impose his own personal belief and ‘truth’ on his readers, but on the contrary he compels them to think, live, experience, and ‘see’ with their own eyes. The interrelation of the concepts of the Fall, repetition and freedom, and the different forms they acquire according to different interpretations, compels us to ‘take notice’ of different aspects of human and divine singularity, that emerge alongside each interpretation.

Thus, in our first chapter we explored more closely a key religious Kierkegaardean notion, namely the concept of anxiety. It was argued – and hopefully shown beyond doubt- that by associating anxiety with Adam’s fall, Kierkegaard offers a radical account of the book of Genesis.
More specifically, Kierkegaard argues that the Fall of each individual human being should not be conceived as a mere consequence of Adam's Fall, but as the actual happening in the life of each individual, in their freedom. Moreover, Kierkegaard has 'called our attention' to the significations of a possible distinction between a time before and after the Fall. Two fundamental questions arise in relation to this conception: Are the divine being and the human beings radically and irretrievably separated as a consequence of the Fall? And secondly, how should we conceive the boundaries of human freedom and repetition?

Thus, in the second chapter of this study we challenged two accounts- viz. those of St. Augustine and Kant- that in our opinion advocate the existence of a radical gap between the time before and after the Fall, and moreover between God and the human beings to the extent that God is either distant or reduced to a regulative principle.

In the third chapter we explored a radically different account not only of repetition, religiosity, contemporaneity, time, freedom and the Fall, but also of the divine as a personal God. This exploration is conducted through the writings of the middle period of Schelling's philosophy that arguably pave the ground for a re-interpretation of Kierkegaard in the final chapter of our thesis.

Repetition, contemporaneity, freedom, faith and sacrificial love both in its human and divine manifestations as they emerge from a
revaluation of Kierkegaard's aesthetic writings were thus the main topics of the last chapter of this work.

Instead of formally and systematically conclude this thesis we would rather remain faithful to the Kierkegardean spirit urging us to surmount the confines of formal and systematic thought that desperately seeks for conclusions. Thus, in our attempt to 'take notice' - for a final time in this work - of the religious themes haunting not only Kierkegaard, St. Augustine, Kant and Schelling but every human being, we are compelled to pursue our 'inconclusive' thoughts in an 'indirect' manner. Indeed, being structured along the lines of a work of art, the postscript of our thesis challenges and shows the restrictions imposed by the language of formal logic and rational understanding. Tarkovsky's film The Sacrifice - shot in Sweden in 1985- will provide us with the 'occasion' of speaking - but more importantly of remaining silent- about those religious themes, while it opens up new dimensions of thinking and experiencing them.
Alexander, the hero of Tarkovsky’s film *Sacrifice*, picked up a dry tree branch off the ground, stuck it in the cliff and started narrating the following story to his son

> Once you know, ...an elder in a monastery... also stuck a dry tree into a mountain...He commanded his novice- Ioann...to water this tree every day, until it came to life...Each morning Ioann would set off uphill with his bucket of water...so it went for three whole years. And then, one fine day, he ascended the mountain and saw: the tree was completely covered- every inch- with flowers (Tarkovsky 1999: 516).

The Kid\textsuperscript{221} listened silently to his father’s soliloquy, temporarily confined to silence due to a minor operation he underwent in his vocal chords. Without expecting a certain response from the child, Alexander, whose birthday that day it was, continued his thinking by wondering if ‘method’ and ‘system\textsuperscript{222}’ are the keys for understanding the mystery of life. If, he asks, someone performs the same action, every day, each day, at the same time “as though a ritual...systematically and without deviation” then, possibly, the “world will change” (ibid: 516). Almost ironically- and in a possible allusion to Kant’s strict observance of his everyday routine- Alexander gives an illustration of this hypothesis with the following words: “...suppose you wake up in the morning, get up at seven, go to the bathroom, fill a glass of water from the tap, and pour it down the lavatory. Nothing more...” (Loc. Cit).

\textsuperscript{221} The name of the son is not revealed in the course of the film.  
\textsuperscript{222} A possible allusion to Hegel?
Put in Kierkegaardian terms, what intrigues Tarkovsky’s hero is repetition in its many guises. Externally viewed, Ioann’s action to water the tree daily seems identical with the act of someone that every day follows mechanically and uninterruptedly the same routine and in this respect it can be likened with what has already been discussed in the previous chapter of the thesis about Constantius’s journey to Berlin. The question therefore arises whether there are any means by which to distinguish empty or merely mechanical repetition from fulfilled repetition, when the very act of repetition is only made accessible to the onlooker in an ‘external’ manner. As perhaps expected, Tarkovsky refrains from providing us with a definite answer to this question, for there is arguably not one such answer. Sharing with Kierkegaard and Schelling this special ability to recognise the call of inwardness, the director simply prompts us to follow Alexander in his journey to inwardness.

Alexander’s thoughts are interrupted by the arrival on the scene of a mysterious figure, Otto the postman. Far from being an ordinary postman, Otto is rather a herald, similar to the one who brought the ‘news of the day’ in Kierkegaard’s account or with the madman in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. Indeed, Otto straightaway declares himself to be a postman not in profession but in his free time and goes on to further compare himself -and his whole manner of reasoning- with Nietzsche’s dwarf (Tarkovsky 1999: 518-9). “What’s your relationship
with God like?" Otto asks Alexander, only to receive the following answer: "No...we're not acquainted with each other! I never had the honour of an introduction" (ibid: 518). "That's no tragedy, no tragedy at all" replies the postman, implying perhaps that the real tragedy would be the illusion that one is in a perfect relationship with God. 'The honour of an introduction': Alexander seems to be looking for a relationship with a personal God, which is neither St. Augustine's transcendent God nor Kant's God conceived as a regulative principle. We could say that by admitting his non-existent relationship with such a God, Alexander 'took notice', maybe for the first time in his life, of how his "organ of faith has atrophied" (Synessios 1999: xxv). "All this has been lost nowadays! We have lost the knack of praying..." Alexander exclaims, having now returned home to celebrate his birthday.

Few minutes or perhaps hours later\textsuperscript{223}, the scenery has drastically changed. The TV is switched on and everyone looks scared and petrified. A terrible and mass-destructive world war is declared. It seems that there is no possibility of escaping such a war and an actual enemy is not named. The only enemy the prime minister recognises is panic, for it brings disorder and chaos.

\textsuperscript{223} For one cannot easily judge the actual length of time in Tarkovsky's movies.
Using words that remind us of Kant, the prime minister orders:

> Every intelligent citizen is to summon up all his courage and steadily assist the army to preserve the peace, order and discipline, for the terrible enemy in our midst now is panic. Because it is contagious and beyond the influence of common sense. Only order and organisation, dear fellow citizens! Only order can oppose the chaos! I entreat you, I appeal to your courage and to your reason, come what may! (Tarkovsky 1999: 537).

Tarkovsky does not bother to give us a clear picture of the country and the date the story is taking place. Taking into consideration that the film was shot in Sweden, we assume that the story is taking place there and by judging from the note that Alexander left at the end of the film, we learn that the date is June 1986. Needless to say, Tarkovsky's perception of time is peculiar; his heroes seem almost a-temporal and they -up to some extent- could be living in any modern era or European country. An indication of this only relative and loose situatedness in socio-historical contexts may be also traced in the birthday present that Otto brought to Alexander- an authentic map of Europe at the end of the 17th century. In any case, Tarkovsky's characters could be characterised with some accuracy as being lonely and isolated citizens of a cosmopolitan society.

Being a citizen in a cosmopolitan society does not fill the gap of loneliness that Tarkovsky's heroes experience. As Alexander points out in words quite strongly reminiscent of those of Pascal cited in the beginning of chapter four, this human being feels scared of everything in life: "Life was terrifying...but instead of making an accommodation with nature, and sharing his fate with her...instead man began to defend..."
himself...People stopped communicating\textsuperscript{224}..." (ibid: 521). If put in Schellingean terms, this passage could be seen as indicating that the human being, by moving away - or falling - from the 'centrum', develops an egocentric selfhood that deprives her from 'religiousity' and 'faith' in their primordial sense. What is lost then is the belief, by virtue of the absurd, or in the name of the paradox, that "everything is possible".

Nuclear destruction being imminent everyone but Alexander's wife anticipate death in silent agony. Stricken by panic she cries out: "We must do something!" This is perhaps the typical reaction of the trapped person, the need to act against the sheer force of fateful events, which is so often completely deprived of any specific and even remotely intelligible course of action. With the intervention of the doctor this short feat of hysteria gives place to a relapse to the state of passivity and fatality characterising the whole company. In the midst of all this, Alexander seems still open to a mode of action, which despite being resolute is as far removed from the confines of rationality as to border with faith by virtue of the absurd.

Speaking of Alexander, Tarkovsky points out that he is neither the prototype of hero nor a strong man. Alexander is rather an ordinary person that is nevertheless able to sacrifice himself, and moreover his

\textsuperscript{224} It seems to us that Kierkegaard, not only in his writings but most importantly in his personal life, experienced and captured in a wonderful and dramatic way the loneliness of the single individual and the lack of communication. This persistence in his conception of indirect communication might indicate that Kierkegaard might have lost his hope (and maybe his faith?) to the possibility of a mystical communication of the inner living experience between two or more persons.
egocentric self, in the name of a higher ideal, or in Kierkegaardian terms. 'by virtue of the absurd' (Tarkovsky 1987: 287). Thus, as another

Abraham, Alexander puts his whole life at risk, for his actions, spring out of freedom, are incommunicable to the others in his environment (loc. Cit).

If one could follow a chronological order in the description of the events taking place in the film, one could give the following account:

First, Alexander prays to God, fervently, for the first time in his life:

Then he goes on to his knees, folds his hands, and, trying to look at the black peaks of the still trees, he begins to pray properly, for the first time in his life...’O God! Save us in this terrible hour...Let not my children die, nor my friends...because this war is the last...and will leave neither victor nor vanquished...I will give Thee everything I have, I'll leave my family which I love, I'll burn my home, I will deny myself the Kid, I'll become dumb, I'll never speak to anyone; I'll deny myself everything that binds me to life; but just make everything as it was earlier, this morning, like yesterday with none of this sickening, deathly fear! Help me, Lord and I will do all that I have promised Thee!...’ (Tarkovsky 1999: 543-4).

Secondly, Alexander also follows the postman's paradoxical suggestion that the only alternative to this terrible situation is to go and sleep with Maria, his servant, who being a witch, has magical powers and she could save the world. Having visited Maria, Alexander returns home where he falls asleep only to wake up next morning and find everything being exactly the same as it was before the declaration of the war. Even everybody at home is now immersed in her own problem, as if the war has never happened or it was never even a remote possibility. Only Alexander, and perhaps Maria, Otto and the Kid, seem to have
knowledge or recollection of the events. Thus, in inner consistency with what he promised in his prayer, Alexander burns the house, denies his family, and surrenders himself to the doctors that eventually lead him into the madhouse. His 'sacrifice' is moreover perceived by the others as madness and absurdity. Alexander is now considered a 'madman' and he does nothing to prove the opposite. He promised to be silent and he now keeps his promise. He finds it impossible to communicate his inner experiences even to his best friend, Victor

I did it, don't worry...Listen Victor, I meant to tell you something very import...'
But just then he remembers, and falls silent. He falls silent, never again to speak. As he has promised (ibid: 559).

Far from being pedantic, the director neither exalts Alexander's action nor favours one of the two possible courses of actions undertaken by his character. Tarkovsky is far from being a preacher; he does not even make clear -but rather chooses to keep us confused through and through- regarding the possibility of the whole story with the war being a bad dream of Alexander. Even in the latter case though, one cannot ignore the importance of Alexander's sacrifice given there is no doubt about the importance of dreams.

For Schelling for example, in the dreaming state, the whole range of potencies are in effect, while for Kierkegaard the effects of anxiety and possibility are best described in comparison with the dizziness of the dreaming state.
Divine or holy madness cannot be distinguished in an external manner from pathological madness. Exoterically, Alexander is mad, and everyone seems sad and feels pity for him. Only Otto, the mad postman, and Maria, the witch, and as we are going to see the Kid, have an intimation of Alexander's inner movement of repetition. Alexander gained his freedom by 'seeing' the power of repetition that could render the past into future, although on another plane. The collision of eternity and time has happened for him, and consequently to him the world cannot be the same.

We could say that being dissatisfied with approaches such as St. Augustine's and Kant's that see the relation between God and the human person as being trapped in the boundaries of fallen time, Alexander attempts the impossible, only to show the power of repetition and freedom.

If for Kant, "we ought to hazard nothing that may be wrong" (Religion: 173), then Alexander can be said to act in an essentially anti-Kantian manner. In effect he does exactly the opposite from what Kant prescribes to the moral agent, by achieving this primordial sense of religiosity where one surrenders himself to "the highest commitment to the right without choice" (OHF: 71), arguably cancelling therefore- in a sense- the act of the Fall.

More importantly, Alexander left traces of his act of repetition behind him in the form of a note addressed to his family, urging them to
leave the house and to go for a walk: “Why not go for a little walk. The Kid will show you the ‘Japanese’ tree, which he and I planted yesterday. Or was it today? Love to you all...Forgive me in advance...” (Tarkovsky 1999: 557).

The film and our thesis both conclude with the following scene. Alexander is being driven away in an ambulance, only Maria in tow, until it reaches this place in the countryside just by the sea, where the planted tree still stands. The ambulance slowly passes the tree, and Alexander silently bids farewell to the Kid who keeps faithfully and repeatedly watering the tree.

He is walking along the road, and having difficulty carrying a heavy, large bucket full of water. When the vehicle draws level with him, he stops to rest the bucket on the ground and watches it drive past. Mr Alexander pulls himself away from the window in alarm, before his son notices him... (ibid: 560).

Then, the Kid, resting under the tree, speaks for the first time in the movie. The first words uttered by the Kid, are perhaps ironically the final words Tarkovsky wrote for the cinema before his untimely death. These compelling words invite us to ‘take notice’ of the importance of investigating ‘who’ instead of ‘what’ God or the divine are and are spoken with the uttermost simplicity that marks all genuine questions: “In the Beginning was the Word...” Why is that papa?” (Synessios 1999: xxv)
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