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Mandarin-based Civic Scheme Impacts on Political Socialisation of Foreign Spouse Learners in Central Taipei’s Formal Citizenship Courses during the Ma Administrations: A Case Study

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List of Abbreviations

ACSMCP: The Association of Cross-Strait Marriage Communication and Promotion

AHRLIM: The Alliance for Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants

ASEAN: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CARES: The Chinese Association of Relief and Ensuing Services

CPC: The Communist Party of China

DPP: The Democratic Progressive Party

KMT: The Chinese Kuomintang (The Chinese Nationalist Party)

LSTMF: The Lawrence S. Ting Memorial Fund

MOE: The Ministry of Education

MOI: The Ministry of the Interior

NIA: The National Immigration Agency

NP: The New Party

NTDT: The New Tang Dynasty Television

PEP: The People First Party
PRC: The People’s Republic of China

RTI: The Radio Taiwan International

ROC: The Republic of China

TASAT: The Trans Asia Sisters Association, Taiwan

TSU: The Taiwan Solidarity Union

YWCA: The Young Women’s Christian Association
Abstract

This thesis is an analysis of political socialisation of the foreign spouses\(^1\) during the KMT Ma administration I & II\(^2\) in Central Taipei. The research looks at the way that their political socialisation was affected by changes to the curricular guidelines for their citizenship courses. It seeks to show that civic education policy implementation in Taiwan had an over-scaled nationalist bias that impacted on foreign spouse learners. Fieldwork by means of in-depth interviews and classroom observations is integrated into a baseline analysis of governmental and NGO public discourses, marital immigration regulations and relevant reports. The thesis explicates the underlying cleavages in the struggles over pathways to citizenship that have created a complex series of links in the political socialisation of new migrants. It thus examines how the Ma administrations addressed integration and dealt with related issues of multiculturalism. It is hoped that this study sheds new light upon the discrimination experienced by the learners which, in turn, motivated their empowerment through participation in socio-political movements against prejudice.

\(^{1}\) Marital immigrants, as a subset of new immigrants, have been growing in both numbers and self-awareness. Mainland and foreign spouses (as a hybrid new group, marital immigrants) were married to four Taiwanese ethno-cultural groups (Benshengren, Waishengren, Hakka, and Aborigines). Owing to Mainland spouses’ shortage in the citizenship courses after the Ma administration set an open policy in their working rights in 2009 (according to Paragraph 1 of Article 17 of the Act Governing Relations between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area amended on 14 August 2009 (laws and regulations database of the Republic of China, 2009)), this study focuses on foreign spouse learners.

\(^{2}\) 20\(^{th}\) May 2016 was Inauguration of DPP Tsai Ing-Wen’s administrations after eight-year governing of the KMT Ma administrations (20\(^{th}\) May 2008 - 19\(^{th}\) May 2016).
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Motivations and Purposes

With the growth of international migration and its increased political saliency in Taiwan, migration policymaking in this country was greatly expanded, e.g. developing special administrative units along with inter-ministerial taskforces. Mandarin-based citizenship courses for new immigrants could be viewed as one key aspect of this trend. The specific historical period of the First and Second Ma administrations invited particular focus because the relevant policies of this administration differed a great deal from the preceding government, e.g. the use of national education guidelines instead of civic scheme guidelines. Through incentivised open policies on the working rights of Mainland and foreign spouses\(^3\), most marital immigrants (even nearly illiterate Mainland spouses from rural or minority communities) attended the government-sponsored vocational education courses (i.e. hairdressing and cosmetics courses for marital immigrants), which overlapped with Mandarin-based citizenship courses. Generally speaking, the government-funded citizenship courses providing a language foundation in Mandarin alongside Taiwanese civic knowledge. The focus of this research is on the use of education policy as a tool of political socialisation, and its impact on migrant spouses, as well as on broader questions of transnational identity and multicultural citizenship.

\(^3\) The open policy for foreign spouses’ working rights was revealed on the amended Paragraph 1 of Article 9 and Article 11 of Enforcement Rules of Employment Service Law on 18 August 2011 (laws and regulations database of the Republic of China, 2011). Thus, the chosen programmes were amongst the very few which could maintain the minimum required number of foreign spouse students for the government-funded civic scheme.
According to the Standards for Identification of Basic Language Abilities and Common Sense of National Rights and Duties of Naturalised ROC Citizens, the 72-hours of classes are de facto citizenship courses (or so-called adjustment education courses). I use the term “citizenship courses” in the title but also “adjustment education courses” interchangeably. In addition to the formal Mandarin-based citizenship courses (or namely adjustment courses), there were two main types of foreign spouse students, including home welcoming ones (e.g. overseas Chinese spouses from Southeast Asia) and migrating “dream seekers” (e.g. marital immigrant women of Southeast Asian national). The motivation to understand transnational sentiments of these two main types of students led to me to focus on a case study of learners’ political socialisation in government-funded civic courses. In addition, the capital city centre courses were chosen because of their flexibility in course level options (i.e. basic, intermediate, and high intermediate) amongst the official Mandarin-based citizenship courses, as certain students have learned Mandarin in their hometown before migration.

The study stresses the fundamental role played by formal education in a localised setting. In examining the schooling effects on their civic awareness, the study explores the curricular guidelines and their impact on the political socialisation process for foreign spouse students. In other words, it examines the ways and extent to which they were politically informed through a civic curriculum (e.g. acquisition of knowledge about local politics), their interactions with one another in the courses/local community, and their extracurricular political participation during the transition. In summary, the research aims at analysing the programme participants’ political socialisation through their reactions to the Ma administration’s top-down modification of national education guidelines. The research includes a detailed explanatory analysis of key factors and additional subcultural variations. Such issues concern ideological or cultural differences of origins, the emerging awareness of hybrid minority awareness,
immigrant women’s empowerment, and the difficulties of finding a balance between socio-political assimilation and cultural identity. In addition, the interracial dynamics that arose in their political socialisation process could be revealed from their alienation and identity issues alongside tensions over changes in the curricular guidelines. Other factors affecting their sense of belonging were the deficiency of comprehensive human rights law education, the level of socio-political participation in concurrent events, developing multiculturalism within a dual system, or the political party preferences as political consequences of identity.

The research thus looks at the way their political socialisation was affected by the transition of formal citizenship in educational settings and seeks to determine whether relevant policy and curricular guidelines changes have an over-scaled nationalist bias for the foreign spouse learners. The research also engages with broader questions about learners’ political representation and their participation in socio-political movements against discrimination.

1.2 Literature Review

My research has focused on the role of the educational system as a tool of political socialisation. Initially coined by Herbert Hyman in 1959, and connected with education, the term ‘political socialisation’ has recently gained much greater currency in political science research (Ichilloy, 2014). Political socialisation refers to the process by which individuals develop attitudes and feelings regarding their roles in the political
Political socialisation is the process of induction into a political culture, which identifies the educational system as one of the key agencies involved in this process (ibid.). Formalised education plays a decisive role in the political socialisation process; there is a high correlation between education and political cognition/participation (e.g. exposure to politics, awareness of governmental impact, range of political opinions, and political information) (ibid.). The consequence of the inclusion of an explicitly political content in the curriculum may result in a strong form of political socialisation, in which pre-existing prejudices are either weakened or reinforced, leading either to conservatism or to radicalism in political orientation and behaviours (ibid., pp.19-20).

This chapter reviews the studies of national sentiments and group dynamics that came about as a result of the gradual political socialisation of the new Taiwanese population. The major approaches adopted in the academic literature give some examples of unsuccessful policies and resulting negative effects. They discuss a backlash against government policies that use education as a tool of national assimilation, especially as part of a nationalist agenda. In order to justify the employment of a life-history qualitative approach for this specific case study, the review looks at the literature on the attendance of orientation courses during the period c.2008-2016. In particular, the review focuses respectively on the cause (curricular motivation), the process (development of transnational identity and group dynamics in the learning process), and the result (multicultural citizenship as learning outcome) of their political socialisation.
1.2.1 Studies on the Motivation of Relevant Political Socialisation within Citizenship Programmes

In general, the values of the existing political system are reflected and promoted by its education system. But the way political socialisation into civic attitudes takes place varies across countries (Han, Hoskins, and Sim, 2014). Rogowski proposes that early political socialisation is likely to be more influential and have a longer lasting effect than what is learned later. (Rogowski, 2015, p.14). Rogowski also notes that adult students’ political attitudes and behaviours can be developed through interactions with classmates, inquiries about current political news reports in class, and even experiences of frustrated expectations of the formal civic education settings (ibid., p.6). In particular, formal educational systems bear a heavier load of socialisation in most developing countries (Coleman, 2015, p.22). To sum up, political socialisation through formal education, is understood in terms of the gradual development of the individuals’ own particular and idiosyncratic comprehension and engagement of the political world they live in (Fillieule, 2013). In other words, political socialisation can be identifiable in a formal learning process where the students are inducted into local political culture through individual behavioural orientation development for a more effectively participatory citizenship, including social activism, public participation and the expression of opinion. However, if the citizenship courses lack information regarding the electoral system, it is more likely that new immigrant students will not understand the complexity of regional and party-proportional representation when voting.

In one study of learning outcomes of citizenship courses for new immigrants, Tsan has demonstrated the political effectiveness of students in adjustment education
courses and their life histories in Kaohsiung (Tsan, 2009), which is relevant to my case study of overseas Hakka spouses who emigrated from Kaohsiung to Taipei. Fluency in Mandarin, Hô-ló-uē or English facilitates their engagement in political affairs, particularly in the ability to read and absorb political news. The ‘political talks’ and ‘frequency of reading political news’ were not only salient but similar in both subgroups of new immigrants, while foreign spouses participated less than Mainland ones because of their limited Mandarin. Consequently, Tsan finds the KMT\(^4\)-oriented spouses more politically partisan than the DPP\(^5\)-oriented, though both have low levels political engagement generally\(^6\) (*ibid.*). Tsan’s research reveals that this increased partisanship of KMT-oriented foreign and Mainland wives also derives from the intensive political engagement of their husbands. In addition, local language fluency, as well as where they live, have influenced their level of socio-political participation (*ibid.*). Tsan recommends the adoption of South Korean and Japanese models to evaluate overseas marriage risks as well as providing general information and legal services. In another study, Holland contradicts traditional notions that related education programmes promote conformity, instead arguing for the capacity of programme participants to empower themselves and others in citizenry transformation and community engagement with positive experiences (Holland, 2014, p.295). In that way, a formal educational programme can challenge inefficient governmental policymaking (*ibid.*, p.298). Both Tsan’s study and Holland’s study provide substantial context for the research questions of this thesis in regard to the political socialisation of marital

\(^4\) The KMT, The Chinese Kuo-Min-Tang (The Chinese Nationalist Party) was the ruling party then (c.2008-2016).

\(^5\) The DPP, The Democratic Progressive Party was the largest opposing party then (c.2008-2016).

\(^6\) Given this conclusion, it is significant to note that indigenisation movements, whether implicitly or explicitly, have encouraged new citizens to expand their political effectiveness. For example, *The Trans Asia Sisters Association, Taiwan (TASAT)* has its own programme for socio-political education.
immigrant students.

In relation to my research concern of evaluating the adjustment education curriculum in order to understand its role in issues of political socialisation, it is important to look at the proportion of courses devoted to civic education. Wu argues that the curriculum should include aspects of ethnic Hakka and aboriginal culture, an introduction to the election system, and a discussion of regulations when the curriculum deals with the themes of democracy and legal education (Wu, 2009). Research clearly demonstrates that political participation in a democratic regime should be an essential subject taught within adjustment education in order to inculcate a sense of social responsibility. Wu, however, does not present any discussion of political orientations of programme participants after they left the programmes. Moreover, certain preliminary points need to be heightened, e.g. the study ignores further evaluation of the curriculum design with regard to a nationalist bias. Indeed, the neglect of these elements has prompted some of the research questions in this thesis that address curriculum evaluation and the related on-going debate around the role of education in political socialisation, particularly as concerns its impacts on marital immigrant students. Furthermore, the government sponsored research project series, ‘The Study of Foreign and Mainland Spouses’ Adjustment and Relevant Civil Rights’, conducted a focus group study of ‘underprivileged’ new immigrants that went beyond previous surveys of foreign and Mainland brides by the Ministry of the Interior, respectively in 2003 and 2008 (Yo, 2009). According to the study, the values of democracy can be strengthened by adjustment education courses, e.g. the gradual adjustment of underprivileged students to the broader Taiwanese political scene, including criticism of the government by some after attending the Mandarin-based adjustment education courses, despite the reinforcement of a particular national identity within the programmes (ibid.). My case study takes the above conclusion, along with Wu’s claims regarding curriculum, as a
starting point, examining the sources and practices of protest by underprivileged marital immigrant students against over-scaled nationalist policymaking.

In a comparative study of the supplementary Mainland spouses’ political identities, Zen finds that Mainland brides firmly support the KMT regardless of marital status, age difference, educational backgrounds, in-law families’ political orientation. Zen argues that this firm support comes about because Mainland Chinese brides usually have a strong awareness of a need to transform their national identity in favour of the Chinese Kuomintang, as doing so when actively exercising their civil and political rights in political campaigns would be the key to greater influence in domestic politics (Zen, 2009). The fact that the finding Zen advances ends up rather conventionally reflecting political orientation after participation in Mandarin-based adjustment education inspires further analysis in this thesis of the political consequences on identity through the compilation of interviews with programme participants. My research seeks to verify and clarify the findings above by introducing a more detailed breakdown of the participants, e.g. distinguishing foreign and Mainland spouse students from new immigrants. Furthermore, my case study seeks to analyse their political socialisation given the context of Ma’s nation-building scheme through the dialogues and group dynamics in the programmes.

1.2.2 Studies on the Process of Political Socialisation Concerning Transnational Identity and Group Dynamics
I correlate transnational identity with political socialisation by discussing the contributions to the analysis of migrant students’ political socialisation. Authors emphasising transnationalism have productively challenged the boundaries of migration studies on their life histories, especially in the focus on factors such as race and gender (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, Genova, Garelli, Grappi, Heller, Hess, Kasparek, Mezzadra, Neilson, Peano, Pezzani, Pickles, Rahola, Riedner, Scheel, and Tazzioli, 2014, p.13). One particular study demonstrated that as marriage induced migration rose with the liberalisation of the law in the 1980s (Schucher, 2008, p.18), the pattern of transnational marriages changed the population structure and group dynamics in Taiwan. Although Mainland spouses are supplementary to this case study, it is important to understand that Taiwan simultaneously confronted the problem of integrating almost 300,000 marital migrants from Mainland China as it sought to become more visible in the international community. The wave of marital migration across the Taiwan Strait began in the early 1990s and reached its peak in 2003. These arriving Mainland Chinese spouses have not only encountered more restrictions than foreign spouses to acquiring residency and citizenship, but they have suffered from limited rights of family reunification as well as barriers to civil service employment (Friedman, 2010). Generally speaking, scholars of transnational studies discuss how cultural rights manifest themselves in the multicultural politics of immigrant groups (e.g. foreign spouse students in this case study who were primarily from Southeast Asia). For instance, Han and her co-writers question whether official language courses and naturalisation tests contribute to transnational citizenry or constitute a discriminatory gatekeeping mechanism where language is a proxy for ethnicity, as the emphasis on official language and deterrence of mother-tongues are significant components of a switch from multiculturalism towards a policy of assimilation (Han, Starkey, and Green, 2010, p.18), which responds to my second research question of alienation and identity in group dynamics. Given the distinctive Confucian values within the educational
system (Han, 2007, p.5), this study can further examine whether the students are in effect being socialised into a passive sense of citizenship. This is especially true considering the evidence that the system confirms commonalities in immigrants from East Asian societies, particularly those with a similarly common and predominant Confucian heritage (Green, Janmaat, and Han, 2009, p.92) in the overseas areas these spouse students are originally from.

Moreover, Wang adopts Steven Vertovec’s concept of transnational communities of immigrant women as one such example in Taiwan, while supporting the cultural rights of immigrant women learners who are mostly from Southeast Asian countries (Wang, 2009, pp.3-11). Wang introduces an examination of the official educational plans and programmes in an attempt to promote Southeast Asian language rights for the transnational communities. Wang also concludes that language training is a tool of assimilation, and that the curriculum merely focuses on domestic customs rather than the original cultures of the new immigrants (ibid., p.12). In his study entitled ‘The Formation of “Transnational Communities”: A New Challenge to “Multicultural Taiwan”’, he reinforces the conclusion that foreign spouse students not only face forced assimilation in Taiwanese society but are also discriminated against because of their culture of origin (ibid., pp.10-11). Nevertheless, the transnational communities carve out their own space in Taiwan, despite discrimination, by means of their own ethnic restaurants, shops, and festivals which now permeate Taiwan. The transnational communities present unique challenges to the issues of cultural adjustment and identity, citizenship and cultural policy in an emergent multi-cultural Taiwan because they bring a new experience of cosmopolitanism to the island (ibid., p.7). The literature studying transnationalism discusses how cultural rights have manifested themselves in the multicultural politics of the group of immigrant women learners who are primarily from Southeast Asia. At the same time, the literature emphasises the advantages of the
cultural differences brought to Taiwan by new citizens who maintain traditions hoping to make their children proud of their maternal cultures. Alternatively, Wang merges the case of overseas Hakka wives’ ethnic identity into their Taiwanese Hakka husbands’ pan-Hakka movement. Wang supports the development of ethnic Hakka literacy education associated with ethnic Hakka indigenisation movement, rather than the formal Mandarin-based adjustment education for the students (Wang, 2007(a), p.314). From the perspective of many transnational scholars, the pioneering literacy education programme run by the Hakka NGO has been marginalised from mainstream governmental programmes. Given his study of overseas Chinese spouse students joining in the movement of pro-indigenisation, Wang identifies new forms of cosmopolitan transnationalism as the special ethno-political role of ethnic Hakkas in Taiwan because both overseas Hakka wives and their Taiwanese Hakka husbands may express plural identities and loyalties to both the KMT and DPP. Even so, Wang misses the ethnic Hakkas’ plural and shifting political socialisation as the third force in Taiwanese domestic politics. Instead, my study emphasises the distinctive ethnic subgroup (Hakka spouses) as the main subgroup of ethnic Chinese in my case study that Hakka spouses rather suffered from the harsh terms of state spousal sponsorship on the naturalisation applications.

To sum up, an analysis of studies investigating the change in the population structure and group dynamics of Taiwan can become highly contentious and politicised (Lu, 2011). For instance, Wang’s argument that the transnational spouse learners are excluded from mainstream society as outsiders (Wang, 2009), which appears to contradict their formal rights as outlined in *The Official Annual Report of Year 2013 in Regard to Foreign and Mainland Spouses’ Life Adjustment* (National Immigration Agency, 2014, p.7). Transnational scholars therefore call for understanding the significance of the fifth ethnic group in Taiwan, e.g. Sandel and Liang use cross-cultural
adaption and cultural fusion to explain the identities of cross-border migrant women learners (Sandel & Liang, 2010, pp.250-274). Highlighting transnationalism helps to explain emergent identities of foreign spouse students and leads to research questions regarding the dialogues between national identity and formal citizenship programmes. Much of my case study is concerned with foreign national (largely Southeast Asian), overseas Chinese (including overseas Hakka) spouses’ transnational identity in Taiwan where national identity is informed by the rules laid out in the *R.O.C. Constitution*. Wang notes that overseas spouse students act on the basis of two overlapping perspectives – one stemming from their culture of origin and the other from their host society – interwoven into their transnational identities (Wang, 2009). My research scrutinises the plural guises made possible by these dual identities. Also, it examines the expectation of political assimilation demanded in the over-scaled nationalist-driven guidelines to Mandarin and citizenship education, and their impact on the process of the new immigrant students’ political socialisation. With the intention of promoting assimilation, the KMT government has encouraged new immigrants to participate in the citizenship programmes where naturalisation is emphasised, particularly for foreign spouses (Chiu, 2009). Not only does the process of naturalisation have multiple limitations for foreign spouse learners, but Mainland spouses are, in themselves, a case apart that cannot be reduced only to the linguistic differences between Mainland China’s use of simplified characters and the Taiwanese preference for traditional characters. In any case, Mandarin-based adjustment education has become an over-scaled nationalist-driven tool designed to promote a new collective identity for immigrants, in which the KMT-inspired nationalism and nation-building schemes may

7 Identity here refers to one’s national identity (as a form of political identity) and sense of belonging to the state – neither the previous argued cultural adjustment and identity of transnational marriages against cultural hegemony, nor one’s ethnic identity based on common ethnicity, ancestry, heritage, language or dialect, religion, or traditions – regardless of one's citizenship status.
limit opportunities to address issues related to ethnic diversity within the relevant group
dynamics of my study.

1.2.3 Studies on the Outcome of Political Socialisation Concerning Developing
Multicultural Citizenship under the Nationalist Guidelines

As formalised by the KMT, the citizenship courses highlighted an apparent
cleavage within Mandarin-based Chinese nationalism between the Kuomintang
government and hegemonic Mainland China. With a focus on the subjectivity of ethno-
culture and society, pro-pluralism advocates have criticised KMT-inflected sinicization
guidelines is enlightening in this regard. School practices of patriotic education could
be viewed as promoting an intense political agenda, but Pavenkov believes the
promotion of patriotism to be a conscious choice in a democratic society (Pavenkov,
2016).

Although interracial and cross-strait marital immigrants had pushed for greater
citizenship rights, there had been significant public image problems: bogus marriages
and prostitution, underage pregnancy, poverty and poor education, illiteracy amongst
Southeast Asian brides, ineffective parenting skills, and affiliated issues of mail-order
brides and domestic violence (Cheng, 2008, p.7). This reveals the extent of the
majority’s prejudices. Moreover, the repeated shifting of policies of the post-2008 Ma
administration regarding Mainland spouses that resulted from the transitions of ruling
parties in Taiwan over the past decade (Tseng, Cheng and Fell, 2014, pp. 220-221) could
hinder the political socialisation needed to integrate Mainland spouses into a participatory democracy (e.g. no need for attending the Mandarin-based citizenship courses after the open policy in their working rights) in spite of their status improvement from those policies. Creating Taiwanese citizens is a highly politicised project which has an impact on the marital migrants’ life histories, e.g. policies favourable to Mainland spouses under the Ma administration were strongly condemned in protests by foreign spouses. KMT-oriented nationalism not only has been wary of the deepening impacts of multicultural policy, but also emphasises the limits of ethnic minority rights so as not to undermine the politics of assimilation. These points are taken up by my research with regard to the ethno-political conflicts and the curricular guidelines impacts.

Next, the immigrant waves experienced by Taiwan have produced a new hybrid ethno-cultural group, which will be of interest to those studying ethnicity in the contemporary state. Yet Taiwan is virtually unacknowledged in world politics due to its equivocal status. With the ethno-nationalist classification of ‘them’ and ‘us’, the issue of cross-strait security has focussed the discussion of Mainland brides on their potentially ambiguous national identities and loyalties (Lan, 2008, pp.837-838). However, this does not fully account for the core ideas of identity central to Ma’s nationalism. Nationalism, on the other hand, defines the nation in terms of a common culture and language, and the heritage connects to an historical homeland which expresses their nationalist sentiments but does not openly underline the ethnic Chinese basis of their political nationalism.

Much as federal Anglophone Canadian and Québécois elites struggle for the control of the new immigrants, so too have the KMT and DPP elites in Taiwan engaged in a similar contest. Will Kymlicka advocates a multi-national state by accommodating
immigrants and native minorities with devolution of control of sensitive ethno-cultural issues, as well as internal restrictions and external protections of multicultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995, pp.4-5). In addition, Kymlicka’s discussion of the tension between nationalism and multiculturalism proves particularly helpful in assessing the current KMT’s curricular guidelines based on ROC Chinese nationalism rather than professed multiculturalism. On the one hand, Kymlicka values the right of ethnic minorities to autonomy rather than mere integration into a greater nation (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 208-212). When ethnic minorities have been forced to assimilate into the nation-state in which they live, they also have been forced to sacrifice their rights to self-government (ibid., p.222). However, Kymlicka also expresses concerns about an unbridled policy of multiculturalism because it undermines the centrality of the overarching state (ibid., p.253). Discussing the example of the Québécois, he presents the paradox of a liberal nationalism in which a native ethnic or language group tries to limit the number of immigrants so as to protect their position. Kymlicka discusses the case of the Francophone Québec majority which became a minority amongst Anglophones within the context of the Canadian Federation Canada as a whole (ibid., pp. 254-264, 283-285). In the case of Taiwan, then, Mandarin-based adjustment education therefore has the dual and complex function of, on the one hand, inculcating respect for given ethno-cultural groups, while on the other, forging a transnational identity that can bind various minorities to the state. The American political scientist, Charney, argues that Kymlicka’s balancing act fails because his seeming prioritisation of national identity sacrifices his initial defence of minority ethno-cultural identities (Charney, 2003, pp.295-296). Interestingly, however, despite arguing that the claims of nationalism conflict with the claims of religion in a religiously plural nation-state (ibid., p.296), Charney supports a common language to formulate national identity and core beliefs (ibid., p.303).
Kymlicka’s work on the ethno-cultural rights of two national minorities (Canadian aboriginals and the Québécois) includes the rights of self-government, poly-ethnic rights, and special group representational rights, which provides interesting parallels for the case of Taiwan, i.e. Taiwanese multicultural politics. Kymlica suggests that the rights of minorities can be protected through a guaranteed quota of the parliamentary seats (Kymlicka, 1995, pp.131-151), which illustrates the tensions thrown up between the right of self-government of minorities within the nation-state and representation of minorities within the national parliamentary institutions at the national centre, i.e. the difference say between regional self-government for an identifiable national minority like the Québécois and representation in the Canadian parliament in Ottawa. More to the point the levels of representation and self-government expressed through Taiwan’s binary electoral system may provide the means for balancing the interests of different minorities against the central government in the way that Kymlicka suggests in the case of Canada.

Thus, in Kymlicka’s work the question of addressing cultural diversity in the nation-state is approached by discussing the needs of established nations within the broader nation-state, on the one hand, and the reception of immigrants on the other (ibid., p.10). Kymlicka argues for the acceptance of dual citizenship and a public policy of multiculturalism (Spencer, 2003, p.197). But, to what extent do these policies threaten liberal policies? Two issues must be addressed. First, to what extent could a group have the right to limit its members in the name of group solidarity? And second, to what extent can a group protect its resources from dilution from the greater whole?

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8 Self-government rights: delegation of powers to national minorities, e.g. Taiwanese aborigines. Poly-ethnic rights: financial supports and legal protection for particular ethnic groups, e.g. social welfare of the Hakka and the aborigines. Special group representational rights: the guaranteed seats for national minorities, e.g. parliamentary representatives for the highland and lowland aborigines.
He argues that external protections must be in force to defend the principles of individual liberty and equality (Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 35-46) because internal restrictions may stoke intra-group tensions. In sum, multicultural policy can face the challenge of forging a multi-cultural state to accommodate immigrants and native minority groups (ibid., pp.4-5). In the case of Taiwan, the governmental educational guidelines have not enabled new immigrants to exercise self-governance over their cultures of origins. Inspired by the Chinese nationalism (Townsend, 1992, p.97) of Dr Sun Yat-sen⁹ (Gregor & Chang, 1979, p.22), the educational guidelines of the Ma administration under the R.O.C. Constitution are associated with Sinicisation (Corcuff, 2011). However, it is worthwhile laying out some of this argument here.

State multiculturalism practices in Taiwan can be viewed as descriptive and normative during the first Ma administration, in relation to gender, ethnicity and nationality of one’s life history (Cheng and Fell, 2014, p.6). The authors used “descriptive” for expressing a condition of what was denoted by the modified policy, dual track of nationalism-multiculturalism, or nationalist-led multicultural policy. Equally, state multiculturalism practices, including the Taiwanese model of marriage immigration policymaking, were seen as “normative or normative pluralism” under cultural assimilation (Bauböck, 1994, pp. 21-25). Even if multicultural citizenship addresses the need to redefine the growing plurality of societies with a high degree of migration, the hybrid group of newly naturalised marital immigrants, after the completion of the orientation programme (as a new underprivileged group) in Taiwan, may require a higher degree of state intervention in order to secure real equality. In Taiwan, from the 1980s, one can, however, detect, through successive changes within

⁹ Dr Sun Yat-sen (12 November 1866 – 12 March 1925) was the founding father of the Republic of China and a renowned Han Chinese leader, who, under the umbrella of Confucianism, promoted the melding of democracy and nationalism in opposition to Manchus imperialism.
the relevant education, a context for the gradual reform of the core provisions that constitute the pathways for the attainment of citizenship.

The reasons to add multicultural feminism to the literature review include not only multicultural backgrounds of the students in the citizenship courses but also good research practice. Lee’s case study, influenced by American feminist theorist Susan Okin, showed that female marriage immigrants suffer severe gender discrimination in patriarchal-based ethnic minority communities (Lee, 2009, pp.14-15). That is, the term multicultural feminism could be defined as representing the marginalised voices and ideology of many kinds of minority women. Lee investigates how immigrant women’s civil and political rights are influenced by the themes of nation, class, ethnicity, and gender. Lee denotes that foreign spouses suffer dual oppression because of their gender and their ethnic minority status. Lee also proposes the reform of the education certificate system, especially for well-educated Mainland brides, in order to solve the issue of their native educational background. Finally, Lee discusses women’s empowerment advocates and NGO grassroots groups influential in the pro-indigenisation awakening (*ibid.*, pp.50-52). However, although Lee challenges the high satisfaction scores on the quality of the family lives of foreign spouses registered in the annual governmental report, she ignores the positive effects of closer-knit in-law relations and greater tolerance experienced by overseas Hakka immigrant women due to shared ethnicity with their husbands.

From the perspective of multicultural feminism, official Mandarin-based adjustment education, then, is an inefficient means to enhance female immigrant learners’ status in mainstream society, and it also transmitted an ideology and accommodation of the culture of silence (Hsia, 2010; Hsia, 2007). Indeed, multicultural feminists criticise the assigned maternal role of immigrant women learners which, they
argue, has led to gender inequality and only partial citizenship. Furthermore, spousal sponsorship makes their naturalisation more difficult. Being a pioneer of foreign spouses’ literacy education research, Hsia challenges the media regarding the reason why overseas Hakka spouses find their civic rights undermined. Hsia thus undertakes an action plan, with a praxis-oriented method, emphasising collective socio-political transformation through women’s empowerment (ibid.)\textsuperscript{10}. Hsia’s approach illustrates how the concepts of ‘theatre of the oppressed’ and ‘pedagogy of the oppressed’ (elaborated by Paulo Friere) break ‘the culture of silence’ and stimulated political awareness. The brides from Southeast Asia, including overseas Hakka brides, generally seek to make financial contributions to their original families and prefer local people to call them new immigrants rather than foreign brides, but they are also victims of domestic violence and prejudice (Hsia, 2010). Transnational marriages have been associated with the underprivileged lives, with a percentage of brides ending up in the sex industry as strip dancers or prostitutes. Other discussions point to their children’s lack of a proper family education in Mandarin in comparison to classmates whose mothers are native speakers (ibid.). Problems relating to female immigration encompass society generally and included issues of ethnicity, social problems, language problems, parenting, illegal workers, and abuse within the family. In sum, the call for civil and political rights\textsuperscript{11} and gender equality by the advocates of multicultural feminism cannot be ignored, especially for the stigmatised brides from periphery

\textsuperscript{10} Both Hsia and her supervised postgraduate student Wu address the contribution of older immigrant women during the initial period of NGO literacy education programmes (Wu, 2000). Wu finds the successful adjustment of immigrant women related to interaction with their mothers-in-law. Wu merely partially criticise the grooms’ financial and socio-economic conditions, which showed her sympathy towards the brides (Wu, 2000).

\textsuperscript{11} Civil and political rights are, namely, the first-generation human rights, succeeded by the second-generation human rights (i.e. social, economic, and cultural rights) associated with the third-generation human rights (i.e. group and collective rights). The thesis covers the three generations of human rights of the foreign spouse students.
countries. Multicultural feminists focus on gender inequality and marginalised migratory roles of immigrant women learners, while most of them are stereotyped as being impoverished and functionally illiterate or discriminated against as mere reproductive labourers in patriarchal communities. This certainly belies the idea of their effective assimilation into the community. Thus, their reproductive role, as an aspect of gender inequality, resulted in partial citizenship. With local language barriers inherited from their mothers, the children of these women have not experienced equal chances in learning Mandarin. It is crucial to understand the foreign spouse students’ adjustment and thereby help to ameliorate the multiple inequalities they suffered, especially in terms of their minority rights.

1.3 Research Questions

Key research questions focus on contributing factors to pathways to citizenship, associated with debates, e.g. the Guidelines Changes Protest\textsuperscript{12} and the Sunflower

\textsuperscript{12} The protest against the changes to the national education guidelines made by \textit{the Guidelines Changes Committee} of the KMT Ma Administration in 2015 was another wave of the bipolar battle between pro-Chinese historicity vs pro-Taiwanese subjectivity (Lin and Hsih, 2015). In addition to the interviews with some alumni who confirmed their socio-political participation in the protest, some students in the case study participated in the debates of the changes to the national education guidelines revealed by the follow-up interview with their programme head teacher (2016).
Student Movement\textsuperscript{13} over the nationalist KMT Ma’s framework:

1. What issues motivated their political socialisation from the revised scheme?

- What socio-political issues were voiced against the changes in Mandarin-based civic scheme (including relevant policies, curricular guidelines, and curriculum)?

2. What dynamics-related transnational identity was developed during the scheme change?

- How were group dynamics involved in the process of transnational identity formation under the scheme changes?

3. To what extent did the transition facilitate a grassroots form of multicultural citizenship?

- To what extent did the revised scheme frustrate their ability to secure their relevant rights and facilitate the political consequences of identities, e.g. whether the formal educational settings focused on an ethnocentric connection to Chinese historicity (Corcuff, 2011) rather than multiculturalism\textsuperscript{14}?  

\textsuperscript{13} The Sunflower Student Movement was a protest driven by a coalition of students and civic groups between 18 March and 10 April 2014. The activists who were worried of Chinese competition in the workplaces protested the pass of the \textit{Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement} in the legislation without clause-by-clause review, as well as ignorance of the demands, e.g. rejection of the Trade Pact, monitoring future agreements with China closely, and establishing civil conference to discuss constitutional amendment. The legislative battle revealed the deep-seated nature of the pro-Chinese historicity vs. pro-Taiwanese subjectivity rivalry (Taiwan March Editorials, 2015). Certain students in the case study participated in the protest against the China policy (called as westbound policy).

\textsuperscript{14} The Torch Plan for New Immigrants (which began in the end of the Ma administration I) adopted a specific municipal scheme initialled by ex-KMT Chairman Chu (National Immigration Agency, 2012), but paused during the Ma administration II. The additional nationwide Torch Plan was not successful,
The reason for the choice of parameters is to conduct linear research on the learners’ impacted political socialisation which focuses on the *cause* (specific issues of the scheme), the *process* (dynamics-related transnational identity formation against assimilation), and the *consequence* (multicultural citizenship alongside normative multiculturalism diverging from nationalist guidelines) in this praxis-oriented case study.

1.4 Background and Context of the Mandarin-based Civic Scheme for New Immigrants

1.4.1 Mandarin-based Civic Scheme Changes in the Ma Administrations Era

(from 20th May 2008 to 19th May 2016)

According to Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of *the Standards for Identification of Basic Language Abilities and Common Sense of National Rights and Duties of Naturalised ROC Citizens*, a ‘72-hour course’ is required for foreign national or stateless naturalisation applicants in accordance with Subparagraph 1 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of *the Nationality Act* (Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China, 2014a). Thus, the 72-hour Mandarin-based citizenship education courses/programmes (or namely adjustment education courses/programmes) were created by the Mandarin-based civic scheme, including guidelines and curricula for these government-funded

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and Southeast Asian immigrant groups lobbied for more multicultural promotion (The TASAT Editorial, 2016).
citizenship courses and relevant regulations/policies.

The transition from the DPP to the KMT in 2008 marked the beginnings of another key period for immigrant education programmes as the Ma administration shifted focus and issued regulatory changes. After KMT President Ma won the presidency in 2008, his first-term administration was devoted to accelerating the development of cross-strait relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China. During this period, there emerged a public battle over the extent to which Taiwan should move closer to China, which had knock-on effects on related policymaking. Nevertheless, the promotion of ROC Chinese nationalism by the KMT was clearly evidenced in its retention of the use of traditional Mandarin characters (including in the curriculum for new immigrant students in the courses), rather than simplified characters in national education.

Given this indication of where policy was headed, could national identity-driven education provide an alternative to an education grounded in nationalism? The answer can be confirmed in the affirmative, since the official guidelines were overshadowed by the emphasis on ROC Chinese nationalism. Its rhetorical position overwhelmingly supported Chinese domination over other ethnic immigrant groups alongside a nominal supplementary policy draft. Conversely, the previous DPP government strongly supported Southeast Asian immigrant women, a position which differed from the first term of KMT Ma administration.

From the inception of Ma’s second term in 2012, there was growing evidence that the China-oriented policy would continue to affect educational policies for marital immigrants. This tendency was also shown in the nominal supplementary Torch Plan
for New Immigrants unveiled on 12th June 2012. From then on, along with less predominant appearances of occasional Torch Plan cultural lectures as well as fewer Torch Plan native language courses and multicultural food fêtes supplied by the civic scheme fund (The 2012 Annual Report of National Immigration Agency, 2013b), a nationalist slant in the official supervision started to become evident. This partial or limited multiculturalism of the so-called Torch Plan operated until 2014.

In the meantime, supporters of a Taiwanese orientated policy (including foreign spouse students in their extracurricular socio-political participation) protested against the changes in guidelines made by the Ma Administration. The extracurricular controversy, by raising the question regarding the extent to which the island should economically integrate with the mainland, could be viewed as the greatest threat to stability of the KMT governance since the 28th February Incident in 1947. Nevertheless, the question of the nature of citizenship was being debated not only across ethnic boundaries but also within the KMT itself, as factions differed concerning the extent to which the island should economically integrate with the mainland. In addition, the ruling party was unsuccessful in public information campaigns to contest intolerant or hostile attitudes towards new immigrants. Foreign spouse students thus claimed their civil right reforms and diversity in the society.

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15 This scheme adopted the previous policy design of the Taipei County (later New Taipei City) Torch Plan for New Immigrants (The 2012 Annual Report of National Immigration Agency, 2013b).
16 The bitter memory of ‘The 28th February Incident’ during thirty-eight years of authoritarian policing, especially a strict Mandarin education and banning of any dialects in school, was about the suppression carried out by the Kuomintang (KMT) government which killed numerous Taiwanese inhabitants on 28 February 1947. During this period of terror, more than 30,000 Taiwanese inhabitants vanished, died, or were imprisoned. For decades, this has been a source of ongoing tension between a pro-Chinese historicity and a pro-Taiwanese subjectivity. The government created a national Memorial Day for the Incident but the wounds from this key and tragic historical episode still run deep throughout contemporary Taiwanese society (Fieischauer, 2012).
Furthermore, the divide concerning regulatory shortcomings illustrates the way in which marital immigration education funding distribution was politically motivated, and the extent to which the KMT Ma administration was incapable of a critical self-examination of the problematic distribution of funds within its civic scheme. According to Article 5 of *The Measure of Foreign Spouses’ Care and Counselling Fund Management and Operation*[^17], the educational fund was supposed to work fairly as the fund counselling committee meetings were expected to be transparent. However, an anonymous immigration officer (who had participated in the Project Torch Funds Administration under the Foreign Spouses’ Care and Counselling Fund Management and Operation) confirmed that the process of marital immigration regulation policymaking was the result of secret negotiations, as well as the defects of *Regulation Regarding to Funds of Foreign Spouses’ Care and Counselling* and relevant policy implementation[^18]. Concerning the problematic funding distribution, Torch Plan (or

[^17]: This civic scheme fund should have a counselling committee comprised of thirty-three committee members for a two-year term. One member is the chair and is also the Minister of the Interior. The Deputy Minister of the Interior is also the deputy chair. The other committee members are assigned by a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Assignees include: one representative for each of the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Health Welfare, the Directorate-general of Budget, Accounting, and Statistics, the Mainland Affairs Council, the National Immigration Agency; three municipal representatives, a county governmental representative, ten specialists and scholars; and, finally, eleven NGO representatives. The triple review of the funding management and implementation includes the committee members of the related career, governmental, and academic representation (see *The Measure of Foreign Spouses’ Care and Counselling Fund Management and Operation* in the Appendices).

[^18]: This staff member, δg3 (pseudonym) who worked in the National Immigration Agency (NIA) and was especially assigned to the Project Torch Funds Administration under the Foreign Spouses’ Care and Counselling Fund Management and Operation said, ‘the NGO and academic representatives were chosen by the Minister of the Interior, and we never know the secret agreements on the meetings. In addition, the linkage of different governmental departments was wasting the funding and administrative resources criticised by public opinions. After the NIA chief’s leave, the migratory counselling tasks should be transformed, too. Compared with foreign countries, the NIA had done too much for marital migratory care and counselling. Abundant governmental schemes ought to be
Project Torch), for instance, is actually one item of the special funding of the Ministry of the Interior.

Indeed, the dual track policies during the Ma Administrations were seen as the distinctive shift (e.g. adding Southeast Asian languages teaching and learning) from the preceding administration alongside some baseline policy continuity, e.g. basic Mandarin requirement for naturalisation. Overall, during the period of the Ma Administrations, however, there were never specific guidelines for marital immigration education in policymaking.

1.4.2 Migration of Spouses of Foreign and Chinese Ethnicity

The previous section addressed and argued for the salience of issues of over-scaled nationalist politics from the state archives, delving into the context of how the state coped with immigration. This following section introduces the historical background of the programme participants (as spousal migration of foreign or Chinese ethnicity mainly from Vietnam and Indonesia) who attended the courses for the purpose of naturalisation.

In particular, the background justifies the focus on ethnic Chinese spouses amongst foreign spouses who were mainly from Southeast Asia (as they played a key role in the process of adjustment education courses development) alongside the choices

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eliminated. The tasks should switch to focus on national security, e.g. sham marriages, human trafficking, prostitution, and those [illegal immigrants] who lacked ID cards’ (Author’s Interview with an NIA administrator who spoke in Mandarin at 2 pm, 26 June 2014 at a Meeting Room in the NIA).
of cases in central Taipei denoted in the 1.4.4 section (either the most developed programme or prevalent ones in the wealthy areas as the representatives). What’s more, a Mandarin-South Asian language bilingual connection, as emphasised in the ethnic Chinese migrant subgroup stressed in my case study, is explored in this section for a later, further in-depth analysis.

Since the era of the authoritarian KMT government (1949-1987), ethno-cultural tensions have persisted in Taiwan. In terms of Taiwanese history, the era of the so-called ‘dark island’ was demarcated by the two talismanic dates, 1949 and 1987. In the beginning of this era, the opportunity arose for the language of the newly mobilised group to replace the language of the formally dominant group as the official language of a state (Waldon, 1985, p.419). Mandarin, brought by the KMT government from the mainland, became and remained (even after the era of authoritarianism passed) the official language of the island, rather than Hō-ló-uē, Hakka and aboriginal languages prevalent in Taiwan before the rule of the KMT began in 1949. But after the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, certain multicultural policies were instituted by the successive KMT Lee Administration, the DPP Chen Administration and the KMT Ma Administration. Each administration’s policy of immigration education was filtered through longstanding underlying ethnic tensions. In two decades, the domestic political context has been modified by the self-awareness movements of the Hakka and the Aborigines, as well as the development of Hakka Affairs Council and Council of

19 The mother-tongue of Benshengren, namely Hō-ló-uē (河洛話), which was originally from the inhabited area of the lower reaches of the surrounding Yellow River and is currently a main dialect in Taiwan.

20 Article Ten in the ROC Constitution Amendment in 1997 claimed to support multiculturalism.

21 President Chen, Shui-bian announced that the ROC was a multi-ethnic and multicultural state; in addition to multiculturalism, it was fundamental national policy to support and advance multi-ethnic equality (Presidential Palace, 11th November 2001).
Indigenous Peoples. Meanwhile, Mainland and foreign spouses have become a new and hybrid group\textsuperscript{22} within the island’s population of 23,115,835 (The Ministry of the Interior, 2012)\textsuperscript{23}.

Taiwan has experienced transnational marriage flows in the following waves: first, transnational links with overseas Hakka (of ethnic Chinese) immigrant women (predominantly from Indonesia) from the late 1970s; then, cross-strait marriages in the aftermath of termination of the 38-year Martial Law, instituted by the KMT President Chiang Ching-kuo on 19th May 1987; and finally, immigrant women from Southeast Asia (mainly Southeast Asian and ethnic Chinese migrants from Vietnam and Indonesia) seeking transnational marriages through matchmakers since the 1990s (Schucher, 2008, p.11). To some extent the arrival of overseas spouses during the past decades has been the result of the transformation of the economic and social structures of Taiwan (Maher, 2004, p.4) deeply rooted in transnational capitalism (Chun, 2002, pp.102-122). Thus, Taiwan is comparable to neighbouring countries that have also become receiving countries of international marital immigrant flows, especially from Southeast Asia. This last flow of immigrant spouses developed particularly to assist underprivileged Taiwanese men with their marriage difficulties through brokered marriages with brides from Southeast Asia, mainly from Vietnam and Indonesia (including ethnic Chinese ones). To sum up, cross-strait and overseas forms of spousal migration and citizenship have contributed to a new multi-ethnic presence in the population (see Figure 1).

\textsuperscript{22} In the \textit{National Security Report of 2006}, marital immigrants/migrants were bundled together as a hybrid ethno-cultural group in Taiwan (Cheng, 2008).
\textsuperscript{23} According to the statistics of the \textit{Ministry of the Interior}, as of July 2012, the population of Taiwan was 23,268,372 (Kinmen and Matsu Islands are excluded).
In particular, the significant waves of marital migration of ethnic Chinese spouses included the overseas Hakka spouses from Indonesia in the late 1970s, Mainland spouses of cross-strait marriages after the lifting of Martial Law in 1987, and overseas Chinese spouses (including overseas Hakka and Chinese minorities) mainly from Southeast Asia since the 1990s. In addition, the choice of their transnational marriages could be grounded in cultural attractions of these spouses of Chinese ethnicity, rather than merely financial concerns. Besides, according to the annual report of the Ministry of the Interior (2012), most foreign spouses are women, making Taiwan

24 In 2013, the population of Taiwan was 23,361,147 of which 483,587, or 2%, were classified as ‘New Immigrants’ through cross-strait and transnational marriages. Of these new immigrants those spouses termed ‘Mainland Spouses’ (Mainland, Hong Kong and Macau) numbered 326,574, and from elsewhere termed ‘Foreign Spouses’ were 157,013. In detail, the breakdown of ‘New Immigrants’ though marriage was, firstly, Mainland spouses: Mainland: 64.62%, Hong Kong and Macau: 2.70%; and secondly, foreign spouses: Vietnam: 18.61%, Indonesia: 5.90%, Thailand: 1.79%, The Philippines: 1.57%, Cambodia: 0.92%, Japan: 0.80%, South Korea: 0.24%, and Others: 2.85% (the Ministry of the Interior, 2013).
an example of feminised immigration (see Table 1). Thus, the interactions of female immigrant spouses within distinct minority communities (such as the Hakka) serves as an interesting subset to the general theme as marital immigrants’ in-law family varies between four distinct Taiwanese ethno-cultural groups (Waishengren25, Benshengren26, Hakka27, and aborigines28).

Table 1: The Population of Foreign Spouses in Taiwan by Their Origin Nationalities and Genders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Male Spouses</th>
<th>Female Spouses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>86,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>27,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>2,575</td>
<td>5,760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>6,858</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 The Waishengren include the KMT administrators, the ROC army and certain middle echelons from the mainland, who escaped China during and after the Civil War. The Waishengren refer to persons who were external to Taiwan but included all provinces in the mainland. Over several decades, the Waishengren accounted for 12 to 15% of the population in Taiwan (Wang, 2007b, p. 892).
26 The Benshengren form 65% of Taiwan’s population today, whose ancestors emigrated from Province of Fujian in the seventeenth century onwards. After being ruled by the Japanese between 1895 and 1945, the Benshengren began to develop a distinct identity with their own language, which differed from that of Chinese nationals (ibid.).
27 Ethnic Hakka migrated during the Qing Dynasty from northern China to Province of Canton, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia. The Hakka make up 15 to 18% of Taiwan today, making it the second largest ethnic group, possessing a distinctive Hakka language (ibid.).
28 The aborigines, approximately 2 to 3% of the current population of Taiwan, are of Austronesians descent (ibid.). The 14 aboriginal groups, constituting the racial minorities, have sought their minority’s rights in the context of the much larger non-aboriginal groups of Waishengren, Benshengren, and Hakka.
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1,725</td>
<td>2,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>7,465</td>
<td>5,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13,304</td>
<td>139,009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Official Statistics Database in the Ministry of the Interior (June 2012)

1.4.3 The Curricular Guidelines and Implementation during the Ma Administrations

This section addresses the curricular guidelines and the provisions of lessons by the Ma Administrations, as well as variations in their implementation despite the restriction of teaching materials in the formal courses.

1.4.3.1 The Provisions of the Lessons and Curricular Guidelines

According to Paragraph 3 of Article 3 of both the 2009 and 2014 Standards for Identification of Basic Language Abilities and Common Sense of National Rights and Duties of Naturalised ROC Citizens during the Ma administrations, the qualifying programmes offered in accordance with Subparagraph 2 of Paragraph 1 include those operated directly by government agencies, as well as the formal government-funded courses in public schools, or government-supported courses in organisations (Laws and
Regulations Database of the Republic of China, 2014a). With respect to proof of attending an educational programme offered by government agencies, the 2009 and 2014 Standards noted a requirement of ‘72-hour course’ for foreign national or stateless naturalisation applicants in accordance with Subparagraph 1 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of Nationality Act, or divorced foreign spouses who exercise custody rights of their minor children, on the list of Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the 2009 and 2014 Standards.  

Unlike the specific guidelines for marital immigration education under the DPP Chen Administration, the KMT Ma Administration initially ignored the need for direction in citizenship programmes. Due to this lack of specific educational guidelines for marital immigration education, the qualifying schools adopted the curricular guidelines for national primary/secondary education instead, and mainly used the textbooks of national primary/secondary education. But in November 2013, the Ma administration sent the official letter of changes to the curricular guidelines to nationwide primary and secondary schools by post, and asked social science teachers to instruct students that the capital is Nanjing according to the ROC Constitution (Blogger, 2013). Since then, supporters of a Taiwanese orientated policy (including

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29 Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Standards for Identification of Basic Language Abilities and Common Sense of National Rights and Duties of Naturalised ROC Citizens in 2009 and 2014: With respect to proof of participation in an educational programme offered by government agencies as specified in Subparagraph 2 above, the regulations are as follows: 1. For applications made in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Act: proof of at least 200 hours of class time is required. 2. For applications made in accordance with Subparagraph 1 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of this Act, or by persons who, subsequent to divorce from an ROC national, have exercising responsibility of the right and obligation for the minor children: proof of at least 72 hours of class time is required. 3. For applications made in accordance with Subparagraph 2 to Subparagraph 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4, or Article 5 of this Act: proof of at least 100 hours of class time is required. 4. For applications made in accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article 3, Paragraph 1 of Article 4, or Article 5 of this Act by persons aged 65 years or over: proof of at least 72 hours of class time is required (Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China, 2014a).
foreign spouse students in their extracurricular socio-political participation) not only protested against the political ideology of nationalist Chinese historicity\(^\text{30}\) in the curricular guidelines, but also doubted the expertise of the committee members (Wang, 2015), when new legislation replaced the abolished Secondary School Educational Law. In addition, some subject committees were accused of having been revised and audited by the same person, while other committee members were accused of selling their own textbooks to schools (Cho, 2015). Later, despite the rejection of the changes to the guidelines by the Courts, the Minister of Education announced his decision to implement the policy, which caused on-going protests against the KMT administration and the KMT-led changes in the guidelines. The public also became convinced that the cross-strait trade policy of KMT Ma Administration was strongly associated with these secret changes in the guidelines. These educational rights activists under the banner ‘you Chinese-mentality (思華), we Taiwanese-mentality (思台)’ thus accused the Ma administration of dismissal of Taiwanese subjectivity (The Editorials, 2015; Lee, 2015; Lin, 2015). In particular, the most frequent question on the governmental website was ‘why has the KMT government deleted significant events in Taiwanese history, e.g. the 28\(^{\text{th}}\) February Incident and the Period of White Terror (the Period of Censorship) from high school citizenship education?’ (Wu, 2015a). Since the guidelines were also followed in the secondary school-level education programmes for new immigrant students, the question cut across cleavages created by a complex series of struggles over the political socialisation of new immigrants.

In detail, the changes to the guidelines in Mandarin education included a reduction

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\(^{30}\) The KMT-style ROC nationalism (Corcuff, 2011) could be traced back through its thirty-eight year-long authoritarian control of government (1949-1987) that began after the mass migration from the Mainland to Taiwan triggered by its loss in the Civil War (1946-1949) (Chiu, Fell and Lin (eds.), 2014, p. xii). The subjectivity of Taiwan, on the other hand, was rooted in the suffering experiences of whom were dominated by a militarised government in the late 1940s.
of Taiwan-related topics, including the deletion of topics on island culture, gender equality, multiculturalism, human rights, and the rule of law (Chu, 2015). But the changes to the guidelines supported the incorporation of ‘Fundamental Chinese Culture’ as required lessons within Mandarin education in Taiwan (ibid.). The new guidelines largely increased the proportion of ancient Han literature covered in Mandarin curriculum (ibid.), corresponding to the overarching aim of the KMT’s China policy under President Ma to roll back the de-Sinicisation elements of ex-President Chen’s Taiwanisation programme, through an emphasis of Taiwan’s Chinese cultural heritage and situating Taiwan within the agenda of the greater Chinese nation (Sullivan and Smyth, 2015, p.1). The committee members even removed any references to the KMT’s history of censorship (the so-called White Terror) from citizenship education because the committee members with KMT-backgrounds thought students ought not to know this history (The Liberty Times Net Editorial Board, 2015e).

The Ma administration also exerted control by promoting Chinese historicity and nationalism in the changes to the guidelines. In history education, several salient sections were changed to favour a pro-KMT version of Taiwanese history, which are listed as follows: 1. Sections arguing that ‘ROC founder Dr Sun Yat-sen sought Taiwan’s support’ and ‘Taiwan’s participation in revolutions for establishing the ROC’ were added; 2. ‘The great voyage era’ was changed to be ‘Han Chinese’s arrival in Taiwan and the great voyage era’, while ‘multicultural development’ was revised to be ‘Chinese culture and multicultural development’; 3. The Fourth of May Movement and the New Cultural Movement during historical KMT governance in Mainland China were added; 4. ‘The Dutch and Spanish governing in Taiwan’ were revised to be ‘the Dutch and Spanish access to Taiwan (which were not officially recognised by the Chinese monarch)’; 5. ‘The Qing Dynasty’s Taiwan policy’ was linked with mainland dominance as ‘the Qing monarch’s Taiwan policy’, while ‘Zheng’s governing’ was
changed to be ‘Zheng’s governing under the Ming monarch (of the mainland)’ and ‘Taking over Taiwan’ was rephrased to be ‘regaining possession in Taiwan (of mainland Chinese)’; 6. ‘Early sinicised Taiwanese aborigines’ were altered to be ‘native Taiwanese in general’ regardless of any multicultural distinctions; 7. ‘The period of Japanese governing’ was changed to ‘the period of Japanese colonial governing against the anti-Japanese movements’; 8. ‘The women who were Japanese army’s sexual slaves during the Second World War’ was changed to a stronger description of ‘the women who “were forced to” be the Japanese army’s sexual slaves’; 9. Deleting any positive references to Japanese history in Taiwan, e.g. deleting the remarkable Japanese Incident – タイオワン事件 (Lin and Hsih, 2015, p. A3).

The changes above reflected an intensive Chinese consciousness in the effort to merge Taiwanese history into Mainland Chinese history, an anti-Japanese focus emerging from the shadows of WW2, and the deliberate ignoring of significant Taiwanese aboriginal history or other aspects of multiculturalism (Lai, 2014). During the Ma administration, the guidelines change committee members promoted a more critical characterisation of Japanese occupation and supported pan-Chinese attitudes against the DPP’s island identity (Schubert and Braig, 2012) in order to declare the Chinese view of history in accordance with the ROC Constitution (Wu and Lin, 2015). In other words, for educational policy decision-makers, the so-called changes to the guidelines, with a focus on curriculum adjustment, were based on foundational concepts in the ROC Constitution (Blogger, 2013).

1.4.3.2 Variation of the Teaching Materials and Formal Courses
The student interviewees in this case study mentioned that the formal citizenship programmes only take three years to complete to the primary education level and another three years to complete to the secondary education level, rather than the twelve-year national education for pupils. Despite this difference, however, the students on the formal citizenship programme studied the same curriculum and textbooks as their mixed-race pupil children used in schools. In addition, the Ma administration assigned formal citizenship courses a prominent role in foreign spouse students’ development of citizenship competency. Though the curriculum could vary somewhat, the joint civic and official language programmes (including the subjects of basic language abilities and an introduction to national rights and duties) generally aimed at enabling students from diverse cultural backgrounds to engage in dialogues with locals and methods in order to assist in their self-empowerment as citizens.

Variation of the teaching materials for the formal citizenship courses followed this order. In contrast to the language courses in NGOs (e.g. YWCA) or languages institutes, the government-funded citizenship programmes in the municipal evening schools or occasional governmental Mandarin and civic education workshops held in the city/county hall or the districts administration building adopted official education curriculum and textbooks. The former – evening courses – were operated by the local primary/secondary schools, like the programmes examined in this case study. The latter were held by the districts’ administration offices occasionally on weekends.

The teaching materials in this case study included national primary/secondary education curriculum and textbooks, including the subjects of Mandarin (the language)

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31 In particular, the secondary education course interviewees included the citizenship programme students and graduates of primary education level who were worried about the KMT-led changes in secondary education guidelines but continued secondary education under the civic scheme.
and social sciences (i.e. history, geography, and citizenship education), as well as the specific curriculum and textbooks designed for the citizenship courses. In particular, the formal evening courses held in municipal schools tended to use the curriculum/textbooks of national primary/secondary education, rather than the adjustment education curriculum/textbooks edited by the Bureau of Education of Taipei City Government.

Generally speaking, most teachers used national education textbooks for the lectures in the formal citizenship courses. Apart from the previous contextual introduction of secondary-education level curriculum, the formal primary-education level focused on the advantage of the formal Mandarin curriculum in regard to Zhuyin (Bopomofo Phonetic Symbols) and Chinese characters stroke-order practice. However, the Chinese patriarchal viewpoints were promoted, e.g. macho men and submissive women (Hu & Yang, 2013b, pp. 24-27, 34-41, 78-83, 103-109), as well as male family members’ dominance (Wang (ed.), 2014a, p.82), and Han Chinese customs (ibid., pp.87-88). Apparently, the social sciences focused on historical movements against Japanese colonial rule (Wang (ed.), 2014b, pp. 16-33) and stressed the patriotic nature in primary-school level Mandarin (Chen & Su, 2013 (eds.), p. 45) while President Ma’s leadership promoted a pan Chinese nationalism by raising territorial issues against Japan. Lastly, by selecting archival photos displaying the historical ban on dialects for use in textbooks, the set curriculum seemed to be sending not-so-subtle warning signals to students who might speak languages and dialects other than Mandarin in school settings. The message in some of the images used in primary-school level courses translates: ‘I love to speak Mandarin. I ought not to speak my dialect.’ It is not hard to see how the images would deepen conflicts between those who speak dialects and other languages and those who speak Mandarin (Wang (ed.), 2014b, p.90) (see Figure 2).
The KMT-led Ma Administration promoted a supplementary curriculum co-edited by the City Governments, *The Foundation of Foreign Spouses’ Adult Education* at formal citizenship courses for marital immigrants in greater Taipei, which was moderately adopted by the courses examined in this case study. In the teacher's handbook, the curricular guidelines implied a connection with Chinese historicity. Also, the information supplied was not only about giving up one’s original nationality for obtaining a Taiwanese ID card, but also about the willing acceptance of Chinese tradition and heritage (The Joint Educational Committee of Ministry of Education, New Taipei City and Taipei City, 2013, p.42). In contrast, the curriculum co-edited by the

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32 The curriculum includes the Book I (the introduction of a traditional family structure) with Phonetic Symbols and 139 vocabularies respectively, the Book II (the certificate, health and social relations) which continues with 236 vocabularies for learning, and the Book III (social customs, governmental institutes and adult learning) with 323 vocabularies ensues, followed by *Literacy Education Vocabulary Guidelines of the Ministry of Education*. 
outspoken TASAT, Lai-Qu Huayu (I)(II)(III) for Immigrants\textsuperscript{33}, which promoted multiculturalism through online stories and news e-learning, was neglected. The exclusion of this curriculum seemed to point to a form of official censorship.

1.4.4 Demography of the Teaching Faculty and Student Cohorts of the Case Study

The NGOs initially developed self-help literacy education courses from the late 1980s to 1999. The formal citizenship courses were later established for marital immigrants in 1999, corresponding to the increasing variety of voices involved in multicultural issues. During the Ma administrations (from 20 May 2008 to 19 May 2016), socio-political tensions arose, which stimulated students’ extracurricular

\textsuperscript{33} The courses nearly abandoned this overlooked curriculum and textbooks. The Grade One was designed for students who had learned Mandarin over 40 hours, including: the lesson of travelling in Taiwan contained the introduction to the major four ethno-cultural groups in Taiwan and their languages; the lesson of the gift giving taught that giving a clock is forbidden. In addition, there was a case study of bullied mixed-race pupils on campus (Chong & Meinung Office, the TASAT (eds.), 2004, pp. 86-87). The Grade Two was designed for students who had learned Mandarin over 80 hours. The introductory section was discussed with major dialects (ibid., pp. 126-127) and a migrant film. The section on Taiwanese customs included a Taiwanese tale of marriage e-learning through songs, e-news, essays, and storylines – in which rats were looking for their son-in-law and a touching Buddhist story – Maudgalyayana. The Grade Three was designed for students who had learned Mandarin over 120 hours, with a focus on the history of Taiwan, including the 28\textsuperscript{th} February Incident, the Civil War between the CPC and KMT 1946- 1949, the authoritarian period in Taiwan (1949-1987), the Formosa incident in 1979, the governments of the KMT and the DPP (ibid., pp. 35-36), and a discussion of Taiwan’s economic crisis where was argued that downturn was caused by competition from the stronger Mainland market of the PRC (ibid., p.42).
participation in protests over the issues arising from greater integration with the economy of Mainland China. A key issue was thus raised in the context of the KMT’s nation-building project, namely the integration of Mainland spouses who are ethnically and linguistically similar to, but politically different from, the mainstream of the Taiwanese population. Furthermore, the retention of dual identities by new immigrants was becoming more commonplace in Taiwan. The adjustment education under the Ma administration, then, can be viewed as a key battleground in domestic politics, complicated by complex policies over issues of both cross-strait and overseas forms of spousal citizenship.

In fact, there were only three complete municipal government-funded Mandarin-based adjustment education programmes for marital immigrants left in the capital city centre. That is, the capital city centre courses had been chosen due to its flexibility in course level options (i.e. basic, intermediate, and high intermediate) amongst the 72-hour Mandarin-based citizenship courses, as certain students have learned Mandarin in their hometown before migration. Also, the cases chosen as representative in this case study were either the most developed programmes, or the most prevalent ones in the wealthy areas of Taipei. In sum, the chosen programmes were amongst the very few that could maintain the minimum required number of foreign spouse students for the government-funded civic scheme. As a result, the courses in the educational institutes were merged into a mixed class – where marital immigrant students became the focus of this case study – with few local senior female citizens, one young male Southeast Asian engineering professional, or one single young male American born Chinese banking professional, respectively. In total, there were seventy-two interviewees in

34 After the interview at 2-5pm, 18th April 2011 in the Ministry of the Interior in regard to the detailed information of formal citizenship courses for new immigrants, I begun to focus on the notable Mandarin-based citizenship courses. In addition, both educational bureau staffs (the interviews were
this case study, including twenty-two staff members and fifty students who received the language and basic civic knowledge certificate from the courses c.2008-16, which is the total amount of foreign spouse students there during the Ma administrations. Moreover, in the classrooms observed in 2014, only one Mainland spouse (rather than my studied foreign spouse) who was born and bred in a rural minority family attended both the primary school programme and governmental workshop c.2013-15 (i.e. the citizenship evening courses in the α school, and the governmental workshops for adjustment education).

Next, I address the teaching environments of the three schools (α, β, and γ), their location (central Taipei), the composition of staff (paid and voluntary), the relevant curricular information (the staff adopted the given national education curriculum, and their curricular designs ought to be reviewed by the programme coordinator and superintended by the local and central governments), timetables, attendance (in-law family members’ attitudes on migrant women’s attendance), and classroom setting.

There were in total nine teaching faculty in the formal citizenship courses explored in this case study. The teaching materials were supervised by the educational authority during the Ma administrations, which means the teachers had to follow the given curricular guidelines and adopt the national education textbooks on the adjustment education lectures. In addition, the teaching staff could decide what to teach, but still had to refer to the curricular guidelines for further internal programme assessment, which could be seen in these details in the section of background information of the interviewees, e.g. the Taiwanese aboriginal teacher followed the given curriculum but

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held at 3-4 pm and 4-5 pm, respectively, on 27th March 2014) and administrative staffs in the government-funded courses (the interviews were held at 10-11 am and 4-5 pm on 28th March 2014) revealed the same information.

35 The names of the educational institutes (and the interviewees) are anonymous to ensure privacy.
added her own curricular design of Taiwanese songs and names (as her supplementary teaching materials) in order to meet the standard of programme assessment. Besides, student cohorts in three schools (including a joint programme of two schools) can be described as two types, either filled with nearly foreign spouse students or mainly foreign spouse students mixed with a few local seniors (except one overseas Chinese working professional).

Firstly, α school and β school are joint programmes. Formal citizenship (or so-called adjustment education) courses in α school had two full-time teaching faculty members, including one female (a Benshengren who was born in 1979 with a master’s degree from National Taipei University of Education and had taught in the basic citizenship course for eight years) and one male (a Waishengren who was born in 1960 with a bachelor’s degree from National Taiwan Normal University and had taught in the high intermediate adjustment education course for almost thirteen years). Next, β school had another three experienced full-time teaching faculty members in the formal adjustment education courses (i.e. the subjects of Mandarin and social sciences), including one female staff member (a Taiwanese aboriginal born in 1958, who earned a bachelor’s degree at National Taipei University of Education and had taught in the intermediate adjustment education course for more than ten years, especially witnessed the tensions between the female foreign spouse students and their in-law family members who accompanied them to school for keeping an eye on them) and two male staff members (a Benshengren, who was born in 1965, earned bachelor’s degree at National Taiwan University and master’s degree at University of Missouri and had taught in the high intermediate adjustment education course for nearly seven years; and a Taiwanese Hakka born in 1959, who earned a bachelor’s degree at National Taipei University of Education and had taught in the basic and intermediate adjustment education courses for fifteen years).
In addition, the joint programme (α school and β school) merged marital immigrants into a mixed class with few local senior female citizens (who were not foreign spouses and did not participate in the case study). One single young male American-born Chinese banking professional occasionally attended one Taiwanese aboriginal teacher’s courses, is the exception. As he was not a marital immigrant, he did not participate in the case study. In the class of 2009 graduation from the 72-hour certificate course, there were four foreign spouse students in the intermediate/high intermediate mixed level cohort (an overseas Chinese woman from Vietnam; an Indonesian woman; a Laotian woman; an Indonesian woman). In the class of 2010 graduation, there were four foreign spouse students from two levels of basic and high intermediate (an overseas Hakka woman from Vietnam; an overseas Hakka woman from Indonesia; a Thai woman; a Malaysian woman from Singapore). In the class of 2011, there were four foreign spouse students from two levels of basic and high intermediate (an Indonesian woman; a Filipino woman; a Thai woman; a Burmese woman). In the class of 2012, there were four foreign spouse students from two levels of basic and high intermediate (two Vietnamese women and two Indonesian women). In the class of 2013, there were four foreign spouse students from two levels of intermediate and high intermediate (a Vietnamese primary-school-graduate homemaker who was born in 1984 and attended the adjustment course for her secondary education; a female mixed-race of overseas Chinese minority and Thai from Thailand; two Cambodian women who were friends and joined the course together). In the class of 2014, there were five foreign spouse students from three levels of basic, intermediate, and high intermediate (an overseas Hakka woman from Indonesia; an Indonesian primary-school-graduate community cleaner who was born in 1986; an overseas Chinese woman from Indonesia who was a KMT member; an Indonesian-Chinese-mixed-race and elementary-school-graduate who was from Indonesia; a chef with Indonesian lower-secondary-school certificate who was born in Indonesia in 1970). In
the class of 2015, there were four foreign spouse students from each of the three levels (a primary-school-graduate homemaker who was born in Vietnam in 1979; an Indonesian primary-school-graduate waitress who was born in Indonesia in 1986; an overseas Hakka woman from Indonesia; a Thai woman; a Vietnamese woman). In the class of 2016, there were four foreign spouse students from the three levels (an Indonesian woman; a Vietnamese woman; an overseas Chinese spouse from Indonesia; a mixed-race of Indonesian and overseas Chinese from Indonesia).

Furthermore, there were four part-time, voluntary teaching faculty members in γ school, which were one female (a Taiwanese Hakka who was born in 1975 with a bachelor’s degree from Taipei Municipal University of Education and had taught in this formal adjustment education course since 2013, as an associate teacher) and three males (a Benshengren who was born in 1977 with a master’s degree at National Taipei University of Education and had taught in the formal adjustment education related courses for a decade; a Benshengren who was born in 1959 with a bachelor’s degree at National Chung-Hsing University and had taught in the related course for six years; and finally, a Benshengren military-school-graduate sergeant who was born in 1968 and had taught in the related course for eight years). In addition to the teaching faculty in γ school, there was a male Bengshenren head teacher (born 1977) in the full-time position leading/teaching the courses more than a decade.

The weekday-evening adjustment education courses were held on campus of γ school with nearly all foreign spouse students along with one foreign working professional. In the 2008-2009 cohort, there were three female foreign spouse students (a Vietnamese from Vietnam as a part-time student; an overseas Chinese from Vietnam as a part-time student who had her husband’s encouragement to attend the adjustment education programme; a part-time Indonesian student). In the 2009-2010 cohort, a
Vietnamese attended the adjustment education programme for avoiding conflicts with her husband and in-law family members, along with an American classmate from the United States. Both were new foreign spouse students, while the rest of their classmates were continuing students. In the 2010-2011 cohort, an Argentine college-graduate Spanish tutor born in 1968 was a new part-time foreign spouse student in this adjustment education course c.2011-14 alongside continuing students in the class. In the 2011-2012 cohort, they were all continuing students without new students. In the 2012-2013 cohort, there were three foreign spouse students, including a Vietnamese marital immigrant woman, a Vietnamese-secondary-school-graduate homemaker in Taiwan who was born in Vietnam in 1985 and occasionally studied in this adjustment education course c.2013-16, and the Argentine continuing student. In the biggest class of 2013-2014, the secondary-school level programme included three male foreign spouse students as the supportive sampling of the case study (a Russian college-graduate carpenter who was born in 1977 and had studied in this adjustment education course for three months; an Iraqi college-graduate engineer who was born in 1972 and had studied in this adjustment education course for just one month; and the Argentine continuing student). Also, it included one female overseas Chinese spouse student from Southeast Asia (a Vietnamese-secondary-school-graduate homemaker who was born in Vietnam in 1984 and a part-time student in this adjustment education course c.2014-15) and two marital immigrant women students of Southeast Asian nations (Phuong, a Vietnamese-secondary-school-graduate tofu shop worker who was born in Vietnam in 1985 and studied in this adjustment education course c.2014-15; and a Vietnamese continuing student). In the 2013-2014 cohort, there was one young male Southeast Asian engineering professional student who was not a foreign spouse and did not participate in this case study. In the 2014-2015 cohorts, there were a new female Vietnamese marital immigrant student alongside three continuing students from the same country in this secondary-school level programme. In the 2015-2016 cohorts, two
new and one continuing Vietnamese marital immigrant women and a Thai marital immigrant woman (whose husband disagreed with her studies in adjustment education) completed this course.

Finally, not only did teachers supervise their students’ political socialisation process and observed their interactions with in-law family members, including their spouses (for taking them home after school), but students also shared their experiences (in school, at home, or in the local community) in order to make sense of their adjustment. Therefore, the attitudes of Taiwanese spouses and other in-laws towards the migrant women’s attendances of the courses could be taken as an example to be highlighted. These are analysed and explained in the later chapters of the related interview transcripts analysis.
Chapter 2: Research Methodology

This chapter provides two sections on the qualitative research methodology within the overall study. Taking into account the supporting information supplied by relevant government publications, and journalist reports associated with scholarly papers in the intervening time, the exploration of the political socialisation of the subjects was actually conducted using life-history qualitative research methodology/methods that included data collection (including narratives of their extracurricular political activities) from interview transcripts and follow-up chats, and on-site classroom observations (so as to understand their group dynamics).

In addition, a rationale/justification for the methodology is provided, especially for the selection of the locations/schools, alongside the sampling frame/the sample as non-probability sampling often used for qualitative case studies. In particular, the nationwide official education followed by specific national guidelines is seen as one case to be studied as an example of the Taiwanese-styled official civic education programme for marital immigrants. Hence, the form of sampling/sample is chosen for a specific reason and does not claim to be representative of all official Mandarin-based citizenship education programmes. In sum, the qualitative research fieldwork combined with the methods is designed to collect data for further analysis and explanation of what experiences and paths shape their learning outcomes, along with a form of transnational citizenry in order to respond to my research questions.

2.1 Introduction of the Life-History Qualitative Research
2.1.1 The Life-History Approach in Educational Settings

The life-history approach has been valued lately by researchers investigating educational topics of all kinds, including teachers’ perceptions and experiences of different areas of their lives and careers, curriculum evaluation, and managerial concerns. The life-history research in educational settings makes a unique contribution to the understanding of schools, schooling, and educational experiences however characterised (Goodson and Sikes, 2001). As an alternative to empirical methods, the life-history qualitative research is frequently used in marital immigration studies for identifying and documenting political socialisation and transnational identity patterns of individuals (Atlas editorial, 2017). This study adopts the life history approach, in its techniques and terminology. A life history is an account of a life as it emerges from the researcher’s compilation of written accounts as well as transcribed oral interviews and conversations. The story is subsequently edited, interpreted, and presented in one of various ways, usually in conjunction with other sources. Life histories may be topical, focusing on only one or more segmented portions of a life, attempting to tell in detail events as they are recalled (Ojermark, 2007, p.4). Life histories, then, build on oral histories, using narratives and testimonies.

Oral history is the practice of interviewing individuals on their past experiences of events with the intention of constructing an historical account. As a story linked with time, the narrative provides an opportunity for organising our actions and experiences. A testimony in a case study is an oral history narrative where the first-person recounts a real situation involving repression and marginalisation for the analysis and recording of a single case. In addition to oral histories and narratives, memoirs and life histories, especially those written by women, are integral to any analysis of the gendered nature
of state oppression. As such, written testimonies are also treated as significant political texts requiring examination (Stefatos, 2012, p.25).

The life-history methodology explores a person’s individual experiences within a macroscopic framework. Life-history information challenges the researcher to realise an individual’s current attitudes and how they may have been affected by initial decisions made in another time and place (Hage, 1992). Because subjects are asked to describe their lives as such, life-history as a qualitative research method considers foremost what it is like to be that particular person in the society in which they live. The purpose of a collection of interviews is to capture a living picture of a group of people and a way of life. That is, how the subject views the host society at the particular time, and how the subject views one’s own life within the society (Atlas editorial, 2017).

However, the oral reconstruction of one’s life, usually narrated over interviews and under diverse circumstances, is neither always expressed in a logical or coherent manner nor able to cover the issues of memory lost and negative impacts after disclosure (Ojermark, 2007, p.4). That is, the challenge of the life-history approach can be put down to the difficulty to form an appropriate compilation of a narrative given these limitations (ibid., pp. 5-6). Beyond the promises and perils of life history research, it does nevertheless link to a particular way that responds to the stories that people habitually tell in their daily lives. With the aim of analysing memoirs of individuals systematically as good practice, the life-history researcher attempts to structure the process of both telling the subject’s stories to yield in-depth details about the specific life experiences that the individual has produced, and allowing other readers to decide on the credibility of the stories in relation to their own worlds (Dhunpath and Samuel (eds.), 2009, p.3). Education thus is the construction of personal and social stories since teachers and students live engage in making sense of the world in which they live (ibid., p.4). In particular, the life-history researcher focuses on some specific dimensions of
social reality to illuminate and demarcate the realm of what is to be investigated, or what realm of one’s life is being researched. Significantly, life history research encourages the researcher to be surprised by the data, to be thrown off track from their original thoughts, to veer into territory that was not anticipated, with new ways of seeing, knowing, understanding, and interpreting life experiences (ibid., pp.4-5).

The reason to adopt this life-history approach is mainly because it is most appealing when presented as a story, especially in a creative process between the researcher and research subjects weaving an interconnective net to capture the fullness and diversity of experiences, rather than the processes of traditional researchers who attempt to establish the veracity of certain truths (ibid., p.4). To sum up, the life-history approach can be an empowering form of socio-political research, as it advances voices often excluded in other forms of research. Hence, my research methodology adopts life-history qualitative approach for this case study, such as life-history interview questions conduct, life-history interview transcripts compiling (together with field notes) for life-history narrative data analysis.

2.1.2 Background Information of the Interviewees

There were in total fifty students/alumnae interviewees attending the courses. Since the students and teaching staff were both users of the Ma’s curricular guidelines, the teaching staff provided alternative observations of the students’ political socialisation (the rest of the statements by other socio-political actors, e.g. supervisory
governmental or NGO staff mainly supplied or commented on the reports regarding policy implementation of the citizenship programmes). According to the ethics and principles of qualitative research, the names of interviewees and interview locations, including the names of schools and the names of workplaces, have been altered to protect their identities and privacy. I added letter and number for teaching staff/ students after the schools (α, β, and γ) and governmental/NGO staff (δ) as pseudonyms, e.g. αt1, δg1. In order to visualise the specific settings along with life-history of each marital immigrant student, the list of interviewees with detailed background information is as follows:

1. **Teaching Staff and Foreign Spouse Students (who completed the 72-hour certificate course) in the Alpha School (α) and Beta School (β):**

   (1) αt1 was interviewed after a class from 8:00 to 9:00 pm on the 15 May 2014 in the school. αt1, a single female Benshengren, born in 1979, possessed a MA from National Taipei University of Education and had taught in the formal basic adjustment education course for eight years. αt1 was a very friendly teacher willing to help to supply her observations of the foreign spouse students’ political socialisation in her class. Coincidently, αt1 mentioned that she also had studied qualitative research methods in Educational Studies when she noticed that my questions were designed as a semi-structured interview, employing qualitative interview methods. αt1 was open to the idea of increasing foreign spouses in Taiwanese population. Also, αt1 was outgoing and talkative when she interacted with the foreign spouse students, and she maintained a good relationship with these students.

   (2) αt2, a male Waishengren, was born in 1960 and earned a BA from National Taiwan
Normal University and had taught in the formal adjustment education course for more than a decade. In particular, αt2 taught Mandarin and citizenship education in the formal high intermediate adjustment education courses in the school, and described the students’ learning outcomes from the joint educational programme during the interview at the school, Taipei on 9 June 2014, from 6:00 to 7:00 pm. αt2 also worked as the Office Manager and Head Teacher of the School. As a confident and experienced teacher, he felt comfortable responding to any challenges from the students in his courses, according to the testimonies of current students and alumnae. αt2 also recommended him as the best representative to answer any question regarding the formal curriculum.

(3) βt1 was one of nine teaching faculty in the formal intermediate adjustment education courses of this case study. βt1, a female Taiwanese aboriginal born in 1958, earned a BA from National Taipei University of Education and had taught in the formal adjustment education course for more than ten years. She was teaching folk music during my first visit to the School. She appreciated having an American-born male Chinese student attending her course and as a result welcomed the interview by an overseas research student. She was passionate and demonstrated her accomplishments in Mandarin teaching during the observations. In teaching her students about how to avoid gender bias in choosing Mandarin names for themselves, she was proud to offer a critique of the patriarchy inherent in local naming traditions for baby girls. What is more, βt1 talked about witnessing the students’ political socialisation in the ways they confronted their in-law families and society in general. Finally, this Taiwanese aboriginal teacher followed the given curriculum but added her own curricular design of Taiwanese songs and names (as her supplementary teaching materials) in order to meet the standard of programme assessment. The interview with her was held in the classroom of the school from 7:00 to 8:00 pm (after class), 4 July 2014.
βt2 was interviewed between 8:00 and 9:00 pm, 13 June 2014 in the school. He was one of two male staff members for the high-intermediate-level evening courses. He did not avoid sensitive ethno-political issues when he taught geography, history, and citizenship education. A Benshengren born in 1965, βt2 earned a BSc degree from National Taiwan University (NTU) and a MSc from the University of Missouri. He had taught history, geography, and citizenship education in the formal adjustment education course for nearly seven years. At the time, he taught a class with a mixed student population including marital spouses from a variety of origins and a few local older female citizens. βt2 allowed me to carry out classroom observations in his lectures for the purpose of collecting data, particularly the discussions concerning issues to do with ethno-cultural aspects impacting on the students’ political socialisation. βt2 was not intimidated by the guidelines issued by the Ma Administrations and recognised the significance of the 228 Incident and other relevant historical events in relation to the interests of the students in his class.

βt3, a married Taiwanese Hakka born in 1959 and a father of three children who earned a BA from National Taipei University of Education, had taught in the formal basic/intermediate adjustment education courses for fifteen years. βt3, the other experienced male teaching staff in the school, taught Mandarin. He was interviewed from 6:00 to 8:00 pm, 6 June 2014, and from 8:50 to 9:30 pm, 30 June 2014 in the school. He supplied his personal observations regarding his Mainland and foreign spouse students, as well as introducing me to his colleagues who taught in the same evening programme. βt3 noted that the only Mainland minority spouse student in class was extremely quiet and avoided interacting or talking much with other students or teachers. Generally speaking, βt3 supplied this research with information on the political socialisation of the students who were interviewed. Lastly, βt3 also kindly offered an opportunity for classroom observations during his lessons. His lecture demonstrated strong rapport with his students, which was
helpful in data collection, especially in the opportunity to witness student responses first-hand (e.g. their interests, critiques, and doubts) concerning the formal adjustment education curriculum.

(6) αβs1, a Vietnamese-primary-school-graduate homemaker was born in Vietnam in 1984. She was a female overseas Hakka spouse student in the class and received the 72-hour course certificate in 2010 (and continued her learning in secondary education in 2014). The interviews were held in the Taipei Multimedia Centre (9:50 - 10:30 am, 22 April 2014) and the School (6:30 – 7:00 pm, 1 May 2014).

(7) αβs2 was a female overseas Hakka spouse student in the class of 2010 cohort. The interview with αβs2 was held at 2 pm, 28 April 2014 in the classroom. The follow-up voice chat with αβs2 was took place at 1-2 pm, 8 May 2016 via Skype voice chat system. αβs2, an overseas Hakka from Indonesia and a factory assistant, presented a particularly pressing problem facing Taiwan today.

(8) αβs3 was a female overseas Hakka spouse student in the class of 2015 graduation. The after-school interviews were held in the classroom, respectively, at 9:00 - 9:20 pm, 28 March 2014, 6:30 - 7:10 pm, 4 April 2014, 6:45 – 7:05 pm, 11 April 2014, and 8:00 – 9:00 pm, 9 May 2014. αβs3 was an overseas Hakka migrant woman from Indonesia, and her interview illustrated the long-standing interracial tensions between Chinese and Southeast Asians and their effects on her perspective regarding Taiwan.

(9) αβs4 was a female overseas Hakka spouse student in the 2010 class cohort. The interviews were held in the school (6:10 – 6:30 pm, 11 April 2014, 6:00 – 6:50 pm, 14 May 2014, and 6:00 -7:00 pm, 23 May 2014). αβs4, an ethnic Hakka from rural Vietnam, provided another example of the positioning of the Hakka marital immigrant between cross-strait and interracial rivals as revealed in the formal Mandarin education programme.

(10) αβs5, an Indonesian primary-school-graduate waitress in Taiwan, was born in
Indonesia in 1986 and attended adjustment education course in 2014, as a part-time student. She was a female overseas Hakka spouse student in the intermediate class. The course had another two female overseas Chinese spouse students, together with two alumnae who visited the course sometimes. The interviews were held in the school (9:00 – 9:30 pm, 1 May 2014, 7:00 - 8:00 pm, 9 June 2014, and 8:50 – 9:20 pm, 20 July 2016). αβs5, an Indonesian Hakka immigrant woman working in a restaurant, revealed in her interview how she maintained her Hakka ties without committing to any politically associated groups.

(11) αβs6, a female overseas Hakka spouse student was interviewed in the classroom (8:50 – 9:10 pm, 24 May 2014, and 7:00 - 8:00 pm, 30 June 2014). αβs6, a homemaker, born in Indonesia in 1970, discussed the uncertain national/international status of Taiwan as well as her worries about the effects on job opportunities that might result from the government’s Mainland focus.

(12) αβs7 worked at the KMT-led Chung-Hua Radio Station and was a female overseas Chinese spouse student from Vietnam in the class of 2009 cohort. The interview was held at the Chung-Hua Radio Station at 9-10am, 24 April 2014, and followed up with a Skype voice chat (10-11 am, 7 May 2016) and a meeting (1:00 – 2:00 pm, 8 July 2016). This KMT-led Vietnamese radio hostess was born and raised in Vietnam and was sympathetic to individuals who battled to survive in a foreign setting. However, αβs7 discussed her encounters with prejudice and recalled the tense and hostile dynamics in the classroom between Mainland and Southeast Asian spouse students, but it was she who had to bridge the gap between these two subgroups because she knew how to speak both languages. αβs7 also expressed her firm support for the KMT and its policies for new immigrants; while she knew people who joined in the TASAT she considered them aggressive. She had given assistance to other female immigrant women in the Lawrence S. Ting Memorial Fund and the Young Women’s Christian Association.
(13) αβs8 was a female overseas Chinese spouse student from Southeast Asia. The interviews were held in the classroom (7-8 pm, 14 May 2014, and 6-7 pm, 22 May 2014). αβs8, an overseas Chinese from Indonesia and a KMT member who had been living in Taiwan for more than twenty years, expressed her scepticism towards the prospects of her political party promoting anything more than its elites’ interests.

(14) αβs9, an Indonesian primary-school-graduate was born in Indonesia in 1986. αβs9, an overseas Chinese and Hô-ló-uē speaker from Indonesia who worked as a community cleaner, discussed the language rivalry between Hô-ló-uē and Mandarin in Taiwan. She was an overseas Chinese spouse student in the class of 2014 cohort. The interviews were held in the classroom (7:00 – 8:00 pm, 28 March 2014, and 8:50 – 9:10 pm, 11 April 2014).

(15) αβs10 was a female foreign spouse student from Indonesia. She was an Indonesian elementary-school graduate, as well as Indonesian and Chinese mixed-race. The interviews with αβs10 were held at 8:50 pm, 22 May 2014 in the school, and 7 pm, 2 July 2014 in her Catholic church, Taipei. This interview revealed the strong political sensitivities of a new immigrant who had a multicultural background and preferred to be with the multicultural group in class. She noted that her father was an Indonesian and her mother was an overseas Chinese from Province of Fujian. She thus could speak some Hô-ló-uē because her mother taught it to her during childhood. But she still needed to learn the new phonetic system of the Taiwanese model of Mandarin because her mother had taught her only simplified Chinese characters.

(16) αβs11, an Indonesian lower-secondary-school-graduate and a chef in Taiwan, was born in Indonesia in 1986 and received the 72-hour adjustment education course certificate in 2014. She was an overseas Hakka spouse student in the class. Similar to most formal adjustment education courses nationwide, αβs11’s educational programme merged marital immigrants into a mixed class with a few local senior
female citizens who were not foreign spouses. The interviews were held in the classroom (7-8 pm, 25 June 2014, and 8:50 - 9:15 pm, 11 June 2014). αβs11 emphasised how marital immigration to Taiwan was stimulated by reaction against anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia and noted the similarities in the effects of the Vietnamese anti-Chinese riots in 2014.

(17) αβs12, a homemaker who was born in Vietnam in 1979, received the 72-hour course certificate in 2015. αβs12 was a female overseas Chinese spouse student in the mixed class of a few local elderly female citizens and new immigrant students. The interviews were held in the classroom (3:30 – 4:00 pm and 6:00 – 7:00 pm, 13 May 2014). αβs12 expressed her disappointment with the effects of the stereotyping of marital immigrant women in Taiwanese society, and her interview expressed the misery and vulnerability arising from continual harassment. She felt greater candour needed to be employed to confront the patriarchal assumptions of Taiwanese society.

(18) αβs13 (pen name: ‘A-gun’), was of Thai and northern Thailand-border KMT-background and Chinese Muslim minority mixed-race, was a female overseas spouse student from Thailand in the class of 2013 graduation cohort who spoke fluent Mandarin and worked in a KMT-led radio station for Thai listeners in Taiwan. She was interviewed at the Multimedia Centre, Taipei (1:00 – 2:00 pm, 30 April 2014; 1:00 - 2:00 pm, 9 May 2014; 1:00 - 2:00 pm, 18 May 2014). Being a mixed-race daughter of a KMT veteran, αβs13 defended the KMT-led Mandarin-based adjustment education courses while she expected the Ma administration to make efforts on the multicultural Torch Plan. In particular, she enjoyed joining the diverse immigrant women’s activities in the Lawrence S. Ting Memorial Fund and the Young Women’s Christian Association.

(19) αβs14, an immigrant women student who originated from Vietnam, was interviewed via a skype voice chat at 4 – 6 pm, 7 May 2016, which was followed
by the interview in the classroom (1 – 2 pm, 31 March 2014). αβs14, a part-time Mandarin-based adjustment education programme participant and marital immigrant living in Taiwan for more than 20 years, was a keen observer of the unspoken crimes that occurred in her locality. She completed her 72-hour certificate course in 2016. She was born in 1964 in Vietnam and expressed a dislike of women from Vietnam who had become prostitutes, particularly because of the indecent assault on her juvenile son. She was associated with the TASAT’s multiculturalists.

(20) In order to deal with her Taiwanese ID card application, αβs15, a middle-aged overseas Chinese spouse from Indonesia and a retail saleswoman, was a part-time student of the adjustment education programme for obtaining a 72-hour course certificate in 2016 during the second Ma administration. Her parents were originally from Province of Fujian in Mainland, so she could speak Hô-lô-uē, which made it easier to adjust to Taiwanese society. αβs15 expected the 72-hour long programme to be shortened because of looking after her child and working at the same time. The interviews with αβs15 who spoke in Hô-lô-uē were held in the classroom from 7:30 to 8:30 pm, 6 July 2016, as well as from 6 to 8 pm, 8 July 2016.

(21) αβs16, a middle-aged homemaker taking care of her father-in-law who had suffered a stroke, was an illiterate in Indonesia and received her 72-hour course certificate from the adjustment education course in 2016. This immigrant woman alumna, who had a local Indonesian father and an overseas Chinese mother who originally came from Province of Fujian, spoke in Hô-lô-uē in the interview at the evening school. For her, Taiwan was Taiwan and Mainland was Mainland, although both spoke the same language. While she called both Taiwan and Indonesia home, she was somewhat upset about the programme which expected her to be part of the host society but still treated her like a foreigner. αβs16 was a good example of the illiterate immigrant who found the courage to adjust herself and survive abroad, through attending the formal 72-hour induction course, as a key requirement to get
a Taiwanese ID card. The one-hour interviews with αβs16, who spoke in Hô-ló-uē, were held in the classroom begun at 7pm, 7 July 2016, and 4 pm, 8 July 2016.

(22) αβs17, a Cambodian immigrant woman, who married a Taiwanese disabled man, who was nearly her father’s age, through a Taiwanese marriage broker, attended the joint programmes for adjustment education in general. She believed that her darker skin even made local people discriminate against her. Thus, she stayed strong and studied hard in Mandarin while whitening her skin. αβs17 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2013, and the interview was held from 9-11 am, 1 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre. She especially condemned the government for quickly wading into the contentious issue of a cross-strait service trade agreement, without solving the domestic conflicts concerning the changes to curricular guidelines.

(23) αβs18 from Indonesia did volunteer work to help newly marital immigrants in the community, while having two part-time jobs as a kitchen assistant in a noodle shop and a shabu-shabu restaurant. She was married to a husband who ran up a debt and left home to avoid creditors. αβs18 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2016, and the interview was held in 4-6 pm, 11 July 2016 in the classroom.

(24) αβs19 from Indonesia married her Taiwanese truck driver husband when she was twenty years old, but she never had any chance to study in the adjustment education programme until 2009. Before doing the course, she did not know any Mandarin. Hence, she lacked opportunities to communicate with neighbours and in-law family members. While her mother-in-law and father-in-law often insulted her, her husband was a heavy drinker and abused her from time to time. αβs19 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2009, and the interview was held at 9-11 am, 1 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(25) αβs20, a Thai immigrant woman was a tailor back home, but married a gambler husband in Taiwan. She was upset about her past with a gambler. She attended the
course with the hope of living independently in a new country. She did not want to be a social burden due to her low-income status. She received the 72-hour course certificate in 2015, and the interview was held in 2-4 am, 9 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(26) αβs21 was from Bangkok and married a Taiwanese construction worker. She suffered from domestic violence and had even reported it to a nearby police station. But she was compassionate towards her husband’s drinking problems and continued living with him. However, she had recently moved out and started living alone. She planned to fight for her children’s custody and save them from domestic abuse. αβs21 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2010. The interview was held in 2-4 pm, 21 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(27) αβs22 was from the very poor countryside of Cambodia. She married a Taiwanese divorced, unemployed man with drinking problems. She suffered from severe family abuses while she attended the adjustment education programme. She kept the hope of getting a Taiwanese ID card after naturalisation. She planned to get a divorce and was ready to continue her immigrant life in Taiwan. αβs22 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2010. The interview was held in 2-4 pm, 3 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(28) αβs23, a Malaysian marital immigrant from Singapore did not speak Mandarin, so she attended the adjustment education course for learning Mandarin. Her Taiwanese husband was a fisherman. She expected to find a full-time job after the study. αβs23 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2010. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 25 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(29) αβs24 from Indonesia married a Taiwanese baker. She enjoyed her married life and had a supportive husband. She attended the Mandarin-based adjustment education because she had never learned Mandarin in Indonesia. She had several foreign working experiences before coming to Taiwan, so she adjusted herself well.
to this new society, and insisted on her ethnic rights under the biased scheme. αβs24 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2011. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 15 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(30) αβs25 was born at a poor village in Vietnam in 1975 and lacked educational opportunities. She married her Taiwanese carpenter husband when she was twenty-eight years old. She was enthusiastic about learning Mandarin and other subjects through the adjustment education programme, which she did in order to overcome her local language barrier and to adjust herself to this society. In particular, she recorded her transnational living experiences in her diary in Mandarin, as writing practice for the course. In addition, she planned to open her own Vietnamese restaurant. αβs25 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2012. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 6 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(31) αβs26 was originally from Vietnam and was a single mother with two young children living in Taipei city after her Taiwanese husband’s death. She worked as a kitchen assistant and married a senior Taiwanese chief. Similar to most Southeast Asian spouses, αβs26 grew up in a very poor farmers’ family with lots of children and lived in a village where lacked medical cares. She attended the adjustment education programme to help her find a job so she could raise her young children after graduation. αβs26 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2012. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 27 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(32) αβs27, a Filipino marital immigrant came from a poor village and married a Taiwanese country man. She moved out and lived by herself after having contracted an STI from her ex-husband. She decided to join in the adjustment education programme and earn the certificate in order to get a Taiwanese ID card and have a regular full-time job. αβs27 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2011. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 2 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(33) αβs28, a Laotian marital immigrant, who married to a Taiwanese plumber, was
born to a very poor family. She was very introverted and felt that attending the adjustment education course was a big challenge to her. αβs28 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2009. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 6 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre. αβs28 expressed her view that the Ma administration quickly paid more attention to the cross-strait service trade agreement rather than to the domestic conflicts concerning the changes to curricular guidelines.

(34) αβs29, an Indonesian marital immigrant was born in a village. She was a homemaker and attended the adjustment education programme to broaden her social scope. She saw herself as a tough person, able to take on every challenge in the new society. αβs29 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2012. The interview was held from 9-11 am, 23 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre. During the interview, she talked about her recent divorce and concerns about family rights related laws for foreign spouse students.

(35) αβs30 from Indonesia married a mid-age Taiwanese man with a sixteen-year age gap. αβs30 talked a lot about her family background, and especially about the poverty she experienced in her early years. She worked as a cleaner from a very young age. She studied hard for the 72-hour course certificate in order to get naturalised as soon as possible. She was sympathetic to the underprivileged in the society, especially the disabled and homeless. αβs30 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2012. The interview was held in 2-4 pm, 11 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(36) αβs31, a Thai marital immigrant woman, was a waitress back home before her transnational marriage. She criticised aspects of gender inequality in the adjustment education curriculum and textbooks. She was concerned for the rights of marital immigrant women. αβs31 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2011. The interview was held in 2-4 pm, 5 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(37) αβs32 from Indonesia married a Taiwanese craftsman while she worked as a maid
in a Taiwanese family. She had her own Indonesian ethnic shop and restaurant to supply Indonesian foodstuffs after she finished the adjustment education programme. She was happy, an adjustment education success story, although she was worried about her accent, especially in dealing with business. Her husband was supportive and helped her look after the children while she was working. In addition, she gradually overcame multiple barriers of cultural differences. αβs32 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2012. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 18 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(38) αβs33, a foreign spouse from Vietnam married a Taiwanese mechanic. She could speak and write basic Mandarin Chinese but still felt discriminated against while she looked for work. Therefore, she decided to attend the adjustment education programme for an official certificate that she associated with better opportunities. αβs33 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2015. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 28 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(39) αβs34 was a Burmese marital immigrant woman. She married a Taiwanese farmer. The couple had started a food stand business. αβs34 complained about the scheme changes against foreign spousal rights. She expected a new Taiwanese economic miracle and condemned the gender inequality under the patriarchal social structure, and especially prejudices against foreign spouses. She attended the Mandarin-based educational programme for better adjusting to the new society. αβs34 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2011. The interview was held in 4-6 pm, 17 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

2. Teaching Staff and Foreign Spouse Students (who completed the 72-hour certificate course) in the Gamma School (γ):
(1) γt1, a Benshengren born in 1977, possessed a MA from National Taipei University of Education and had taught in the formal adjustment education courses for more than a decade. He was a full-time male teacher for this much praised evening adjustment education course and was interviewed in several face-to-face interviews, respectively, 7-8pm 21 April 2014, 4-6pm 25 April 2014, 8-9pm 30 June 2014, and 4-5pm 7 July 2016 in the school, as well as a skype voice interview on 6 May 2016 (1:30-2:30 pm). γt1 also supplied the information regarding his successful teaching career and identified himself as an observer of the development of adjustment education programmes. He also spoke of one female Mainland spouse in his lessons at the district adjustment education programme, who was born and bred in a rural minority family and who attended both district programmes and governmental workshops for marital immigrants. She was also in the observed class of the capital city centre.

(2) γt2, a male Benshengren military-school-graduate, with a rank of sergeant, was born in 1968 and was a part-time teacher in the secondary-education-level course. During his interview from 6:00 to 7:00 pm on 10th June 2014, γt2 demonstrated his pride in having served in the army of the ROC by revealing the honours awarded and the stories of his army life. He was also interviewed again after 10th June 2014 and talked about his role as a teacher for the weekday-evening adjustment education course.

(3) γt3, an accountant by day and a part-time teacher by night, was in charge of civic education in the secondary-education-level course. γt3 told me that he wanted to give the foreign spouse students opportunities to work in his company. He believed it to be natural that ethnic subgroups would gather and socialise together in the languages of their countries of origin. He was invited to join a social movement by three immigrant women students from Vietnam who were talking about The Sunflower Student Movement against the Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement. In
addition, as a male Benshengren who was born in 1959, he earned a BA from National Chung-Hsing University and had taught in the formal adjustment education course for six years as a part-time teacher. He was one of four part-time teaching faculty members in the formal adjustment education programme at the school. The interviews with him took place in the school from 6:00 to 7:00 pm on 7th May 2014, as well as 8-9 pm on 2nd June 2014.

(4) γt4, a female Taiwanese Hakka who was born in 1975, earned a BA from Taipei Municipal University of Education and had taught in the formal adjustment education course as an associate teacher since 2014. She was interviewed in the school between 7:00 and 8:00 pm on 7th May 2014. In April 2014, she was just beginning her teaching career, and expressed some worries about answering unexpected questions raised by the students during her lessons, probably due to an unfortunate incident that had happened in the same evening course a few years previously. As a new teacher, γt4 was eager to collect feedback on learning outcomes from her students after class, so she supplied useful information about the students’ political socialisation and more generally about what she had heard about the Mandarin-based adjustment education programmes.

(5) γs1 was a male foreign spouse student interviewed three times at the school (7:00 - 7:30 pm, 17 June 2014, 7:10 – 8:30 pm, 18 June 2014, and 6:00 -7:00 pm, 23 June 2014). γs1, a male college-graduate and carpenter living in Taiwan, was born in Russia in 1977. This secondary-school level programme included three male foreign spouse students, and γs1 was one of them. He had an arranged marriage through the Korean Unification Church. He happily showed me his in-law family photo in the interview.

(6) γs2 was a male foreign spouse student also interviewed three times after class at the school (9-10 pm, 19 May 2014; 9-10 pm, 26 May 2014; 9-10 pm, 9 June 2014). A college-graduate engineer, he was born in Iraq in 1972 and studied in this
adjustment education course just for one month. γs2 perceived a sense of social distancing regarding his origins.

(7) γs3 was a male foreign spouse student born in Argentina in 1968 and was a Spanish tutor in Taiwan. He was interviewed a couple of times at the school in Taipei (7:50 - 8:10 pm, 19 May 2014, 5:50 - 6:30 pm, 26 May 2014, 6:30 - 7:00 pm, 9 June 2014, and 6:00 - 7:00 pm, 10 June 2014). He expressed that he experienced less discrimination from native-born citizens of Taiwan mainly due to his Buddhist/Taoist religious beliefs. He studied part-time in this adjustment education course for two academic years.

(8) γs4, a Vietnamese secondary-school-graduate homemaker in Taiwan, was born in Vietnam in 1984 and studied in this adjustment education programme c.2013-15. As an overseas Chinese female spouse student from Vietnam, γs4 studied in order to adjust herself into her new society. The interviews were held in the school (7-8 pm, 16 May 2014, and 8:50 – 9:10 pm, 23 May 2014) and the Taipei Multimedia Centre (1:50 - 3:00 pm, 30 May 2015). She initially stopped studying at the Mandarin-based adjustment education courses due to her pregnancy, and then she transferred from the previous evening primary education course to the evening course at the suggestion of her colleague. She compared her experience of learning Mandarin in Vietnam to that in Taiwan, but personally preferred learning Taiwanese phonetic symbols. As a Cantonese Chinese immigrant woman from Vietnam, who only used a Taiwanese passport, γs4 sought to express an alternative viewpoint concerning disputes over students’ political socialisation. She had her own views on the differentiation of Taiwanese and Mainland Chinese after studying at the adjustment education programmes.

(9) γs5, a Vietnamese secondary-school-graduate tofu shop worker in Taiwan, was born in Vietnam in 1985 and studied in the adjustment education course c.2013-15. As a marital immigrant women student originally from Southeast Asia, γs5 viewed
Taiwan as the country of her husband and children rather than her own country. She hardly had any sense of belonging to the host country, but she still applied herself to the study of Mandarin in order to survive in her new home. She made efforts to read local newspapers and watch TV news reports, particularly political news, to which she paid much attention. γs5 was interested in joining the women’s empowerment NGO (such as the Southeast Asian spousal sisterhood, the TASAT) for having her voice held. But she had little time due to her work in her in-law-family’s tofu business and parenting responsibilities. The interviews were held in National Library, Taipei (3-4 pm, 22 April 2014, and 3-4 pm, 29 April 2014), as well as a follow-up phone interview from 7:00 to 7:30 pm, 29 May 2014 and another face-to-face interview from 2-3 pm, 17 July 2016. She was also associated with the outspoken TASAT activists. She participated in the Student Movement against Curricular Guidelines Changes as a Southeast Asian spouse student.

(10) γs6, an Indonesian-upper-secondary-school-graduate homemaker in Taiwan, was born in Vietnam in 1985 but has moved to Indonesia and studied part-time in the adjustment education course c.2013-16. The interviews were held in the Multimedia Centre, Taipei (5-6 pm, 1 June 2014, and 3-4 pm, 10 July 2016). As a Muslim, γs6 felt more religious discrimination than Buddhist immigrant women and was highly engaged in extracurricular ethnic associational activities of the TASAT among the multicultural women activists.

(11) γs7, a female manufactory worker from Thailand, married a Taiwanese farmer. She suffered domestic violence. Her husband disagreed with her decision to study in the adjustment education programme, but she was brave enough to get separated. She participated in the Student Movement against Curricular Guidelines Changes. She completed her certificate in 2016 when she lived alone in Taipei city. The interview was held from 7-9 pm, 19 July 2016 in the school.

(12) γs8 was a female manufactory worker originally from Vietnam and married to her
Taiwanese manufactory colleague in Vietnam. After the couple moved to live in Taipei city, γs8 began to attend the adjustment education course in order to obtain the 72-hour course certificate for naturalisation requirement. γs8 received her certificate in 2016. The interview was held in 6-8 pm, 18 July 2016 in the school.

(13) γs9, an Indonesian marital immigrant, was born at a small city in Indonesia. She had bad relationship with her mother-in-law. She was very pleased to join in the adjustment education programme for further studies of local culture and customs. She especially appreciated caring teachers who supported her. She was always selected as the student leader in class and expected locals to respect her cultural differences and foreign background. She had cancer and received treatment after the courses in 2011. γs9 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2011. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 8 May 2015, in the Taipei Multimedia Centre. As a Southeast Asian spouse alumna, she actively participated in the Sunflower Student Movement then.

(14) γs10, an overseas Hakka marital immigrant woman, was from Hanoi, Vietnam. She had her Taiwanese Hakka security guard husband’s encouragement to attend the adjustment education programme. She often took part in the volunteer works for assisting other newly marital Hakka migrants in the immigrant help centre. γs10 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2011. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 6 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(15) γs11, a Vietnamese marital immigrant woman got married to a Taiwanese clerk. She emphasised that she attended the adjustment education programme for avoiding conflicts with her husband and in-law family. Once she obtained her certificate and was naturalised, she divorced her husband because of domestic violence. She particularly made efforts to shine the spotlight on multicultural issues. γs11 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2012. The interview was held from 4-6 pm, 7 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.
(16) γs12, a Vietnamese marital immigrant was born to an underprivileged family. She married a Taiwanese factory worker but sought a divorce because of their constant conflicts. She completed the adjustment education programme before her divorce. Hence, she could apply for naturalisation and obtain a Taiwanese ID card to legally work in Taiwan. She was also enthusiastic about the ethnic associational activities of the TASAT. γs12 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2012. The interview was held from 4-6 pm, 28 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(17) γs13, a Vietnamese marital immigrant woman attended the adjustment education programme for naturalisation-oriented 72-hour certificate. She lived in a tiny studio flat with her two children. She expected that the naturalisation would be of benefit to her job applications. She went for a divorce after naturalisation. Her policeman husband was a heavy drinker who abused her. She used to suffer from male chauvinism and was afraid of domestic violence. As a Southeast Asian spouse alumna, she took part in the Sunflower Student Movement. γs13 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2013. The interview was held in 9-11 am, 30 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(18) γs14, a Vietnamese marital immigrant woman, was rejected many times in job interviews in Taiwan because of her marital immigrant status. Hence, she decided to attend the adjustment education course for the certificate and then got naturalised. She actively helped other foreign spouse students due to her caring nature and nursing experience in Vietnam. She joined the Student Movement against Curricular Guidelines Changes as a Southeast Asian spouse student. γs14 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2015. The interview was held in 2-4 pm, 29 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(19) γs15 was a tour guide in the United States before she married a Taiwanese salesman. She attended the adjustment education programme in order to get a decent job. γs15 disliked the lesson of local Mandarin phonetic symbols (Bopomofo)
and had even raised a debate on it. She insisted her native Roman phonetic system to be applied for the Mandarin study, rather than brand new phonetic symbols/system to be taught. s15 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2010, and the interview was held in 2-4 pm, 16 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.

(20) γs16, a Vietnamese marital immigrant woman, was born to a large family. She began to work as a factory worker when she was a teenager. She attended the adjustment education programme to learn Mandarin and gain the certificate. She was, like most Vietnamese marital immigrant students, applying for naturalisation. γs16 received the 72-hour course certificate in 2016. The interview was held in 6-8 pm, 16 July 2016 in the school.

3. Supervisory/Assistance Role of Governmental Staff (Delta, δ):

(1) δg1, a single female Benshengren born in 1968, worked at the Population Policy Bureau of Household Registration Administration of the Ministry of the Interior as an administrator for two decades. The interview with δg1 was held from 2:00 to 5:00 pm, 18 April 2011 in the Ministry of the Interior. This interview concerned a detailed discussion of formal Mandarin and civic education courses for new immigrants and led this research to focus on the interesting case of the government-funded citizenship courses. She had dealt with Mainland and foreign spouse Mandarin-based adjustment education administration for nearly twenty years in the central government. δg1 and her colleagues annually evaluated the courses run by city and county authorities and supplied this research with the published annual official reports.

(2) δg2, who worked at the National Immigration Agency, was interviewed by phone from 10:00 am to 12:00 pm, 20 June 2014. δg2 was originally an administrator in
the Household Registration Administration but transferred to the National Immigration Agency on its first day of existence. δg2 was δg1’s colleague in the Household Registration Administration and δg3’s colleague in the National Immigration Agency. δg2 was the bridge between the two administrations and also the person who introduced δg3 and supplied the personnel information concerning the National Immigration Agency.

(3) δg3, a male administrative staff member interviewed from 1:00 to 4:00 pm, on 26 June 2014 in the National Immigration Agency, was hired and assigned a job in another bureau by a well-known ex-KMT official during the KMT Lee’s Administration. Later, δg3 was promoted to administrator by the KMT government, partially in charge of the government educational funds for new immigrants’ adjustment education programmes. δg3 considered Mainland spouses as overseas spouses. He therefore suggested that Mainland spouses be placed into the category of foreign spouses’ welfare. δg3 mentioned that he faced difficulties during the tenure of DPP Chen’s administration, due to political differences. δg3 was also under personal pressure due to debts incurred through loans and gambling and he embraced a new life through embracing Tibetan Buddhism. He revealed detailed information about the interactions between specialists, NGO representatives, and government officials who were the final decision-makers concerning the funding of the programme discussed in this research.

(4) δg4, who was introduced by the staff in the Ministry of the Interior, was interviewed from 10-11am, 28 March 2014. She gave information about the District Administration where she was employed. She noted that two complete government-funded Mandarin and civic education programmes for marital immigrants were left in the capital city centre (and one of them was a joint programme). As a result, these were merged into a mixed class – where marital immigrant students became the focus of this case study – with few local senior female citizens, one single male
American born Chinese banking professional, and one foreign working professional.

(5) δg5 was interviewed in Taipei City Hall from 4:00 to 5:00 pm, on 28 March 2014. This male member of the administrative staff supplied information concerning the government-funded Mandarin and civic education courses for marital immigrants.

(6) δg6, a female administrative staff working in the Bureau of Education, Taipei City Government was interviewed on the phone from 3:00 to 4:00 pm, on 27 March 2014. The information she gave was confirmed by the administrative staff in the government-funded courses (the interviews were held at 10-11 am and 4-5 pm on 28 March 2014 in the Educational Scheme Office).

(7) δg7 was a male administrator in the Section of National Education, the Bureau of Education in the Taipei City Government. The interview with δg7 was held at 4-5 pm on 27 March 2014 in his office. Along with information concerning relevant educational policy and pertinent laws, the staff member revealed detailed information and statistics in regard to the adjustment education courses within central Taipei.

4. Supervisory/Assistance Role of NGOs Staff (Delta, δ):

(1) δn1, interviewed through a voice chat on 5 May 2014 (2:12 - 3:35 pm), was connected to Headquarters of the CARES, Taipei. She expressed her serious concerns concerning overseas spouse adjustment in Taiwan. A pan-Chinese NGO staff and KMT supporter, she worked in the CARES for more than three decades and dealt with overseas Chinese affairs, with a regional focus on Southeast Asia. She supplied me with her experience of editing research on life histories of overseas Chinese in the Southeast Asian countries.

(2) δn2 was interviewed via skype on 23 April 2014 (4-5 pm). δn2 was a NGO’s staff
member and introduced to the researcher by δn6. δn2 worked at the Lawrence S. Ting Memorial Fund for a decade, with a focus on the administrative affairs of the NGO government-funded courses for foreign spouse students. δn2 was a specialist on multicultural policy and a supporter of women’s empowerment. In addition, one of overseas Chinese spouse interviewees was introduced by δn2.

(3) δn3 was interviewed through skype voice chats connected to the headquarters of the YWCA-Taipei on 28 April 2014 (10-11 am). δn3, a feminist and a staff member at the YWCA, was introduced by δn2. The YWCA and δn2’s NGO had a close cooperative relationship working closely together in supporting and supplying adult continuing education courses for overseas spouse students. In addition, one Thai foreign spouse interviewee was introduced by δn3.

(4) δn4, a female divorced foreign spouse and multicultural feminist, took part in several protests against what she considered the prejudiced policymaking carried out against foreign spouses in Taiwan. The interview was via skype voice chat connected to the headquarters of the TASAT on 5 May 2014 (1:00-1:30 pm). δn4, an outspoken NGO staff member who advised the researcher about the positions posted on the NGO’s official website. The TASAT official blog was firmly against what it felt about the KMT’s ethnic discrimination regarding the violation of their rights.

(5) Voice chats connected to headquarters of the Association of Cross-strait Marriage Communication and Promotion with at 3-4 pm, 12 April 2011 and 2-4 pm, 3 July 2014 with δn5 confirmed the Nationalist politics of this NGO. δn5 discussed the interactions of the NGOs representing new immigrants held at the meetings of the Alliance for Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants (AHRLIM). He frequently posted online articles on this NGO’s Facebook page, which discussed pressing concerns about the policies explored in this research. δn5 was friendly and introduced some Mainland spouses, but they did not attend the course and could not
be considered students in the adjustment education programmes.

(6) δn6, an NGO head staff member, graduated from a world-class university with a doctoral degree in business administration. δn6 was interviewed face-to-face on 15 April 2011 (6-8 pm) and 22 April 2014 (7-9 pm). He kindly supplied the detailed information about his NGO’s published memoirs of foreign spouse students. This information was very valuable for contributing to my use of the life-history method of qualitative research, particularly on specific students’ political socialisation. In addition, δn2 and δn3 were introduced by δn6.

2.2 Methodological Tips and Applied Methods

2.2.1 Semi-structured Interview and Interview Enquiry Design

2.2.1.1 The Semi-structured Interview

One of the main approaches employed in the interviews is avoiding yes-or-no questions but, rather, getting the subject to tell the story of his or her life in their own words (as narratives). It is common practice to follow a chronological path in each interviewee from one’s early childhood to the present (Atlas editorial, 2017). In addition, there are several ways to conduct life history interviews (Goodson, 2008, p.1). In order to focus on the research topics efficiently, this research adopted semi-structured interviews in the life-history qualitative research, which allows researchers to prepare a series of interview questions related to the thematic research topics in
advance, but randomly select parts of them during the interviews (Newton, 2010). Moreover, not only did each interview begin with open inquiries, but also their storytelling was mainly developed with the interviewees themselves rather than being interpreted after the fact.

The number of foreign spouse students in each formal adjustment education programme academic year was roughly three to six (there were fifty graduates in total of this case study during the Ma administrations) while there was a decreasing number of Mainland spouse students, indeed just one left in the later years. The subjects within the adjustment education courses included Mandarin and social science education, in accordance with the guidelines for national primary/secondary education. Amid the 72-hour adjustment courses, the capital city centre had been chosen because of its provision of a complete education (primary and secondary) and its flexibility in course level options (i.e. basic, intermediate, and high intermediate). The sites chosen in central Taipei were in wealthy areas where they could offer the most developed or prevalent programmes. In fact, the chosen programmes were amongst the very few that could maintain the minimum required number of foreign spouse students for the government-funded civic scheme.

In the beginning, to clarify, I carried out semi-structured interviews rather than questionnaires. The initial in-depth interview enquiry designed for male and female individual interviewee students (with the age range stretching from mid-20s to late-50s) in the programmes was carried out face-to-face or via Skype. Research was thus used to analyse and explain what experiences and paths shape the perspectives of the students (mostly educated to primary-education or lower-secondary education level) in regard to their socio-political awareness and partisan political campaigns. In order to have a more comprehensive sense of their life histories from various sources, I not only
collected the previous NGO archives of the same interviewees but also interviewed the teachers, governmental and NGOs administrative staff, and students themselves to supply a rounded portrait.

Data was collected through in-depth interviews of the students and staff, together with classroom observations. I went about this in the following manner. The fifty learner interviewees included three male and forty-seven female foreign spouses; most of them were either Southeast Asians or overseas Chinese from Southeast Asia (including six female overseas Hakka). As to the staff, I interviewed twenty-two staff (nine teaching staff, six relevant NGO administrative staff, and seven city government or district administrative staff) after consulting a senior administrative staff member from the Ministry of the Interior who was in charge of adjustment education programmes for marital immigrants in 2011. The empirical fieldwork was designed to be used to analyse and explain what experiences and paths shaped the transnational identities of the students.

In regard to professional ethics, I sought official permission for access to the specific educational sites. Interviews were confidential and respondents were anonymous. Also, open-ended questions were used in order to avoid confirmation bias. Also, I made a documentation sheet for the interview (Flick, 2006, p. 289), including the time/date, place, and duration of the interview; the indicator of the interviewee, along with their gender, age, profession, educational background, country of birth, previous nationality and ethnicity. In addition, interview facilities, i.e. smart phone tape recorder and documentation sheets were included. In order to secure confidentiality with informed consent for my research project and consider the possible consequences for the subjects, professional ethics shaped the interviews, especially during the process of thematising, designing, establishing an interview situation, as well as setting up
transcriptions and analyses (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p.63).

Before the scheduled interviews, I clearly stated that I was the only person who had access to the interview transcripts and data for further analysis (ibid., p.72), and the interviewees could amend their statements at any time (ibid., p.73), which assisted in building mutual trust in the first stage of the process (Newton, 2010, p.6). Moreover, the interviews were anonymised in order to allay concerns over the protection of privacy. Also, I identified and dealt with serious validity threats in my proposal in order to control for confirmation bias (Maxwell, 2013, p.136). The study was constructed to avoid the inability to address explicitly the counterfactual without any presence of the presumed cause in the law of causality. Furthermore, I evaluated the effects which the settings may have caused on my results (ibid., p.129).

2.2.1.2 The Interview Enquiry Design

The semi-structured interview meant that each interviewee had been introduced with open inquiries (Flick, 2006, pp.155-161). Indeed, the interview questions were designed for a semi-structured interview, following a qualitative research methodology standard for case studies of employing life-history interview approach (Goodson, 2008, pp.1-2). In addition, the devised sets of thematic interview questions were viewed with the aim of further in-depth analysis of their responses to the related issues affecting students’ political socialisation.
In order to gather empirical data to conduct a comprehensive analysis on curriculum-driven political socialisation of the students, the fieldwork was devised with two sets of interview questions, respectively, for the students and the supplementary information givers, their teachers. It aimed to illustrate the relationship between ethno-political implications of the curricular guidelines changes and ethno-political perceptions of the students. It provided in-depth narrative analysis concerning the curricular impact on their political socialisation, in conjunction with what I had decoded from the classroom observation notes. The enquiry design is laid out here:

1. Set I of Questions for the Students:\(^{36}\):

(1) What is your learning experience in terms of ethno-cultural relations?

(2) Are the attitudes, perceptions, beliefs and behaviours of the staff and classmates ethnically sensitive regarding your transnational identity?

(3) What is your expectation of this course and the official guidelines to national education?

(4) How do you view the concurrent ethno-cultural events, e.g. the cross-strait relations after the curricular guidelines changes, the socio-political protest against the Cross-strait Services Trade Agreement, and the mistaken attack on Taiwanese factories as Chinese ones in Vietnam?

\(^{36}\) Collection of the main information which the students supplied, as Track I.
(5) What is the difference in Mandarin instruction if you have studied Mandarin before you came to Taiwan? (Where and when did you learn it before your marital immigration? With simplified or traditional Mandarin characters?)

2. Set II of Questions for the Staff:

(1) Concerning the impacts on the learners, what strength and weakness do the curriculum guidelines have, and why?

(2) How does the adjustment education programme cope with the political ideology under the KMT-led Ma Administration?

(3) Regarding the effects to the learners, is the formal curriculum multi-ethnic and multicultural? (Are instructional materials examined for ethno-cultural bias?)

(4) How do your students and you conceive of the relationship between Mandarin-based adjustment education courses and ethno-cultural diversity, especially given the range of languages/dialects within the society?

(5) How do the guidelines to the curriculum affect their political socialisation? (What political implications are there?)

In sum, the comprehensive interview questions are designed to prepare for a

37 Collection of the pertinent information which the staff supplied, as Track II.
further analysis of the narratives in response to the changes in both official guidelines and accompanied formal adjustment education curriculum.

2.2.1.3 The Supplementary Interview Methods and Follow-up Phone Conversations

The supplementary interview methods are set to enhance data effectiveness and increase efficiency of data collection. Previous interview archives of the subject’s life history can also be used by researchers (Atlas editorial, 2017), such as the publication of Lawrence S. Ting Memorial Fund and the YWCA, Walking Hand-in-hand: The Stories of Immigrant Women as relevant NGO’s supplementary data collection. Many of these studies may be referred to as action research (e.g. Hsia’s research on women’s empowerment of literacy education programme participants in the Meinung Hometown Association) wherein life histories are intended to inform a wider range of action by the research participants, often in collaboration with researchers, ranging from local community development initiatives to lobbying government (Ojermark, 2007, p.1).

A few interviewees lacked the confidence to answer questions in the first instance, so I used psychological counselling skills to assist interviewees to feel relaxed enough to situate themselves within the circumstances of a professional interview. But there were obstacles to the smooth running of my schedule: some of the interviewees had to postpone a session due to sudden pressures at work, and the interviews might be postponed due to sudden phone calls summoning them back home to mind their
children or to cook. In the end, these were only temporary obstacles and eventually I collected enough data to carry out a thorough analysis.

Semi-structured interviews allow interviewees to have greater leeway in expressing themselves and to amend their statements later (Newton, 2010, p.6), e.g. through follow-up phone chats. Follow-up phone conservations focused on students’ reactions to later political incidents after the interviews, so as to have a comprehensive picture of the development of their national identities during the Ma administrations. Follow-up conversations were held to analyse the impact of events on the national elections and further probing their political engagement and political party affiliations. Both sets of elections, the late 2014 nine-for-one general elections and the early 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections, saw a shift from a KMT-led to DPP-led national government. In addition, the elections confirmed the rise of Taiwanese subjectivity over the previous Chinese historicity in terms of the overall national debate. The phone conversations could thus be seen as a supplementary source of evidence to support my arguments in the analytical chapters of this research.

2.2.2 Field Notes and Data Analysis

2.2.2.1 Classroom Observations and Field Notes

Classroom observations and field notes were also used to collect empirical data on the adjustment education courses for new immigrants in Taiwan, particularly on how
some professional terms, e.g. Taiwanese subjectivity and Chinese historicity were taught by the programme teachers in class. I kept field notes on the phrases adopted by students from their learning in class so as to have materials for conducting my interview questions. Also, classroom observations and further interviews were conducted in the capital city centre after consulting with experienced staff. As to the relationship between semi-structured interviews and classroom observations, the interviews were designed to capture the unsaid from the observed (Maxwell, 2013, p.103).

These methods were especially important to understand the classroom environment and to attempt to understand the perspectives of some students who had political concerns and refused interviews. Classroom observations and field notes also provided an understanding of the perspectives of staff and classmates concerning the more politically radical students. Alternatively, another way to collect relevant data and comprehend political ideological development of the activist students is to consider the online context of their ethnic associational networks (e.g. NGOs’ official websites and blogs).

This praxis-oriented research envisaged contacting key sources by making email or phone call enquiries to the administrators of educational institutes and governmental bureaus in order to obtain permission to review relevant documents, as well as to access fieldwork sites for further classroom observations and confidential/anonymouse interviews, i.e. the Mandarin-based adjustment education courses for new immigrants, including the adult continuing education programme located in the night school. The scheduled timetable for each task was around one month, and the research methods included the collection of effective data through in-depth interviews and classroom observations.
The qualitative research methodology in the case study involved decoding the collected data (e.g. compiling the interview transcripts) and selecting key issues for in-depth narrative analysis, rather than focusing on the numbers of quantitative statistics analysis. The task at this stage was to compile interview transcripts as well as completing document analysis employing qualitative research methods. The compilation of interview transcripts, narrative data analysis and the comprehensive analysis of associated documents employed qualitative methodology. The most common approach to the analysis of life histories is narrative data analysis which takes an explanatory approach based on the construction of a given reality (Ojermark, 2007, p.6). The emphasis in narrative analysis is on the active construction of life stories through the interactions between interviewer and interviewees in a collaborative project. In addition, analysis is of the interview itself (i.e. the themes that emerge from the narrative and how they reconstruct the past and meaning), or the interviewee’s view of reality that is treated as a unique perspective and mediated by social context (ibid., pp. 4-6). I thus conducted narrative data analysis for a systematic explanation in this praxis-oriented research. Coding was used to manage data to build ideas and to interrogate the data (Bazeley, 2013, pp. 128-130) while sorting was done to create codes for coding, i.e. cutting out passages and placing them in separate piles in the various categories through mapping and interpreting concepts (ibid., pp.133, 178). The coding/sorting section particularly focused on the main topics, e.g. their underprivileged status against social prejudices, and marital immigrant women’s empowerment associated with
My strategies for qualitative data analysis were as follows: The first step was to listen to the interview tapes, and then read the interview transcripts and observational notes in order to develop tentative ideas and form descriptive categories and linkages. The second step was to apply the initial step to my data in order to analyse narrative structure and context (Maxwell, 2013, p.107), e.g. condensing case synopses into a cross-case narrative, and noting the relations between concepts (Bazeley, 2013, pp. 272, 279). In addition, I designed comparative displays from the coded categories in the matrix to interpret the comparative analysis to condense case synopses into a cross-case narrative; and then, to note the relations between concepts in the table. In summary, in developing a detailed analysis, I organised the transcripts into clusters, and then analysed the clustered quotes on particular topics in order to present an initial report (Goodson, 2008, p.4). My aim was to excavate the ethno-political meanings produced in an array of organisational practices or group dynamics while I investigated how the project of each life history was formulated in particular ethnic associational networks within specific forms of presence in Taipei. In addition, an elaboration of a semi-structured interview involves a compiling of interview transcripts with selective coding. I thus applied the segmentation of a passage or line of the context to the concepts (codes) and then categorised these codes with sentence-by-sentence or paragraph-by-paragraph coding (Flick, 2006, pp. 296-300). In particular, any change of direction in the storytelling from the interviewees pointed to something more multifaceted than the alternatives (Goodson, 2008, p.5).

The framing of overseas marriage migration policy has been subject to change due to the interests and political manipulations of the ruling political party. This study thus applied a contextual analysis of the KMT’s and the DPP’s related policies to
explain their preferences and relevant cultural hegemony and the effect on political socialisation of the programme students. In addition, social unity concerning issues of identity requires a sense of belonging generated by the education, which has the typical function of inculcating particular virtues to bind various groups to the state (Kymlicka, 2001, pp.311-312, 314-316). Thus, the evaluation of the formal adjustment education programmes was focused on a qualitative method of analysing the plural guises of official guidelines for conceptualising the fragmented paradigm known as national identity. Furthermore, evaluation of annual reports of the Mandarin-based adjustment education programmes, marriage immigration regulations and relevant documents (from the database of Ministry of the Interior and the National Immigration Agency) assisted the conduct of narrative data analysis and explanation in this praxis-oriented research. In particular, narrative analysis of my research focused on the meanings and linguistics of the interview transcripts (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009, p.222). That is, the interview narratives were conducted with context-sensitive analysis, including microscopic and macroscopic examinations of the issues. In particular, the interview narratives were prepared for further analysis of transnational identity. In addition, the interview transcripts translated the interviewee’s words as closely as possible. In some cases, the phrasing might seem odd because certain female foreign spouse interviewees were only beginner Mandarin learners and not able to elaborate their ideas with high levels of language proficiency. At the same time, the educational background of most interviewees was limited to either primary-education or lower secondary-education both in their motherlands and in Taiwan.

Lastly, in order to understand the broader narrative of marital immigrants’ integration in Taiwan, government publications like regulations amendments, changes to the guidelines, annual reports of policy implementation as well as relevant journalist media and scholarly papers were examined. These sources provided additional, though
equally important, resources for data analyses on the issues of marital migrants’ political socialisation. In sum, the breadth and depth of data collection provided a solid foundation for thorough analytic responses to the research questions.
Chapter 3: The Issues Motivated Their Political Socialisation from the Revised Scheme

3.1 The Issues Based on Ideological or Cultural Differences of Origins

Though a series of governmental measures for pathways to citizenship of overseas spouses had been on the national agenda since late 1990s, the extent to which the Ma administration actually employed full multiculturalism, given mass migration, was very limited. This section thus addresses the personal experiences and issues of the controversial and difficult educational circumstances encountered by marital immigrant students, particularly based on the ideological or cultural differences of their origins, e.g. communist regimes or Islamic societies.

At first, the challenges of socio-political adjustment of overseas spouse students were caused by the gap between their hometown political ideology/ethno-culture and their new locality. Such transnational issues have been manifested in local communities and in the classrooms. Invariably, an immigrant woman’s self-image seemed to be embedded in the marginalised socio-political contexts they found themselves in, being largely to do with the perception of an inferior status, maintained and reinforced by oppression fostered by a patriarchal society. Whether living with a native born-and-bred husband from either of the aboriginal groups, Hakka, Benshengren or Waishengren, the immigrant wife was consistently perceived as a

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38 This could be confirmed by a key figure interviewed in The Association of Cross-strait Marriage Communication and Promotion (Author’s interview with this NGO representative, 5n5 at 3 pm, 3 July 2014). He condemned the backlash against Mainland spouses because of their communist background. His organisation even perceived that they received fewer benefits from local community care and social welfare as compared with the Southeast Asian brides-based NGO, Trans Asia Sisters Association, Taiwan, which was supported by a female solicitor and parliamentary representative.
‘foreigner’ rather than as a ‘newcomer’ (Chiu, Fell and Lin, 2014, p.2). Even the ideological assumptions behind the spousal sponsorship scheme made the application for naturalisation extremely difficult. Under the discriminatory lens of the host ideology and political economic superiority, the narrative of being merely seen as serving the purpose of reproduction emerged among female foreign spouse students. The circumstances where the foreign spouse students felt comfortable, safe, and could get involved free from bullying or judgment were very important. αβs19, an Indonesian marital immigrant student expressed her viewpoints with regard to the scheme settings of the Ma administration,

Certain scheme settings of the Ma administration had stirred hatred towards foreign spouse students. What’s more, I thought all this hatred amounted to censorship based on ideological or cultural differences of origins [alongside tyranny of the majority or racial superiority]. Nothing can stop this type of censorship from spreading, and that was exactly what happened (Author’s interview with αβs19 at 10 am, 12 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre)39.

αβs19 was one of those who thought all this amounted to the feeling of being censored, or under culture of silence surround the issues, which were based on ideological or cultural differences of origins. Moreover, concerning the part of original political ideological difference, γs10, an overseas Hakka marital immigrant woman from Vietnam who received the 72-hour course certificate in 2011 from the γ school, said,

39 The selected account in my case study was either concise quotations only without relevant context, or highlighted sentences in bold amongst long quotations which were highly relevant context for rigour.
I was an accountant at a Taiwanese company in Vietnam before I married my Taiwanese Hakka husband. I felt that finding jobs in Taiwan was very difficult for Vietnamese immigrant women – I always asked myself if they disliked my communist country background, and few offers usually were low-paying jobs. I have ever worked in a foreign care workers agency company for a while, but I quitted my job because that company somehow violated foreign workers’ rights. I grew up in a socialist country, so I felt the media here was very liberal. In addition, I was worried about social prejudices against marital immigrants’ original culture and political ideology back home, and other foreign spouse students also discussed the relevant issues in the adjustment education class, as the socialisation was stemming from each culture of origin. Taking myself as an example, my status contained both my advantage to join the Hakka indigenisation movement (because I did not need to adjust to ethnic Hakka customs in Taiwan) and the struggle experiencing less prejudice among the foreign spouses but still suffering marginalisation as a group in the context of local xenophobia. I believed that the adjustment scheme of the Ma administration should be the key calling this stereotyping problem (Author’s interview with γs10 was held from 9 to 11 am, 6 May 2015, in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

Owing to her country’s Communist background, γs10 not only thought local media was too liberal but also was worried about social prejudices. She mentioned that her foreign spouse classmates discussed this form of prejudice against their home country’s political ideology while they received democratic education in this Mandarin-based adjustment education programme. In particular, she considered that the Ma’s scheme was key to the stereotyping problem. Furthermore, this narrative showed an awareness of her marginalised status in the context of local xenophobia.
With regard to the part of original cultural difference, αβs18 from Indonesia, a part-time kitchen assistant in a noodle shop and a shabu-shabu restaurant, received the 72-hour course certificate in 2016 from the joint programmes and said,

Local people always thought that foreign spouses from another cultural background got married for money. I tried my best to prove that I was not like that. I also did my best to learn Taiwanese phonetic system in the adjustment education programme. I had never blamed any local people for my unfortunate marriage and miserable living condition in Taiwan because that was my own decision for a transnational marriage. After my husband’s leave, what I could do was to carry on my life. However, I thought local people disliked my Indonesian Islamic culture. They discriminated against my original culture and custom that differed from the local culture. The adjustment scheme was not efficient to tell locals to respect our culture (Author’s interview with αβs18 was held in 4-6 pm, 11 July 2016 in the α school).

In the narrative, αβs18 expressed her experiences of discrimination against her original Indonesian Islamic cultural background. In her eyes, this bias could be attributed to adjustment scheme of the Ma administration.

Indeed, the relevant policies under the Ma administration, as played out in the classroom, were unable to overcome manifest cultural or political and ideological differences among marital immigrants or between foreign spouses and locals. αβs7, an overseas Chinese spouse alumna who was born and raised in Vietnam, stated,

Though I was conservative and firmly support state stability, I did not agree that ‘the territory of the Republic of China is part of Mainland China’, as suggested by the KMT. Some Vietnamese spouses thought that Taiwan was a part of China
because the communist Vietnamese government gave them the wrong information in their formal education. I hoped there would be no war across the strait, keeping the status quo. I supported the non-communist ROC. **As a new citizen, I did not want to see the current government closer to the communist Mainland government,** because I felt the Chinese are dominant, e.g. Chinese tourists brought lots of chaos to Taiwan from the Mainland due to their lousy habits and behaviour. The National Palace Museum was changed a lot after the market-alike scene caused by loud Chinese visitors, which undermined the beauty of Chinese cultural prestige. I, a Vietnamese overseas Chinese, therefore tend to align my national identity to be the same as the local conservative viewpoint. I noticed that my secondary school children’s geography textbooks contained many references to Mainland China, and my children argued why they had to study Mainland geography so much while they lived in Taiwan. So, they asked me why the Taiwanese must study detailed Chinese geography under the curricular guidelines of the Ma administration. However, the civil rights of Mainland spouses were much improved in the Ma administration, e.g. fewer limits in obtaining an ID card. But the government was kinder to Mainland spouses in facilitating the issuing of visas for dependents. **Southeast Asian spouses thought that the Ma administration had an ethnic preference towards Mainland spouses.** It was a China-oriented presidency, so I was afraid that Taiwan would become another Hong Kong\(^{40}\) under the Ma Administration. As a radio station hostess for the Vietnamese audience, **I had heard of some**

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\(^{40}\) Corresponding to her worry of a second Hong Kong, a programme teacher γt1 revealed his observation on programme students and alumni: A Hong Kong-born-and-bred female student [a programme alumna] refused to talk about anything related to the current situation of her birthplace. As I understand, she thought that there was no benefit to talk about this. In contrast, she only spoke about her life in Taiwan (Author’s interview at 10am, 25 April 2014 in the y school, Taipei).
Southeast Asian spouses being afraid of talking to the locals because they feared of getting disparaged after the adjustment scheme changed by the Ma administration\textsuperscript{41}. Though I understood that belittling type of bias, I did not really care about those neighbours (Author’s interview with αβs7 at 10 am, 24 April 2014 in her radio station).

After choosing to migrate to the democratic ROC rather than the Communist PRC, αβs7’s political sensitivity reminded her that national geographic education for an inclusion of the Mainland carried out under the Ma’s curricular guidelines might create a situation of general uneasiness for students who were uncertain where they fitted into Taiwanese society.\textsuperscript{42} Furthermore, while presenting herself as identifying with a ROC conception of Chinese identity, excluding territorial inclusion of the Mainland, and condemning communist-related regime, this interviewee denoted the suffering of Southeast Asian spouses with fears of getting disparaged by the locals mainly due to the Ma’s adjustment scheme changes.

Next, αβs1, born and bred in communist Vietnam, but an overseas Hakka immigrant woman married her Taiwanese Hakka husband in her early 30s, also noted the prejudice Southeast Asian immigrant women faced in Taiwan,

After having heard that most Southeast Asian spouses experienced prejudices and oppressed by local patriarchal society, I would suggest them

\textsuperscript{41} These challenges might be compounded by the Ma Administration’s contradictory style of policymaking which subordinated multicultural politics to nationalism.

\textsuperscript{42} This was particularly acute for a female overseas Chinese spouse student who was attempting to integrate herself into a state in Taiwan aligned to the political status quo established in 1949 and reaffirmed by the Ma’s ROC administration. Though this interviewee did not question the sovereignty of Taiwan, the official education programmes for the marital immigrants underlined the one China policy, with the ROC as the self-proclaimed legitimate representative of China.
to access to local information on Taiwan’s customs/culture as well as its politics. Most students who were from diverse cultural backgrounds worked by day, so they did not have enough spare time to access to the information of local cultures supplied by the district government. The ethno-political biased curriculum helped us think about the issues. Nonetheless, the teaching staff was helpful in our Mandarin learning, as they taught the Taiwanese phonetic symbols. They also offered some family advice, including ‘tips’ on interaction with father-in-law and mother-in-law. But why did the curricular guidelines of the Ma administration have to teach unification in the cross-strait relationship? This would not improve the current tensions between the two political regimes. Being a Hakka, I worried about Taiwan’s future (Author’s interview with αβs1 at 9:50 am, 22 April 2014 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

This statement of an overseas Hakka spouse student confirmed the circumstances where most Southeast Asian spouses experienced prejudices and oppression at the hands of the local patriarchal society. Thus, she suggested to the victims that they access to more local information about Taiwan’s customs and culture in the district government while the ethno-political biased curriculum motivated αβs1 to think about the issues. Moreover, she expressed not only her ethnic Hakka identity but also her scepticism about the curricular guidelines of the Ma administration.

Culturally different marital migrant students who adjusted themselves into a new society were forced to confront the parallel and ongoing ethno-cultural disputes arising between the advocates of Taiwanese indigenisation and Chinese historical connection. The decreasing number of Mainland spouse learners attending the adjustment education
courses reveals another factor exacerbated by the issues surrounding cultural origins.43 One mainland spouse student even felt embarrassed about her illiteracy in written Mandarin. As a result, she felt little national pride and avoided talking about her background. Nevertheless, the original cultural differences served to divide marital immigrants based on the amount of prejudice they perceived. After all, each subgroup always assumed the local government was in favour of other subgroups over itself, exemplifying the expression ‘the grass is always greener on the other side.’ As the result, each female student interviewee could gradually develop her distinct form of political socialisation stemming based on her original cultural or political ideological issues.44 In other words, the bias against political, ideological or cultural differences under the Ma’s adjustment scheme, compounded by varied backgrounds without a common historical memory that was manifested in relationships between the foreign spouses and locals, became one of the key issues motivating migrants’ political socialisation.

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43 As the information in Chinese Association of Relief and Ensuing Services (CARES) identified, the main reason Mainland spouses stopped attending Mandarin-based adjustment education programmes was because the Ma administration removed restrictions on working opportunities for Mainland spouses. Mainland spouses thus attended the government-sponsored vocational courses rather than adjustment education programmes. However, being virtually dependent on charity for new citizens offered by institutions such as the Lawrence S. Ting Memorial Fund, Mainland spouses still considered themselves to be stigmatised, remarking that their children from cross-strait marriages are discriminated against from both sides. Taiwanese natives often referred to the women prejudicially as ‘Da-lu-mei’ – a condescending term for women from the Mainland – while Mainland Chinese referred to Taiwanese using the belittling term ‘Tai-ba-z’ originally from the Shanghai dialect (Ting, Ting, Lee, Ho, Cho, Tsai, and Zou (eds.), 2010, pp. 32-33). Moreover, coming from another – arguably more rigorous – hegemonic communist cultural background, Vietnamese marital immigrant women expressed concerns that Taiwanese politics and local media were too liberal from their socialist point of view (ibid., p.45).

44 For instance, the original culture of Southeast Asian Muslims stood in the way of their accepting traditional Taiwanese religious beliefs and customs (Go, 2011, pp. 90-97) under the Ma’s adjustment scheme.
3.2 Emerging Hybrid Minorities and Additional Immigrant Women’s Collective Awareness

Since late 1990s, a series of controversial governmental measures were devised for those who emerged as hybrid minorities, namely the new immigrants. Their subsequent increase in socio-political awareness could be presented as the result of these second triggers of political socialisation after the initial experiences of transnational migration. This section examines how far the development of this new socio-political awareness of immigrant students could progress, which was highly relevant to the extent what they had been accepted in Taiwan during the Ma administrations, especially with regard to the women multicultural awareness raising on the part of most female interviewees. Alongside their vulnerable status under the hegemonic local conservatism, repressed voices of the emerging hybrid ethnic minorities (as newbies in the host society) in educational settings were the de facto inducement of their political socialisation.

3.2.1 Circumstances of the Southeast Asian Spouse Students: From Majority at Home to Minority Abroad
Unlike native citizens in Taiwan, the implicit and explicit ties of Southeast Asian spouses to their homelands were often mistaken for an unwillingness to be integrated into the host society, associated with feelings of alienation, superiority, or other kinds of exclusionary cultural differentiation (Palmary, Burman, Chantler and Kiguwa, 2010, pp. 141-142). Regarding the foreign spouse learners’ transnational issues, there is limited research on the emigration policies of their original countries (Castles, de Haas and Miller, 2014, p. 296). However, the Southeast Asian spouse students have become notably more outspoken\(^{45}\) in response to the formal courses and policymaking rhetoric in Taiwan. As the majority at home but a minority in Taiwan, these Southeast Asian spouse activists were against any forms of prejudices and unfairness that might place them in a vulnerable, victimised position. Their socio-political awareness which led them to participate actively in the movement for curricular reform was thus gradually emerging.

To illustrate this point, one of the marital migrant interviewees, αβs13 (pen name: ‘A-gun’) who was mixed-race, Muslim, born and bred in Thailand firmly supported a multicultural plan of Southeast Asian language,

Today, I would like to talk about life stories of most Southeast Asian immigrant women (like from my hometown Thailand), who were my Thai-speaking radio audiences. They suffered too much merely because of their Southeast Asian origins, accents and looks. Hence, I supported the governmental Torch Plan in Southeast Asian languages. In addition, local people must learn to accept ‘us’. I did not like the concept of tolerance in the limited liberal curriculum of the

\(^{45}\) During the fieldwork of classroom observation, some radical Southeast Asian female programme attendees even personally conceived of China as a rogue state, and even accused government officials of appealing to Mainland China rather than standing up to it.
conservative Ma Administration, which sounded prejudiced to us (as minorities here). I hoped the government might recognise educational certificates issued in our original countries. The government had not done enough in the Torch Plan. So, I hoped the government would be much more efficient in helping Southeast Asian immigrant women through home visits rather than doing nothing, and I would actively seek for the supports of the Southeast Asian immigrant women from my ethnic association about it (Author’s interview with αβs13 at 1 pm, 30th April 2014 in the Multimedia Centre, Taipei).

Seemingly, even if this programme alumna disliked mere tolerance in the curriculum, the Ma administration ultimately tolerated their identity as long as multiculturalists steered clear of any form of radicalism. Given the political consequences of the relevant official policies, this interviewee (alias ‘A-gun’), as a Southeast Asian opinion leader in the local newly ethnic minority’s media, delivered on her pledge to promote multicultural voices in the pursuit of transnational women as newly minorities in the public forum. In this way, the priorities of Southeast Asian immigrant women were no longer merely attached to survival in the local patriarchal society but promoted their own ethno-political identities based on their ethnic associations (Tang, Bélanger, and Wang, 2011).

Indeed, their vulnerable status was under the local hegemonic conservatism. This type of xenophobia in the local patriarchal society was heightened by the revised adjustment scheme. A female Vietnamese spouse alumna αβs26 was thus concerned

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46 These new citizens’ representation of diversity in political participation and pursuit of relevant ethno-cultural rights could therefore represent the dawning of a new domestic vision of the state itself.
regarding their shift from a regular majority in their culture of origins to a much vulnerable, marginalised minority in a host society,

During the learning period, the negative, xenophobic descriptions of my people who were immigrants here (e.g. maids, reproductive role, or human trafficking) in the curriculum of the Ma administration made me feel shame of my own background. I felt we Southeast Asian immigrant women were marginalised in the society, from majority at home to minority abroad, along with the content of the adjustment scheme (Author’s interview with αβs26 was held at 9-11am, 27 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

In conjunction with the patriarchal, xenophobic content of the curriculum/adjustment scheme during the Ma administration, this female Southeast Asian spouse student emphasised the repressed voices of Southeast Asian transnational women as newly marginalised minorities in the host society. The head teacher in the γ school who was also concerned about one of the emerging hybrid minorities – most Southeast Asian immigrant women from very poor family backgrounds as typical stigmatised immigrant women – said,

A Malaysian-born, Singapore-raised, English-speaking overseas Chinese spouse student of mine said that she could browse the Internet to learn Mandarin, and our Mandarin courses were too easy for her. I had met this student in a Mandarin-based adjustment education workshop for foreign spouses held by the Council where other Southeast Asians (mostly Vietnamese) were afraid of her. Only one Vietnamese was confident enough to talk with her because of her higher socio-economic status back home, which was unlike other Vietnamese immigrant women from very poor villages as typical stigmatised immigrant women (although they were the majority at home). In addition, Vietnamese spouses in
my class had strong connections with their hometown although most of them sought to obtain Taiwanese ID cards and Taiwanese passports (with the note of their Vietnamese birthplace) for earning a living. However, I also had heard of an extraordinary life story of a Vietnamese spouse – a lady who never abandoned her Vietnamese passport. This lady was a Vietnamese teacher and notably different from most foreign spouses who were eager to obtain Taiwanese ID cards (Author's Interview with γt1 at 5:30pm, 25 April 2014 in the γ school, Taipei).

Beyond the extraordinary example during his teaching life, γt1 witnessed the naturalisation of most Southeast Asian spouse students (especially the Vietnamese) who held strong attachments to their culture of origin.

Nevertheless, it could be argued that the students who had strong overseas ties were more likely to be involved in the issues and voices of marital immigrant women. γs12, who had stronger overseas ties, was more enthusiastic about the activities of the Southeast Asian feminist NGO, the TASAT and said,

We joined in the extracurricular ethno-political associational activities because of the schooling and classroom discussion on the sensitive ethnic-related issues. After divorce, I had more connections with my hometown Vietnam and participated more in these multicultural feminist activities for transnational women, especially for Southeast Asian marital immigrants (newly hybrid minorities). However, I believed that these ethno-political activities were not successful due to the unacceptance of the Taiwanese society under the leadership of the Ma administrations (Author’s interview with γs12 was held at 4-6 pm, 28 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).
This account illustrated that their ethno-political associational activities could be viewed as the extension of ethnic conflicts in class. And the development of socio-political awareness of Southeast Asian transnational women students was highly relevant to the extent that it had been accepted in Taiwan during the Ma administrations, including multicultural women’s issues, presenting as another trigger of political socialisation after the initial experiences of transnational migration.

3.2.2 Circumstances of the Overseas Chinese Spouse Students: Cultural ‘Passing’

‘I think we need to look more closely at why identifying myself as black seems to you to be making a fuss. I think we need to keep in mind that it’s a fuss only if it disturbs your presumption that I’m white. So perhaps the solution is for you to not make that presumption. About anyone. That certainly would be better for me, because I don’t look forward to your confusion and hostility at all. I’d really prefer not to disturb you. But you see, I have no choice. I’m cornered. If I tell you who I am, you become nervous and uncomfortable, or antagonized. But if I don’t tell you who I am, I have to pass for white. And why should I have to do that?’

– Adrian Piper, an American Philosopher of Otherness and Cornered, 1988 (Mercurylanes, 2009)
The exclusion that Piper describes in an American setting, was similar to the position of the overseas Chinese spouse students, who had the same ethnicity as most locals but had to pass as Taiwanese in order to avoid the perils of discrimination from the majority in the host society. While remaining ethno-politically charged, this type of cultural ‘passing’ was extended to other loci of social anxiety, such as trafficking, slavery, gender politics and class as well. That is, ‘passing’ might reveal the flexible nature of identities that were not always visible, and it would be better to identify whether this phenomenon of being ‘cornered’ was a product of the transnational experience of being overseas Chinese spouses in Taiwan. Indeed, they faced an ingrained challenge, as ‘passing’ could be a source of national pride or ethnic shame, of individual pleasure or personal pain. However, according to Subparagraph 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 in the Nationality Act\textsuperscript{47}, the overseas Chinese spouse students were eligible to apply for ROC nationality through a policy of the right of return. This enables the overseas Chinese spouse students to move themselves from being in the minority in their countries of origin to embrace their own ethnicity in Taiwan.

Under these circumstances, overseas Chinese spouse students gradually came to their own individual assessments about the ethno-political aspects of the educational

\textsuperscript{47} Article 4 in the Nationality Act: A foreign national or stateless person who now has a domicile in the territory of the ROC, if meeting the requisites provided in Subparagraph 2 to Subparagraph 5 of Paragraph 1 of the preceding article, has legally resided in the territory of the ROC totally for more than 183 days every year for more than 3 consecutive years, under any of the conditions provided by the following Subparagraphs, can also apply for naturalization: 1. He/she is the spouse of a national of the ROC. 2. His/her father or mother is or was once a national of the ROC. 3. He/she is an adopted child of a national of the ROC. 4. He/she was born in the territory of the ROC. A foreign national or stateless person who is a minor, if his/her father, mother or adoptive parents now is or are national (s) of the ROC, even if he /she has legally resided in the territory of the ROC less than 3 years and doesn’t meet the requisites provided in Subparagraph 2, Subparagraph 4 and Subparagraph 5 of Paragraph 1 of preceding Article, can also apply for naturalisation (Laws and regulations database of the Republic of China, 2006).
programmes. For example, αβs7 expressed her own perspective on formal adjustment education below,

For overseas Chinese, this programme was not a way of assimilation, and the critique of assimilation [by some people] was overwhelming. You must learn Taiwanese language and culture if you wanted to live in Taiwan. It’s a universal rule wherever you went. It would be easier for a new life through learning local languages. I agreed with the government about promoting Mandarin education, and I did not want to see the development of multiculturalism without the emphasis of official language education. The purpose of Mandarin education for new immigrants during the KMT Ma Administration was to help adjust themselves into the new society. You know what? I have seen illiterates who did know the official language in the most miserable position in my home country. However, my personal bus-taking experience (which I shared in the classroom) made me vulnerable as the approaching male strangers once noticed my accents of speaking Mandarin then discriminated against my Southeast Asian origin although my appearance looked as same as the local women, which made me avoid chats with male strangers on bus afterwards (Author’s interview with αβs7 at 9:30am, 24 April 2014 in her radio station).

Concerning the challenge of the increasing population of marital immigrants, the KMT Ma administrations attempted to create schemes for pathways to citizenship, relying significantly on adult education culminating in cultural strategies of formal adjustment education for new immigrants to enhance their political socialisation. From αβs7’s individual perspective as being an overseas Chinese spouse, she seemed to firmly support the KMT’s position for its type of immigration education and nation-building. Nevertheless, this student with ethnic Chinese looks still encountered
unpleasant prejudice against her overseas Chinese accents and chose to avoid the subgroup identifying over chats on bus, as a way of cultural passing.

After suffering from prejudices against their marital immigration associated with given ethno-cultural disputes, some of the overseas Chinese (especially overseas Hakka) spouse students could hesitate to speak out with their own voices because they were from foreign countries and tended to sacrifice their ethno-cultural subgroup awareness for protection of their children in transnational marriages. Thus, αβs1, a Hakka born in Vietnam considered herself to be a foreign national and passively noted,

I had never thought that I would like to be Taiwanese, but I really wanted to help my elementary-school children with their homework. I still considered myself a Vietnamese Hakka because I never forgot where I was from. I rather viewed Taiwan as my children’s home country because its name was not ethnic Hakka-related. Besides, my Hakka husband and I both belonged to the targeted Hakkas. [Namely, the special commission and policies reserved for the ethnic Hakkas in Taiwan though the Mainland was not able to give the Hakkas a province] (Author’s interview with αβs1 at 10 am, 22 April 2014 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

Thus, the specific circumstances of being an ethnic Hakka, according to an Indonesian Hakka spouse student αβs2 working as a factory assistant in her late 30s, confronted her with a complex issue of cultural passing,

Approximately seventy percent of Indonesian inhabitants were strict Muslims. This was followed closely behind by Indonesian Chinese. Although Indonesia was identified by its own national identity, I still chose to have my own Hakka
identity. But being a Hakka was something different in Taiwan. Also, I supported an economically independent Taiwan rather than being a second Hong Kong in the campaign after the study. However, in Taiwan, I, an overseas Hakka spouse from Southeast Asia, would rethink how to response to such a socio-political issue although I understood the class debate over the Sunflower Student Movement between the teacher and Taiwanese students, which was resulted from the Westbound Policy. I seemed inclined to be aligned with the majority host society (Author’s Interview with αβs2 at 2pm, 28 April 2014 in the β school, Taipei).

Times were tough but the marital immigrant students who lived on the margins of society thought they would be even tougher due to inadequate policymaking during the economic recession. For αβs2, after having acquired greater socio-political awareness through education, her increased capacity allowed her to engage in campaign demanding better economic policy from the government. However, her minority position as an overseas Hakka immigrant woman made her feel that she had to conform to the cultural norms of the majority host society (Go (ed.), 2011, p.1).

Next, αβs7’s colleague, αβs13, mixed-race daughter of a KMT veteran and Southeast Asian, who hosted a broadcasting programme for foreign spouses at the

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48 The Taiwanese Hakka have long been the third pole in the arena of Taiwanese ethno-politics shifting between Taiwanese subjectivity and KMT-inspired Chinese historicity connection. As an astute burgeoning power, they can invoke their own form of cost-benefit analysis, embracing either side to advance their own interests (Lu, 2011) for transcending merely acting as promoters of their own regional politics, or making an impact on the national scene. In addition, the female overseas Hakka student interviewees seemed to support their Hakka husbands’ third force through customarily strong marriage bonds. In opposition to the would-be assimilationist policies, the students also witnessed or participated in the debates over the future shape of Taiwan.

49 The mission of The Chinese Association for Relief and Ensuing Services (CARES) was to help the second generation of the KMT army veterans who lived in the Southeast Asian borders although
KMT-associated radio station, also explained the circumstances of half overseas Chinese spouse students’ cultural passing within the Mandarin-based adjustment educational programme during the Ma administrations,

Foreign spouses lacked fluency in local spoken language and tended to hang out with their own ethnic groups (e.g. foreign workers from the same country) in Taiwan. The language barrier was the most prominent problem for those foreign spouses who were from very poor rural backgrounds. Immigrant women had even resorted to gambling and providing drinking/escorting/prostitution services. I viewed Taiwan as a country because my father had ROC citizenship. Although Taiwan or Mainland China had its own viewpoint on One China, many foreign countries might implicitly admit Taiwan to be country because of its economic autonomy. I tended to be a good follower of the KMT’s literacy education programme for foreign spouses [the Mandarin-based adjustment education programme for foreign spouses during KMT-led Ma Administration], as well as working in a KMT-associated radio station and reading the KMT’s newspapers with the statement: ‘The Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement was not an unsuccessful policy but just lacked enough promotion’. As to religious beliefs, my KMT-veteran father was an Islamic minority in China, which made me Islamic. I thus concerned the issues of few Islamic activities in Taiwan and the lack of Islamic acceptance by marital immigrant women’s in-law families here. For those issues and reasons above, I got no choice and had to note the importance of learning Mandarin alongside the worries of not being helpful for our children at study. What’s worst, the neighbours could figure out our

most overseas Chinese with this veteran family background had migrated to Taiwan from Thailand and Myanmar.
vulnerable places and belittle us due to the accents (Author’s Interview with αβs13 at 1 pm, 30 April 2014 in the Multimedia Centre, Taipei).

This passage was about an overseas Chinese minority spouse student who felt released from previous vulnerabilities once she arrived in Taiwan and embraced the cultural and linguistic policies of the Ma Administration. Undoubtedly, the long-standing ties of a KMT veteran family background might pull her towards greater political association with the KMT once she settled in Taiwan during the KMT Ma’s revised scheme period. Nonetheless, this mixed-race radio station hostess emphasised that the significance of the Mandarin-based adjustment education was essential for cultural passing (i.e. being afraid of the accent issues for exclusion), but also, alongside, her previous promotion of diversity through a policy of multiculturalism.

3.3 Finding a Balance: Socio-political Assimilation vs. Cultural Identity

As visible and vulnerable victims under cultural hegemony, the foreign spouse students often suffered from negative public scrutiny. This was particularly the case with Southeast Asians who arrived through marriage brokering. The public image of marginalised marital immigrant women was an extension of the socio-economically underprivileged status of their native husbands. Based on this bias, foreign spouses,

\[50\] Regardless of the underprivileged status, the new citizens have been potentially influential voters in general elections.
regardless of having permanent residency or naturalised citizenship in Taiwan, might search for a sense of transnational identity after attending state-led adjustment education programmes but could remain in a persistent sense of social marginalisation within the dominant culture (Wang, 2009, p.5). This section thus examines the prejudice experienced by the foreign spouse students, which provokes their relevant political socialisation.

3.3.1 The External Physical Factors

αβs20, a Thai marital immigrant student, argued that the curriculum discriminated against Southeast Asian spouses and workers by referring to them as servants (The News Editorials, 2015) along with their easily recognisable foreign appearance,

I felt the content of textbooks discriminated against Southeast Asian brides and workers. The description of servants made us mad. Indeed, the curricular guidelines of the Ma administration discriminated against us. Our looks and accents differing from locals made us much prejudiced, especially under the biased curricular guidelines (Author’s Interview with αβs20 at 2pm, 9 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

Initially, the local language barriers of the foreign spouses were emphasised rather than downplayed in Taiwanese society. In particular, their accents when speaking Mandarin, together with foreign looks and physical behaviours during interpersonal
interactions, made the immigrants easily identifiable and hence subjected them to discrimination.

Furthermore, most of the spouses were stereotyped as illiterates in the process of settlement. What is worse, some were viewed as existing merely for reproductive purposes. Moreover, it was often believed that as the result of language barriers inherited from the maternal side, mixed-race pupils had insufficient competency in comparison with their classmates, who were born from native-speaking mothers. The ever-increasing population of foreign spouses, alongside the large percentage of mixed-race pupils, has generated a new issue concerning mixed ethnicity in Taiwanese society. αβs7, an overseas Chinese spouse alumna from Vietnam being a Vietnamese radio programme hostess, explained this problematic issue, referring to her personal experiences of prejudice,

I had also encountered some forms of discrimination and ‘xenophobia’ as I am one of overseas Chinese spouses from Vietnam with our own language usages. In the first instance, everything was unsatisfactory to me, for example, the way people mocked my accent made me feel unhappy and excluded. The way they talked and then they talked about the local culture which excluded me had a profound effect upon me, which hurt my feelings deeply. They said some strong language against me. They said that my words and feelings were immaterial to them. What was worse, they kept asking ‘what did you want to get from us?’ (Author’s Interview with αβs7 at 10:30 am, 24 April 2014 in her radio station).

According to this narrative, αβs7 experienced discrimination based on the identifiable ‘otherness’ in her accent, producing feelings of isolation and exclusion. She
and her ethno-cultural language group could be categorised by the Taiwanese according to their own language usages and, as a result, she felt stigmatised.

On the one hand, the narrative above was disputed by the following statement of αβs14, a long-standing Mandarin-based adjustment education programme participant and marital immigrant living in Taiwan for two decades who objected to the first part of αβs7’s claims, saying of the immigrant women,

How dare those foreign spouses from my hometown seduced my underage son! I personally did not suggest talking to any of them who liked to go to Vietnamese bars as prostitutes. Most of them were still young but harassed my son who studied in high school. How insane it was! Some of them even said that they were secret lovers of some local celebrities, and they could tell local policemen names of those celebrities for avoiding arrests for illegal prostitution. In addition, I heard of one marital immigrant who used bogus identities for border-control entry three times and was respectively married to three senior Taiwanese in order to take all of their money (Author’s Interview with αβs7 who spoke in Hô-ló-uē was at 1 pm, 31 March 2014 in the Beta School, Taipei).

For αβs14, the negative attention αβs7 received arose from the reality of the criminal activities going on within the immigrant community. The judgments stemmed from the fact that prostitution existed among the foreign women who shared αβs7’s physical traits and ethno-cultural background. Furthermore, beyond the language

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51 On the other hand, αt1, a female Taiwanese primary school teacher in her 30s agreed with the foreign (overseas)/local language usage issues related by αβs7: foreign spouses from the same country used their native languages to help each other in Mandarin learning. Their pre-school children occasionally came to my class, and I also taught them basic Mandarin. Generally speaking, foreign spouses were not able to adopt local usages (Author’s Interview with αt1 at 8 pm, 15 May 2014 in the Alpha School).
barrier and accent as an external factor in the stereotyping of immigrant women, αβs7 identified an interracial tension in the formal courses,

We had rarely seen Caucasian marital immigrants attending the evening Mandarin courses located in Taipei municipal schools. Apparently, we had no idea about their attitudes. (Sigh.) Where had they been for studying this subject? It sounded odd to me (Author’s Interview with αβs7 at 10:30 am, 24 April 2014 in her radio station).

This could be viewed as another physical factor and scenery in their isolated conditions.

In addition to a negative public image resulting from their near illiteracy in Mandarin and their accents in spoken Mandarin, the students might suffer from the stigma of domestic violence at the hands of drunken husbands, which in many cases led to the additional dishonour of divorce (Ting, Ting, Lee, Ho, Cho, Tsai, and Zou (eds.), 2010, pp. 60-68, 102-107). This has come to form the typical public image of marital immigrant women. Finally, the social exclusion was related to the growing number of foreign spouses brought about by matchmaking networks that promoted transnational marriages spurred on by the demand in a patriarchal society to have brides who would give birth to a male heir capable of continuing the family line. As such, the marriage brokers greatly increased the number of transnational marriages via Chinese, Taiwanese, Hakka, aboriginal TV channels, and their own transnational matchmaking TV programmes. αβs12 from Vietnam was enraged,

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What were the strangers looking at? Being an optimistic, friendly person and a new citizen, I, an overseas Chinese, had still encountered somehow discrimination against my accent in society, e.g. some lousy people even asked me how much I sent back home after they had noticed that I was from another country by my looks. How awful they were! You know what. Those annoying baddies passed by or sat next to me on public transportation and said something nasty on purpose. Some jerks even asked me how much I was sold for in a transnational marriage. How evil they were! By what right did they assume the authority to discriminate against me? (Author’s Interview with αβs12 at 6-7pm, 13 May 2014 in the Beta School).

Despite efforts by αβs12 and other foreign spouses to integrate into Taiwanese culture, their experiences of local xenophobic attitudes made them feel depressed. Owing to financial circumstances, some underprivileged Southeast Asian women sought better lives in Taiwan by means of arranged marriages and, in doing so, unwittingly reinforced negative stereotypes. Their husbands’ deals with marriage brokers generated the perception in Taiwanese society of transactional brides in bogus marriages (which multicultural feminists opposed). Once in their new communities, these immigrant women faced a multitude of problems, ranging from an incapacity to adapt to the new culture, difficulties in the induction education of the receiving community, conflicts with their in-law family members, and the lack of legal knowledge of their host nation. Indeed, public discourse continued wider concerns about the education levels of children of foreign spouses as well as the possibilities of greater social impacts, with the collapse of marriages and the some well publicised cases of child abandonment by mothers (Lee, 2007). This experience of prejudice is something that shaped their political socialisation.
3.3.2 The Internal Cultural Factors

‘I went to school where I could meet mates. I preferred sitting next to other Vietnamese, and we could grasp the chance to speak Vietnamese. It was alright to see some learners from other countries in the same class though I did not talk to them. [After all.] I did not speak their native languages, especially I did not know about their original cultures. [In addition.] I knew little about the local culture, and Taiwanese rarely knew Vietnamese culture as well.’

- γs5, a Vietnamese migratory woman working in her mother-in-law’s Taiwanese Tofu and beverage shop, indicated ethnic differentiation during the Interview held at 3pm, 22 April 2014 in the National Library, Taipei

Firstly, αβs7 reflected on the cultural dimension of migration,

Southeast Asians [including Southeast Asian spouses] usually attended the primary and secondary night schools for adult education in the subjects of Mandarin and citizenship education. This programme seemed to have its own curriculum design, but it lacked understanding of Vietnamese learners’ culture of origin, e.g. the expression of ‘really?’ as a cultural difference. The
teachers who were not familiar with Vietnamese culture did not teach or explain cultural differences in class so that we encountered difficulties after class. A Mandarin expression – i.e. really? – was understood in local usages as an insignificant bridge to connect dialogues in Taiwan, while the expression casted serious doubts on one’s credibility in Vietnam. Vietnamese spouse students would misunderstand Taiwanese. After their long observation and comprehension in Taiwanese culture, they gradually felt they were different from Taiwanese in language practices. Overall, there were no slang lessons [lessons in usages] and we need to learn them by ourselves. This programme was after the governmental guidelines supplying the Taiwanese phonetic system. But the three-hour course twice per week was inadequate and not long enough in learning new vocabularies for the students from foreign countries (Author’s Interview with αβs7 at 10:30 am, 24 April 2014 in her radio station).

According to this narrative, αβs7 identified how even small local usages had heightened her sense of ‘otherness’ and uneasiness in using local idioms. According to her argument, these distinctions have created long-standing barriers to integration into Taiwanese culture for newcomers.

In order to decode the black box of national sentiment and identity development of those whose origin is in Southeast Asia, it is essential to examine the detailed cultural differences between domestic Taiwanese and overseas Chinese societies, e.g. the distinct type of Taiwanese and Chinese identity reconfiguration of overseas Chinese brides (especially Indonesian Chinese women) is evident when their maternal Chinese cultural practices regarding raising their children is criticised by their new Taiwanese families (Cheng, 2014, p.136). Sharp distinctions in cultural heritage like this are made by domestic women in Taiwan, although the overseas Chinese act as an asset in
increasing the KMT’s legitimacy (ibid., p.139) and tend to support Taiwan rather than their ancestral Mainland China and demonstrate an increasing ROC consciousness.

However, αβs8, an overseas Chinese from Indonesia and a KMT member who had been living in Taiwan for more than two decades, revealed her scepticism towards the prospects of her political party promoting anything that impinged on the elites’ benefits,

Though my maternal grandfather was from southern Mainland China, I supported the KMT-associated ROC in Taiwan. I might also support the KMT’s Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement if we did not live in Mainland and they did not live in Taiwan. I had never thought that the Mainland Chinese government would look after Taiwan because it had its own issues! Hong Kong’s situation seemed not so good after returning to Mainland China. If Mainland China and Taiwan had become one country, we would lose job opportunities because of competitive Mainland Chinese. Those rich people, the officials and their children who studied abroad would migrate to a foreign country immediately as the domestic circumstances went wrong. So, they would never care about it. But how about we poor ones? These issues which also were mentioned by the teacher in the adjustment education course made me feel desperate while studying in the programme (Author’s Interview with αβs8 at 7pm, 14 May 2014 in the Beta School, Taipei).

Clearly αβs8 worries that the KMT’s efforts to move closer to Mainland China will jeopardize the Taiwanese economy, prompting the wealthier to flee and leave the poor to be subsumed back into the PRC. Such a perspective shows that an overseas Chinese spouse student could connect the socio-political issues which were mentioned by the teacher in class, as a schooling stimulation on one’s political socialisation.
Indeed, as an Indonesian Muslim student αβs32 noted,

The local historical events taught in the curriculum recalled my memory back home because of the similar ethno-cultural prejudices in history. However, my good understanding of the local sorrow history did not get enough respects to my religious minority status in the educational settings (Author’s interview with αβs32 from 9am to 11am, 18 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

Another Indonesian Muslim student αβs24 added,

Indeed, the Ma’s scheme discriminated my Indonesian Islamic culture through a form of educational ignorance. I felt frustrated and would like to do something for my ethnic or religious culture (Author’s Interview with αβs24 from 9am to 11am, 15 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

The prejudice experienced by both of them, due to an ignorance of their culture of origins, was something that provoked their political socialisation.

Furthermore, non-traditional faith believers might feel somewhat restrained to engage in the local classroom, local society and the Taiwanese polity, by their identifiable cultural characteristics. γt1, a faculty member not only talked about the issues of patriarchal culture, but also illustrated the different experience of a male Muslim marital immigrant in the classroom,

Nearly four years ago, male foreign spouse learners started to attend our Mandarin programme and grouped themselves together regardless of their nationalities rather than mixed with women in class. In addition, male students who kept their original nationalities and passports enjoyed wandering out of the classroom during the break, which was very different from Southeast Asian
women (who would like to request Taiwanese ID cards and passports) chatting
to each other in the classroom during the break. We adopted traditional Confucian
teaching methods. Lately, a loud male Iraqi learner challenged the teachers
with various enquiries, especially advanced Mandarin questions which
volunteer teachers did not know the answers. That student was an engineer
from a patriarchal Islamic society which seemed much more male-dominant
than our traditional patriarchal society. At the staff meeting, I was the only
staff member who supported him. Unfortunately, I was not able to defend his
inappropriate behaviour in class because the committee members preferred
obedient students in oriental educational settings (Author’s Interview with γt1
at 4:30pm, 25th April 2014 in the γ school).

The interview above demonstrated the nuances of the integration of Muslim
immigrant men into Taiwanese society despite a parallel patriarchal background.
Despite the inherent patriarchal nature of Taiwanese culture, the Muslim immigrant
men were viewed as too aggressive and unruly. Coming from a background that
expected obedience from students, the teachers in the programme found themselves ill-
equipped to address the concerns of these students and found them to be overly
outspoken and challenging, which stood in the way of effective language instruction.

In addition to uncovering the effects of prejudicial cultural norms regarding
genders in the classroom, the fieldwork examining Taiwan’s marital immigration
politics and particularly the role of Mandarin-based adjustment education programmes
casts light on the extent to which overseas spouses are discriminated against by native-born citizens. In relation to public opinion on foreign spouses, αβs7 argued,

The society and immigration officers have awful impressions of those trafficking
criminals and shameless marriage brokers, so we were associated with a wrong
public image as troublemakers. You know what, some locals even asked us if the war was still going on in Vietnam, or if there were leaf-made houses in Vietnam. Yes, there were leaf-made houses in poor villages, but the Vietnamese War ended several decades ago. The government was not aware of some public images of misunderstanding Vietnamese marital immigrants. The senior husbands even prohibited immigrant women from receiving Mandarin education because they were afraid that their transnational wives would leave them after having local language proficiency. If they were genuine to us, they should not be afraid of that. Yes, some female foreign spouses left their husbands, but not all of them. In addition, they could find jobs and earn some money for their family after the language training. Moreover, the communist Vietnamese government always forced new immigrants to attend official language courses, but the Taiwanese government had never forced any new immigrants to attend formal adjustment education programmes (Author’s Interview with αβs7 at 9:30 am, 24 April 2014 in her radio station).

Undoubtedly, αβs7 expressed great concerns about widespread issues of human trafficking and sham marriages associated with brokering transnational marriages, which were contrary to The Regulations Governing Juridical Persons and Non-Profit Juridical Associations Brokering Transnational Marriages and The Regulations Governing the Implementation of Interview by the National Immigration Agency. Alongside her experiences of prejudice resulting from her cultural background, there seemed to be a great deal of uncertainty about a female overseas Chinese migrants’ ability to be the agent of her own destiny. As such, even if overseas Chinese were awarded nationality in Taiwan by jus sanguinis, the domicile laws still drew exclusionary civic boundaries around the political community based on the immigrants’ obligations to countries of origin. Thus, their identities were defined primarily out of
resistance to the bilateral political poles of the KMT and the DPP, as well as triangulation between their ethnicities, birth places and Taiwan. But this is no doubt just a variation on a more general theme, since the sense of exclusion and competing loyalties seemed to accompany immigrants generally. The resulting lack of the integration into their new polity might be somewhat overstated for the women restrained by the constraints from their patriarchal culture of origins. The KMT’s set education, curriculum, and marital immigration regulations, however, ought to shoulder some of the blame for this issue as well. The subsequent mutual incomprehension was preventable.

In addition, the government-sponsored adjustment education courses most appealing to new immigrant students taught Zhuyin\textsuperscript{53}/traditional characters rather than Hanyu Pinyin\textsuperscript{54}/simplified characters. While the KMT conservatives hardly appeared to promote a balanced language policy\textsuperscript{55} and to avoid triumphalism, programme instructor γt1 expressed his concerns,

I had taught only three Mainland spouse learners. They sought to learn the Taiwanese Mandarin phonetic symbols, Bopomofo for survival in the Taiwanese job market. One of them was illiterate, coming from a very poor and rural background in the Province of Fujian in the PRC. This Mainland spouse student was always a loner and felt politically discriminated against her communist belief.

\textsuperscript{53} The phonetic symbols, Bopomofo for traditional Chinese characters learning in the ROC’s educational system is the present Mandarin phonetic system in Taiwan, Republic of China (ROC).

\textsuperscript{54} The phonetic system of simplified Chinese characters used in Mainland China, Hanyu Pinyin refers to the official phonetic system for transcribing the Mandarin pronunciation of Chinese characters into Roman or Latin alphabet in the Mainland China, the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

\textsuperscript{55} Meanwhile, the paradigm of Mandarin-based Chinese historicity connection (Corcuff, 2011) was in competition with the mother tongues associated with indigenisation and the subjectivity of Taiwan (Makeham & Hsieh, 2005, pp.187-276).
However, such differences were not presented in Vietnamese brides who openly opposed socio-political discrimination outside the classroom, even if sharing a communist ideology collectively. One Mainland minority student from an Islamic province was a college graduate and fluent in Mandarin but came to my class, declaring that her husband had asked her to learn the Taiwanese Bopomofo to assist with his in-law family’s business. The teaching staff launched a series of advanced sessions to cater for her needs. In another special instance, a female American spouse had raised the most radical debate in class. In the first half of the class, she interrupted the Mandarin phonetic symbols, Bopomofo lesson in front of a volunteer Taiwanese teacher and insisted her native Roman phonetic system be applied in any Chinese learning. A female communist Vietnamese immediately responded with the statement that ‘we live in Taiwan, we must learn the Taiwanese Mandarin phonetic symbols, Bopomofo’ and turned back to seek her Southeast Asian sisterhood’s support by saying ‘classmates, what I was saying is right, isn’t it?’ This incident split the class into two main competing subgroups regarding learning Mandarin. I was the leading staff member trying to defuse the situation rather than reporting it to the educational authority. After class, most voluntary teaching staff remained supportive of the Mandarin phonetic symbols, Bopomofo because they thought that it was quite natural to learn it in Taiwan. After a two-week long discussion, a different teaching method was created, e.g. while one foreign spouse learner was unwilling to learn this ROC phonetic system but felt alright with the traditional Chinese characters, we would arrange this learner to attend the second half of the class. In the last two years, there were fewer and fewer learners trying to learn the Taiwanese phonetic system and only one or two foreign spouses would like to learn it in the revised learning session (Author’s interview with γl at 4pm, 25 April 2014 in the γ school).
This account of linguistic battle issues\textsuperscript{56} highlighted a division across the Taiwan Strait: namely, cleavage between PRC’s *Hanyu Pinyin* and the simplified characters vs. ROC’s Bopomofo and the traditional characters. Also, the students seemed to be challenged by an underlying form of censorship of language politics during the process of their political socialisation. They had to find the balance between cultural identity of their native linguistic patterns and socio-political assimilation of local official language policy.

Indeed, the awkward position of the marital spouses exposed a new challenge to the identity of multicultural Taiwan, as the government’s post-national citizenship and cultural policy became two overlapping and interweaving phases of the same movement (Wang, 2009, p.7). The policymaking of the KMT government added the major Southeast Asian languages to official primary education, with an emphasis on maternal cultures as another track in the dual approach to foreign spousal naturalisation, namely, the governmental *Torch Plan* executed by the National Immigration Agency. Compounding the difficulty was the concealed problem that very few official policy reviews and reports explored the effects of patriarchy or the implications of cultural differences and contrasts for programme participants.

Moreover, marital immigration issues became the battleground for both gender and ethnic politics. The outspoken feminist NGO – *TASAT* – which certain interviewees

\textsuperscript{56} This teacher continued the discussion and emphasised the hidden native language competition among the students: Filipino spouses could get English teaching jobs whilst Vietnamese and Indonesian had to rely on learning Mandarin to find jobs and communicate with their in-laws. Most female students in the class were from deprived backgrounds, except one American woman with higher social status. This was why she could directly voice her preference not to learn the Taiwanese phonetic system in class. I felt that this incident reflects to the reality of language competition, and English was higher than Mandarin in the hierarchy of universal language competition (Author’s interview with yt1 at 5pm, 25th April 2014 in the γ school).
joined, strongly criticised male officials in the Ma administration on its organisational website (TASAT, 2015) in support of this group of Southeast Asian marital immigrant women. However, the TASAT website pointed to broader issues of discrimination in Taiwanese society: ‘foreign spouses are not commercial products’; and asks rhetorically: ‘how dare they call us imported brides in a community filled with the multicultural marriages?’ (TASAT, 2015). Indeed, proof of the argument of the fractured nature of the movement could be found in the street-level conflicts between local women and female immigrants (TASAT, 2015). To understand this complexity, it was important to balance empathy with the anger of female immigrants at being excluded from mainstream society with an assessment of the difficulties resulting from the broader context of their associations in ethnic groups and the newly empowered socio-political self-awareness that has emerged. To illustrate this point, consider two significant marriage structures in the Meinung community – majority Hakka couples and the non-Hakka largely married to Southeast Asians. Such a consideration not only benefits the understanding of overseas Hakka spouses’ ethnic marriages, but also explains the initial attractiveness of grassroots NGOs for non-Hakka immigrant women. Thus, compared to the closer relationship overseas Hakka wives had with their local Hakka husbands, Southeast Asian wives ought to overcome greater cultural and linguistic differences to create supportive relationships. Thus, the grassroots NGO created a supportive network to empower these women against gender inequality and cultural prejudice. In particular, it supplied language education and praised the courage of Southeast Asian spouse students with a theme song of the educational programmes57.

57 Mandarin lyrics of the theme song went as follows: 天皇皇，地皇皇，無邊無際太平洋；左思想，右思量，出路（希望）在何方；天茫茫，地茫茫，無親無故靠台郎；月光光，心慌慌，故鄉在遠方；朋友班，識字班，走出角落不孤單；識字班，姐妹班，讀書（識字）相聯伴；姐妹班，合作班，互信互愛相救難；合作班，連四方，日久他鄉是故鄉。 (English translation of the lyrics made by the TASAT went as follows: The sky's so magnificent; the earth's so magnificent. The endless Pacific Ocean. Thinking of this; thinking of that. Where does the road come out at? The sky's so vast;
Subsequently, certain immigrant women of Southeast Asian origin demonstrated their integration into Taiwanese civil society by participating in intergroup dynamics and political demonstrations.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{58} For instance, protests erupted – like The Sunflower Student Movement which included the participation of Southeast Asian spouse students – against Ma’s 2012 re-election in response to his proposed further reconciliation with Mainland China and campaign promise of economic cooperation with the authorities in Beijing.
Chapter 4: Dynamics-related Transnational Identity under the Scheme Changes in Their Political Socialisation Process

4.1 Community Cohesion in Democracy Education?

The support of the DPP along with the level of participation in the so-called Sunflower Student Movement revealed the extent of public anger toward the Ma administration. The Ma administration proved unable to reply satisfactorily to a series of incidents that threatened press freedoms and democratic principles, e.g. the National Communications Commission Incident (Lai, 2010) and the non-transparent changes to the guidelines, which initiated on-going community-level intergroup conflicts. In particular, there was wide dissatisfaction with the changes to curricular guidelines, but the failure of the Ma administration to respond positively and diminish socio-political fear provoked an even greater backlash against the changes. This section discusses practices that undermined community cohesion. Through an examination of interviews of participants in the adjustment education programmes, this discussion continues the theoretical analysis of marital migratory dynamics in the socio-political context under the given educational settings.

4.1.1 More than Traditional Theme of Ethnicity?
Remarkably, γs1, a 37-year-old Russian carpenter whose marriage was arranged by the Korean Unification Church, reflected that ‘Taiwan was too tiny to stand itself against Mainland China, which was similar to the situation of Ukraine people under Russia’ (Author’s Interview with γs1 at 6pm, 23 June 2014, in the γ school).

As The Economist noted, President Ma Ying-jeou invoked the neologism, ‘Frenemy’ (the juxtaposition of a friend and an enemy) to characterise cross-strait intra-Chinese relationship (The Liberty Times Net Editorial Board, 2015d). However, within Taiwan itself, patterns of tension existed between locals and Mainland or overseas Chinese spouses, including the overseas Hakka whose ancestry descended from northern China. As the overseas Hakka had retained their solid ethno-cultural identity, they provided an alternative insight on transnational studies and marital immigration politics. So did the overseas Chinese spouse students in my case study, whose parents were originally from the Province of Fujian or Canton to Southwest Asian countries. For instance, αβs15, a middle-aged overseas Chinese spouse student originally from Indonesia, was an alumna of the adjustment education course during the first Ma Administration, commented,

I understood that some foreign spouses were not satisfied with Mandarin as an educational priority, and I attended the 72-hour high intermediate course taught by the head teacher for three months in order to deal with my Taiwanese ID card application. I was alright with other marital immigrants, and the classmates from Indonesia would sit down next to each other in class; I was a high school graduate in Indonesia and attended cram schools for learning Mandarin, so I could speak and write a little Mandarin before I came to Taiwan. Moreover, my parents were
from the Province of Fujian in Mainland, so I watched Taiwanese TV programmes and could speak Taiwanese [Hô-ló-uē], which helped me easily adjust myself to Taiwanese society. It went without saying that we understand the sensitive cross-strait topic although the historical connection was emphasised by the textbooks in curriculum after the scheme changed by the Ma administration; I felt that I understood traditional Mandarin characters [in Taiwan] easier than simplified ones [in Mainland China], but I could understand simplified characters as well. I expected the 72-hour long programme to be shortened because I had to look after my child and work (paid by hours) at the same time. Especially, I really needed the certificate of 72-hour course for my Taiwanese ID card application. I definitely considered to continue the study in the adjustment education programmes after my child grew up a little more (the interview with αβs15 who spoke in Hô-ló-uē in the Beta School at 7:30pm, 6 July 2016).

The interviewee above illustrated an unspoken rule for the people who were basically of the same ethnicity to understand sensitive political topics whilst receiving the curriculum after the scheme changed during the Ma Administration. From αβs15’s overseas Chinese perspective, issues of national pride were not easy for her, especially facing a bifurcation of the same culture and race (同文同種, Tong Wen Tong Zhong) between communist and democratic regimes. Besides, despite some voices denoted by this Hô-ló-uē-speaking (or so-called Taiwanese-speaking) against the KMT’s Mandarin-prioritised scheme59, the framework for the creation of a national identity

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59 With a close bond to tradition, the ethnic Hakka has been confirmed as an identified group through its distinct building style and culturally unique folk music, but the simultaneous development of a collective identity associated with Mandarin-speaking seemed to be superior to a Hakka identity.
according to the nationalists’ liking was encoded by the KMT within the guidelines for instructing newly arrived immigrants in Mandarin as the official language.

Next, αβs16, another middle-aged migratory woman alumna and illiterate from Indonesia, and a homemaker taking care of her father-in-law who had suffered a stroke, commented,

I attended the night school for new immigrants located in the primary school classroom for three to four months for obtaining a Taiwanese ID. To be honest, I did not learn well in Mandarin because it was too difficult, especially in a short time. So, I currently have forgotten how to use Bopomofo [Taiwanese phonetic symbols] which was taught by the teacher in class then although I could still remember how to use them. During my study at the Mandarin-based adjustment education programme, Indonesian students gathered and chatted in Indonesian language rather than using the Mandarin taught in class. Let me show you what I had written in Indonesian numbers and Mandarin characters; I had never attended any school in Indonesia as my father was Indonesian and my mother came from the Province of Fujian. I remembered that she read books in simplified Mandarin characters and spoke Southern Fujian dialect [Hô-ló-uē], so she taught me how to speak Taiwanese dialect [Hô-ló-uē]. After the scheme changed, I felt that the political issues got worse in the community dynamics, such as the dispute of ‘Taiwan was Taiwan and Mainland was Mainland’ (although both spoke the same language) during my study in the Mandarin-based adjustment education course. The teacher in class had been to Indonesia and showed that he concerns for us; being a mixed-race, I felt this programme never forgot my foreign mixed-race origin but expected me to cope with the local culture. I called both Taiwan and Indonesia my homes, and Indonesia was my old
home which my mother, older brother and younger brother remained in contact
with (the interview with αβs16 who spoke in Hô-lô-uê in the Beta School at 7pm,
7 July 2016).

Though αβs16 studied hard to overcome her illiteracy, and actively engaged
herself in the formal educational programme, her mixed-race background made her feel
that she was caught between a somewhat inclusive policy which benefitted overseas
Chinese and at the same time feeling like an outsider. In the aftermath of the changed
scheme under the Ma administration, αβs16’s mixed-race background, or αβs15’s
ethnic minority background from Indonesia, might also place them in a different
position from Mainland spouses (who were born and bred in a Chinese majority society)
amid the community dynamics, since both were aware of a sensitive intra-ethnic dispute
during their studies. Furthermore, whilst Mainland spouses from cross-strait marriages
have found themselves in a special but peculiar position within the national
community\footnote{Though Mainland spouses seemed to profit from the policy of cross-strait relations, these feelings
of commonality were limited by doubts in officials’ minds regarding the ideological reliability of the
Mainland spouses who were at times considered a threat to national stability (Cheng and Fell, 2014,
pp.21-22). What’s worse, Mainland spouses who became divorced were immediately deported to
the PRC unless they could demonstrate that they had been victims of domestic abuse or were
guardians of their legitimate children (ibid., p.18).} according to the Act Governing the Relationship between Peoples of the
Taiwan Area and Mainland Area (Cheng and Fell, 2014, p.17), the naturalisation
process of the spouses from Southeast Asia was clearly governed by the Nationality
Act. Under the Nationality Act, ethnic Chinese spouses migrating from Southeast Asia
were treated in similar fashion to other foreign national spouses in the naturalisation
process for a Taiwanese ID card as the narratives of αβs15 and αβs16, while spouses
from the Mainland were treated differently.
Despite sharing a common heritage separated only by the Taiwan Strait, overseas Chinese spouses (including overseas Hakka spouses) were motivated to review their transnational identities. αβs11, an Indonesian lower-secondary-school-graduate and a chef in Taiwan, was an overseas Hakka spouse student in the class and explained,

I intended to stay a long time in Taiwan and was not willing to return to Indonesia because of the anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia, and I had lived in Taiwan more than a decade. The anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia were as severe as the ones in Vietnam. **I used to talk in Hakka with my family back home; there were many Hakka people in Taiwan, and overseas Hakka spouse students tended to socialise with each other in school.** In general, teachers in school taught well, but my child did not learn Hakka in school or at home. …… Being a restaurant chef here, I noticed that the restaurant I worked at always turned the news channels on. So, I had watched a lot of news about Taiwanese politics, and I definitely knew who was the good guy or the bad guy after a long stay; it varied a lot after attending the Mandarin-based adjustment education course, and **I could understand the news in newspapers much more after the teacher’s explanation of socio-political problems in class, especially the KMT-led special relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China during the Ma administrations** (The interview with αβs11 was held in the Alpha School, at 7pm, 25 June 2014).

αβs11 emphasised that overseas Chinese underwent marital immigration to Taiwan because of anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia and noted parallels with the Vietnamese anti-Chinese riots in 2014. In particular, αβs11, an overseas Hakka spouse student, paid more attention to political news reports, the cross-strait relationship and associated developments after the lessons of understanding local socio-political
disputes. To sum up, overseas Chinese spouses here might be sensitive about the development of division of traditional theme of ethnicity because any change of political circumstances could bring about regulatory revision in the civil rights of Mainland and overseas Chinese spouses.

4.1.2 Alienation and Identity?

γs5, originally from Vietnam, an assistant in her in-law family’s tofu and beverage shop, said: I had no time to think about my hometown because I must focus on life adjustment in Taiwan and joined the adjustment education scheme for learning official language. I could understand the TV news due to the vocabulary learning from the class. In the view of local community, I, a foreign spouse, was only a reproductive tool, particularly under the adjustment scheme during the Ma administrations. And my mixed-race children were also prejudiced. I often felt desperate and never considered myself as Taiwanese, but I lived like

A primary-school-graduate homemaker and an overseas Hakka marital immigrant from Indonesia, αβs3 also described this issue: since I had never attended Mandarin courses in Indonesia, my [Hakka] husband encouraged me to attend the evening school designed for foreign spouses. However, after class, I had once asked my husband why Taiwan [in the curriculum] should take Mainland China as motherland? How about [the motherland of] the Hakka? (Author’s Interview with αβs3 at 7pm, 29th March 2014 in the Beta School). This student’s narrative hinted at how a new citizen used her Hakka identity to slot herself into the more general debate in Taiwan about the country’s relations with the Mainland. In this message, instead of following the given curriculum, she identified with her husband’s Hakka position, which underscored her doubt of the state’s subjectivity as connected to China and as exercised in domestic politics.
a Taiwanese because I had been here for a long time. This type of few Taiwanese identity was not enough to meet the official expectation (Author’s Interview with γs5 at 3pm, 22 April 2014 in National Library).

The narrative could be associated with cultural differentiation and national pride under the adjustment scheme during the Ma administrations, as another example of Piper’s ‘cornered otherness’ (or alienation). With that in mind, the question posed in Taiwan was how the government planned to foster national identity and a sense of shared socio-cultural identity. Exploring manifold governmental positions, one could arrive at the conclusion that foreign mothers (as the vast majority of foreign parents) and even the foreign father of a child in Taiwan with mixed ethnicity occupied a vulnerable position in the host society. This position was exaggerated on the maternal side, as the culture was so deeply rooted in a de facto patriarchal structure. Yet, the governmental efforts for students of mixed ethnicity, such as international family days and summer camps for mixed-race pupils, were ineffective in enhancing their related cultural rights. In the educational setting, government success was also significantly limited without the envisaged set of bilingual textbooks in mother-tongue courses. Overall, the most vulnerable marital migrants vocalised a fear of going against the majority. Nevertheless, their Taiwanese-born and bred mixed-race children reflected the manners, speech and thought patterns of their foreign-born parent, thus distinguishing them from the majority. In turn, the distinction influenced their estimation of who they believed themselves to be.

Regarding the sense of alienation of the foreign spouse students, βt3, a 55-year-old Hakka teacher in the Mandarin course, claimed,
The composition of learners gradually changed due to the shift of President Ma’s policymaking. But I still helped to issue the learning certificates, as one of required documents to obtain ID cards. Most learners in the community stressed their underprivileged status, which was totally different from TV programmes produced for the introduction of foreign spouses. What was worse, one foreign spouse revealed that she married a divorced man, which was a common situation in transnational marriages. Most of them had never finished the entire programmes, so I felt compassion for these foreign spouse students’ difficulties in surviving and raising children alongside their sense of otherness. The purpose of Mandarin learning was to find a job in Taiwan as well as helping their children in homework. I had seen lots of problematic transnational marriages, so I asked a young Vietnamese bride if she felt worthy to marry her husband in Taiwan, but this pretty youth almost cried over the huge age gap in her interracial marriage. Many young Vietnamese brides were married to older men in Taiwan, and the husbands always checked if their young Vietnamese wives attended the class because they suspected their dressed-up wives having affairs with other guys rather than attending the courses. The divorces and domestic violence could result in their absence from the programmes. On the contrary, a Mainland spouse student was very proud of the Mainland’s infrastructure, such as highways, together with superior attitudes in expressions, such as ‘you’re Taiwanese, and we’re Mainland Chinese’. But she was hesitant and reserved, with a communist-style conservativism, on sensitive political topics. In general, the programme attempted to change her identity, mentality, or political orientation [to assimilate communist-bred Mainland spouse] through the influence of the ROC’s democratic educational [Mandarin-based adjustment education] programmes. But I tended to teach
students in a traditional way (Author’s Interview with βt3 at 6pm, 6 June 2014 in the Beta School).

First of all, the teacher denoted the composition of learners gradually changed after the policymaking shift of the Ma administration. Amongst the remaining but underprivileged students in the community, this teacher demonstrated that his only Mainland spouse student retained a sense of pride in her Mainland origins, particularly bragging about the modern nature of infrastructure in the Mainland. This teacher also hoped to eliminate her inability to engage fully in political topics due to her Mainland communist background. In describing the circumstances of the Vietnamese participants in the programme, the instructor noted the ways in which marital difficulties promoted a sense of alienation and desperation. Lacking emotional connections with their husbands, these marital immigrants seized the chance to socialise with other immigrants who shared their cultural backgrounds in the evening courses, which in turn provoked the suspicions of their husbands and further domestic violence. The teacher identified both group’s sources of feelings of alienation in the host country culture, and their efforts to retain ties to the cultures of their homelands. In other words, this narrative might help to understand the rationale for the reluctance to entertain the development of a new national identity.

Reinforcing these perceptions, αt2, a Taiwanese teacher with more than ten years’ teaching experience in the Mandarin-based adjustment education programme for new immigrants, said,

The learners (mostly from Vietnam and Indonesia except one Mainland minority spouse) took part in each three-year learning period in the educational programme. In particular, the Vietnamese spouse students in the community preferred supporting Taiwan in the Vietnamese riot against the Chinese [In fact that the
Vietnamese protesters mistook Taiwanese factories for Mainland owned factories. However, their worries focused on not only Taiwanese-Vietnamese relationship but also prolonged Taiwanese economic depression due to their fears of being deported or being unemployed. Besides, their diverging national identity could be related to their Taiwanese ID cards and passports applications, as well as their own and their children’s national education under the curricular guidelines during the KMT Ma administrations, especially after the adjustment scheme changed (Author’s Interview with αt2 at 6pm, 9 June 2014 in the Alpha School).

Having experienced the subtle influences of the educational guidelines and immigration measures relevant to new citizens, the interviewees were extremely helpful in providing a glimpse into the learners’ issues of adjustment and difficulties in a new society. Indeed, αt2 explained the learners’ disappointments at circumstances and services of the public sector for their inclusion when the adjustment scheme changed during the Ma administrations. Perhaps the Vietnamese spouse students in the community that turned to the support of Taiwan in the Vietnamese riots were motivated by fears of being marginalised or deported.

Another teacher revealed the interests of the students in the history and current affairs of Taiwan. βt2, a 49-year-old National-Taiwan-University graduate, a Taiwanese teacher of civil society education in the programme, said,

The KMT’s guidelines for curriculum design affected the learning, but I tried to provide a comprehensive viewpoint to foreign spouse learners who married to the Weishengren, Benshengren, Hakka, or Aborigines but lacked understanding of public issues, including ex-Taiwanese DPP President Chen’s release, different historical eras of the Taiwan’s independence movement, the demonstration
against the 4th nuclear plant, and the Sunflower Student Movement, etc. **These incidents seemed to provoke their socio-political interests in classroom discussion, and further generated their self-awareness related to the sense of alienation and identity.** However, Mainland spouse learners remained silent about *The Tiananmen Square Incident* (1989). Students were curious about the KMT’s military crackdown and *the 28th February Incident*, as well as the policing in *The Formosa Incident*. After all, intergroup conflicts were always there, between migrants who arrived in different periods for me [a history teacher]. It was also essential to explore educational functions of promoting female immigrant learners’ equality in the community (Author’s interview with βt2 at 8pm, 13 June 2014 in the Beta School).

This teacher indicated that the prevailing attitudes in the educational programmes launched in the context of ethno-cultural disputes62, further provoked classroom discussion and socio-political self-awareness in accordance with the sense of alienation and identity. Thus, the potential mobilisations, including for immigrant women’s equality, which once more thronged the streets, clutching banners and blocking traffic in a face-off with police during the Ma administration, could be viewed as one variable of political socialisation as βt2 said.

Moreover, γs8, a Vietnamese spouse student added,

I joined in the *TASAT* for the prejudices against our foreign spouse sisterhood activities. The movements of immigrant women’s equality were against the curricular guidelines changes and immigrant policies/regulations related to the

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62 This includes *the 28th February Incident* (the later KMT migrants vs. the prior migrants and the Taiwanese), *the Formosa Incident* (the KMT vs. the DPP), the termination of the National Assembly, and the Hakka and the Aborigines’ self-awareness movements.
problematic adjustment scheme during the Ma administrations. By doing so, the people in the community would stop discriminating against us. I did not want to hear any foreign spouse students and their pupil children being laughed at in school within the community. These campus bullies were mainly due to the adjustment scheme changes during the Ma administrations (Author’s interview with γs8 at 6pm, 18 July 2016 in the γ school).

This TASAT-related Vietnamese spouse student emphasised her efforts in marital immigrant women’s equality amid community-based group dynamics. She was particularly against any form of bullying and social discrimination against them. Alongside the sense of alienation and identity, she expressed the opinions of foreign spouse students against the curricular guidelines changes and immigrant policies/regulations related to the problematic adjustment scheme during the Ma administrations.

4.1.3 Contradictions to Social Cohesion?

This subsection discusses the host society’s unwillingness to fully accept the foreign spouse students, resulting in their growth of feelings of alienation, exclusion, or inferiority. Whilst maintaining a variety of implicit and explicit ties to their homeland, the new citizens – as seen in this research – have called for recognition of the structural factors impeding their formation of socio-politically integrated identities among the
groups outside their origins. Ultimately, these foreign spouse students sought changes in civil society that would promote ethnic justice.

After re-election, President Ma promised reconciliation with the Mainland alongside economic rapprochement with the Beijing government. His opponents, especially the opposition DPP, accused him of yielding the island's interests to forces across the Taiwan Strait. In early 2014, this gave rise to the Sunflower Student Movement against a draft trade agreement made by the government. The initial controversies between political parties over the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement created several fractured splinter groups which the foreign spouse students joined. And ɣt3, who was a teacher in the course, witnessed this,

Female students mentioned their participation in the Sunflower Student Movement, which were based on their own grief and indignation for participating in such socio-political activities in Taiwan. That was because they suffered social exclusion. They especially felt excluded from policymaking of the adjustment scheme during the Ma administrations (Author’s Interview with ɣt3 at 6:30 pm, 7 May 2014 in the γ school).

In relation to social exclusion, the fieldwork has revealed the underlying cleavages in the struggle over pathways to citizenship, particularly the impacts found in the curricular guidelines made by the nationalist government. During the Ma administrations, some of the spouse students reacted to the general public's avoidance of multicultural claims. Thus, an overseas Hakka from Indonesia, αβs4, lamented,

What a pity that Hakka culture was being ignored, and the curricular guidelines of KMT Ma administration (made by the Ministry of Education) were mainly Mandarin-based assimilation. In addition, I was asked to give up my original
nationality in order to obtain a Taiwanese passport. I used to join in vastly different [community-based] activities but lacked opportunities to promote Hakka culture. One of my children who attended the basic Hakka mother-tongue course was the only one whom I spoke Hakka to (Author’s Interview with αβs4 at 6pm, 23 May 2014 in the Alpha School).

The statement reveals the depression that resulted from the disregarding of her ethnic Hakka culture. After understanding the Mandarin-centred circumstances, αβs4 found it difficult to exercise her ethnic Hakka voice in the community and domestic politics. αβs5, an Indonesian Hakka immigrant woman working in a restaurant also emphasised her Hakka mother-tongue after a long residence in Taiwan,

While Southeast Asians were against [overseas] Chinese in Indonesia and Vietnam, I stayed safe in Taiwan. I nearly forgot Indonesia after having lived in Taiwan for decades, which was good to me. Whilst the adjustment scheme promoted Mandarin, I still remembered my mother-tongue but only used it to communicate with local senior Hakka (Author’s Interview with αβs5 at 7pm, 9 June 2014 in the Alpha School).

This excerpt from αβs5 demonstrated that she felt much safer than being in Indonesia where her Chinese ethnicity could endanger her wellbeing, but she also realised that Mandarin-speaking hegemony might limit whom she could network with in Hakka dialect.

On the other hand, Hakka αβs2 further explained her ethno-political perspective regarding the rivalry between the KMT and the DPP,
The KMT government often neglected our ethnic rights regardless of our naturalised status. I was so disappointed about the KMT-led curriculum which didn’t mention any of our distinct subgroup’s contribution to the community. After following my Hakka husband’s political neutrality between the KMT and the DPP, I did not vote for any specific political party at the general elections at the end of 2014 or the beginning of 2016, but both of us supported the Hakkas as a third force. We Hakkas were just a small subgroup of new immigrants in the community. We had better not to join in their rivalry though both sides [the KMT and the DPP] had sought our supports during the campaigns (Author’s follow-up voice chat with αβs2 at 1-2 pm, 8 May 2016, via Skype Voice Chat).

This testimony demonstrated that overseas Hakka spouses seemed to follow their Hakka husbands by remaining a third force amongst group dynamics in the community. αβs2 considered her overseas Hakka identity to be distanced from either mainstream political party. In addition, she was upset about the absence of her subgroup’s constructive role in marital immigration policies upon the KMT-driven curriculum during the Ma Administrations.

Next, γs2, a rare male Iraqi marital immigrant, also talked about his different but still vulnerable position,

I knew that they did not like me and tried to exclude me in class. I would like to have an English-Chinese bilingual teacher to help me in Mandarin learning because it would be easier to learn Mandarin through a teacher with English proficiency. I had difficulty with the teachers who did not speak English and did not explain the meanings of vocabularies in English. How could I know Chinese meaning without explanation [in English]? It was very difficult to read
confusing street names on Taipei’s signs with various English spellings. I am an Iraqi and not a Taiwanese. I am a Muslim and felt hard to find appropriate food to eat in Taiwan. I considered to be naturalised, so I joined this community-based marital immigration educational programme to obtain the 72-hour learning certificate to be qualified to apply for naturalisation to a Taiwanese society, rather than a Chinese society of President Ma’s government. However, I suffered social prejudice regarding my Muslim background and culture in the educational system. I was initially hesitant to be naturalised because I felt discriminated against as a terrorist suspect. So, I support multiculturalism in marital immigration educational policy (Author’s Interview with γs2 who talked in English at 9 pm, 9 June 2014 in the Gamma School).

This was not just a simple expression of the social distance created by social conservatism. When one looked at the Muslim learner’s alienation through the lens of his religious belief, a great deal began to make sense. Lack of language alone no longer explained why a Muslim student decided to disassociate himself from a hybrid learning group. Nevertheless, he suggested multicultural development and the notion of Taiwanese subjectivity, rather than Chinese historicity associated with the ethnocentrism present in the curriculum during the Ma Administrations.

However, an atypical example of a cosmopolitan foreign spouse student was a middle-aged Spanish tutor from Argentina who joined a community-based adjustment education course for a few years. With a disinclination to engage in the prevailing ethno-political conflicts, γs3 firmly insisted,

Regardless of the relevant policymaking and educational guidelines, I viewed Mainland Chinese and Taiwanese basically as the same people, and I tended not to support the KMT Chinese nationalism or the DPP multicultural
connection to Southeast Asians. Also, I am different from most Christian foreign spouses (such as my Russian classmate) in this programme who were conflicted by religious differences as outsiders. They doubted the KMT’s policies and kept a distance at the same time [confirmed by ys1]. I had lived in many places such as Argentina, Europe and Taiwan, so I had learned to see all of them the same. In sum, I am a peaceful Buddhist and Taoist temples goer. However, I preferred the Roman phonetic system based on the Western alphabet merely because it was easier for Western learners (Author’s Interview with ys3 who spoke in English at 6pm, 10 June 2014 in the Gamma School).

For ys3, his daily practices in the local surroundings reduced hostility from the host community. In other words, this Buddhist foreign spouse student who stayed neutral in ethnic politics considered himself suffering less discrimination from native-born citizens, which varied considerably from the experience of those who presented more concerns about xenophobia in the host community.

4.2 Tensions in the Changes to the Curricular Guidelines
Figure 3: Protest Banners of Taiwanese-mentality (思台) against Chinese-mentality (思華) in the Changes to the Guidelines (The Liberty Times Net Editorials, 2015, p. A3)

This section argues that the changes to the curricular guidelines for national education (including Mandarin/history/geography/citizenship education) were received sceptically by foreign spouse students. Unlike the DPP Chen Administration, which set specific guidelines for marital immigration education, the KMT Ma administration initially neglected the need for direction in this area. Therefore, overall changes to the national education guidelines proposed at a meeting of the Guidelines Changes Committee held by the Ministry of Education, caused anxiety amongst new immigrants.

Apparently, ethnic minority rights were to be ignored despite the new era of multi-ethnic Taiwan; ethnic minorities and multiculturalism were given much attention in the new curricular guidelines. In the period that followed, ethnic challenges loomed large
as foreign spouses increasingly voiced concerns about the KMT’s biased guidelines. Mainland spouses were also dissatisfied as they considered the KMT’s policy implementation a half measure to meet its own political purposes. For them, the KMT never solved the double standard in obtaining national ID cards between Mainland and foreign spouses created by *The Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area*. The new immigrants also supported secondary school students and teachers protesting against the inappropriate KMT dominance in textbooks (Lin, Tsai & Lang, 2015, p. A1). Significant mass movements against the KMT’s reinforced guidelines took place amidst bureaucratic dysfunctions.

At the same time, several feminist NGOs (including the *TASAT*) protested the incorporation of terms that were insulting to newly immigrant women, e.g. references to foreign brides and Filipino/Indonesian maids listed in the changes of geography education (Lin, 2015). From their perspective, the prohibition of prejudice within immigration law had been violated by the inappropriate phrases in the changes to the guidelines. The insulting nature of these changes was evident in my interviews with marital migrant students. A Southeast Asian spouse student (e.g. γs6, a Muslim from Indonesia who felt more religiously discriminated against than Buddhist migratory women, interviewed at 5-6 pm, 1 June 2014, in the Taipei Multimedia Centre) mentioned the radical political NGO *TASAT* during the fieldwork carried out on the official educational programme. One Mainland spouse student refused to talk about politics but recommended a Mainland spouse socio-political association and endorsed the claims on its official blog. I therefore contacted these two NGOs’ representatives for further clarification of their positions. For example, the *TASAT* was firmly against any form of KMT inspired ethnic discrimination regarding the violation of their subgroup’s rights of Southeast Asian spouses, as well as against the KMT’s dismissal of multiculturalism and its China friendly leanings (*The TASAT* Editorial, 2015a; *The
These views were emphasised in a voice chat with the TASAT office administrator δn4.

One Southeast Asian marital immigrant, αβs14, a Vietnamese spouse who was a programme participant, paid attention to the changes to the guidelines both for her immigration education and her children’s national education. In a follow-up conversation in May 2016, she commented,

School teachers who supported the DPP were angry at KMT’s changes to curricular guidelines which oppressed their Taiwanese consciousness and views of history, so they encouraged us to vote for the DPP which stood for Taiwanese identity as its promises in campaigns of the two major elections in the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2016. My children’s teachers also told them to pass this message to parents who had voting rights. As I know, most Southeast Asian spouses with foreign cultural or multicultural backgrounds voted for DPP (due to their disappointments at the restricted multiculturalism of the Ma administration). I had witnessed the radical conflicts between mainland-oriented and Taiwanese-identity groups in school and community. The TV headline news were also filled with ideological competition between the KMT and the DPP in national identity debates. I supported the DPP more because it was not China-oriented and continuously developed local railway transportation. Another reason to choose the DPP was bad economic condition under the KMT Ma Administration, which was totally different from the old days when my sisters and I began to live in Taiwan. I remembered that several international economic reports ranked Taiwan top two or three around the world under the DPP administration. After having seen so many societal tragedies of Southeast Asian spouses who were divorced and got involved with drugs and sexual criminality due to their poverty during the Ma administrations, I was deeply worried about my children’s future of limited job opportunities under the Taiwanese economy,
as well as certain Taiwanese who worked in foreign countries might suffer from potential abuses (Author’s follow-up voice conversation with αβς14 in Hô-lô-uê at 5 pm, 7 May 2016 via Skype Voice Chat).

Owing to the distinct ethnic background and economic influences, this account of a Southeast Asian spouse student demonstrated the reasons why the DPP’s Taiwanese orientation in educational policy and at the elections gained support and was more attractive than the KMT’s. She also disclosed that most marital immigrants who expressed dismay at the restricted multiculturalism being carried out were aligned towards the island consciousness of the DPP’s supporters after the adjustment scheme changed.

Certainly, the most significant cleavage contextualizing the tensions over the changes to the guidelines was the contest between the pan-Chinese consciousness of the KMT’s Chinese historical connection and the indigenisation-framed DPP’s Taiwanese autonomy, a long-standing dispute originating from a sense of old and new homelands, some that is reflected on the cover of Taiwan’s passport. As the controversy gained steam, the KMT government relied more on their ethnic-genealogical paradigm (or the so-called nation-building plan) (Smith, 1991, p.123) rather than Taiwanese indigenisation (Bentuhua).63

In the revised curricular guidelines for the official educational programmes, the KMT government’s narrow political nationalism could be seen most obviously in the curriculum, e.g. its bogus claim that the PRC is only temporarily occupying the

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63 The poll of political effectiveness and governmental satisfaction has not only revealed a support rate of lower than 9%, but is also criticised as autocratic censorship in national education. In addition, leading scholars claimed that President Ma was the invisible hand behind the surreptitious adjustment of the guidelines at the KMT’s meeting in 2010, which has been confirmed by the convenor of the adjustment of guidelines (The Liberty Times Net Editorials, 2015b). The changes in the guidelines made by the Ministry of Education thus could be viewed as the way to align with the KMT’s political ideology (The Liberty Times Net Editorials, 2015d; Wu, 2015).
Mainland area. Indeed, the curriculum expressed the ROC’s claim to be the legitimate government. γs5 from Vietnam expressed doubts about these changes in the guidelines.

I joined in this programme because instructors might explain the meaning of the content. The teaching staff might care for us, but conversations were not long enough. From my Vietnamese perspective, the KMT’s new guidelines focused on the connection across the Taiwan Strait, but it did not convince people to accept the cross-strait special relationship in territory and sovereignty (Author’s Interview with γs5 at 3pm, 22 April 2014 in the National Library).

The narrative above also highlighted the key issues surrounding the biased guidelines. When the KMT worried about its diminishing support, it attempted to maintain leadership through its historical connection with Mainland China, based on a related ethnicity (Chu, 2012). Within this context, the KMT guidelines primarily emphasises those elements that underscore the commonalities shared with Mainland China rather than adopting a professed multicultural framework. Nevertheless, on the other hand, as the Chinese nationalist party, the KMT, engaged with Mainland China through a competition for cultural representation of the Han, while Taiwanese indigenisation gradually came to be associated with Hô-ló-uē, Taiwanese Hakka and Taiwanese aboriginal identities (Makeham and Hsiau, 2005, pp. 55-56). Since the KMT’s massive election defeat in 2014, the KMT’s political reputation has declined alongside the gradual shift of power from the KMT to the DPP in Taiwan. At the same time, the release from prison in 2015 of the DPP’s previous President Chen, who had been convicted of money laundering during his administration, has ironically bolstered the DPP’s popularity. For the defenders of status quo, they could learn from the peril of renewing the guidelines without turning to successful principles in national
education policymaking, seeing as the teachers interviewed voiced complaints about the new guidelines similar to γs5’s.

Nonetheless, significant incidents in modern Taiwanese history were excluded from the KMT-led guidelines for curriculum over objections from the students, educators, and historians. At the same time, the KMT’s scheme highlighted elements, such as the association of Chinese customs with patriarchal authority, for its own political purposes. Suffice it to say that the KMT’s defence of China would appeal more strongly within Taiwanese society based on a patriarchal, patriotic and Chinese historical connection to its *status quo*.

In addition, γs14, a female Vietnamese student, confirmed the culture of silence in group dynamics during the period of curricular guidelines change,

The circumstances of this adjustment education programme varied while the KMT administration changed the curricular guidelines. Patriarchal and rigorous disciplines taught by a voluntary teacher with the KMT military background made us feel uncomfortable. In addition, many people in the community also did not accept the curricular guidelines changes, and our lives were just like under culture of silence during that period of curricular guidelines changes (Author’s Interview with γs14 at 3pm, 29 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

γs14’s narrative revealed the culture of silence in community dynamics over the changes to the curricular guidelines.

Furthermore, γs16, another Vietnamese spouse student in the 2015-16 course, added her comments after the scheme changed,
The revised curricular guidelines of the KMT Ma administration neglected education in diversity and a developing multicultural Taiwanese society. The community people asking for more Taiwanese history inclusion did not think the process of the guidelines changes for history education transparent, either. I was gradually socialised in the process, especially in politics (Author’s Interview with γs16 at 6pm, 16 July 2016 in the Gamma School).

In the process of political socialisation, foreign spouse students might have repugnance for the approach which displayed an ignorance of the developing multi-ethnic society in contemporary Taiwan, as γs16 mentioned. The public criticised the overemphasis of Mainland Chinese history (Lin, 2016) whilst asking for more coverage of Taiwanese history, that is, for fair, respectful and transparent changes in the curricular guidelines, as γs16 implied.

To sum up, the new guidelines for formal Mandarin and citizenship education were seen ethno-politically biased because they did not assist the newcomers to view historical events through a diverse ethno-cultural perspective. Instead of re-evaluating the guidelines, the KMT government held the requests and recommendations of the public in contempt (Lin, & Hsih, 2015, p. A3).

4.3 The Praxis-oriented Means of Assessment in Policy Implications and Group Dynamics

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64 For instance, critics argued that the historical curriculum against Japanese might possibly open historical wounds and stir an incident with Japan.
In regard to Nanjing as the capital, and its historical Chinese connection, in the process of the scheme changes, overseas Hakka spouse student αβs11 expected students could participate in open and rigorous discussions,

Censorship of the curricular guidelines changes was outrageous, such as demanding schools to teach Nanjing as the capital. Students should have the confidence to challenge controversial opinions and take part in open and frank discussions (Author’s Interview with αβs11 at 7pm, 25 June 2014 in the Alpha School).

In addition to group dynamics in the community after the scheme changed, Vietnamese spouse alumna αβs23 also witnessed the demonstrations over free speech curbs,

I also have seen several demonstrates in Taipei city fighting over free speech curbs, as well as intergroup conflicts in community (Author’s Interview with αβs23 at 9am, 25 May 2015 in the Alpha School).

Moreover, a Filipino spouse student, αβs27, believed freedom of expression was being stifled in the related policy implications,

I suggested the policy implication circumstances to allow our repressed voices to speak out. But we had some problems when it came to structural barriers for certain groups, like our marital immigrant women as ethnic minority female students on campus. Foreign spouse students who I spoke to agreed that they wanted everyone to have a voice on campus. Free speech had always been there to help and protect minorities when one looked at civil rights movements and
feminism, especially all the great progression under these movements was made possible through the use of freedom of expression (Author’s Interview with αβs27 at 9am, 2 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

The campus had long been considered a place for debate and for ideas to be challenged, but they were also meant to be places where minorities of all kinds could feel safe, comfortable, and not sidelined in a way they might be elsewhere. However, facing the policy of banning controversial speech regarding the Ma Administration during its scheme changes, the students refused censorship and expected the courses to uphold free speech.

Next, though the governmental schemes, namely the Torch Plan (see Figure 6.3.1), brought up some elements focusing on the multicultural backgrounds of marital immigrant students, the activities under the plan were infrequent, and the implementation of the plan was incomplete. The students thus remained dissatisfied with the government efforts for diminishing their sense of being marginalised and indeed anticipated its imminent demise. The design of the plan collapsed because the training of Southeast Asian language teachers in primary school education or as bilingual interpreters for the corporations was inadequate to resolve the shortage of teachers/interpreters. In attempting to meet the urgent shortage of bilingual interpreters for Southeast Asian businesses, the item on the immigration educational fund share list, i.e. The Proposal of Future Bilingual Leadership, overwhelmingly favoured training mixed-race pupils, who may be prepared in a decade or more, rather than appointing qualified interpreters. Initially, this might appeal to transnational families, however, it ensured that they remained only underprivileged beneficiaries of the programme without providing a means to sustain themselves in the long term.
Because the focus on multiculturalism was subordinated to the promotion of the ruling party’s ideology within the educational programme for immigrants, it was unacceptable to the foreign spouse students. Not surprisingly, marital immigrants – whose numbers were increasing – complained that their native languages were not officially recognised as local dialects. The inadequate implementation of the multicultural goals of the programme, as demonstrated by the ineffective accommodation of the language needs of immigrant families, hampered their integration and led to the feeling that they were second-class citizens.

Language concerns within the programme did not affect only Southeast Asian marital immigrants, however. Overseas Chinese immigrants also experienced discrimination based on their spoken native dialects. Depending on the origins, migrants from cross-strait territories (e.g. Mainland China, Hong Kong) and Southeast Asian Mandarin-speaking zones (e.g. Singapore, Malaysian Chinese communities) speak both dialects and Mandarin for daily communication. But in the following interview, αβς9, an overseas Chinese and Hô-ló-uē speaker from Indonesia who worked as a community cleaner, spoke of a language rivalry between Hô-ló-uē and Mandarin in Taiwan,
I had studied in Mandarin in Indonesia’s cram schools for a while, preparing for migration. In addition, I had learned some Mandarin due to my parents who came from the Province of Fujian. In particular, I spoke some Hô-lô-uē because of my parents were Hô-lô-uē speaking just like Taiwanese. I preferred traditional Mandarin characters as it was easier to comprehend although I could read simplified characters. The teacher in Taiwan taught Mandarin with Bopomofo phonetic symbols rather than Latinate alphabet. In order to obtain the ID card, I studied in several evening schools with various lengths of courses. Having learned Mandarin in the local evening schools, I noticed that Indonesian brides sat next to each other and gathered as a small group. This 72-hour programme was designed for language certificate as the requirement for naturalisation. It would be better if this Mandarin-based programme could care about our adjustment in the local Hô-lô-uē-based community beyond the rivalry of Mandarin vs. Taiwanese dialects. It took time to adjust and continue learning Mandarin in this programme from primary to secondary education level.

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65 This phenomenon of classroom dynamics was also revealed by other interviewees, such as αβs7, an overseas Chinese spouse alumna born and raised in Vietnam stated: in the first lesson, we did not know each other’s nationality and sat next to each other. After figuring out who was from the same country and who was not, the group dynamics changed a lot from the second or third class. People preferred to talk to their own ethnic group and gathered themselves as a subgroup in class (Author’s interview with αβs7 at 10 am, 24 April 2014 in her radio station). In addition, αβs1, born and bred Vietnam but an overseas Hakka married her Taiwanese Hakka husband noted: I had observed that the same cultural background students tended to sit next to each other as a small group in the adjustment education course. Overseas Hakka spouses were more sociable by chatting with classmates who spoke the Hakka language (Author’s interview with αβs1 at 9:50 am, 22 April 2014 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

66 Subparagraph 2 of Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of The Standards for Identification of Basic Language Abilities and Common Sense of National Rights and Duties of Naturalised ROC Citizens (2014): For applications made in accordance with Subparagraph 1 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of this Act, or by persons who, subsequent to divorce from an ROC national, have exercising responsibility of the right and obligation for the minor children: proof of at least 72 hours of class time is required (Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China, 2014a).
interview with αβs9 who spoke in Hô-ló-uē was at 7pm, 28 March 2014 in the Beta School).

Despite obtaining a job as a community cleaner, as a benefit of the multicultural scheme for new citizens and of her language advantage as a native limited Hô-ló-uē speaker, αβs9 complained that governmental efforts in immigration education hardly met the learners’ needs in the local community, because the daily spoken language outside of class was mainly Taiwanese dialects rather than Mandarin. In particular, her account addressed socio-political tensions inherent in the polarisation between official and vernacular languages, which could be correlated with the conflict between the Chinese historical connection and Taiwanese consciousness.

The following extract of an interview with αβs10, a middle-aged elementary school graduate of Indonesian and Chinese mixed-race provided further confirmation of this. This mixed-race marital immigrant expressed her sensitivity about ethno-cultural issues during the Ma administration,

My father was Indonesian, and my mother was overseas Chinese from the Province of Fujian. So, I could speak some Hô-ló-uē because my mother taught me. However, I only knew how to speak rather than writing. In addition, my mother insisted on teaching us her mother tongue rather than Indonesian language. But I still needed to learn new phonetic symbols and Taiwanese model of Mandarin because my mother taught me simplified Chinese characters. I preferred sitting next to Indonesian students and practicing Mandarin with them. Other students also talked in their mother tongues, so we talked in Indonesian in class to help each other in learning this new language. In order to obtain an ID card, I studied Mandarin in this programme. I felt the KMT Ma’s policies and curriculum expected us to be Chinese rather than new Taiwanese
citizens, and filled with economic concerns without genuinely accepted us to be new Taiwanese citizens. After giving birth to my child, my confusion became deeper due to very few governmental multicultural activities (The Interview with αβs9 who spoke both Hô-ló-uē and Mandarin at 7pm, 2 July 2014, in her church).

This account revealed the strong political sensitivity of a new immigrant student who had a multicultural background and preferred to be with the multicultural group in class. In other words, αβs10’s mixed-race status might show her preference for multiculturalism, which took precedence over her half overseas Chinese background with native Hô-ló-uē proficiency. αβs10 thus claimed that official multicultural activities (i.e. the Torch Plan) were only supplementary and infrequent. Also, αβs10 believed that the marital immigrant educational policymaking of the Ma administrations was merely for economic reasons rather than being a policy endorsing a multicultural pathway to Taiwanese citizenship; this was something that caused spouse students from Southeast Asia to be confused by the policy implementation under the Ma administration’s guidelines.

As illustrated in these testimonies, the Ma administration’s paradoxical emphasis on both nationalism and multiculturalism within the education programme did not earn the political trust of the marital immigrant students, especially those who demonstrated their growing dissatisfaction through protests. In addition, the southbound policy (for Southeast Asia) and the westbound policy (for the Mainland) could not bring about an integration substantive enough to meet their expectations. Left to their own devices in attempting to integrate into Taiwanese society, Southeast Asian TASAT-associated activists, as multicultural feminists, led by a DPP parliamentary representative.\footnote{The narrative of δn5 from the Association of Cross-strait Marriage Communication and Promotion.}
argued against the limited scope of the Ma Administration’s definition of citizenship as a narrow form of nationalism. And it seemed to reflect a carrot and stick approach within the two-sided policymaking of the Ma Administration. As a result, distributions from the fund left no one satisfied, as nationalists argued that the engagement policy of cross-strait marital migration also seemed to take a back seat. In the end, the educational plan lacked constructive attempts to promote a credible multicultural programme. Besides, the behind scenes manoeuvring over ethnically charged aspects of immigration education policymaking, e.g. the lack of transparency in holding committee meetings for the changes to the guidelines, could be viewed as state-level manipulation of both national education and marital immigration education policies.

In addition, the government’s lack of ethno-cultural sensitivity regarding the rivalry between marital immigrants 68 rendered it ineffective in managing their integration into the Taiwanese polity. αβs3, an overseas Hakka migrant woman from Indonesia, confirmed the long-standing interracial tensions between Chinese and Southeast Asians and their effects on her perspective regarding Taiwan,

My home island was next to Singapore. I got bullied by Indonesians and have heard of the same anti-Chinese riots in Indonesia [as the Vietnamese one], which made me refuse to connect with Southeast Asian groups in Taiwan. Regarding the riot against Chinese but damaging Taiwanese factories in Vietnam, I was sure that the Vietnamese must have misidentified Taiwanese factories as Mainland

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68 We paid attention to the students’ worries of the disputes over Mainland Chinese vs. Vietnamese (Author’s Interview with a military veteran and volunteer teacher, yt2 at 7pm, 7 June 2014 in the Gamma School). The above narrative demonstrates the extent that teachers in the courses were obligated to deal with the effects upon the immigrant students of anti-Chinese riots during the Taiwanese factory attack in Vietnam (2014) alongside language competition between Southeast Asian mother-tongues and Mandarin.
Chinese factories because they did not understand the meaning of Mandarin characters. For me, mainland and overseas Chinese were totally different. So, I believed that we varied from Mainland Chinese spouses in Taiwan. And, if the Vietnamese kept attacking the Taiwanese factories, they would lose international business. Hopefully, there were effective measures to solve this type of interracial problems (Author’s interview with αβs3 at 8 pm, 9 May 2014 in the Beta School, Taipei).

αβs3’s wary of anti-Chinese movements was due to her past experiences of being bullied. As a result, she did not connect with Southeast Asian groups in Taiwan, although she immigrated from Indonesia to Taiwan herself. Moreover, for her, Mainland spouses\(^{69}\) are one form of Chinese spouses in Taiwan, overseas Chinese spouses are the other.

αβs4, an ethnic Hakka from rural Vietnam, positioned herself apart from the rivals,

The lecture much helped me realise local Taiwanese news reports regarding the Vietnamese demonstrations against Chinese. However, I was born and bred in the Southeast Asian countryside which lacked public information. The Indonesian historical incidents of anti-Chinese movements occurred in big cities, so I only had heard of urban wealthy Chinese causing jealousy and exclusion of local Southeast Asians. From the Hakkas’ perspective, I would act like ‘better you than me’ to escape involvement in the arena of Southeast Asians vs. Mainland Chinese (The interview with αβs4 at 6 pm, 14 May 2014 in the Alpha School).

\(^{69}\) Based on the ethnic background, Mainland spouses supported the nationalist policies (the narratives of δn5 at the Association of Cross-strait Marriage Communication and Promotion on 12 April 2011).
αβs4 confirmed ethnic tensions but expressed her outsider position. Other overseas Chinese spouses from Southeast Asia might not position themselves between Mainland and Southeast Asian spouses, either. Most of them had either Cantonese, Hakka, or Hô-lô-uē (the dialects) background. For example, γs4, a Cantonese-speaking Chinese immigrant woman from Vietnam, who only used a Taiwanese passport, expressed her views after attending the programme,

In my childhood, the Vietnamese who could not provide better and cheaper food turned to purchase the items from Mainland China. We Vietnamese Chinese avoided eating the fruits from Mainland China because of the rumours now and then. As for the Incident of Taiwanese Merchants [the riot damaging Taiwanese factories in Vietnam in 2014], we [overseas Chinese] considered both Vietnamese and Mainland Chinese to be wrong because the Vietnamese should not mistake Taiwanese factories as mainland Chinese ones. If Taiwanese merchants avoided doing business and trade in Vietnam after this riot, it would definitely affect the economy of Vietnam. I believed so after I attended this adjustment education programme (Author’s Interview with γs4 at 7pm, 16 May 2014 in the Gamma School).

Although Southeast Asian and Mainland Chinese could be divided by pre-existing cultural tensions and lingering connections to their original countries, γs4’s position set her apart from the conflict between Vietnamese and Mainland Chinese, after attending the citizenship programme.
In sum, while Mainland spouses’ inferiority was politicised by their communist motherland backgrounds\textsuperscript{70} and socialist upbringing, which was incompatible with Taiwan’s democratic ideology (Cheng and Fell, 2014, p.6), the Southeast Asian spouses might also be affected by other issues related to the rise of new immigrants of overseas origins. This is because both migrant subgroups were politically affected by the major political fault line dividing KMT’s policy implications from the DPP’s. Based on the issues revealed by the interviewees, a fair, well-designed migration policy was thus essential and could avoid societal backlash by providing a win-win situation for the host society, migrants, and cultures of origin alike (Castles, 2008, pp. 6-7). Still, legislation passed by the government in efforts to promote its nation-building ideology seemed to exaggerate differences, whilst sham marriages caused public concern. Given the need to promote strong national unity in the face of an increasingly multi-ethnic society, the Ma administration should have better considered the risks of side-lining multicultural concerns in the curriculum.

\textsuperscript{70} Questions surrounding Mainland migrants in terms of juridical status and national incorporation underscored a key tension in the Taiwanese nation-building project. Perhaps, any amplified integration at the supranational level through the closer commercial ties of the island and Mainland has been simultaneously accompanied by a fragmentation of politics at the national level in Taiwan.
Chapter 5: The Extent of the Revised Scheme Facilitating a Grassroots Form of Multicultural Citizenship

5.1 The Deficiency of Relevant Human Rights Education

This section argues that students could not pursue their rights effectively because the curriculum and textbooks lacked information about relevant human rights laws, especially the ones related to specific rights claims they might make. As noted, the KMT government’s efforts to diminish education about contentious events such as the 28th February Incident (Fieishauer, 2012) created a sense of uneasiness among marital immigrant students in the capital city centre’s adjustment education courses. The efforts amounted, in effect, to censorship by selecting what materials would appear on the subjects test, as the KMT government could pressure textbook publishers and educators to conform to their education goals. As a consequence of these changes, marital immigrants perceived that the intention of the KMT government was to assimilate them (and their children) into their favoured pro-Mainland ideological agenda. Although the marital immigrant students were especially interested in rights-related historical events, they were somewhat frustrated about the omission of key events from the curriculum or the lack of open discussion in the community-based adjustment education course. This was noticed by voluntary teacher γt2,

The programme tried to avoid teaching the curriculum co-edited by the outspoken TASAT, Lai-Qu Huayu (I)(II)(III) for Immigrants71, with a focus on human rights,

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71 Only one community-based multicultural adjustment education course partially adopted (but avoided to use) this overlooked curriculum and textbooks. The Grade One was designed for students who had learned Mandarin over 40 hours, including: the lesson of travelling in Taiwan contained the introduction to the major four ethno-cultural groups in Taiwan and their languages; the lesson of the gift giving taught that giving a clock is forbidden. In addition, there was a case study of bullied mixed-race pupils on campus (Chong & Meinung Office, the TASAT (eds.), 2004, pp. 86-87). The Grade Two
multiculturalism and ethno-political awareness of foreign spouses. That was because the scheme changed since the first term of the Ma administration (Author’s Interview with γt2 at 7pm, 16 May 2014 in the Gamma School, Taipei).

Insensitive to the issue of censorship, the KMT government appeared also at best tone deaf in its governance. As a result, according to the testimony of two student interviewees (Author’s interviews with αβs17 at 9am, 1 May 2015, and αβs28 at 9am, 6 May 2015, respectively) who were supportive of multi-culturalism, the government quickly waded into the contentious issue of a cross-strait service trade agreement, without solving the domestic conflicts concerning the changes to curricular guidelines. This could generate a backlash based on violations of their induction education in human rights laws. Thus, the TASAT activists, who carried the poster ‘fight until the very end’, built solid connections with the protesters in what they considered to be significant steps in their continuing drive for the creation of a transparent democracy in a diverse ethno-cultural state. 72 The TASAT members strongly opposed the KMT was designed for students who had learned Mandarin over 80 hours. The introductory section was discussed with major dialects (Chong and Meinung Office, the TASAT (eds.), 2004, pp. 126-127) and a migrant film. The section on Taiwanese customs included a Taiwanese tale of marriage e-learning through songs, e-news, essays and storylines – in which rats were looking for their son-in-law and a touching Buddhist story – Maudgalyayana. The Grade Three was designed for students who had learned Mandarin over 120 hours, with a focus on the history of Taiwan, including the 28th February Incident, the Civil War between the CPC and KMT 1946-1949, the authoritarian period in Taiwan (1949-1987), the Formosa incident in 1979, the governments of the KMT and the DPP (Chong & Meinung Office, TASAT (eds.), 2004, pp. 35-36), and a discussion of Taiwan’s economic crisis where was argued that downturn was caused by competition from the stronger Mainland market of the PRC (Chong & Meinung Office, TASAT (eds.), 2004, p.42).

72 The dispute of ‘Chinese chauvinism dominating Taiwan’s education system’ was first raised by a Hô-ló-uê (the mother tongue of Benshengren) renaissance college student organisation during the protest over the PRC’s missile tests aimed at Taiwan before the first Taiwanese presidential direct election in 1996 (Hsiau, 2000, p. 1). Nearly two decades afterwards, the Sunflower Student
government’s violation of human rights of Southeast Asian marital immigrants in its legislative amendments to *The Nationality Act*. And the TASAT believed these new amendments contradicted the regulations of *The International Human Right Conventions* and were implemented without notice or negotiation with immigrant NGOs. For example, under the new amendments, the naturalised status of foreign spouses who were convicted of criminal activities (as illegal prostitutes through bogus marriages) within five years of naturalisation would be cancelled (see Article 3 and Article 4 of *The Nationality Act*).

Movement once more invoked Taiwanese consciousness and autonomy against China-oriented policy and relevant attachment to the Mainland.

73 Article 3: A foreign national or stateless person who now has a domicile in the territory of the ROC, if meeting concurrently the requisites provided in the following Subparagraphs, can apply for naturalization: 1. He/she annually has resided in the territory of the ROC for more than 183 days every year in total for more than 5 consecutive years. 2. He/she is above 20 years old and has the capacity to act in accordance with both the laws of the ROC and the laws of his/her own country. 3. He/she behaves decently and has no records of crime. 4. He/she has enough property or professional skills for his/her self-support or ensuring his/her living. 5. He/she possesses basic language ability in the language of our country and understands the basic common knowledge of national’s rights and obligations. The standards of determination, testing, exempting from testing, charging and other matters to be observed regarding the basic language ability and basic common knowledge of our country’s national’s rights and obligations provided in the preceding Subparagraph 5 shall be set by the Ministry of the Interior a (hereinafter referred to as the MOI).

Article 4: A foreign national or stateless person who now has a domicile in the territory of the ROC, if meeting the requisites provided in Subparagraph 2 to Subparagraph 5 of Paragraph 1 of the preceding article, has legally resided in the territory of the ROC totally for more than 183 days every year for more than 3 consecutive years, under any of the conditions provided by the following Subparagraphs, can also apply for naturalization: 1. He/she is the spouse of a national of the ROC. 2. His/her father or mother is or was once a national of the ROC. 3. He/she is an adopted child of a national of the ROC. 4. He/she was born in the territory of the ROC. A foreign national or stateless person who is a minor, if his/her father, mother, or adoptive parents now is or are national (s) of the ROC, even if he/she has legally resided in the territory of the ROC less than 3 years and doesn’t meet the requisites provided in Subparagraph 2, Subparagraph 4 and Subparagraph 5 of Paragraph 4 of preceding Article, can also apply for naturalisation (Laws and regulations database of the Republic of China, 2006).
Similarly, the NGOs argued that it was unfair that the amendments required newly naturalised immigrants to wait ten years after naturalisation to be able to take up positions in the civil services or be selected to stand in the general elections (see Article 10 of The Nationality Act\textsuperscript{74}). Additionally, the NGOs argued against the requirement that immigrants give up their original citizenship in order to complete naturalisation in Taiwan, since many other nations no longer demanded the same of their immigrants (The TASAT Editorial, 2016).

In particular, the International Human Rights Conventions obligated member states to engage in family rights’ protection. Concerning the relevant human rights law education, a Cambodian spouse student, αβs22 said,

I did not agree with the Cambodian government’s ban on Taiwanese-Cambodian marriages. If Taiwan claimed to value human rights, the Ma administration should have different attitude from the Cambodian government\textsuperscript{75} with regards to

\textsuperscript{74} Article 10: Naturalised foreign nationals or stateless persons have no right to hold the following government offices: 1. President, vice president. 2. Legislator. 3. Premier, vice premier or minister without portfolio of the Executive Yuan; president, vice president or Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan; president, vice president or members of the Examination Yuan; president, vice president, members or auditor-general of the Control Yuan. 4. Personnel specially appointed or designated. 5. Deputy Minister of each Ministry. 6. Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary. 7. Vice minister or commissioner of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission; vice minister of the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission. 8. Other government offices shall be compared with personnel holding selected ranks above the thirteenth grade. 9. General officer of the land, navy or air force. 10. Local government office position elected by the people. The foregoing restrictions shall be lifted after 10 years from the date of naturalization, but if otherwise provided by any other act, the provisions of that act shall prevail (Laws and regulations database of the Republic of China, 2006).

\textsuperscript{75} Citing the prevention of international people trafficking as its reason, the Cambodian government banned marriages between its nationals and nationals of several countries, including Taiwan. Due to the ban, Taiwanese nationals who married Cambodians were unable to apply for Taiwanese residency visas for their spouses, as applications for such visas require a marriage certificate issued by the Cambodian government.
the laws related to its adjustment scheme. Without a residency visa, Cambodian spouses ought not to travel to Taiwan and registered their marriage with Taiwanese authorities. It was ironic that the mother of a Taiwanese child did not have legal residency in Taiwan and was not allowed to work. The National Immigration Agency had measures to prevent human trafficking through bogus marriages, but why couldn’t it deal with things differently when couples were really married? What’s worse, why did the curriculum not mention the human rights law education? (Author’s Interview with αβs22 at 2pm, 3 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

As the Cambodian government officially bans its citizens from marrying Taiwanese citizens, αβs22 called on the Ma administration to give special consideration when processing applications for residency or marriage certificates for Taiwanese-Cambodian couples, as, according to the law, a marriage certificate from an immigrant spouse’s country of origin was required for such applications. For her, the extent of the adjustment scheme undermined their Cambodian spouse students’ civic rights, because the curriculum never supplied the relevant human rights law education.

A marital immigrant rights NGO76 (some students associated with in the case study) also argued that the curriculum discriminated against Southeast Asian spouses and workers by referring to them as servants. They expressed a preference to be called new immigrant women rather than foreign brides, arguing that the alternative phrasing removed the implied relation of dependence on their husbands, and the stereotype of being non-natives (The News Editorials, 2015). Indeed, in order to avoid the escalation

76 The TASAT indicated ‘the ban on transnational marriages with Taiwanese in Cambodia’ and ‘the harsh interviewing of foreign spouses for entry, which separated foreign spouses and their children.’
of these tensions into open conflict, it was essential that the deficiency of relevant human rights law education be resolved as soon as possible.

A Thai spouse student, αβs21 said,

We and our children do not need your sympathy but respect. We hope to be included to the society. But I had not become one of them yet. After completing the adjustment education programme and naturalisation, then we had the ID cards for work. The adjustment education course never talked about our ethno-political rights’ protection or enhancement, so we did not understand the related human rights law (Author’s Interview with αβs21 at 2pm, 21 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

Also, a divorced Indonesian spouse student αβs29 said,

Citizenship education course talked about working rights but incomplete. I noticed the restriction of divorced foreign spouses in working rights after my divorce. I did not have a fixed-term job, and the job offer I had was low. They disliked us, so they did not give me a fixed-term job. In addition, the launch of an open policy for the foreign spousal working rights came two years late than that for the Mainland spousal’s [the foreign one’s was in 2011, and the Mainland one’s was in 2009]. The adjustment scheme for marital immigrants of the Ma administration had bias on us. I did not want my children and my educational rights continuously be prejudiced against (Author’s Interview with αβs29 at 9pm, 23 May 2014 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

Both foreign spouse learners suffered from the lack of adequate human rights law education under the Ma’s adjustment scheme, something that would have enhanced
their civil rights, especially in getting a decent job. Since a great deal had happened to raise public awareness of the increasing divergence on the issues of national identity between the guideline makers and the induction programme users, any efforts to address Taiwan’s problems must first redress the glaring lack of human rights education. In the rights-based debates, the foreign spouses showed great concerns regarding an imagined or potential peril implicit in compliance with the curricular guidelines, as is clear in the oral testimonies presented in this case study. While the disputes came to their children’s educational rights\textsuperscript{77}, their shared worries, then, might become the unifying factor in pursuing cross-generational human rights\textsuperscript{78} as both used the same set of national curricula.

5.2 Political Participation in Concurrent Events

This section discussed the macroscopic realities of marital immigration politics and the growing political participation of immigrant spouses within the context of

\textsuperscript{77} First, nationwide high school students were against the changes made by the guideline committee members, the Minister of Education in June 2015 (The Liberty Time Net Editorials, 2015a; The News Editorials, 2015). Second, high school teachers and college students took part in the protest against disregarding Taiwanese history and multiculturalism (The Liberty Times Net Editorials, 2015c; The Liberty Times Net Editorial Board, 2015c). Third, university lecturers, together with the major opposition party, opposed the Ma Administration whose aim was self-preservation of its dominance (Jocylin, 2015).

\textsuperscript{78} For instance, the avoidance of the human rights issues from one generation to the next was demonstrated by the fact that the ethnic language rights of foreign spouses had not been acknowledged in parliament.
concurrent political events, such as the *Sunflower Student Movement*, the protest against *Changes in the Curricular Guidelines*, and other grassroots actions. γt2, a military-school-graduate sergeant volunteer teacher witnessed this,

The Vietnamese spouse students asked the question: ‘Teacher, do you love Taiwan?’ after they had participated in several protests and demonstrations against changes to the curricular guidelines. They also complained about the unaffordability of purchasing property due to the inferior economic policies of the Ma administration (Author’s Interview with γt2 at 6 pm, 10 June 2014 in the Gamma School).

Political participation was mainly due to issues around the nation-building agenda implicit within the curricular guidelines, and the departure from a more multicultural approach. Criticisms arose over the predominantly nationalist approach which overshadowed a more timid, supplementary multicultural scheme. Under the existing system, certain marital immigrant students remained silent. A Vietnamese spouse student αβs25 had witnessed this,

I had seen examples of the nationalists seeking to stifle those who do not agree with them. That really was quite a shame. We should promote a legal duty on the education sector to secure human rights within the law (Author’s Interview with αβs25 at 9am, 6 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

Moreover, γt3, another volunteer teacher in his mid-fifties, said,

The ethnic subgroup gathering was common in the classroom for ethnic associational socialising and networking, and I noticed that Vietnamese immigrant women students were talking about the Sunflower Student Movement
against the Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement. Surprisingly, the female students even actively invited us to join in the Sunflower Student Movement [that they had participated in]. These students also felt frustrated about the struggle of the official educational programmes for marital immigrants between the KMT’s China-oriented position and the DPP opposing position (Author’s Interview with γt3 at 6pm, 7 May 2014 in the Gamma School).

The learners from Southeast Asia were concerned as to whether Taiwan was better off enjoying a close relationship with China and were no less worried about potential jeopardy to the ROC’s democracy brought on by the PRC’s influence during the Ma’s scheme changed. Indeed, this volunteer teacher’s recollection provided evidence that the Vietnamese immigrant women students associated with populists/multiculturalists and anti-Ma movements. At the same time, this teacher identified these women’s struggles over pathways to citizenship within the context of the official educational programmes for marital immigrants, as an aspect of the broader polarisation between the KMT’s China-oriented position and the DPP opposing position.

Besides, it is also essential to reemphasise both the structural and agent-led factors in socio-political awareness of the marital immigrants. Under the pressures imposed by governmental guidelines to national education in the official language, culture and history of the host nation, separate and distinct identities were fostered during the

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79 I also confirmed with Southeast Asian spouse alumna γs9, alumna γs13, student γs5, student γs14, and student γs7 in regard to their learning experiences and after-school activities participation in Sunflower Student Movement and Student Movement against Curricular Guidelines Changes, respectively (Author’s Interviews with γs9 at 9-11am 8 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre, with γs13 at 9-11am 30 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre, with γs5 at 2-3pm 17 July 2016 in the Gamma School, with γs14 at 2-4pm 29 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre, with γs7 at 7-9pm 19 July 2016 in the Gamma School).
process of adjustment to the host community. Paradoxically, this hybrid group of newly naturalised immigrant women who lacked a cohesive relationship with the host community still required a measure of official state intervention to secure their equal rights. On the other hand, the official approval of even a token form of auxiliary multiculturalism increased worries in the host population that these new citizens would compete with them in the Taiwanese labour market. But, in response to these contradictions, an emergent self-awareness of newly arrived immigrants and the ensuing creation of social movements associated with their national identities had contested the exclusion said to be inherent in the host society. A foreign spouse student αβs33’s said,

Marital migrants fostered feelings of alienation and exclusion whilst not being fully accepted by the host society, e.g. the biased curriculum, so we turned to participate in the concurrent socio-political events for seeking the attentions (Author’s Interview with αβs33 from 9am to 11am, 28 May 2015 in the Alpha School).

This narrative thus looked to further analyse the community backlash against marital immigrants as well as the relevant issues surrounding their societal exclusion from the curriculum when the critiques addressed the flaws of policy implementation. From this analytic stance, it returns to a discussion of ethnic politics in marital migratory development and tensions which fostered certain students’ socio-political participation in concurrent events.

While competing for leadership in Chinese societies with the PRC, the Ma administration declared adherence to a shared Chinese civilisation and cultural nationalism. This cultural nationalism caused socio-political tensions amid immigrant groups in Taiwan, in part because its structure presented a dichotomy between the core
westbound policy of promoting a closer cross-strait relationship and the peripheral southbound policy focused on the Southeast Asian market, without promoting an adequate programme of integration based on multicultural principles. In effect, government efforts might have looked to cross-border marriages to make Taiwan a hybrid democratic polity, backed by a vibrant economy which was intricately connected to, and dependent upon, the Chinese market. Thus, the foreign spouse students were worried about an on-going prioritisation of nationalism over multiculturalism.

In a follow-up conversation after the 2016 elections, teacher γt4, who promoted multicultural elements in the educational programme for new immigrants, added,

As I know, female Vietnamese spouse students joined in several nationwide student protests against changes to the guidelines and China-oriented policies. They also worked with Southeast Asian spouse NGOs (e.g. the TASAT) for their ethnic and immigrant women’s rights claims in the amendments to immigration laws against the KMT’s proposals. They believed that voters’ changes in political orientation could lead a transition in Taiwan towards multiculturalism. Although the marital immigration trend was decreasing in recent years, the DPP’s new Southeast Asian policy began. The new DPP government would take power from 20 May 2016. And language learning rivalry between Southeast Asian mother-tongues, Mandarin and Taiwanese dialects would be a tough issue for the new government (Author’s follow-up voice chat with γt4 from 1:30 pm to 2:30 pm, 6 May 2016 before the governmental transition/political power handover from the KMT to the DPP, Skype Voice Chat).

This account revealed how the Southeast Asian spouse learners demonstrated their opposition to the nationalist guidelines and China-oriented policies. Indeed, they were in favour of multiculturalism. This testimony also demonstrated continual impacts of
the language rivalry between the political campaigns of both the KMT and the DPP as they appealed to the new citizens of Taiwan. Significantly, this factor of language-related rivalry in the process of political socialisation might continue despite the transition of government from one party to another.

With the growth of international migration and its increased political saliency, the political voices of immigrants had also been extended to both economic issues and international relations in the Asia-Pacific region. Programme participants interviewed in this case study, who worried about their economic future, seemed to care more about how government funds would be redistributed after the government had set up inter-ministerial taskforces. One reflective voice even asked when the Taiwanese economic miracle would happen. Besides, it would be wrong to underestimate the impact of spouse immigrant protesters, in alliance with Taiwanese indigenous activists in their opposition to both Chinese economic policies and the ambivalent policies concerning the guidelines for national education of the defunct government. Significant credit should be given to foreign spouse learners who absented themselves from the Mandarin-based courses to take part in the mass socio-political protests, regardless of the odds. Even standing up to those who dismissed their complaints of domestic violence, the immigrant women students sought the support of feminist NGOs against local xenophobic sentiments and gender inequality. To sum up, the students enthusiastically participated in events against the Ma Administration’s policies, which means they supported the empowerment of themselves as marital immigrant women who embraced a new multicultural identity. And the extent of the revised scheme de facto facilitated their grassroots form of multicultural citizenship.

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80 Author’s interview with αβς34, a Burmese spouse alumna from 4pm to 6pm, 17 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre.
5.3 Developing Multiculturalism within a Dual System

Inequality in the educational system under the Ma’s nation-building and China-oriented policy was an example of insufficient structural transition linked with high unemployment rate. Motivations behind the modified transitional policy agendas were highlighted by many of the interviewee students (only three male students were the exceptional) who were put into the category of multicultural women. A Thai immigrant woman, αβs31, said,

I heard from my previous classmates about the same fund (according to the measures) which not only adapted to adjustment education but also plugged-in to do the torch plan. The torch plan had not made it, and the Ma administration had lots of problems concerning its adjustment scheme. The Ma’s additional multicultural track did not support multicultural women’s voices to be heard. I believe that vulnerable women were easily bullied on campus or in the society. From time to time, I would have a thought in my head, but I (as a foreign spouse student) lacked the confidence to let that thought out, especially under the local patriarchal pressure (Author’s interview with αβs31 at 2pm, 5 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

An Indonesian spouse student, αβs30, further confirmed the overwhelming nationalism within a dual system,

The adjustment education seemed to assimilate us alongside an unsuccessful multicultural Torch Plan. While attending the adjustment education course, I did not know why the Ma’s Torch Plan was ineffective, would it be related to its
nationalism? So much was awesome around Taiwan if social mobility and multiculturalism mattered (Author’s interview with αβs30 at 3pm, 11 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

Indeed, the marital immigration education policy design promoting a bizarre criss-crossing of nation-building and multiculturalism carried out by the Ma Administration. First, owing to concerns over national security, the KMT government launched a revised population policy that diverted the marital immigration education funding to some groups for political gain. Second, though the government developed its broadcasting network (*The Global News for New Immigrants*) through marital immigration educational funds, this service neither changed public prejudice against marital immigrants as underprivileged, nor convinced new immigrant voters that the government merited a more benign public image for promoting their social advancement. Third, although the government invested in a projected ten-year bilingual translator training module for mixed-race pupils (The Editorial Board, 2015), it neither sensibly dealt with the urgent interpreter shortage in the Southeast Asian market nor explained how it would fill the gap between the future bilingual interpreter scheme and the current shortage. Fourth, the biased educational guidelines and related policies (including immigration educational policy) resulted in the decline of public support for the Ma Administration.

Moreover, it could be argued whether domestic party politics inspired transnational subgroups to seek their ethno-political rights due to competing educational guidelines and ideological struggles. Originally, the DPP administration guidelines during the institutionalised period emphasised multiculturalism in the citizenship courses; however, the successive KMT-led Ma Administration reversed the national education guidelines to those in the previous DPP Chen Administrations by
connecting Chinese historicity with nation-building. On the one hand, the citizenship courses were shifted to adhere to the new guidelines by emphasising ethnocentrism during the Ma Administrations. On the other hand, the new emphasis of the government’s foreign policy shifts, which greatly emphasised business interests in the Mainland more than cultural relations towards Southeast Asia, gave rise to feelings of insecurity and confusion among the marital immigrant students in this case study, especially whom originally came from Southeast Asia.

For example, αβs6, a homemaker in her late 40s, commented about the lack of clarity about her national status, as well as her worries about the effects on job opportunities that might result from the Ma Government’s focus on the Mainland and cross-strait issues,

I, a Hakka from Indonesia, had attended the Mandarin and citizenship education night courses for five years, from local primary to secondary education level. The curriculum asked us to accept it, like the KMT Ma’s educational programmes taught us about the Republic of China in Taiwan. I also was somewhat worried about the job market and economy under the rule of the KMT Ma government. Taiwanese would lose jobs if the government allowed Mainland Chinese to work in Taiwan. I would not like to see an awful economic situation as I had seen in Indonesia (a small mirthless bark of laughter) (Author’s Interview with αβs6 at 7pm, 1st July 2014 in the Beta School).

This student viewed citizenship courses as maintaining the nationalist doctrine based on the KMT-driven guidelines changes during the Ma Administrations. Moreover, her deep worries included the lack of effective solution on the given ethno-cultural issues together with the Ma’s deplorable economic policies.
Facing the economic uncertainty was embedded in the changes to guidelines as well as the whole series of questions that resulted from the guidelines’ focus on nationalism over multiculturalism, βt1, a native Taiwanese teacher in the programme also commented,

**Under the politicised guidelines/multicultural policies under political nationalism, my lecture taught foreign spouse learners about local culture and customs**, e.g. name-giving from the old generation (full of patriarchal ideas in girls’ names for the unexpected baby girl). Also, the local elderly underprivileged husbands were afraid that their Southeast Asian wives would leave, so the old husbands took their wives to my class and kept an eye on them. Lastly, **very few Western learners came for handwriting practice as they often went to language institutes rather than attending government-funded primary or secondary evening education programmes** (Author’s Interview with βt1 at 7pm, 4 July 2014 in the Beta School).

This instructor’s comments revealed the issue of subgrouping amongst foreign spouses in learning Mandarin, which means foreign spouses from more developed countries often attended Mandarin courses at private language centres. These more privileged spouses might see themselves as superior to Southeast Asian ones in this municipal class. Indeed, this division could affect political socialisation of the Southeast Asian spouse students.

Last but not least, an overseas Chinese spouse alumna αβs7 explained her general anxiety regarding the bipolarity of Taiwanese politics, during a follow-up chat in May 2016,
I was worried about the lack of policy continuity from the KMT leadership to the DPP administration. The previous KMT’s initial efforts provided a good direction for multicultural development - e.g. the *Torch Plan* - and should be kept or improved. I was very disappointed with the KMT’s failure in the general elections [in the end of 2014 and the beginning of 2016]. As overseas Chinese spouses, we fully supported the KMT’s Chinese nationalism and its policies for new immigrants (i.e. Mandarin education) although the KMT-led changes to curricular guidelines had disturbed pupils’ learning and their advanced subjects test (Author’s follow-up conversation with αβs7 at 10 am, 7 May 2016 via Skype Voice Chat).

The testimony was evidence of some Chinese-associated spouses’ support of the KMT’s dual system and form of policymaking. αβs7’s position was verified to an extent by the online presence of one well-known pro-KMT Mainland spousal NGO, *The Association of Cross-strait Marriage Communication and Promotion.*

Overall, the change in population demographics of immigrants challenged the KMT’s alternative nation-building plan. Perhaps, the most dangerous phenomenon gripping the nation was the growth of narrow political nationalism afflicted with the doctrine of any single political party. A growing number of foreign spouse students were beginning to realise that political nationalism was not the sole prerequisite for

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81 The group had accused the DPP of instigating the 2014 student protests against the KMT’s Mainland-oriented policies, and in a Facebook post during campaigning before the 2016 elections, the NGO submitted an open letter to the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-Wen: ‘we, Mainland spouses and in-law families, strongly questioned the DPP Tsai’s current propaganda against Mainland spouses’ civil rights because Tsai Ing-Wen used to be a MP who made several biased policies against us during the previous DPP Chen Administration (e.g. the investigation of our loyalty to Taiwan, restrictions on our working and civil rights). We request equality, especially in adjusting the time to obtain a national ID card from six to four years, to be equal to the regulations for foreign spouses on the same matter’ (*The Association of Cross-strait Marriage Communication and Promotion*, 2015).
social cohesion and created a set of ineffective migratory measures. Moreover, the multiculturalist students who were in favour of a wider celebration of diversity in national heritage, as an alternative to political nationalism. Despite promoting ethnic rights of transnational marital immigrants for a while, the multiculturalists under the Ma’s scheme had never succeeded in elevating ethnic celebrations to the same level as the Taiwanese national holidays.

5.4 Political Consequence of Identity

Deeper understandings of the themes discussed in class made their transnational identity formation manifest, e.g. a Vietnamese marital immigrant woman, γs11’s narrative,

After the study of the induction programme for new immigrants, I felt it deepened my political socialisation to think about political identity. Albeit the revised scheme was unhelpful, I took it as a thing to facilitate our grassroots movements in multiculturalism. In the aftermath of this induction programme, I hope every foreign spouse student out there has had a chance to think about the things that really matter and the difference that every single one of us can make. Part of my citizenship role is to shine a spotlight on multicultural issues that need that spotlight. So, I would continue to play my part in society and do my best so that I could wake up in the morning and feel energised while I actively participate in grassroots form of multiculturalism, especially in helping newly or soon-to-be
naturalised foreign spouses (Author’s interview with γs11 at 4pm, 7 May 2015 in the Taipei Multimedia Centre).

Because the civic scheme frustrated their ethno-political rights enhancement and facilitated grassroots form of multicultural citizenship, the foreign spouse students, such as γs11, gradually developed their own political identity.

Whilst maintaining a variety of implicit and explicit ties to their homelands, the new immigrants – as seen in this study – called for recognition of the structural factors, which have impeded the formation of their socio-politically integrated identities in Taiwan. However, without adequate respect for their diversity in ethnic politics, many participants harboured feelings of alienation or inferiority. For instance, the natives doubted whether newcomers in the programme would ever resolve their concerns by learning Taiwanese norms of behaviour and avoid the cultural faux pas that isolated them socially.

Compounded by the debate over ethnic diversity and cultural bias, the political consequences of identity emerged in learning and dynamics within the formal educational courses. Narrative analyses of educational impacts were thus provided as examinations of whether the courses assisted the individuals to view intergroup tensions through diverse ethno-cultural perspectives, as well as whether the courses became a medium driving them to be ethno-politically sensitive and multiculturally empowered.

82 For instance, the transnational marriages neglected structural factors like gender bias where the female migrant spouse students seemed to get involved in the struggle against patriarchal oppression, but the marriages were still viewed as a means to balance the shortage of domestic marriages.
As a result of rapidly increasing transnational marriage brokering, the largely underprivileged population of marital immigrants encountered significant difficulty integrating into Taiwanese society despite the assistance from support groups. Whilst the non-profit charity and volunteer learning groups implemented to assist their integration consistent with the official policies of the local authorities, a form of unspoken political correctness restricted a challenge to patriarchal domination. On the one hand, a plethora of understated issues confronted certain female immigrants, such as street prostitution, trafficking, sham marriages, and domestic violence. There has been growing pressure on Taiwanese society to find reasonable solutions to these problems, which are grounded in the issues of creating a truly multicultural society. But, on the other hand, solutions to these problems were stymied by the guidelines for the relevant education which were based on a cultural hegemony associated with governmental ideology. Thus, the interviewees revealed that the guidelines created a system that focused on cross-strait relationships while relegating the multicultural element of the plan to the background.

In addition to the difficulties of integrating into Taiwanese society, the narratives addressed an alternative issue implicit in Taiwan's nation-building programme regarding assimilating Mainland spouses who are ethnically and linguistically similar but politically different across the Taiwan Strait. Tensions driven by public concerns

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83 As Taiwan sought to establish itself as an independent polity in the international community, it simultaneously confronted the problem of how to integrate almost 300,000 Mainland spouses; this most recent wave of marital immigration across the Taiwan Strait began in the early 1990s and reached its peak in 2003, stabilising since then at roughly 10 percent of all marriages annually. Mainland spouses in Taiwan faced more onerous requirements for residency and citizenship than any other category of foreign spouses. In the years immediately following naturalisation, moreover, they remained barred from civil service employment and had limited family reunification rights (Friedman, 2010). These post-naturalisation inequalities were in relation to redefining the scope of the Taiwanese family and nation, which underscored a tension in Taiwan's nation-building project:
over the issue showed government difficulty in using marital immigration education to craft solutions that diminish disputes regarding national consciousness. After the general election in late 2014, the Ma administration no longer had the political potency to carry out such a programme, thus opening the door to the opposition to accuse them of failing to mend the roof while the sun was shining.

A review of the debates related to the necessity for greater state intervention to secure their education, integration and equality seemed to reveal the wisdom of an old proverb that ‘a setback may turn out to be a blessing in disguise.’ Though the magnitude of the effects of the political shifts underway was difficult to comprehend, there was still a significant need for a consistent curriculum of official language education and coupled with a support system designed to enable them to be effective members of the citizenry. In sum, the political consequences of identity might act as social reflection of the national move to balance the pros-and-cons of a normative pluralism given the relevant policies.

Turning to the macro and micro contextual decoding of these narratives, the migrant students, mainly affected by the Chinese historical connection rather than Taiwanese consciousness in the educational guidelines (Schubert & Braig, 2012), could be categorised into three primary groups on the left-right political spectrum (see figure 7.4.1) within the context of Taiwan’s political culture. During the struggles of the socio-politically marginalised under the first and second terms of the Ma Administration, the students tried hard to situate themselves under the leadership of centre-right KMT (the

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how to integrate the immigrants who were racially, ethnically, and linguistically similar, but who came tainted by longstanding political differences across the Taiwan Strait. The above issue which motivated the change of immigration interview enquiries were connected to a wider discussion of discrimination whilst migratory watch (BBC, 2010; 2011) supplied a possible solution to the phenomenon that illegal marriage brokers brought Mainland or Southeast Asian girls into sex industry via bogus marriages.

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leading party of the pan-blue coalition) as opposed by centre-left DPP (the leading party of pan-green coalition)\(^84\). Nevertheless, their experiences of different degrees of bias or care at the hands of different political parties explained their participation in specific ethno-political debates. For instance, extracurricular activities of the NGO TASAT were supported by a DPP parliamentary representative who helped them to fight for their individual rights at the meetings of the Alliance for Human Rights Legislation for Immigrants and Migrants (Fieischauer, 2012).

Figure 5: Political Spectrum of the Marital Migrant Students:

| The Centre-Left | The Centre | The Centre-Right\(^85\) |

In the process of political socialisation, those of the centre-right came to support the \textit{status quo} leadership of the Nationalist Party (namely the KMT) rather than the DPP. Yet, despite the fact that those on the centre-right followed the model prescribed by KMT's educational policies, the changes in the guidelines were not helpful to the Ma administration and certainly did not delay its downfall between 2014 to 2016. In general, narratives of the overseas Chinese spouses from Southeast Asia revealed the

\(^{84}\) Because the coalition was led by the KMT party whose flag is blue, it was named the pan-blue coalition; similarly, DPP party's green flag, led to the pan-green coalition name.

\(^{85}\) The individuals who tended to support the \textit{status quo} in the process of political socialisation fall on the blue end of the spectrum. The individuals who endorsed pluralism in opposition to the KMT-led identity and its attendant forms of political socialisation are found on the green end of the spectrum. The individuals who had neutral attitudes in the process of political socialisation are placed in the cyan zone.
dilemmas posed by choosing between the westbound policy towards Mainland China and the southbound policy towards Southeast Asia. In this sense, the students from Southeast Asia were caught up within major strategic issues, which played out in increasingly tense political confrontations in the denouement of 2014-2016.

It seemed clear that the pro-nationalist changes to the curricular guidelines were accepted by the centre-right migrant spouses and those who were in the centre on the political spectrum. Moreover, the students who became solid multiculturalists characteristically fall together on the centre-left of the political spectrum, especially the female student interviewees of Southeast Asian background who were associated with the feminist NGO TASAT, where the focus was on issues of unemployment and family breakdown. By taking on the legal restrictions confronting women, the centre-left’s political identity was formed by a transition from isolation and self-defence to a public alliance through the pursuit of transnational women’s rights. This was especially true of those whose transition from underprivileged to active socio-political protesters (with on-site TASAT political street shows and demonstrations) left them occupying a new position on the spectrum towards the DPP and populist movements. Through a self-awakening process, the students developed their political position after having experienced immigration education which included the discussion of political and cultural tolerance. The centre-left tendency coalesced through their mobilisation within the feminist group TASAT, promoting women’s empowerment against commercialised sexual exploitation as embodied in transnational marriages.
Chapter 6: Conclusion – Overall Review and Research Findings

Formal adjustment education had been implemented for nearly two decades by the end of the Ma administration c.2016. Over the same period, Taiwanese society had become more culturally diverse, and there was a widespread commitment to the values of liberal democracy and human rights, even where these might not always be observed. However, the findings of this study show a rather different picture. The examination of the KMT-led guidelines for curriculum, and the contexts in which national pride and values were embedded, had highlighted the degree of ethnocentricity in the policy of the Ma administration. The Ma administration attempted to shape Taiwanese identity for its own ends, while its guidelines for education attempted to inculcate a passive multicultural citizenship. Although the Ma administration had contributed a supplementary multicultural torch plan to marital immigrant students in its civic scheme, most of the interviewed foreign spouse students seemed not to appreciate this back-up plan. The over-emphasised nationalism of the scheme was particularly demonstrated by the need to give up one’s original nationality in order to meet the requirements of naturalisation. Certainly, the Ma administration had never been particularly successful in public information campaigns against intolerant attitudes towards new immigrants or assisting them into an integrated national culture. Nevertheless, the marital immigrant students developed their individual transnational identities under the shifting positions of the government. The learners appeared to have their own voices concerning the ideological competition between the pro-Chinese historical focus of the KMT Ma Administration and the pro-Taiwanese consciousness of the opposition DPP. Since this study aimed to explore the scheme’s impact on the political socialisation of the students, it was imperative to examine the impact of the
shifting nature of national curricular guidelines alongside local xenophobia. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 thus formulated a triple-dimensional examination of outcome-based political socialisation through classroom observation and on-site interviews in the educational programmes.

In this study, student participants sought to redress their unequal status through education. Given the economic depression and high unemployment rates at the time, the immigrants from Southeast Asia interviewed hardly had positive feelings, even with some of the benefits gained from adjustment educational policies. While their ethnic associated NGOs sought to promote transparent rather than secretive forms of policymaking, the students also fought for their rights to earn more government support.

The programme staff ranged from active educators to passive purveyors of information and thus, in this regard, could be key determinants in the political socialisation of the students. In fact, the evaluation by the staff of the political socialisation of their students, and the students’ own self-evaluation of their political socialisation, at times came to rather similar conclusions. They benefitted from an education in democracy but perceived it to too nationalist in orientation. Thus, a few students began to engage in extracurricular social movements as the unintended outcome of their educational process. At the same time, a series of government schemes, including the changes to the curriculum guidelines, led to tensions between Mainland and Southeast Asian spouses and the political mobilisation of both. Meanwhile, as part of the third-force political culture in domestic politics, the narratives of female overseas Hakka spouses in the programmes reveal their alignment with local Hakka husbands’ political views, as well as having a strong ethnic Hakka identity themselves.

86 One key element of the Ma administration was to roll back the de-Sinicisation elements of ex-President Chen’s Taiwanisation, with the emphases of Chinese heritage and situating Taiwan to the greater China in the contexts (Sullivan and Smyth, 2015, p.1; Corcuff, 2011).
Analysing statements of the programme participants who opposed the KMT’s educational guidelines helped to confirm the research itself. The KMT’s dual approach to marital immigration education was supplemented with the Torch Plan and associated with the southbound policy in Southeast Asia, without any concern for a possible backlash. Indeed, the curriculum guidelines did not account for the implications of ethnic conflicts between Southeast Asian and Mainland spouses. This thoughtlessness increased scepticism about the changes to the curricular guidelines. Whilst DPP-related mass movements attempted to bring about a positive policy reassessment, the Ma Administration, propelled by its ethnocentric bias, still appeared incapable of resolving the controversy. Furthermore, the main divisions among the programme participants were fostered by reactions to the interpretation of controversies where the government was not able to act efficiently to deal with protesters’ demands. Therefore, while the centre-right might ally with the KMT against the historical memory of Japanese militarism, the centre-left could stand with the DPP against Ma’s China policy.

Hence, issues arising from insensitivity to ethno-cultural difference, problematic fund sharing, debates about the westbound policy versus the southbound policy, as well as the neglected claims for civil rights of each subgroup and indeed the needs of individuals, all served as illustrative flashpoints in the course of political socialisation. Though the Ma administration implemented the Torch Plan and made efforts to integrate hybrid groups of marital immigrants, these efforts fell short and were undermined by the inherent contradictions of these policies. The fundamental thrust of the Ma administration connecting to Chinese historicity invoked criticism from the interviewees identified as centre-left and those who found obtaining citizenship more difficult than they first imagined. On the other hand, the centre-right marital immigrant interviewees firmly supported the policies of the Ma administration, particularly Mandarin-based programmes for foreign spouses.
Furthermore, the differences in learning outcome confirm that the Southeast Asian spouse learners were more likely to actively participate in the protests (e.g. the Guidelines Changes Protest and the Sunflower Student Movement) against the biased scheme, as well as participating in the activities of the multicultural feminist NGO, as a pathway towards their empowerment. As some Southeast Asian students joined in the extracurricular socio-political protests, it also could be argued that the students who have stronger overseas ties were more likely to be involved in multiculturalist campaigns for the empowerment of marital immigrant women. Also, some overseas Chinese spouse students tended to reconsider, rather than immediately affirm, their Chinese identity alongside the scheme changes while they commented on the Ma’s emphasis on improving the cross-strait relationship. Moreover, this transnational population was growing in prominence and self-awareness, as evidenced by the ethno-cultural roles they played in the construction of national narratives; and their opposition to Ma’s policy went viral and advanced a new direction in institutional reforms.

Indeed, this qualitative research conducted on political socialisation and on the related topic of adjustment education, has studied the life-histories of participants, regarding their political attitudes and further extracurricular socio-political engagement. Much of this life-historical case study was presented by those who were concerned about cross-generational patriotism, ethnic justice, diverse socio-political opinions, and/or the inspiration of student protests. Apparently, the perils of the educational measures arose for the marital immigrant students because of the lack of an effective voice bridging traditional bipolar rivalries and old divisions during the process of their political socialisation, something which dissatisfied many of the interviewees in this

87 For example, the overseas Hakka immigrant women students were most likely to join in their local Hakka husband for their ethno-cultural rights claims after the stimulus of the Ma’s scheme.
case study. Last but not least, the classroom observations demonstrated how gender inequality experienced in their homelands were renegotiated through an encounter with a new type of patriarchal culture present in Taiwan.

To sum up, the following research findings emerged from the lines of enquiry discussed above. Firstly, the socio-political issues emerging from the changes of Mandarin-based civic scheme (e.g. relevant policies and curricular guidelines as the mediums of integration) noticeably motivated their political socialisation. The issues could be based on ideological or cultural differences of origins, their emerging hybrid minorities awareness and immigrant women’s empowerment, or the situation of finding a balance between socio-political assimilation and cultural identity. Secondly, the transnational identity that emerges through their political socialisation was accompanied by their worries that they would no longer be accepted by the local community. It was also the case that there were divisions amongst the students over the changes to the curricular guidelines, and those who accepted the changes felt more comfortable within the local community as opposed to the students who resisted these changes. Thirdly, the extent of the revised scheme and the deficiency of relevant human rights education de facto frustrated their rights enhancement. However, this frustration (alongside the formal educational settings focused on ethnocentric connection to Chinese historicity rather than professed multiculturalism) facilitated their political participation in concurrent events, their grassroots form of multicultural citizenship, and their political consequences of identities.

Hopefully, this research has offered some insights that might be useful for future studies. As long as state multiculturalism may genuinely be concerned with respecting their original cultures and constructing a sense of belonging for the transnational students, a balanced transition towards a more liberal vision of their life journeys is
possible. Future studies could be directed at evaluating the degree to which state educational policies promote and facilitate equity⁸⁸ and active citizenship.

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⁸⁸ Regarding representatives of proletarian Southeast Asian spouses within the new southbound policy towards Southeast Asia, Tran, one of committee members, a mother-tongue lecturer (Tran, 2016) and director of a performing group contrasting with most underprivileged Southeast Asian spouses was appointed to a new committee for new immigrants in the DPP alongside a new title of the immigrant educational funds set by the current DPP Tsai Administration on the end of August 2016. Having a specific office demonstrated their successful lobbying for the marital migrants’ rights, as well as becoming more aware of how power structures work and how to engage themselves in the related advantages.
Appendices

1. The Nationality Act (27 January 2006)

Article 1: Acquisition, loss, restoration, and revocation of the nationality of the Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the ROC) shall be subject to the provisions of this Act.

Article 2: A person shall have the nationality of the ROC under any of the conditions provided by the following Subparagraphs:

1. His/her father or mother was a national of the ROC when he/she was born.

2. He/she was born after the death of his/her father or mother, and his/her father or mother was a national of the ROC at the time of death.

3. He/she was born in the territory of the ROC, and his/her parents can’t be ascertained, or both were stateless persons.

4. He/she has undergone the naturalization process.

   Preceding Subparagraph 1 and Subparagraph 2 shall also apply to the persons who were minors at the time of the amendment and promulgation of this Act.

Article 3: A foreign national or stateless person who now has a domicile in the territory

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89 The discussed regulations in this research.

of the ROC, if meeting concurrently the requisites provided in the following Subparagraphs, can apply for naturalization:

1. He/she annually has resided in the territory of the ROC for more than 183 days every year in total for more than 5 consecutive years.

2. He/she is above 20 years old and has the capacity to act in accordance with both the laws of the ROC and the laws of his/her own country.

3. He/she behaves decently and has no records of crime.

4. He/she has enough property or professional skills for his/her self-support or ensuring his/her living.

5. He/she possesses basic language ability in the language of our country and understands the basic common knowledge of national’s rights and obligations.

The standards of determination, testing, exempting from testing, charging and other matters to be observed regarding the basic language ability and basic common knowledge of our country’s national’s rights and obligations provided in the preceding Subparagraph 5 shall be set by the Ministry of the Interior a (hereinafter referred to as the MOI).

Article 4: A foreign national or stateless person who now has a domicile in the territory of the ROC, if meeting the requisites provided in Subparagraph 2 to Subparagraph 5 of Paragraph 1 of the preceding article, has legally resided in the territory of the ROC totally for more than 183 days every year for more than 3 consecutive years, under any of the conditions
provided by the following Subparagraphs, can also apply for naturalization:

1. He/she is the spouse of a national of the ROC.

2. His/her father or mother is or was once a national of the ROC.

3. He/she is an adopted child of a national of the ROC.

4. He/she was born in the territory of the ROC.

A foreign national or stateless person who is a minor, if his/her father, mother or adoptive parents now is or are national (s) of the ROC, even if he/she has legally resided in the territory of the ROC less than 3 years and doesn’t meet the requisites provided in Subparagraph 2, Subparagraph 4 and Subparagraph 5 of Paragraph 1 of preceding Article, can also apply for naturalisation.

**Article 5:** A foreign national or stateless person who now has a domicile in the territory of the ROC, if meeting the requisites provided in Subparagraph 2 to Subparagraph 5 of Paragraph 1 of Article 3, under any of the conditions provided by the following Subparagraphs, can also apply for naturalization:

1. He/she was born in the territory of the ROC, and his/her father or mother was also born in the territory of the ROC.

2. He/she has legally resided in the territory of the ROC for more than 10 consecutive years.

**Article 6:** A foreign national or stateless person who has made special contributions to the ROC but doesn’t meet the requisites provided in Subparagraphs of
Paragraph 1 of Article 1, can also apply for naturalization. Preceding permission of naturalization by the MOI shall be approved by the Executive Yuan.

**Article 7:** Unmarried minor children of a naturalised person may apply for accompanying naturalisation.

**Article 8:** A foreign national or stateless person who applies for naturalization files the application with the MOI and shall acquire the nationality of the ROC from the date of the permission.

**Article 9:** A foreign national who applies for naturalization according to Article 3 to Article 7 shall provide the certification of his/her loss of previous nationality. But if he/she alleges he/she can’t obtain the certificate for causes not attributable to him/her and foreign affairs authorities investigate and determine that this is true, he/she does not need to provide the certificate.

**Article 10:** Naturalised foreign nationals or stateless persons have no right to hold the following government offices:

1. President, vice president.

2. Legislator.

3. Premier, vice premier or minister without portfolio of the Executive Yuan; president, vice president or Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan; president, vice president or members of the Examination Yuan; president, vice president, members or auditor-general of the Control Yuan.
4. Personnel specially appointed or designated.

5. Deputy Minister of each Ministry.

6. Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

7. Vice minister or commissioner of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission; vice minister of the Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission.

8. Other government offices shall be compared with personnel holding selected ranks above the thirteenth grade.

9. General officer of the land, navy or air force.

10. Local government office position elected by the people.

The foregoing restrictions shall be lifted after 10 years from the date of naturalization, but if otherwise provided by any other act, the provisions of that act shall prevail.

**Article 11:** With the permission of the MOI, a national of the ROC may lose his/her nationality of the ROC under any of the following conditions:

1. His/her natural father is a foreign national, and he/she is acknowledged the parentage by his/her natural father.

2. His/her father can’t be ascertained, or he/she is not acknowledged the parentage by his/her natural father, and his/her mother is an alien.
3. He/she is the spouse of a foreign national.

4. He/she is the adopted child of a foreign national.

5. He/she is 20 years old and has the capacity to act according to the laws of the ROC and acquires the nationality of another country voluntarily.

Minor children of a person who lost the nationality of the ROC according to the preceding Paragraph shall concurrently lose the nationality of the ROC with the permission of the MOI.

**Article 12:** For a person who applies to lose his/her nationality according to the preceding Paragraph, under any of the following conditions, the MOI shall not permit the loss of nationality:

1. A male from January 1 of the next year after he was 15 years old, who is not exempted from military service and has not fulfilled his military service. But nationals, who reside overseas and were born overseas, and have no household registration in the ROC or moved overseas before December 31 of the year they were 15 years old, shall be excluded.

2. He/she is in active military service.

3. He/she now holds a government official of the ROC.

**Article 13:** Under any of the following conditions, a national who meets the provisions of Article 11 shall not lose his/her nationality:

1. He/she is a criminal defendant under investigation or trial.
2. He/she was sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment and the sentence has not been completely served.

3. He/she is a civil defendant.

4. He/she is the subject of a court judgment or administrative order and the judgment or order has not been fully executed yet.

5. He/she was pronounced bankrupt and his/her rights were not restored.

He/she is obligated to pay overdue tax or arrears of tax penalty.

**Article 14:** For a person who loses the nationality of the ROC according to Article 11, during the time he/she has not acquired the nationality of another country, his/her loss of nationality may be withdrawn with the permission of the MOI.

**Article 15:** For a person who loses the nationality of the ROC according to Article 11, if he/she now has a domicile in the territory of the ROC and meets the requisites provided in Subparagraph 3 and Subparagraph 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 3, he/she may apply for restoring his/her nationality of the ROC.

The preceding Subparagraph shall not apply to naturalized persons and their children naturalised concurrently who lost the nationality of the ROC.

**Article 16:** Minor children of a person who has restored his/her nationality of the ROC may apply for concurrently restoring their nationality of the ROC.

**Article 17:** A person who applies for restoring his/her of the nationality of the ROC according to Article 15 to Article 16 shall file the application with the
MOI and shall have his/her nationality of the ROC restored from the date of permission.

**Article 18:** A person who has had restored the nationality of the ROC has no right to hold the government offices provided in the Subparagraphs of Paragraph 1 of Article 10 within 3 years from the date of restoration of the nationality, but if otherwise provided by another act, the provisions of that act shall prevail.

**Article 19:** If it is found that the naturalization, loss, or restoration of the nationality of the ROC is not conforming to the provisions of this Act within 5 years, the naturalization, loss, or restoration shall be withdrawn.

**Article 20:** A national of the ROC who acquires the nationality of another country has no right to hold government offices of the ROC. If he/she has held a government office, the relevant authority shall discharge his/her government office; a legislator shall be discharged by the Legislative Yuan, government service personnel elected by the people of a municipality, county (city), township (city) shall be discharged by the Executive Yuan, the MOI, or a county government respectively, a village chief shall be discharged by the township (city, district) office, but the following Subparagraphs shall not be subject to this restriction if provided by the competent authorities:

1. Presidents of public universities, teachers who concurrently serve as administrative governors of public school of all levels, principals, vice principals or researchers (including researchers who concurrently serve as governors of academic research) of research organizations (bodies)
and principals, vice principals and contracted professionals (including part-time governors) of social education or culture bodies established with the approval of the competent administrative authority of education or culture authorities.

2. Personnel in public-operated utilities other than the persons who take primary decision-making responsibility for the operational policy.

3. Non-governor positions focusing on technology research and design regularly engaged through contract by various authorities.

4. Commissioners without position engaged through selection for consultation only according to the organizational law by the competent authority of overseas Compatriot affairs.

5. Otherwise provided by other acts.

Persons in Subparagraph 1 to Subparagraph 3 of the preceding Paragraph shall be limited to talents who have expertise or special skills difficult to find in our country and occupy positions not involving state secrets.

Government services of Subparagraph 1 don’t include teachers, lecturers and research personnel, professional technical personnel who do not concurrently serve as administrative governors at all levels of public schools. If a national of the ROC who concurrently has the nationality of another country wants to hold a government office limited by nationality as determined by this Article, he/she shall handle the waiver of the other country’s nationality before taking office and complete the
loss of that country’s nationality and the acquisition of certification documents within 1 year from the date of taking office, but if otherwise provided by another act, the provisions of that act shall prevail.

Article 21: (Deleted).

Article 22: The enforcement rules of this Act shall be enacted by the MOI.

Article 23: This Act shall come into force from the date of promulgation.

2. The Measure of Foreign Spouses’ Care and Counselling Fund Management and Operation (16 July 2014)

Article 1: According to Article 21 of The Budget Act, the foreign spousal care and counselling fund (hereafter “the fund”) is set for promoting comprehensive foreign spousal care and counselling services, training and developing relevant human resources, having multicultural society in order to efficiently integrate governmental and non-governmental resources.

Article 2: The fund is a special fund for its sub-units under Subparagraph 2 of Paragraph 1 of Article 4 of The Budget Act, taking Ministry of the Interior

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(hereafter “the Ministry”) as the superior authority institute.

**Article 3:** The source of the fund is from:

1. The funding of governmental budget process.
2. The income of receiving.
3. The income of the interest of the fund.
4. Other relevant incomes.

**Article 4:** The use of the fund goes as follows:

1. The expenses of research in relevant issues of foreign spouses and their children care and counselling.
2. Strengthening the counselling expenses before foreign spouses come to Taiwan.
3. The expenses of regional foreign spousal family care visit and the relevant services.
4. The expenses of medical supplementary and social care before foreign spousal household registration.
5. The expenses of activities of various foreign spousal learning course, promotion and encouragement as well as items of providing babysitting of participants’ children.
(6) The expenses of foreign spousal employment and career services.

(7) The expense of foreign spousal employee ability lifting learning programme.

(8) The expenses of organisational participation and development.

(9) The expenses of foreign spousal care and counselling volunteer training and operation.

(10) The expenses of supplements of metropolitan, county (municipal) governmental foreign spousal family service centre.

(11) The expenses of the promotion of multicultural concept, learning programmes and community service participation.

(12) The expense of foreign spousal legal service.

(13) The expense of management and general affairs.

(14) Other relevant expenses.

Article 5: The fund should have foreign spousal care and counselling committee (hereafter “the committee”), 33 committee members for two-year term, one of them is the chair who is also the minister of Ministry of the Interior. Another is deputy chair who is also the deputy minister of Ministry of the Interior. The other committee members are assigned by:

(1) One representative of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
(2) One representative of Ministry of Education.

(3) One representative of Ministry of Labour.

(4) One representative of Ministry of Health Welfare.

(5) One representative of Directorate-general of Budget, Accounting and Statistics.

(6) One representative of Mainland Affairs Council.

(7) One representative of National Immigration Agency.

(8) Three metropolitan, county (municipal) governmental representatives.

(9) Ten specialists and scholars.

(10) Eleven NGO representatives.

**Article 6:** The task of the committee goes as follows:

(1) Review of bursary, management, and operation of the fund.

(2) Review of annual budgets and accounts of the fund.

(3) Review of operation and implementation of the fund.

(4) Other relevant tasks.
Article 7: The committee has one executive secretary, two deputy executive secretaries and several administrative staffs assigned by Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Health Welfare, and relevant institutes.

Article 8: The committee members and staffs are all holding positions without salaries.

Article 9: The committee has the regular meetings per two months and temporary meetings in case, which are held by the chair; if the chair cannot do this, the deputy chair do it instead; if both chair and deputy chair cannot do it, the representative from the committee assigned by the chair will do it.

The final decision of the committee shall have the half committee members’ presentation and the agreement of more than half present committee members.

The authority should post the operation and research summary in its website as well as posting the committee report according to Governmental Information Disclosure Act.

Article 10: The fund management and operation should focus on the benefits and security concerns, and its management should cope with Public Reserve Act and the relevant regulations.

Article 11: The fund can be used to buy governmental bonds, treasury stocks or other short-term ones for the business need.

Article 12: Budget preparation, execution and account management of the fund should be in accordance with the Budget Act, the Accounting Law, the Audit Law and related regulations.
Article 13: The accounting transaction processing of the fund should fix with the accounting system.

Article 14: At the beginning of each year, the annual work plan and business report should be sent to the Executive Yuan for reference.

Article 15: If there is surplus in annual account of the fund, it should be allocated by the regulation.

Article 16: At the end, the fund should be closed, and the remaining should be handed over to the State Treasury.

Article 17: This measure was implemented since 1 January 2005, including the amendment.
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