Music from Beyond the Curtain: 
Soviet Recordings and 
Cold War Cultural Relations 
1950s – 70s

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Evgeniya Kondrashina, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

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Abstract

This study investigates the role of Soviet classical music recordings in Western–Soviet relationships during the Cold War, with a focus on the UK. Whereas studies of cultural relations have commonly concentrated on government interactions, I draw attention to private actors that shifted exchange between the USSR and the West from the political to the commercial sphere.

The research concerns, firstly, the motivations and interactions of state, corporate and individual agents involved in bringing Soviet-made recordings to the West and recording Soviet musicians abroad in the 1950s–70s, and, secondly, the analysis of these recordings as cultural artefacts: the choice of repertoire, iconography and critical reviews. I revise the established notion that the Détente period was characterised by stagnation in cultural relations between the USSR and the West, arguing instead that this was a golden era for Soviet classical music recordings on the international stage, when a diverse repertoire was recorded, licensed, manufactured and distributed.

This project demystifies the common view of the USSR as an ideology-driven state by demonstrating how Soviet motivation changed with time, becoming highly commercial by the 1970s. I propose that the USSR became a key player in the global classical music record business through three channels: recording projects with Soviet performers in the West, licensing and exports. Its full integration, however, would be hindered by internal idiosyncrasies of the socialist system that were at odds with the capitalist approach.

I show further that Western partners helped in this process of integration. When Western record companies selected imagery and sleeve notes for Soviet recordings, these often aligned with broader marketing strategies or softened any sense of hostility towards culture from beyond the Iron Curtain. In this way, classical recordings played a crucial role in the generation of perceptions of Soviet music and musicians abroad.
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Introduction

Building on existing scholarship exploring Cold War cultural relations, this study will investigate the role of Soviet classical music recordings in Western–Soviet relationships, focusing largely on the UK. The research will concern two key areas: firstly, the motives and interactions of state, corporate and individual agents involved in Soviet classical music record production and sales in the West; and, secondly, their analysis as cultural artefacts: the choice of repertoire, iconography and the discourses around the Soviet recordings created through the sleeve images, notes and critical reviews. The goal is to analyse Soviet recordings in the West as a product of the ideological, political and economic conditions of the times. I will investigate the movements of cultural artefacts and official and unofficial connections between the different social systems of the West and the USSR from the late 1950s to early 1980s, a time in which cultural relations were active and exclusive recording contracts were being made between the USSR and its Western partners.

Music recordings are saleable commodities. The work of the musicians making recordings is also available for purchase. Sales of recordings and radio broadcasts were the main ways in which Soviet classical music performances were disseminated across the West in the Cold War. Recordings by Soviet artists were a commodity that the USSR exported, licensed and produced on par with its capitalist partners, the private record companies. My aim is to demystify the typical view of the USSR as simply an ideology-driven state, demonstrating how Soviet motivations regarding the issue of recordings changed with time: from primarily ideological in the 1950s, to more commercial in the 1970s. For private Western record companies, famous Soviet musicians were part of a global system and were marketed along the same lines as their Western peers.

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1 Throughout this dissertation, I use the term ‘classical music’ in the very traditional and canonical sense, consistent with what commercial record companies would consider as such.

2 I use the word ‘record,’ ‘recording,’ ‘disc’ and ‘vinyl’ interchangeably to talk about the material object of the vinyl record.
I use the term ‘Soviet recordings’ or ‘recordings of Soviet artists’ to signify the body of recordings that were made in the USSR and then exported to the West, recordings made by Western record labels based on tapes of performances recorded in the USSR, and recordings of Soviet performers made in the West while on tour. The works that were recorded on these vinyls were composed in different time periods and geographies: Russian (pre–1917), Soviet (1917 onwards) and less often, Western art music, both nineteenth-century and earlier and (very rarely) twentieth-century repertoire.

Three main questions have guided this research. Firstly, I analyse the channels through which Soviet recordings reached the UK from the mid-1950s to the early-1980s, with a focus on the private and corporate agents of cultural transfer that were involved. Secondly, I look at the motivations on both sides for the recording of Soviet musicians and licensing agreements between the USSR and their Western partners. Having considered the relations behind Soviet recordings, I turn my attention to the actual objects. An analysis of the images, sleeve notes and critical reviews of selected Soviet records available in the UK reveals new sides to Western perceptions of ‘Russianness’ and ‘Sovietness’ in music during the Cold War.

Taking the example of the Soviet Union’s participation in the global record industry, my research develops the broader claim, advocated by Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, that contrary to the traditional assumption of a capitalist–communist split during the Cold War, the USSR was an active participant in the global economy.\(^3\) Available data indicates that the Soviet Union was far from isolated from global trade: its level of foreign trade to national economic output increased from 9% in 1955 to 21% in 1975; the latter was comparable to Japan’s level and higher than that of India, Brazil and even the United States.\(^4\) Furthermore, Sanchez-Sibony demonstrates that ‘Western Europe (and to some extent Japan) was the real focus of Soviet commercial and economic ambition.’\(^5\)

\(^4\) Ibid., 5.
\(^5\) Ibid., 9.
Three of the classical music record industry’s top five key markets were in Western Europe: France, the UK and Germany. Although my focus is on the UK, I regularly draw parallels with events in the other two countries, as well as the USA, since the recording companies often produced and sold records on a global, rather than a country-specific basis. More generally, Britain was always one of the key trading partners in Western Europe for the USSR, especially after the signing of two key bilateral trading agreements in 1968 and 1974. Following Philip Hanson, Sanchez-Sibony shows that by the 1960s constant trade deficits pressured the USSR to find new ways of earning foreign currency. Exporting the talent of Soviet classical musicians and the results of their work (music recordings) was a trade attraction that the USSR sustained from the early 1950s and until its collapse in 1991.

1. Cold War Cultural Relations

Early English-language scholarship on the Cold War rarely recognised the importance of understanding culture as an instrument of diplomacy. It concentrated instead on the military and political aspects of relations. More recent studies have attempted to decipher the implicit goals of the Cold War counterparties, and to understand how art was used as a weapon in the struggle for dominance. However, these studies have still often concentrated on the

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6 The other two markets were the USA and Japan.
8 Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy (London: Routledge, 2003), 122 and Sanchez-Sibony, Red Globalization, 111.
10 Michael David-Fox, Showcasing the Great Experiment: Cultural Diplomacy and Western Visitors to the Soviet Union, 1921–1941 (New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2014); Cara McDaniel, American-Soviet Cultural Diplomacy: The Bolshoi Ballet’s American Premiere (London: Lexington Books, 2015); Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War: Raising the Iron Curtain (University Park, Penn.: Penn State University Press, 2003); Frances Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (London:
narrower area of cultural diplomacy, in which official government organisations are the driving force behind the cross-country cultural exchanges. In the particular context of ballet, David Caute, for example, has acknowledged the different motivations behind engaging in cultural diplomacy for the Soviet and American sides in the Cold War and attempted to understand and compare them.11 His chapter ‘Classical Music Wars’ considerably overlaps with Mark Carroll’s book Music and Ideology in Cold War Europe: an account of how classical music was used by officials in the West and the Soviet Union to achieve ideological aims and create an impression of cultural supremacy on both sides.12 Danielle Fosler-Lussier similarly argues that in its initial stages ‘US-Soviet musical diplomacy was an important symbolic ritual that enabled both superpowers to claim victories within a ‘safe’ arena that would not lead to military escalation.’13

This interpretation applies particularly to early Cold War cultural diplomacy interactions between the USSR and the West (often represented by the USA) during the 1950s ‘Thaw era.’ The signing of cultural agreements between the USSR and the key Western players, especially the UK (1959) and the USA (1958) opened the door for many performing artists to tour on either side of the East-West divide for the next thirty years. Among the American ensembles and individual artists that toured the USSR under that agreement were the Philadelphia Orchestra and New York Philharmonic; the American Ballet Theater and New York City Ballet, Benny Goodman, Woody Herman, and Duke Ellington and many others.14 On the Soviet side, the first to tour the US and UK

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14 Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War, 125–126.
was the Igor Moiseyev State Folk Dance Ensemble. Classical musicians dominated consecutive tours.

The focus of recent academic research into the Cold War has shifted towards the recognition of the pluralistic nature of relations: conflict could be accompanied by cases of cooperation, and artistic excellence could prevail over political or ideological considerations. Instead of viewing the period as a bipolar conflict, publications like The Cambridge History of the Cold War regard the multifaceted and wide-ranging interactions across many countries as equally important as the US–USSR axis. The historian Gordon Johnson has also noted the multidisciplinary dimension of contemporary Cold War studies, which encompass all areas of human interaction, especially focusing on culture. My research is no exception: it combines cultural diplomacy, economics, musicology and cultural studies.

Some Cold War historians, including Holger Nehring, argue that such a pluralistic and multi-geographical and multi-actor view of the period comes at a price: ‘Cold War studies have lost a sense of enquiry and a clear conceptualisation of what it is that constitutes the subject.’ Others go as far as to criticise contemporary academic research for downplaying the significance of the military conflicts and excessively focusing on culture and co-operative initiatives. Although Nehring’s point is valid, I contend that a more complex understanding of Cold War interactions is beneficial for all academic disciplines from international relations and economics to musicology and cultural studies.

My research adds its own layer of understanding to this larger issue by analysing

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15 Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy, 172.
the interactions of private agents and state organisations, both Western and
Soviet, within the domain of music recordings.

Close attention has been paid in recent academic studies to relationships
between individuals across the East–West divide, which were often richer and
more nuanced than dealings between official government bodies.20 Three of the
latest books to contribute important case studies and arguments in investigating
the role of individual actors are edited volumes: Twentieth-Century Music and
Politics by Pauline Fairclough, Music, Art and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural
Interactions and the Cold War by Simo Mikkonen and Pekka Suutari and Entangled
East and West by Mikkonen, Giles Scott-Smith and Jari Parkkinen.21 All three are
collections of case studies focusing on the interactions between performing artists
and other individual agents of cultural exchange between the Soviet Bloc and the
West.

Mikkonen and Suutari argue that, for the Soviet Union, ‘the aim was not so
much to spread communism as to use cultural influencing to make the Soviet
Union look less a threat and appear in a more positive light.’22 As I will reveal in
the thesis, this was especially relevant for the early Cold War period and applied
to music recordings as much as to any other cultural area.23 In Entangled East and

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20 Felix Meyer et al., eds., Crosscurrents: American and European Music in Interaction, 1900–
2000 (Suffolk: Boydell, 2014); Cameron Pyke, Benjamin Britten and Russia (Suffolk:
Boydell, 2016); Harlow Robinson, The Last Impresario: The Life, Times, and Legacy of Sol
Hurok (New York: Penguin Books, 1995); Ludmila Stern, Western Intellectuals and the Soviet
Union, 1920–40 (London: Routledge, 2009); Mike Dennis, Winter Kept Us Warm (Helsinki:
Kikimora Publications, 2010).

21 Pauline Fairclough, ed., Twentieth-Century Music and Politics: Essays in Memory of Neil
Edmunds (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013); Simo Mikkonen and Pekka Suutari, eds., Music, Art
and Diplomacy: East-West Cultural Interactions and the Cold War (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015);
Simo Mikkonen, Giles Scott-Smith and Jari Parkkinen, eds., Entangled East and West:
Cultural Diplomacy and Artistic Interaction during the Cold War (Berlin: De Gruyter
Oldenbourg, 2019). The latter also contains my publication based on Chapter 4 of this
dissertation (Evgeniya Kondrashina, ‘Soviet Music Recordings and Cold War Cultural
Relations,’ 193–216).

22 Mikkonen and Suutari, Music, Art and Diplomacy, 157.

23 The first part focuses on an analysis of the interactions between state and private agents
of cultural diplomacy, using examples such as VOKS (the official Soviet cultural
exchange organisation) and the British composer Alan Bush. The second and third parts
look at the two most active forms of cultural exchange in the early Cold War: dance and
music. Chapters five through seven consider the tours of the USSR by the Cleveland
Orchestra in 1965 and the Oberlin College Choir in 1964, as well as Richter’s tour of the
West, Mikkonen, Scott-Smith and Parkkinen aim to uncover the transnational cultural connections between the USSR and Europe, which was at least as important a partner in cultural relations as the USA. The volume also emphasises non-state connections, including private individuals and corporate firms. The chapters analyse case studies of non-state interaction in the areas of visual art, music and education. Verity Clarkson examines the state and unofficial agendas in mounting the landmark *Art in Revolution* exhibition of Soviet avant-garde art in the UK in 1971, with British art curators having to overcome the mixed messages and delays on the side of their Soviet partners. This kind of behaviour would also manifest itself in the classical music touring and recording scene, leading to lost opportunities and the frustration of Western record companies, as I explore in Chapter 2. Victoria Zora’s chapter on the publishing of Soviet scores in the post-war United States and the UK is also significant for my research because music record licensing deals with the West grew out of book and score publishing relations established earlier.

My research considers the dealings of individual agents within the context of Cold War cultural relations. Whereas existing literature has looked at people involved in cultural tours, I will examine the motives and actions not only of individuals but also of private Western corporations in their dealings with the Soviet Union.

Although most academic literature on Cold War cultural relations has focused on the USA and the Soviet Union, some publications have taken the UK as their subject. One early study of British–Soviet relations from 1975 onwards considers cultural contacts in the areas of tourism, literature, language and scientific exchanges. In the case of music exchanges, there exist only selective case studies, including those by Fairclough, Louise Wiggins, Sarah Constanzo USA in 1960. The remaining chapters present case studies of Russian ‘theatre tourists,’ who went on tours of Eastern European theatres in the 1970s, and the Bolshoi Ballet’s tours to the West in 1954–1968.

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and Cameron Pyke. They have focused on the UK by describing musicians’ tours or the relationships of selected famous individuals, for instance, composers Alan Bush and Benjamin Britten, with the Soviet Union.  

Fairclough’s and Mikkonen and Suutari’s publications, similarly to the majority of other books and articles on cultural relations and exchanges in the Cold War, concentrate on the so-called ‘Thaw era’ between 1953 and 1964. Far less has been written about cultural exchange during the ‘Détenente period’ of the 1970s–80s, when a fragile balance of world power was maintained between the West and USSR. A typical attitude towards cultural relations in this era can be summarized by the following quote:

[Khrushchev’s] successor as general secretary, Leonid Brezhnev, reversed the partial domestic thaw and sharply reduced cultural contacts with capitalist states. While limited development of tourism and artistic and scientific exchanges accompanied the superpower détente of the 1970s, foreign policy was now based firmly on the traditional foundations of military power, rather than the revolutionary optimism of the Khrushchev era. Remaining efforts to influence Western opinion largely took the form of KGB ‘active measures’ operating outside any framework.


28 Apart from the books mentioned above, see also Annette Vowinckel, Marcus Payk, and Thomas Lindenberger, eds., Cold War Cultures: Perspectives on Eastern and Western European Societies (New York: Berghahn Books, 2014).

of interstate cultural agreement. The revival of the KGB’s status testified, too, to the regime’s determination to suppress any negative externalities of the even limited cultural intercourse.\textsuperscript{30}

The case of classical music recordings, however, indicates that cultural exchange in the 1970s by no means slowed down; it merely shifted from the domain of official cultural diplomacy into tours organised by private Western impresarios and their companies. With the growth of popular music culture, the focus of performing arts coming into the USSR shifted from classical music, ballet and opera to more popular genres, including country and jazz.\textsuperscript{31} Several American jazz figures toured the USSR in the 1960s: Benny Goodman in 1962, Earl Hines in 1966, Charles Lloyd in 1967 and Duke Ellington in 1971.\textsuperscript{32} Soviet classical musicians, meanwhile, continued actively touring Western states throughout the Détente.

Mikkonen and others have noted the increased importance of personal networks and relations for cultural exchanges in that period: ‘at the government level, it may seem that the artistic connections in the Soviet Union had stagnated. However, at the transnational level, we can see how new personal and professional connections developed and became more dynamic.’\textsuperscript{33} He continues to explain that the established official cultural agreements of the 1950s led to further developments of interpersonal connections derived from those agreements in later years, often along the lines not set forth by the Communist Party. Instead of ideological and political aims, artists were pursuing their own


personal and professional motivations.'\textsuperscript{34} The entire focus of the book \textit{Reconsidering Stagnation} is on the study of personal networks and interactions beyond the official doctrine of the Brezhnev years within a variety of social spheres: tourism, visual arts, music and science. However, recordings, rather than tours of musicians, are something that have been untapped by researchers thus far.

Music exchange often forms part of cultural relations discussions more broadly. Some argue for music’s more influential role than other arts based on the assumption that instrumental music can be considered a universal language. Stemming from this hypothesis, Kiril Tomoff has argued that music can provide ‘a particularly powerful lens through which to examine the dynamic relationships between competition and integration that characterized the cultural Cold War.’\textsuperscript{35} Tomoff’s enthusiasm for music as a means of transnational interaction in the Cold War has been echoed by Fosler-Lussier. In her analysis of the role of music in America’s cultural diplomacy, she notes that ‘music was highly valued in both places: lacking verbal content, it appeared to stand apart from politics in a way that literature did not.’\textsuperscript{36} For my purposes, the important consideration is not whether music indeed is a universal language, but that officials on both sides of the Soviet-West divide during the Cold War often believed that it was and used it accordingly. There is more, of course, to music than purely instrumental works (which are the focus of Tomoff’s and Fosler-Lussier’s arguments). The Soviet and Russian repertoire that came to the West through recordings and musicians’ tours was diverse, encompassing vocal works, opera, ballet, as well as symphonic and chamber pieces (as I explore in Chapter 4). What is more, rather than being a source of easy communication, music’s particular hermeneutic malleability left it open to place-specific reinterpretations. Even in the cases of music with associated texts or action, I

\textsuperscript{34} Mikkonen, ‘Changing Dynamics,’ 170.
\textsuperscript{36} Fosler-Lussier, \textit{Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy}, 166.
reveal that producers of records had the power to generate new meanings through their choice of sleeve imagery (Chapter 5).\textsuperscript{37}

My research considers the presentation of Soviet classical music recordings in British Cold War society as well as the channels through which they were available. In this respect, the discussion of cultural relations between the West and the USSR needs to be complemented by the study of the role recordings played in society, technological innovation in the record industry and what they had come to signify as a means of music reproduction.

David Patmore defines five key stages in the development of the record industry from its inception in the second half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{38} The Cold War period described in this thesis falls into the broader era of the tape recorder and long-playing record (LP) of 1948 – 1983.\textsuperscript{39} It is also from 1950 onwards that the vinyl record overtook radio as the main vehicle for listening to recorded music.\textsuperscript{40} The emergence of the phenomenon of the private record collector led to growing demand for records in the West. By the 1960s, the Western public’s growing familiarity with Soviet classical musicians through the cultural exchange tours developed a market for Soviet recordings in the West, including the UK. Recordings proved a much more powerful tool in the dissemination of music across any country than individual musicians’ tours, or even radio. By the 1970s, technological advancements in music recording had led to a widespread practice of listening and collecting records in the West, and Soviet classical music recordings formed a substantial part of this movement.

\textsuperscript{37} Mikkonen and Suutari, \textit{Music, Art and Diplomacy}, 4.
\textsuperscript{40} There are also many recent non-academic histories of the recording industry and its diverse mediums over the twentieth century: Travis Elborough, \textit{The Long-Playing Goodbye} (London: Sceptre, 2008); Mark Coleman, \textit{Playback: From the Victrola to MP3, 100 Years of Music, Machines and Money} (New York: Da Capo, 2004); Greg Milner, \textit{Perfecting Sound Forever: The Story of Recorded Music} (London: Granta Books, 2009).
2. Music Recordings in Western Society

Music scholars have been fascinated with the record as a new and highly unusual medium since the early twentieth century. English-language academic literature has explored in detail how recorded music gradually penetrated all aspects of society. The invention of the phonograph led to a multitude of changes in people’s perception of music and their relationship with it. The most important effects included the physical separation of listeners from performers, the opportunity to hear a single performance multiple times and the dissemination of a vast range of music genres across the globe. A new social code for listening to recordings was invented and actively disseminated by record producers through advertising. Finally, record companies communicated the message that the gramophone was an indispensable item in any consumer’s home.

Several scholars have pointed out the dynamic relationship between technological innovations in recorded music and the socio-cultural practices and habits of listening to it. They all recognise the reciprocal impact between technology and society: the former can produce new forms of interaction with music, like listening to the gramophone record, but it is the cultural narratives created by active agents, in this case, record companies and music magazine editors, around records and playback equipment that form the norms, practices and discourses around this form of music appreciation. Tia DeNora in her

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43 Symes, Setting the Record Straight, 63.

analysis of the various social uses of music advocates for placing equal importance on the variety of musical materials and the social contexts of their use, arguing that both are integral to a holistic understanding of music.\textsuperscript{45} This is highly relevant for the study of recordings, as these musical artefacts are closely connected to both the production environment (the recording studio) and the listening environment (the consumer’s home).

The low quality of recording equipment and records in the early 1900s produced an unfavourable comparison with concert hall listening. Theodor Adorno famously attributed the decline of serious, concentrated, critical classical music listening to the spread of gramophones and radio, which due to their inferior quality of reproduction could only fulfil an entertainment function, and could not be used for serious listening.\textsuperscript{46} To convince classical music lovers of the worth of their products, gramophone companies ‘had to create a convincing rhetoric for the bourgeoisie that the technology would indeed suit their musical tastes, habits and attitudes.’\textsuperscript{47} Through public demonstrations of their equipment, as well as magazine articles, record companies pursued two discourses. The first was the idea that listening in solitude in one’s home to the record player was equivalent to the ‘best seat in an acoustically perfect hall,’ in the words of the famous EMI producer Walter Legge.\textsuperscript{48} This discourse became more convincing and significant with advances in reproduction technology by the 1960s.

The second was educating the listener and the music critic in the subtle features of the technology, to produce a new type of music lover who could evaluate not just the aesthetic, but also the technical features of a recorded work. Timothy Taylor, echoing the works of Jonathan Sterne and DeNora, notes that a technical invention becomes available technology possessing some significance to


\textsuperscript{47} Volmar, ‘Experiencing High Fidelity,’ 402.

\textsuperscript{48} Symes, \textit{Setting the Record Straight}, 73.
society only when it is consciously put towards particular social uses. Many have observed that the phonograph in its early days was not intended for music reproduction and it was only Emil Berliner ten years after its invention, in 1887, who proposed using the gramophone with that aim. Targeted advertising in magazines and purposeful positioning by the record companies solidified this social use for the machine.

After the Second World War, three key technical innovations triggered accelerated growth in the record industry and brought the gramophone into almost every British home: the development of magnetic tape recording, the invention of the vinyl long-playing disc and the introduction of stereo sound reproduction (when multiple sound channels are reproduced through several speakers placed in different parts of the room). The first presented the opportunity to record for longer periods of time and edit the result, including the usage of parts from different recording takes. This, in turn, produced the desire for the perfect recording, which would not have any mistakes or performance idiosyncrasies.

The vinyl long-playing record (LP) was released into the Western consumer market in the early 1950s. With this, it was possible to fit an entire symphony onto a single record (20–25 minutes of music on each side), while before the most common format of 78s could only hold five minutes of music on each side. Besides, the sound quality of the LP was considerably higher. The LP remained the main format for classical music listening in the home between the 1950s and the early 1980s when it was gradually overtaken in terms of sales.

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50 It’s first inventor, Thomas Edison, in 1877 believed that ‘the machine would record and playback speech.’ Alexander Bell later created a competing machine. Both patents were bought by the investor Jesse H. Lippincott, who set up the North American Phonography Company to license these machines to companies for use as dictation machines. It was in 1887 that Emile Berliner patented a different format of the gramophone and envisaged it for the reproduction of music as entertainment, rather than office use. See Richard Osborne, *Vinyl: A History of the Analogue Record* (London: Routledge, 2016), 13.
volume by cassettes and then CDs.\textsuperscript{53} Even Adorno, writing in the late 1960s, came to admire the LP as a means of making musical works available to everyone to listen to in detail at their own pace and convenience.\textsuperscript{54}

The establishment of the LP format also led to an important phenomenon: all major classical music repertoire in the back catalogue of the main record companies was very quickly reissued during the 1950s in this format. This meant that the record listener now had access to a huge variety of interpretations of the same music. For instance, by 1954 there were twenty-one different versions of Beethoven’s \textit{Eroica} Symphony and ten versions of Mozart’s Piano Concerto No. 20.\textsuperscript{55} Hence, by the late 1950s, the Western classical music market was saturated with works from the traditional Western canon, and the prospect of new repertoire and new interpretations from beyond the Iron Curtain became a particularly attractive one.

The introduction of stereo sound reproduction technology in 1958 dramatically improved the quality of the listening at home experience, which for classical music was a much more significant factor compared to other music genres.\textsuperscript{56} The market for high-quality LPs of classical music took off, with music lovers investing in technically advanced listening equipment and paying a premium for the stereo vinyl with classical music that would give a high fidelity listening experience mimicking the live performance in a concert hall or opera house.\textsuperscript{57} As noted by Tom Perchard, ‘by the end of the 1960s the transformation was complete, and something like high-fidelity audio was a fixture of many homes (if still concentrated in the affluent classes).’\textsuperscript{58} Especially before the 1970s

\textsuperscript{53} Day, \textit{A Century of Recorded Music}, 21.
\textsuperscript{55} Gronow and Saunio, \textit{An International History of the Recording Industry}, 113.
and the introduction of cheaper classical labels, affluent listeners who possessed high-quality audio equipment were exactly the type of consumer targeted by classical music producers. By the 1960s, equipment was so advanced that one could hear differences in the quality of records and very minuscule nuances of performances; this allowed critics and record collectors to assess and compare records to the extent that technical variations between recordings made with different equipment could be discerned. This led to the development of a new type of connoisseurship which valued both the musical and technological features of a recorded work.\(^9\) The hi-fi consumer came to combine two roles in one: of the technology-savvy engineer and the classical music concert-goer.\(^6\) In this context, the introduction of Soviet recordings into the Western market was appealing not only for the opportunity it presented to compare interpretations, but also to compare recording capabilities.

The music recording has so far been completely neglected in studies of cultural exchange between Britain and the USSR during the Cold War.\(^6\) Studies of the classical recording industry, meanwhile, have concentrated largely on the West. My research brings the two together by studying Soviet recordings in the context of British Cold War social and business relationships. I propose that recordings were crucial in forming the British public’s view of the USSR, and that the choice of repertoire to be recorded and sold to the public, as well as its presentation through the record’s cover and text, was based on a combination of ideological and economic factors.

\(^9\) One should note that at-home listening is not the only way to listen to gramophone records. A whole plethora of listening practices developed in parallel to the technological advancement of the recording industry, both in solitary and social situations. For more details on other listening practices see Clarke, ‘The Impact of Recording on Listening,’ 62 and DeNora, *Music in Everyday Life*.


\(^6\) Classical music recordings and the economic and social forces behind them have also been only highly selectively considered in musicology. For a discussion, see, for example, Stephen Cottrell, ‘The Rise and Rise of Phonomusicology,’ in Recorded Music: Performance, Culture and Technology, ed. Amanda Bayley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 29.
3. Methodology

My approach has been shaped by a combination of methods: actor-network theory (ANT) and theories of transnational cultural transfer. ANT initially appeared in the 1980s as a methodology for analysing the creation and construction of scientific knowledge.\(^6\) The primary empirical tool of ANT is a description of events to understand the various elements and their roles.\(^6\) As outlined in such classic texts as Bruno Latour’s *Science in Action* and *Reassembling the Social*, ANT includes several assumptions.\(^4\) Firstly, it assumes that to study a part of society is to look closely at relationships and how these are formed and changed. Relations can be between human and nonhuman members of society, and relations with nonhumans are just as important to study as relations between humans.\(^5\)

The most comprehensive consideration of the application of ANT to historical musicology can be found in Benjamin Piekut’s literature overview.\(^6\) He observes that ‘whatever music might be, it clearly relies on many things that are not music, and therefore we should conceive of it as a set of relations among distinct materials and events that have been translated to work together.’\(^6\) Piekut’s perspective together with the appeal by Erica Cudworth and Stephen Hobden in international relations studies for greater significance to be placed on the role of material objects further validates the application of ANT principles to this research.\(^6\)

\(^5\) Latour argued that technological artefacts ‘exceed’ their designers’ intentions in ways that cannot be predicted, which is why it is important to study them and their role. (Michael, *Actor-Network Theory*, 58).
\(^6\) Ibid., 192.
The interest in ANT within musicology has been echoed by the more general material turn in recent musicological studies. Will Straw observes that ‘thing theory’ has been discussed in academic humanities since the end of the 1990s. More recently, without the explicit mention of ANT as their methodology, Nicholas Cook, Christopher Symes, Michael Chanan and Timothy Day have analysed the music record as a cultural artefact. They have looked at the participants, connections and the cultural, economic and social implications of the invention of the gramophone. Georgina Born’s focus on the cultural production of music heavily involves the analysis of interactions between human and non-human agents. The study of the Sony Walkman considers ANT and other ‘material turn’ theories. Tina DeNora argues for an active agency role for music in itself which is neither a simple result of production by composers or musicians, nor just a reflection of the social as manifested by the listeners’ perceptions.

Even Richard Taruskin emphasises the importance of agency, although he remains convinced in the primary importance of human agency, as ultimately he argues, all cultural objects are a product of people’s labour and thus reflect their creators’ worldviews and intentions. Unlike advocates of ANT, Taruskin insists

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69 With regards to explicit application of ANT in musicology research, Nick Prior has looked at a specific music genre of ‘glitch’ that relies heavily on manipulation of sounds and music with technology, including computers and synthesizers. (Nick Prior, ‘Putting a Glitch in the Field: Bourdieu, Actor Network Theory and Contemporary Music,’ Cultural Sociology, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2008), 301–319). Simon Zagorski-Thomas has studied the nuanced process of creating a music record in the studio, demonstrating that it is very much a collaborative and technology-dependent practice. (Simon Zagorsky-Thomas, The Musicology of Record Production (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).


74 Tia DeNora, After Adorno, 57.

on the intentions of the agents, while for ANT the agent doesn’t need to realise their participation or significance in the network to merit analysis.\textsuperscript{76} It is exactly for this reason that ANT is a particularly useful set of principles for my research, the central topic of which is non-human objects: music recordings, which don’t have any explicit intentions but nevertheless formed perceptions of Soviet and Russian music and musicians among Western listeners.

It is impossible, nevertheless, to apply pure ANT to the study of recordings. ANT insists on a detailed comprehensive description and avoids any assumptions or conclusions. Taylor, together with others, has noted the limitations of ANT in its disinterest in social structures that ‘exist independently of what a given set of agents can make of it means that ANT cannot satisfactorily explain why certain scientific ideas are accepted rather than others, for example.’\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, I will employ ANT tools in my research, but will still discuss the relevant social, political and cultural structures. I will frame the discussion in the spirit of ANT with a focus on non-human actors in the network of relations.\textsuperscript{78}

With regards to recordings, Piekut notes that:

The problem of tracing connections across time and space is evidently quite difficult when the network in question exists in the second half of the twentieth century, when thousands upon thousands of LPs were moved from here to there along distribution channels that remain for the most part uncharted. The relative difficulty of such materially focused investigations of influence is no excuse not to do it, though, for this is perhaps, the most important way that musical ideas are mediated in the period between 1965 and 2000.\textsuperscript{79}

In light of the described challenge, it would be impossible to conduct an exhaustive ANT analysis across the twenty-five years and multiple countries and agents involved in bringing Soviet recordings to the West. Instead, I apply three key principles of ANT when exploring the relationships of the USSR with the

\textsuperscript{76} Piekut, ‘Actor-Networks in Music History,’ 196.
\textsuperscript{77} Taylor, \textit{Strange Sounds}, 33.
\textsuperscript{78} I use the words ‘actor’ and ‘agent’ interchangeably.
\textsuperscript{79} Piekut, ‘Actor-Networks in Music History,’ 203.
global recording industry, other nations and private agents. I uncover networks of agents, describing their roles and impact, including so-called ‘indeterminate agents’ that do not have explicit motivation within the network but have impact on the relationships. ANT considers such agents a vital part of the analysis, while many other approaches ignore such actors.\textsuperscript{80} Due to the longevity and diversity of the relationships across countries, different people were the key contacts over the course of the years, and often not all names are known, especially on the Soviet side, which is why I investigate roles and organisations, but not an exhaustive list of people’s names. Secondly, I consider a multitude of factors, together with the controversies and incoherencies involved in Soviet–Western recording relationships. ANT scholars do not attempt to produce a single version of events and point out inconsistencies or missing information in the data.

Another important aspect is the transnational dimension of this research. A transnational approach is particularly beneficial to study of Soviet musical culture as it challenges common conceptions of cultural and economic isolation from the West. Transnational history presumes a movement of people, objects, technology across national borders, focusing on people’s and objects’ links and networks.\textsuperscript{81} This puts transnational history very much in line with the philosophy of ANT and the trends explored in cultural relations academic studies. Transnational history is also substantially embedded in music studies and has been the subject of intense discussion in the discipline in recent decades.\textsuperscript{82} Network studies like ANT are particularly useful when exploring transnational connections within musicology. They can be used to distinguish between the individual transformative influences more accurately and in finer detail to avoid generalisations. Thus, blending together the basic principles of ANT with transnational histories approach is the methodological foundation of this research.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 196–197.
4. Sources and Materials

In this research, I have considered both written and oral sources. To present a transnational perspective on the subject, I accessed information in Moscow and London. Business and state were united into one during the Soviet era, therefore, government archives in Moscow, especially RGALI (Russian State Archive of Literature and Art) contain a plethora of business information on the USSR’s transactions with private record companies in the West. A substantial number of contractual and financial business papers from various record companies (EMI in the UK, Capitol in the USA, Le Chant du Monde and Pathé Marconi in France, Ariola and Deutsche Grammophon in West Germany) were freely accessible in the Soviet Ministry of Culture folders there.

In London, the National Archives contain information on cultural diplomacy issues that shaped the integration of the USSR into the global record business. Archives of the two key performing venues, Southbank Centre (Royal Festival Hall) and Royal Albert Hall, hold concert programme notes for the performances of Soviet artists in the West. And finally, the British Library Sound Archive preserves the physical objects that are at the core of my analysis – the Soviet classical music recordings, as well as archives of British national newspapers and recording and classical music industry magazines.\(^3\)

Unfortunately, business archives of private companies in any Western country are not as accessible as public ones. The EMI archive in the UK, currently supervised by the EMI Archive Trust, is no exception. Like others before me, I have been refused access to this archive, as they only provide selective pre–1947 information to researchers.\(^4\) I mitigated this issue through the documents I found in the Moscow archives and by interviewing the key people involved in

\(^3\) I would like to express my gratitude to the British Library for bestowing on me the role of Edison Fellow in 2017–2018. During this period, I was able to work with the sets of recordings needed for the various analyses in Chapters 3–6.

the Soviet relationship on the EMI side who could communicate the business’s perspective on the issue.85

The use of interviews combined with archival research allows for a more nuanced interpretation of the documents, especially when hypothesising about the motivation behind decisions written out in documents. For this research, the interviews were less of a tool for factual data gathering, but more to provide an interpretation of those facts from the interviewer’s perspective. First and foremost, I interviewed Tony Locantro, the EMI business manager who dealt with classical music business transactions with the USSR under Peter Andry and Michael Allen in the ten years from 1972–73, multiple times. I also interviewed Michael Allen, Tony Locantro’s boss and business manager of EMI’s International Classical Division who concluded recording agreements with the USSR during the Cold War and was also for a time head of Angel Records, the classical division of Capitol Records, the American subsidiary of EMI; John Pattrick, General Manager of the Classical Division of EMI Records UK in 1975–1984, responsible for distribution of records across the UK and Michael Letchford, classical music marketing manager of EMI Records UK.86 I was unable to find anyone involved in the business relations on the Soviet side and the staff of the current Melodiya record company ignored my requests for meetings and information.87

Researching history is subjective in that the final story that is told depends on which archival documents were available, which people the author could talk to and the degree of reliability of written and oral sources. Keith Jenkins called this ‘reflexive methodology:’ ‘What this means is that you are given an explicit analysis of why the history you are getting is the one you are getting and why

85 Of course, not all the key people involved in Soviet relationship were alive at the time of this research. Peter Andry, the EMI classical music producer, involved in many recording projects of Soviet artists died in 2010, but his book of memoirs provides useful information on working with them (Peter Andry, Inside the Recording Studio: Working with Callas, Rostropovich, Domingo and the Classical Elite (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2008)).
86 John Pattrick communicated with me by email and did not want to be interviewed in person.
87 All my interviewees in the UK were white men in their early 80s. This means that their counterparties in the USSR very likely have died by now, as life expectancy in Russia is shorter than in the UK.
you are getting it in the way you are and not in any other.’

In practical terms, the researcher should accept that he or she can construct a story of the past, but it will be just one of several possible ways to present and explain it.

5. Summary

Part I of this thesis traces the multifaceted relations between the private and state Western and Soviet systems, through which individuals, corporations and the cultural objects themselves amplified and distorted the cultural diplomacy goals of the Soviet and British states. As I will reveal, the sale of Soviet recordings and the recording of Soviet artists abroad became detached from any diplomatic involvement, and the Soviet Union behaved in many respects like a capitalist record label, immersed in the global classical music business. I will thus demonstrate the deep integration of the Soviet Union, a communist state, into the global record industry, driven by capitalist principles of money-making, changing what scholars have thus far thought about the role of Soviet musicians and their recordings in the Cold War.

The focus in Part I is on the network of relationships and agents around the production and sale of Soviet recordings in the West, with an emphasis on the UK, during the Thaw and Cold War years. A Western recording company could either record a performer, license a recording from another company (or in the Soviet case, from the state) or import recordings. This was applicable to classical musicians of any genre and origin, both Western and Soviet. Chapter 1 focuses on the very start of this process from the early 1950s, while Chapters 2, 3 and 4 discuss the main channels through which Soviet music recordings came to the UK in the 1960s–70s: recordings of Soviet performers made while on tour in the West (Chapters 2 and 3), licensing agreements between large foreign record companies and the USSR (Chapter 4) and imports of Soviet records (Chapter 4).

Methodologically, I will focus on the various types of agents and their relations: individuals, collectives (private and state organisations, and any other groups of people within those) and material objects. Spread throughout those chapters is a

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discussion of the repertoire that was recorded, including analysing why certain repertoire was chosen to be recorded and how this influenced which performers and composers from the USSR were heard in the West.

In Chapter 1, I explore the earliest ways in which British audiences came to encounter Soviet performers on record. First, I consider the early concert tours organised in conjunction with British friendship societies; I demonstrate how and why these societies were eventually set aside as partners by the Soviets in favour of commercial impresarios and private record companies. I then analyse the dualistic role of the British government: the state actively disliked the friendship societies’ ideologically driven participation in Soviet artists’ tours, and explicitly supported the impresarios and record companies, who were motivated by profit-making opportunities rather than any political agenda. The early concerts organised by the friendship societies acquainted Western audiences with Soviet musicians and generated demand for more concerts and recordings. The latter were all made by the largest Western record companies, that sought out direct arrangements with the Soviet Ministry of Culture.

In Chapter 2 I explore the recording of Soviet artists in the West at its height, the 1960s–70s, through an exploration of the logistical, bureaucratic and financial aspects of the recording deals made. While the Soviet Union was becoming an important player in the global record industry, its idiosyncratic ideological and economic internal system hampered this position. I discuss the factors that undermined relations with Western partners, including country-specific distribution rights for recordings, debates over copyright law, internal Soviet bureaucracy, miscommunication and independent decision-making by Soviet artists, and political and security issues.

Chapter 3 takes the general points made in the previous chapter deeper by zooming in on two case studies. The first considers the Western recording career of the world-famous pianist Sviatoslav Richter, the poster child of the Soviet Union for tours and recordings abroad throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The second focuses on the Young Artists Programme (YAP) developed by EMI and
the USSR together to build the Western recording careers of rising Soviet musicians in the 1970s in search of the next Richter.

This thesis highlights the role of non-government agents that were motivated by profit-making considerations rather than ideological reasons of inter-government cultural diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s. State-sponsored cultural tours of the 1950s–60s familiarised the public in the West with foreign artists and led to a demand for their recordings. Recognising their commercial potential, Western record companies actively sought to establish licensing agreements for Soviet recordings in the 1960s–70s. At the centre of Chapter 4 are the agents, terms and results of a successful and productive long-term licensing agreement between the Soviet Union and the largest British record company EMI in 1968–1982. For Western record labels, the licensing deals were a way of establishing long-term stable relationships with the USSR in order to secure guaranteed access to recording the Soviet artists in the West. In addition, they provided access to a larger number of Soviet performers, specifically, orchestral recordings and the Bolshoi Theatre’s full-length Russian-language operas (the orchestras toured and recorded in the West much less than individual performers). In addition to an extensive discussion of licensing, this chapter also covers one last channel for bringing Soviet recordings to the Western audience, which is imports.

The gramophone radically changed the network of relations and agents involved in the production and consumption of music. Before the invention of recording, the material objects associated with music (scores and musical instruments) required a human agent to actively and directly interact with the object in real time. There was no time lag between the human manipulation of a musical instrument and the absorption of sound by the listener. The existence of a music recording leads to a situation where a performance is preserved in auditory form, unlike a score which preserves only features of an auditory experience but not the entirety of the specific performance. Moreover, the gramophone allows multiple re-creations of the performance, crucially, without the need for the performers to be present and at the sole will of the listener, who
simply needs to put the record on the gramophone and place the playing needle at the beginning of the grooves. The technological features of the gramophone player, the quality of the material from which the record is made, how the performance was recorded onto tape and then transferred onto the vinyl record, all have a direct effect on the aural experience of the listener.

Unlike a live concert performance, there is no automatic audio-visual element when listening to music on a home record player. ‘Solitary listening’, writes Mark Katz, ‘impractical without recording, is perhaps now the dominant type of musical experience in most cultures’.89 The vinyl cover image and sleeve notes act as concert programme notes and create a visual and textual interpretation of the music. Their role is further amplified by the solitary nature of the gramophone listening experience. Colin Symes notes that a complex system of ‘texts and inscriptions, everything from the logs kept by record producers to the contents of record criticism and journalism’ developed around the record player and drew together ‘the members of the record community around a common set of reference points and values’.90

The goal of Part II of my dissertation is to consider different aspects of the object of the Soviet music recording and their connections to the human agents involved and the discourse generated around these recordings through text and imagery. Chapter 5 looks at the creators of the record: the record company and its employees making decisions on the repertoire and cover imagery. I analyse the cover images of a large sub-set of Soviet recordings produced by EMI in the UK over fifteen years from 1967 under the licensing agreement discussed in Chapter 4, to identify common patterns and presentational biases. When I look at the vinyls as material objects I focus on their visual, rather than sonic qualities. In the second part of Chapter 5, I present a case study on the recordings of the Soviet composer, Dmitry Shostakovich, whose music was (and still is) subject to diverse interpretations. I analyse the widely different Western positioning of his controversial Symphony No. 13 Babiy Yar and his official Soviet oratorio Song of

89 Katz, Capturing Sound, 189.
90 Symes, Setting the Record Straight, 61.
the Forests through the cover images of the records and, in so doing, reveal how and why record companies shaped Shostakovich’s image in the West.

Once a recording was sold in shops, trade press and art sections of national newspapers published reviews and articles with critics’ opinions on them. The views critics expressed about the recordings influenced consumers’ perceptions of the music, especially when it came to repertoire the latter were unfamiliar with. In Chapter 6 I consider recordings of Shostakovich’s opera *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk* and *Katerina Ismailova* (two versions of the same opera written thirty years apart) to demonstrate how sleeve notes and critical reviews made an impact on the popularity of a recording and its subsequent reissues, which in turn, contributed to the canonisation of the earlier version of the opera over the second.
Part 1. Channels, Relationships and Agents

Chapter 1. How It All Began:
From Friendship Societies to Commercial Impresarios

1. Friendship Societies Pave the Way for Commercial Deals

Cultural exchanges and trade between the USSR and the West were scarce in the years before the Second World War. The touring of performing artists was limited, as was the sending of physical objects, such as scores and recordings. What little exchange did take place was organised by All-Russian Society for Cultural Relations Abroad (Vsesoyuznoe obshestvo kulturnoy svyazi s zagranitsey, VOKS), the Soviet state body for cultural relations with the West. A 1946 decree explicitly ordered VOKS and the Soviet Committee on Cultural Affairs to organise tours of Soviet music and theatre groups to foreign countries. The purpose of VOKS, as it was put later in a 1949 note to Stalin from one his top advisors, Vyacheslav Molotov, was ‘to acquaint foreign countries and to popularise the culture of the peoples of the USSR abroad.’ Since Soviet recording technology and quality of materials lagged behind Western equivalents, scores were the main musical objects VOKS sent to friendship societies and individuals in the West.

93 Note from V.M Molotov to I.V Stalin on the VOKS charter from 7 April 1949, Ibid., 377.
94 A variety of scores were sent to the West, including works by Nikolay Myaskovsky, Vissarion Shebalin, Dmitry Kabalevsky, and Shostakovich. For a concert of contemporary Soviet music held by the Society for Cultural Relations between the People of the British Commonwealth and the USSR in April–June 1932 VOKS sent works by Aleksander Mosolov, Aleksander Goedike, Boris Lyatoshinsky, Shostakovich, Myaskovsky and Leonid Polovinkin. Source: Quarterly and monthly reports of the music section of VOKS for 1930–33, GARF, f. 5283, op. 12, d. 223, 35.
After the death of Stalin in 1953, the USSR embarked on a public relations campaign to demonstrate the achievements of communism to the capitalist world.\textsuperscript{95} Sending Soviet classical musicians on tour and selling their recordings abroad became an important part of this strategy. To execute it, however, the Soviet side needed partners in the target capitalist states. Soviet friendship societies were the most enthusiastic and open supporters of the USSR; it was logical in the first instance to team up with them to set up and promote the concerts and recordings of Soviet musicians abroad. Soviet friendship societies were voluntary non-profit organisations uniting Western supporters of Soviet and Russian culture and ideology. They were present in all the major European countries and the USA. In 1950s Britain the two key Soviet friendship societies – the counterparts of VOKS – were the Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR (SCR) and the British Soviet Friendship Society (BSFS).\textsuperscript{96}

Formed in 1924, the SCR’s goal was to ‘promote mutual understanding between the British and Soviet people through cultural and educational contacts.’\textsuperscript{97} Its primary members were British intellectuals and members of the upper classes. The periods before and after the Second World War were the height of its influence. Together with providing information about life and culture in the USSR, lending books and a wide variety of printed press materials from the USSR, it organised mutual visits of intellectuals and professionals between the UK and USSR, tours of Soviet musicians, lectures, language courses, film screenings and concerts of music recordings to its own members and those of the public.\textsuperscript{98} Its Annual Reports also drew its members’ attention to the wide variety of further Soviet-related London events taking place, including live music performances, lectures on various aspects of Soviet life, accounts of travellers’

\textsuperscript{95} McDaniel, \textit{American-Soviet Cultural Diplomacy}, xix.
\textsuperscript{96} After 1992, the SCR was re-named Society for Cooperation in Russian and Soviet Studies (SCRSS) and it still functions today.
\textsuperscript{97} Chris Cook and David Waller, \textit{The Longman Guide to Sources in Contemporary British History, 1: Organisations and Societies} (London: Longman, 1994), 300–301.
impressions of their trips to the USSR, film screenings and play readings. The society was able to acquire scores of new music that were then lent by the library to its members; and the Anglo-Soviet Journal, the SCR’s quarterly publication, featured translations of Soviet critical articles on music as well as British writing on Soviet music.

Although the SCR fiercely ascertained its financial and ideological independence from the Soviet Union, there is evidence that it was financially supported by VOKS at least in the 1920s. Its presentation of information about the USSR to the British public was consistently skewed towards the positive. For instance, as early as 1950 the society was loaned a ‘magnetophone’ by VOKS and the Soviet Embassy, which made it possible ‘to hear, on the Society’s premises, some of the most recent Soviet works in the form of excellent recordings by leading Soviet artists.’ The characterisation of Soviet records as ‘excellent’ is at odds with magazine reviews of Soviet-made recordings which deemed the latter short of Western standards. As noted by Emily Lygo, the society was as biased in its description of Soviet records as it was in its presentations of other aspects of Soviet life and culture.

On 26 June 1954, VOKS sent its representatives in London five boxes of recordings weighing 62 kilograms with the instructions to pass these to the SCR; the parcel included works by Pyotr Tchaikovsky, Mikhail Glinka, Nikolay Myaskovsky and Aleksander Glazunov. A further selection of recordings, this time including more works by contemporary composers, such as Shostakovich, Aram Khachaturyan and Dmitry Kabalevsky, was sent only three months later. The substantial size of the parcel is symbolic of the deliberate opening up of the

100 Emily Lygo, ‘Promoting Soviet Culture in Britain,’ 577.
102 Emily Lygo, ‘Promoting Soviet Culture in Britain,’ 577.
103 Correspondence with VOKS representative in England regarding the exchange of delegations, photo exhibitions and sending books, scores, recordings and regarding other issues, GARF, f. 5283 op.15 d. 599, II, 47.
104 Ibid.
Soviet Union to Western exchanges from 1953. It also demonstrates that recordings were an important part of the Soviet mission of proving its cultural competitiveness abroad and that in those early years it was through the SCR that the Soviet Union aimed to fulfil its cultural diplomacy goals. It was the efforts of the SCR and BSFS that lay the foundation for the recognition of Soviet performers in the West.

The British Soviet Friendship Society (BSFS), renamed from the Anglo-Soviet Friendship Committee, was founded by the merger of two Soviet friendship organisations in 1946, the Russia Today Society (established in 1930) and Friends of the Soviet Union (also established in 1930). The BSFS aimed to ‘strengthen peace and friendship, understanding and trade between Great Britain and the USSR.’\(^\text{105}\) Many of its members were also members of the Communist Party of Great Britain, and although the majority of its papers were lost during an office move in 1958, whatever is left is now kept together with the Communist Party archive at The People’s History Museum in Manchester. However, membership of the BSFS was broader than that of the Communist Party. As noted by a contemporary author, ‘it is the largest and wealthiest of the front organisations, possessing a heterogeneous membership of fifty thousand, all organized into numerous branches.’\(^\text{106}\) The BSFS was primarily designed to link British and Soviet people. Like the SCR, it organised talks and seminars, exchanges, and promoted an image of the USSR as a peaceful and democratic state.\(^\text{107}\) Writing about the network of USSR friendship societies across the Western world, the magazine *The World Today*, an international affairs publication read by many of the world’s decision-makers and thinkers, called them ‘an extremely powerful machine – probably the most powerful of any organisation in the world for the diffusion of culture.’\(^\text{108}\) While the BSFS was less

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influential than the SCR in terms of music and cultural events, it figured heavily as a promoter of Soviet artists in early 1950s Britain.

As in other Western countries, the touring of Soviet performing artists to the UK steadily increased through the early 1950s. Many of these performers were sent for the English-Soviet Friendship month organised by the SCR in November of each year.109 Whereas in 1952 only seven Soviet musicians were sent to the UK, including Kabalevsky and the pianist Emil Gilels, twenty arrived in 1953, including the famous Pyatnizky Army Choir and ballet dancers, and twenty-seven in 1954: the Beryezka Dance Ensemble, also the violinist David Oistrakh, a string quartet, ballet and folk dancers and circus performers. Indeed, the growth of these tours was such that in his internal letter to the Foreign Office in 1955, the British Prime Minister’s Secretary complained that the country had ‘for some years been over-run by balalaika players and folk dancers from Eastern Europe.’110 This complaint was no doubt aggravated by the prominent role played by the two UK friendship societies, which dealt with the Soviet Ministry of Culture, VOKS and the Soviet Embassy in London.111

The key venues in London for these society-run concerts were the Royal Albert Hall and the Royal Festival Hall. The societies took pride in having encouraged these concerts. The SCR Annual Report for 1955–56 boasted: ‘We recall with pride that the return of David Oistrakh to Britain in February of this year, to a phenomenally successful concert tour, was in no small measure the result of the Society’s having had him as its guest in November 1954.’112 They also describe how the SCR welcomed the cellist Mstislav Rostropovich to the Royal Festival Hall in 1955.113 This flurry of activity was a conscious effort by the societies (fully supported by Soviet officials) to acquaint the Western audiences

109 Note on the Cultural Ties of England and the USSR, 1 November 1955, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d.102, 157.
110 Letter from Philip de Zulueta, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, to the British Foreign Office, August 13, 1955, The National Archives, FO 371/116811.
111 For details of bureaucratic procedures and government involvement in exchange see Fairclough ‘Détente to Cold War,’ 39.
113 Ibid.
with outstanding Soviet classical musicians and, more generally, to promote the idea of Soviet cultural excellency.

2. Commercial Impresarios Take Over the Tours

As in the case of US tours explored by Tomoff, the first and most active touring Soviet artists of the 1950s to the UK were Emil Gilels and David Oistrakh.114 Born in Odessa, Ukraine in 1916, Gilels won several competitions at home and abroad before the Second World War broke out. His touring career began right after the war with visits to the Soviet Bloc countries.115 Gilels gave his first concert in the UK at the Royal Albert Hall on 9 December 1952, sponsored by the BSFS.116 Similarly, Oistrakh first found European fame in 1937 when he won the Eugène Ysaÿe Violin Competition in Brussels, but his fully-fledged travels across the capitalist world did not start until after the end of World War II.117 His first British concert was at the Royal Albert Hall on 10 November 1954 and was organised by the SCR. Oistrakh gave a total of three concerts in London at the Royal Albert Hall during that tour: recitals on 10 November, a joint concert with the Soviet composer Khachaturian and the Philharmonia Orchestra on 25 November, and a joint concert with the London Symphony Orchestra on 6 December.118 Even at these first concerts, music critics hailed his virtuosity and sensitivity of playing, commenting that ‘his reputation is well merited’ and placing him on par with the famous Russian-American violinist Jascha Heifetz, who performed in the same venue the week before.119 Oistrakh’s son Igor, also a violinist, was even quicker than his father in playing to the British public: his first

114 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 117.
116 Royal Albert Hall archive, RAHE/1/1952/207.
concert in the UK took place at the Royal Albert Hall a year earlier, on 22 November 1953.\textsuperscript{120}

It was after the success of these first tours organised by the friendship societies that commercial touring agents and record companies spotted the profit-making potential in partnering with the Soviet Union to promote its musicians and record them. As described by Lou Levy, the head of Leeds Music and one of the early partners of the USSR in the USA, in a 1956 interview for \textit{Billboard} magazine: ‘just a couple of years ago, he found it difficult to place any of the Russian tapes, but once David Oistrakh and Emil Gilels appeared here and lived up to their advance notices, every diskery started bidding for their produce.’\textsuperscript{121}

Music played a smaller role in the SCR’s and BSFS’s activities from 1955 onwards. Concerts at the Royal Albert Hall and Royal Festival Hall were quickly taken over by commercial impresarios either jointly with the friendship societies or on their own.\textsuperscript{122} The two key concerts agents to work with the Soviet artists in the UK were Viktor Hochhauser and Harold Holt. Commercial impresarios were individuals, often managing their own company and employees, who invited artists to perform in concert venues for a fee and organised every detail of their tours, including legal documentation, accommodation, transport, ticket sales, promotion and the co-ordination of ensembles if needed.

On the Soviet side, Goskonzert performed a similar function. Established in 1956 by the Soviet Ministry of Culture, Goskonzert was responsible for negotiating tours of Soviet musicians abroad and foreign musicians to the USSR. Record deals and recording negotiations were handled by an organisation responsible to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. It had been created in 1923 for foreign trade operations in books, magazines, stamps and gramophone records. Together these two Soviet agents dealt with the two commercial impresarios Hochhauser and Holt (who from 1956 entirely took over

\textsuperscript{120} Royal Albert Hall archive, RAHE/1/1953/166.
\textsuperscript{121} ‘Leeds Renews USSR Pact on Class. Imports,’ \textit{Billboard}, 6 October 1956, 34.
\textsuperscript{122} Index of performances by various Soviet artists (Emil Gilels, Igor and David Oistrakh) in both Royal Albert Hall archive and Southbank Centre archive.
the organisation of Soviet artists’ UK concerts), and the Western record companies.\textsuperscript{123}

In the programmes for their concerts, the friendship societies had featured heavy self-advertising, including membership appeals, to support their work and to attend their film screenings and lectures. Such advertising understandably disappeared for concerts organised by the impresarios, giving way to the promotion of commercial products such as recordings, sheet music, music magazines, piano manufacturers, restaurants, cigarettes and even Russian-themed advertising: vodka and The Russian Shop in High Holborn selling ‘souvenirs, perfumes, watches and balalaika records’.\textsuperscript{124} This demonstrates a clear shift from self-promotion by the friendship societies towards commercial promoters of the concerts earning money on the advertisements in the programmes. This is also an example of a very common phenomenon of branding products by associating them with a particular nation-state, irrespective of their relevance to the actual event. In this case, anything historically thought of as ‘Russian’ (and not necessarily ‘Soviet’) was deemed relevant.\textsuperscript{125} Nationality was used as a selling point.

From 1956, with the support of the impresarios, visits by Soviet musicians increased in number and their reputations abroad reached new heights. Gilels was hailed by music critics as an ‘international celebrity,’ who displayed ‘every facet of his prodigious technique, his breath-taking brilliance of fingerwork as well as his strength of wrist of arm, his rhythmic exuberance, his extraordinary wide range of tone colour, and his absolutely clear texture.’\textsuperscript{126} Critics were even more complimentary of David Oistrakh, stating that he played with ‘consummate mastery’ and hailing him as a ‘great soloist.’\textsuperscript{127} The review of another concert noted his ‘exquisite bowing’ and ‘fresh and illuminating

\begin{itemize}
\item[123] Ibid.
\item[124] Royal Albert Hall archive, RAHE/1/1961/74.
\item[126] ‘Festival Hall,’ \textit{The Times}, 24 April 1957, 3 and ‘Festival Hall: Mr. Emil Gilels,’ \textit{The Times}, 26 April 1957, 3.
\end{itemize}
interpretation’. Another critic implied that Oistrakh was one of the superstar global violinists by stating that ‘it is the great concertos which show the ordinary listener how a great performer differs from his acceptable but less inspired colleagues.’ One went as far as to note two-mile traffic jams on all sides of the Royal Albert Hall, indicative of the public demand for Oistrakh’s performances; he further comments that ‘in spite of the entire concert being broadcast there was not a glimpse of an unoccupied seat at any level of the vast interior of this hall.’

In January 1960, in the space of one week, both Yehudi Menuhin and Oistrakh played separate concerts with the same conductor, Norman del Mar, and the London Philharmonic Orchestra. In a review for The Times of Menuhin’s playing, the author says that ‘both [violinists] were rewarded with monstrous audiences.’ These reviews illustrate the treatment of both Gilels and Oistrakh as world-class musicians that were able to summon large audiences for their concerts. This served as confirmation to all the business partners behind their concerts, the USSR and the impresarios, that there was potential for financial gain.

The skyrocketing popularity of Soviet artists throughout the 1950s meant that they were placed on par with top Western performers and treated as such by both audiences and promoters. The commercial agents encouraged by the artists’ stellar reputation and popularity realized the potential for selling concert tickets and recordings. The impresarios organising the tours no longer needed support from the friendship societies as they had by then established relationships of their own with the Soviet Ministry of Culture and Goskonzert. The impresarios took on these tours because they saw their money-making potential. Driven by their vast financial support and an appeal wider than that offered by the niche societies, Soviet artists could attain real fame abroad. This, in turn, created demand for their recordings from Western listeners.

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128 ‘Excellence of Mr. Oistrakh,’ The Times, 19 May 1958, 14.
129 ‘Albert Hall Concert: Mr. David Oistrakh,’ The Times, 5 March 1956, 12.
131 ‘Mr. Menuhin Plays Bartok’s Posthumous Concerto,’ The Times, 22 January 1960, 6.
3. The Role of the British Government

In 1955, worried by the growing influence of the two independent friendship organisations, the SCR and BSFS, the British government established the Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council (SRCBC). Its key role was to undermine the role of friendship societies as counteragents of the USSR in organising touring activities for Soviet musicians, or, as a confidential report put it to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘to try to get those exchanges out of the hands of Communists and their British stooges.’\(^\text{132}\) The SRCBC’s official aims were almost word-for-word copied from those of the friendship societies: ‘to encourage on a reciprocal basis mutual understanding between the two countries, primarily by sponsoring visits in both directions of small groups of people representing the various fields of activities,’ which included a list of industrial, agricultural, scientific, medical, local government and art areas.\(^\text{133}\)

Judging by the confidential reports of the SRCBC and the Foreign Office in the 1950s, the British government tried its best to counteract the increasing influence of the friendship societies. However, the feeble attempts to ‘consider an approach to the Soviet embassy asking them to use the S.R.C. [SRCBC] as the sole channel for the issue of invitations [for Soviet artists to visit the UK]’ did not produce the desired effect.\(^\text{134}\) In their letter to the British embassy in Washington D.C, the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, responsible for relations with the USSR among others, stated that ‘the Russians have already made it clear that, while they are prepared to accept the good offices of the Soviet Relations Committee of the British Council [SRCBC], they have no intention of abandoning what they call their ‘traditional contacts’ with the ‘friendship’ societies.’\(^\text{135}\) The Soviet side was happy to cooperate with commercial impresarios, but not the


\(^\text{135}\) Confidential report NS 1755/120, 25 January 1956, The National Archives, FO 371/116821.
SRCBC because the former had very clear purely commercial motives in promoting Soviet artists, which did not involve any ideological judgements on communism. The SRCBC was a representative of a hostile ideology, which was worried by the USSR’s aspirations for its artists abroad.

In 1956, the Foreign Office proudly reported that British officials had boycotted a tour by the Moiseyev Dance Ensemble, organised by the BSFS and SCR as part of one of their ‘friendship’ months. However, they conceded with disappointment that they had been unable to convince the largest British TV channels BBC and ITA not to broadcast the performances. In the minutes of its meetings, the SRCBC stated clearly that it would not co-operate on any events or tours with the friendship societies: ‘H.M Government’s dislike of the Societies would be made clear [to the Soviet embassy], however, and the advantages of the British Council channel emphasized.’ But the Soviet side didn’t care much for this rhetoric, and so this ‘cat-and-mouse’ game carried on until commercial impresarios stepped in to organise tours in full force.

The British government did not object to the impresarios’ activities, as it regarded them as purely money-making businesses that did not have any ideological or political agendas. In their report of 1955, the SRCBC explicitly stated that ‘music (orchestras, choirs etc.), coming to this country should in principle be handled on a commercial basis.’ In an earlier report mentioning musical exchanges, the committee noted that ‘it is felt that, since these developments [negotiation around tours of Soviet musicians and orchestras to the UK] seem to be working out satisfactorily on a commercial basis, the Committee need for the present only retain a watching brief, merely giving advice as required. It looks as if some of these negotiations may well fall through

136 The British Council. Soviet Relations Committee. Tenth meeting to be held on Thursday, 17 November 1955 at 11am, The National Archives, FO 371/116822.
137 The British Council. Soviet Relations Committee. Draft minutes of the ninth meeting held at 65 Davies Street, W1 on Monday, 24 October 1955 at 2.45pm, The National Archives, FO 371/116821
by being undertaken by undesirable and also inefficient organisations. This from our point of view would be all to the good.’

The commercial impresarios did have to engage with the UK government to obtain labour permits for the visiting Soviet artists. Provided they adhered to the regulations, the UK government did not stand in the way of bringing Soviet artists into the country. For instance, when Saga Films wanted to bring the pianist Lazar Berman on tour in 1958, the Foreign Office sent the following note to the Home Office: ‘As you see the firm [Saga Films] has strong Communist connexions [sic]. Their invitation to Berman, is, no doubt, part of the Soviet cultural drive and intended mainly for propaganda purposes. We would, however, have no objection to the issue of a labour permit to Berman if you decide to grant him a visa.’

When landmark tours were planned, the impresarios strove to obtain the British government’s co-operation. For instance, Ian Hunter, the Managing Director of Harold Holt agency, approached the UK government when planning a tour of the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra in 1955: ‘although I know the Russian Ministry of Culture in Moscow, I feel that would never get anywhere with an invitation to a Russian orchestra, unless it has support on the highest political level.’

The concert agency had sent an invitation to the Leningrad Philharmonic and the Ministry of Culture, but was asking whether the government could assist through its channels in reaching a decision. The matter was referred to the SRCBC to comment on. Having been approached by concert agents several times, the SRCBC decided to issue internal guidelines for such matters to the government, Foreign Office and British Embassy. In it they explained that the various agencies that had approached them were not seeking any financial help, but assistance in contacts with the Soviet Union and guidance as to timing of the tours: ‘The view of the Committee

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140 Confidential note NS 1754/5/G from the Foreign Office to the Home Office, 4 March 1958, The National Archives, FO 371/135391.
141 Letter from Ian Hunter, Managing Director of Harold Holt Limited to Philip de Zulueta, private secretary to the Prime Minister, 11 August 1955, The National Archives, FO 371/116811.
is that such commercial undertakings should be encouraged."¹⁴² A showcase tour of great importance for the SRCBC was that of the Bolshoi Ballet at the Royal Opera House in 1956. This was the first large tour of a major Soviet arts organisation after the signing of the cultural agreement between the two governments which completely excluded the friendship societies from the project. On the British side, the organising parties included various government bodies (the SRCBC, the Foreign Office, the British Embassy in Moscow) and the Royal Opera House led by the director David Webster.¹⁴³ The tour was a huge success, both artistically and politically for both sides.

Overall, the British Government actively tried to diminish the influence of the two friendship societies, the SCR and BSFS, by subtly inhibiting their activities, but were happy to support the activities of the commercial impresarios. It rightly believed that commercial impresarios only engaged in touring for financial gains and did not possess the pro-Communist ideology of the friendship societies, which was viewed by the British government as a potential threat to the state.

4. First Attempts at Recording Soviet Artists Abroad

Having observed the interest in Soviet artists generated by their tours, large Western record companies were quick to realise their commercial potential and joined the impresarios in recording and promoting the artists. Often, their reach extended well beyond their home countries, as many of the record labels had subsidiaries across the top Western markets: USA, UK, France and Germany. At that time, there were three ways in which Western record labels could produce recordings of Soviet artists. Firstly, they could catch them whilst on tour outside the USSR. The downside of this approach was the unpredictability of the tours, which were negotiated by the inviting impresario and the Soviet side. Moreover,

the repertoire recorded at such sessions would have to match what the soloist had performed on tour, to avoid extra rehearsals. Thus, a record label could not request specific repertoire. Two longer-term solutions that could guarantee a stable stream of new recordings by Soviet musicians were to try and secure an agreement with the Ministry of Culture to either record Soviet musicians abroad in a specific country or to license tapes of music recorded in the USSR and release those on recordings in the West.

EMI, with its Columbia label led by the producer Walter Legge, was the main British record company to pursue Soviet musicians from the 1950s. They actively engaged in all three avenues: recording the soloists on tour, seeking licensing agreements for Soviet tapes, and negotiating their own recording projects involving Soviet artists. EMI had three primary classical music labels in the UK – HMV, Columbia and Parlophone – and the release of a particular recording under one of them was influenced by a combination of internal factors, including the producer that had led the negotiations for the recording to be made: Legge was at the forefront of the Columbia label, while David Bicknell was responsible for HMV and George Martin for Parlophone. Other factors to consider included the general schedule of all (Western and Soviet) classical music releases on each label and the marketing budget available at that moment. In the UK, they primarily recorded at London’s Abbey Road Studios, often duplicating the repertoire played at the Royal Albert Hall or Royal Festival Hall concerts the day before.

4.1. Soviet Soloists
From 1954 record companies, believing in their profit-making potential, began pursuing Soviet soloists, primarily Gilels and David Oistrakh. Two factors were at play here: the larger record labels were the ones that could afford to pay for advertising space in concert programmes, and they could follow Soviet artists on tour and record them as the opportunity arose. As the cover to the Warner Music CD box set reissue of Oistrakh’s 1950s and 1960s recordings notes, ‘making recordings with Soviet artists in the 1950s was a chancy business... it was a case
of catch them when and where you can.’144 As a rule, the Soviet musicians first toured Eastern European and Scandinavian countries and later, the wider capitalist world. By 1956, recordings had been made by different large record labels of Soviet artists which the Soviet government deemed ‘safe’ to tour, first and foremost, Oistrakh. The programmes for his aforementioned concerts of November–December 1954 exclusively advertised Columbia recordings made with the Stockholm Festival Orchestra (33CX 1194) and Khachaturian’s work performed by Igor Oistrakh with the Philharmonia Orchestra recorded the previous year while on tour in the UK (33CX 1141).145 The programmes for David Oistrakh and the London Philharmonic Orchestra’s concert on 4 March 1956 (organised by Hochhauser and Holt) boasted adverts for records with several labels: one recording with the New York Philharmonic of Shostakovich’s First Violin Concerto on Philips (ABL 3101), three recordings with Sächsische Staatskapelle Dresden of Brahms Violin Concerto (DGM 18199), Mozart Violin Concerto No. 5 (DG 16101) and Tchaikovsky Violin Concerto (DGM 18196) on Deutsche Grammophon, and six different recordings for Columbia.146 The latter are worth listing in full to illustrate the breadth of repertoire and locations where Soviet artists had recorded by 1956, even before any official cultural agreements between the Soviet Union and the key capitalist countries came into being.147 These were:

- 33CX 1303 Khachaturian Violin Concerto with the Philharmonia Orchestra
- 33CX 1246 Lalo Symphonie Espagnole with the Philharmonia Orchestra
- 33CX 1036 Sibelius Violin Concerto with the Stockholm Festival Orchestra

146 Royal Albert Hall archive, references RAHE/1/1956/26.
147 The USSR signed its first cultural agreement with the UK in 1959 and with the USA in 1958.
• 33CX 1194 Beethoven Violin Concerto with the Stockholm Festival Orchestra
• 33CX 1201 Franck and Szymanowski Violin Sonatas with Vladimir Yampolsky.

These examples of record advertisements demonstrate the variety of geographical locations – Dresden, Stockholm, London and New York, to name just a few – where Oistrakh had recorded by 1956 for the same label, Columbia, as well as the breadth of repertoire: from Western canonical pieces of Beethoven and Brahms to Shostakovich’s most recent Violin Concerto, premiered only a year earlier in Leningrad. The record labels that secured the recording contracts for Soviet soloists were always the large ones. Usually, they had some association with the orchestra with which Oistrakh recorded: the most straightforward example is the Columbia label of EMI which had an exclusive recording agreement with the Philharmonia Orchestra. The latter belonged to Legge. Every time a Soviet musician gave a concert with this orchestra, Columbia would request an extra day to make a recording of the same concert repertoire in the studio, often at their flagship recording facilities in Abbey Road Studios.

On a British tour of April–May 1957 Gilels recorded Beethoven’s Fourth and Fifth Piano Concertos for Columbia, again, with its ‘house’ Philharmonia Orchestra.\(^\text{148}\) EMI released the disc in multiple territories: the UK, the USA, Germany, the Netherlands, France and Australia.\(^\text{149}\) Such recordings were key to EMI’s financial success as they appealed to consumers in several large markets. Along similar lines, the tour of Rostropovich to Britain on 14–23 April 1957 included a live concert on TV on 14 April, two concerts at the Royal Festival Hall on 18 and 21 April and four recording sessions for EMI on 15, 16, 23 and 24 April.\(^\text{150}\) Lengthy negotiations around the tour involved the commercial concert agency Borsdorf and Company, EMI record company, the Soviet Embassy in London and the Ministry of Culture. Letters between the Soviet Embassy and the

\(^{148}\) Schedule of Gilels’ tour to the UK for April–May 1957, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 427, 92.
\(^{149}\) Letter from the Ministry of Culture to EMI producer Walter Legge, 23 January 1957, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 427, 88.
\(^{150}\) Letter from Borsdorf and Company to the Ministry of Culture with the tour schedule, 19 February 1957, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 427, 14.
Ministry of Culture indicate that Rostropovich agreed to the tour; the Ministry of Culture confirmed dates and repertoire and insisted on the condition that the Soviet party should not suffer any losses on the tour.\textsuperscript{151} As a result, Rostropovich recorded Dvořák’s Cello Concerto with the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra and Adrian Boult for EMI on the prestigious classical HMV label.\textsuperscript{152} Soviet soloists’ active recording careers in the West throughout the 1950s were not conditioned on any inter-governmental cultural agreement; they were purely based on decisions by the Soviet government to let them travel abroad and by Western record labels seizing the opportunity to record them.

The sale of Soviet soloists’ recordings was very successful in the Western markets, at least as far as the USA and the UK were concerned. An article in the American record magazine \textit{High Fidelity} in June 1956 singled out the large sales of such recordings in its overview of the market situation in general by noting that ‘Soviet performers have provided the record industry with its best-selling LPs for the past six months and show every indication of doing so,’ and then, later on in the article: ‘Except for the few issues featuring Soviet soloists, orchestral records have not been selling spectacularly well this year.’\textsuperscript{153} By 1956 there were so many concerts and recordings of Soviet performers that editors of \textit{High Fidelity} magazine wrote: ‘During the past year we have been undergoing a Russian invasion. Focal points of the Soviet drive have been our recital halls and recording studios, which have fallen defenceless before such People’s Heroes as David Oistrakh and Emil Gilels.’\textsuperscript{154}

Warner Music is now the owner of the Columbia record label for which Oistrakh, Gilels and Rostropovich recorded extensively in the 1950s. Reissued in 2008, 13 discs of its 17-CD set \textit{David Oistrakh: The Great Recordings} contain music recorded entirely in the 1950s. Warner Music released a 9-CD set reissue of Gilels’ EMI recordings in 2010. Similarly, they reissued the EMI recordings of

\textsuperscript{151} Letter from the Ministry of Culture to the Soviet Embassy in London, 24 December 1955, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 102, 119.
\textsuperscript{153} Untitled, \textit{High Fidelity}, June 1956, 51.
\textsuperscript{154} ‘BSO to USSR,’ \textit{High Fidelity}, August 1956, 21.
Rostropovich in 2017 as a 43-CD set, entitled *Rostropovich: Cellist of the Century.* These modern releases demonstrate that even after all these years, record companies still believe there exists listeners’ demand for historical recordings of top Soviet artists.

4.2. Soviet Orchestras

Far rarer and more logistically challenging than soloists’ tours were tours of Soviet orchestras. In 1956 EMI France (Pathé Marconi) complained to the Soviet ambassador in France: ‘we have recorded your artists in Europe and the USA, as well as your conductors, but we have never been able to record your orchestras.’ The most famous Soviet orchestra, the Leningrad Philharmonic, rarely travelled outside of the USSR: in the first years after the Second World War, it only toured to ‘Soviet Bloc’ countries in 1948 and to the Prague Spring Festival in 1955. This could have been due simply to the difficulties of touring an entire orchestra as opposed to one soloist. The orchestra first went on a wider European tour in 1956, covering Austria, GDR, Switzerland and West Germany. It was during this tour that the West German record company Deutsche Grammophon recorded the orchestra with its two principal conductors Yevgeniy Mravinsky and Kurt Sanderling. Before then, the only way the orchestra could be heard on record outside of the USSR was through Soviet tapes of its performances that were occasionally released by small Western record labels: American labels Vanguard, Monarch, Monitor Records and Parliament, and East German label Eterna. Whereas the latter had a connection with the Soviet Union and could obtain the tapes directly from the Soviet side, the

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155 Rostropovich remained loyal to the EMI label all his life, including after his immigration to the West in 1974, hence, the huge number of recordings he made for the company.

156 Letter from Pathé Marconi (EMI) to the Soviet ambassador in France, 13 February 1956, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 602, 40–43.


158 Tassie, *Yevgeniy Mravinsky*, 171.

159 Ibid., 172.
American labels licensed tapes through the official representative of the USSR in the USA, Leeds Music (Chapter 4).

The Leningrad Philharmonic then toured Europe in 1960, performing 34 concerts in eight countries in two months: Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland and Austria.\(^\text{160}\) Although the leading record companies, including EMI, Philips and Decca all tried hard to get the rights to record the Leningrad Philharmonic during this tour, it was Deutsche Grammophon that secured the rights to record the orchestra thanks to its previous association with the Leningrad Philharmonic from 1956.\(^\text{161}\) According to the 1960 agreement between Deutsche Grammophon and the Soviet trade arm that dealt with recordings, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, the orchestra performed in London on 20–24 September 1960 and in Vienna on 7–17 November 1960. Hochhauser and Holt organised the concerts. In London, they recorded Tchaikovsky’s Symphony No. 4 with their star conductor Yevgeniy Mravinsky, Schumann’s Cello Concerto with Rostropovich and conductor Gennadiy Rozhdestvensky, Tchaikovsky’s Rococo Variations and Francesca da Rimini and excerpts from Khachaturian’s Gayaneh with Rozhdestvensky. In Vienna, the Leningrad Philharmonic and Mravinsky recorded Tchaikovsky’s Symphonies 4, 5 and 6.\(^\text{162}\) This came to a total of five double-sided LPs, on which the Soviet party to the agreement was paid a standard record industry royalty rate of 8%.\(^\text{163}\) This was in line with industry rates (see Chapter 2). According to the agreement, the artists could not record this repertoire for any record company outside the Socialist Bloc for the next five years. The Soviet Ministry of Culture received a copy of the tape and gave Deutsche Grammophon the right to release the records

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\(^\text{161}\) Tassie, Yevgeniy Mravinsky, 182.

\(^\text{162}\) Agreement between Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Deutsche Grammophon (Polydor) of 1960, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 2011, 79–82. Royal Albert Hall and Southbank Centre archives, list of performances for ‘Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra.’

in any country outside of the Socialist Bloc. The key recording in this series was the set of Tchaikovsky symphonies. Deutsche Grammophon issued the records in multiple locations, including its key European markets of Germany, the UK and France, as well as the USA, Australia and Japan and re-released the symphonies at least another four times in most of these locations: in 1964, 1974, 1984, 2010 and 2017. Bringing a large orchestra to record outside of the USSR was no small feat. The complexity of the logistics and financial constraints of such enterprise, to which I return in Chapter 2, prevented the Leningrad Philharmonic from recording in the West for the next eighteen years. Therefore, the 1960 tour was a landmark in the orchestra’s history. In reviewing the recordings, *High Fidelity* critic noted that recording the full series of symphonies by Beethoven or Brahms was common in the West, however, no such thing existed for Tchaikovsky. According to reviews, the Leningrad Philharmonic recording was the first of this kind and executed at Western standards of sound and technology.

The second tour of a Soviet orchestra to the UK was by the Moscow Philharmonic with the conductor Kirill Kondrashin in 1963, organised again by Hochhauser and Holt. The Moscow orchestra had not recorded in the West until then, and recordings that were available in the West before this tour were miscellaneous tapes acquired through random personal channels by small Western record labels, likely released without the consent of the Soviet side: the American niche labels Record Corporation of America, Ultraphonic, Period Records and Mercury Records, and the French Disque Acropole, as well by the Soviet Bloc record companies Artia/Supraphon (Czechoslovakia) and Līgo (Latvia). The UK tour covered London, Manchester, Wolverhampton and Huddersfield. In London, together with Igor and David Oistrakh, Kondrashin and the Moscow Philharmonic gave six concerts at the Royal Festival Hall on 15, 16, 17, 19, 21 and 23 September and two concerts at the Royal Albert Hall on 28 and 29 September 1963, organised by Hochhauser and Holt and the British

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164 Telegram from the Ministry of Culture to Deutsche Grammophon (Polydor), RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 2011, 20.
165 ‘Tchaikovsky: Symphonies. LPM 18657,’ *High Fidelity*, February 1962, 94.
The concerts consisted of Western and Russian canonical repertoire and Soviet contemporary music. Most of these were extensively reviewed in the arts sections of the British press, with critics searching for similarities with Western interpretations of the works, as well as idiosyncrasies. The London concerts resulted in two discs on Decca: together with Oistrakh, father and son, the orchestra recorded Mozart’s Sinfonia Concertante and with the pianist Vladimir Ashkenazy they recorded Sergey Rakhmaninov’s Piano Concerto No. 2.

Large transnational record labels thus seized the opportunity to record Soviet artists in the West from the very start. They partnered with the Western concert promotion agents, negotiating together with the Soviet side. As a result, companies like EMI, Le Chant du Monde and Deutsche Grammophon managed to establish links with the Soviet system and opened the doors for the USSR into the global classical music record business.

5. Conclusion

The 1950s were a time when the Soviet Union tried out two models of integration into the global music business, friendship societies and commercial partners, and decided to commit to the latter. A similar pattern of relationship-building has been outlined by Tomoff with respect to the USA, although he does not offer any in-depth investigation of links with US friendship societies. He argues that ‘by opting to utilise impresarios instead of friendship societies to display Soviet cultural accomplishments in the West, Soviet policymakers opted to join a US-dominated global capitalist economy of cultural exchange rather than struggle against that US-dominated economy by creating an alternative system.’

167 Royal Albert Hall and Southbank Centre archives: list of concerts for entry ‘Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra.’
168 Tassie, Kirill Kondrashin, 184.
169 A selection of reviews includes ‘Masterly Brilliance of Moscow Orchestra,’ The Times, 16 September 1963, 14; ‘Virtuoso Tchaikovsky by Moscow Orchestra,’ The Times, 17 September 1963, 16; ‘Mr. David Oistrakh’s Mastery,’ The Times, 23 September 1963, 6.
170 ‘The Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra Recorded in London,’ High Fidelity, February 1964, 82.
171 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 172.
was a necessary condition for the much more formal, regulated and predictable arrangements for recording musicians (Chapters 2 and 3) and licensing records (Chapter 4) of Soviet artists that were concluded from the mid–1960s onwards.

The first ten to fifteen years of Soviet entry to the global cultural business scene featured competition and chaos among the large commercial players. There was no clear understanding either on the Soviet or Western side how to deal with recording Soviet artists abroad and on what terms. From the mid–1960s, EMI became the dominant Soviet partner in Britain, as did Le Chant du Monde in France and Ariola in Germany, thanks to the exclusive licensing agreements they established with the Soviet side. Chapter 4 will look at these in detail, while Chapters 2 and 3 will explore the immersion of the USSR into the global record business through recording projects of Soviet performers and the idiosyncrasies of its participation.
Chapter 2. Recording Soviet Artists in the West:
Catch Them When You Can

1. The Western Business Partners

By the mid-1950s, the largest Western markets for records were the USA, the UK, France and West Germany.\(^{172}\) By 1955 global record sales in all music genres were £96 million, with half attributed to the United States, and the UK, France and West Germany accounting for £3.6 million each.\(^{173}\) This is not surprising, since the USA, unlike European countries, did not have to rebuild itself after the Second World War. In Europe, the two record companies in the best position after the war were the British EMI and Decca. Their manufacturing facilities were relatively unharmed by the war and they quickly re-established links with their representatives across Europe and the USA.\(^{174}\)

Many of the large national record companies either operated across the five most significant markets: USA, UK, France, Germany and Japan through direct subsidiaries, or concluded licensing agreements for each other’s recordings.\(^{175}\) The local subsidiaries could both cater to the specific tastes of national markets and at the same time, could take advantage of economies of scale and sell music that was attractive more globally.\(^{176}\) Each record company wanted to make sure that its ‘global’ classical records, those appealing to at least two to three of the key markets, would be released in those territories, either by its subsidiary or through a licensing agreement with a competitor. This fact is key to our discussion of Soviet recordings, as many of the Soviet performers recorded in the West, especially for the first time in the 1950s, were considered attractive to listeners globally. Consequently, their same recordings could appear under different labels in different countries.

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172 The fifth important market was Japan, but that is outside the scope of this dissertation.
173 David Patmore, ‘Selling sounds,’ 118.
174 Ibid., 119.
175 Ibid., 130.
The largest record companies in the USA were RCA-Victor and CBS (or Columbia). Until 1952, the latter had a licensing agreement with EMI, the largest player in the UK market. After that CBS switched its European distribution to the Dutch Philips company. RCA-Victor also had a distribution agreement in Europe with EMI, which in 1957 it switched to the second largest UK record company Decca. In 1954, the largest German record company Deutsche Grammophon established a UK subsidiary called Polydor. In 1955 EMI established the Angel label in the USA and in 1955 bought Capitol Records into which the Angel label was eventually absorbed. Angel would prove important for licensing of Soviet records (Chapter 4). In France, the two largest companies were Le Chant du Monde, a pro-Communist label favoured by the Soviet Union, and EMI’s French subsidiary Pathé Marconi. From 1962 Deutsche Grammophon started a merger with Philips, which by 1980 included Decca. All were united under the Polygram company but continued using their individual labels on records.

One of the focuses of this dissertation is the largest British record company during the Cold War, Electric and Musical Industries (EMI). The Gramophone Company, the principal predecessor of EMI, enjoyed excellent relations with the Russian Empire before the 1917 revolution: not only did it have an office in St. Petersburg, but from 1903 it opened a record-pressing factory in Riga, Latvia, to satisfy Russian demand for records. Before 1910, Russia was one of its largest markets both in terms of recording artists and record sales. During the 1920s–40s when Soviet artists became increasingly closed off from contact with the West, EMI still actively recorded Russian émigré musicians, including Vladimir Horowitz and Jascha Heifetz. Peter Martland has pointed out that EMI was one of the largest record companies in the Western world, diverse both geographically and in the range of products it manufactured. By 1960 half the

177 David Patmore, ‘Selling sounds,’ 138–139.
178 Ibid., 142.
179 Peter Martland, Since Records Began: EMI the First 100 Years (London: Amadeus Press, 1997), 69–70.
180 Its record activities covered markets of the UK and Australia (HMV, Parlophone and other labels), US (Capitol Records including the Angel label), France (Pathé Marconi), Scandinavia, Germany (Electrola), Austria, Switzerland Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey.
group’s turnover came from record sales. EMI had several subsidiaries in other countries. The primary ones were Capitol Records in the USA, Pathé Marconi in France, Electrola (Germany), Bovema (Holland) and Toshiba (Japan).

Kevin Tennent has traced the market shares and distribution networks of the largest record players from 1950 to 1980 in the UK. In 1960, the two main record companies in Britain, EMI and Decca, each held market shares of circa 40% (overall in all genres of music). By 1975 EMI’s share dropped substantially due to more intense competition from newly created record companies and American entrants into the British market. However, it still held roughly 16% of the British LP market, almost twice as high as the next two competitors.

Although the landscape of the global Western record business was constantly changing, with companies concluding licensing agreements for each other’s records and creating or acquiring subsidiaries to expand their reach, there were several clear country-specific large players with which the Soviet side conducted business regularly from the late 1950s to the 1980s. These were EMI in the UK, Le Chant du Monde (often in partnership with EMI’s Pathé Marconi) in France, Ariola-Eurodisc and Deutsche Grammophon in West Germany, EMI (Capital Records) until 1974 and later, CBS in the USA.

2. The Soviet Business Partners

In the early twentieth century Russia was one of the top markets for recorded music both in terms of the production of new recordings and sales. After the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, all assets of Western record companies, seized by the

South America (Brazil, Argentina, Chile), Asia (India, Pakistan, Singapore), and South Africa.


183 The British Phonographic Yearbook 1976, 197.


185 Martland, Since Records Began, 69–70.
newly created Soviet state, acted intermittently as recording and production facilities among other uses. Various government bodies were responsible for production of records, but in a country torn by First World War, civil war and famine this was not a priority industry in the 1920s.

The new Bolshevik state envisaged gramophone records to be used first and foremost as a propaganda tool. Recordings were made of political leaders’ speeches, and record players were mounted on carriages with horses that were walked around the central streets of large cities so that everyone could hear the voices and ideas of the new regime. From the times of New Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921, regulations were relaxed and Muztrest, the formally named organisation that was responsible for producing recordings, recycled many pre-revolutionary recordings, often those of the Gramophone Company, using those original discs of dance music and opera arias recorded before 1917, for issuing records. This continued into the 1930s. However, they also produced new recordings of contemporary singers, including tenor Sergey Lemeshev, the Pyatnitsky choir and violinist David Oistrakh.

By the 1930s the industry was still producing relatively low volumes of records whose quality left much to be desired and could not satisfy consumer

186 The Soviet government also seized assets of other foreign record companies: the French Pathé Records, the German-founded Extra Records and American Columbia Records. Aleksander Zheleznïy, Nash drug gramplastinka [Our Friend the Gramophone Record] (Kiev: Muzichna Ukraina, 1989), 40–54. Peter Andry, EMI’s classical music producer in the 1970s, recollects: ‘I visited the Moscow branch several times and found the studios and offices still situated in the former Anglican Church complex, old-fashioned and somewhat seedy but comfortable enough.’ Andry, Inside the Recording Studio, 132.

187 There is limited discussion of the Soviet record industry in Western academic literature. This is likely due to the lack of information in the public domain about this area of Soviet life. Apart from encyclopaedia entries, only two English-language books provide some insights: by John Bennett, Pekka Gronow and Ilpo Saunio. (Frank Hoffman, ed., Encyclopaedia of Recorded Sound (London: Routledge, 2005), entries on ‘EMI’ and ‘Melodiya.’ Gronow and Saunio, An International History of the Recording Industry; John Bennett, Melodiya: A Soviet Russian L.P. Discography (London: Greenwood Press, 1981) is a reasonably comprehensive Melodiya discography).

188 P.N. Grunberg, V.L. Yanin, Istoriya nachala gramzapisî v Rossiî [History of Early Recording in Russia] (Moscow: Rossiyskiy Fond Fundamentalnih Issledovaniy, 2002), 171.
demand. By 1933 a decree was issued admitting the unsatisfactory state of the record industry. The Party Central Committee decided to pass all gramophone industry production to the Ministry of Heavy Industry. The plan was to increase the production of gramophones from 155,000 in 1933 to 1.5 million by 1937; this implied a 5.6 times growth per annum, a completely unrealistic figure. Regarding gramophone records, the ambitious plan was to set production at 3 million for 1933, 7 million for 1934, 15 million for 1935, 25 million for 1936 and 40 million for 1937. These numbers envisage growth at an average of 100% per annum, a rate which was never achieved. Furthermore, a special ‘Repertoire Commission’ was created that included party members, ministers and musicians, such as the composers Shostakovich, Reinhold Glier, Vissarion Shebalin and Mikhail Ippolitov-Ivanov and the conductor and violinist Yuriy Fayer. The commission was responsible for deciding on what music would be produced on gramophone records, driven by an aim for ‘the repertoire of gramophone records to be diverse, and include together with symphonic and classical music, vocal music, especially music of the peoples of the USSR, literary readings, humorous stories, romances, arias and dance music.’ Finally, a special confidential appendix to the decree ordered the Ministry of Heavy Industry to import machines and parts necessary to establish gramophone production inside the USSR and shellac, the main material for the production of records, as well as to send several specialist engineers abroad to consult with foreign gramophone producers on best practices. This demonstrates that even during the 1930s, when the USSR did not engage in active economic relations with the Western world, the management of the domestic record industry was aware of the technological lag and took measures to address it. These steps were never fully, if at all, executed in practice, as the technological gap existed until the mid-1960s.

189 Gleb Skorohodov, Tayni Grammofona (Moscow: EKSMO, 2004), 354.
191 Ibid.
In early 1955 Cecil Parrott, the British ambassador in Moscow and later, from 1957 to 1960, Director of Research of the Foreign Office, sent a report to the Foreign Office entitled ‘Soviet Gramophone Records.’ In this report, he describes how he regularly tried buying classical music records in Moscow during the previous year and how, although he managed to buy some excellent records issued earlier, nothing new had been issued for the previous nine months. Parrott cited an article from the magazine Sovetskaya Muzika, which explained several reasons for this. Firstly, the production of wax for gramophone records was subordinate to the production of tape for radio broadcasting; these were made in the same production facility. The repertoire committee would not agree to a recording of a work by one artist if it had already been recorded by someone else. There was also the issue of the small size of the recording studio and the outdated equipment. It additionally turned out that many records were stored away and not sold: in that particular year, only 9,000 were distributed and over twice as many were stored. Parrott gives a surprisingly capitalist reason for this: the records were only released if enough orders were placed for them in advance by the trade organisations, which preferred to order records ‘which they can dispose of easily,’ leading to strong sales of light and dance music and weak sales of classical music. For instance, in the third quarter of 1954 ‘various corny tangos and foxtrots were issued in hundreds of thousands of copies, whereas the waltz from the ballet The Sleeping Beauty was only issued in 300 copies.’ This reason was completely in line with demand-supply logic of capitalism, very surprising for a communist state that wanted to enlighten and develop its citizens on the best form of music, understood to be the classical genre. Parrott continued his lament about the decline in the sales of classical music records

194 Ibid.
within the USSR: by the end of 1954 classical music accounted only for 3.62% of all the production for the largest facility, the Aprelevka factory, a drop of almost 40% from 5.76% in the previous year. Parrott concluded that in his opinion, ‘this article, together with my personal experience, reveals a particularly disgraceful state of affairs, and exposes once more the humbug of the Soviet being ‘the apostles of culture’... It is another story of pitiable Soviet mismanagement – all the more pitiable considering the wealth of good material that undoubtedly exists.’

This detailed account of the Soviet record industry illustrates a broader point about the lag of the domestic economy behind Western equivalents, which was not surprising after the Second World War and limited resources available to resurrect production. Sanchez-Sibony noted the low quality of many Soviet products, which the country attempted to improve ‘in order to be competitive with the West’. This situation was also characteristic of the record industry and the poor quality of Soviet-produced recording discs forced foreign partners interested in selling music by Soviet performers abroad, to pursue recording these artists themselves or licensing tapes from the USSR and producing their own discs from these in the 1950s (as will be revealed in Chapter 4).

The quality of Soviet recordings remained inferior to Western equivalents until the unification of all management, production and marketing of recordings under the Melodiya label in 1964. This included all the record producing factories, recording facilities and wholesale record trade venues in the country. Melodiya became one of the six largest companies in the world by production volume and a monopoly producer inside the USSR. Many of the features Lindsay Hansen describes in the operations of East Germany’s only record company, owned by the state, VEB Deutsche Schallplatten, match those of Melodiya in the Soviet Union, including the hierarchical and complicated internal structure of decision-making, limited marketing activity and fixed prices

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196 Ibid.
197 Sanchez-Sibony, Red Globalization, 176.
198 The Ministry of Culture order about the establishment of Melodiya and the production plan until 1970, 31 December 1964, GARF, f. 5446, op.99, d. 1390, 56.
of records by music genre with classical being the cheapest and pop the most expensive.\textsuperscript{200}

The Brezhnev years from 1964 were characterised by a growth in consumer spending inside the USSR.\textsuperscript{201} In line with this, production and consumption of gramophone records, both classical and other genres, increased. The plan was to produce 300 million records in 1970 as opposed to the 124 million of 1964, as well as increase export.\textsuperscript{202} As was often the case, numbers set out in the plan were a substantial overestimate compared to real figures. Average production volume across the 1970s was c. 200 million.\textsuperscript{203}

By the 1960s, there were several organisations on the Soviet side involved in decision-making on foreign recordings, all with their internal aims and agendas; this was a state of affairs that invariably confused their foreign partners. These inconsistencies stemmed from the conflict between a desire to earn foreign currency from recordings and tours of Soviet musicians abroad, and the insistence on executing the same recordings projects domestically to then exporting these abroad to stoke national pride. Two interlinked decision-making lines dealt with recordings: the organisations that were accountable to the Ministry of Culture and those accountable to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. There was a further separate decision-making thread relating to the KGB that determined whether an artist could be let out of the USSR on tour or to a recording session.

The key organisation under the Ministry of Culture responsible for touring artists both in the USSR and abroad was Goskonzert (the State Concert Agency). It was important for recordings because decisions on making recordings abroad, especially in the earlier years of the Cold War, were linked to musicians’ tours there. Thus, a musician might give two concerts in London and then on the third

\textsuperscript{201} Christopher Read, \textit{The Making and Breaking of the Soviet System} (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 166.
\textsuperscript{203} Gronow and Saunio, \textit{An International History of the Recording Industry}, 181.
day record the same repertoire in a studio for an LP. Melodiya was also accountable to the Ministry of Culture but dealt only with internal Soviet matters of the record business. However, the Ministry of Culture realized that there was a cost to letting a Soviet artist record in the West: he/she would not be spending this time recording in the USSR and the recorded repertoire would be sold in the West by a foreign partner and not by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. Consequently, the Ministry of Culture regularly consulted Melodiya on whether to allow foreign companies to record Soviet artists.

Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, a body of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, was responsible for trade in cultural products: first books, then recordings, stamps and the published press. It was the official partner of all foreign record companies and it often acted without fully appreciating the conventions by which the global record industry operated (Section 6). A side player was the Soviet Embassy in London (or in another relevant Western country). Although it did not have any formal decision-making power in the record or touring business, foreign companies sometimes appealed to its high-level employees to hasten the decision-making process in the Ministry of Culture and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga or when they wanted to draw attention to a problem.

Finally, even after the decisions on an artist’s touring or recording schedule were made by the above parties, the local Communist Party committee, and often for the superstar artists, the KGB, was called upon to request approval for a temporary exit out of the USSR. As a rule, this was granted, although as we shall see later, by the 1980s a new worrying wave of cancellations of appearances in the West affected the life and reputation of rising Soviet musicians and the foreign organisers of their touring and recording sessions.

Formally, it was Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga that was responsible for approving or rejecting proposals to record Soviet artists in the West.²⁰⁴ It was accountable to the Ministry of Foreign Trade and not the Ministry of Culture, and

²⁰⁴ Letter from Deputy Head of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga A. Pavlov to Head of Foreign Affairs Committee at the Ministry of Culture Kalinin, 29 December 1965, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 1166, 1: ‘As you know, according to orders, all decisions regarding making records are part of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga competencies.’
could, in practice, take these decisions without consulting the Ministry of Culture. In the early 1960s, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was extremely selective when it came to giving consent for recordings abroad, and even when it did agree to a Western recording with a Soviet artist, it would add a condition that Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga recordings (i.e. Soviet export recordings) of the same repertoire would be distributed in competition with the recordings made by foreign companies: ‘when Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga signs contracts to make recordings in the West of Soviet artists, it is envisaged that these recordings do not preclude the distribution of Soviet export recordings abroad with the same repertoire performed by the same artists.’

In practice, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga consulted the Ministry of Culture every time a foreign partner sent a request to make a record with a Soviet artist. However, by the mid–1960s there were still no clear practical arrangements between Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and the Ministry of Culture on how to answer such appeals. Therefore, the decision-making was a battle between a desire to earn income from recording projects abroad by granting such requests and an issue of national pride based on the ideological view that Soviet artists should first and foremost record on domestic soil for Melodiya.

A note to the Ministry of Culture from the Soviet Embassy in the UK concerning the tour by Igor Oistrakh and Arvīds Jansons to England in February 1965 illustrates many of the internal difficulties that existed within the process of recording and touring Soviet artists abroad, in this specific case, in the UK. It explicitly blamed Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga’s actions for preventing both the possible earnings of much needed foreign currency and the further promotion of the artists’ reputation abroad. The note explained that despite the agreement by the Ministry of Culture to allow Igor Oistrakh to record works by Bartók and Beethoven in London for Decca, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga prohibited the project.

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205 Letter to the director of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga A. Zmeulovu from A. Slavnov, Deputy Head of External Affairs Department of the Ministry of Culture, 22 August 1961, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 238, 11.

206 Note on the tour of Igor Oistrakh and Arvīds Jansons in February 1965 in England from Soviet Embassy in London to the Ministry of Culture, 6 April 1965, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 779, 16–18.
Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga believed (and rightly so) that the distribution of the London recording would decrease its income from the sales of its label. The Soviet Embassy accepted that might be the case, but then gave a very financially calculated argument in favour of the Decca recording: foreign income from one recording could amount to c. £600–£800 (with £400 in advance and a royalty payment of 5–6% on sale price). Given that classical vinyls from Western labels cost c. £2, this means they expected to sell 2,000–4,000 copies.207

At the same time, the Soviet Embassy claimed that Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga sold its records for 3–4 shillings per item, which is 6–7 records for £1; clearly much cheaper. The difference in price reflected the discrepancy in brand name and quality of materials and sound reproduction. To reach the same income level of £600–£800, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga had to sell 3,600–4,800 discs, not to mention the costs of pressing, import and delivery, which was higher than the Decca estimate and involved extra expenditures. Moreover, Decca promised to grant Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga rights for this recording in the Soviet Bloc, as was usual in such agreements between the USSR and foreign record labels. The note then continued to explain that ‘the absence of a clear agreement between the Ministry of Culture and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga on the issue of granting permission to record Soviet artists abroad impedes such recording arrangements as this one with Decca. Also, one must note that this repertoire that was suggested for Oistrakh can be recorded by Decca with the American violinist Yehudi Menuhin, which will foster further competition to our records.’208 This recording was never made, but the discussions around it demonstrate that internal Soviet organisations were led by self-interest as much as by financial gain and the desire to enhance the USSR’s reputation abroad. It

207 EMI’s average break-even target was fixed at c. 2,000 LPs sold in retail for over two years. The Soviet Embassy’s estimate demonstrates an understanding of the workings of the Western record sales business. Thank you to David Patmore for providing this comparison information (email from David Patmore, 18 December 2018).
208 Note on the tour of Igor Oistrakh and Arvīds Jansons in February 1965 in England from Soviet Embassy in London to the Ministry of Culture, 6 April 1965, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 779, 18. The Soviet Embassy was wrong to give the example of Menuhin because he was exclusively an EMI artist and could not record for Decca, but despite the bad example, their point is still valid.
also demonstrates that the USSR was not a monolithic state and decision-making was diluted among various bureaucratic entities. Intense discussions were going on between Soviet organisations on the best strategy of engagement with foreign partners: whether to grant rights to make recordings abroad or to produce them internally in the USSR and then export them. Within ten years such debates would cease, and all foreign requests for recordings would be duly approved by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and the Ministry of Culture (Section 4).

One of the most challenging projects for EMI within its relationship with the USSR was acquiring permission to record Gilels playing Beethoven’s five piano concertos. The two-year-long negotiation to realise this plan was regularly interrupted by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga’s strong conviction that this recording project had to be executed in the Soviet Union. EMI first approached Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga between December 1965 and January 1966. However, to their displeasure, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga received a note from the Soviet Trade Delegation (their representatives in London) on 25 March saying that the Ministry of Culture had agreed for such recordings to take place with the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra.209

Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga wrote to the Ministry of Culture to make their disapproval known, as Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga believed that such recordings should be made by Melodiya in the USSR and then licensed or exported abroad. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga also claimed that the royalty payment they usually negotiated was 10%, while EMI only offered 5% to the Ministry of Culture. (This was not so, as we will see in ‘Financial Matters’ section). Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga’s note to the Ministry of Culture of 5 April 1966 explicitly stated its general disapproval of ‘the frequent practice of recording leading Soviet artists abroad instead of undertaking such recordings in the USSR.’ Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga believed that such practices deprived the USSR of privileged recording rights to these artists, increased competition over exported Soviet records and raised complaints from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga’s business partners in various

209 Letter from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to the Ministry of Culture, 5 April 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 1166, 63–64.
countries that bought its recordings and tapes. In light of this, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga insisted that the approval to record Gilels granted to EMI should remain an exception on the condition that these records were only distributed in the UK and that Gilels would record the same repertoire for Melodiya.

On further negotiations between Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and EMI on the matter, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga claimed that it could not agree to EMI’s demand for distribution across the Western world, but would instead agree to the Western world without continental Europe. The Ministry of Culture still insisted that Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga find a way to reach an agreement and for EMI to record the concerts on 3–8 January and 1–6 February 1967 in London. However, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga continued to contradict the Ministry of Culture, and informed EMI, to the Ministry of Culture’s indignation, that the Ministry of Culture had rejected the recording. The Ministry of Culture insisted that the recording take place on the abovementioned terms.

Finally, the Culture Minister Ekaterina Furtzeva signed the order herself and it was sent to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. The latter continued to create obstacles by writing a further letter to the Ministry of Culture, again repeating its reasons for rejection: ‘There is high demand for Soviet records and tapes from foreign partners for new Soviet recordings of Beethoven’s concertos by Gilels and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga risks losing high profits by not providing such recordings to its partners.’ It concluded the letter with the statement that ‘recordings of Soviet artists should be the property of our Soviet state and not of foreign capitalist record firms.’ This is the same position it expressed earlier when refusing to let Decca record the Oistrakh duet in England in 1965. The matter dragged on into the middle of 1967, when Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga kept sending the Ministry of Culture letters about the disagreement on distribution.

210 Letter from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to Kalinin, Head of External Communications at the Ministry of Culture, 26 August 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 1166, 65.
211 Letter from Kalinin, Head of External Communications at the Ministry of Culture to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 13 December 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 1166, 66–67.
212 Letter from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to Kalinin, Head of External Communications at the Ministry of Culture, 20 December 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 1166, 68.
213 Ibid.
rights across Europe, as Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga already had commitments relating to distribution in selected European countries and could not grant the rights to EMI in those locations. EMI insisted it wanted the whole of the capitalist world.214

EMI’s persistence paid off and eventually it recorded Gilels playing all five Beethoven piano concertos with the Cleveland Symphony Orchestra under conductor George Szell in April–May 1968. However, its distribution rights in the major Western markets were severely curtailed. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga had distribution rights in the USSR and the Soviet Bloc countries, Ariola-Eurodisc had rights for West Germany, Austria and Switzerland, and EMI had rights for its usual territories of Great Britain, Australia and the USA.215

A decade later, the Ministry of Culture was still articulating the view to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Goskonzert that recordings of Soviet artists should be made, as a rule, in the Soviet Union: ‘For artists, whose performances attract the interest of foreign record companies, it is necessary to include in the contracts concluded abroad a special condition that their touring repertoire will first be recorded on Melodiya, with subsequent sales of these recordings abroad during business as usual. Melodiya agrees with this point of view.’216 In reality, after 1970, the Ministry of Culture and Melodiya did not often reject foreign partners’ recording proposals. Tours were important as a tool to drive sales of records (preferably Melodiya ones and not recordings made abroad), as well as demonstrating the virtuosity of Soviet artists. This contradiction of goals – being

214 Letter from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to the Ministry of Culture, 12 April 1967, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 1566, 33.
215 Interestingly, EMI eventually did not issue the Gilels Beethoven concertos in the UK, due to the conflict of its internal priorities: by an unfortunate coincidence, in September 1967 the same Beethoven cycle was recorded by the young rising star pianist Daniel Barenboim and the distinguished conductor Otto Klemperer. EMI in the UK released their set in early 1968, and so was reluctant to take on another full set of the same repertoire for risk of diluting sales. The release of the Gilels-Szell Beethoven recording was nevertheless crucial for EMI in the USA in furtherance of their need for major recordings involving American orchestras to compete with RCA and CBS (email from Tony Locantro, 6 February 2019).
216 Letter from Head of Foreign Affairs Duzhev (the Ministry of Culture) to Deputy Head Gordeev (Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga), with a copy to Head of Goskonzert Supagin, 14 December 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 403, 34–36.
opposed to a foreign recording session on paper but in practice not objecting to them – stems from the inconsistencies between the aims of Soviet bureaucratic organisation on paper and in practice. On paper they were supposed to be guided by principles of engaging national artists at home to play for the benefit of Soviet citizens; however, earning foreign currency was a priority by the 1960s–70s.

3. The Motivations of Agents

To understand further the decision-making motivation of the Soviet side involved in the record business with the West in 1950–1980, we need to clarify the economic and ideological principles behind it. The Western capitalist system and Soviet planned economies were in many ways different, even opposed. Understanding these dissimilarities is crucial as they inhibited the business connections around recordings of Soviet artists and ultimately led to frustration and even to the complete breakdown of relationships.

The fundamental difference between the Western capitalist and Soviet central-planning economic systems was the nature of production and consumption decision-making. In the Western model, these decisions were made by independent agents acting in the open market: individual consumers decided which items they wanted to purchase. Firms observed this demand and produced goods and services to meet the needs of the consumers. In such a situation, producers and consumers interacted directly and firms could adjust their production volumes reasonably quickly in response to demand changes.

In the planned Soviet economy, the consumption and production predictions were carried out by a centralised bureaucratic government organisation called Gosplan. In an ideal world of instant and efficient information processing, this would lead to the same outcome as the capitalist system and demand and supply would equal out for each industry. However, information processing even with modern computers is not completely fast and efficient. The situation was much worse in the USSR of the 1950s–80s. Gosplan determined the production volumes for a huge range of industries, which were then further broken down into plans
for specific factories by the respective ministries. The factories were also given
quotas for input materials from suppliers. This was done on an annual basis.\textsuperscript{217}

Such a system was incredibly cumbersome and ineffective. There were huge
discrepancies between the planned and actual production volumes in every
industry that could not be corrected quickly enough, thus resulting in more
discrepancies.

By the mid–1960s, the Soviet government attempted to introduce reforms that
would allow firms to collect orders from consumers and then produce according
to demand. Additionally, the system did not have any internal stimuli to
improve production efficiencies; more effective production was not rewarded
with more income for the firm or the workers, hence there was no reason to
improve productivity, especially when there was no competition from abroad.

Finally, the USSR was obliged to import many types of machinery and
materials, far more so than Western economies. Thus, it needed foreign currency
to pay for those imports.\textsuperscript{218} To earn foreign currency, the USSR, first of all,
exported natural resources, including oil. Soviet ministries did not forfeit the
opportunities to earn foreign money on other exports, including concert tours
and recordings of Soviet classical musicians.

As Mikkonen has argued, at the start of active cultural relations with the
West in the 1950s, ‘the aim [of Soviet cultural diplomacy] was not so much to
spread communism as to use cultural influencing to make the Soviet Union look
less a threat and appear in a more positive light.’\textsuperscript{219} As a supposedly ‘universal
language,’ instrumental music in particular, was regarded by Western and Soviet
cultural officials as one of the most effective tools to influence foreign opinion
about the USSR.\textsuperscript{220} The perception was that similarly to dance, music without a
strong verbal component ‘appeared to stand apart from politics in a way that
literature did not,’ leading to its presumed effectiveness as a cultural

\textsuperscript{217} Evgeniy Yasin, \textit{Rossiyskaya ekonomika: istoki i panorama rinochnih reform [The Russian
Economy: Sources and Panorama of Market Reforms]} (Moscow: Higher School of Economics,
2002), 35.

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid., 39–44.

\textsuperscript{219} Mikkonen and Suutari, \textit{Music, Art and Diplomacy}, 157.

\textsuperscript{220} Tomoff, \textit{Virtuosi Abroad}, 6.
promotional tool.\footnote{Fosler-Lussier, Music in America’s Cold War Diplomacy, 166.} This meant that, when it came to record deals, the USSR deemed the promotion of Soviet classical music more important than financial gains in the 1950s. Consequently, Soviet classical music recordings were often sold abroad at low prices then. As Mikkonen has shown in relation to that time, ‘the distribution of Soviet recordings for the USSR was primarily an ideological issue rather than a financial one.’\footnote{Mikkonen, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds,’ 139–140.}

However, motivation became more financially-driven from the 1960s. By then, the Soviet government needed foreign currency to cover its growing import demands and took any opportunity to earn money on the export of Soviet goods.\footnote{Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy, 122.} In 1977, the USSR Ministry of Culture acknowledged the importance of record sales as an income source in its note to the Central Committee of the Communist Party: ‘Leading Western firms eagerly buy Soviet recordings of symphonic and instrumental music, which brings the state considerable foreign currency revenues.’\footnote{Memorandum of the Soviet Ministry of Culture to Central Committee of the Communist Party on the creation of a symphony orchestra for the all-union record firm ‘Melodiya,’ in Kultura i Vlast’ ot Stalina do Gorbacheva, ed. Tavanez, 88.} The USSR was behaving more like a capitalist record label at that point. Sanchez-Sibony ironically notes the contradiction between the Soviet desire to earn hard currency and its ideology: ‘An obsession with obtaining dollars and the constant mimicking of capitalist practices in their relations with their own “empire” is hard to square with their oft-assumed enterprise of world revolution and general political drive to undermine the West wherever possible.’\footnote{Sanchez-Sibony, Red Globalization, 174.}

Western record companies’ motivation for engagement with Soviet recordings, in contrast, was consistently commercial. As well as earning money on the exclusive licensing of Soviet recordings, the company was eager to profit from recording Soviet soloists in the West. The prolific touring activities of Soviet classical music superstars during the Thaw era had familiarised the Western public with their names by the 1970s, creating high demand for their recordings.
Licensing contracts envisaged the provision of priority, preferably exclusive, access for record companies to these artists in the label’s home territories (Chapter 4). At that time, it was common for record companies to create exclusive associations with successful performers to retain the artists on their books. This ensured the record company’s access to the artists for future profitable recordings. EMI was no different. Not a single Soviet musician was presented in the EMI artists’ roster in the 1956–57 Annual Report to shareholders. This is not surprising given the limited number of recordings made by Soviet musicians in the West until that time. But already by 1959 EMI eagerly boasted Gilels, Richter, Rostropovich and David and Igor Oistrakh on their lists of artists. This illustrates EMI’s willingness to signpost Soviet artists as theirs, even before they were established as such.

Michael Allen, business head of EMI’s International Classical Division, actively involved in the Soviet relationship in the 1960s, explained that the primary motivation behind the licensing relationship with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was to gain access to recording the superstars of the Soviet music scene (a detailed discussion of the licensing agreement is presented in Chapter 4). According to him, EMI’s idea was to first obtain access to the Soviet recordings of those artists and then record the performers in the West. Tony Locantro, the business manager of the EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga relationship, in a separate interview, confirmed this desire of EMI to secure the Soviet artists. Once the artist had been recorded by the company, the record label possessed all copyright to that recording in agreed Western countries for the next fifty years. Rights in the communist countries, meanwhile, were owned by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. In the long run, this was commercially appealing to the record company and guaranteed a stream of revenues from this recording without incurring any more substantial costs to produce it.

229 Tony Locantro interview for the British Library Sound Archive, 7 December 2016.
For instance, one of EMI’s absolute bestsellers in its entire classical music catalogue of the 1970s was the Beethoven Triple Concerto recorded by Oistrakh, Rostropovich and Richter with the Berlin Philharmonic under their famous conductor Herbert von Karajan. Its success stood in stark contrast to the soloists’ attitude to the result: later in life, Richter remarked that ‘it’s a dreadful recording and I disown it utterly.’ According to Richter, there was much disagreement among the soloists and the conductor during the recording process: he and Oistrakh did not support Karajan’s interpretation and tempo choices. This is further corroborated by recollections of both David Oistrakh and Rostropovich, in their conversations with Igor Oistrakh. Nevertheless, the combination of three Soviet superstar soloists and a leading Western conductor and orchestra evidently created an irresistible appeal in the eyes of the consumers and produced long-term profits for EMI.

4. Business as Usual

The late 1960s and throughout the 1970s were the time of business-as-usual. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga had by then established productive key licensing agreements (see Chapter 4) and accumulated ample experience of negotiating rights to record Soviet players in the West. In the years after 1970 Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga consulted the Ministry of Culture regularly and became much more lenient regarding foreign record companies’ requests. This new, more open attitude to recording Soviet artists abroad was a result of prioritizing foreign currency income over cultural diplomacy and other non-economic considerations.

The archives of the Ministry of Culture contain many letters from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to the Ministry of Culture and Melodiya passing on

requests from foreign record companies to record Soviet artists in the West. A typical recording request from a foreign partner would assume the following pattern in the 1970s: the Western company would write a letter to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga requesting the right to record a Soviet performer in a particular Western city on proposed dates with a suggested repertoire, and, if applicable, a proposed conductor and orchestra. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga would then send this letter to the Ministry of Culture for their opinion. The Ministry of Culture would forward the letter to Melodiya, which would relay its opinion back to the Ministry of Culture. The latter, in turn, would communicate its decision, which always matched that of Melodiya, to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (Figure 2.1). Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga stopped challenging the Ministry of Culture’s decisions after 1970. By then the idea that ‘national artists should perform and record for the benefit of their citizens’ was superseded by the overwhelming need to earn foreign currency to cover Soviet trade deficits.

Figure 2.1. Bureaucratic Decision-Making Chain for Recording Soviet Artists Abroad

After 1970 a steady stream of requests to record Soviet artists poured in from large record companies, particularly EMI for the UK, Le Chant du Monde and Pathé Marconi for France, Ariola and Deutsche Grammophon for West Germany. All requests for a decision on foreign recording sessions were
answered by Melodiya and the Ministry of Culture with a ‘yes as long as the artist agrees.’ As an example, in December 1975 Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga wrote to the Ministry of Culture saying that EMI wanted to record the violinist Gidon Kremer playing Brahms’s Violin Concerto with the Berlin Philharmonic under Karajan, and Richter and Oleg Kagan in Innsbruck playing Beethoven’s violin sonatas. EMI would give the tapes to Melodiya for free to distribute across the USSR and Communist Bloc countries like Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany (standard conditions of foreign record agreements with the USSR). Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was happy with the arrangement and asked what the Ministry of Culture thought. There is a handwritten note on this letter: ‘Ask Melodiya’s opinion.’ The answer almost a month later was: ‘We have no objections, if the recording is made during a tour that is already in the plan. If the artist needs to travel specifically for the recording session, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga will need to organise this.’

In February 1976, EMI through Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga requested that the young conductor Vladimir Fedoseyev and young violinist Gidon Kremer record Tchaikovsky’s Violin Concerto with the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra in London on 20–21 April right after the concert on 18 April. Melodiya, as usual, would receive a free tape. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was happy to support the request. The Ministry of Culture replied that it had no objections. More requests poured in two months later for the pianist Lazar Berman and Fedoseyev to play Rakhmaninov’s Piano Concerto No. 3 with the LSO. This time, unusually for the UK, the record label was CBS and not EMI. Melodiya was...

233 Letter from Head of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga Raisa Kaliyenko to Duzhev in the Ministry of Culture, 18 December 1975, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 401, 34.
234 Letter from Duzhev in the Ministry of Culture to Head of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga Raisa Kaliyenko, 14 January 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 401, 35.
235 Letter from Duzhev in the Ministry of Culture to Head of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga Raisa Kaliyenko, 10 March 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 401, p. 59.
236 Letter from Kaliyenko in Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to Duzhev in the Ministry of Culture, 27 April 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 401, 72.
supportive, so almost a month later Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga received a reply from the Ministry of Culture that it did not object.237

The more straightforward decision-making process on the Soviet side led to the ‘pouring in’ of foreign recording requests. The Ministry of Culture archival folder on cultural matters with the UK contains many letters that all follow the same pattern: Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga would send a letter to the Ministry of Culture informing them of EMI’s proposal, the Ministry of Culture would forward that to Melodiya, Melodiya would reply with a ‘yes,’ which would then be passed to EMI through the same chain of agents. This situation occurred with recordings of Yuriy Temirkanov with Dmitry Alekseyev, Daniil Shafran playing Shubert, Schumann and Chopin for October–November 1977, and Yevgeniy Svetlanov recording Glazunov’s Vremena Goda.238

These archival documents demonstrate the overwhelming dominance of EMI in the UK when it came to recording Soviet artists. EMI was the one British company with a firm foot in the door of the Soviet bureaucratic system. The more recording projects EMI completed, the more routine they became, and the requests that came in regularly became business as usual for Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, the Ministry of Culture and Melodiya. The consistency in the chain of Soviet bureaucratic approval must have been reassuring for the Western partners, and a decided relief from the unpredictability of Soviet decision-making before the late 1960s.

EMI was particularly keen on recording the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra and their legendary conductor Yevgeniy Mravinsky. The last time the orchestra recorded abroad had been in 1960 and the lucrative deal had gone to Deutsche Grammophon (as seen in Chapter 1). Mravinsky’s last studio (non-live)

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237 Letter from Duzhev in the Ministry of Culture to Head of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga Raisa Kaliyenko, 9 May 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 401, 73.
recording had been in 1961 in Moscow. In 1962, the KGB banned the orchestra from touring abroad for the next ten years. When the ban was prematurely lifted in 1966, the Leningrad Philharmonic under Mravinsky gave concerts in Western and Eastern Europe (1966, 1967, 1972, 1974) and Japan (1973), but there were no recordings made in the West that had been officially approved by the Soviet Union. None of the large labels that had relationships with the Soviet bureaucratic organisations recorded the orchestra on tour in either the West or Socialist Bloc until 1978; the only way to hear them on record was through licensed tapes made from recordings in the USSR.

EMI pursued the Leningrad Philharmonic systematically, writing to the Ministry of Culture about their ‘the long-cherished hope of recording the Leningrad Philharmonic with Mravinsky.’ A letter from Peter Andry, then head of EMI’s International Classical Division, who visited Leningrad together with the Chairman of EMI, Sir John Read, in April 1977, highlighted that ‘there have been in progress for some considerable time now discussions concerning the recording by EMI of the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra under its Chief Conductor, Maestro Mravinsky.’ The reply came, as usual, a month later: ‘We would love to make the recording, but Mravinsky did not give agreement to such a recording in the next season. This, of course, does not preclude our further fruitful collaboration on other projects in the future.’

Recordings of live performances by the Leningrad Philharmonic were eventually made by Ariola and Le Chant du Monde at the Vienna Festival in 1978; EMI was also able to license domestic tapes from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga for the Melodiya/HMV series (see Chapter 4).

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239 Tassie, Yeovgeniy Mravinsky, vii.
240 Mikkonen, ‘Winning Hearts and Minds,’ 152.
241 Tassie, Yeovgeniy Mravinsky, 215–223.
242 Letter from Peter Andry (EMI) to Shmelev in Goskonzert, 7 February 1970, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 1272, 13–14.
243 Letter from Peter Andry (EMI) to Kukharsky (Deputy Minister of Culture), 4 May 1977, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 678, 3–4.
244 Letter from Kukharsky (Deputy Minister of Culture) to Peter Andry (EMI), 6 June 1977, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 678, 5.
case, the record company is in control of the placement of recording equipment; this is particularly important with large groups of varying musical instruments that are characteristic of an orchestra. It is surprising that despite the regular annual concerts in Western and Eastern Europe, the Western record labels were not able to produce recordings of the Leningrad Philharmonic abroad for almost twenty years (between 1960 and 1978). This could be due to many reasons and we are unlikely to know which one is more valid, including the Soviet side’s unwillingness to give such an attractive deal to one foreign partner to the detriment of others or the logistical hassle of recording an entire orchestra in a studio setting abroad.

5. Financial Matters

The Soviet government accepted the Western financial model of payments for touring and recordings. For the latter this consisted of two parts: a fixed amount of money as an advance against income for making the recording and a percentage of the sales price as a royalty (income) from every record sold.

What do the financial payments offered by the record company tell us about the value they place on a performer? Both the advance and the royalty payment were a deduction from the record companies’ income, thus the latter needed to ensure that whatever rates the artists were offered still left the firm enough money to make a profit. Moreover, since competition existed for the top classical artists the financial payments also reflect the level of desirability of the artists, their popularity, and, consequently, the fierceness of competition to record them.

The Soviet Ministry of Culture archive contains some selective information on financial dealings with the Western record companies. There is insufficient data to conduct a comprehensive analysis, but the information that is available hints at Soviet artists being valued by Western labels at the same level as their peers abroad. Advances are very difficult to compare with equivalent values for Western performers: they were not part of many Western stars’ recording sessions as they generally had a rolling contract with the company and
didn’t need an advance on a project-by-project basis. Record labels had to offer advances for Soviet artists as each recording was treated as a one-off project.

Royalties, however, were another matter. The unrealized recording contract put forward by Pathé Marconi to the Ministry of Culture in 1957 to make recordings together with the Ministry of Culture in the Soviet Union offered a royalty rate of 8%.

Deutsche Grammophon recorded the Leningrad Philharmonic on their 1960 tour and paid a royalty rate of 8% to the entire orchestra, including the conductor Mravinsky. Table 2.1 demonstrates that in the 1960s Western labels offered a Soviet soloist the common royalty of 5%, in line with the rates paid to Western soloists. A further 5% was often split between the accompanying orchestra and conductor. It is hard to draw definite conclusions on the dynamics of royalty rates paid to the Soviet side from the 1950s to the 1980s given the limited number of data points surviving in the archives. I would speculate that offers of royalties were higher in the 1950s when relationships were fluid and developing. After all, royalty rates were a way of luring the Soviet side into partnership with the Western companies. Once relationships stabilized in the 1960s, offers of royalties would have settled at standard industry rates (see Table 2.1). Certain high-profile performers could, however, expect to receive more, such as Richter (who was offered 10% by Pathé Marconi in 1966), and Rostropovich (who received 7% from Le Chant du Monde in 1964).

According to Tony Locantro, the EMI business manager dealing with the Soviet side, royalty rates did not differ between the leading Soviet artists and their Western peers. By the 1970s the EMI royalty rates were fixed and not part of negotiations during discussions of recording projects with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. Locantro recalled that it was the execution of various recording projects that EMI requested the Ministry of Culture to approve, but the royalty rate was taken for granted at 5% for orchestral projects and could be as high as 10% for

246 Contract between Pathé Marconi/EMI and the Ministry of Culture, 10 February 1957, RGALI f.2329, op.8, d.602, 5–11.
247 Agreement between Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Deutsche Grammophon (Polydor), [no date] 1960, RGALI f. 2329, op. 8, d. 2011, 79–82.
248 Interview with Tony Locantro, 20 October 2018.
solo recordings. Such similarity of financial arrangements to Western projects serves as a further illustration of how the USSR’s recording business followed the same principles and guidelines as the global classical music industry.

\[249\] Ibid.
Table 2.1. Royalty Rates for Recording Soviet Artists in the West

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Royalty</th>
<th>Soviet Artist</th>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Repertoire and other participating artists</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>10% solo, 5%</td>
<td>Vladimir Ashkenazy</td>
<td>Electrola-Odeon</td>
<td>Brahms, Chopin, Rakhmaninov, Liszt and Prokofiev</td>
<td>Contract with Electrola-Odeon, 25 October 1957, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 587, 27–30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>19, 22</td>
<td>Wembley Town Hall, London</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>David and Igor Oistrakh</td>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Bach’s Double Concerto BWV 1043, Beethoven’s Violin Romance No. 1 and No. 2, all with the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra under Eugene Goossens, Beethoven’s Violin Romance No. 2 and Vivaldi’s Concerto No. 8 with the same orchestra conducted by David Oistrakh</td>
<td>Contract between DG and MK for recording Soviet artists in London, 11 February 1961, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 238, 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>24–30</td>
<td>Vienna</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Sviatoslav Richter</td>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Vienna Symphony, the first recording was of Beethoven’s Piano Concerto No. 3 with Kurt Sanderling and the second of Tchaikovsky’s Piano Concerto No. 1 with Herbert von Karajan</td>
<td>Contract between GK and DG, [no date given], RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 238, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>15 December</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Mstislav Rostropovich</td>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Letter from CDM to MC, 2 November 1964, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 478, 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1–2 April</td>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>David Oistrakh</td>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>Sonatas of Debussy, Ravel and Prokofiev</td>
<td>Letter from CDM and PM to MC, 17 June 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 478, 88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>9 August</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Sviatoslav Richter</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>solo</td>
<td>Letter from CDM and PM to MC, 20 June 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 478, 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Leonid Kogan</td>
<td>PM</td>
<td>solo</td>
<td>Letter from Kalinin, Head of External Communications at MC to MK, 13 December 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 1166, 66–67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>April–May</td>
<td>Cleveland, USA</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Emil Gilels</td>
<td>EMI</td>
<td>Beethoven piano concertos with the Cleveland Symphony Orchestra conducted by George Szell</td>
<td>Letter from Kalinin, Head of External Communications at MC to MK, 13 December 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 1166, 66–67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Problems in the Relationships

Despite its integration into the global record industry, the USSR was still a closed state with a strong communist ideology. Consequently, its relationships with Western partners could not be based on purely capitalist considerations and were often obscured by other factors. Though patient in their dealings with the USSR at first, the foreign record companies became increasingly dissatisfied with the multitude of inhibitors to day-to-day business interactions.

One of the most frustrating issues was the divergent understanding of distribution rights: whereas the Western record companies were used to thinking on a global scale and issuing their hit records in as many important geographical markets as they could, the Soviet side approached the distribution of records in the same way as books, on a country-by-country basis, and required the foreign partners to do the same with Soviet recordings. This likely limited the sales numbers and earnings for each of the Western labels.

Delays in responding to offers of concerts and recording projects were another peculiarity of dealing with the Soviet Union. The primary reason for this was the many layers of bureaucracy that the request had to go through. This understandably frustrated the Western counterparties and even sometimes resulted in monetary losses. Ironically, a country created on the fundamental assumption of all-encompassing planning in every sector of the economy could not deliver the same comfort of long-term planning to its foreign partners.

Other frustrations included miscommunications and artists’ self-directed actions, which were not aligned with the course of action advocated by the Soviet bureaucrats, as well as security issues and international political events. Finally, the USSR’s refusal to adhere to international copyright conventions created problems in the payment of fees for licensed music in both directions: pirating of Soviet classical records was very common in the West, especially the USA, and, in return, Melodiya issued unauthorized discs of foreign performers, often in the pop sector, because they were in great demand in the USSR.
6.1. Country-Specific Distribution Rights

Country-specific distribution rights favoured by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga were a source of constant frustration for all its Western partners. Coming from the book publishing business, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga treated each country as a separate market. Western record companies, however, thought about distribution on a global scale, with a focus on the top five largest classical music markets. Whenever a foreign record label made a recording with a Soviet superstar performer, they aimed to release it in at least two or three key markets. However, if Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga already had other distribution partners in those markets, this was not possible. *Billboard* reported that the Soviet Union advised its foreign partners that ‘we believe in competition. We don’t like monopolies or exclusive deals.’ \(^{250}\) This sounds surprising, coming from representatives of a country that internally had only monopolies in all areas of the economy, including record production and distribution. The Soviet bureaucrats were probably wary of giving too much power to any single foreign partner. Michael Allen recalled this rights issue as being highly frustrating for EMI. Its employees were used to thinking on a global scale, rather than ‘like the book publishing business that was based on language differences.’ \(^{251}\) Therefore, whenever EMI made a recording with a Soviet artist, it could issue it in the UK and Australia, and often the USA, but did not have the authority to distribute it across France (where Le Chant du Monde was the official Soviet distribution partner), Germany (Deutsche Grammophon and Ariola-Eurodisc) or Japan (Viktor Music Industries and Shinsekai Records for imports of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga records), without additional negotiations about those markets.

In 1966, Deutsche Grammophon made a live recording of Richter at the Festival de Tours. This aroused indignation from Le Chant du Monde, which had rights to make all recordings of Soviet artists in France. They wrote to the Ministry of Culture: ‘We have written to you multiple times to indicate that this

\(^{250}\) ‘Red Countries Lifting Curtain on Classical Product to West,’ *Billboard*, 15 January 1966, 56.

\(^{251}\) Michael Allen interview, 1 November 2017.
recording was done without our consent, and, it turns out, without yours, too.' Le Chant du Monde urged the Ministry of Culture to react strongly to ensure that other recording companies did not engage in similar activities. Deutsche Grammophon informed the Soviet side that the recording of the concert in Tours was made with Richter’s agreement, so the Repertoire Director of Deutsche Grammophon Hans Hirsch asked that the Ministry of Culture talk to Richter directly as his firm had a written agreement from Richter to make the recording. Deutsche Grammophon reiterated that they were very interested in recordings of Soviet artists and ready to share recording rights as long as the recordings were made on their equipment. This example also illustrates the difficulty for Soviet bureaucrats around controlling the actions of Soviet artists abroad (Section 6.3).

A similar argument over distribution rights occurred when in 1968 Le Chant du Monde made a recording of songs by Bulat Okudzhava, a famous Soviet guitar poet-singer. Le Chant du Monde had to be content with issuing the record only in France, with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga having rights for the rest of the world. There was also a note from the Ministry of Culture asking Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to warn Le Chant du Monde about making unapproved recordings: ‘please warn Roire [Head of Le Chant du Monde] that he has broken the agreed order of things by not having sought approval from us of this recording session.’

The Ministry of Culture did their best to honour country-specific commitments to the record companies. Unlike the incident with Richter in Tours,

252 Letter from Le Chant du Monde to the Ministry of Culture, 16 June 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 478, 86.
253 Letter from Soviet Embassy representative in the GDR Kosarev to the Ministry of Culture, 30 June 1966, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 478, 76.
256 Letter from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to Kalinin, Head of External Communications at the Ministry of Culture, 3 January 1968, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 2103, 1.
257 Ibid.
in 1968 the Ministry of Culture was able to honour its contract with Le Chant du Monde that all recordings of Soviet artists and licensing of Soviet records in France were made only by Le Chant du Monde or by another company with Le Chant du Monde’s agreement. The Ministry of Culture did not give recording rights to Khachaturian conducting his works with the Orchestre de Paris to Polydor, the French subsidiary of Deutsche Grammophon.\textsuperscript{258} It was eventually agreed that Le Chant du Monde would make this recording. Similarly, when requested by Chandos Music, an independent record label with a relationship with RCA, to record Soviet artists in the UK, the Ministry of Culture through the Soviet embassy replied that they could not accept the offer because they had a prior agreement with EMI.\textsuperscript{259}

Whenever there was too much interest from Western labels in making a recording of certain repertoire with a particular performer, the Ministry of Culture could not grant rights to one firm without upsetting others. Instead it preferred not to give rights to anyone and do the recording internally in the USSR with the intention of then exporting it. In 1976 EMI, Polydor (Deutsche Grammophon French subsidiary) and CBS independently approached Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga with the suggestion to record Rakhmaninov’s Piano Concerto No. 3 with Lazar Berman and a prominent Western orchestra, like the LSO and a well-known conductor, like Claudio Abbado. However, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was of the opinion that ‘by showing a preference towards one of these firms, and each one of them does have the right to expect this, our relationships with the others automatically deteriorate.’\textsuperscript{260} In light of the situation, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga recommended recording the concerto on Melodiya and licensing the rights abroad. However, for reasons unclear from the archival materials, the Soviet side was considering granting the rights to CBS.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{258} Letter from the Ministry of Culture to the Russian Embassy in France, 2 March 1968, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 2103, 3.
\item \textsuperscript{259} Letter from John Hargreaves at Chandos Music to the Cultural Attaché at the Soviet Embassy in London, 24 September 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 401, 148–149.
\item \textsuperscript{260} Letter from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to Deputy Minister of Culture Popov, 9 June 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 401, 82.
\end{itemize}
Not surprisingly, EMI wrote to the Ministry of Culture complaining about the possible preference that would be given to CBS to produce this recording:

EMI is pressing Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to grant permission to record the Rakhmaninov Third Piano Concerto with Lazar Berman in London this November. EMI also wants to make one solo piano recital LP with Mr. Berman at the same time. The concerto recording is linked to a concert with the LSO to be conducted by Claudio Abbado and the German company UNITEL also intends to make a film of Berman and Abbado performing the concerto. It seems however that Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga wish to allow CBS to make the recording despite EMI’s continued requests. This is unacceptable.261

Despite EMI’s protests, it was indeed CBS that made the recording with Berman, Abbado and the LSO in 1977.262 Unfortunately, I did not find documentary evidence to explain such a change of heart on the Soviet side, especially since London was considered EMI’s recording territory. Country-specific distribution rights imposed on them by the USSR, were inconvenient for foreign partners as they limited the territorial distribution for their recordings, therefore, capping potential revenues from their sales.

### 6.2. The Inefficiency of Soviet Bureaucracy

There were many differences in approach and mentality between a slow, unmotivated monopoly that was the Soviet bureaucracy and profit-oriented, astute long-term planning organisations that were the foreign record companies. Confusion over which Soviet organisation could grant permission for recording projects abroad persisted throughout the 1960s. When Le Chant du Monde requested to record the Barshai Ensemble on four LPs in Paris, a note from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to the Ministry of Culture complained that Rudolf Barshai and the Ministry of Culture representative E. Nikiforov did not wait for the outcome of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga’s negotiations with Le Chant du Monde and signed an agreement with the latter in Paris in absence of

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261 Letter from EMI to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga on unresolved matters between EMI and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 19 July 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 403, 11.
Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga representative on 16 July 1965. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga believed the conditions of the agreement to be commercially disadvantageous to the Soviet side. Also, they had obtained information from Le Chant du Monde that the Ministry of Culture had signed another contract on 25 June the previous year to make similar recordings with the Barshai Ensemble, which again had unsatisfactory financial terms. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga drew the Ministry’s attention to the fact that such actions could lead to a clash of interests between the foreign partners, in this instance, Le Chant du Monde and the Japanese firm Shinsekai Records. According to an agreement it had made earlier with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, Shinsekai Records had licensed Soviet tapes with the same repertoire that Le Chant du Monde wanted to record and had put those recordings into distribution. Although the initial distribution territories were likely to be different (France and Japan), this must have been a matter of principle not to have different recording partners release the same repertoire by the same Soviet artists outside of the USSR.

The Soviet bureaucratic organisations were highly inefficient at responding to offers for concerts and recordings by foreign parties. This was true for both Goskonzert, which was responsible for the tours, and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, which dealt with recordings. The severe slowness in communication on the side of the Soviet bureaucracy was characteristic of its dealings with all foreign partners in the cultural sector. The archives contain many letters from impresarios complaining about delays in responses to suggestions of tour dates and programming, which made their work with the concert venues and potential performing partners (Western orchestras and conductors) difficult. The main Soviet touring counterpart in the UK, Viktor Hochhauser, sent complaints on the unhurried responses regarding programming and the availability of artists and last-minute cancellations by the Soviet side, which caused the impresario to incur losses. For example,

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263 Letter from Deputy Head of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga A. Pavlov to Head of External Communications at the Ministry of Culture Kalinin, 29 December 1965, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 1166, 1–2.
264 RGALI, f. 3162, op. 1, d. 1785.
Hochhauser wrote to Goskonzert in early 1976 complaining that Goskonzert had not replied to four telexes and numerous telegrams with regards to an invitation for Maksim Shostakovich to conduct a special Jubilee Concert in memory of his father on 25–26 September 1976. Since he had not received an answer, Hochhauser had to revoke the invitation. Similarly, the impresario Robert Paterson wrote to the Ministry of Culture complaining: ‘There are serious communication breakdowns with Goskonzert. In all probability there will be serious problems in finalizing engagement of Kogan [violinist Leonid Kogan] in April 1976 and Moscow State Symphony Orchestra in September 1976. Goskonzert has not given reply to the proposed programme of Tchaikovsky concertos for eight weeks. In the case of the orchestra, because there were serious delays in us receiving the proposed programmes, the BBC have now cancelled both the Promenade Concerts that they originally offered. They plan an entire three months’ season and of course you know orchestral repertoire is of the essence as no composition is repeated during that period of three months.’

Regarding recording requests, we have seen in the ‘Business as Usual’ section that the average turnaround time for a request to record a Soviet artist in the West was c. 1–1.5 months. This delay appears to have been down to the sluggishness of Melodiya. By way of example: in 1977, EMI requested to record Richter in London playing Beethoven’s Piano Concerto No. 3 on one LP with the New Philharmonia Orchestra and conductor Ricardo Muti. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga passed on the request to the Ministry of Culture on 30 June, then the Ministry of Culture asked Melodiya’s opinion (we don’t know on what date) and Melodiya replied in agreement only on 1 August, with the Ministry of Culture sending their reply based on Melodiya’s decision on 3 August. Judging from these timings, the bureaucratic movements within the Ministry of Culture were

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265 Letter from impresario Viktor Hochhauser to Head of Goskonzert Supagin, [no date] 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 401, 45.
266 Letter from impresario Robert Paterson to the Ministry of Culture, [no date] 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 130, 103.
267 Letter from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to the Ministry of Culture, 30 June 1977, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 678, 34. Letter from the Ministry of Culture to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 3 August 1977, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 678, 35. Letter from Melodiya to the Ministry of Culture, 1 August 1977, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 678, 37.
quick and it was Melodiya that caused the delay. Tony Locantro has recalled how he had to constantly send telexes to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to approve recording projects, often not receiving a reply until the day the recording was set to take place. Such delays by the Soviet side created unnecessary uncertainty and worry for the foreign partners and inhibited their internal planning. In extreme cases, such behaviour resulted in the cancellation of concerts and recording projects with financial repercussions for the Western counterparties.

6.3. Soviet Artists’ Self-Directed Unauthorised Actions

Apart from a lack of internal communication between the Soviet bureaucratic organisations, leading to inefficiency in passing on decisions to foreign partners, there was also a lack of control over Soviet artists’ actions abroad. The need for Soviet artists to confirm their touring and recording decisions with the Ministry of Culture was a feature unique to the Soviet system. It was triggered by the understanding that Soviet artists had an obligation towards the state to pay back for the full free education and material goods such as apartments, cars and social privileges they received inside the USSR. In Western countries, musicians were free agents, who first searched to fund their education and then earned income as they saw fit to support themselves.

It happened that with the Soviet artists’ agreement large record labels made recordings when the former were within reach, i.e. on tour in the West, without waiting for consent from the Soviet bureaucracy, as obtaining the latter took time and effort. Rostropovich was a particularly difficult character for the Soviet bureaucracy to control. In December 1974 he recorded three LPs for EMI without asking the Ministry of Culture and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga first. Writing to the Ministry of Culture, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga expressed its concern that these recordings were made without any formal contract with a Soviet bureaucratic organisation. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga related EMI’s version of the story to the Ministry of Culture: EMI claimed that Rostropovich had told

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268 Tony Locantro interview, 1 February 2017.
269 Letter from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to the Ministry of Culture, 17 December 1974, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 103, 23.
them that he had the Ministry of Culture’s approval for any recordings he wanted to make abroad. EMI had recorded Rostropovich in Paris conducting Rimsky-Korsakov’s Scheherazade with the Orchestre de Paris and then playing Strauss’s Cello Sonata No. 6, Beethoven’s Twelve Variations on Ein Mädchen oder Weibchen and Twelve Variations on a Theme from Handel’s Judas Maccabaeus. Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was furious that EMI had sent a letter offering to sell these recordings at commercial rates for distribution in the Communist Bloc, whereas normally Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga would be the one receiving the commercial gains for the right to record Soviet artists abroad. EMI wrote:

We understand that as a result of developments in copyright matters, it may be possible now for Melodiya to account for royalties. We propose that these two EMI recordings might be made available on the basis of a normal licensing arrangement on the payment of all-in royalty rate to be agreed between us. Such a royalty would fully cover our contractual royalty obligations to any other artists, in this case Mme Devetzi and the Orchestre de Paris respectively, and would be in line with normal commercial licensing arrangements which we make with other companies in the West. In this particular case, we will make this available at lower rate as gesture of goodwill and in accordance with Rostropovich’s wishes, suggest all-in rate 7% based on retail price less the usual deductions for packaging etc.

The proposed rate of 7% was indeed lower than the usual rate of 10% for soloist, conductor and orchestra recording. EMI sent this note to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga in December 1974, six months after Rostropovich’s forced exile from the USSR. For several years, there had been an unspoken ban on his concerts in Moscow. Soviet authorities shunned him because of his support of the dissident Aleksander Solzhenitsin. He was eventually deprived of Soviet citizenship in March 1978. Thus, once he came to the West, Rostropovich viewed himself free of

271 Letter from Tony Locantro (EMI) to Raisa Kaliyenko (Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga), 3 December 1974, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 103, 24–25.
272 Elizabeth Wilson, Mstislav Rostropovich: Cellist, Teacher, Legend (London: Faber and Faber, 2011), 150.
Soviet bureaucratic orders and pursued concerts and tours as he saw fit. Surprisingly, the Soviet side still regarded him as their asset and expected to be paid on his behalf, perhaps because he was technically still a Soviet citizen.

Another difficulty, this time for the foreign partners, was the limited availability of Soviet artists for recording in the West. Soviet artists could work abroad for only three months a year; the rest they had to spend in the USSR.\(^{273}\) Such restrictions contributed to a further, embarrassing difficulty for the Soviet side: the regular defections of Soviet artists from the mid-1960s. Some well-known names include the ballet dancer Rudolf Nureyev (1962), ballerina Natalia Makarova (1970), ballet dancer Mikhail Barishnikov (1974), pianist Yuriy Egorov (1974), the conductors Kirill Kondrashin (1979) and Maksim Shostakovich (1980). These defections were incredibly damaging for the USSR’s reputation abroad. Soviet officials were keen to demonstrate how much value and effort was placed on culture in the communist system; defections of well-known cultural figures highlighted their dissatisfaction with that system, potentially, undermining its credibility in the eyes of Western partners.

6.4. Copyright Infringement

Another problem was copyright infringement on both sides of the capitalist–socialist divide. At the time, there were two key international documents relating to copyright in the West: the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886 and the Universal Copyright Convention of 1952 (UCC). They both guaranteed the protection of an author’s intellectual property rights during his/her lifetime, for either 50 or 25 years posthumously.\(^{274}\) The Soviet

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\(^{273}\) Letter from the Ministry of Culture to Soviet Embassy in London, 11 December 1975, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 103, 29. The LSO had approached the Embassy to ask whether Gennadiy Rozhdestvensky would like to become guest conductor with the orchestra, but the Ministry of Culture said he already had an agreement with the Stockholm Symphony Orchestra and touring commitments. The Ministry reminded the embassy that ‘Soviet artists can perform abroad not more than three months a year. The rest of the time they work in the USSR.’

Union did not become part of any international or bilateral copyright agreement until 1973 when it joined the UCC. Until then, both the West and USSR could issue each other’s recordings without paying any money to the performers or authors on the other side.

Some small record companies in the West did just that. The most notorious among them was the Colosseum label, run by Bruno G. Ronty, an American music producer. *High Fidelity* magazine claimed that he bought Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga-branded recordings in Four Continent Bookshop in New York, which contained the largest selection of Russian books and records, and then copied them onto tapes and pressed Colosseum records with the same repertoire.275 These included a complete production of Musorgsky’s opera *Boris Godunov*, Shostakovich playing his piano works and recitals by Gilels, to name just a few. It was the Czech government that brought action against Colosseum and its distributors to stop copying its Supraphon-label records. This forced Ronty to create a new label, Bruno Records, but his bootlegging activities were severely truncated. Many large record labels were aware of this unauthorized activity. Le Chant du Monde in their discussions with the Soviet Ministry of Culture in 1963 openly complained that such labels as Acropol (a Spanish label), Musidisc and Bruno Records presented a serious problem because they made recordings of Soviet music from radio broadcasts and then released cheap unauthorized recordings of inferior quality.276

Melodiya also issued pirate recordings of Western songs, including some by The Beatles and the American bandleader and arranger Ray Conniff.277 The British singer Robert Young, who toured the USSR in 1975 and was very popular

\[275\] ‘Pirates, Prima Donnas and Plain White Wrappers,’ *High Fidelity*, December 1976, 80–81.

\[276\] Report on the visit of the French Communist Party member M. Jérôme to the Ministry of Culture and conversation with Minister of Culture E. Furtzeva, 28–29 April 1963, RGALI, f. 2329, d. 9, op. 478, 1–5.

there, protested the release by Melodiya of an LP of his songs. Melodiya argued that the LP was not for sale, but ‘for information only’ and that the songs on it were recorded before the USSR joined the UCC. Technically, this was correct and the USSR did not have to pay royalties for any intellectual property it used before 1973.

Divergence in the treatment of international copyright agreements meant that foreign partners could not legally license their recordings to the USSR and expect fair payment in return. Only after the signing of the copyright conventions in 1973 and subsequent reciprocal licensing agreements of 1975 (Chapter 4), did the flow of recordings between the USSR and the West become a steady two-way stream.

6.5. Political and Security Concerns
After the cultural diplomacy drive behind the touring and recording of Soviet artists in the West of the 1950s subsided, these activities became part of the commercial world from the 1960s. However, they could not be completely immune to international political events, even if the effect of the latter was usually short-term. The first of these events to affect recordings was the suppression of the protests in Hungary by Soviet military forces at the end of 1956. The worries over public demonstrations related to this event led to the cancellation of David and Igor Oistrakh’s concerts in Berlin and Vienna and refusal of entry to perform in Italy for David Oistrakh, the Borodin String Quartet and pianist Yevgeniy Malinin. The Hungarian crisis unfolded in the middle of the Bolshoi Ballet’s tour resident at the Royal Opera House. The tour was completed in full, but the dancers left in the night straight after the final

278 Letter from Deputy Head of External Relations Committee of the Ministry of Culture Aleksandrov to Head of Melodiya Pakhomov, 10 March 1975, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 103, 48–49.
280 Miller, ‘Striking a Compromise,’ 401.
performance – the same night that Soviet tanks entered Budapest.\textsuperscript{282} The reciprocal tour by The Royal Ballet, which was already scheduled and planned to take place in Moscow straight after, was cancelled by the British side in protest against the invasion of Budapest by Soviet troops. All communication with the Soviet side on cultural diplomacy projects was halted. Although it was renewed only four months later, in February 1957, it was not until early 1961 that The Royal Ballet finally made it to the USSR.\textsuperscript{283}

Following the defection by the ballet dancer Rudolf Nureyev in 1962, the Soviet side forbade its artists to take part in the same events as Nureyev. This resulted in changes and cancellations to many Soviet performers’ concert schedules, which would usually have been agreed at least six months or a year in advance. Richter, for instance, had to cancel three concerts at the Athens Festival in 1963 because Nureyev had performed there.\textsuperscript{284}

Despite the promotion of Soviet superstar musicians both within the USSR and abroad, their musical careers still depended on their loyalty to the Soviet system. The enthusiasm for Soviet performances and recordings in the West did not automatically ensure that the USSR would grant all requests for tours; many decisions were driven by security rather than Western demand considerations. Tomoff has discussed the most striking difference in the treatment of musicians by the Soviet authorities. He compares the complete inability of Richter to travel outside the Soviet Bloc to the packed touring and recording schedule of David Oistrakh in the West in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{285} David Oistrakh toured frequently and appeared almost annually in the UK, although one of his first invitations, to the Edinburgh Festival in 1953, was declined by Soviet bureaucrats. An internal note from the Ministry of Culture to the Soviet Central Party Committee indicated that the festival was not international enough, as artists from only two to four other countries were invited and added without any explanation, that ‘in addition, the Commission on Trips Abroad at the TsK KPSS

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\textsuperscript{282} Gonçalves, ‘Ballet, Propaganda, and Politics in the Cold War,’ 184.
\textsuperscript{283} Ibid., 186.
\textsuperscript{284}‘Athens Refusal by Mr. Richter,’ The Times, 29 August 1963, 1.
\textsuperscript{285} Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 18.
\end{flushright}
[Central Committee of the Communist Party] objects to the trip of D. Oistrakh to England."\(^{286}\) However, the next year he was giving recitals at the Royal Albert Hall and making recordings on tours for established record companies. Even as early as the 1950s many letters by foreign impresarios, friendship organisations, concert halls, festivals, orchestras, record companies to the Ministry of Culture requested the participation of various Soviet artists, including the ballerina Galina Ulanova, and were duly turned down without any explanation with a formal ‘participation not planned.’\(^{287}\) It is difficult to ascertain the reasons behind such rejections, as they likely varied depending on the artist’s social standing in the USSR and particular circumstances of the invitation and event.

A prominent example from the Détente era was the promising young pianist Andrey Gavrilov. Having won the Tchaikovsky Piano Competition at the age of eighteen in 1974, he started touring and recording heavily both in the USSR and abroad shortly after. He was singled out by EMI as one of their protégé young artists (Chapter 3). In 1979 Gavrilov’s involvement in their Young Artists Programme and EMI’s investment in him looked set for success. All through 1979, EMI’s request for recordings kept pouring in and were duly granted by the Ministry of Culture.\(^{288}\) His international career was abruptly interrupted in December that year. Gavrilov was due to record with Herbert von Karajan and the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra but failed to appear for the recording session: the KGB placed Gavrilov under house arrest in Moscow for anti-Soviet remarks and behaviour.\(^{289}\) He was not allowed to travel outside of the Soviet Union until 1984 when he immediately emigrated to the West.\(^{290}\)

\(^{286}\) ‘N.N. Bespalov to G.M. Malenkov about the undesirability of D.F. Oikstrakh going to the Edinburgh Festival,’ in Muzika vmesto sumbura, ed. Maksimenkov, 408.

\(^{287}\) Letter from the Ministry of Culture to the Soviet Embassy in London, 24 December 1955, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d.102, 119.


\(^{290}\) Several EMI RECORDS UK employees who got to know Gavrilov during their recording sessions of the 1970s were instrumental in helping him stay in the West (Gavrilov, Andrei, Fira and Pitch, 283–300).
Following the incident with Gavrilov in 1979, Western partners expressed worries around the young conductor Temirkanov not being able to fulfil his commitment to perform in London with the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra on 2–4 March 1980 after his appearances in France in December 1979 and in the USA in January 1980, and after the previous cancellation of the young pianist’s Dmitry Alekseyev’s performance. Goskonzert forwarded the letter to the Ministry of Culture, and someone from the Ministry of Culture made a hand-written answer on the letter: ‘the ministry does not object to his trip, as long as he agrees to go without family members.’ A further handwritten note dated 3 March 1980 finalised the issue: ‘Temirkanov agreed to go without his wife (his passport was ready), but Lenobkom [the regional Communist Party organisation] cancelled the trip.’ In effect, she was to be held hostage inside the USSR to ensure her husband’s return to his home country.

Although Western record companies would have preferred the process of recording Soviet artists to be identical to that of their Western peers, the peculiar ideological and economic conditions of the USSR made this impossible. Therefore, the former had to accept the idiosyncrasies of the relationship with the bureaucratic counterparties of the Soviet Union. Initial motivation for engaging in recording Soviet artists was different for capitalist private corporations and a communist state machine, with cultural diplomacy playing a key role. The deeper the Soviet Union dived into the global record market, the more political and ideological factors were put to the side and the players aligned in their money-making goals. The two case studies in the next chapter will illustrate various aspects of the business and political relations in presenting Soviet artists to Western markets and the deep integration of the USSR into the global record business.

291 Telegram from John Bimson of the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra to Head of Goskonzert Supagin, 6 February 1980, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 1532, 77.
292 Letter from Goskonzert to the Ministry of Culture, 25 February 1980, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 1532, 78.
Chapter 3. Promoting Soviet Superstars:

Sviatoslav Richter and the Rising Young Artists

As with other cultural goods, the demand for records is driven by two things: taste and function. The case studies in this chapter will demonstrate that ‘in questions of taste in recorded music, the primary unit of brand is usually the performer.’ The superstar performer has had a central role in the recording industry since its inception. In the early 1900s, to generate an uptake among consumers for the new technology – the gramophone player – record companies enlisted the very best of the opera singers to make records and enhance the gramophone’s reputation as a listening medium. The Italian tenor Enrico Caruso was particularly successful in contributing to this mission.

By the 1960s, the idea of the successful superstar musician whose records sold on the strength of his/her name, was an established part of the global record industry. It was only a matter of time before Soviet classical musicians joined the elite club of recording superstars. The most successful among them was the pianist Sviatoslav Richter, whose active touring and recording years fell on the 1960s–70s, when the Western LP listening culture was at its peak. Richter was already a mature performer by the time he started recording and touring in the West, and he gained a stellar reputation among the critics and audiences alike after only a few concerts. Therefore, Western record companies did not need to spend financial resources promoting his name and could capitalise on his reputation almost immediately.

This stands in contrast to the Young Artists Programme (YAP), a dedicated several-years long effort by EMI to promote and establish the reputation of rising Soviet musicians in the West at the end of the 1970s. The latter demanded time, financial and logistical resources and patience and was a much riskier undertaking than recording Richter. It was, in effect, an effort to cultivate the brand name of whoever would be the next Richter. Both case studies

293 Zagorski-Thomas, The Musicology of Record Production, 226.
294 Ibid.
295 Symes, Setting the Record Straight, 25.
discussed in the current chapter, Richter and YAP, demonstrate the high level of competition that foreign record labels were prepared to engage in to execute recording projects with Soviet performers both established and new. This was driven by the strong demand of Western consumers for these artists and the record companies’ desire to earn money on the performers’ brand name.

1. Sviatoslav Richter and His Western Recording Career

Sviatoslav Richter was one of the most celebrated pianists of the twentieth century and the most prominent of the Soviet superstar musicians. His active touring career fell on the 1960s and 1970s when the touring and recording of Soviet artists in the West was at its peak. The following case study of Richter’s Western recording career and output illustrates several key ideas discussed in the previous chapters. Firstly, I demonstrate the astonishing demand for Richter’s concerts and discs among the Western public which led to fierce competition between Western record labels to make highly profitable recordings. Secondly, the discussion around his vast discography illustrates the breadth of geographical location, performance repertoire and foreign partnerships that the Soviet Union was able to establish over the decades of participation in the Western record business. It also demonstrates that Western record labels treated classical music superstars identically, irrespective of whether they were from the West or Soviet Union, as long as there were money-making opportunities present.

1.1. Demand and Competition

Richter entered the Moscow Conservatoire in 1937 and the first Soviet recordings of his performances were distributed in the West after the Second World War. By the mid-1950s, Western critics hailed him as the ‘best pianist in the world,’ years before he had been allowed to tour there by the Soviet state.296 Such

assessments were based on the second-rate quality Soviet-made recordings of his playing that had been released by that point and reached the West.

His first American tour of 1960 turned Richter into a true star. He gave around twenty-five concerts in Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston and New York, including concerts with symphony orchestras and solo recitals. During the tour, he made recordings of Brahms’s Piano Concerto No. 2 with the Chicago Symphony Orchestra and the conductor Erich Leinsdorf, Beethoven’s Piano Concerto No. 1 with the Boston Symphony Orchestra and Charles Munch, and various solo piano works.297 His Carnegie Hall performances in New York were recorded by the venue’s in-house team and were released on Columbia Masterworks (later part of Sony). Richter did not approve them, but they became hits straight away.298

Meri Herrala’s research into this first landmark tour to the USA applies the idea of Soviet participation in the global capitalist system to the market of classical music recordings and touring.299 Taking the example of fierce competition between Western record labels to record Richter’s Carnegie Hall concerts, Herrala demonstrates the inefficiencies and non-aligned interests between various Soviet bureaucratic organisations involved in foreign touring and recording, a topic I explored more fully in Chapter 2. On further examples of recordings throughout the 1960s and 1970s below, I expand her conclusion to markets outside the USA and beyond one recording project.

The July 1961 tour to the UK enhanced Richter’s reputation in the Western world with three sold out concerts at the Royal Festival Hall in London.300 Although cancelled due to illness, his later three solo concerts on 11,

300 ‘Sovereign Artistry of Mr. Richter,’ The Times, 10 July 1961, 12.
13 and 15 September 1961 at the Royal Festival Hall as part of the Soviet Gala Week were again completely sold out.301 Well aware of his commercial appeal, the Pathé Marconi artist manager Jacques Leiser arranged for Richter’s first-ever studio recording in the West to take place at EMI’s Abbey Road Studios in August 1961: Schumann’s Fantasy in C Major and Beethoven’s Sonata in D Minor.302 Such was Richter’s fantastic success with both the public and critics that recording companies ‘scrambled over one another’ to release his recordings.303 This fervour only intensified by 1963 when the music critic Paul Moor wrote in The Gramophone magazine: ‘How enviable to be Sviatoslav Richter! More than any other musician or group of musicians in the world, he is today, less than three years after his Western debut, sought after by managers and recording firms with a zeal bordering on the abject.’304

One of the most famous recording projects was Richter’s tour of Italy in October–November 1962. This was a huge event for the classical music world; so significant that EMI bought out advertising space on the front cover of The Gramophone’s April 1963 issue to promote one of the recordings made on that tour (Figure 3.1). The magazine devoted an entire article to the event, an honour not granted to any other Soviet artist until then.305 It was written by a well-established music writer and pianist Paul Moor, who contributed to several classical music magazines and was also a radio broadcaster. He particularly noted the unprecedented demand for Richter’s recordings ‘where even his less desirable Soviet-made tapes are scrambled over by firms from all over the Western world avid to release them.’306

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301 ‘Richter’s Concerts Cancelled,’ The Times, 1 September 1961, 9.
302 Rasmussen, Sviatoslav Richter: Pianist, 166.
304 Ibid., 460.
305 Moor, ‘Richter in Italy,’ 460.
306 Ibid.
The tour was supposed to be recorded by Deutsche Grammophon, but Richter’s producer at EMI at the time, Leiser, also arranged for EMI to join in so that ‘Deutsche Grammophon would record all the concerts but share some of the resulting recordings with us [EMI], which would then be distributed on HMV.’

This collaboration by the two largest European record companies was an unprecedented event and a testament to the huge interest taken in Richter by Western labels. As Moor put it in *The Gramophone*:

> Now Richter has accomplished the apparently unattainable: for the first time in phonographic history, two major firms normally in sharp competition with each other have joined forces and worked together in order to get the Richter recordings they both wanted and which under other circumstances, in view of the costs involved, would be unobtainable.

Since Richter had worked with Deutsche Grammophon’s recording manager Heinz Wildhagen for three years and Deutsche Grammophon had more experience than EMI in transporting stereo recording equipment around Europe, it was decided that Deutsche Grammphon would do the actual recording sessions on the tour. Although the concerts themselves went well, recording them presented a variety of challenges depending on the city and concert.

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308 Paul Moor, ‘Richter in Italy,’ 460.
location. Deutsche Grammophon rented the piano that Richter particularly liked when playing in Stockholm, but it took badly to the constant movement from city to city during the tour during the very first concerts in Genoa, Milan and Turin and the recordings made in those cities were deemed unsuitable for production.\textsuperscript{309} There was also the usual challenge of recording live presented by noise from the audience and from outside the venues, such as the distant ringing of bells at St. Mark’s Cathedral in Venice.\textsuperscript{310} This was exacerbated by the fact that the recordings were made with a single microphone between the piano and the audience. The willingness of the record companies to overcome multiple technical and logistical difficulties to pursue Richter on this Italy tour is a further testament to the value of his brand name, which the two recording partners were planning to capitalise on.

The final recordings were made based on slicing and taping together various parts of the same musical works performed at multiple concerts on the tour. The Gramophone reviewed two of these, which ‘represent the quintessence of the best of Richter’s tour’ and were recorded in Rome, Palermo and Venice.\textsuperscript{311} The author of the reviews was Roger Fiske, a musicologist and BBC producer of music education programmes and a regularly contributing critic. He reviewed two discs: one by EMI of Schumann’s Papillons, Sonata No. 2 and Carnival of Vienna (ASD 520) and one by Deutsche Grammophon of Chopin’s Polonaise-Fantaisie, several Etudes, Debussy’s Estampes and Aleksander Scriabin’s Piano Sonata No. 5 (SLPM 138849).\textsuperscript{312} Although the recordings had some audience noises, the reviewer did not find these a drawback. He had ‘nothing but praise for the sound’ remarking that ‘the actual quality of the piano tone is astonishingly good, and as near as anything up to the best studio standards.’\textsuperscript{313} Live recordings are difficult to execute, even with one soloist, due to the unpredictable acoustic characteristics of the concert venues. The Richter in Italy recordings were a testament to the excellency of the technical team and proof

\textsuperscript{309} Ibid., 461.
\textsuperscript{310} Ibid., 461.
\textsuperscript{311} Roger Fiske, ‘Sviatoslav Richter in Italy,’ The Gramophone, April 1963, 473.
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid., 473.
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid., 473.
that co-operation was possible among competitors when large challenging projects needed to be executed.

1.2. Discography Analysis

Richter’s discography is vast due to his varied performance repertoire, multiple reissues and licensing by various record labels of the same performance, and the existence of official and pirated recordings of many of his live performances. There are two reasonably comprehensive discographies available: one in a book self-published by John Hunt in 1999, and an official British Library Sound Archive publication of 1983.\textsuperscript{314} I have taken the British Library discography as my main database because it covers exactly the period of interest for this dissertation (up to 1983) and is an authoritative source. I have triangulated it with the Hunt dataset as well as with discographies at the end of Bruno Monsaingeon’s book of interviews with Richter and the contemporary CD box sets, which are reissues of the vinyl recordings and have detailed information on recording locations and dates.\textsuperscript{315} This section explores the locations, repertoire and record label affiliations of his discs, as many sessions outside of the USSR were held not only in the UK but also in Western and Eastern Europe, the USA and Japan. The recordings were then issued in the UK and across Europe and the USA. My compiled dataset is presented in Appendix A. The analysis of Richter’s recordings by geography, repertoire, year of performance and record label reveals the factors that influenced the Western recording career of a Soviet musician: a combination of his personal preferences and views and the workings of Soviet bureaucracy with its own interests of financial gain and ideological motivation.


The Richter British Library discography, from his first recording in Prague (Communist Bloc) in 1954 to Tours (France) in 1979, shows that Richter made a total of 65 recording trips to the West and Japan, of which many were combined with concerts. Some of the tours were several weeks long, for instance, the US trip in 1960 and Italian tour of 1962. In each trip Richter made at least one recording, often more, with the total number of original recordings in the dataset standing at 74. Many of these were then licensed by the company that recorded it to labels in other countries.

I have grouped the locations of his recording sessions into four large categories: Soviet Bloc countries (22%), Western Europe (69%), USA (6%) and Japan (3%). Western Europe as a recording location was clearly preferred by all parties: Western record labels, Soviet bureaucratic organisations and the artist himself. There are several possible reasons for this. For one, Europe was closer to the USSR than the USA, so it was easier to travel there. Secondly, the Western record labels always preferred to record in their territory, in their studio or with a Western orchestra, as opposed to bringing their equipment to Eastern Europe. Moreover, Richter admitted that he did not like the USA and preferred travelling to his favourite cities: Prague, Venice, Paris and Vienna.\textsuperscript{316} He also enjoyed participating in festivals organized by artist-friends, like the Aldeburgh Festival of Benjamin Britten or his own Festival de Tours and the Salzburg Festival.\textsuperscript{317}

During the touring years of the 1960s–70s, Soviet artists, including the superstars like Richter, Rostropovich and Gilels, to name but a few, preferred recording in the West rather than internally for Melodiya for financial and self-promotional reasons. As a rule, the artists would first tour across the USSR, then would be granted permission to expand into the Soviet Bloc countries, then the Western states closest to the USSR, like Finland, and finally, if all went well, to the wider Western world. Richter made his first recording outside of the USSR in Prague in 1954 with repertoire by Bach, Tchaikovsky, Prokofiev and

\textsuperscript{316} Monsaingeon, \textit{Sviatoslav Richter}, 96.
\textsuperscript{317} Regarding the USA, Richter commented that ‘I’d never have got to know America and would have been all the better for it. True, American orchestras are of the very first rank, as are its galleries and cocktails. But the noise, the cheap culture, the advertising and the language!’ Ibid., 96.
Shostakovich for the Czech state record company Supraphon. These recordings were also licensed to other record labels: Artia (US exporting label of Supraphon), Le Chante du Monde (France), Ariola-Eurodisc (West Germany), Deutsche Grammophon (West Germany) and Eterna (GDR). The 1960s and 1970s, however, were Richter’s busiest decades for touring, with 43% and 46% of all the tours in the database taking place in those decades respectively. Only 11% fall in the 1950s. This is not surprising, as Richter was not allowed to travel much or even leave the Soviet Bloc until 1960, mostly because of KGB concerns about his reliability as a Soviet citizen. His mother was thought to still live in West Germany, his father was executed during World War II as an ‘enemy of the people,’ he had no children, and was not officially married to his partner, the singer Nina Dorlyak. Thus, he had no firm ties in the USSR and had potential relatives to flee abroad to.

After the first landmark tours and recordings of 1960 in the USA, 1961 in the UK and 1962 in Italy, Richter’s Western recording career took off. Unlike Rostropovich, for instance, who was loyal to EMI for many years, Richter was notorious for recording for many competing record labels. Table 3.1 sums up the number of new, original recordings he made for various record labels (excluding licensing of records by labels to each other).

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318 Rasmussen, Sviatoslav Richter, 268.
319 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 134.
Table 3.1. Breakdown of Richter’s Western Recorded Discs by Label

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Records</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Pirate?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rococo</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28.4%</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMI</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ariola</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philips</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDM</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supraphon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BWS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>Might be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrorecord</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victor Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnabout</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penzance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decca</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Falk Schwartz and John Berrie, ‘Sviatoslav Richter – a Discography,’ *Recorded Sound: The Journal of the British Library National Sound Archive*, No. 84 (July 1983), 16–57. Judgement about whether the discs were pirated is mine.

Not surprisingly, the top positions in the table are occupied by the top names in the industry: EMI, Deutsche Grammophon, Ariola, Philips, Le Chant du Monde and RCA. What is surprising is the leader’s name, Rococo Records, with 28%, and the fact that all their recordings are live (Appendix A). Rococo Records was a Canadian label created in 1951 by André Ross and brothers Len and Peter Court.320 Ross was the producer who generated the recordings for the label. According to Canadian record industry expert, Stephen Clarke, ‘he was quite secretive about his sources and it would not surprise me if he ignored the niceties of copyright law.’321

The British Library Sound Archive holds eleven of Rococo’s fourteen Richer recordings. All Rococo records have a very basic cover and the Richter recordings adhere to this pattern. Figure 3.2 presents two covers: one of Richter’s

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320 Email from Stephen Clarke, a Canadian academic, lecturer at the University of Toronto and writer for the Canadian Opera Company, who was closely involved in the record business and knew Rococo Records owners, 8 December 2018.

321 Ibid.
discs and a randomly chosen Western performer. They are both basic, simple and uniform in look. Neither the cover nor the actual disc for any of the examined Richter recordings contain any information on where and how the recording sessions took place. In some of the volumes, a piece of paper has been inserted with basic typewritten information about the performer and his biography.

**Figure 3.2. Rococo Records Covers and Disc**

Source: The British Library Sound Archive.

As discussed in Chapter 2, before 1973 the USSR was not part of the Berne Copyright Convention: anyone in the West could release recordings of Soviet artists either copied from Soviet LPs or taped from radio broadcasts and avoid paying royalties to the Soviet side. Canada, where the Rococo label originated, also had much more relaxed copyright laws than other Western countries. Rococo’s releases of Richter’s live performances spanned the years 1954 to 1977; so both before and after the signing of the Copyright Convention.

Initially, Rococo specialized in re-issuing early historic recordings. Later it expanded into recordings of live radio broadcasts: apart from Richter, Rococo issued LPs of the Romanian conductor Sergiu Celibidache, German conductors Hermann Scherchen and Wilhelm Furtwängler, violinist Jascha Heifetz, pianists Arthur Schnabel and Arturo Benedetti Michelangeli to name a few Western musicians.

Rococo recorded Richter at the Aldeburgh Festival, as well as around Europe (London, Warsaw, Budapest, Venice, Florence, Helsinki, Salzburg) and the USA (Newark, New York). Richter performed at seven Aldeburgh Festivals before
1980: in 1964–67 and 1974–76.\textsuperscript{322} All these seasons of the festival were broadcast on BBC Radio and Rococo issued recordings of more than half: 1964, 1965, 1966 and 1975.\textsuperscript{323} The Richter recordings were presented as part of a series called \textit{Famous Voices of the Past}. This means that some of them were issued much later than the radio broadcasts from which they were possibly taped. Rococo did not make studio recordings; it issued only live ones.\textsuperscript{324} All this leads me to conclude that Rococo must have recorded these from the radio, rather than live.

Reviews of Rococo recordings in the industry press often note the poor quality of the sound.\textsuperscript{325} Industry experts I have consulted have all independently suggested that Rococo might have been pirating live radio broadcasts by plugging a double tape recorder into the radio. The plain, amateur-looking presentation of the actual discs supports the hypothesis about their dubious origin.\textsuperscript{326} Moreover, I could not find a single letter by any of the small Western labels requesting to record Richter or any other Soviet artist in the West in the archive files of the Ministry of Culture relating to UK, France or Germany. All requests in the Soviet Ministry of Culture archive for these countries are from the major established record companies. Logically, these are the companies that occupy the top places in Table 3.1. Apart from Rococo, several other labels pirated Richter’s recordings, but none at its level: Baton, MJA, MR, Turnabout and Penzance.\textsuperscript{327} This abundance of pirate recordings is a sign of the insatiable consumer demand for Richter’s recordings that were likely to sell whatever the recording quality.

In his interviews, Richter was vocal about not enjoying recording in the studio, and so recording live while on tour suited him well: ‘Recordings have

\textsuperscript{322} Pyke, \textit{Benjamin Britten and Russia}, 116.

\textsuperscript{323} Broadcasting information checked at \url{https://genome.ch.bbc.co.uk/} accessed 21 February 2019 and Rococo catalogue data from the British Library Sound Archive Richter discography (July 1983).


\textsuperscript{325} For example, \textit{High Fidelity}, August 1974, 105; February 1975, 85; December 1977, 78.

\textsuperscript{326} Thank you to David Patmore, academic expert on the record industry from the University of Sheffield, and Jonathan Summers, the British Library Classical Music curator for sharing their knowledge of Rococo Records.

\textsuperscript{327} Email from David Patmore, 18 December 2018.
always been a problem for me. I don’t like them, especially my own. I’m always disappointed when I listen to them as I hear exactly what I’m expecting to hear, a lack of freshness, no sense of the unexpected.’ Thus, 54% of his recordings in the dataset were made live and 46% in the studio. The split is almost equal, while for other artists at the time, the majority of their recordings were in the studio. One critic for The Times noted the overwhelming live nature of his recordings as early as 1963, writing that ‘nearly every recording of his [Richter’s] comes with coughs, sneezes and applause.’ This draws attention to why his live recordings were mostly of solo or small ensemble works: large-scale orchestral concerts, without the aid of numerous carefully positioned microphones, were accompanied by high levels of unwanted audience (and indeed performer) noise.

According to Tomoff, when Soviet artists performed abroad, ‘they reproduced the original appropriation [of the Western musical canon], then introduced the Soviet innovation in three phases.’ The first would be establishing the ‘performer’s virtuosic capabilities through performance of a standard work from the common Western canon.’ The next step was ‘showcasing the Russian musical tradition of which the Soviets were assumed to be the natural inheritors,’ with Tchaikovsky being the favourite. Thirdly, ‘performance of a work by a contemporary Soviet composer.’ Although this was the path forged by Richter’s predecessors, David Oistrakh and Emil Gilels especially, Richter’s repertoire choice did not comply with this pattern. From his very first recording in Warsaw in 1954 he included works by Prokofiev alongside canonical Western composers. In fact, of the 74 recordings, Prokofiev is present on ten. Shostakovich is there only twice. Since Richter mostly recorded chamber piano repertoire and did not need to negotiate the programme with a conductor, his choice of works was guided by his personal preference more than for any other Soviet performer. Richter was an avid lover of Prokofiev’s music, and the

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328 Ibid., 102.
330 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 125.
331 Ibid., 125.
332 Ibid., 125.
333 Ibid., 125.
romantic piano composers: Schubert, Schumann, Beethoven, Brahms, Liszt and Rakhmaninov.\textsuperscript{334} Beethoven’s works are present in 30\% of all the recordings in the sample, more than any other composer. Although Richter did not pursue the conventional repertoire path of other Soviet performers during their Western careers in the sequence theorized by Tomoff, the variety of works, both Western and domestic, that he covered was incredibly wide. Many of the works were from the classical music canon and familiar to Western audiences. The mostly solo or chamber set up of his concerts allowed Richter to make independent decisions on his programming. Solo or chamber works constitute 65\% of the 74 recordings in the dataset; of these only eight are with other musicians: Rostropovich (four recordings), the German baritone Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau (two), David Oistrakh (one) and violinist Oleg Kagan (one).

Richter made orchestral recordings rarely with the same orchestra twice: he played with the Warsaw Symphony Orchestra, the Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra, the London Symphony Orchestra, the Boston and the Chicago Symphony Orchestras, the Philharmonia Orchestra (EMI’s house orchestra) and the Vienna Symphony Orchestra, to name the most famous ones. The pianist did not like the practice of planning recording projects several months or years in advance, and so it was easier for him to record live and solo. In doing so, he could avoid any need to confirm programmes, venues and dates with other musicians far ahead. He said of his preferences: ‘I hate all the planning that there is in the world of music…. In Europe, orchestras demand that I accept engagements four or five years ahead. They are always booked up when I am free.’\textsuperscript{335}

Richter realized a vast and varied discography with many Western record companies. Such was his appeal that record labels fiercely competed to organise his recording sessions, knowing the pianist was not loyal to any one of them. However, on large complicated projects like the Italian tour, they were able to set their differences aside and work together, in the knowledge that they would all

\textsuperscript{334} Monsaingeon, \textit{Sviatoslav Richter}, 89 and Pyke, \textit{Benjamin Britten and Russia}, 116.

\textsuperscript{335} Monsaingeon, \textit{Sviatoslav Richter}, 110.
benefit from the results. Once Richter was permitted to travel abroad and proved his credibility to Soviet security forces, he was freely allowed into the West to engage in recording projects and tours, earning foreign currency for the Soviet bureaucrats. The large number of his pirated discs signals two things: the high demand for Richter’s output and the fact that the Soviet side engaged only with large players in the global record industry; the small companies had to find their own, if illegal, ways of gaining a slice of profits from the Richter recording pie. Finally, a successful Soviet performer like Richter, having proven his loyalty to the Soviet system, could expect much personal freedom in the choice of location and programming for his Western recordings and tours.

2. Young Artists Programme: In Search of the Next Richter

Like every record business with a long-term outlook, EMI was keen to develop new talent and sign promising classical music performers from the very early days of their career. It was, and still is, common for large Western labels to scout artists when they are young, invest money and time into their development, and sign exclusive record deals in the hope of reaping benefits once they rise to fame and stay loyal to their record label. This was also the case for Soviet artists.

There was, however, a substantial difference in the way EMI pursued and developed Soviet and Western young artists. For the latter, EMI relied on its national subsidiaries to do the scouting, development and release of their records. Thus, when the now world-famous conductor Sir Simon Rattle started with the Bournemouth Symphony Orchestra and the City of Birmingham Symphony Orchestra in the late 1970s, it was EMI Records UK that recorded and promoted his discs. His records were targeted to sell firstly in Britain and any sales in other territories were a nice bonus, but not of primary concern. EMI could not mimic this model with Soviet artists, as it had no local subsidiary in the USSR and the Soviet relationship was in the hands of the International Classical Division, which was an internal EMI head office organisation without a single territory association. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, recording Soviet

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336 Email from Tony Locantro, 30 August 2019.
artists was always associated with higher political and bureaucratic uncertainty than with their Western peers. Therefore, it made sense to develop a dedicated programme for young Soviet artists and release their recordings in all possible Western markets. In addition, such a concentrated effort signalled EMI’s commitment to their relationship with the Soviet Union and, presumably, could work in their favour in case of competition with other Western record labels for recording projects of Soviet artists abroad.337

EMI set about signing young Soviet classical musicians as early as 1967 when its American subsidiary made plans to record and promote such performers.338 By 1972 Peter Andry and Michael Allen from EMI’s International Classical Division concluded an agreement for the UK to record Soviet artists in London and emphasised their focus on young Soviet musicians, in particular pianists Aleksander Slobodianik, cellist Natalya Gutman and violinists Viktor Tretyakov, Gidon Kremer and Oleg Kagan.339 Andry commented that ‘we all agreed that a new generation of artists has to be built up, recorded and publicized in order to maintain the health of our classical business.’340 Finally, in 1976 EMI, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Goskonzert formally established the ‘Young Artists Programme’ (YAP), a three-year development plan for rising Soviet artists. The plan included the production of recordings, concerts, TV and radio broadcasts and publicity in the UK.

Some of the performers mentioned in the 1972 deal stayed on the list of the YAP, but not all. The performers who made it onto the YAP programme in 1976 were violinists Vladimir Spivakov and Tretyakov, and pianists Dmitry Alekseyev and Andrey Gavrilov. The young conductors were Vladimir Fedoseyev, Dmitry Kitayenko and Yuriy Temirkanov.341 EMI took it upon itself to make at least two LPs of each of the instrumentalists in the three years of the agreement and to use conductors for recordings when appropriate.342 The young

337 As far as I am aware, no other large Western record label had a similar programme.
339 ‘Soviets Record in U.K. Via Melodiya, EMI,’ Billboard, 4 November 1972, 86.
341 ‘Soviet Artists to Record for EMI under New Deal,’ Billboard, 30 October 1976, 54.
342 Tony Locantro interview and notes, 1 February 2017.
artists were given exposure on the licensed Melodiya/HMV series, as well as being recorded exclusively by EMI in the West.

The initial version of the proposed YAP contract also included the violinists Gidon Kremer and Oleg Kagan, winners of several competitions and both students of David Oistrakh, and the pianists Lazar Berman and Viktor Eresco. Kremer was, indeed, so important to EMI that they featured him as one of their star soloists at the EMI gala at Royal Festival Hall together with the young Cuban-American pianist Horacio Gutierrez, with Music Week calling both ‘future recording stars.’ However, because of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga’s diverse range of partners in the West, it was hard to execute the principle of exclusivity of a Soviet artist working only for one Western record company (see Chapter 2). In his letter to the Soviet Embassy, Andry complained about his ‘extreme concern at the apparent lack of cooperation from our colleagues at Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga regarding the promotion of the new generation of Soviet artists.’ He went on to emphasise that EMI together with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Goskonzert had developed the YAP and did its best to fulfil its side of the contract:

We have asked Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga that these new artists should be exclusive to EMI, i.e. they should not record for other Western companies (except for Melodiya) for at least three years, whilst we are helping to build their careers. The principle of exclusivity was agreed by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga but soon we found that for instance, Kremer was extremely busy recording for a competitor (Ariola) in Germany and making plans to continue to do so. Furthermore, I asked Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga for rights to Rakhmaninov’s Piano Concerto No. 3 by Lazar Berman and LSO with Abbado. I was given to understand that this recording would be in order but now I hear from a competitive company that they have received permission from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to record this work for Berman and Fedoseyev.

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343 Letter with proposed YAP from EMI to Goskonzert, 24 March 1976, RGALI, f. 3162, op. 2, d. 510, 51.


345 Letter from Peter Andry to Andrey Parastayev, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in London, 6 May 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 103, 79.

346 Ibid.
Such situations were inevitable given Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga’s variety of country-exclusive business partners and their reluctance to lock themselves into a relationship with one Western label across multiple territories. Further substantial arguments took place around recording Kremer and Kagan:

A point has been reached where Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga have amended EMI’s original memorandum covering the proposal and have omitted from it two of the originally chosen soloists, Oleg Kagan and Gidon Kremer, with whom EMI has already started recording in anticipation of the scheme being fully accepted by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. EMI is particularly concerned about the omission of Kremer, but Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga have said that this artist does not wish to be tied down to one particular record company in the West.347

EMI proposed a compromise: Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga should give EMI exclusivity on important recordings, for instance, with conductors like Karajan, and Ariola–Eurodisc with which Kremer had been recording during the previous year, could have first choice on all solo and chamber works during the period of the scheme. As a result, the names of both artists were taken out of the final version of the YAP contract. The described negotiations around Kremer and Kagan reiterate the active competition that existed among Western companies for rising Soviet artists. The success of Richter, Oistrakh, Gilels and others had established the reputation of the Soviet performing superstar in the West. Record labels were willing to compete hard to capitalise on this reputation and to extend it to the new Soviet artists.

For the YAP, a plan of tours and recordings for 1976 and 1977 was put together by EMI, Melodiya, Goskonzert and the Soviet Ministry of Culture.348 EMI keenly started its execution with Dmitry Alekseyev, the first Russian to win the Leeds Piano Competition in 1975. He was booked for a concert at the Royal Albert Hall. British concert agencies all rushed to gain representation rights straight away and EMI’s Peter Andry declared: ‘We have high hopes of soon

347 Letter from EMI to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga on Unresolved Matters, 19 July 1976, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 403, 11.
having from Melodiya a recording of an Alekseyev performance.' In addition to the Melodiya tape, EMI recorded their own disc of an all-Brahms solo LP in 1977 and a recording of Rakhmaninov’s Piano Concerto No. 2 with the Royal Philharmonic Orchestra conducted by another Young Artist Fedoseyev in 1978.

Another pianist, Andrey Gavrilov, who won the International Tchaikovsky Competition in 1974 at the age of eighteen, recorded two LPs for EMI in the UK and two more of his recordings were licensed from Melodiya in the five years to 1979. From his first performances in the West, he was hailed as a future star. EMI was the only Western record company to record him in his early years. Gavrilov recorded his first LP in the West with another rising star, the British conductor Simon Rattle, and a top British orchestra, in 1978 with a programme of Prokofiev’s Piano Concerto No. 1 and Ravel’s Concerto for the Left Hand (ASD 3571). EMI’s logical idea was to pair two rising young musicians with world-class potential, pianist and conductor, to record an album together. This pairing also supports the hypothesis that record labels treated Soviet performers on the same terms as their Western peers and projected the same expectations, demands and career trajectories on them.

It was not only the Western labels that were keen on the young artists. The Soviet side realised the importance of their promotion abroad. When EMI requested to record Gavrilov with Prokofiev’s Sonatas No. 3 and 9 in Munich during January 1979, the Ministry of Culture and Melodiya agreed that although this repertoire had already been recorded by other performers, Gavrilov should go ahead and make the recording to promote his name in the West. The eagerness of the Soviet side to promote its up-and-coming classical performers was reflected in the additional efforts of Melodiya to record the YAP participants internally and to provide these tapes to EMI. On 19 April 1977, Andry visited the Melodiya offices to talk to the Head of Melodiya Shabanov, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga president Leonov, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga Director of Records Gordeev

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351 Letter from the Ministry of Culture to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 2 September 1978, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 991, 42–44.
and his assistant Popov. Among the various matters on the list was the discussion of new recordings that Melodiya expected to make in the coming year. In addition to twenty-six operas by Russian composers, complete cycles of Tchaikovsky’s, Shostakovich’s and Prokofiev’s symphonies, Melodiya produced a list of Young Artists’ recordings that had either been made or were about to be produced:

- Fedoseyev conducting Glazunov’s Symphonies No. 7, 8 and 9 and Rimsky-Korsakov’s *Concert Fantasy on Russian Themes* and Piano Concerto
- Gavrilov performing Prokofiev’s Sonata No. 8, Tchaikovsky’s *Theme and Variations in A Minor*, Balakirev’s *Islamey* and Scriabin’s Sonata No. 4
- Alekseyev playing Prokofiev’s Four Etudes, Shostakovich’s 24 Preludes and Fugues, Scriabin’s Five Preludes and Sonata No. 5
- Spivakov recording a mixed recital of works by Telemann, Schubert and Handel
- Tretyakov playing Bloch’s Sonata No. 9 and Shostakovich’s Sonata No. 9.

At the same time, the eagerness to record and promote the artists was offset by constraints on their visits abroad. EMI, similarly to other labels, struggled to persuade Goskonzert ‘to arrange for any particular artist to visit a specific country more than twice within one year.’ It was the Ministry of Culture’s unwritten policy to limit appearances in one country to two visits a year and ‘it was not easy to go much beyond this in the need to share out the engagements amongst all the various countries.’

The YAP must have still been worth pursuing for EMI both for financial reasons and to keep a close relationship with the USSR because by 1979 they

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352 Report on meeting between EMI, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and the Ministry of Culture on 19 April 1977 written by Tony Locantro, 4 May 1977, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 677, 81–84.
353 Report on meeting between EMI, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and the Ministry of Culture on 19 April 1977 written by Tony Locantro, 4 May 1977, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 677, 82.
354 Report on the meeting between EMI, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Goskonzert on 17 May 1977 written by Tony Locantro, Douglas Pudney and Peter Andry, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 677, 85.
355 Ibid.
decided to continue the programme and chose two of the artists as the most promising: Gavrilov and Spivakov. EMI proposed to extend the YAP for one more year concentrating totally on the development of Gavrilov and Spivakov with a minimum recording guarantee of two LPs per year for each artist, EMI retaining exclusive rights to record them in the West and increasing their advance by $1,000 per LP. The other artists were retained on the same terms as before, without any minimum guarantee of recordings.

Ambitions to gain access to young promising musicians were displayed by other foreign firms but none reached the scale and duration of EMI’s YAP. Although Ariola-Eurodisc in West Germany never had a formal promotional scheme like the YAP, they also took an active interest in young Soviet performers and regularly issued recordings by winners of the Tchaikovsky Competition: pianists, violinists and cellists.

Le Chant du Monde wrote to the Ministry of Culture asking to produce and distribute recordings of violinist Aleksander Brusilovsky and pianist Mikhail Rud, winners of the Marguerite Long – Jacques Thibaud Competition in 1975. The Ministry of Culture urged Melodiya to provide tapes with their recordings to Le Chant du Monde within two months of the request, ‘considering the high importance of distributing the recordings of these young artists abroad.’ This was further corroborated by the Soviet ambassador in France, who wrote to the Ministry of Culture about his meeting with the Head of Le Chant du Monde Jean Roire. He pointed out the need to produce a long-term collaboration plan between Le Chant du Monde and Melodiya and Le Chant du Monde’s desire to promote young Soviet artists: ‘Roire drew our attention to the fact that his firm does not have established relationships with young Soviet composers and performers. He asked for assistance in this respect and his request, undoubtedly, deserves

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356 Letter from Peter Andry to Shmelev in Goskonzert, 7 February 1970, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 1272, 13–14.
358 Letter from Ministry of Culture to Head of Melodiya Pakhomov, 13 August 1975, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 566, 7.
However, this was never fully realized. Ironically, both Brusilovsky and Rud eventually emigrated to France.\footnote{360}

The duration and scope of the YAP confirm that the USSR was regarded by the Western private companies as an equal partner in the global record industry, a partner that understood the rules of the game and was willing to play by them. Developing a young artist was a commitment of several years’ worth of effort and money, especially on the Western side. However, the case study demonstrates that the various problems identified more broadly in USSR’s participation as a capitalist record company manifested themselves in this programme, too (see Chapter 2). Nevertheless, as much as possible foreign record labels treated Soviet young performers in the same way as their Western peers, developing their careers and expecting financial gains in return.

\footnote{359 Letter from the Soviet Ambassador in France Tchervonenko to Deputy Minister of Culture Popov, 6 August 1975, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 566, 8.}

Chapter 4. Licensing and Imports:
Making Money, Building Relationships

1. The Turmoil of the 1950s

1.1. Licensing and Illegal Copying by Small Record Companies

In parallel to the large record labels which could record Soviet artists in the West as demonstrated in the previous chapters, there was an array of small companies, particularly based in the USA, that actively produced and exported records of Soviet artists across the Western world from the 1950s onwards. Not possessing the financial resources or the connections of their large competitors, they were left to utilise any possible methods to secure Soviet tapes, including illegal copying. Although produced in the USA, the discs of small American record companies were advertised and reviewed in industry magazines in the UK and were available for sale via post and in specialist shops. Not as impactful as the large label releases they nevertheless contributed to acquainting British listeners with a wide repertoire of music by Soviet performers, though often of dubious recording quality, throughout the 1950s and 1960s.

Many of the small American record companies did not have the financial and human resources to pursue Soviet musicians in the West or establish relationships with the Soviet Ministry of Culture and had to resort to releases of Soviet records from tapes acquired in three main ways. The first two were illegal and the third was official. Firstly, they could acquire tapes smuggled from the USSR to Europe or dub official recordings of large European record companies. Secondly, they could record from the radio on tape recorders, though this method was technically difficult and wouldn’t take off until the 1960s, as I discussed in Chapter 3.

Finally, the only officially approved way of releasing Soviet performers on small labels in the USA was by licensing Soviet tapes from the official

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Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga partner for the Western hemisphere Leeds Music.\textsuperscript{362}
Leeds Music was a New York publishing company established in 1935 by Lou Levy.\textsuperscript{363} In 1946 Leeds Music concluded an agreement with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to publish Soviet scores in the USA.\textsuperscript{364} On 25 July 1952, Leeds Music concluded a separate agreement covering music records to become ‘an exclusive licensing agent in the United States and Canada for discs waxed in the Soviet Union.’\textsuperscript{365} The agreement was cleared with the US State Department, unlike later licensing and recording deals from the 1960s, which did not have any US government involvement whatsoever and were a matter purely for the American record companies, as will be discussed further on in this chapter.\textsuperscript{366} In the month following the extended agreement, Leeds Music sent letters to several American record labels warning them to stop production of Soviet records without having concluded an agreement with Leeds Music for licensing and paying the fees. It warned the industry that it would bring legal action against those that did not comply.\textsuperscript{367}

Since the USSR was not signed to the International Copyright Convention, many companies issued their copies of Soviet discs. For instance, a 1952 release of Shostakovich’s *Song of the Forests* was issued legally by Vanguard Records, which paid a fee to Leeds Music, and by Colosseum Records, that obtained the recording through ‘a neutral country in Europe.’\textsuperscript{368} Colosseum Records was in fact, a pirate label, which did not pay any licensing fees and widely issued Soviet records.\textsuperscript{369} The head of Colosseum, Bruno Ronty, justified this unauthorised issuance of records copied from Soviet tapes by stating in a comment to *Billboard* magazine, that ‘we will not pay royalties that will go to an unfriendly country.’\textsuperscript{370}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{362} Ibid, 19.
\item \textsuperscript{364} Victoria Zora, ‘New Directions in Soviet Music Publishing,’ 230.
\item \textsuperscript{365} ‘Leeds Tightens Up on Loose Russian Tape,’ *Billboard*, 23 August 1952, 19.
\item \textsuperscript{366} Ibid, 22.
\item \textsuperscript{367} Ibid, 19.
\item \textsuperscript{368} Ibid, 19.
\item \textsuperscript{369} ‘Pirates, Prima Donnas and Plain White Wrappers,’ *High Fidelity*, December 1976, 80–81.
\item \textsuperscript{370} ‘Leeds Tightens Up on Loose Russian Tape,’ *Billboard*, 23 August 1952, 22.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Leeds Music renewed their agreement with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga for another five years in 1956 and continued to be the exclusive agent for licensing Soviet records in North America. The majority of Leeds’ licensing in the first five years of the agreement was with Vanguard, Concert Hall Records and Westminster. Monitor Records, a company set up in 1956 specifically to release music from the Eastern Bloc and other parts of the non-capitalist world to the American listener, was another prolific small label that licensed Soviet discs through Leeds Music. Whereas Concert Hall Records paid license fees to Leeds Music, other labels such as Colosseum Records published the same recordings, with inferior sound quality but at lower prices, hence, Concert Hall didn’t continue in this business for long. American Columbia label also licensed some tapes from Leeds while at the same time recording Soviet artists as they toured to the West. From 1967 Western hemisphere (the USA and Canada) licences for those record companies that did not have direct access to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and the Ministry of Culture, usually, the small labels, were handled by Celebrity Concert Corp. instead of Leeds Music.

In 1960 some of the small labels started side-stepping Leeds Music and making arrangements directly with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. Recording Artist Music Corporation (Ramco), the owner of the Artia and Parliament labels concluded a deal with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to both license Soviet tapes for production in the USA, Canada and Britain and import Soviet-made records. The deal ‘of indefinite duration’ envisaged the issuance of 60 records made from Soviet tapes and another 60 different vinyls imported from the USSR annually. Such quantities sound highly ambitious, especially for a small label that did not have the pressing facilities of its larger competitors. By way of comparison, EMI pressed c. 210 unique LPs over the course of its fifteen-year licensing agreement

372 Ibid.
374 Email from David Patmore, 27 July 2017.
377 ‘Music Makers,’ *High Fidelity*, June 1960, 55.
with the USSR, discussed further on in this chapter. Jay Frankel, the Artia and Parliament owner, claimed that Leeds Music hadn’t by then received new Soviet tapes for a year and that his labels planned to issue all the newest Soviet releases. In addition to the Soviet agreement, both American labels also had contracts for issuances of the Czech Supraphon, Hungarian Hungaroton and Romanian Electrecord records. Many small record companies issued licensed (or just stolen) music recorded in the USSR but did not record Soviet artists in the West as they could not gain access to them directly. Most of these labels were based in the USA, and their vinyls could be found across record shops in the UK.

1.2. First Attempts at Licensing by the Large Record Companies

The real driver behind Soviet recordings in the UK, USA and Western Europe, however, were the large record companies that concluded direct licensing agreements with the Soviet Union and released Soviet licensed recordings on a mass scale. By the late 1950s, the Soviet Ministry of Culture attempted to pick out a few major partners across the capitalist world for the licensing of records. Conscious of the demand for Soviet performers’ recordings in their home markets, it was the Western record companies that were the initiators behind such agreements. Archival records of negotiations and contracts signed have survived, but almost no recordings were released as a result. This leads me to conclude that the agreements were never realized, quite possibly due to the logistical and bureaucratic difficulties around recording and executing any project in the USSR.

Before embarking on licensing agreements, Western record companies attempted to negotiate recording Soviet musicians on home soil, i.e. inside the USSR, with Western equipment. The primary reason for this could have been the low quality of Soviet recording equipment, which made licensing tapes from the USSR a second-best option. EMI, through their French arm Pathé Marconi, were one of the favourites. EMI was keen to pursue negotiations with its Soviet

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379 Ibid, 4.
counterparts to secure access to the performing artists. Le Chant du Monde, the pro-Communist French label, had always been the first partner of choice for the USSR in France.

Thus, Le Chant du Monde approached the Soviet Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga on behalf of Pathé Marconi at the end of 1956 with an offer to record together in the USSR on Pathé Marconi equipment those classical works that were absent from the Soviet record catalogue. It is likely that Pathé Marconi preferred to send their recording equipment and people to the USSR due to the low quality of Soviet domestic recording technology and engineers. Pathé Marconi explained that they had confirmed with Le Chant du Monde that this arrangement did not infringe on the latter’s interests: the record companies agreed that Le Chant du Monde would distribute the recordings in France, while Pathé Marconi would have rights to the rest of the capitalist world. In addition to classical repertoire, Pathé Marconi offered to provide the Soviet side with recordings by the pop singer Yves Montand, who was hugely popular in the USSR. For Western releases, Pathé Marconi’s main interest lay with the Soviet superstars who had already started touring the West and were familiar to audiences there: Gilels, Oistrakh and Kogan.380

Pathé Marconi, Le Chant du Monde and the Soviet Ministry of Culture met in Moscow to negotiate the terms of the agreement between 29 January and 9 February 1957.381 The French record companies were presented by their Chief Executive Officers, Peter de Jongh and Jean Roire respectively.382 The contract specified that the Ministry of Culture and EMI would together make tape recordings in the USSR for at least 1,200 minutes of music until 31 December

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380 Letter from Pathé Marconi and Le Chant du Monde to the Ministry of Culture, 18 December 1956, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 602, 24–25.
381 It is interesting that in the archival documents the contract is present in both the French and Russian languages. The French contract always names EMI as the foreign counterparty, while the Russian translation of the contract says ‘Pathé Marconi.’ Pathé Marconi was the French subsidiary of EMI; it is named in the Russian version as a counterparty, therefore, it must have conducted the negotiations on behalf of EMI; ironically, the distribution rights which the contract specified for EMI were for capitalist countries excluding France, which went to Le Chant du Monde.
382 Summary note on negotiations between Pathé Marconi and the Ministry of Culture, 10 February 1957, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 602, 3.
1958. All the recorded works had to be different from those already available in the Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga catalogue for foreign record sales. They planned to record a further minimum of ten LPs from 1958 to 1960. The proposed repertoire was overwhelmingly nineteenth-century Western works, except one symphony by Myaskovsky, a ballet suite by Khachaturian and piano sonatas by Prokofiev.\textsuperscript{383}

Both sides had the rights to the recordings: the USSR for its territory, Eastern Europe, China, Korea and GDR and EMI for rest of world, excluding France, which went to Le Chant du Monde.\textsuperscript{384}

The recording project, however, came to nothing. Possible reasons may have been the difficulty of bringing Pathé Marconi equipment and record engineers into the USSR, or problems in reaching an agreement on dates and repertoire in times when the Soviet recording industry lacked a clear developmental strategy and central management organisation. It was only after the creation of Melodiya in 1964 that the USSR started successfully signing foreign record deals and raising its profile in the global classical music record scene.

Le Chant du Monde played a crucial role in all Pathé Marconi–USSR relationships and negotiations well into the 1960s. Jean Roire signed all Pathé Marconi contracts made with Soviet artists on their behalf and ‘declared to have received full authority to sign the present contract and collect all related royalties on their behalf.’\textsuperscript{385} Two record companies which would normally compete were forced in this case to co-operate in pursuit of their common interest: making recordings of Soviet classical musicians.

Approached by Deutsche Grammophon in February 1957 with an offer to record Soviet artists in the USSR using Deutsche Grammophon technology for a

\textsuperscript{383} The works to be recorded under the 1957 agreement between Pathé Marconi (EMI) and the Ministry of Culture were: Myaskovsky Symphony No. 25; Khachaturian \textit{Spartak suite}; Mozart two violin concertos with David Oistrakh; Beethoven five piano concertos with Gilels; Prokofiev piano sonatas with Richter; piano sonatas by Debussy and Ravel with Kogan; Beethoven’s selected sonatas with Oistrakh and Oborin; Chopin 24 Preludes with Gilels.

\textsuperscript{384} The contract between Pathé Marconi/EMI and the Ministry of Culture (Russian translation), 10 February 1957, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 602, 5–11.

\textsuperscript{385} Email from Bertrand Castellani, the catalogue exploitation expert at Warner Classics in Paris (Warner bought Pathé Marconi in 2013), 24 September 2018.
six- to eight-year period, the Soviet Ministry of Culture wrote to the Soviet
Embassy in Berlin: ‘these offers are of no interest to us, as Pathé Marconi [EMI]
have taken it upon themselves to produce similar recordings on much more
profitable terms for us, including a minimum five year contract; of this we have
informed Deutsche Grammophon. They will make a new offer.’386 Deutsche
Grammophon then approached the Soviet side again in July 1957 with improved
terms (the German side was presented by the Manager of the Berlin office,
responsible for Eastern European relationships, Constantin Metaxas).387 They
wrote further in early 1958 with a list of recordings they wanted to make in the
USSR. Deutsche Grammophon was, unsurprisingly, interested in the same
repertoire as EMI, but their list also included requests for recordings to be made
of Tchaikovsky’s ballets and Musorgsky’s opera Boris Godunov.388 The keenness of
such big names as Pathé Marconi, Le Chant du Monde and Deutsche
Grammophon to pave their way into regular recording sessions with Soviet
artists demonstrate their confidence that these discs would sell in Western
markets.

Neither the Le Chant du Monde/Pathé Marconi nor the Deutsche
Grammophon agreements materialised in the form envisaged by the contracts
and proposals. Some of the recordings were eventually made, but not in the
USSR with foreign equipment. Instead, Western record companies made the
recordings abroad. For instance, Gilels recorded the Beethoven piano concertos
first in Paris and London in the 1950s, and then with the Cleveland Symphony
Orchestra and conductor George Szell in April–May 1968, both times for EMI.
The contracts offered by Pathé Marconi and Deutsche Grammophon to the

386 Letter from the Ministry of Culture to Soviet Embassy in Berlin, 16 April 1957, RGALI,
f. 2329, op. 8, d. 581, 3.
387 Letter from Deutsche Grammophon to the Ministry of Culture, 21 January 1958,
RGALI, f. 2329, op. 8, d. 924, 4–5.
388 List of works to be recorded under the January 1958 proposal by Deutsche
Grammophon to the Soviets (proposed recordings dates September – November 1958 in
the USSR), Chopin Piano Concertos No. 1 and 2 with Gilels; Schumann Piano Concerto
Op. 54 with Richter; Grieg Piano Concerto Op. 16 with Richter; Bruch and Mendelssohn
violin concertos with David Oistrakh; Tchaikovsky Nutcracker suite, Cinderella suite, 1812
Overture all with Leningrad Philharmonic and Yevgeniy Mravinsky; arias from Boris
Godunov opera; solo recordings by Richter.
Soviets were ambitious in scale; perhaps, they were a gesture of commitment, a sign on the part of Deutsche Grammophon and EMI about the seriousness of their intentions and loyalty to the Soviet artists, which then gave both record companies opportunities to record the artists in the West on tours. The latter was logistically easier than taking equipment to the USSR and making recordings there.

One agreement that did have a practical realisation, though limited in scope, was negotiated by David Bicknell, Head of the International Artistes Department at EMI. He cultivated relationships with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and the Ministry of Culture separately from the Le Chant du Monde/Pathé Marconi enterprise. Bicknell’s efforts resulted in the first licensing agreement of 1956 to issue Soviet recordings in the UK on the Parlophone label. Unlike the previously discussed unsuccessful attempts to send Western recording equipment and engineers to the USSR to make recordings there, Bicknell licensed Soviet-recorded tapes which then were issued on British vinyls. Consequently, he had to be content with whatever quality tapes the Soviet side could produce, and then mitigate this by transferring the tapes onto British vinyls; this increased the quality of playback. The upside to such an approach was that Bicknell did not have to deal with the logistical and bureaucratic difficulties of mass recording projects in the USSR that turned out to be unrealisable at the time. Bicknell’s licensing method would prove to be the most productive going forward and would be the one adopted by all the major record labels from the middle of the 1960s, especially as the quality of Soviet recording equipment and expertise of recording engineers improved with time.

This first series licensed by Bicknell comprised a diverse selection of music including Russian nineteenth-century works by Glinka, Modest Musorgsky, Aleksandr Borodin and Tchaikovsky, as well as contemporary pieces by Shostakovich, Prokofiev and Yuriy Shaporin. The performers were all

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389 Andry, *Inside the Recording Studio*, 37. This is also confirmed by personal notes and recollections of Tony Locantro. For a short biography of David Bicknell, see Martland, *Since Records Began*, 166.
heavyweights of Soviet classical music: soloists of the Bolshoi Theatre, Oistrakh, Gilels, Richter, Lev Oborin, and Rostropovich.\textsuperscript{390}

This first licensing agreement made in spring 1956 gave EMI exclusive rights to produce records based on Soviet tapes in the UK and helped EMI to secure the right to record Soviet artists on their visits to the West.\textsuperscript{391} As a result, Rostropovich made his debut recording for EMI with the Philharmonia Orchestra, the EMI house orchestra, under the baton of Sir Malcolm Sargent in March 1956 with Myaskovsky’s Cello Concerto (HMV ALP 1427); Oistrakh recorded Brahms’ Double Concerto in March 1956 in Kingsway Hall, London (Columbia 33CX 1487); and Richter made his first record for EMI at Abbey Road studios in August 1961 of Beethoven’s Sonata No.17 and Schumann’s Fantasia in C Major (HMV ASD 450).\textsuperscript{392}

Bicknell’s licensing agreement was not particularly fruitful and expired without renewal in spring 1960.\textsuperscript{393} A likely reason could have been that the actual number of released titles was much lower than agreed in the contract, possibly due to the limited repertoire selection offered by the Soviets to EMI.\textsuperscript{394} Both Tony Locantro and Michael Allen have speculated that these recordings simply got lost in the multitude of new classical music records that EMI released every month in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{395}

The executed and proposed licensing agreements of the 1950s opened the doors for EMI and its competitors to record Soviet soloists in the West, but it was the subsequent country-specific licensing agreements of the 1960s–70s that

\textsuperscript{390} For a selection see https://www.discogs.com/label/522478-Recordings-From-The-USSR accessed 5 June 2017.
\textsuperscript{391} ‘Music Makers,’ \textit{High Fidelity}, June 1956, 53.
\textsuperscript{393} ‘Artia Label,’ \textit{Billboard}, 25 April 1960, 43.
\textsuperscript{395} Michael Allen interview, 1 November 2017 and Tony Locantro interview, 27 October 2017.
brought these performers into the Western classical music market and established them as superstars on par with, if not above, their Western peers.\textsuperscript{396}

2. The 1960s and Beyond

2.1. The American Licensing Agreement

Since the early days of the gramophone, licensing had been a common way for Western record companies to access each others’ catalogues with the aim of increasing sales across geographical territories. The two largest record companies at the beginning of the twentieth century, The Gramophone Company (later, EMI) in Europe and The Victor Talking Machines (later, RCA) in the USA divided the world into their respective territories and licensed master-tapes to each other.\textsuperscript{397} This arrangement was unique in that it was made between two giants of the industry in times when there was little competition. It continued for more than fifty years until the mid-1950s, when each of the companies began to operate on a world-wide basis. By 1960s, the bulk of the classical catalogue was music by composers of the nineteenth century or earlier and therefore free of copyright royalties. This greatly increased the profitability of classical recordings.

With the growth of competition in the sector, licensing became common practice for short periods of time for specific catalogues and territories. In the mid-1960s, EMI licensed selected classical titles for the UK from several American companies, including Epic (a label of CBS), Westminster and Mercury. Each of these ran for around five years. The releases of the first two were carried out under the standard HMV label (with credits to the American partner), while the Mercury releases were executed on a specially created Mercury label.\textsuperscript{398} The American Mercury company was renowned for its technically brilliant orchestral recording sessions that resulted in discs of exceptional quality where every small

\textsuperscript{396} Letter from the Ministry of Culture to Deutsche Grammophon, 30 October 1964, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 9, d. 238, 40: ‘We are sorry to not have replied regarding the licensing agreement. We are re-organising our gramophone industry to create a new company ‘Melodiya.’ Once that is done, we will be in touch regarding the conclusion of the agreement.’

\textsuperscript{397} Martland, \textit{Since Records Began}, 49.

\textsuperscript{398} Email from Tony Locantro, 27 November 2019.
nuance of the playing could be heard. Maintaining this brand identity when licensing was important for positioning them in the British market. Other examples of licensing agreements, especially between American and European companies included Mercury and Philips (The Netherlands), CBS and Philips Westminster and Decca (UK), Vox and Decca.399

Classical music had always been a key market for EMI. By 1961 it had accumulated a classical record catalogue of almost 2,000 vinyls which boasted numerous leading Western performers and conductors.400 The classical music business more generally was highly profitable. As Martland has revealed, ‘although sales of classical records accounted for only 16 per cent of EMI’s total record turnover, their premium price ensured they were highly profitable: in 1961, classical records contributed almost half of the profits generated by EMI’s record division.’ 401

To diversify its classical catalogue, EMI was keen to re-establish licensing relations with the USSR. As seen above, it was already experienced in concluding licensing agreements with Western labels. The trailblazer for the Soviet relationship with EMI was the Angel label, part of its US subsidiary Capitol Records. In August 1966 Angel entered into a licensing agreement with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. It covered manufacture and sale of recordings across all of North and South America, with the most important market being the USA. At the time, the Angel label was positioned as a premium, top quality brand that issued only the best of the classical repertoire. The music was released under the newly created label Melodiya/Angel from January 1967 for the usual price of an Angel long-playing vinyl of $4.79–5.79.402 The equal positioning of Melodiya and Angel labels on the logo and the pricing demonstrate the belief of the American producers in the demand for Soviet recordings in the US market and their

399 Email from Michael Letchford, 28 November 2019.
400 Ibid., 200–201.
401 Ibid., 201.
treatment of Soviet classical music performers and repertoire as being on par with their Western peers. Alan Livingston consulted with the US State Department before flying to Moscow to initiate the deal.\textsuperscript{403} Like the subsequent UK agreement, the recordings were to be made in Moscow because, as stated by \textit{Billboard}, ‘recent improvements in Soviet recordings techniques’ made them equal to ‘those of the U.S. manufacturers.’\textsuperscript{404} Compared to the early proposals of the 1950s, it was not necessary to send Western recording equipment to the USSR as Western partners now viewed Soviet recording capabilities as sufficient. A similar view was shared by another specialist industry magazine, \textit{High Fidelity}: ‘The technical standard of Soviet recordings has improved almost out of recognition within the last few years.’\textsuperscript{405} Licensing was also a much cheaper way of producing recordings, as the Western record company did not have to incur the major cost of making the master tape, which included paying the fees to the orchestral musicians and other personnel plus studio and recording equipment costs.

Angel’s record licensing agreement with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was hailed by \textit{Billboard} magazine as ‘the latest dent in the cultural iron curtain, and marks the first time the Soviet government has provided an American record company with carte blanche distribution rights to its artists.’\textsuperscript{406} Angel published a full page advert in \textit{Billboard} with a portrait of the Head of Capitol Records Alan Livingston entitled ‘Why Angel is introducing a historic new series of stereo recordings from Russia.’ The advertisement elaborated on the reasons why such a series was valuable and needed in the American market: ‘An essential communication is already taking place between our two peoples on many levels – political, scientific, and cultural. This communication must continue. It must grow. The fundamental purpose of the Melodiya/Angel series is to further this

\textsuperscript{403} ‘Capitol Pierces Soviet’s Classical Curtain – Snares a Key Contract,’ \textit{Billboard}, 27 August 1966, 8.
\textsuperscript{404} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{405} ‘The Russians Have Arrived Thanks to Melodiya/Angel,’ \textit{High Fidelity}, March 1967, 67.
\textsuperscript{406} ‘Cap., Red Deal Cuts the Classical Curtain,’ \textit{Billboard}, 27 August 1966, 1.
growth. It is the first systematic documentation of contemporary Soviet music.’ 407

Angel management was both keen to capitalise on Western consumer demand for Soviet performers and support the optimistic US–Soviet cultural diplomacy rhetoric of the times (discussed in Introduction). In terms of repertoire, the plan was to distribute a near equal number of new and more established works. 408

And indeed, the first year of the deal saw the issue of works by Rodion Shchedrin, Kabalevsky, Prokofiev and Shostakovich, alongside those by Tchaikovsky, Borodin, Musorgsky and Scriabin. 409 It was, however, the works by contemporary, Soviet composers that proved the most profitable. By September 1967, the Melodiya/Angel release of Shostakovich’s Execution of Stepan Razin and Symphony No. 9, performed by the Moscow Philharmonic under Kirill Kondrashin, had maintained a place in the Top-40 Billboard classics chart for over half a year. 410 As a result, in several years, according to Billboard, the Angel Melodiya label catalogue represented ‘the most complete collection of Russian music to be found in the U.S market.’ 411

There was a ten-year gap between the American licensing agreement of 1966 and the preceding British one of 1956. They were concluded by different subsidiaries of the same global record giant, EMI, in different countries and by different people. Together they formed important stepping stones for the parent company in fostering closer ties with the Soviet Union, contributing to EMI’s primary goal of ensuring access to Soviet artists for recording projects in the West.

407 ‘Why Angel is introducing a historic new series of stereo recordings from Russia,’ Billboard, 11 February 1967, 39.
408 ‘Melodiya/Angel Drive Rolls with 6 LP Releases,’ Billboard, 13 May 1967, 43.
410 28 weeks according to Billboard Best Selling Classic LPs list, Billboard, 9 September 1967.
2.2. The British Licensing Agreement

Following the success of its US subsidiary, EMI concluded a similar agreement for the UK in late 1967.\textsuperscript{412} This exclusive licensing agreement allowed EMI to release an extensive and varied repertoire of Soviet recordings in the UK under the Melodiya/HMV label. The EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga licensing agreement stipulated the use of the Melodiya/HMV double logo as well as the phrase ‘Recorded by Melodiya in the U.S.S.R.’ on the record sleeve. This condition, requested by the Soviet side, signals their desire to increase international recognition of Soviet culture. As with the American agreement, the dual title of the series highlighted the authenticity of the recordings made in Russia, while being pressed onto the highest quality vinyls by the British record company. EMI had exclusive rights to sell the Soviet recordings in the UK, as well as Australia and New Zealand and later the Republic of Ireland. No other competitor could distribute these recordings. The licensing agreements were rolled forward every three years until 1982, meaning that for over a decade, EMI was a key decision-maker on which Soviet classical music recordings reached British listeners, how they were presented (through sleeve designs and cover notes), and where they were sold.\textsuperscript{413}

The production, marketing and distribution of a record involved many organisations and individuals. In the case of the Melodiya/HMV series the situation is further complicated by the transnational character of the agreement, where in effect, the same recorded performance materialized in two, sometimes three, different guises: in a Soviet LP produced by Melodiya in the USSR, and in an EMI LP produced either in the UK, the US or both. Hence, the same recording was released on LPs with different materials and packaging, depending on whether Melodiya or EMI released it. This section discusses the individuals and

\textsuperscript{412} ‘First release in Melodiya agreement,’ Record Retailer and Music Industry News, 28 August 1968, 6.

\textsuperscript{413} The sleeve notes and images will be the focus of Chapter 5 of this thesis. One of the first releases, in December 1968, was Shostakovich’s The Execution of Stepan Razin, the recording that had already been so successful on the Angel label in the USA and had been previously unavailable from any UK record company (ASD 2409). Source: ‘Important First for EMI in December,’ Record Retailer and Music Industry News, 20 November 1968, 11.
organisations, both state and private, involved in the licensing agreements. I also refer to any other parties that had an indirect influence on the agreements and the recordings produced as a result.

Figure 4.1 demonstrates the network of actors involved in the Melodiya/HMV agreements. From 1964, the USSR state recording company, Melodiya, controlled all recording sessions and the mass production of LPs in the country. The sound quality depended on the technical facilities of the Melodiya recording studio. Exports of Soviet cultural goods were executed through Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga.\footnote{414 They also exported books, periodicals and stamps.} Both Melodiya and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga were obliged to confirm their annual plans with official government bodies, the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Trade respectively, which could approve or reject the plans.

Three parties were involved in the negotiations around the licensing of Melodiya recordings: EMI, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and the Soviet Trade Delegation. Figure 4.2 presents the key individuals involved in the contracts from the early 1970s until the end of the relationship in 1982. EMI was represented by
Peter Andry, Tony Locantro and Douglas Pudney from the International Classical Division (ICD) of EMI and John Pattrick from EMI Records UK. Tony Locantro was the EMI business manager who dealt with the classical music business transactions with the USSR from 1972–73 onwards; Peter Andry was General Manager of the ICD and the manager responsible for Soviet relations within EMI, including recording of Soviet performers in the West; John Pattrick was General Manager of the Classical Division of EMI Records UK in 1975–1984, responsible for distribution of records across the UK and Douglas Pudney was Manager of Repertoire and Creative Services.\footnote{Douglas Pudney died in 1978 and Peter Andry in 2010.} Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga was represented by Ms Raisa Kaliyenko, but the Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga day-to-day contact relating to the licensing contracts was Igor Preferenskiy.\footnote{Ms. Kaliyenko was superseded by Mr. Leonov (first name unknown) at some point after 1975, but Tony Locantro was unable to recall or find the exact year in his papers.} The Soviet Trade Delegation was responsible for concluding trade agreements between the UK and the USSR and facilitating trade activities.\footnote{Tony Locantro interview for the British Library Sound Archive, 7 December 2016.} Its representative in the EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga deal, Lev Ershov, did not carry any decision-making powers and performed supervisory functions at meetings.\footnote{This organisation still exists and is now called the Trade Delegation of the Russian Federation in the United Kingdom, it is based at the same address as in the 1970s at 32–33 Highgate West Hill, London N6 6NL.}

There seems to have been no involvement in this agreement, direct or otherwise, from the UK government.\footnote{Email from Tony Locantro, 23 May 2017. I have not found any mention of UK state involvement or interest in any other sources either.} The music was recorded in the USSR in Melodiya recording studios and issued first inside the country by Melodiya on its LPs. EMI was routinely given lists of available Melodiya master tapes, and it was Douglas Pudney and John Pattrick who chose which they wanted to release in the UK and then placed their orders. In the early years of the relationship (before the 1970s), Angel in the USA was the lead decision-maker on which tapes to license from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and the UK simply produced the same LPs. The recordings from the Melodiya master tapes were then transferred onto lacquers at EMI’s Abbey Road Studios and pressed as LP vinyl records in EMI’s
main production facility in Hayes, Middlesex. EMI chose the sleeve cover image and sleeve notes for the UK-distributed vinyls. I will consider more closely the people and departments within EMI that were responsible for marketing and cover images in Chapter 5 when I analyse the covers of the Melodiya/HMV series.

Figure 4.2. Renewal of the EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga Licensing Agreement for a Further Three Years, 22–24 April 1974

From left to right: Lev Ershov (Soviet Trade Delegation), Raisa Kaliienko (Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga), Peter Andry (EMI), Tony Locantro (EMI), Douglas Pudney (EMI), Pat Feldman (EMI Contracts Manager). Source: Personal files of Tony Locantro.

The network described in Figure 4.1 contains a variety of non-human actors. Melodiya’s recording facilities determined the way the performance was recorded; Melodiya’s annual plan, supervised by the Ministry of Culture, specified which repertoire was recorded, by which musicians and how this music was presented to the Soviet listener. The EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga contract set out the terms of the relationship: their main features will be

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420 Tony Locantro interview for the British Library Sound Archive, 7 December 2016; Andry, Inside the Recording Studio, 132–33.
421 The current Melodiya staff have declined to provide any materials on the matter.
discussed below. The regular lists of available recordings were sent by Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to EMI to choose which music EMI wanted to license. However, ultimately, as noted also by Taruskin, all these objects were conceived and created by human actors, each possessing their own biases and aims. From the mid–1970s, in addition to these lists, EMI also had meetings with Melodiya and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to request recordings of particular repertoire of interest. These requests were politely accepted but rarely realized in practice.422 Finally, EMI Records UK produced the LPs in its UK facility. The records were distributed widely across the UK, and the reach of the distribution network (the location of record shops) determined who could obtain the recordings. The result of all these movements along the network was an object, which had the same music on it as the recording made by Melodiya in the USSR, but whose material, sleeve images and text were created by EMI and which was sold to British (and often American) consumers.

EMI was the only British record company that had a productive licensing deal with the Soviet Union from 1965 to the early 1980s. The US-based record company United Artists (UA) concluded a licensing agreement with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga for a selected group of recordings in 1977, but UA was taken over by EMI in 1979.423 The focus of the UA deal was, unusually, on both classical and pop Soviet records. Until this deal UA did not have a classical catalogue at all and was planning to launch one with the Soviet releases.424 It was planning, in return, on releasing UA pop artists in the USSR (Paul Anka and Shirley Bassey). On the pop side for the UK, UA wanted to release the Pesniary folk group.425 On the classical side, although the plan was to make thirty albums

422 Email from Tony Locantro, 28 September 2017: ‘EMI and Angel made repertoire suggestions to Melodiya but Melodiya were generally not able to follow through and make the suggested recordings.’ This was consistent with the opinion of Michael Allen in his interview of 1 November 2017.
423 ‘Melodiya: Only Slow Progress,’ Billboard, 27 October 1979, 76.
424 ‘UA-Soviet Deal Firmed,’ Billboard, 6 May 1978, 3.
425 ‘UA Signs Disk Pact with Soviets,’ Billboard, 6 May 1978, 80.
within the next eighteen months, only five licensed recordings were produced in 1978 under UA’s Cadenza label.\textsuperscript{426}

In 1975 Melodiya, in response to requests of foreign record companies, sent a five-year recording plan to the Ministry of Culture.\textsuperscript{427} Western record companies, EMI, Le Chant du Monde and Deutsche Grammophon to name just a few, had regularly complained about the lack of clarity in the communication of Melodiya’s recording plans. This complicated their internal release schedules and decisions on which Soviet tapes to license. Such a situation is surprising considering that the Soviet economy was first and foremost a planned economy: drawing up plans for several years in advance was, in theory, at the core of any Soviet production activity. In Melodiya’s five-year plan of 1975, the list of performers included established and up-and-coming cellists, violinists and pianists; many of them featured on the HMV/Melodiya recordings. The list of symphonic music featured infrequently heard repertoire by such composers as Arensky, Gretchaninov, Kalinnikov, Liapunov, Medtner, Taneyev, as well as more canonical Russian (Rimsky-Korsakov, Tchaikovsky, Glazunov, Scriabin, Rakhmaninov) and Soviet (Khachaturian, Prokofiev, Myaskovsky) works. It was the Russian-language opera repertoire that presented the most ambition, as this required massive resources and could not be easily recorded abroad. Many of the operas were not frequently performed in the West and were of interest to record collectors. The list included Glinka’s \textit{Ruslan and Ludmila}, Dargomyzhsky’s \textit{Rusalka}, Musorgsky’s \textit{Boris Godunov} (in the original version), Zhenitba, \textit{The Fair at Sorochintsy}, Rimsky-Korsakov’s \textit{Sadko}, \textit{The Maid of Pskov}, \textit{The Tale of Tsar Saltan} and \textit{Mozart and Salieri}, Rubinstein’s \textit{The Demon}, Tchaikovsky’s \textit{The Enchantress} and \textit{The Oprichnik}, Alexey Verstovsky’s \textit{Askold’s Grave} and Prokofiev’s \textit{Semyon Kotko}. Many of these works were, in fact, released on the Melodiya/HMV label (see Appendix B).

\textsuperscript{426} Catalogue numbers ULCA 10000–10004. Thank you to Tony Locantro and Jonathan Summers for pointing out this information.
\textsuperscript{427} Plan of Proposed Recordings for Foreign Firms, 16 December 1975, RGALI, f. 2329, op. 29, d. 566, 10–14.
2.3. The 1975 Reciprocal Licensing Agreement

Having developed a productive and continuing one-way relationship by the mid–1970s (EMI licensing tapes from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga), EMI and the USSR were then ready to take the next step and develop it into a two-way flow of recordings. From August 1975 the licensing agreement between EMI and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga became reciprocal: it was envisaged that EMI would also license its recordings to Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga for manufacturing and distribution across the USSR. Until the Soviet Union joined the Universal Copyright Convention in 1973, there was no way for Western artists to claim royalties from sales of their music in the country. Once the USSR joined the convention, licensing music to Melodiya, with its access to one of the largest consumer markets in the world, became a lucrative business for Western record companies and artists.

At first, the Soviets’ interest lay in EMI’s classical catalogue. As had been the case on EMI’s side, the Soviet side was most interested in the label’s superstar performers. These included singers Victoria de los Angeles, Elisabeth Schwarzkopf and Nicolai Gedda, instrumentalists Jacqueline du Pré and Arturo Benedetti Michelangeli, and conductors Daniel Barenboim, Otto Klemperer and Riccardo Muti. However, tours of the USSR by pop, jazz and rock musicians also paved the way for the cautious release of non-classical Western repertoire in the country. In pop, Melodiya licensed music by the Beatles, Salvatore Adamo and the Dutch pop duo Maywood; in jazz, old recordings by Sidney Bechet (released in the USSR in 1983, but originally recorded by EMI in the 1930s–40s) and Nat King Cole (USSR release 1981, recorded in the 1950s); and in rock, the band Smokie (USSR release 1980, recorded 1977). Although the music licensed into the USSR from Western rock, jazz and pop was mostly from back catalogues, this still demonstrates the diversity of musical genres that infused the USSR in the 1970s from the West. A real breakthrough in relations between the West and the Soviet Union was the tour by Cliff Richard (an EMI artist) in 1976 to Moscow (eight concerts) and Leningrad (twelve concerts). One of the Leningrad concerts

428 ‘Two-way Deal with Russia,’ Music Week, 23 August 1975, 29.
was broadcast on Soviet television.\textsuperscript{429} The USSR also licensed music from EMI’s subsidiaries in other countries: for instance, Edith Piaf’s song repertoire, which was hugely popular in the USSR, was acquired from EMI’s French subsidiary Pathé Marconi.

EMI was not the sole licensee of foreign records to the Soviet Union. Melodiya steadily increased releases of foreign artists from the mid–1970s.\textsuperscript{430} In August 1974 it concluded a similar reciprocal agreement with its US partner CBS Records and released jazz musicians Ray Conniff, Miles Davis, Ella Fitzgerald, Duke Ellington together with classical music recordings of orchestral performances with Bruno Walter and Leonard Bernstein.\textsuperscript{431} The German record company Polydor signed a reciprocal deal with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga in early 1975 and licensed both classical and pop music to the USSR.\textsuperscript{432}

Throughout the 1970s–80s, Melodiya licensed from a variety of Western record companies, the most active being Ariola-Eurodisc (GDR), Polygram (Netherlands and Germany), Hispavox (Spain), CBS Records and ABC Records (USA), and Decca (UK) from 1984, when the EMI exclusive licensing agreement ceased.\textsuperscript{433} Tony Locantro has recalled that the Soviets upset EMI Records UK by not licensing anything in 1979, as they had already spent all their budget on recordings by ABBA from Polar Music (Sweden).\textsuperscript{434} Indeed, the demand for ABBA inside the Soviet Union was so high that when ABBA’s ‘Arrival’ album was released in the USSR, according to Billboard ‘for the first time the Russians are said to have agreed to manufacture and market an overseas album without insisting on reciprocal trade in exchange.’\textsuperscript{435} 200,000 copies were released in the

\textsuperscript{429} ‘Cliff Richard in Russia,’ \textit{Music Week}, 23 August 1975, 1–4.
\textsuperscript{430} ‘Melodiya Increases Foreign Talent Exposure in Russia,’ \textit{Music Week}, 28 June 1975, 10.
\textsuperscript{431} ‘Jazz Flavour to First CBS–Melodiya Releases,’ \textit{Music Week}, 18 January 1975, 10.
\textsuperscript{432} ‘Polydor Signs Deal with East Europe Countries,’ \textit{Music Week}, 27 February 1975, 1.
\textsuperscript{434} Tony Locantro interview, 9 December 2016, also confirmed by ‘Late Breaking News,’ \textit{Billboard}, 8 September 1979, ABBA-42.
\textsuperscript{435} ‘U.S.S.R’s 1-Way Abba LP Deal,’ \textit{Billboard}, 10 June 1978, 1.
USSR; this represented an almost tenfold increase on the only previous release of ABBA’s other album with the same name of 25,000 copies from Polydor.436

Sergey I. Zhuk has looked at examples of Soviet consumption during the Détente in the areas of film, radio, television and rock music.437 He notes that Western cultural products, including music recordings, became ‘a point of cultural fixation for Soviet youth, who exaggerated the cultural significance of these products.’ 438 ABBA’s and other foreign groups’ recordings were such cultural fixations for Soviet consumers.

The UK’s Chrysalis Records, primarily a rock, electronic and pop label, agreed to release Leo Sayer’s ‘Greatest Hits’ album in the USSR in 1979.439 Although the deal had to be two-way and Chrysalis enthusiastically planned Soviet classical releases in the UK, nothing came out of this. Discussing releases of Soviet pop in the West, the head of Chrysalis’ International Division Des Brown acknowledged that ‘more groundwork is necessary,’ including the necessity to translate lyrics into English for any chance of Western-wide releases for Soviet pop singers.440

Foreign record labels were overwhelmingly interested in Soviet classical music performers and did not attempt to license any other genre of music. The rigorous free education provided to Soviet classical musicians by the state allowed them to develop into world-class stars that could compete with Western peers for the attention of the audiences. Other genres of music, perhaps apart from folk, were not encouraged in the USSR and Soviet performers severely lagged in excellence in these genres. In addition, other genres of music were entirely vocal which meant that it was difficult to promote Russian language songs to Western audiences.

436 Ibid., 68.
438 Ibid., 352.
440 Ibid.
These examples demonstrate that the movement of recordings was a two-way stream from 1975: recordings were licensed by the West from the USSR and vice versa. Classical music was the only genre exported by the Soviet Union, while in exchange the USSR imported a variety of music beyond classical. In both instances, there was a direct link between the touring of musicians and the subsequent sale of recordings, either by them or from their genre of music.

2.4. Other Licensing Agreements

The EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Capitol–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga licensing agreements brought Soviet classical music into the global record market. Western audiences were keen to hear Soviet artists’ music outside of the concert hall. Commercial record companies were eager to seize every opportunity to meet this demand, place the Soviet artists on their roster and produce a stream of earnings from their recordings. Their Soviet counterpart Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, in effect, a government department in a communist state, was an equal and active partner of the business relationship displaying commercial motivation.

From 1965, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga concluded licensing agreements with record companies in many Western countries. All these agreements, including EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga roughly adhered to the same template in duration (three years), geographical reach (usually the record company’s home country), the double-logo of the Western label and Melodiya, and the mechanism for choosing and delivering tapes from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga to the foreign partner. Each country-specific agreement was concluded with a different Western record company: EMI covered UK, Australia and New Zealand, Le Chant du Monde – France, Capitol Records (EMI) – USA until 1974 and CBS afterwards, Ariola-Eurodisc – West Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Scandinavia. This was a common way of making licensing arrangement for the Western record industry, as often one company would license its records to a player in another country.
Le Chant du Monde had acquired tapes to release on gramophone records from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga since the early 1950s. It was only from early 1965 that this became formalized in a licensing agreement that envisaged the use of the Melodiya/Le Chant du Monde logo and a royalty of 10%, similar to the EMI agreement. The contract would be rolled over every three years, again just like with EMI, and Le Chant du Monde was to be the exclusive licensee and importer of Soviet records in France. Immediately after the licensing agreement, Le Chant du Monde, like its other Western competitors, requested to record Soviet artists on tour. In this case, it received the Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga’s agreement to make five recordings of the Barshai Chamber Orchestra in Paris from 27 June to 18 July 1965. Interestingly, these were made in co-operation with EMI’s Pathé Marconi.

An internal note to the Soviet Cultural Minister Ekaterina Furtzeva from late 1967 revealed that Le Chant du Monde had issued twenty records from Soviet licensed tapes that year, mostly of music by Russian and Soviet composers, as was also the case with Melodiya/HMV. The French side had, in addition, requested a three year recording plan from Melodiya and ‘complained, as have other foreign record companies also done on the absence of new recordings by Richter, Gilels and Rostropovich and insufficient number of recordings by Oistrakh and Kogan’. In 1968 Le Chant du Monde bought fifteen hours of tape and in 1969 twenty hours of tape from Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga; in 1968 it sold 85,000 licensed Soviet recordings and 110,000 in 1969. This steady increase in both the number of licensed tapes and sold vinyls demonstrates

441 Note to the Minister of Culture E. Furtzeva, 9 February 1965, RGALI, f. 2329, d. 9, op. 478, 32.
442 Contract between Le Chant du Monde and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 30 January 1965, RGALI, f. 2329, d. 9, op. 478, 38.
443 Note to the Minister of Culture E. Furtzeva, 9 March 1965, RGALI, f. 2329, d. 9, op. 478, 36.
444 Note to the Minister of Culture E. Furtzeva on cooperation with the French record firm Le Chant du Monde, 13 October 1967, RGALI, f. 2329, d. 29, op. 566, 1–2.
445 Ibid.
446 Internal Ministry of Culture note about dealings with Le Chant du Monde, [no date] 1970, RGALI, f. 2329, d. 29, op. 566, 5.
persistence and desire on both sides to implement the agreement on a consistent and enduring basis.

In Western Germany, the commitment was greater in scope. Ariola-Eurodisc concluded a licensing agreement for Soviet tapes in Western Germany, Austria, Switzerland and Scandinavia in 1965.\textsuperscript{447} The Head of the record company, Werner Vogelsang, reported successful sales of Soviet music in his market and remained keen to promote Soviet classical recordings in the West, having released c. 60 Soviet recordings in the year to end of 1966.\textsuperscript{448} He also commented on the experience of the Soviet side (Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Melodiya) in negotiating licensing contracts: ‘The Soviet Union is well informed about the structure of Western pricing in licence transactions and we had to negotiate long and hard before we came to an agreement.’\textsuperscript{449} Similarly to the EMI licensing agreement, there was no involvement of German political structures as recordings were not part of cultural agreements, but of the trade sector.\textsuperscript{450} The 1965 Ariola agreement was ‘virtually the same as that just signed with Capitol.’\textsuperscript{451} Ariola actively marketed the Soviet releases and used ‘specially designed jackets which German critics rate as among the best produced by German record companies.’\textsuperscript{452} This signals how much importance Ariola attached to the Soviet releases and believed in their profit-making potential. Indeed, the licensing contract with the USSR pushed sales figures for Ariola to an all-time peak only a year later.\textsuperscript{453} By 1974 the Melodiya/Eurodisc label catalogue included over 200 albums in both classical and folk music.\textsuperscript{454} The repertoire covered was similar to

\textsuperscript{447} ‘Partner “Melodia”: Ein Gespräch mit Werner Vogelsang,’ \textit{fono forum}, 15 December 1965, 566. Translation from German by MA Translation Studies at Goldsmiths, University of London student Franziska Maciszonek on 16 November 2018.

\textsuperscript{448} ‘Reds’ Music Future in West Bright,’ \textit{Billboard}, 8 October 1966, 32.

\textsuperscript{449} ‘Partner “Melodia’, \textit{fono forum}, 567.

\textsuperscript{450} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{451} ‘Reds’ Music Future in West Bright,’ \textit{Billboard}, 8 October 1966, 32.

\textsuperscript{452} ‘Melodia Repertoire Pushing Ariola to All-Time Sales High,’ \textit{Billboard}, 24 December 1966, 46.

\textsuperscript{453} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{454} ‘Ariola/Eurodisc, Melodiya: 10 Years of Cooperation,’ \textit{Billboard}, 14 December 1974, 27.
what EMI issued in the UK: mostly Soviet and Russian works, including those that were hard to find in Western markets.\footnote{Ibid.}

In 1967 the Spanish Vergara record company concluded its licensing deal with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga but for smaller volumes, c. 20 releases per annum. Around the same time, the Italian Clan Celentano also signed an agreement with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga.\footnote{‘Vergara Makes 2 Moves to Broaden Classical Range,’ \textit{Billboard}, 21 October 1967, 79.} In 1973 Polydor, the parent of Deutsche Grammophon, managed to conclude a licensing agreement for West Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavia, Denmark, Israel and South Africa.\footnote{‘Polydor, Melodiya In Rights Agreement,’ \textit{Billboard}, 3 March 1973, 97.} Its final ambition following the licensing deal was to record Soviet artists on Deutsche Grammophon and sell some of its Western vinyls for distribution in the USSR.

Concluding a licensing agreement with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, thus, became a common way for key Western record labels to ensure continuity of their relationship with the USSR and being able to regularly record Soviet musicians abroad. Since the Soviets wanted to deal with one partner per country to limit their exposure to any one Western label they concluded agreements similar in duration and scope with labels across Western Europe and the USA. It was how actively the Western partners chose to act on that agreement that distinguished the British relationship. EMI was at the forefront of building and developing connections to Soviet partners from the middle of the 1950s. Together with the many recording projects of Soviet musicians in the West, its prolific licensing agreement brought a varied repertoire of Russian and Soviet classical music to the British listener. What that repertoire was and how widely it was distributed across the country is the focus of the next sections.

### 3. The Melodiya/HMV Repertoire and Performers

A comparison with repertoire that was recorded by the foreign record companies directly in the West, reveals that Russian and Soviet composers dominated the...
Melodiya/HMV repertoire taking up almost 90% of all the music. In choosing which works to license from Melodiya’s catalogue, EMI focused on Russian and Soviet repertoire, following the perception that musicians possess a special authenticity of interpretation when performing the music from their home country, in this case, Soviet artists playing Russian and Soviet repertoire. This was in some practical respects applicable to Soviet music of the time, since some Soviet performers had a level of access to the composers which their foreign peers lacked. For instance, the Borodin String Quartet enjoyed a close working relationship with Shostakovich over many years. Valentin Berlinsky, the quartet’s cellist since its founding days, described the relationship in an interview in 1992: ‘The “Borodins” never played a Shostakovich quartet publicly without first asking the composer to comment on our interpretation. (I have kept a number of his letters. In one of them, he raves about our interpretation and sends best wishes for future performances).’ The Borodin String Quartet performed with Shostakovich on many occasions and recorded all his string quartets. This complete recording was one of the highlights of the Melodiya/HMV series (SLS 879). Recordings of all the Shostakovich symphonies by the Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra under Kirill Kondrashin, an active champion and close collaborator of the composer, was another bestseller (SLS 5025).

Among the Russian and Soviet composers featured in the Melodiya/HMV series, most items recorded were works by Shostakovich, Tchaikovsky and

458 The British Library Sound Archive holds a copy of every recording manufactured by EMI in the UK, of which the LPs under the Melodiya/HMV label are a sub-set. There is a total of 210 items under this label, some of them are individual LPs, others are two to four LPs in a set, usually a full opera or ballet. The LPs were issued by EMI in the UK between 1967 and 1983, although the actual recordings of the music vary by date and some are from earlier years. EMI assigned an ASD number to each of the LPs in its stereo full-price high-quality classical category and the Soviet licensed records were intermingled in its ASD series with other records by Western classical musicians. The box sets were labelled as SLS number and each LP in the box set had its ASD number. I would like to express my gratitude to the classical music curator of the British Library Sound Archive Jonathan Summers for providing access to the entire Melodiya/HMV set and sharing his expertise.

Prokofiev. These were followed by Rakhmaninov, Glazunov, Nikolay Rimsky-Korsakov, Scriabin and Glinka. The remaining music by Russian composers was comprised of a large variety of names, both from nineteenth- and twentieth-century Russian and Soviet compositional schools; however, each of the composers in this group had fewer than six works in the series, and often just one LP (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1. Russian and Soviet Composers on the Melodiya/HMV Label

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<tr>
<th>Nineteenth-century</th>
<th>Pre-revolutionary and/or emigrated</th>
<th>Soviet</th>
<th>Young Soviet (1950s onwards)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pyotr Tchaikovsky*</td>
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<td>Dmitry Shostakovich*</td>
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<td>Mikhail Glinka*</td>
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<td>Sergey Prokofiev*</td>
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<td>Isaak Dunayevsky</td>
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<td>Vasili Solovyov-Sedoy</td>
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* In the top-eight most prolific Russian and Soviet composers issued on Melodiya/HMV label (by number of recordings). For a full list of recordings see Appendix B.

Table 4.1 demonstrates the diversity of repertoire under the Melodiya/HMV label: a balance of Soviet-era and traditional Russian nineteenth- and early twentieth-century works brought by EMI to the British listener. By the Second World War the Soviet state had completed the process of their canonisation, reinterpreting the works within the Soviet cultural system. The music critic, Hugh Ottaway, who regularly contributed reviews of Melodiya/HMV records for leading classical music magazines, in discussing the recording of Rakhmaninov’s The Bells in the series (ASD 2539) in 1970 remarked that ‘as well as providing some magnificent performances of Russian classics, the

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Melodiya/HMV series now includes a good many works that are virtually unknown in this country."461

At the same time, many of the youngest generation of Soviet composers, the so-called unofficial composers such as Sofia Gubaydulina, Edison Denisov and Arvo Pärt, were not represented in the series. Their semi-official status in Soviet music in the 1970s precluded state-supported performances and recordings of their works; it was not until the early 1980s that Melodiya would start making recordings of their music.462 The exception to this was one recording of Alfred Schnittke’s Prelude in memory of Shostakovich combined with works by Shostakovich and Prokofiev recorded by the young stars violinist Gidon Kremer and pianist Andrey Gavrilov in 1978 (ASD 3547). It is likely Schnittke’s work was included in part because it was a homage to Shostakovich (who had died three years earlier) but also due to the influence of Kremer and Gavrilov, who could, to a certain extent, choose their own repertoire.463 A contemporary of the semi-official Soviet composers, the officially approved composer Rodion Shchedrin features much more prominently in the Melodiya/HMV series, with five recordings in total.464 Although Melodiya gave EMI access to a large, even possibly the entire, selection of its recordings catalogue, the sub-division of composers into official and semi-official within Soviet musical circles and the concentration of all recording power in the hands of the state monopoly

461 The Musical Times, October 1970, 1008.
462 This is confirmed by referencing the discography of each of the young composers on discogs.com and records.su accessed 10 July 2017.
463 For instance, according to Peter Schmelz, the performance of Schnittke’s Concerto Grosso No. 1 in November 1977 took place thanks only to the soloists: ‘The reason that piece was performed was not Schnittke, it was Kremer.’ See Schmelz, Such Freedom, if only Musical: Unofficial Soviet Music during the Thaw (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 206.
464 These recordings are: ASD 2448 (1968) arrangement of Bizet’s Carmen ballet; ASD 2557 (released in the UK in 1970, recorded in 1964) Concerto for Orchestra coupled with Prokofiev’s Symphony No. 4; ASD 2927 (UK release 1973, recorded 1962) Symphony No. 1 coupled with Myaskovsky’s Symphony No. 23, SLS 887 (1974 UK release and recording) of his opera Anna Karenina; ASD 3447 (UK release 1978, recorded 1965) excerpts from his opera Not Love Alone paired with excerpts from Petrov’s opera The Creation of the World; and ASD 3715 (released and recorded in 1979) with works by Shchedrin, Tchaikovsky and Prokofiev arranged and played by the pianist Mikhail Pletnyev.
company thus prevented some Soviet classical music from being recorded and heard both within the USSR and beyond.

This division between official and unofficial composers was a product of the peculiarity of the workings of the Soviet arts system: as Fairclough has put it, ‘in the Soviet context, art was not ‘consumed’ quite as it was in Anglo-American culture. What was available was selected, marketed, and delivered within a framework largely beholden to the prevailing ideological climate.’ Whatever music was recorded within the USSR and licensed to the West through official channels, had to comply with the official mandate of socialist realism. Socialist realism dominated requirements for Soviet music from the 1930s to the late 1950s and although its power subsided during the Cold War, it remained the main ideology in Soviet culture into the 1980s. A detailed discussion of socialist realism is beyond the scope of this thesis; it was a style formed during a back-and-forth interaction between composers and bureaucrats: ‘As members of the bureaucracy, composers actively participated in the shaping of Soviet policy on music…. Most importantly, their compositions fed back into policy-making channels through peer review and music criticism.’

Broadly speaking, the doctrine was loosely understood as avoiding ‘attracting attention to form. Ideally, the form should be transparent, allowing the viewer immediate access to the content.’ Content-wise, it had to ideally have a mix of ‘the classical Western, the classical Russian, the folk Russian, and the popular Soviet.’

In contrast to the young composers, who were often experimenting with techniques that went beyond the official state doctrine of socialist realism and whose promotion within the system was not encouraged (although never openly forbidden), system-loyal talented young performers were given high levels of support and opportunities within Soviet musical circles. This spilt into the

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467 Ibid., 425.
468 Ibid., 438.
licensing relationship with Western record companies. The most productive example is the Young Artists Programme developed by EMI, Goskonzert, the Ministry of Culture and Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga in 1976, discussed in Chapter 3. In contrast, experimental groups like Astraea, founded by the young composers Sofia Gubaidulina, Viktor Suslin and Vyacheslav Artyomov, existed outside the official Soviet musical scene and were not part of the EMI–Melodiya offering.\(^{469}\)

Even the official young performers could quickly be denied recording and touring opportunities, if they started vocally and publicly questioning the Soviet system, as discussed on the example of Andrey Gavrilov in Chapter 2.

As much as Melodiya was keen to record the young performers and to license these recordings as part of the Melodiya/HMV agreement, the soloists themselves, both established and young, preferred to record directly in the West. Consequently, only a fifth of the vinyls in the Melodiya/HMV series has a work played by an instrumental soloist. Often it will be one side of an LP; a very typical division is to have one side one of an LP devoted to a concerto played by a famous instrumentalist and on the other side a symphony by the same composer. There are also some LPs entirely by an instrumental soloist, but this is rare and only for the international superstars, mostly Richter (four LPs), Oistrakh (eight LPs) and Rostropovich (three LPs). Of the four Richter LPs in the Melodiya/HMV series, three are duets with Oistrakh. Most soloists are pianists and most have one-two LPs in the series (see Table 4.2). According to Michael Allen, the Russian superstar soloists did not like recording for Melodiya because they were badly paid for the internal recording sessions and made no royalties on the sales. They preferred to record in the West due to higher fees, which comprised both official income and ‘under the carpet’ payments from Western producers. Western recordings were also much more widely circulated, which offered the performers much broader exposure. Thus, they tried to save their best playing and repertoire for the Western sessions.\(^{470}\) This might explain why out of the 45 LPs on the Melodiya/HMV series that feature a soloist, very few are by the

\(^{469}\) Ibid., 438.

\(^{470}\) Kheng K. Koya, *The Kaleidoscope of Women’s Sounds in The Late 20th and Early 21st Centuries* (Newcastle-Upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2015), 47.
superstars of the Soviet classical music world: Richer, Oistrakh, Gilels and Rostropovich.

Table 4.2. Soviet Soloists on the Melodiya/HMV Label*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violinists</th>
<th>Pianists</th>
<th>Cellists</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>David Oistrakh</td>
<td>Nikolay Petrov</td>
<td>Mstislav</td>
<td>(list of singers is not exhaustive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Igor Oistrakh</td>
<td>Emil Gilels</td>
<td>Rostropovich</td>
<td>Galina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leonid Kogan</td>
<td>Yakov Flier</td>
<td>Mikhail Khomitser</td>
<td>Vishnevskaya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mikhail Vayman</td>
<td>Maria Grinberg</td>
<td>Fedor Luzanov</td>
<td>Irina Arkhipova</td>
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<tr>
<td>Viktor Pikayzen</td>
<td>Arnold Kaplan</td>
<td></td>
<td>Margarita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grigory Feign</td>
<td>Stanislav Nehaus</td>
<td></td>
<td>Miroshnikova</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rosa Fain</td>
<td>Sviatoslav Richter</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yevgeniy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gidon Kremer</td>
<td>Igor Zhukov</td>
<td></td>
<td>Vladimirirov</td>
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<tr>
<td>Boris Korsakov</td>
<td>Pavel Serebryakov</td>
<td></td>
<td>Artur Eizen</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Aleksander Bakhchiev</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yevgeniy</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Victoria Postnikova</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nesterenko</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Vladimir Felsman</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tikhon Khrennikov</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lazar Berman</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dmitry Alekseyev</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Lyubov Timofeeva</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Alexey Nasedkin</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Andrey Gavrilov</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mikhail Pletnyov</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Victor Bunin</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vladimir Kraynev</td>
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</table>

*For a full list of recordings see Appendix B.

In contrast, the leading Soviet orchestras were very well represented on the Melodiya/HMV series: the Leningrad Philharmonic with Mravinsky, the Moscow Philharmonic with Kondrashin, the Moscow Radio Symphony Orchestra with Rozhdestvensky, the USSR Symphony Orchestra with Yevgeniy Svetlanov and the Bolshoi Theatre Orchestra with Boris Khaykin and other conductors, including Rudolf Barshai and Maksim Shostakovich performing with several of the above orchestras. Given that Soviet orchestras did not tour in the West as heavily as the soloists did, the only way for EMI to obtain recordings of Soviet orchestras was through the licensing agreement. In addition to the orchestral and chamber works the Melodiya/HMV series is dominated by theatrical productions from the Bolshoi opera and ballet, which again, EMI could not record in the West themselves with the Bolshoi.
The classical music represented on the Melodiya/HMV label, licensed by EMI from Melodiya, reflects the decision-making of the agents involved. Both Melodiya and EMI were keen to present established Russian classical repertoire and the official Soviet works performed by the best Soviet artists and orchestras. The repertoire that was released through the licensed tapes was the one approved for recording by Melodiya and the Ministry of Culture.

4. Distribution and Marketing

A final aspect of the EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga relationship to consider is the spread of the licensed Soviet recordings across the UK. EMI does not allow access to its financial information, including figures on sales and distribution, hence the answers to these questions can only be approximately inferred. In 1960, the two main record companies in Britain, EMI and Decca, each held market shares of circa 40%. By 1975 EMI’s share dropped substantially due to more intense competition from newly created record companies and American entrants into the British market. However, it still held roughly 16% of the British LP market, almost twice as much as the next two competitors: CBS with 9% and Decca with 8%. Being the largest record company in the UK meant that EMI had a well-developed distribution network, which spanned across the country and catered to large numbers of record lovers.

By the 1970s EMI Records in the UK had five depots in Glasgow, Newcastle, Birmingham, Manchester and London. LPs were pressed in the factory at Hayes and then shipped to the depots. The LPs were then delivered to the record dealers from the depots to fulfil individual orders. Only accredited dealers who had an account with EMI could buy the records from the depots. There were also chains that had shops throughout the UK, including HMV, WH Smith and Our Price. EMI was powerful enough to ‘coerce retailers to order records in large quantities, forcing the retailer to carry more risk on new releases,

472 The British Phonographic Yearbook 1976, 197.
the sales potential of which was often unclear.” For EMI, production costs of LPs were much lower than the sales prices and if licensing royalties were low, as they were in the case of Soviet recordings, it took selling a relatively small number of units to cover the costs of producing a licensed vinyl. The ease of covering costs even with low-volume sales might be one of the reasons EMI undertook to license and manufacture such a wide range of both popular and obscure Russian and Soviet classical music: the record company could afford to issue specialist repertoire since it was likely not to be a loss even at low sales volumes guaranteed by the power and reach of its distribution network. In some respects, EMI played a role similar to state subsidies in the modern world: the company’s low cost base and ability to sell the required minimum number of LPs to make manufacturing worthwhile, led to the production of a wide range of Russian and Soviet classical repertoire, including works that were not widely known in the West at the time, for example, choral hymns by Dmitry Bortniansky (1751–1825) released on the Melodiya/HMV vinyl *Russian Choral Music of the 17th and 18th Centuries* (ASD 3102).

In addition to having a wide distribution reach across the UK, EMI sought to bring Soviet recordings to new audiences. In the 1960s, to diversify from its high-quality standard LPs with the ASD catalogue number, EMI developed more budget series and mail order delivery, which led to a further expansion of its customer base. EMI incorporated some of the Soviet recordings into its various cheaper series, including ‘Classics for Pleasure,’ an inexpensive series sold by non-specialist retailers like supermarkets and booksellers, and the ‘HMV Concert Classics’ series launched in November 1959. The latter aimed ‘to give young music lovers an opportunity to appreciate at a small cost the quality of modern classical recordings performed by international artists.’

In 1975 EMI launched an aggressive marketing push to promote the Melodiya/HMV releases to British listeners. The campaign was called ‘Forward

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474 Tony Locantro interviews and notes, 1 February 2017.
476 Ibid., 290.
with Melodiya/HMV and was featured on four-page inserts in the key industry magazines: *Billboard, The Gramophone, High Fidelity* and *Music Week*.\(^{478}\) In the advert, EMI always referred to the music, artists and recordings as ‘Russian’, not ‘Soviet’: ‘Presenting all that is greatest in Russian music-making: Russian music, Russian artists, Russian recordings.’\(^{479}\) Positioning the music as Russian provided a connection to the long tradition of classical music in Russia, as opposed to the new, and, often viewed as hostile in the Cold War years, Soviet state. The emphasis on ‘Russian’, rather than ‘Soviet’ in Cold War era advertising is not specific to this case: in her research on the Bolshoi and Kirov ballet tours to London of 1954–68 Stéphanie Gonçalves notes that the ballet companies were also positioned as ‘Russian’, rather than ‘Soviet’, highlighting the link with the heritage of Imperial Russian ballet.\(^{480}\) However, this positioning was not without exceptions: the musical press advertisements discussed in Section x, used the word ‘Soviet’, instead of ‘Russian’ to position imported vinyls under the Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga label.

To launch the campaign, EMI issued a record bearing the title ‘Forward with HMV/Melodiya’ with sample music from the licensed repertoire (Figure 4.3).\(^{481}\) Perhaps, EMI decided to reverse the order of the labels on the title of this record from Melodiya/HMV to HMV/Melodiya to capitalise on the familiarity of the HMV brand in the British market. Presumably, this LP was intended to showcase the best of the music in the series. EMI chose to include eleven items: two each by Tchaikovsky and Shostakovich, and one each by Rimsky-Korsakov, Rakhmaninov, Prokofiev, Glazunov, Glière, Shchedrin and Bortniansky. This demonstrates a distribution of repertoire over three centuries, with six Soviet and six pre-revolutionary pieces. However, EMI once again purposefully chose to position the music as Russian, commenting on the back of the LP that the


\(^{480}\) Gonçalves, ‘Ballet as a Tool for Cultural Diplomacy in the Cold War,’ 146–147.

\(^{481}\) Its number was SEOM 20. EMI gave SEOM identifiers to its classical music LPs containing compilations united by a single topic. For instance, SEOM 4 is *An Introduction to the Enjoyment of Organ Music*, SEOM 8 is *Songs and Arias* by Janet Baker and SEOM 24 contains music from 4 August 1979 concert (85th season) of the BBC Proms.
Melodiya/HMV series brings to the UK listeners ‘many great performances of mainly Russian music, both old and new.’

Figure 4.3. ‘Forward with Melodiya/HMV’ Sample LP (Front and Back)

Source: The British Library Sound Archive.

The marketing push complemented the all-Russian focus of EMI’s classical releases for August 1975: all fourteen of EMI’s new classical releases that month were Russian and Soviet music under the Melodiya/HMV series, including repertoire released in the UK for the first time ever: a box set of all fifteen Shostakovich symphonies (SLS 5025), Musorgsky’s opera Khovanshchina (SLS 5023) and Prokofiev’s ballet The Stone Flower (SLS 5024). A ceremonial launch took place in London in the presence of the Soviet ambassador, who was entrusted with the Shostakovich box set to be given to the composer. The presence of the ambassador, presumably, gave the ceremony an additional flavour of prestige. This elaborate marketing campaign demonstrates EMI’s commitment to distributing the Melodiya/HMV recordings across the UK and the importance attributed to the sale of records under this label.

482 ‘Shostakovich Box Set Heads HMV-Melodiya August Releases,’ Music Week, 19 July 1975, 43 and 45. The only other recording of Khovanshchina known in the UK was a Decca recording made in 1969 https://www.discogs.com/MusogrskyyNational-Opera-Belgrade-Khovanshchina/release/10242757 accessed 7 February 2019.

483 ‘EMI Presentation to Shostakovitch [sic],’ Music Week, 10 August 1975, 12. Shostakovich never saw the present as he died on 9 August 1975.
Aside from the fervent targeted campaign of 1975, however, the Melodiya/HMV recordings were generally treated by EMI’s production and marketing teams like any other classical recordings. They were considered a regular part of EMI’s full price catalogue and released and marketed along the same internal guidelines. For instance, new recordings would be advertised in industry magazines, including *The Gramophone*, and in concert programmes of those artists when they performed in the UK. It is very likely that in the years since 1968, the Melodiya/HMV releases had become such an established part of the EMI classical catalogue that the excitement around them subsided and they became part of business-as-usual.

5. Imports

Imports of Soviet recordings, although diverse in repertoire, could not rival the reach and distribution of recordings sold by EMI and other large labels through licensing agreements. Into the 1960s, Transatlantic Records imported Soviet-produced vinyls marketed under the Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga label into the UK. The annual Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga catalogues of its exported recordings reveal the extent of this enterprise. For instance, the catalogue for 1961 entitled ‘Long-playing records’ contained 400 recordings ranging from classical to folk music and some light entertainment music, spoken word and theatre.

The impact of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga imports in the UK was limited to sales through specialised book and record shops and selected advertisements in the musical press. Transatlantic Records placed half-page adverts into *The Gramophone* and other magazines for Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga records. For instance, the October 1965 advert reads: ‘Extending the horizon of classical music, Outstanding Soviet music, Outstanding Soviet artists. Never before available in Britain, English covers and sleeve notes.’ The advert lists some of the composers and their works, and the artist names that must have been familiar to the magazine’s readers as some of the best from the USSR: Richter, Rostropovich, Vishnevskaya, Gilels, Kogan and the Bolshoi Theatre. The

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484 *The Gramophone*, October 1965, 32.
December advert lists the six bestselling records in the Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga series, of which half were contemporary Soviet works and others Russian romantic works.485

At the time, the most well-known retail point for the sale of these imported Soviet records was the London book and record shop Collets. It was founded by Eva Collet Reckitt (1890–1976), a social and political activist and a devout communist. She later opened a branch of Collet’s shop in Moscow after the Second World War. In the 1920s and early 1930s at least, Eva was not only an active supporter of workers’ movements but also a communist spy.486 Collet supported the Workers Music Association, a communist choir singing propaganda songs. Her strong links with the Communist Party provided the opportunity to import Soviet recordings.487 The shop sold a variety of folk and jazz vinyls and sheet music, including Russian ones. Collet’s International Bookstore at 52 Charing Cross Road sold books, and it was books that Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga initially supplied to the shop. Later on, this expanded to include Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga recordings.488 By the 1970s, Collets had four locations in London.489 It shut down due to increased competition in 1989.490

Discurio Record Shop (9 Shepherd Street, London W1) stocked a variety of Supraphon recordings. Supraphon was the main Czechoslovakian label and, as a member of the Soviet Bloc, had access to a steady stream of Soviet recordings. Looking into relationships between Supraphon and the Soviet Union are beyond

486 ‘Eva Collet Reckitt,’ The National Archives, KV 2/1372.
489 The fourth was Collet’s Chinese Gallery and Bookshop at 40 Great Russell Street. Source: The British Record Shop Archive at www.britishrecordshoparchive.org/collets.html accessed 12 April 2018.
the scope of this dissertation, but it is important to note that their recordings were imported into the UK, as well as other capitalist countries, including the USA and Canada, and provided listeners with a wide range of Russian and Soviet music. In their Gramophone full-page advert from the July 1965 issue, Supraphon listed a selection of classical mono recordings they stocked, including Mozart, Debussy and Bach. They also listed Shostakovich’s and Prokofiev’s cello sonatas by the Rostropovich-Richter duet, Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 9 and some other Russian music, including Taneyev and Khachaturian and a record entitled ‘Modern Russian Concertos’ which included works by Glière and writer of mass songs Alexandra Pakhmutova, conducted by Yevgeniy Svetlanov.491

Overall, the various imports available in the UK offered access to a wide variety of repertoire and performers, but they did not leave a long-term imprint on the British record industry or its relationships with the Soviet Union. Consumer impact was also limited as the imported records sold only in a small number of shops.

6. Conclusion

By the early 1980s, the UK and most of the world were in an economic recession. This meant a decline in consumer spending on leisure goods, including the gramophone record. The recording industry, what is more, had experienced signs of a slowdown from the mid–1970s. The first indications of trouble in EMI’s business in the UK were reported in 1975 when profits for 1974–75 declined by 25% compared to the previous year.492 EMI had always been involved in a variety of businesses beyond the record industry, including computers and defence equipment. In the 1970s, the EMI parent company diversified into the production of medical brain scanners and invested enormous amounts of money into developing new CAT scanner technologies. The funds came from the profitable

491 The Gramophone, July 1965, 31.
492 ‘EMI Turnover Increases but Music Profit Down,’ Music Week, 11 October 1975, 1.
record business. However, the medical scanners did not sell as well as EMI had hoped due to competition and the music business was drained of its profits.\textsuperscript{493}

EMI was not alone: due to a decline in consumer spending, the whole of the British record industry was affected, including EMI’s main competitor Decca.\textsuperscript{494} By 1980 most of the UK record industry was showing losses primarily due to active home-taping by consumers, competition from imports and a general economic downturn.\textsuperscript{495}

In addition to industry-wide problems that severely undermined EMI’s business, there were tensions in EMI’s relationship with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga. Capitol Records, EMI’s US subsidiary, did not renew its agreement with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga during the first recession of 1974–75 and CBS Records stepped in to be the primary record licensing partner of the USSR in the USA.\textsuperscript{496} The EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga relationship in the UK lasted much longer but eventually, both industry-wide problems and agreement-specific issues led to its termination in 1982.\textsuperscript{497} The recession had made EMI more attuned to the commercial success of each recording it was issuing: it was impossible now to cover the cost of many interesting but not massively successful LPs with one or two large hits, which were the recordings by the superstar performers. EMI had to concentrate only on licensing the hit recordings and there were difficulties in obtaining those in sufficient amounts. Political risks further impeded access to the best artists (see Chapter 2). EMI also found its exclusive access to the superstar performers undermined by competitors, especially Deutsche Grammophon.

Then there was the question of technology. From the early 1980s EMI gradually started switching all their recordings to the digital format, which was

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{493} Brian Southall, \textit{The Rise and Fall of EMI Records} (London: Omnibus Press, 2009), 35.
  \item \textsuperscript{494} ‘Industry LP Cutback Revealed,’ \textit{Music Week}, 20 December 1975, 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{495} Martland, \textit{Since Records Began}, 252–57 and ‘Using figures supplied by a PPL survey of just under 70 per cent of UK record companies, the BPI estimates that profitability has plummeted from eight per cent profit against sales in 1978 to a minus figure of two percent in 1980.’ from ‘Record Industry in the Red – BPI,’ \textit{Music Week}, 15 May 1982, 1.
  \item \textsuperscript{496} ‘Capitol Continues Handling Melodiya under Contract,’ \textit{Billboard}, 5 October 1974, 40 and ‘CBS Records Licencees List Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga as USSR Partner,’ \textit{Billboard}, 25 January 1975, 106.
  \item \textsuperscript{497} Tony Locantro interview and notes, 1 February 2017.
\end{itemize}
not something Melodiya was able to provide with their technological capabilities. The only two Melodiya recordings issued by EMI under the licensing agreement in 1982 in digital format were produced in Moscow with the aid of the Victor Musical Industries of Japan.\footnote{This is indicated on the back of the LPs: ASD 4271 Stravinsky \textit{The Rite of Spring} and ASD 4272 Rimsky-Korsakov \textit{Scheherazade}, both by the Moscow Radio Symphony Orchestra under Vladimir Fedoseyev.}

Despite its ultimate demise, EMI’s relationship with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Melodiya is a powerful illustration of the importance of non-government players in Cold War cultural relations. Private individuals and corporations actively engaged with the Soviet representatives on their own terms whilst pursuing their specific aims that had little to do with cultural diplomacy. This is especially so in the case of record making, a global profitable business that was at its peak in the 1970s. For both record companies and their Soviet counterparts, the popularity and public performances of the Soviet musicians meant the creation of demand for their music outside of the concert hall. Their records were a source of income for both sides of the licensing agreement. While it is impossible to refer to concrete numbers here, the longevity and repertoire diversity of the licensing contract serve as evidence of its profitability for both the British and Soviet parties.

Although the non-government players were not concerned with cultural diplomacy aims, it was state cultural policy that provided the opportunities for their engagement and facilitated their actions. This chapter demonstrated the long-lasting consequences of cultural diplomacy of the Thaw years: there would have been very few record sales or recording sessions in the West without the concert tours of the Soviet soloists, arguably the most important instrument of Soviet cultural diplomacy. Similarly, in the USSR, the tours of non-classical Western musicians acquainted the Soviet audience with their works and facilitated the sales of their gramophone records. Whereas demand for Soviet musicians’ records in the West was directly created by their tours, it is possible that Western records would have sold in the USSR even without the musicians’ tours, given their novelty and demand, which outstripped supply due to the...
sheer size of the Soviet population and suppressed record prices. The widespread of recordings of the Soviet musicians was a direct consequence of the distribution networks in possession of the large Western labels like EMI, that were able to satisfy the demand of Western consumers.
Part II. The Objects and Their Interpretations

Chapter 5. The Iconography of Record Sleeves

1. Background and Methodology

Since the 1970s, sociologists such as Howard Becker have considered art as a product of the many human agents involved in its creation, who develop shared definitions and conventions around the artwork during production. This approach can be applied to a music record, produced through collaborations between musicians, producers, engineers, designers, music writers and marketing experts. The production of a record involves shared discourses around the music, including the textual and visual information in sleeve notes, on the cover and in record magazines.

Symes provides a detailed account of how record packaging has had several functions and how it has changed over time depending on the format of the record product. The focus of my research is on long-playing records (LPs) of Soviet and Russian music, hence the discussion below will apply to the presentation and packaging of LPs only. As demonstrated in Part I, this was a mass cultural product in the 1960s–70s, and a key vehicle for music consumption by the British population that was available widely across the country.

There were several features of the LPs and their sales practices that distinguished them from other record formats and influenced their packaging and presentation. Firstly, their surface attracted dust much more than the previously utilised 78s, which meant that more layers of sleeve protection were required: the first level was the plain LP paper envelope that contained simple text information about caring for and handling the disc. This was inserted into the second level of protection: the main sturdy cardboard cover which had the image and title information on the front and text explanations, like concert

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500 Symes, Setting the Record Straight, 88–99.
programme notes, on the back. The front cover served a similar function to that of a book cover.501

Secondly, one of the developments of retail sales after the Second World War was the creation of self-service, through which the consumer could walk down the aisle of a shop and browse through the products without direct interaction with the shop personnel.502 In this environment, covers which stood out attracted the customer’s eye, with the most artfully designed being displayed in the record shop windows, like paintings in an art gallery. The need to lure consumers into paying attention to a music record in this new self-service economy was another reason for cover designs becoming more distinct. As noted by Symes, their aim was ‘to dominate the symbolic economy of the retail environment by utilizing various forms of pictorial rhetoric.’503 An album cover can convey powerful messages, fulfilling what he called a ‘rhetorical’ function: ‘it acts as an arousal mechanism, designed to make the music more alluring, for, in many instances, a record is seen before it is heard.’504 Instrumental music is particularly vulnerable to manipulation through images.

Methodologically, I will employ a framework of analysis which, although originally used for text analysis, has since been extended to other means of communication, including visual objects: a blend of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and semiotics. Developed by different schools of thought, these theories have since been brought together to encompass the study of both social and technical aspects of language, and their application has been extended to the study of cultural symbols and objects beyond the textual.

Charles Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure independently developed semiotics in the early twentieth century.505 It was concerned with studying this

501 Osborne, Vinyl, 164.
502 Symes, Setting the Record Straight, 100 and Osborne, Vinyl, 163.
503 Ibid., 100.
504 Symes, Setting the Record Straight, 108.
relationship between form and meaning. Following Roland Barthes and the French structuralists as well as Michael Halliday, Theo van Leeuwen in the 1990s developed social semiotics that concentrated on the analysis of the relationship between language and other aspects of social life, which is why it is always focused on the social elements in a text: ‘As soon as we have established that a given type of physical activity or a given type of material artefact constitutes a semiotic resource, it becomes possible to describe its semiotic potential, its potential for creating meaning’. To study the semiotic potential of record sleeves is to identify those features that are intended by the record company for communicative purposes with the consumers and their possible meanings.

Similarly to social semiotics, critical discourse analysis (CDA), developed by Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak and Teun van Dijk in the same period, is a tool for the social study of language to better assess the links between language, power and ideology. CDA analysts hold that because language influences and shapes a society’s values and ideas, ‘it can also create, maintain and legitimise certain kinds of social practices.’

For my analysis, the approaches taken by CDA and social semiotics are similar and address the discourses, implicit meanings and relationship aspects of cultural objects as manifested in text and images. I will follow the approach of David Machin, who, in relation to popular music record covers, united CDA and social semiotics under the notion of Multimodal Critical Discourse Analysis (MCDA): ‘in MCDA we are interested in showing how images, photographs,

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506 There are two parts to a sign: the signifier (the form the sign takes, i.e. real object or written word) and the signified (the mental concept the signifier represents). Peirce developed a classification of signs into three types which prove useful for my image analysis: icon (where signifier and the signified have a physical resemblance, e.g. an object and its photography), index (the signifier makes one think of the signified because the two are frequently physically connected in the real world, e.g. looking at a bird/person footprint one can infer that a bird/person has been in this place) and symbol (signifier and signified relationship is conventional or arbitrary, like the word ‘record’ and the object of the round vinyl disc with music) (Chandler, Semiotics, 27).


509 Ibid., 9.
diagrams and graphics also work to create meaning, in each case describing the choices made by the author. We want to place these meanings next to those we have found in the accompanying texts.\footnote{Ibid., 9.}

It is useful to supplement my main MCDA approach with genre analysis, which looks at the common framework for text and image presentation on a group of cultural objects united by the same purpose.\footnote{Charles Bazerman, ‘Genre as Social Action,’ in The Routledge Handbook of Discourse Analysis, ed. James Gee (London: Routledge, 2013), 226–238.} My focus in this chapter is on a group of records issued by EMI in the UK, under the same label of Melodiya/HMV, presumably targeted at the same consumer group. They all have similar features in terms of organising the title text, imagery and logo on the front of the cover, the colour and information displayed on the actual LP and the layout of textual and photo information on the back of the cover.

The genre of a classical music record would have been familiar to producers, musicians and consumers by the time the EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga licensing agreement was signed in late 1967. Since ‘different genres are the origin, part of the validation system, and means of circulation, storage, and access of particular pieces of knowledge’, this section will look at the genre of the EMI classical music recording to investigate common features and discourses that the Melodiya/HMV set was part of and which were understood by all the parties involved in the production and consumption of these recordings in the UK.\footnote{Ibid., 231.} Listeners formulate hypotheses about new texts and images based on previous encounters with objects from the same genre: once a classical music lover acquired a standard full-price ASD type recording from EMI, he/she would develop an understanding of how such recordings should look and what kind of music and the surrounding narrative they represent.\footnote{Ibid., 228.}

Much has been said about the importance of imagery in pop music records, while less attention has been paid to the vinyl sleeve in classical music.\footnote{For instance, see David Machin, Analysing Popular Music: Image, Sound and Text (London: Sage, 2010), Nicholas Cook, Analysing Musical Multimedia (Oxford: Oxford}
Symes’s book *Setting the Record Straight* is the only systematic analysis of the cultural elements surrounding the classical music record, with Chapter 5 devoted to the iconography of the sleeve and the notes, and Chapter 6 considering the magazine record reviews. The book deals with Western classical music, without focusing on Russian or Soviet works; however, the cultural context it describes, including the function and history of the classical music LP cover, the narrative of the sleeve notes and the purpose and elements of the magazine record review, will be important for the analysis in this chapter and in Chapter 6. Classical music cover design was never as audacious as pop, rock or jazz records. However, it was not neutral or thoughtless either. From the early 1960s, record companies aimed to attract the attention of targeted consumer groups through the cover art, much like advertising posters.

Classical music recordings from EMI’s HMV label ASD category were high-quality, full-price recordings intended for the reproduction of ‘serious’ classical repertoire. Historically, the HMV red label represented celebrity status and was first used by EMI’s predecessor, The Gramophone Company, in Tsarist Russia on recordings by the stars of the Imperial Opera, because red was a sign of royalty. This tradition continued with top-class HMV releases throughout the twentieth century until the end of the vinyl era. There were other LP categories issued by EMI intended for different purposes: CSD was the second most prestigious HMV classical music label after ASD and was slightly cheaper; MFP (Music for Pleasure) and SXLP (HMV Concert Classics) were reissues from ASD records but sold in the mid-range price category.


515 Symes, *Setting the Record Straight*.


All the discs on the ASD series, including Melodiya/HMV, have a red centre with the relevant logo: HMV with the dog and gramophone for Western recordings and the double logo of Melodiya and HMV for the Melodiya/HMV series (Figure 5.1). Underneath each of the parts of the double logo, there was a clarifying statement that the music had been recorded by Melodiya in the USSR but manufactured by EMI in the UK. Pointing out this separation of creative processes transmitted two important messages to the consumer: that the music was somehow authentic by virtue of being Soviet and Russian repertoire recorded in the country of origin, and that the quality of the record itself was higher than that of recordings originating from the USSR. Consequently, the buyer of such a record was assured they were acquiring the best of two worlds.

Figure 5.1. Standard HMV and Melodiya/HMV Discs

Source: The British Library Sound Archive. ASD 2582 (standard HMV label classical recording) and ASD 2599 (Melodiya/HMV licensed recording). The serial numbers are close to each other, which means these recordings were released within the same year. The design of the HMV ASD label varied considerably over the years but the design shown here was the one used during the Melodiya/HMV era (1968–1982).

Each new record released on the HMV label carried a new consecutive ASD number. Releases of Melodiya/HMV recordings were interspersed with HMV’s Western classical releases: for instance, a selection of records under Melodiya/HMV in 1972 included ASD 2765, 2771, 2772, 2775, 2781, while the releases in between these numbers were standard Western classical recordings on the HMV label. This demonstrated that the Melodiya/HMV series was very much part of the standard HMV releases. Although it was positioned as part of the
HMV label, it was also singled out by the special Melodiya/HMV logo, again emphasising that the listener was gaining access to an authentic Russian interpretation on the highest-quality British record.

Each side of the disc itself bore the title of the work and names of the composers and performers, as well as EMI’s logo, as per the standard HMV record template. The front covers had three key elements: the double logo, situated on one of the corners or sides, the main image, and the text: the title of musical works with composer and performer names. The way the text was organised on the front demonstrates a fascinating hierarchy of relationships in the classical music world, where instrumental performers are given prominence compared to conductors and even composers of the works. This was customary in Western classical music from the very beginning of the recording era when companies lured customers to buy records of well-known opera singers by placing their name in prominent letters on the record. The main aim of such positioning was to attract the consumer’s attention by exploiting the value of the performing artist’s brand.519

The design of the back cover of each record varies, but there are some standard features: the writing, for example, is always in black on white. This can be explained by the purpose the back cover served: to give serious, important information about the music, the composer and performer, and to serve as a textual guide to the music. In this vein, nothing was to distract from the text, including colour. This was also a convention of classical music records beyond the Melodiya/HMV set. Another consideration was saving money: since these were not on display, it was unnecessary to make the back cover colourful and attractive. The back of the cover showed the title information and a detailed breakdown of the music on each side, the logo and information on technical matters of the LP and its compatibility with gramophone players.

519 Scherg, Classique, 265.
2. The Interaction of Objects and Human Agents

Behind all these covers was a network of decision-making agents. When Capitol Records concluded the first licensing agreement with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga in August 1966 for the United States market, all the Melodiya/Angel cover designs were handled by the Angel label art director Marvin Schwartz at the International Design Centre in Angel’s headquarters in Los Angeles, USA.\textsuperscript{520} EMI in the UK followed suit with the British agreement of late 1967 and copied many of the American releases to the British market (see Chapter 4). In fact, Angel employees Marvin Schwartz and Bob Myers made a trip to Moscow at the start of the American agreement and came back with reproductions of paintings from the Tret’yakov gallery, which is where many of the cover images came from.\textsuperscript{521} Edward Bloxham, marketing and creative services coordinator for EMI, involved in cover design of LPs from 1971 under the management of Douglas Pudney, wrote: ‘I recall that when the original Angel deal was struck Marvin and Myers [Bob Myers was Angel’s artists and repertoire manager who signed the American agreement] were given free range of the Trytiakov [sic] and returned with a sackfull of trannies [photographic colour transparencies].’\textsuperscript{522}

\textsuperscript{520} Email from Tony Locantro, 19 July 2017.
\textsuperscript{521} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{522} Email from Edward Bloxham to Tony Locantro, shared by the latter with the author, 22 July 2017. Edward Bloxham was happy to reply to questions by email but did not want to be directly interviewed for this research.
On some occasions the British LPs, therefore, would have the same cover images as the American vinyls for the same repertoire (Figure 5.2). On others, the same images would be used to illustrate different repertoire from the series in the USA and UK (Figure 5.3). This demonstrates that the UK arm of EMI was closely following in the steps of the forerunner of the relationship with the Soviet Union, its American equivalent Angel, and was utilising both the master tapes and cover images for the British market. This kind of visual consistency across markets was common for Western record labels selling the same recording in different geographical, but closely related markets.

The same hierarchy of titles between the Western and British labels was maintained in both cases: the Soviet label came first – Melodiya/Angel and Melodiya/HMV. This demonstrates the emphasis on the Soviet origin that EMI wanted to convey to the listeners; it was ready to sacrifice the primary position of its own labels to demonstrate this unique new Soviet label to the consumers. The
Angel agreement was terminated in 1974, from which time the cover art was produced only for the Melodiya/HMV LPs under the British licensing agreement.

Figure 5.3. Same Images, Different Music on Melodiya/Angel and Melodiya/HMV

Source: The British Library Sound Archive, Discogs.com

Two separate entities within EMI involved in the Soviet relationship were active in cover design decision-making: EMI Records UK, the British distribution subsidiary of EMI Group, and International Classical Division (ICD), headed by Peter Andry and Michael Allen, which was part of EMI Group and was responsible for dealing with classical music recordings across the whole of EMI globally. It is difficult to determine who exactly was responsible for the cover design decisions. We can only speculate that it was a collaborative affair between EMI Records UK and ICD. On the EMI Records UK side, the General Manager of the Classical Division of EMI Records UK, John Pattrick, and the marketing manager, Michael Letchford were involved. From March 1974 Douglas Pudney was the EMI Records UK Marketing and Creative Services Manager responsible
for ‘international marketing strategy, repertoire planning, ICD cover design and publicity display’. The two key people involved in the production of covers were Edward Bloxham, Marketing and Creative Services Co-ordinator and Donald Kennedy, Photography and Covers Co-ordinator. Together they liaised with the International Design Centre in Hollywood on cover design, located images, organised photography sessions and executed decisions, made by the EMI Records UK and the ICD management teams about cover design. Douglas Pudney moved to ICD in late 1974 and continued his duties of choosing classical repertoire, cover images and sleeve note until his death in late 1978. In addition, Marvin Schwartz from the International Design Centre in Los Angeles had regular meetings with marketing directors from the various territories, usually in London, discussing cover art for a variety of classical releases, beyond just those for Melodiya/HMV.

Marvin Schwartz and his American team continued to be responsible for the release of international recordings, those that would sell in at least two of five key EMI territories: UK, USA, Germany, France and Japan. The Beethoven Triple Concerto recording of 1969 is a case in point: recorded in Berlin with three Soviet superstar soloists and a German superstar conductor and orchestra by a British company, for which the design would be done in Los Angeles, as it was distributed across all five EMI key territories (Figure 5.4). For recordings of international superstar artists made by EMI in the West there was a gradual move to one global presentation of the record by the late 1960s. The designs from the Angel art centre in Hollywood were supplied to the country-specific subsidiaries in colour separation films with a floating fifth film containing the lettering that could be changed locally in each territory to adjust the language of

524 *EMI International Classical Division – Objectives and Organisation*, June 1978, 17 (from the personal files of Tony Locantro).
525 Ibid.
526 Email from Tony Locantro, 22 July 2017.
527 Michael Allen interview, 1 November 2017.
the words and the style of the letters. Marvin Schwartz had excellent photographers in the team, hence, whenever they had a chance, they arranged photoshoots for the prominent soloists, e.g. for Rostropovich.

**Figure 5.4. Legendary EMI Recording of Beethoven’s Triple Concerto**

![Figure 5.4. Legendary EMI Recording of Beethoven’s Triple Concerto](source)

Source: The British Library Sound Archive.

A key cover art decision for EMI executives was whether the LP would be sold on the strength of the artist’s name (in which case his/her photo would be on the cover if available) or the actual music (then, they had to decide what image to put on the cover). For internationally renowned Soviet soloists, their face was always on the cover of the LP, often taking up the entire space. This was consistent with the established practice of selling recordings by Western superstar performers. If a conductor or performer was making a series of recordings, cover art for those would also be consistent to signal that the LPs form a coherent whole. In the Melodiya/HMV set, this is illustrated by a series of recordings of Sibelius’ symphonies by the Moscow Radio Symphony Orchestra with Gennady Rozhdestvensky (Figure 5.5). In this particular set, there is even a small logo in the lower left-hand corner of Sibelius’ profile and the words ‘Rozhdestvensky Sibelius’.

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528 Email from Tony Locantro, 12 November 2017.
530 Michael Allen interview, 1 November 2017.
Another sub-series is the symphonic music of Aleksander Scriabin, whose LPs carry paintings by Mikhail Vrubel, a mystical symbolist Russian painter and contemporary of Scriabin (Figure 5.6). Fragments of Vrubel’s paintings are consistently presented in an arch-like thick black frame, as an entrance to a cave or an icon traditionally placed in a corner of a Russian home. EMI applied this policy to composers and performers across the entire classical music range, so this was not Soviet-specific treatment.\textsuperscript{531} More generally, when EMI decided to illustrate a series of symphonic works with reproductions of paintings, they tried to keep it consistent across the series and match a specific, often national, painter to a specific composer. For instance, for the German conductor Otto Klemperer

\textsuperscript{531} Ibid.
recording various Bruckner symphonies with the New Philharmonia Orchestra

EMI employed paintings by the German nineteenth-century Romantic landscape

painter Casper David Friedrich; for the Finnish conductor Paavo Berglund

performing Sibelius symphonies with the Bournemouth Symphony Orchestra it

was landscape paintings by Sibelius’s compatriot Gallen Kallela. This trend of

issuing recordings sets of the same composer–performer pairing took off from

the 1960s and other record companies, not just EMI, also observed a single cover
design style or idea throughout a set.532

Figure 5.6. Scriabin’s Symphonic Music Associated with Vrubel’s Paintings

Source: The British Library Sound Archive. Clockwise from top left (year recorded by

3. The Melodiya/HMV Cover Image Types

Nicholas Cook and Colin Symes have considered selective case studies on

classical music album cover iconography, ‘focusing on the means by which

532 Witteloostuyn, The Classical Long-Playing Record, 155.
record-sleeve images contribute to the construction of musical meaning’.533 However, both provide just a few examples of classical music LPs as illustrations for their larger narratives without any detailed analysis of a significant dataset or the application of a consistent methodology.534

I have studied the cover images of the entire sample of 210 LPs from the Melodiya/HMV series and grouped them by discourse.535 What distinguishes these albums is the peculiarity of their creation: although the recording sessions were held in the USSR by Melodiya, the resulting product was available in the USSR and the UK (and the USA) on LPs that were different in the vinyl material and production process, but more importantly, in the imagery of the cover. The entire visual output of the sleeve covers on the Melodiya/HMV series was an interpretation of Soviet and Russian music by the British record company EMI (or its American subsidiary Capitol Records) for its Western listeners. What kind of imagery was created and why is the subject of this section. Due to the large sample size, such analysis, the first of its kind, allows the drawing of conclusions about the presentation of recordings by Soviet musicians in the UK during the Cold War.

I will first identify the broad categories into which the Melodiya/HMV recordings can be split, and in the next section, zoom in on the imagery of the 42 Shostakovich LPs in the series. There are several constraints to the analysis. Firstly, due to technical limitations, album cover imagery in the 1960s–70s was less sophisticated and inventive than it is today. Secondly, classical music album covers are generally thought to need less creative imagery than other genres of music, as the classical music category is often idealised as being innocent of

533 Cook, ‘The Domestic Gesamtkunstwerk,’ 106.
534 There are also two ‘coffee-table’ books with many illustrations of classical record covers, that serve as useful overviews of the variety of covers in this genre: Jan Pettersson, Labelography: The Major U.K. Record Labels (Stockholm: Premium, 2008) and Witteloostuyyn, The Classical Long-Playing Record.
535 I have decided to focus on cover images, as these are the most vivid and attention-grabbing when looking at records in a store. I have not analysed the sleeve notes of the records. For the Melodiya/HMV series, these often tended to be copied from the Soviet source or written by the same British critics who reviewed the records in the musical press. I look at a case study involving critical reviews in Chapter 6.
commercial imperatives. Finally, it is likely that EMI would have had a limited amount of Russian/Soviet imagery (paintings by Russian artists, images of Soviet performers and composers) at its disposal for the Melodiya/HMV series, due to limited access to materials from the USSR, which was the case for any Western partner of the Soviet Union, be it EMI, Le Chant du Monde or other record companies that had relationships with the USSR. Consequently, some images appear on the Melodiya/HMV series twice on different LPs.

The imagery in the Melodiya/HMV series serves the same goal as that on any record: to convey a pictorial message about the music to the consumer. Hence, I will investigate what these are and how they are executed. Symes proposes a classification of six types of classical music album covers: portraiture and photographs of composers and performers, landscapes, ‘imagery that takes its cue from the type of music’ (e.g. religious music illustrated by church images), imagery that reflects the era when it was composed, opera and ballet recordings, and covers that combine categories from the above.536 I have broken down the Melodiya/HMV series into six categories of my own, some of which overlap with Symes’. The idea behind my division is to split images by the discourse and first impression that might be produced on the consumer when seeing the image. Some of the discourses I have identified can be applied to any classical music record, which is why they are the same as Symes’, but others are specific to the Soviet and Russian narratives of the Melodiya/HMV series.

The first, general, category is the image of a musician or composer on the cover. Many of these are in line with the presentation of Western classical music superstar soloists (Figure 5.7). These are the largest category in the 210 LPs in the series and constitute 35% of all the images. The aim of such images, as pointed out by Cook, is to provide an effective attraction for the consumer at point-of-sale, rather than convey any meaningful message about the music inside the sleeve:537

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536 Symes, Setting the Record Straight, 111–112.
537 Cook, ‘The Domestic Gesamtkunstwerk,’ 108.
All these images conform to the simplest model of the record sleeve: what might be called the semiotics of packaging. Inviting but at the same time elusive, full of promise but without substance, they are conceived more or less exclusively in terms of the point-of-sale interface. They have no further burden of significations, or if they do, it is a signification that has to be read (so to speak) against the grain. In short, they don’t really say anything about the music inside them.

**Figure 5.7. Category One: Images of Performers and Composers**

![Image 1](source) ![Image 2](source)

![Image 3](source) ![Image 4](source)


The second category comprises illustrations of opera and ballet, often featuring a photo or stylised picture of the performance, which is, again, very much in line with presentations on Western covers (Figure 5.8). This category takes up another 16% of the Melodiya/HMV series images.
The third and fourth categories of Soviet and Russian images need to be discussed within the historical context of how Russia had been viewed in the West. How did the creators of the Melodiya/HMV series position ‘Russianness’ and ‘Sovietness’ to the consumers? Asking how the West viewed the USSR during the Cold War is meaningless unless we specify which Western actors we are talking about and which time period is under consideration. British (and other Western) state organisations, including cultural ones, were incredibly wary of their contemporary Soviet counterparties during the Cold War, as discussed in Chapter 1. This attitude was at odds with the enthusiasm shown by private companies for Soviet cultural goods, including records. And what was the ordinary layperson’s impression of the USSR through the cultural goods he/she encountered from there?
Martin Malia in *Russia Under Western Eyes* emphasises this ‘in the eyes of the beholder’ perspective: to talk of the West’s perception of Russia at various points in history one must take into account which West (UK, France, Germany, and so on) and which intellectual line of thought (left/right or government/opposition) one is considering. There were varied perceptions of the USSR during the Cold War, many of them contradictory, many rooted in historical associations of Tsarist Russia and intermingled with contemporary accounts about the Soviet Union.

Historically held views of Russia did not vanish after the creation of the USSR. Written accounts by European intellectuals and travellers at least up until the seventeenth century portrayed Russia as a Christian, but very much barbaric nation; a country in between Europe and Asia. In the eighteenth century the key perception of Russia was that of a strong emergent political force on the European map; Edmund Burke, politician and philosopher, summarised the common attitude to Russia as a ‘newcomer among the great nations stood supreme between Europe and Asia...We see in her as a great but still growing empire’. This view continued into the nineteenth century, leading to a mixed perception of the nation: political conflicts like the Crimean war (1854 – 1856) were intermingled with successful demonstrations of Russian art and science at international exhibitions across European cities and performances of Russian operas. The idea of ‘barbarian at the gate’ carried on across Europe, and, as one would expect, further events like the Bolshevik Revolution and the two world wars only strengthened this view. An astonishing variety of intellectual ideas

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538 Martin Malia, *Russia Under Western Eyes: From the Bronze Horseman to the Lenin Mausoleum* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 10–11.


540 Ibid., 86.


542 Neumann, *Uses of the Other*, 92.
of Russian origin, from terrorism and communism to avant-garde ballets and abstract art, had a profound impact on Western thinkers, especially throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Russia was viewed in the West as a creative, intellectual force that was both admired and feared.

The change of ideology from capitalism to communism with the newly created USSR triggered myths and hostility in Europe and the USA, particularly in the second half of the twentieth century. The discourse of struggle for geopolitical influence between the USSR and the USA dominated official Cold War diplomacy and politics. Nevertheless, more romantic perceptions of the Soviet Union existed, especially among those sympathetic to socialist ideas.

There are two categories which indicate how ‘Russianness’ was interpreted by the creators of the Melodiya/HMV series: landscape photographs and stylised Russian images and paintings. The Russian landscapes chosen often display features that evoke commonplace associations with the country: snow, gloomy skies and onion-domed churches (Figure 5.9).

545 Malia, Russia Under Western Eyes, 296.
546 Only four records fall into the ‘Western landscape’ category, which is not surprising given the low numbers of non-Russian music in the Melodiya/HMV series (see Chapter 4). These are a Sibelius symphony and three LPs by Lazar Berman playing Liszt and Schumann; it is likely, EMI did not have an image of the pianist to place on the cover, which is why they had to resort to landscapes.
The category of stylised Russian imagery and the utilisation of Russian painting reproductions from the Tret’yakov Art Gallery and the Russian Museum comprise 22% of the Melodiya/HMV series (Figure 5.10). Not all of these cover images appear to have been selected with much consideration of the music on the record. Glazunov’s Symphony No. 6 for example, a work about internal torment, desires and longings, revealed by its minor key and dynamic but dark first theme, was matched with a serene painting *Moscow Back Yard* [*Moskovskiy Dvorik*] by Vasiily Polenov of 1878 (see Figure 5.10). Landscape photographs and pictures by nineteenth century Russian painters were often used by Melodiya itself on the covers of its exported LPs.547

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547 Scherg, *Classique*, 90.
Figure 5.10. Category Four: Russian Paintings

The continuing presence of Russian stereotypes in Western minds resulted in an abundance of folk kitsch images and a high number of church images on the covers. 29 LPs or 40% of Russian-themed images (of both photographed landscapes and paintings) include a church. These can be of varying prominence: some covers have the church as the central and only image, while others incorporate them as part of landscapes (Figure 5.11). The presence of such Christian Orthodox symbols stands in stark contrast to the ban on religion that was enforced in atheist Soviet Russia.548

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548 Church images can be a part of either drawings, paintings or photographs on the covers.
In comparison, Soviet images occupy just 5% of the covers. Such a lack of contemporary imagery among Melodiya/HMV indicates EMI’s preference for its record covers to bear associations with somewhat romanticised, less politically hostile pre-Revolutionary Russia. The Soviet images include parades and military scenes (Figure 5.12); most illustrate symphonic programmatic works by Shostakovich, or official Soviet music such as cantatas and recordings by the Red Army Choir. Among Soviet composers on Melodiya/HMV, Shostakovich has the most recordings, especially within the symphonic genre; hence, there is a strong association between Soviet imagery on Melodiya/HMV covers and his programmatic Soviet-themed symphonies, like Symphony No. 7 ‘Leningrad’ or Symphony No. 12 ‘The Year of 1917.’

Music by other Soviet composers on the Melodiya/HMV series comprises opera and ballet which are illustrated with thematic photos or drawings, and
symphonic music. In the latter case, concertos are always accompanied with the image of the soloist and much of the orchestral symphonic music – with the image of the composer, unless there is an explicit programmatic Soviet sub-title attached to the symphony. For instance, Prokofiev’s symphonic works are illustrated with the same portrait: a 1934 painting by Pyotr Konchalovsky.

Overall, Russian images, paintings and landscapes occupy a much more substantial position than purely Soviet images in the series. This is consistent with the marketing approach, described in Chapter 4, whereby the Melodiya/HMV set was positioned in advertisements as ‘Russian’ instead of ‘Soviet’ music.

Figure 5.12. Category Five: Soviet Images


549 The sum of the Russian landscapes (15%) and Russian imagery (22%) categories is 37%, while Soviet imagery is 5%.
'Music with associations’ is the final category on my list: 15 LPs (7% of total) which incorporate instrumental and vocal works that evoke specific visual associations. For instance, a collection of songs by Musorgsky, Tchaikovsky and Rakhmaninov is accompanied by the painting The Apotheosis of War [Apofeos Voini] by Vladimir Vereshchagin of 1871 (Figure 5.13). This painting is meant to focus the listener’s attention on the song cycle Songs and Dances of Death by Musorgsky that occupies one side of the LP. The utilisation of larger typescript gives Musorgsky much more prominence in the title compared to the other two composers and their songs. This may have been done because the many songs by Tchaikovsky and Rakhmaninov on this LP are not united by a single theme.

A record with symphonic music by Rimsky-Korsakov and Glazunov (each composer occupies one side of the LP) presents a heavy bias towards the Antar symphony by the former, which is full of orientalisms (Figure 5.13). Glazunov’s Chopiniana (Les Sylphides), a romantic set of ballet dances, is appropriately illustrated with a fairy-talelike symmetrically identical image of fairies in an enchanted forest under a full moon. A final example, Prokofiev’s The Love for Three Oranges shows a stylised bright drawing of the main characters of the opera.
Figure 5.13. Category Six: ‘Music with Associations’


Apart from depictions of ‘Rusnianness’ and ‘Sovietness,’ the image categories discussed above were not unique to Melodiya/HMV; they were very often used for Western classical music record covers. The imagery on the Melodiya/HMV series reinforced the dominant shared Western discourses around ‘Russian’ music. These discourses had been present since the nineteenth century; neither the radical political changes of the Bolshevik Revolution nor the new communistic system had altered them.

Whereas for some images, like landscapes or folk paintings, the allocation decision by category is easy, others could have been allocated to one of two categories, thus changing the resulting percentage allocation of images among them. For instance, I have included the Vrubel-Scriabin association in the ‘Russian paintings’ category, since Vrubel is a Russian painter who has a large presence in the Tret’yakov gallery. I could have as well allocated these four recordings into the ‘music with association’ category, thus decreasing the percentage weight of the Russian category and increasing that of ‘music with associations.’
4. Analysis of the Shostakovich Recordings

Machin identifies three key areas for record cover imagery analysis within MCDA: iconography, modality and graphical features (typography and colour).\textsuperscript{551} Iconography looks at the actual composition of the image, including objects, human poses and gazes, the setting and salience, ‘where certain features in the composition are meant to stand out, to draw our attention. Such features will have the central symbolic value in the composition’.\textsuperscript{552} Modality concerns itself with how realistic or stylised the image is and why: ‘modality means how real a representation should be taken to be or how closely it represents naturalistic truth’.\textsuperscript{553} Finally, graphical features include the font types, the positioning of the text with respect to the image and the use of colour.\textsuperscript{554}

This section focuses on the 45 Shostakovich LPs in the Melodiya/HMV set, which spans the entire duration of the EMI–Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga licensing agreement from 1968 to 1982. I first give an overview of the types of images in the sample and then, using MCDA described above, analyse a selection of recordings from the sample in detail. I aim to reveal the discourses around the presentation of Shostakovich and his works in the UK during the Cold War and the methods through which these were conveyed on the record covers in the sample.

In analysing the presentation of Shostakovich’s music to the British listener I build on the work of Fairclough and Schmelz. Fairclough has conducted an analysis of the critical reception and presentation of Shostakovich’s symphonic music in Britain from the 1930s to the 1990s in magazine reviews, concert programme notes and biographical literature.\textsuperscript{555} Schmelz’s article is the only analysis so far that explicitly considers the cover art of selected records of

\textsuperscript{551} Machin, Analysing Popular Music, 10–11.
\textsuperscript{552} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{553} Ibid., 50.
\textsuperscript{554} Ibid., 59–75.
Shostakovich’s symphonies in the West.\textsuperscript{556} In particular, he considers the illustrations of Shostakovich’s Symphonies No. 5 and 12 by several Western labels (RCA, Deutsche Grammophon and Angel) and elaborates on the reasons for cover art choices and the impressions these illustrations produce. These illustrations vary widely: ‘from Shostakovich the “angry man” to Shostakovich the true believer’.\textsuperscript{557} He argues, as I show here, that the branding and presentation of Shostakovich and his music during the Cold War on mass Western-produced recordings was unrelated to any Soviet government propaganda and was choice taken by Western record labels.\textsuperscript{558}

Shostakovich was first and foremost known as a composer of orchestral and chamber music. This is reflected in the breakdown of his 45 LPs: just three are of film music, and there are five opera and ballet records (\textit{Katerina Ismailova, The Nose, The Gamblers, The Bolt and The Age of Gold}), and two song cycles. The remaining 34 recordings comprise instrumental repertoire (symphonies, concertos and chamber music). There are fourteen LPs where Shostakovich’s music is paired with another composer: five with Prokofiev, one of each with Tchaikovsky, Musorgsky, Kabalevsky, Khachaturian, Sviridov and Sibelius; and another three are a medley of composers, including Shostakovich, united by a common performer.\textsuperscript{559}

The equal positioning of Shostakovich and Prokofiev’s images on the covers of their dual LPs reflects the view that they were regarded as the two main heavyweights of Soviet music (Figure 5.14). The LPs with Musorgsky and Kabalevsky are dominated by Shostakovich’s image on the cover, while the Tchaikovsky, Khachaturian, Sviridov and Sibelius pairings are landscapes or

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{556} Peter J. Schmelz, “Shostakovich” Fights the Cold War: Reflections from Great to Small,’ \textit{The Journal of Musicological Research}, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2015), 91-140.
\item \textsuperscript{557} Ibid., 102.
\item \textsuperscript{558} Ibid., 97.
\item \textsuperscript{559} These composer ‘medleys’ are SLS 5058 (ASD 3232–3235) ‘David Oistrakh plays violin concertos by Shostakovitch [sic], Prokofiev, Khachaturian, Bartok, Hindemith, Szymanowski,’ ASD 3633 ‘Gennady Rozhdestvensky conducts Janáček, Panufnik, Webern, Bach-Schoenberg, Charles Ives, Shostakovich [sic],’ SLS 5212 ‘Yevgeny Mravinsky and the Leningrad Philharmonic Orchestra at the Vienna Festival’ comprising instrumental works by Weber, Schubert, Brahms, Tchaikovsky and Shostakovich.
\end{itemize}
performer images. Unlike the other landscape covers, Tchaikovsky and Khachaturian are positioned as equals with Shostakovich, because the composers’ names and works are given equal prominence in the title. None of the other composers seemed to EMI worthy of equal presentation with Shostakovich on the cover. This could also be due to the auxiliary role of their music on these records: for instance, there was some space left after recording the full *The Song of the Forests* on an LP, and Sviridov’s *Kursk Songs* was a vocal work that was of convenient length to fit on the remainder of the recording, but clearly not its focus (Figure 5.14).

**Figure 5.14. Shostakovich’s Shared Covers with Other Composers**

![Shostakovich’s Shared Covers with Other Composers]


Exactly a third of the covers bear a picture or photo of the composer alone. A further seven have a photo of the performer or conductor, but not the
composer, including the conductors Rozhdestvensky and Mravinsky. It is hard to
discern whether this was a conscious decision by EMI demonstrating the high
importance attributed to their names, or whether EMI simply happened to have
photos of these two conductors, but say, not of the conductor Kirill Kondrashin,
which is why his recordings of Shostakovich’s works always feature landscapes
or composers’ images.

Shostakovich was (and still is) unavoidably linked in popular minds to
the controversies of being an artist in the Soviet state and the Cold War dynamic
between the West and the USSR. As the best-known Soviet composer, his works
were (and still are) the most prone to speculation and interpretation, due both to
their predominantly instrumental nature and the social and political
circumstances of his life in the Soviet Union. Taking on the role of the most
celebrated official Soviet composer, he was constantly aware of the insecurity of
this status. Throughout his life he experienced the Bolshevik Revolution, the
Civil War, the terror years of the 1930s (when many of his friends and relatives
were sentenced to exile in concentration camps or death) and the Second World
War. He had been thrown from the heights of recognition and fame into social,
-economic and psychological destruction first in 1936 and then in 1948. Therefore, it was, and still is, unclear to listeners and critics what messages
Shostakovich conveyed in his symphonic music: those of a loyal son of
Communism, an undercover dissident or eternal human values remaining above
political issues.

The more traditional photographic images, so typical for classical music
covers, give the impression of a serious thinker and a mature genius at work.
Iconographically, this is represented in Shostakovich’s pose and gaze: he is often
pictured sitting at a table in front of a score, or with his eyes diverted away from
the viewer, either looking somewhere in front of him, at the score or at the sky,
with his hand covering the mouth in a gesture of profound thinking (Figure
5.15). The hand covering the mouth is a gesture particularly ripe for
interpretation considering the narratives of censorship and self-censorship

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surrounding many of his works. It gives the impression that the composer is not allowed to speak his mind and is keeping his interpretation of the symphonies to himself. The prominent composer’s signature on the cover of the first LP in Figure 5.15 gives the impression that the record has been personally validated by the composer. Alternatively, it could suggest the possibility of experiencing an intimate connection with the composer through listening to this record.

Figure 5.15. Photographic Images of Shostakovich in the Melodiya/HMV set

![Photographic Images of Shostakovich in the Melodiya/HMV set](image)


A low degree of modality, that of naturalistic truth, characterises other images of the composer that were used, especially on LPs with film music and song cycles. The distortions applied to the composer’s face are consistent within a genre. For film music, his face is inserted into film tape as if he is the main character of the production, and his image in the song cycles includes him smoking a cigarette and looking away with a pondering gaze, recalling
representations of jazz musicians (Figure 5.16 and for comparison, Figure 5.17 with jazz music covers).

Figure 5.16. Shostakovich’s Image on Film and Song Cycles Recordings

![Image of jazz musician representations](image)


Stephen Cottrell has noted that the ‘evolution of jazz, that quintessentially twentieth-century musical genre, is indeed intertwined with the increasingly widespread use of tobacco products over the course of that century’. The smoking detail changes the perception around Shostakovich from a serious composer of symphonies to that of experimenter and improviser, an artist with a free spirit. This is further emphasised by the dark colours and rich, oil-painting like texture. The music on these two LPs is entirely songs, written on the poems of a variety of Western and Soviet authors; this is not the trademark

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Shostakovich, composer of grand, symphonic works. The imagery can be also linked to the private, even underground, culture traditionally associated with the intimacy of the song genre.

Figure 5.17. Cover Images with Smoking Motifs from Jazz Music


Of all Shostakovich’s symphonies, his more intimate Symphony No. 14, dealing with the issue of death, receives special treatment with a psychedelic image of the composer, though slightly offset by the rather formal body position in a suit (Figure 5.18). This cover echoes the more general infatuation with psychedelic images, primarily in pop, but quite often present in classical music too, in the 1960s and early 1970s (this disc was released by EMI in 1971).  

562 Witteloostuyn, The Classical Long-Playing Record, 144.
The symbol of the orthodox church occupies a less prominent position on the Shostakovich covers than in the full Melodiya/HMV set; however, it still has a significant presence: its appearance on seven of the recordings is almost equal to the five Soviet-themed Shostakovich covers. This demonstrates that the Russian narrative around Shostakovich’s music was less pronounced that it was generally across the Melodiya/HMV set. This may well have been because he was famous enough not to need it. Moreover, the Russian discourse overrides any individual interpretations of symphonic works: there is the same gloomy landscape with a church at the back, be it Symphony No. 5 or 14 (Figure 5.19). The pinnacle of discourse confusion is the lower right-hand image in Figure 5.19: a programmatic Symphony No. 12 devoted to the Bolshevik Revolution with the sub-title ‘The Year 1917’ has been paired with a church-image rather than a Soviet revolutionary scene.
Figure 5.19. Selection of Russian Images Illustrating Shostakovich’s Music


The symphonies that were presented as pro-Soviet or dedicated to Soviet topics, were explicitly positioned by EMI as such (Figure 5.20). EMI was not the only label to do so; other labels similarly adopted this practice.
Performing an exhaustive analysis of all Shostakovich covers produced by Western labels in the Cold War period is beyond the scope of this research. A comparison of the Melodiya/HMV covers for Shostakovich’s works with those available from other Western labels (Discogs.com and consulting compilations of classical music cover art books) reveals the following.\textsuperscript{563} Firstly, EMI with both its Melodiya/Angel (American market) and Melodiya/HMV (British market) agreements was one of the most prolific labels in issuing Shostakovich recordings. Few other large companies recorded Shostakovich’s music (RCA, Columbia/CBS and Philips, occasionally Deutsche Grammophon) or issued his works under licensing agreements with the USSR (Ariola-Eurodisc, West Germany and Le Chant du Monde, France). Ariola-Eurodisc covers of licensed

\textsuperscript{563} Scherg, Classique and Witteloostuyyn, The Classical Long-Playing Record.
Shostakovich symphonies I have come across bear a rather formal portrait of the composer. The few Le Chant du Monde covers that I have seen fall into the Russian iconography or Russian landscape discourse (Figure 5.21).

**Figure 5.21. Selection of Western Shostakovich Covers (non-EMI)**

![Selection of Western Shostakovich Covers (non-EMI)](source)


Eugene Ormandy’s 1975 full Shostakovich symphonies project with the Philadelphia Orchestra is the only example of a recorded Shostakovich LP series with audacious cover artwork that has some, albeit loose, associations with the music played and not with general landscapes or Russian/Soviet associations (Figure 5.22). Even in this series, when issuing Symphonies No. 13–15 as a set in one sleeve, RCA simply placed a portrait of the composer on the cover.

It is exactly from this series that Schmelz takes the example of Symphony No. 5 to illustrate its positioning: Symphony No. 13 from the same series will be discussed in the next chapter. Source: Schmelz, “Shostakovich” Fights the Cold War,’ 92.
Therefore, with the rare exception of the Ormandy series, other Western labels presented Shostakovich’s works in very neutral tones.

Figure 5.22. RCA Ormandy Shostakovich Cycle Covers


Analysing critical response to Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 5, Fairclough points out that ‘UK-based writers about music between 1940 and 1979 tended to take the line of greatest neutrality,’ meaning that they took Shostakovich’s music at face value: a happy finale in a symphony meant just that.565 Some Shostakovich covers in the Melodiya/HMV series and other Western labels discussed above fit this approach. They do not carry an image that is specific to the actual work. The covers either present a neutral composer’s photo or follow the traditional Russian (often with reference to the orthodox church) or

Soviet narratives. They do not aim to reveal any hidden messages within the individual instrumental works. Others, however, both on Melodiya/HMV and on labels with more inventive cover art, like RCA, point to the content of the music with varying degree of explicitness. This duality in presentation of Shostakovich’s works – either ignoring the possible musical messages or revealing them, and sometimes, even exaggerating – is the focus of the next section; there, I discuss a case study for each of the two options.

5. *Babiy Yar Symphony and Song of the Forests*

Two of Shostakovich’s works are worth considering in detail because of the controversial discourses around them and the interpretation of the music supplied by the cover images in light of these: Symphony No. 13 (*Babiy Yar*) about antisemitism and the massacre of Jews during the Second World War, and the oratorio in praise of Stalin *Song of the Forests*. A discussion of these two works, a banned symphony and an official oratorio, and their presentation through record covers reveals the huge differences in cultural and social discourses around the music of the same composer and their transmission to the Western listener.

Schmelz notes that ‘Shostakovich’s representation on LP covers begins pointing to how music was packaged and mediated on its way to the Western Cold War consumer.’ To follow through with this message, in this section I consider the Melodiya/HMV covers of Symphony No. 13 and *Song of the Forests* within the context of other covers, both from competitors and Melodiya; such an approach presents a broader landscape of covers for the same work and allows drawing conclusions about a spectre of approaches to the music from the most exaggerating to the concealing.

Shostakovich composed Symphony No. 13 (*Babiy Yar*) in the spring and summer of 1962, just six months after the poems by Yevgeniy Yevtushenko on which it was based were published. The poems were read as a condemnation

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566 Schmelz, “Shostakovich” Fights the Cold War,’ 97.
of antisemitism in the USSR at the time, and thus received mixed reactions within critical circles. Consequently, finding soloists and a conductor for the premiere of the symphony was not a straightforward matter: both Shostakovich’s first choices, the bass singer Boris Gmirya and the famous conductor Mravinsky, who had premiered many of the composer’s symphonies until then, refused the roles. It is unclear whether this was due to pressure from the authorities not to take on the engagement, but there is evidence to suggest that such considerations were at least part of the reason. The Ministry of Culture requested that the work wasn’t performed any more. However, the first performance did go ahead on 18 December 1962 by the Moscow Philharmonic Orchestra with conductor Kirill Kondrashin. The repeat performance on 20 December was recorded but not released until the collapse of the Soviet Union (Russian Disc record in Figure 5.24). After the premiere, officials at the Ministry of Culture strongly advised the composer and poet to change the text to reflect that not only Jews, but also Russians and Ukrainians died at Babi Yar, if they wanted to see further public performances of the symphony. Both eventually agreed and Kondrashin conducted the new version on 10 and 11 February 1963. Further performances of the work were nevertheless discouraged inside the Soviet Union.

The symphony appeared in the West in an unauthorised, and much sensationalised, recording produced by Everest Records in October 1967 (Figure 5.23). The cover image conveys the subject of Jewish suffering with a gloomy black-and-white pattern outlining a ghost-like face full of suffering, set behind the Jewish star of David. This recording contained the original, unchanged version of the poems. The Everest Records note at the back read: ‘This performance of Shostakovich 13th Symphony is the actual live performance recorded in Moscow on November 20, 1965, therefore please allow for audience

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568 Ibid.
571 It was issued in the 1990s on the Russian Disc label under RD CD 11 191.
573 Wilson, *Shostakovich*, 405.
noises. Since that time the Russian Government has banned the performance. The performance is of prime importance and you will surely be captivated with the sincerity and poignancy of the music.’ By drawing attention to the government ban, the note increases the excitement around this performance.

Due to its unauthorised release, the record attracted much attention from consumers and the press with record dealers displaying it in prime locations within shops.\textsuperscript{574} It generated a public appeal from Celebrity Concert Corp., the official Soviet licensing partner in the USA at the time, for Everest to withdraw all the unauthorised copies from distribution and threatening to take legal action.\textsuperscript{575} Everest head Bernard Solomon claimed (as it turns out, untruthfully) that the Soviets had offered him a large sum of money exceeding what he expected to earn on the sale of the recording, to take it off the market, but he flatly refused: ‘This is something I feel very strongly about.’\textsuperscript{576} He also announced that all net profits from the sales would go to the United Jewish Appeal.\textsuperscript{577} This release and the events around it were viewed by Everest as an ideological issue and not a money-making opportunity, a symbol of the American belief in freedom of expression vs. the censorship of the communist regime. More generally, Everest Records were known for their interesting, daring and thought-out cover designs, and this recording is no exception.\textsuperscript{578}

The RCA ‘Red Seal’ recording of 1970 by The Philadelphia Orchestra with Eugene Ormandy was the first recording of Symphony No. 13 made in the West (Figure 5.23). At first glance, the main cover contains a traditional composition of the photos of the conductor, composer and poet in standard poses. However, the phrase ‘Banned in Russia! First Recording in the Western World’ in bold yellow capital letters at the top implies something sensational about the release. The lower right-hand corner images of emaciated figures and a woman’s face in agony, as well as the photo of Shostakovich as if it were pieced

\textsuperscript{574} ‘Everest’s Stormy ‘No. 13’ to be Lucky Number for UA,’ \textit{Billboard}, 4 November 1967, 1.
\textsuperscript{575} Ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{576} Ibid., 48.
\textsuperscript{577} ‘Soviet Rep Rebuts Solomon on $ Offer,’ \textit{Billboard}, 11 November 1967, 3.
\textsuperscript{578} Scherg, \textit{Classique}, 36.
together after being torn, all point to the tragic nature of the events the
symphony portrays. The latter also points to the issue of censorship and
recovering a torn up (first, banned) version of the symphony. The cover
messages of Jewish deaths, tragedy and artistic censorship implied that
Symphony No. 13 was banned because it was about a dreadful Soviet state secret
that could not be disclosed to the world. As noted by Schmelz, ‘this symphony
was sold in the West as an authentic outpouring of grief at Nazi atrocities and
simultaneously as an example of “banned” Soviet music. Its complicated initial
reception played perfectly into Cold War rhetoric that pitted Western and
American freedoms against Soviet restraint.’ 579

Figure 5.23. The First Records of Symphony No. 13 in the West


The Melodiya/HMV cover is telling, but less sensational (Figure 5.25):
three-quarters of the image is occupied by earth with rocks, to symbolise the
many deaths, but the newly sprung shoots of green grass just slightly covered by
sunlight convey a message of hope and life. In the right-hand upper corner, the
Star of David reference to the Jewish theme is too obvious to miss. The covers of
later issues of the symphony on various labels by Western recording companies
are in line with the Melodiya/HMV presentation, revealing the inner tragedy of
the music, but without the extreme hysteria of the Everest and RCA covers

579 Schmelz, “Shostakovich” Fights the Cold War,’ 100.

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(Figure 5.24). However, they are still more interpretative than the Melodiya covers, which simply show the composer’s profile and make no reference to the narrative of the symphony (Figure 5.25). All the covers for Babiy Yar created in the West have either the image of the Jewish Star of David or images that evoke associations of sufferings and struggle: people stretching out their hands, wired fences, bare earth with bits of broken rock and wood, or cemeteries.

**Figure 5.24. Symphony No. 13 (Babiy Yar) Covers in the West**

![Symphony No. 13 (Babiy Yar) Covers in the West](source)

Figure 5.25. Symphony No. 13 (*Babiy Yar*) Melodiya Covers


*Song of the Forests* was composed under very different circumstances and for a completely different purpose. It was regarded as a state-commissioned piece of music written in the dominant idiom of socialist realism for Stalin’s 70th birthday celebrations and to commemorate state reforestation projects in 1949.\textsuperscript{580} Being so strongly tied to pro-USSR politics, it is unsurprising that it had rarely been recorded in the West. Shostakovich commissioned the text of the work from the official Soviet poet Yevgeniy Dolmatovskiy and planned the oratorio with him.\textsuperscript{581} Frolova-Walker has shown in great detail how *Song of the Forests* is a well-crafted artistic work in the socialist realism idiom, combining Russian and Soviet motifs with explicit Stalin-glorifying lyrics to achieve mass appeal: ‘The two most

\textsuperscript{580} Fairclough, *Dmitry Shostakovich*, 99.

\textsuperscript{581} Fay, *Shostakovich: A Life*, 175.
prominent stylistic elements are the mass song/film music idiom, of which Shostakovich was already an acknowledged master, and the style russe, which lent the piece a certain pedigree and gravitas through its connection to various classic Russian operas. She argues that it is impossible to appreciate the work without acknowledging its ‘Stalinist context’, which is why any attempt to present the work as a neutral glorification of nature misses the essence of the work.

Four recordings of Song of the Forests were issued in the USSR (1951, 1968, 1971 and 1979). These were occasionally licensed to the West, including four first-version releases on Le Chant du Monde and Vanguard (USA) in 1952, Ultragphon (Czechoslovakia) and Colosseum (USA) in 1954 and second-version releases: Melodiya/HMV and Viktor/Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (Japan) in 1973. No Song of the Forests recordings were made in the West until the 1990s. All the records released in and outside of the USSR bear a striking similarity of iconographic presentation: none allude to the strong Soviet content of the music. Instead, the covers use tranquil forest scenes.

In the Melodiya/HMV case, the image is a painting by one of the nineteenth century’s most prominent painters of forest scenes, Ivan Shishkin, In the Forests of Dutchess Mordvinova [V Lesah Grafini Mordvinovoy] (Figure 5.26). This gives the impression of a melancholic and calm, even romantic setting; features that presumably were meant to attract the record-collector and distract them from the Soviet text.

There are indeed nineteenth-century Russian folk motives present in the work, especially in the second movement. Fairclough notes that ‘it might be more appropriate to see Song of the Forests as the work that prompted Shostakovich to follow a new path, during the course of which he developed a genuine interest in precisely the kind of ‘Russian’ materials he has thus far ignored: peasant and

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583 Ibid., 98.
584 Derek C. Hulme, Dmitry Shostakovich Catalogue (Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow Press, 2010), 318–319.
revolutionary folklore.’ Therefore, although the music of the oratorio combines messages of Sovietness and Russianness, Western cover designers chose exclusively to concentrate on the latter and ignore the former. Distancing away from political messages into more universal landscapes would have been a smart marketing strategy for EMI to ensure that the cover appealed to a wider group of listeners, especially given that many would not have heard of the work or its dedication to Stalin before buying the LP.

Figure 5.26. Song of the Forests Western and Russian Covers


6. Conclusion

Within the Melodiya/HMV series, EMI built a generic presentation of Shostakovich in the West through either the Russian or Soviet discourse, similar to other Western labels. EMI avoided any radical visual positioning of the

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composer’s symphonic works, with a slightly more adventurous cover for Symphony No. 13. One reason for this could be that EMI was interested in maintaining a long-term relationship with the USSR and did not want to upset the Soviet side with covers that were too provocative. Although the USSR never explicitly directed the cover imagery chosen by EMI for the Melodiya/HMV series, the latter could implicitly strive to avoid political controversies. Indeed, among the large labels that had licensing agreements with the USSR, Ariola was the only one that also issued this symphony; it displayed a neutral photo of the composer on the cover. Labels like Everest Records did not have such considerations in mind; on the contrary, their sales strategy for Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 13 lay in explicitly positioning the cover as anti-Soviet.

More generally, among the large labels, EMI was not the one with the most inventive covers; companies like RCA in the USA or Philips in the Netherlands were more audacious and imaginative in their choices of classical music covers beyond the Soviet. However, it was not the most uninspired either: for example, for Deutsche Grammophon, ‘an interesting cover design did not have priority’ and one-fourth of their LP cover area was dominated by the large yellow logo banner.

The cover design of EMI’s ASD records, of which Melodiya/HMV was a subset, was aimed at sophisticated traditional listeners, who possessed prior knowledge of, at least the Western classical music canon. Therefore, the consumer could be as attracted by the name of composer and performer as by stand-out cover design. For serious classical music listeners, the latter was just one of the means for drawing their attention to the record. The Melodiya/HMV series was well-established as part of EMI’s core ASD records and was widely sold across the UK. The presentation of Soviet and Russian music on this series, including the works of Shostakovich, was never openly provocative. It combined general imagery categories (image of the performer, Russian or Soviet discourse,}

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587 Scherg, *Classique*, 46.
illustration of opera/ballet scenes) with more individual interpretations of selected works.
Chapter 6. Recordings Shape the Musical Canon:
Shostakovich’s *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District*

This chapter explores how material cultural products are able to shape the musical canon: how the promotion of a particular version of a musical work through scores, the pictorial and written elements of record covers and critical reviews and discussions in industry press can influence critics’ and performers’ preferences. I will consider a case study: the introduction of Shostakovich’s opera *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District* into the Western canon in 1979 by the Soviet cellist Rostropovich to the detriment of the second version of the opera, *Katerina Ismailova.* The cultural product, I will argue, which influenced the perception of this opera in the West, and that indicated a new ‘correct way’ in which the opera was to be performed, was the first recording of *Lady Macbeth* made in the West by EMI with Rostropovich conducting the London Philharmonic Orchestra and his wife, the soprano Galina Vishnevskaya, in the lead role in 1978. This research expands on the work of Laurel Fay, who has examined the differences between the versions of *Lady Macbeth* and *Katerina Ismailova.* While she concentrates on the musical differences, with her primary focus on scores, I pursue a different course, considering instead recordings, the main means by which Western listeners could hear the opera during the Cold War, and their reception.

Following Nicholas Cook, I propose that a recording is a direct product of the thinking and actions of many people with varying aims: the producer, composer, musicians and the record company’s marketing and production teams. The final product depends on the assumptions held by the creators about the nature and purpose of the object they are making. The way the record is presented to the listener also reflects conscious decisions taken by the creators. In the case of the EMI *Lady Macbeth* recording, Rostropovich played a crucial role, as will be shown.

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588 From here on, *Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District* will be shortened to *Lady Macbeth.*
below and it was his view of the music and its interpretation that was communicated. Music critics’ reviews of both recording and opera performances shaped audiences’ perceptions further.

As noted by Colin Symes, there are three main components of traditional classical music recordings: cover artworks, sleeve notes and critical reviews.591 Each of these elements serves to interpret the music for the listener even before he/she has had a chance to hear a note of it. Thus, cover illustrations, sleeve notes and reviews position the music, as do the biases and discourses, implicitly or explicitly held by the creators of the recording and reviews. Chapter 5 looked in detail at the creation of artworks, while this chapter will devote more attention to the textual discourse around a recording in sleeve notes, classical music magazines and the national press.

Simon Frith speculates that the very first record review was published in Talking Machine News in March 1913 with the purpose of both educating and guiding consumers as well as marketing recordings to them.592 Frith noted that ‘the critic’s authority rested on their knowledge of both the history of music and record company catalogues.’593 Symes goes even further by stating that industry magazines are a vehicle through which listeners absorb discourses around listening to and interpreting classical music on records.594 The template of the classical music record review remained constant following its establishment by the Gramophone magazine in the late 1920s. It was an analytical description of the music that employed musicological terms and literary comparisons and metaphors.595 The record was treated by music critics in four different ways: as a record of a performance of a musical work, as a collectable object, as an acoustic device with technical characteristics and as a work of art in its own right.596 I

593 Ibid.
594 Colin Symes, ‘Just for the Record,’ 152.
596 Ibid., 272–277.
would also suggest that critical reviews influence whether a musical work becomes part of the established canon.

Discussions of how certain works enter the canon have been rife in decades of late, and don’t merit rehearsing in full here, although a brief overview serves to remind us that the role of recordings has rarely been foregrounded. Jim Samson in the *Grove* defines canon as ‘a term used to describe a list of composers or works assigned value and greatness by consensus.’ William Weber distinguishes three types of canon – scholarly, sacred and performing – and it is the latter that is of greatest relevance here. Mark Everist argues that ‘texts and documents which articulate the reception of a work are similar – in many cases identical – to those that are responsible for imparting value to the work, and hence for its inclusion in, or exclusion from, the canon.’

In line with this approach, I firstly, analyse the critical reviews and other articles around the distribution of the *Lady Macbeth* recording into the marketplace to survey why this version entered the canon. Secondly, I look at recording reissues and the statistics on performances of both *Lady Macbeth* and *Katerina Ismailova* to prove that the former, not the latter, has entered the Western classical music canon. Such an approach to determining canon is also consistent with the notion of reception, which Samson defines as the work’s ‘afterlife,’ in which the work’s ‘manner of occupying social landscape changes constantly.’ ‘In locating and describing these changes,’ he continues, ‘a reception study can light up the ideology concealed in the corners of music history. And it can expose in the process some of the vested interests at work in the promotion, dissemination, influence and evaluation of musical works.’ Following Everist, in this case study I will illustrate how ‘changes in the canonic status of a work, of a

composer’s output, or of a complete repertory can be associated very clearly with particular individuals or small groups.’

My line of thought was also inspired by Pauline Fairclough’s analysis of shifting perceptions of Shostakovich’s music in the UK. Critics changed their opinions of Shostakovich’s works over time guided by two separate considerations: the general discourse in British critical circles on the relationship between art and society and the wider information about the state of affairs in the Soviet Union available to the British public. For example, before the Second World War, British critics generally regarded art and social life as separate, adhering to the doctrine of art for art’s sake. Therefore, they regarded Shostakovich’s personal life, the political situation and the issue of censorship in the USSR as irrelevant to the understanding of his music. Attitudes shifted during the Cold War when critics came to appreciate the complexity of relationships between artists and the state in the USSR. They started discussing his life events in programme notes and some even began to apply political interpretations to his music. This aligns with the wider reception of Soviet and Russian culture in the UK as illustrated by examples from Anthony Cross’ collection of essays A People Passing Rude. Although as in other publications, most of the case studies cover the pre-1960s period, two chapters illustrate events of later years: the Soviet Industrial exhibitions at Earl’s Court in 1961, 1968 and 1979, and the reception of Soviet film in the 1960s–1990s. As in the case of Shostakovich’s reception, access to a greater amount of information on the USSR in the 1970s led British viewers to question the glorified presentation of the Soviet way of life at the Earls’ Court Exhibition in 1979, compared to the much more idealistic and non-questioning attitude expressed in 1961.

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601 Everist, ‘Reception Theories,’ 397.
602 Fairclough, ‘The ‘Old Shostakovich,’ 266–296.
603 Ibid., 272.
604 Cross, ed., A People Passing Rude.
1. Background to the Opera

Shostakovich wrote *Lady Macbeth* in 1930–1932, at a time when artistic experimentation was still very much encouraged in Soviet Russia. It is based on the novel of the same title by the nineteenth century Russian realist writer Nikolay Leskov. The story follows the life of a young lonely provincial merchant’s wife, who falls in love and is driven to murder by the circumstances around her. The opera itself was premiered on 22 January 1934 in Moscow and then ran in parallel in both Moscow and Leningrad to great public and critical acclaim.\(^{606}\) During the preparation of these productions, Shostakovich and his librettist Aleksander Preys made many changes to the music, working in collaboration with both the Moscow and Leningrad theatres. It is often the case that an operatic score is a collaborative effort of the composer with other artists: the librettist, opera director and singers. As such, Shostakovich was very open to absorbing others’ ideas on the staging of *Lady Macbeth* and made changes to the score accordingly.\(^{607}\) His original authored version of 1932 was never published in the USSR, but Shostakovich supervised and approved the piano-vocal score printed in 1935 as op. 29, which already contained substantial changes compared to his 1932 version.\(^{608}\) In the following two years, the opera was widely premiered abroad, including Cleveland (31 January 1935), New York (5 February 1935), Philadelphia (5 April 1935), Stockholm (15 November 1935), Prague (20 January 1936), London (18 March 1936), Zurich (1936) and Copenhagen (10 October 1936).\(^{609}\)

Meanwhile at home, it was hailed as one of the flagship artistic achievements of the new Soviet state.\(^{610}\) In 1936, however, after being seen by Stalin, the production was severely denounced in the infamous article ‘Muddle instead of Music,’ printed in the main state newspaper *Pravda*. Consequently, performances

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\(^{607}\) Ibid.

\(^{608}\) Fay, ‘From *Lady Macbeth* to *Katerina,*’ 162.

\(^{609}\) Fay, *Shostakovich: A Life,* 77.

of the opera were banned in the USSR. This was part of a more general campaign by the newly created Committee for Artistic Affairs to control the musical output of Soviet composers. Its productions also halted in the West, with only one performance in Italy after the Second World War by the Dusseldorf Opera in 1959.

Shostakovich began to revise the opera of his own will in 1954, the year after the death of Stalin. This was confirmed by his close friend at the time, Isaak Glikman and further corroborated by evidence found by Fay. He continued revisions while rehearsing for the premiere of the new version in 1963 and in January signed off on the final version, which was printed as op. 114 in both full and piano scores in Moscow in 1965. Once Shostakovich finalised the score, he ‘would sanction no deviations.’ For example, in 1964 he was upset when he learned that the La Scala theatre in Milan was planning to stage the 1935 version. He wrote to Nicolas Benois who arranged communications with the theatre: ‘I have been able to make many corrections and improvements in the new version and I beg you to tell them to produce the opera in the new version by all means, or to leave it alone.’ In the same letter he also forbade any cuts or changes, and later printed this categorical order in the ‘Composer’s note’ to the 1965 published score: ‘No cuts whatever [sic] are permitted.’

The premiere, under the title Katerina Ismailova, took place in January 1963 in Moscow, before reaching several cities across the West, including London (1963, the Royal Opera House), Nice (1964), Vienna, Budapest, Leipzig and Oslo (all in 1965). The Soviet state record company Melodiya recorded Katerina Ismailova in 1964.

The libretto of Katerina Ismailova was substantially different from the Lady Macbeth version of 1935; however, there was much less difference musically. The

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611 Ibid., 236.
612 Isaak Glikman, Pisma k drugu (Moscow: DSCH, 1993), 120. Fay, ‘From Lady Macbeth to Katerina,’ 178.
613 Fay, ‘From Lady Macbeth to Katerina,’ 184.
614 Ibid., 185.
616 Fay, Shostakovich: A Life, 238.
key change identified by Shostakovich scholars is the elimination of the charged sexual appetite of the heroine and associated music.617 In his 1973 interview with High Fidelity magazine, Shostakovich himself said that the key musical changes, from his perspective, were in the orchestration.618 Shostakovich also added a final line to the libretto of Katerina Ismailova that was absent from the Lady Macbeth version. In the last scene, the convicts on their way to Siberia sing a sad song. The new line is said by a lonely old convict: ‘Akh, why is this life of ours so dark, so fearful? Is man born for such a life?’ Fay has speculated that in this line ‘Shostakovich is explicitly identifying here with the Old Convict, appropriating his voice to convey his own misgivings about the all-too-real adversity and tragedy that exists outside of the confines of the theatre.’619 She notes, and I agree, that anyone, not familiar with this version, would be omitting this personal message from the ageing composer.

2. The EMI Recording of Lady Macbeth (1979)

The consensus among most Shostakovich scholars today, including Richard Taruskin, Fay, David Fanning, Marina Frolova-Walker and Elizabeth Wilson, is that the composer himself preferred the second version of the opera and that the artistic changes he made when revising the opera in 1954 were not imposed by external political or social factors but were of his own artistic doing.620 Despite this established view, it is Lady Macbeth that remains ubiquitous in Western opera houses today; Katerina Ismailova is rarely performed. A significant reason, I propose, is the 1979 EMI recording of Lady Macbeth, its critical reviews and subsequent reissues, together with scores and performances of this opera in the West.

617 Fay, ‘From Lady Macbeth to Katerina,’ 180 and 186.
618 Royal S. Brown, ‘An Interview with Shostakovich,’ High Fidelity, October 1973, 89.
619 Fay, ‘From Lady Macbeth to Katerina,’ 187.
The Sikorski publishing house was established in 1935 in Germany and negotiated publications of Soviet music compositions with the USSR from the early 1950s, including contemporary works by Khachaturian, Kabalevsky, Prokofiev and Shostakovich. In 1979 Sikorski published what was claimed to be the 1932 long-lost original version of Lady Macbeth. The publication was such a major event for the publishing house that it is still described on their website as part of company history: ‘A remarkable music-historical achievement took place in 1979 with the publication of the formerly banned original version of the opera Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk by Shostakovich.’

The score contains the term ‘Urtext’ in its sub-title, which, by definition, indicates that the editor and publishing house wanted to claim this score as the one true to the composer’s original intentions. Sikorski’s claim of Urtext status for the 1932 version can only be accepted to a limited extent. As Stanley Boorman observes, the fundamental problem with the notion of Urtext is that it presumes trust on the part of the reader in both the composer and the editor:

The editor asserts that it represents precisely the content as the composer would have wanted to see it – and (some even believe) would have wanted to hear it. In both these cases, the user’s trust is expected. If the first is perhaps a self-evident plea for faith on the part of the reader, the second is equally dangerous. It claims that every mark on the ‘original’ is to be trusted and interpreted, and that nothing else is needed in this respect, the Urtext edition demands implicit trust, requiring an act of credulity. Worse, it also presumes a similar trust on the part of the editor.

The Sikorski editor’s note erroneously (but vigorously) claims that it was political pressure and censorship that induced Shostakovich to make changes between his 1932 and 1935 versions: ‘Obviously, the author aimed at a certain intensification for the benefit of the expressiveness of the work. This was the reason, consequently, that the opera became subject to censorship and editorial interventions. The first edition, published 1935 thus shows over fifty, partly severe, differences in the text, most of them due to the eliminations of vulgarisms.

and erotic allusions.’ The editor continues specifying examples of differences between the versions and explains that: ‘Shostakovich’s masterpiece, originally strident with expressiveness and provocation, was published in 1935 in an already revised version in which the offensive parts were removed. The rediscovery of the original version of 1932 and its recording by Rostropovich (EMI SLS 5157) and the coincident publication of it by Sikorski (a first stage performance took place in 1979 in Wuppertal, Germany) present the work as the author had it in view.’ The Sikorski editor’s notes claims that the 1935 version had already scrubbed out the intensity and impulsivity of the work. Here one sees a reference in one musical object, the score, to the other, the recording. In the minds of their creators, Sikorski and Rostropovich, these are interlinked and united by the same purpose of, from their perspectives, being the authentic version that would have been approved by the composer.

The second event, which preceded the publication of the score by a year, was the recording of Lady Macbeth between 28 March and 22 April 1978 in EMI’s Abbey Road Studios under Rostropovich’s baton. He had known Shostakovich and performed his works both whilst in the USSR and after his exile to the West. Indeed, according to his biographer Elizabeth Wilson, ‘from the early 1960s onwards, Rostropovich sought to be involved in performances of Shostakovich’s music whenever it was possible.’ Rostropovich had led the cello section in the premiere of Katerina Ismailova in Moscow in 1963, and his wife sang the title role in the Soviet film Katerina Ismailova of 1966.

At the time of working on Katerina Ismailova, the couple were well acquainted with the Lady Macbeth version from 1935, and Vishnevskaya expressed a strong preference towards it. In her memoirs, she discussed many of the differences in the portrayal of the heroine and regarded the changes in Katerina Ismailova as Shostakovich’s concessions to Soviet society where such sexual openness was not appropriate. Although she was thrilled to be asked to record the role of Katerina

624 Ibid., 1.
625 Wilson, Mstislav Rostropovich, 189.
for the film, Vishnevskaya commented that ‘unfortunately the film-opera was produced based on this changed version.’ Describing the filming process, Vishnevskaya sought to bring the emotional and sexual drama of the earlier version into the role of Katerina as much as she could. She regularly complained about the prudishness of the Soviet public and how she received letters from viewers disapproving of the film’s love scene.

Rostropovich and his wife had a difficult relationship with the Soviet authorities for many years. Both were passionate artists, who found it insulting to compromise on their artistic vision. Rostropovich was also deeply dissatisfied with the Soviet way of working and living, especially after his first Western tours in the mid-1950s. Speaking his mind did not earn him any popularity with Soviet bureaucrats. His position in Soviet society became more and more difficult, especially after he publicly supported and gave refuge at his home to the banned writer Aleksander Solzhenitsin in 1970. He was also unhappy with the fact that he could not control his own touring schedule and projects, as discussed in Part I. In addition, both husband and wife had a difficult relationship with the Soviet Minister of Culture Ekaterina Furtzeva, blaming her for unrealised touring opportunities, especially when in 1962 she forbade Vishnevskaya from premiering the title role in Benjamin Britten’s War Requiem which had been written especially for her. Speaking years later, Vishnevskaya dramatically exclaimed: ‘Orwell’s ‘Animal Farm’ is not a fantasy, it exists, and the Kremlin’s stars shine bright over it. I lived in it, I survived, I am from there...’ In 1974 Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya left the USSR indefinitely, and in 1978, right before the start of the Lady Macbeth recording sessions, they were stripped of their Soviet citizenship.

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627 Ibid., 399.
630 ‘Galina Vishnevskaya,’ *The Times*, 12 December 2012, 57.
631 Vishnevskaya, *Galina*, 400.
British mainstream press, making him known beyond the classical music world. It is perhaps unsurprising, in light of these events, that the couple would promote *Lady Macbeth* as an opera that had been destroyed by Soviet interventions, and urgently needed restoring. Shostakovich had died in 1975, leaving Rostropovich to interpret his position on *Lady Macbeth vs. Katerina Ismailova* without the risk of being contradicted by the composer.

When arriving to the West, Rostropovich was keen to make the music of both Shostakovich and Prokofiev more widely performed and appreciated. By 1979, Rostropovich was an influential voice in the international world of classical music recording. He had recorded for EMI since the late 1950s and had regularly laid ‘golden eggs’ for the company, in the words of his EMI producer, Peter Andry. In 1978 Rostropovich signed a new agreement with EMI for twenty-four albums. It was his strong position in the industry, in part, that enabled such an ambitious project as the recording of *Lady Macbeth* to go ahead. Peter Andry described in detail how the *Lady Macbeth* recording was eventually agreed upon:

> When Rostropovich came to me and we first discussed the project, I thought such a long and challenging recording would have little appeal to the general record-buying public. Many further lengthy deliberations followed. Continued pleadings by Slava that this would be his and Galina’s most important artistic statement in our catalogue left me exhausted. I asked for more time to consider. Slava then proposed that he and Galina, who was to sing the title role, would forgo their fees provided that we recorded the work. Despite Slava’s generous gesture, the project was still going to cost a mighty amount of money, including hefty publishers’ fees for the hire of the music, and it was something I was reluctant to authorise. I turned to management. They batted it back to me. Not wishing to lose such a major figure as Rostropovich, we decided to go ahead.

It is likely that Rostropovich made such a passionate campaign to record *Lady Macbeth* because it represented, for him, a symbol of unconstrained artistic expression and his own artistic freedom that could be realized, from his

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perspective, only in the West. The Lady Macbeth recording was a project for which EMI gave Rostropovich complete artistic freedom. Thus, recording the first version of Lady Macbeth was a project very much driven by the individual enthusiasm, energy and vision of Rostropovich. Andry also believed that the timing of the recording, April 1978, made it a particularly emotional experience for the musician as it was just a few days after his Soviet citizenship had been revoked.

Furthermore, Rostropovich’s insistence on staging the first version of musical works stemmed from his belief that a composer’s true intentions were compromised under the Soviet regime. This view was realized on other occasions beyond the Lady Macbeth case. As told by his interviewer, Claude Samuel, Rostropovich felt that it was his ‘sacred duty’ to stage the first version of Prokofiev’s opera War and Peace which he did in 1986: ‘Rostropovich spoke of the event: “I think the greatest thing I have done in my life is to have restored the opera War and Peace to its original form by scrupulously respecting Prokofiev’s intentions.”’

In parallel, certain technological and cultural changes that spread out across the Western world facilitated the discourse of the composer’s first version as the ‘true version.’ As discussed in the Introduction, the spread of the LP format from the 1950s allowed for full-length operas rather than excerpts to be listened to in the privacy and convenience of one’s home. This facilitated the widespread fascination with the composer’s true intentions and presentation of the work as originally envisaged by the composer in full. As concluded by Stephen Meyer, in discussing recordings of Richard Wagner’s Lohengrin, ‘recording technology – particularly as it was applied to complete recordings on long-playing microgroove discs – thus became a vehicle through which performers and audiences could lay claim to the composer’s intention and its aura of authenticity.’ Moreover, by the late 1970s, the authentic performance

movement was gaining considerable traction in a variety of musical areas, including among professional ensembles, through the creation of dedicated workshops, in festivals and courses for both professional and amateur players, and, most importantly for this narrative, in the record industry.\textsuperscript{639} Large labels started issuing series of early music recordings on period instruments and creating entire labels dedicated to authentic performances. This included the British conductor Christopher Hogwood revitalising Decca’s early music label \textit{L’Oiseau-Lyre}, and other record companies (EMI, Philips) dipping their toes in the water with early music releases under their main classical labels.\textsuperscript{640} The push for composers’ originals also extended to the opera stage. In 1973, the Royal Opera House staged the 1964 Oeser edition of Georges Bizet’s opera \textit{Carmen}. This was a heavily edited medley of the composer’s autograph score and the conducting score of the first performances of the opera, which Bizet supervised. Up until the 1960s, it had been common to use the standard 1877 Choudens edition that was based on the revisions Bizet’s friend Guiraud made to the manuscript after his death.\textsuperscript{641} Thus, by recording \textit{Lady Macbeth}, Rostropovich and EMI were tapping into a discourse about the importance of recovering originals that was well established in the West.

3. Discussion of Scores and Recordings

3.1. Scores

Sikorski did not identify the source score for his publication but claimed it to be the 1932 edition. Fay hypothesises that ‘the 1979 Sikorski score appears to have used the modified plates for the 1935 Muzgiz vocal score as the basis for its edition.’\textsuperscript{642} Based on Sikorski’s claim and the same date of release for his edition and the EMI recording, I speculate that the publishing house could have used the

\begin{footnotes}
\item[640] Email from David Patmore, 17 August 2019 and Discogs.com.
\item[642] Fay, ‘From \textit{Lady Macbeth} to \textit{Katerina},’ footnote 10, 163.
\end{footnotes}
1932 score that Rostropovich utilised for his recording project. According to the Rostropovich, he found the score for the recording in the Library of Congress in Washington D.C., when he was working with the National Symphony Orchestra in 1977. In the sleeve notes to the 2002 reissue of *Lady Macbeth* EMI recording we read:

But where was the 1932 score – this “official war secret” – to be found? By a bizarre chance, Rostropovich discovered a copy in the Library of Congress in Washington, little more than a stone’s throw from the apartment he used when working with the National Symphony Orchestra. The score had been consulted by the conductor Dimitri Mitropoulos but had otherwise lain unremarked for 40 years.⁶⁴³

Figure 6.1 shows the front page of this score.⁶⁴⁴ Irrespective of the validity of Rostropovich’s or Sikorski’s statements about their sources, what makes their claims relevant for my investigation is their insistence on their version’s superiority over others.

**Figure 6.1. Front Page of 1932 *Lady Macbeth* Score**

Source: Library of Congress.

Sikorski’s insistence on the superiority of their publication was based on several differences between the two *Lady Macbeth* versions (the newly discovered

⁶⁴³ Sleeve notes to the 2002 CD reissue of the 1979 *Lady Macbeth* recording, EMI Classics, 14.

⁶⁴⁴ I would like to thank my friend Alexey Morozov, living in Washington D.C. for tracking down this score in the Library of Congress and taking photos of the first pages.
1932/1979 version and the commonly used 1935 version). A key contrast is the wording of Katerina’s aria in Act 1, Scene 3. The Sikorski editorial especially singles out this aria as one of the more noticeable changes in the libretto from 1932 to 1935 (Figure 6.2).

**Figure 6.2. Katerina’s Aria in Act 1, Scene 3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The foal runs after the filly,</td>
<td>Once I saw from my window a little nest, a little nest under the roof;</td>
<td>I could see from my window a little nest, hidden under the sloping roof.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The tom-cat seeks the female,</td>
<td>A happy dove was hast’ning there,</td>
<td>And there two doves would sit cooing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The dove hastens to his mate.</td>
<td>Was hast’ning there with her darling mate.</td>
<td>Then high in the wide-wide sky they’d go soaring.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But no one hurries to me.</td>
<td>Now often do I look at them</td>
<td>But now whenever I see their nest,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The wind caresses the birch-tree,</td>
<td>And with envy bitterly weep and cry;</td>
<td>My eyes fill with tears of envy,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>And the sun warms it with his heat,</td>
<td>Oh, happy dove, she has a mate.</td>
<td>Envy of their happiness!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For everyone there’s a smile from somewhere,</td>
<td>I have no freedom, I have no darling, none,</td>
<td>Kept in seclusion,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But no one will come to me.</td>
<td>I am not able to fly, ah!</td>
<td>Unloved and unloving,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one will put his hand round my waist,</td>
<td>I have no freedom, I have no darling, none,</td>
<td>And no freedom, no freedom, no liberty!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one will press his lips to mine.</td>
<td>I am not able to fly, ah!</td>
<td>Ah, no, I can’t live like this!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one will stroke my white breast.</td>
<td></td>
<td>For I have no nest like those little birds!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No one will tire me out</td>
<td></td>
<td>I’ve no one who loves me, no one to love!</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With his passionate embraces.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Although the words of the aria are different, the mood and main message are the same: a longing for a mate. The original version is focused on sexual desire, while both the 1935 and 1963 versions pursue an emotional and spiritual connection with a soulmate. Royal S. Brown discussed this difference at length in
a 1984 essay and suggested that the 1935 version of the words was much better suited to the music which remained unchanged.645

The main difference between the two Lady Macbeth versions (1932/1979 and 1935) and Katerina Ismailova is the heroine’s overt sexual appetite, which was substantially subdued by Shostakovich in the latter version. This is noticeable primarily in two scenes. At the end of Act I, Scene 3 of both Lady Macbeth versions is the famous sex scene. In Katerina Ismailova Sergey and Katerina are interrupted by her father-in-law.646 However, the final orchestral coda, symbolising the sexual act is present in all three versions.647 And in Act I, Scene 5 of Lady Macbeth Katerina repeatedly begs Sergey to kiss her, while at the equivalent moment in Katerina Ismailova she worries about Sergey’s future.648 The above examples illustrate the shift from portraying the protagonist’s sexual frustrations in Lady Macbeth to focusing on her spiritual anguish in Katerina Ismailova.

3.2. Recordings

The 1964 recording of Katerina Ismailova was from a Moscow performance at the Stanislavskiy and Nemirovich-Danchenko Musical Theatre, conducted by Gennadiy Provatorov. The tape was then licensed to multiple Western partners under the licensing agreements, discussed in detail in Chapter 4: Melodiya/Angel (USA) in 1967, Melodiya/Eurodisc (Germany) and Melodiya/Le Chant Du Monde (France) in 1967, but only in 1975 on Melodiya/HMV (UK).649 The UK disc was identical in terms of cover art and sleeve notes to the American record and it is

646 Shostakovich, Lady Macbeth (Sikorski, 1979), 90–97; Shostakovich, Lady Macbeth (Muzgiz, 1935), 92–96; Shostakovich, Katerina Izmailova, (Muzika, 1963), 109–112.
647 Shostakovich, Lady Macbeth (Sikorski, 1979), 98–99; Shostakovich, Lady Macbeth (Muzgiz, 1935), 97; Shostakovich, Katerina Izmailova (Muzika, 1963), 113.
649 The LP’s in the Melodiya/HMV album have catalogue numbers ASD 3204 to 3207, which indicated the release year was 1975.
both discs and their reviews that I will consider for the purposes of this study.\textsuperscript{650} They were both issued by local subsidiaries of EMI Group.

Figure 6.3 presents the front covers of the various licensed \textit{Katerina Ismailova} recordings and the EMI \textit{Lady Macbeth} recording of 1979. The uniting feature on all the covers are the Russian folk elements, such as churches, wooden houses, icons and the dress and Katerina’s hairstyle. What makes the EMI cover stand out from all the others, however, is the use of a photograph of the heroine (played by Galina Vishnevskaya). The other covers, with pictures of villages or Katerina together with the support characters, emphasise the collective, social aspect of the opera. Vishnevskaya in the EMI cover, in full Russian dress and with a whole array of Russian paraphernalia, including a wall of icons, a samovar, folk-painted cups and plates, sits with an expression of sadness, longing and disappointment on her face. Both the fact that it is a photograph and the absence of any other characters point to the importance of Katerina in this version. It is not unreasonable to suppose that Rostropovich was also promoting his wife through such a prominent positioning on the cover. The photograph also generates an impression of greater realism and authenticity, thus echoing the recording’s claims to representing the opera as Shostakovich truly intended it. This message of authenticity on the EMI cover is underlined by including a handwritten message signed by Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya in Russian on the back, emphasising their close connection to Shostakovich and the fact that this recording is the ‘original version’ (Figure 6.4).

\textsuperscript{650} As discussed in Chapter 4, EMI in the UK issued many of the same records as its American subsidiary, Capitol Records, under the licensing agreements with Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga.
Figure 6.3. Front Covers of Katerina Ismailova and Lady Macbeth Recordings


Figure 6.4. Back Cover Element of EMI’s Lady Macbeth Recording

Source: The British Library Sound Archive.
The sleeve notes of the Melodiya/HMV Katerina Ismailova are a translation of the notes from the licensed Melodiya recording, written by the Soviet musicologist Semyon Shlifshteyn. When discussing the creation of the opera, Shlifshteyn does not mention the 1936 ban and simply asserts that Shostakovich revised the work in 1963. The notes also avoid any discussion of social and personal life events, concentrating instead on the musical and aesthetic qualities of the opera and its libretto.

The sleeve notes of the 1979 Lady Macbeth recording stand in contrast to this approach. The main text, titled ‘The Return of Lady Macbeth,’ was provided by the notorious Soviet dissident writer Solomon Volkov. In the same year, he caused a sensation by publishing what he claimed were the authentic, smuggled memoirs of Shostakovich entitled Testimony. Many believed him. A typical attitude was expressed in the books’ review section by Bayan Northcott, a music critic for the Sunday Telegraph: ‘The tone of the voice that comes through even through translation – pained, nervous, obsessive, not always easy to read – sounds just too likely and too unremittingly sustained to have been faked.’ It was only several years later that scholars like Fay found evidence to suggest that these memoirs were largely fabricated by Volkov and never authorised by Shostakovich. Nevertheless, the recording, Volkov’s book, comments on the recording and in subsequent magazine articles all endorsed the position of Shostakovich as the martyr composer, who had to change his opera under external pressure and whose real true vision comes forward only through the original opera of 1932.

Volkov’s article in the sleeve notes of the Lady Macbeth recording retells the story of the banning of the opera after Stalin saw its performance and emphasises

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653 Although interestingly, Rostropovich hated Volkov’s book: ‘When I read the rubbish written by Solomon Volkov, I must say I was deeply surprised to find him claiming that Shostakovich had put his own signature to the pages.’ Source: Manashir Yakubov, ‘Shostakovich’s World is Our World: Mstislav Rostropovich Interview,’ in A Shostakovich Casebook, ed. Malcolm Harold Brown, 147.
what he believes to be the three most crucial elements in the work: the painstakingly detailed image of the functions of the police apparatus, the tedium of everyday Russian life, and eroticism. Volkov concludes by noting that ‘Shostakovich edited the opera in 1958, giving it a new name *Katerina Ismailova*. The changes in music and in the text of the libretto were obviously made under the pressure of circumstances.’⁶⁵⁴ He further claims that ‘this present recording is of the very first original version of the opera. It reinstates *Lady Macbeth* to the listener as it was conceived and realized by Shostakovich. Thus, this recording restores historic and aesthetic justice to one of the most brilliant compositions of modern Russian music.’⁶⁵⁵ Volkov’s focus on Shostakovich biography in the text, and his argument that to reach a better understanding of the composer, we need to hear the opera as he originally intended it could be driven by his own interests in promoting *Testimony* and the dissident image of the composer that it portrays.

Fairclough in her discussion of Shostakovich’s Symphony No. 5 also confirms Volkov’s influence on Western interpretations of Shostakovich’s music well into our times, primarily ‘pre-concert talks, program notes, and other popular accounts of the work frequently quote Volkov or reference his interpretation.’⁶⁵⁶ Many music critics of the 1980s, more familiar with Shostakovich’s music and biography, were wary of Volkov’s book and ‘felt that they had to fight hard to retain what they perceived as musical, rather than political, interest in Shostakovich’s music.’⁶⁵⁷

*Lady Macbeth* was advertised as any regular EMI recording. Every month, EMI bought two to four full pages of advertising space in *The Gramophone*, and the May 1979 issue had a full-page advert for the *Lady Macbeth* release. Not much more was done.⁶⁵⁸ It is very likely that as a company EMI did not devote as much

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⁶⁵⁵ Ibid.
⁶⁵⁷ Fairclough, ‘The ‘Old Shostakovich,’’ 291.
⁶⁵⁸ Unfortunately, I could not find sales data for the recording or any indication on how well it sold. Presumably, it did well, as EMI reissued this recording several times, most recently in 2002 and 2008. Warner Classics, which bought the classical business of EMI, also reissued the same recording in 2009 and 2016.
attention to this recording as Rostropovich personally did. EMI ran a successful world-class music business and signed many international superstars, among whom Rostropovich was just one. Thus, the main responsibility for promoting the recording lay with Rostropovich himself. He felt deep satisfaction from bringing the recording project to life and regularly talked about the recording in his interviews (see Section 4.2 below).

Together the new score and recording of *Lady Macbeth* shifted the focus from the *Katerina Ismailova* version of the opera in both performers’ and listeners’ perceptions. It was easier for performers to obtain the Western score than to search for the Soviet *Katerina Ismailova* score (it had not been published in the West). By 1979 EMI would have taken the *Katerina Ismailova* recording out of distribution while selling the new *Lady Macbeth* recording widely across its dealers and shops. The excellent quality of the performance and recording could not have gone unnoticed by record lovers, shifting their preference towards hearing this version in the opera house.

4. Discourse in the Industry Press

4.1. Katerina Ismailova Record Reviews

*Katerina Ismailova* recordings had been a success prior to the 1979 release of *Lady Macbeth*. This was partly due to the improved quality of these vinyls as compared to the average Soviet-produced recording, since the *Katerina Ismailova* recordings were licensed under the agreements discussed in Chapter 4. At the time of its first release in 1967 on the Melodiya/Angel label in the USA, the *Katerina Ismailova* recording was reviewed by several industry publications, though by a smaller number than the *Lady Macbeth* recording in 1979 (Table 6.1). All of them, apart from *Billboard*, which was primarily a non-classical record and music business magazine, devoted full articles to the *Katerina Ismailova* release.
Table 6.1. Reviews of Katerina Ismailova Recording (1967)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Magazine</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author’s Name</th>
<th>About the author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Record Guide</td>
<td>Aug-66</td>
<td>George Louis Mayer</td>
<td>Head of New York Public Library Music Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billboard</td>
<td>Mar-67</td>
<td>No name</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Fidelity</td>
<td>Mar-67</td>
<td>Bernard Jacobson</td>
<td>Music critic, inc. Fanfare magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-Fi/Stereo Review</td>
<td>Jul-67</td>
<td>George Jellinek</td>
<td>Music Director of US radio station WQXR and opera expert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New York Times</td>
<td>26-Mar-67</td>
<td>Howard Klein</td>
<td>US music critic and Director of Arts at the Rockefeller Foundation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The critics unanimously hailed the Melodiya/Angel Katerina Ismailova record as a huge improvement on the average quality of Soviet recording that Western listeners had endured until then. The opera was issued as part of a larger licensing agreement between EMI’s American arm, Capitol Records, and Melodiya. As such, the master tape of the recording was made in the USSR, but the discs from this master tape for sale to consumers were made by the American partner using its own materials and transfer engineers’ expertise. As a result, the technical quality of the playback was noticeably higher than of Soviet-produced records. This was widely complimented by the music critics. Bernard Jacobson in his High Fidelity review, which was about recent Soviet recordings more generally, remarked that ‘the technical standard of Soviet recordings has improved almost out of recognition within the last few years,’ including the issue of Katerina Ismailova.

Billboard magazine rated the recording as excellent noting that ‘the Russian group’s performance is up to the highest international standards.’ George Jellinek, writing for Hi-Fi/Stereo Review, thought the performance ‘uneven,’ but the recording quality ‘good.’ He praised the Melodiya/Angel partnership as raising the quality of Soviet records noting that the collaboration ‘augurs well for the future.’

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662 Ibid.
Similarly, hailed the quality of the recording as an improvement on the usual Soviet-produced discs. The influential music critic and Director of the Arts at the Rockefeller Centre, Howard Klein, writing for the \textit{New York Times}, expressed views very much in line with others and praised the new Melodiya/Angel partnership, acknowledging the vast improvement in quality it had brought over Soviet-produced records, although, from his perspective, it was still not on par with Western technical standards.

Whereas critics agreed on the technical qualities of the recording, they found both strengths and weaknesses in the actual performance executed at Stanislavskiy and Nemirovich-Danchenko Musical Theatre and in Shostakovich’s music. Regarding the production itself, opinions were mostly favourable. Jacobson in \textit{High Fidelity} praised the dramatic way in which the performance ‘captures action and atmosphere,’ as well as the excellent portrayal of the heroine. Jellinek in \textit{Hi-Fi/Stereo Review}, on the contrary, did not approve of the ‘shrill voice’ of the leading female singer, Ekaterina Andreeva. George Mayer in \textit{American Record Guide} commented that the production ‘has many compelling features and makes a terrific impact in a first-rate performance because of the opportunities it gives to first-class singing actors for showing their stuff.’

With regards to Shostakovich’s music, Jellinek in \textit{Hi-Fi/Stereo Review} believed the opera to be ‘best in its atmospheric episodes.’ Jacobson in \textit{High Fidelity} praised the excellent portrayal of the heroine, but singled out many musical and literary imperfections and concluded that ‘it is not a really good opera.’ Fast forward to 1975, in a lengthy overview article on Russian opera for the same magazine, the music critic Conrad Osborne acknowledged Jacobson’s previous tepid review of 1967, but thought the musical imperfections of the score were

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsc{Guide}, 1119.
  \item Jacobson, ‘The Russians have arrived,’ 67–68.
  \item Jellinek, ‘Shostakovich: \textit{Katerina Ismailova},’ 83.
  \item George Louis Mayer, \textit{Katerina Ismailova}, \textit{American Record Guide}, August 1966, 1118.
  \item Jellinek, ‘Shostakovich: \textit{Katerina Ismailova},’ 83.
  \item Jacobson, ‘The Russians have arrived,’ 67–68.
\end{itemize}
outweighed by ‘a performance of such dramatic conviction and vitality.’  
George Mayer in *American Record Guide* in agreement with Jacobson, expressed
the opinion that musically *Katerina Ismailova* ‘is not, however, a great opera. At
best, it is a flawed near-miss.’

Were the music critics aware that *Katerina Ismailova* was a revised version of a
1930s opera? They would most likely have had some knowledge of the situation
in Soviet musical life. Starting in the 1940s, several books on Soviet composers
were published in the West every decade, including those by émigré writers,
such as Andrey Olkhovsky’s *Music under the Soviets* (1955) and Yurii Yelagin’s
*The Taming of the Arts* (1951), as well as an account of Stalinist repressions in
Richard Anthony Leonard’s *A History of Russian Music* (1956). None of these
music critics would have heard the first version of Lady Macbeth of the 1930s as
they were all but one born during that decade, so all their information would
have come from printed sources, including 1930s magazine and newspaper
articles.

Jacobson in *High Fidelity* briefly discussed the opera’s success and fall from
grace of the 1930s, but surprisingly ignored the fact that this disc was a new
version of the opera. He treated it as a performance of the work from the 1930s
and did not realise in writing the article that this was a new version of the opera.
Therefore, he did not compare the two versions. Jellinek in *Hi-Fi/Stereo Review*
passingly acknowledged the political turmoil of the 1930s around the previous
version of the opera, and, like Jacobson, did not realise that this was a new
version, regarding it as a new recording of the 1930s version presented under a
new name.

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671 Mayer, ‘Katerina Ismailova,’ 1118.
672 Fairclough, ‘The ‘Old Shostakovich,’ 279.
673 In 1967 the critics were the following ages: George Mayer 37, Bernard Jacobson 30,
George Jellinek 47, Howard Klein 36 years old.
674 It seems that not only music critics were confused about the title of the opera. The
advertisements of *Katerina Ismailova* premiere at the Royal Opera House in 1963 referred
to it interchangeably by either name. See reference to it as *Lady Macbeth* in ‘London Diary
for December,’ *The Musical Times*, Vol. 104, No. 1449 (November 1963), 837 and as
1963), 878.
The *American Record Guide* ran a large stand-alone article on *Katerina Ismailova*.

George Mayer carefully discussed the political controversies around the first version of the opera and its undoubted Western success in the 1930s. Unlike the above-mentioned critics, he acknowledged in the first paragraph that ‘in 1962–63, Shostakovich revised the work somewhat; and as “Katerina Ismailova” it has enjoyed a powerful new lease on life.’

Although he knew about the existence of an earlier 1930s version of the opera, Mayer did not comment on any musical or other differences between the two versions. In fact, his knowledge about the opera in the 1930s was based on an article in *Herald Tribune* by its music critic Lawrence Gilman, which had asserted that Shostakovich aimed to evoke compassion and understanding for Katerina in his opera.

Mayer was dissatisfied with this positioning of Katerina as a victim of circumstances who deserves the viewer’s compassion and pity but did not discriminate in his discussion between the two versions, treating this positioning of Katerina as existing in both. He concluded that ‘this release is recommended without reservation as a superlative performance of a worthwhile modern opera.’

Stating that ‘a certain sensationalism inevitably attaches to “Katerina,”’ Klein in the *New York Times* similarly discussed the history of the opera, directly stating that Shostakovich revised the opera under a new name. He was the only critic to compare the two versions, primarily in their portrayal of Katerina: ‘In the first version, Katerina was a self-willed creature who brings about her own destruction largely through calculation. In the revised version, the heroine is a victim of society, and her selfish acts are seen as the blameless reaction of a deprived being struggling against a vicious system’.

He did not, unfortunately, explain where his deep knowledge of the 1930s version had come from. Perhaps in support of his Western individualism, Klein was unimpressed by the scenes

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675 Mayer, *'Katerina Ismailova,'* 1117–1119.
676 Ibid., 1117.
677 Ibid., 1118.
678 Ibid., 1118.
679 Ibid., 1119.
depicting crowds, calling them ‘socially significant propaganda.’ Commenting on the sleeve notes of the record he noted: ‘Some effort should have been made on Angel’s part, however, to present a more accurate account of the opera’s history and the composer’s problems with it. What we have is an undiluted artistic propaganda which is rather transparent and almost endearingly naive.’ This is to a large extent accurate: the Katerina Ismailova sleeve notes, as discussed in Section 3.2, focus on the musical discussion of the opera and fail to mention any social or personal events in Shostakovich’s life relevant to its creation in the 1930s or revision in the 1950s.

Overall, the Katerina Ismailova recording was a success with the critics. To a large extent this was due to it being the first of its kind: the Angel/Melodiya vinyl was the first full-length recording of the opera, as it was technically impossible to record the entire Lady Macbeth opera in the 1930s. Critics demonstrated very different levels of knowledge with regards to the history of its creation and revision, reflecting the limited access to information, sometimes of contradictory nature, available at the time about Soviet music in the West.

4.2. Lady Macbeth Record Reviews

All the main classical music record magazines in the US and UK published articles about the 1979 Lady Macbeth recording, which signifies just how important the release was perceived to be. The reviews, what is more, were overwhelmingly positive (Table 6.2). The recording also won the International Record Critics Award of 1980 in the opera category.

In their reviews, all the critics found it necessary to compare this Western recording with the Soviet recording discussed above. A major reason why they preferred the Lady Macbeth recording over Katerina Ismailova was that the quality

681 Ibid.
682 Ibid.
683 I could not find even a short review of Lady Macbeth in Billboard, neither in an online search nor in the print version. This is surprising, given that Katerina Ismailova was reviewed, albeit in a small article, and that Billboard regularly published classical music records reviews, though it was primarily a music business publication.
of the former was higher than of the latter. This is not surprising, given the
sixteen-year advancement in recording and sound technology from 1963 to 1979,
as well as the international level of musicianship exhibited by such a major
orchestra as the London Philharmonic.

Table 6.2. Reviews of Lady Macbeth Recording (1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Publication</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Author’s Name</th>
<th>About the author</th>
<th>Other mentions in the issue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American Record Guide</td>
<td>Oct-79</td>
<td>David W. Moore</td>
<td>Composer and critic</td>
<td>excerpts from the album booklet written by Volkov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fanfare</td>
<td>Sept/Oct-79</td>
<td>Royal S. Brown</td>
<td>Contributing editor, musicologist, book</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gramophone</td>
<td>May-79</td>
<td>Arnold Whittall</td>
<td>Music academic, record reviewer</td>
<td>large article ‘Rostropovich and Lady Macbeth’ by Mike Ashman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Fidelity</td>
<td>Sep-79</td>
<td>Dale Harris</td>
<td>US music critic and lecturer</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L.M.G. Monthly Letter</td>
<td>Jul-79</td>
<td>No name</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opera News</td>
<td>08-Dec-79</td>
<td>No name</td>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday Review</td>
<td>Aug-79</td>
<td>Irving Kolodin</td>
<td>US music critic and historian</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hi-Fi/Stereo Review</td>
<td>Oct-79</td>
<td>Eric Saltzman</td>
<td>US scholar music critic, and record producer</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sunday Times</td>
<td>Dec-79</td>
<td>Arthur Jacobs</td>
<td>British musicologist and critic</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Telegraph</td>
<td>May-79</td>
<td>Robert Henderson</td>
<td>Chief music critic for 20 years</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Guardian</td>
<td>Mar-84</td>
<td>Edward Greenfield</td>
<td>Classical music critic for 30 years</td>
<td>No</td>
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The music critics found the performance on this recording to be very convincing and powerful. Royal S. Brown, writing in Fanfare magazine, strongly felt that musically this recording was much better than the Katerina Ismailova one, thanks to the conducting of Rostropovich, the virtuosity of the orchestra and Vishnevskaya’s singing. All other reviewers similarly unanimously praised many of these aspects of the performance. Irving Kolodin in Saturday Review admired the ‘vitality, energy, and tragic force’ and unusually among the critics remarked that ‘under Rostropovich’s inspired direction of a work by his close friend, the emphasis is less on the sexual adventure of Ismailova and her lover

685 Royal S. Brown, ‘This Lady is a Champ,’ Fanfare, September/October 1979, 140–143.
Sergey than with the underlying factors of a loveless marriage.’ Critics noted the passion and force of the opera’s execution, with Robert Henderson of The Daily Telegraph calling it a ‘fiercely committed performance conducted by Rostropovich.’ Arthur Jacobs for The Sunday Times described the recording as ‘the original and more brutal version never previously recorded, […] delivered with fierce conviction by Vishnevskaya with an exceptionally good supporting cast.’

It was when comparing the two versions that most of the critics went along with, or even quoted, Rostropovich’s point of view. The majority accepted the validity of his claim that Shostakovich had been forced to turn Lady Macbeth into Katerina Ismailova against his will. The American Record Guide ran a special opera issue, featuring Lady Macbeth on the front cover. David Moore’s review ‘A Tragic Opera’s Tragic Story’ was placed next to an insert from the record’s sleeve notes written by Volkov and dramatically titled ‘Stalin Was Furious!’ Although, Moore expressed the opinion that musically ‘the original version of this opera is not greatly different from the revision’, Volkov’s emotionally charged article included very politized language and concluded that ‘Shostakovich edited the opera in 1958, giving it a new name Katerina Ismailova. The changes in music and in the text of the libretto were obviously made under the pressure of circumstances.’

Similarly, reviews in the national newspapers retold the story of Stalin’s disapproval and subsequent banning of the opera, before describing the 1979 release as Rostropovich’s passion project. The critics were insistent on the authenticity of this version as opposed to Katerina Ismailova; Edward Greenfield for The Guardian remarked: ‘What the records told us was that though the actual

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686 Irving Kolodin, Untitled, Saturday Review, August 1979, 47.
textual differences are minimal, the total impact of the original can be far greater. 692 Robert Henderson for *The Daily Telegraph* wrote: ‘Except under extreme pressure, Rostropovich insists, Shostakovich would never willingly have altered anything.’ 693

In addition to the review of the recording, *The Gramophone* published an article by the opera producer Mike Ashman entitled ‘Rostropovich and *Lady Macbeth*.’ 694 The title already points out what becomes evident in the body of the article: this is the opera from Rostropovich’s perspective, not the composer’s. It also emphasised the close links between Rostropovich and Shostakovich, with a detailed discussion of external pressures on Shostakovich to make changes during the 1950s, and extensively interviewed Rostropovich about the event. In the interview, Rostropovich noted that ‘overall there was a general simplification of text and music, but it is really impossible to compare the two versions. In time, I think *Lady Macbeth* must be the version to be accepted.’ 695 And further on, in the interview Rostropovich passionately claimed that ‘Shostakovich wouldn’t have changed anything, absolutely not at all if he hadn’t had to. One of the last things he said to me was, “If you perform *Lady Macbeth*, please do the first version”.’ 696

There are two indicators that Rostropovich may have fabricated this story. Firstly, I have not been able to track this story down in any of Rostropovich’s biographies. Wilson, the author of an authoritative biography, tells a different story. In her account, Rostropovich, in a conversation with Shostakovich before his permanent departure to the West, said: ‘Dmitry Dmitryevich, over there I will be able to play your music and record *Lady Macbeth* of Mtsensk and all your symphonies.’ Wilson continues: ‘Through tears Shostakovich said, ‘Well, if you’re going to do the symphonies, then please start with the fourth.’’ 697 There is no mention of *Lady Macbeth*. Moreover, as revealed by Simon Morrison, Rostropovich was prone to ‘memory slips or occasional recourses to

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694 Mike Ashman, ‘Rostropovich and *Lady Macbeth,*’ *The Gramophone,* May 1979, 1861.
695 Ibid.
696 Ibid.
embellishment.’ Hence, Rostropovich’s own words in interviews, especially on such a personal project as the recording of *Lady Macbeth*, should not be taken at face value.

However, critics easily went along with his story. A critic for *E.M.G Monthly Letter* remarked that both Rostropovich and his wife ‘were intimately involved in this revival [of the second version, *Katerina Ismailova*] and contributed to its great success, yet Rostropovich has said that Shostakovich always preferred the original and maintains that he would never have changed a note if he had not had to.’ The author continued that although all the critics have long approved of *Katerina Ismailova*, ‘there is no substitute for the burning intensity and fresh inspiration of the original version.’

Rostropovich emphasised his strong and enduring friendship with Shostakovich, which presumably positioned him as the true interpreter of the composer’s intentions. This was eagerly repeated by the critics. Eric Saltzman in *Hi-Fi/Stereo Review* article, like others, mentioned that only thanks to Rostropovich’s efforts, who was Shostakovich’s friend and mentor, the opera was produced, ‘an act of love on the part of Rostropovich and Vishnevskaya.’

The review in *Opera News* openly called this recording ‘a labour of love by Rostropovich’ and comparing it with the *Katerina Ismailova* record, remarked that the latter was ‘“correct” [played according to the notes but without feeling] while the Rostropovich is alive and eloquent.’

In later years, when discussing the opera or Rostropovich’s involvement with it, critics would continue to strongly associate the recording with Rostropovich: ‘It was Rostropovich, ever provocative, who five years ago brought to light on record the original version of Shostakovich’s opera, *Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk*.’

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700 Ibid.
Only two critics – Dale Harris for *High Fidelity* and Arnold Whittall for *The Gramophone* – were not convinced by Rostropovich’s rhetoric. Harris’s article ‘Shostakovich’s *Lady Macbeth* with her Sting Undiluted’ shifted the discussion from Rostropovich’s to the composer’s perspective. It was a balanced article, where the author admitted that political events could obscure one’s judgement of the two versions: ‘It is of course tempting to believe that Shostakovich’s revisions were carried out purely for reasons of political obedience and the results must therefore be weaker than the original’, he wrote. ‘Nevertheless, the matter is not so simple. A certain number of his changes clearly represent the mature composer’s increased knowledge of vocal technique.’

Whittall, similarly, expressed his dissatisfaction with the *Lady Macbeth* version of the opera as a composition, also noting that Rostropovich admitted putting some changes into the original version in his recording: ‘Purists will note from Rostropovich’s interview published on page 1852 [the article by Mike Ashman] that he has not recorded the original version absolutely unmodified.’

Listening to the recording, we can note that Rostropovich kept some of the vocal lines from the *Katerina Ismailova* version, the one which he and his wife knew well from their Soviet days.

The 1979 recording was much more a Rostropovich project than a Shostakovich opera. The former expressed his eloquent and passionate preference for the version of the opera he had produced and expanded this to indicate that the composer would have preferred that version as well. Most critics accepted this assumption and validated the superiority of Rostropovich’s *Lady Macbeth*.

4.3. Discourses around the Opera and Its Identity

Critical reviews of the opera’s recordings were a part of the broader discourse around *Lady Macbeth/Katerina Ismailova* in Britain. Two events

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704 Dale Harris, ‘Shostakovich’s *Lady Macbeth* with her Sting Undiluted,’ *High Fidelity*, September 1979, 103.
especially generated high interest among critics, contributing to the perception of
the two versions among performers and audiences. In the Cold War period two
different productions of the opera in Britain – one of each version – attracted
substantial attention of the national press. The first was the premiere of Katerina
Ismailova in December 1963 at the Royal Opera House with the composer himself
directing the rehearsals and its revival a year later. The second was the Lady
Macbeth production based on Rostropovich’s recording staged by English

Reviews of the 1963 Katerina Ismailova performance demonstrate that
although the newspaper critics did not have the same misunderstanding as the
Katerina Ismailova record reviewers that this was the same opera under a different
name, they vigorously argued that the differences between the two versions were
minimal and unimportant. Many of them were as young as their record
reviewing peers, so the only way for them to know about the 1930s version
would have been from printed materials. 706

Jeremy Noble, an American music critic writing for The Musical Times,
admired this production and found Katerina Ismailova the more balanced of the
three operas that were in the repertoire that winter, the others being Madame
Butterfly and The Tales of Hoffmann. 707 He discussed the opera from a purely
aesthetic perspective, without any mention of political or social events around its
creation. Half of The Times article about the same premiere was devoted to
discussing the differences between the two versions (the 1935 Lady Macbeth and
Katerina Ismailova), with the author William Mann characterising Lady Macbeth as
‘a byword for “fidgety, screaming neurasthenia” and “wilful dissonance,” a post-
expressionist shocker of supercharged provocative power – a sort of 1930s

706 In 1963 Jeremy Noble (The Musical Times) was 33 years old, William Mann (The Times)
was 39, Kathleen Halton (The Sunday Times) only 26 but she clearly consulted with the
more senior critic Desmond Shawe-Taylor who was 56 then, Andrey Porter (Financial
Times) was 35 and Peter Heyworth (The Observer) was 42 years old.
He praised the deeper, more human portrayal of the heroine in the new version and regarded the musical changes in it favourably.

An article in The Sunday Times departed from this aesthetics-only approach, extensively discussing the ban of the 1930s, and acknowledging that the Royal Opera House had expressed an interest in staging the opera as far back as 1955: “They asked to do it when they heard three years ago Shostakovich was revising it… The revisions are almost entirely musical, though the text has been made more palatable. “If you knew nothing of the political scene,” says Downes [the conductor of the Royal Opera House production], “you’d consider the changes merely a stylistic tightening-up.” Shostakovich, who watched the London rehearsals and suggested small changes, considers this production “very Russian, very good – though quite different from the Russian one.” Similarly, all other articles, praising the work, were quick to note the minimal differences between this version and that produced in the 1930s. Andrew Porter for the Financial Times wrote: ‘Shostakovich’s opera Katerina Ismailova is an unconventional work of genius, and a brilliant and stirring and enthralling composition.’ The changes are small: essentially it is the same opera.

Similarly, Peter Heyworth in The Observer, noted that ‘during the Thaw Shostakovich himself was at work on what we were led to suppose was a substantial revision…. In fact, the title is almost the newest thing about it, for “Katerina Ismailova” differs surprisingly little from the original.’ Even as late as 1979, Desmond Shawe-Taylor writing for The Sunday Times thought the differences between the two versions unimportant, as these ‘distract our attention from something much more important: the unfailing vitality and momentum of this youthful opera.’

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708 From Our Music Critic [William Mann, the main music critic from 1960 to 1982, was 39 years old in 1963], ‘Murderess Who Demands Our Sympathy,’ The Times, 3 December 1963, 15.
711 Ibid.
712 Peter Heyworth, ‘Misalliance in Mtsensk,’ The Observer, 8 December 1963, 29.
Rostropovich’s impact on the perception of the opera extended beyond the production of the 1979 Lady Macbeth recording. It also influenced stage productions. The next performance of the opera after 1963 in Britain came in 1987; the English National Opera staged Rostropovich/Sikorski Lady Macbeth. This production was consistently referred to by music critics who reviewed the performance as ‘the original version.’ As Robert Henderson announced in *The Daily Telegraph*: ‘Though later revised with the title “Katerina Ismailova,” and given in that form at Covent Garden in the 1960s, it was only in 1979 that the original version of “Lady Macbeth” was disinterred, and which is now receiving its British stage premiere at the Coliseum.’ Critics’ opinions differed regarding the production itself, with some admiring it as ‘a relentlessly spectacular production.’ Others believed the excessive emotionality and constant shifts between tragic and satirical presentations, was too much of a ‘crowded theatrical spectacle.’

We observe a conflicting presentation of the opera by the music critics: on the one hand, in 1963 many of them didn’t realise there were two versions of the opera, or believed the differences to be minimal, while on the other, in 1979, there was a trend to support Rostropovich’s positioning of the first version as authentic and substantially different from the second.

5. Modern Performances and Recordings

Performances, including premieres, of *Katerina Ismailova* in the West, took place mainly in the 1960s. They did not actively continue into the 1970s. A substantial barrier may have been the excessive bureaucracy in dealing with the Soviet side to obtain the score and permission to stage the opera. After 1979, *Lady

Macbeth became the version performed in the West on a regular basis and remains so to this day. It was performed much more frequently and widely across the West than Katerina Ismailova. This could also be because both the Sikorski score and the Rostropovich recording were readily available in the West, as opposed to the Soviet score of Katerina Ismailova.

The Operabase performance data demonstrates the imbalance between the productions of the two versions in the past five years. From 1 January 2014 to 15 May 2019, there were a total of 260 performances entitled Lady Macbeth around the world. In the same period, Katerina Ismailova scored only 26 performances (ten times less), all of them either in Russia or ex-Eastern Bloc states (Bulgaria, Ukraine) (Table 6.3). While it goes beyond the scope of this study to determine exactly which scores were used for each of these productions, what is important is the nominal title chosen by the opera directors. It signifies the undoubted preference for the title Lady Macbeth in the West, as opposed to the ex-Soviet Bloc countries.

Table 6.3. Lady Macbeth and Katerina Ismailova Theatre Productions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lady Macbeth</th>
<th>Katerina Ismailova</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2014 - May 2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>8 (Ukraine, Bulgaria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2019 - Dec 2020</td>
<td>8 (Czech Republic, Greece)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Operabase.com accessed 17 May 2017 and 15 May 2019. Although Operabase allows seeing plans until 2029, there are no productions planned that far out.

720 Operabase does not provide free access to data before 2014.
721 A case in point is the 2006 production of Katerina Ismailova rather than Lady Macbeth brought to the Coliseum in London by the Mariinsky Theatre under the Russian conductor Valeriy Gergiyev.
Why such a difference? Several factors could have been at play. Firstly, the Rostropovich recording and Sikorski score created a divide between the Western and Russian versions of the opera. Until the creation of these two objects, there was the official Soviet-approved production of Lady Macbeth of the 1930s exported to the West, and then another official Soviet-approved production of Katerina Ismailova in 1963. However, after 1979 there was a gap between the Soviet and Rostropovich versions of the opera, further widened by the latter’s public antipathy towards anything officially Soviet. Western audiences might have found Lady Macbeth a culturally closer and more familiar title, with possible reference to Shakespeare, making it a better semiotic fit for Western productions. Shostakovich, on the other hand, for a similar reason of cultural identity, could have preferred the Katerina Ismailova title for sounding more Russian. This was recognised by The Guardian’s music critic Tom Sutcliffe; while reviewing the ENO production of 1987 he wrote, ‘think what the opera cost Shostakovich, and why he preferred the Russian name of Katerina Ismailova to the international title, Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District.’

There are many more full recordings of Lady Macbeth in the West than of Katerina Ismailova. In fact, there have been no new Western recordings of Katerina Ismailova since the 1970s. Lady Macbeth has been recorded by various companies, including Deutsche Grammophon (Opéra Bastille, 1992), Opus Arte (Nederlandse Opera, 2006), EMI (Grand Theatre De Liceu Barcelona, 2006) and Art Haus Musik (Maggio Musicale Fiorentino, 2009) to name a few examples. After the Rostropovich recording, another wasn’t made for at least thirteen years, indicating again that it was considered irreplaceable at least for a time. An overview of the top 100 musical works that shaped the twentieth century, run by The Daily Telegraph, concentrated entirely on Lady Macbeth, discussing the 1930s history in detail and singling out one recording: that of Rostropovich.

723 Hulme, Dmitry Shostakovich Catalogue, 89–91 and 467–469.
724 Ibid., 467–469.
725 Ibid.
726 Geoffrey Norris, ’50 works that shaped the century: Number 35 Lady Macbeth of Mtsensk by Dmitry Shostakovich,’ The Daily Telegraph, 28 August 1999, 60.
The 1979 _Lady Macbeth_ recording has been regularly reissued by EMI. A particularly important reissue was its release on the series _Great Recordings of the Century_ in 2002, then in 2006 and 2009. The EMI 1979 recording now holds its iconic status, even more so after the passing of so many years. The narrative of Rostropovich rescuing the composer’s authentic version from obscurity persists today. The sleeve notes on the 2002 and 2006 CDs claim: ‘Shorty after Shostakovich’s death in August 1975, the Melodiya recording was licensed by EMI and given wider circulation. However, plans were already afoot to record the “real” _Lady Macbeth_. One of the last things Shostakovich had said to Rostropovich was: “If you perform _Lady Macbeth_, please do the first version.”

The notes on the CDs, written by Richard Osborne, a music critic for _The Gramophone_, similarly to the 1979 sleeve notes, describe the romantic story of how Rostropovich found the forgotten 1932 score at the Library of Congress in Washington D.C. where he was working.

6. Conclusion

Several factors led to the dominance of _Lady Macbeth over Katerina Ismailova_ in the Western canon. The key was the release of the brilliant EMI recording in 1979 which received unanimous critical approval for its musical and technical qualities and quickly became the golden standard for the production of _Lady Macbeth_ in the West. Listening to recordings reinforces expectations and stereotypes of the correct way a work should be performed: people expect to hear the 1932 _Lady Macbeth_ in the opera house because that is the recording they know. _Lady Macbeth_, since 1979, has dominated over _Katerina_ in the record shops due to constant reissues, new recordings of this version and, arguably, the higher quality of these recordings over the Melodiya release of _Katerina Ismailova_ in 1964. There have been no new recordings of _Katerina Ismailova_ outside the ex-Soviet Bloc.

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This has a knock-on effect on one’s judgement of the right way the work should be performed on stage. An important cultural factor facilitating the dominance of *Lady Macbeth* over *Katerina Ismailova* was the change in the public’s listening habits and the development of a recording listening culture: members of the public would buy and collect and listen to recordings at home. Such a practice meant that a listener who bought the 1979 EMI recording of *Lady Macbeth* would listen to it repeatedly, thus engraining in his/her mind the one and only interpretation of the opera which he/she would then expect to hear in the opera house or on the radio.

The presentation of this recording through the critics’ emphasis on its difference from *Katerina Ismailova* widened the gap between the two versions. Rostropovich’s and Volkov’s strong anti-Soviet stance and Rostropovich’s insistence that he, as a close friend, knew better than anyone else which version Shostakovich preferred further skewed the discourse. At the same time, Shostakovich who died in 1975 could not say anything on the matter, thus placing Rostropovich in the position of his interpreter. In addition, the fascination with the ‘urtext’ of a musical work in the 1970s and 80s further led to regarding the Sikorski score and Rostropovich recording as the authoritative interpretation of the opera.

This case study has outlined the importance of cultural objects and the surrounding discourse they generate. The professional critical reviews agreed on the technical and artistic superiority of the EMI recording over the Soviet one. However, several events of 1979 built a discourse that supported a preference for the 1930s version in the West to the detriment of the second version, despite the latter being favoured by the composer himself. These were the media presentation of the opera’s miraculous revival by Rostropovich, biased articles by Volkov and Rostropovich, the claim of Urtext status by the Sikorski score, and the publication of *Testimony*. Today, the most prestigious music publishers Boosey and Hawkes use the Sikorski version of the score. In describing the work, their website unambiguously asserts the importance of the 1979 events and the canonical status of *Lady Macbeth* in Western music: ‘Since the rediscovery of the
original version in the 1980s, this opera has hardly been absent from the international operatic scene. It may now be considered standard repertory.\textsuperscript{728}

In April 2018 the Royal Opera House revived its 2004 production of \textit{Lady Macbeth}, explicitly stating in the programme notes that it was the first version. In their welcome note, the Music Director of the ROH Antonio Pappano and Director of Opera Oliver Mears described the work in the most provocative terms:

Shostakovich’s opera was nothing less than an act of dissidence: a denunciation of the tedium, brutality and group-think of the new Russia. With its bitter satire, of the police, its uncompromising depiction of Siberian incarceration, its unashamed modernism and above all its passionate advocacy of love and individualism, it is small wonder that the opera caused Stalin to take personal offence.\textsuperscript{729}

This is an example of presenting Shostakovich in contemporary mass culture that Fairclough has described as ‘tactics to shock and impress us with Shostakovich’s political relevance.’ She rightly claims that the image of ‘tragic Shostakovich’ is currently exploited by classical music organisations in need of attracting money-paying audiences through a strong, provocative, one-sided story that does not necessarily reflect the complexity of reality behind it.\textsuperscript{730}

Admittedly, the full-length programme notes by Rosamund Bartlett for the same Royal Opera House performance are more balanced and divulge the complexities surrounding the writing and performance of the opera and its two versions.\textsuperscript{731} Her discussion includes several points that are rarely mentioned in popular, public-facing notes on the opera: that Shostakovich often wrote music in support of the Soviet regime; that \textit{Katerina} was created in order to allow the opera into the Soviet musical canon; and that he revised the opera out of his own will (and not under political pressure) in the early 1950s.

\textsuperscript{729} \textit{Lady Macbeth} Programme Notes, Royal Opera House, 12 April 2018, 3.
\textsuperscript{730} Fairclough, \textit{Dmitry Shostakovich}, 7.
\textsuperscript{731} Rosamund Bartlett, ‘From the Nose to the Lady’ and ‘The Impact of \textit{Lady Macbeth}’, \textit{Lady Macbeth} Programme Notes, Royal Opera House, 12 April 2018, 11–17 and 42–46.
It is encouraging to see that some contemporary discourses around the opera are more nuanced than in previous decades. *Lady Macbeth* continues to dominate over *Katerina Ismailova* in the Western canon even today without any sign of giving up its positions to *Katerina Ismailova*. Critics and educators discussing the work in public lectures and programme notes now often recognise the importance of political and social events in shaping the creation and perception of the opera. *Lady Macbeth* is still likely to act as the ‘go-to’ version for Western productions; what this chapter aimed to do is to highlight the controversial history behind the opera and the role of particular individuals and objects in shaping its place in the Western canon.
Conclusion

1. Transnational Connections

This thesis has shed new light on the cultural relations between two apparently opposite ideological systems – the communist Soviet Union and capitalist West – in the Détente period. These relations have been investigated in two main ways: through the application of ANT to the analysis of business, political and cultural relations between public and private agents (Part I), and through the application of CDA to the analysis of the musical objects (recordings) that moved or were created through these relationships, as well as their perception through critical reviews (Part II).

Cultural and, in particular, musical relations were an indispensable part of Soviet-West interactions from the 1950s until the collapse of the USSR. Over the years they took on different forms, first as official government-induced exchanges, then as initiatives of individual impresarios, artists and businessmen. The British public was exposed to performances by Soviet musicians not only through their tours but also through radio broadcasts and recordings. The latter two, however, were the most wide-reaching channels through which the music spread, being more accessible than concerts. I have traced the networks of key relationships and agents around the production and sale of Soviet recordings in the UK during the Thaw and Cold War years, and in so doing have demonstrated that contrary to prevalent beliefs, the period of the 1960s–70s was not characterised by cultural stagnation.

From the 1950s, early concerts organised by friendship societies acquainted British audiences with Soviet musicians and generated demand for more concerts and recordings. The latter were made by the largest Western record companies, which sought out direct arrangements with the Soviet Ministry of Culture for making and licensing recordings. The USSR developed relationships with various leading international players, such as Le Chant du Monde in France, Ariola in West Germany and Capitol Records (part of EMI) and then CBS in the USA. I have analysed the three main channels through which Soviet music recordings came to the West in general, and the UK specifically, in the 1960s–70s: recordings of Soviet
performers made while on tour in the West (Chapters 2 and 3), licensing agreements between large foreign record companies and the USSR (Chapter 4) and imports of Soviet records (Chapter 4). The most successful and productive long-term licensing agreement in Britain was that between the Soviet Union and EMI Group of 1968–1982.

The depth of the Soviet Union’s integration into the global record business is difficult to determine precisely. Export figures discussed by Hanson and Sanchez-Sibony tell us about the movement of recordings from the USSR to the West, but a large proportion of the recordings that I have discussed were made directly in the West, either using Soviet tapes or by Soviet musicians who came there on tours or for recording projects. One would need to know sales figures of all Soviet music records, licensed, exported and made in the West across at least the top Western markets. Such information would need to be gathered on a company-by-company basis; much of this data, however, remains confidential, if it exists at all. Therefore, it is only possible to surmise, without exact figures, that there was growth in the spread and consumption of Soviet recordings internationally during the Cold War. This conclusion is based on two observations: the increasing amounts of archival documents relating to recording projects between private Western corporations and the Soviet state that are held at the Moscow archives, and the number of different Soviet recordings produced both under licensing agreements and those made directly in the West throughout the Détente period.

We can also infer that this growth was nevertheless inhibited by the Soviet system, which prevented the USSR from completely integrating into the international market. The Soviet state owned the domestic recording facilities and its bureaucratic organisations, the Ministry of Culture, Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga and Melodiya, had substantial decision-making powers on where and what Soviet performers could perform and record. Therefore, awkward differences of the communist system, such as requests for country-specific distribution rights, debates over copyright law, complicated internal bureaucracy and security concerns, all undermined relations with Western partners.
The recording projects that developed out of relationships between the USSR and the private Western record companies always possessed a substantial transnational dimension. From the Western record companies and their staff that executed the project, to the geographical location of the recording session; from the musicians involved to the distribution and marketing of the actual record – all of this was often spread across several countries. In Chapter 3, I demonstrated this geographical breadth through the example of recordings made in the West by Richter. His recording activity covered all five most important markets (France, the UK, the USA, Germany and Japan) and extended well beyond these to include the entirety of the West and Eastern Europe.

The work of the USSR in international recordings projects has a legacy that lingers today. Recordings of Russian musicians continue to be highly valued by Western listeners. Despite the collapse of the USSR and the economic and political turmoil of the 1990s, Russian classical music education produces high-class musicians that find recognition, fame and recording contracts across the West. Most recent names include the violinist Alina Ibragimova (partially Russian-trained), the pianists Denis Matsuyev and Daniil Trifonov and the oboist Alexey Ogrintchuk. In the new capitalist Russian economy, there is no need for them to seek state approval to engage in recording projects and concerts in the West and in Russia. They follow in the footsteps of their predecessors, the Soviet superstar musicians, but the change to a capitalist system has made things easier and even more integrated.

2. The Interaction of State and Private Agents

When it comes to understanding Cold War cultural exchange, Mikkonen and Suutari have appealed to researchers to consider the role of individual agents and their motives and relationships, as well as audience perceptions of exchange.

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732 For their full discography see the following links:
https://www.discogs.com/artist/2104651-Alina-Ibragimova
https://www.discogs.com/artist/3694054-Daniil-Trifonov and
https://www.discogs.com/artist/3047708-Denis-Matsuev and
and of the artefacts that were brought or sent across the Iron Curtain. In tracing the multifaceted relations between the private sphere and the state in the UK and the USSR this thesis has demonstrated how human and material actors both amplified and distorted the cultural diplomacy goals of the Soviet and British states. I have considered human agents in a variety of forms: starting from aggregated state systems, I broke them down into specific bureaucratic decision-making organisations and, where possible, identified names of individuals who made decisions and signed documents and contracts. On the Western side, this thesis investigated the previously neglected role of private actors in transnational relations between the West and the USSR. These were either profit-making corporations or private individuals that were not connected to or influenced by Western government bodies in their business affairs with the USSR.

Starting from the 1950s, large record companies were often involved in the tours of classical performers run by individual impresarios, meaning that recordings by Soviet musicians made and licensed abroad were very much part of the capitalist music touring and record industry. The USSR started to play by its rules, but could still decide which musicians participated in the tours and recording sessions and on what conditions. As identified by Tomoff in relation to the USA, the key challenge was how to align Soviet state interest in displaying the achievements of communism with the private, commercial interests of its Western counterparts.

While Soviet motivations regarding the issue of recordings were primarily ideological in the 1950s, by the 1970s they had become highly commercial. As demonstrated in Chapter 2, when it came to record deals in the 1950s, many in the USSR believed that the promotion of a positive image of Soviet classical music abroad was more important than financial gains, with the decision often being made to sell records at low prices. However, motivations of Soviet bureaucrats became more financially-driven in the 1970s due to the need for foreign currency to cover its growing import demands; therefore, Soviet foreign

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733 Mikkonen and Suutari, Music, Art and Diplomacy, 159.
734 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 173.
735 Tomoff, Virtuosi Abroad, 147.
trade organisations, including Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga sought opportunities to earn money on the export of Soviet recordings and the performing talent of Soviet musicians. At the same time, the musicians themselves had private and varying motivations for engaging in recording projects abroad. As demonstrated by the example of Richter, musicians’ choices could be driven by their interest in a particular repertoire, venue, collaborators and potential audience recognition. By positioning the USSR as a player in the international music recording industry and revealing individual motivations, this thesis contributes to a wider trend in academic research which has sought to demystify the view of the Soviet Union as a monolithic ideologically-driven machine in its foreign relations. It has also expanded upon such research by looking at an as-yet undiscussed element: classical music recordings.

Equally, Western record labels had diverse, largely apolitical, motivations in establishing recording contracts with the USSR and its musicians, meaning that the movements of people and recordings in the 1960s and 70s can be understood as sitting outside of governmental cultural diplomacy. For Western record labels, the licensing deals were a way of establishing long-term stable relationships with the USSR in order to secure guaranteed access to recording highly sought-after Soviet artists in the West. What is more, the record companies treated famous Soviet musicians as part of a global system of recording, marketing and sales and considered the releases of Soviet recordings within their global pipeline of classical music recordings.

It was because of this alignment of Soviet and private imperatives for recording that the Brezhnev years became a golden era for Soviet classical music recordings in the UK, when a vast and diverse number of musicians and new repertoire was recorded, licensed, manufactured as LPs, and distributed. I have demonstrated that thanks to the licensing and recording agreements, Western listeners could hear a larger number of Soviet performers than ever before. The movement of recordings became particularly useful in this respect when it came to hearing ensembles. While Western audiences might catch soloists in concerts as well as on record, Soviet opera troupes and orchestras rarely toured abroad, meaning that
recordings offered a near-unique chance to hear their interpretations of full-length Russian-language operas and of symphonic works. An extension of this thesis might be to explore such ensemble recordings and their reception further, since my focus here was more on soloists.

In seeking to illuminate how recordings of Soviet musicians, either made abroad or imported, reached Western ears, my focus was on the mass dissemination of recordings, which was first and foremost economically driven. I also took the stance that LPs, which could be listened to and examined multiple times in the home, had a greater impact than radio broadcasts. To complete the picture, a future angle might be to trace how and why performances by Soviet musicians were broadcast and received in the same period.

3. The Power of Non-Human Actors

In addition to considering the interaction of human actors in their various forms across state borders, following Piekut, this thesis has demonstrated how material objects (Soviet recordings) can act as agents in their own right. Contrary to Taruskin’s view that an actor has to have a subjective feeling component to be considered as such, I adhered to the ANT stance that to be impactful, ‘an actor need not realize, understand or intend the difference it makes, but it nonetheless should be accounted for in the analysis.’ Within the scope of this thesis, such convictions necessitated the analysis of the recordings’ impact on the British listener, through exploring the breadth of their spread and their reception in the press.

Writing in 1935, Walter Benjamin described the ‘aura’ of the work of art as representing the history around the work and the tradition of listening or viewing that surrounds it. Another indispensable part of the artwork’s true aura, as opposed to its copy (through film, photography or recordings), are the established real-life social interactions around it. Benjamin’s main criticism of copies of

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artworks, which for him included recordings, was that they did not have any such aura at the time. However, by 1960 a whole new listening culture with its specific rituals and discourses had developed in the West, arguably, turning the recording into a true work of art with its own aura.

This aura, I would argue, constructs the perception of and discourses around the musical work in the listener’s mind. I have used the aura of a recording as a proxy for listener’s perceptions and have speculated what kind of meanings and discourses it could have generated. The aura was manifested through the images, sleeve notes and critical reviews of Soviet recordings available in the UK. It also revealed itself through the aural peculiarities of the musical work on that particular recording, performed by particular musicians and recorded and played back with specific technical equipment. Although I have briefly touched upon the most crucial innovations in recording and play-back technology during the Cold War, I have chosen not to analyse the aural characteristics of the records, focusing instead on the visual and textual aspects of the recordings, which contributed to the making of its aura. The focus of my research is the perception of the sounds, not the sounds themselves.

The Western record companies were the main creators of imagery and sleeve notes for the Soviet recordings, considering the latter within their broader marketing strategy that encompassed both Western and Soviet performers. I have analysed the cover images of a large sub-set of Soviet recordings produced by EMI in the UK over fifteen years from 1967 under the licensing agreement with the USSR and have identified common patterns and presentational biases. The imagery on the Melodiya/HMV series, I have shown, could be divided into several categories; some were consistent with the presentation of Western classical music on record and others carried a specific Soviet or Russian narrative.

The most substantial among the former was the imagery of superstar performers, which was not subject to any national stereotypes. Through such images Western record companies constructed a persona of an international classical musician which could be sold to customers in a variety of Western markets. Other images, however, especially those for orchestral works by Soviet
or Russian composers frequently followed Russian stereotypes: snowy landscapes, churches and folk scenes. Such Russian images, including those of church domes, were especially common in cases when the musical composition was not devoted to an event or particular textual narratives. This was consistent with EMI’s approach to marketing Soviet recordings through other channels, like magazine advertisements, whereby the Melodiya/HMV releases were positioned as ‘Russian’ rather than ‘Soviet.’

In 1986, an American supporter of Soviet underground rock bands, Joanna Stingray, secretly brought several tapes of their music to the USA and released an LP entitled ‘Red Wave: 4 Underground Bands from the USSR’ (Figure (Conclusion)). It featured four of the most active (and later on, very famous) rock bands that were not part of the official music scene and could not release their music on Melodiya: Kino, Aquarium, Alisa and Strange Games. Their semi-official position within the Soviet Union was a substantial part of the attraction of this album. Despite representing opposite sides of the Soviet musical arena, the imagery for this album and Soviet classical music records was strikingly similar: the background of the rock album is dominated by a church, Saint Basil’s Cathedral in Red Square, a highly recognisable Russian landmark. This demonstrates the consistency of Western associations with music from the Soviet Union, irrespective of genre and status: the symbol of the Russian orthodox church was relevant for all categories of Western listeners as an eternal and instantly recognisable symbol of the country, even despite the USSR being an officially atheist state.
My analysis of the contrasting Western positioning of Shostakovich’s controversial Symphony No. 13 *Babi y Yar* and his official Soviet oratorio *Song of the Forests* through record cover art has uncovered that the degree of an image’s controversy depended on the record company’s relationship with the USSR. Long-term Soviet partners, like EMI, Deutsche Grammophon and Ariola avoided explicitly provocative covers, whereas companies like RCA and Everest Records, who did not have a relationship with the USSR, intentionally sought to gain attention and sales through anti-Soviet imagery and texts. Moreover, the choice of imagery for Soviet records was also a reflection of the more general creativity level of the record labels: for instance, neither Deutsche Grammophon nor EMI were known for their inventive covers, whereas RCA and Philips were more audacious and imaginative in their choices of illustrations. I have argued that the imagery and sleeve notes were part of the record’s aura and influenced consumers’ perception of the music, starting from the moment they were displayed on the shelves of the record shops.

Ultimately, it was the interaction of human and material actors that created the discourses and perceptions around a musical work on record. The record shop workers were the ones to decide where to place them in the shop, and the
record company’s marketing team determined how much advertising a new record would receive in the industry press. Recording technology, decisions by audio engineers and playback equipment influenced the perception of music on the LP: for instance, it was possible to artificially limit the dynamic range of the recording, therefore narrowing the gap between the loudest and softest passages in the music.

This mix of human and non-human influences is the key distinctive feature of ANT that makes it so productive in application to the present topic, where technology, politics, business and music are interwoven. I investigated this interaction of humans and objects especially in the case study of Shostakovich’s *Lady Macbeth* and *Katerina Ismailova* on record. The release of the 1979 Rostropovich-EMI recording, which received unanimous critical approval for its musical and technical qualities and quickly became the golden standard for the production of *Lady Macbeth* in the West, generated expectations about which version of the opera should be performed: from this point on, Western audiences expected to hear the 1932 *Lady Macbeth* in the opera house. Constant reissues and new recordings of *Lady Macbeth* rather than *Katerina* (under the 1979 record’s influence) have further cemented its position in the Western canon. The presentation of this recording by human actors – the critics, and their emphasis on its difference from *Katerina Ismailova* – widened the gap between the two versions. Rostropovich’s and Volkov’s strong anti-Soviet stance and Rostropovich’s insistence that he, as a close friend, knew better than anyone else which version Shostakovich preferred, further skewed the discourse.

The power of images to shape consumers’ perceptions and attitudes towards classical music is as strong today as it was during the Cold War. Recognising the continuing fascination with Soviet performing superstars, Melodiya (no longer a state monopoly) has found its niche in the current market economy.\(^738\) During the 1990s it lost all its recording facilities and tumbled into oblivion. It turned itself

\(^738\) Melodiya had been government owned, even following the break-up of the USSR. On 7 February 2020, it was sold to a private firm Formaks that develops online streaming services and is affiliated with Melodiya top management. Source: https://melody.su/melody/events/42192/ accessed 21 February 2020.
around in the early 2000s. Melodiya now specialises in issuing expensive comprehensive box sets of archival recordings of famous Soviet soloists aimed at Western record collectors. These are packaged in beautifully crafted sturdy boxes and are priced, depending on the size of a set, from as low as £100 to over £1,000. It is often the superstars of the Cold War era that Melodiya chooses for such products: Richter, Gilels, Oistrakh, Rostropovich, Kondrashin, Mravinsky, Barshai and so on.\textsuperscript{739}

Their covers are imaginative: for instance, Richter’s box set is black, but on opening it the covers of individual discs represent a piano keyboard. Conceptually, the box sets adhere to the established Western tradition of presenting the superstar performer through their image, by including many photographs from the company archive into the sleeve notes. Soviet musicians have become an established part of this tradition, kept alive by Western companies and Melodiya alike.

Such reissues also indicate that performers of the Soviet times are regarded as more important than the repertoire. Finally, they illustrate the broader ideas about recordings that have been expressed in academic literature and discussed across this thesis. Recordings have a greater impact on the consumer’s perception of the music because they can be listened to repeatedly; they inspire purchase for the sake of collection and interpretations of the music can change depending on packaging and presentation. Contemporary Melodiya box sets have been released in limited numbers in the West and appear to be treated as collectible items.\textsuperscript{740}

4. Impact and Moving Forward

This thesis has investigated the cultural relations between the USSR and Britain and the role of Soviet recordings in British society during the Cold War. It has uncovered previously ignored relationships and the movement of cultural

\textsuperscript{739} They also issue standard CDs and provide website downloads. Lacking a recording studio, Melodiya has been active in undertaking live recording projects.

\textsuperscript{740} For example, see https://classicalmusicguide.com/viewtopic.php?t=45412 accessed 14 March 2020.
products that formed an important part of Western society especially during the Détente. I have blended together the research of Fairclough, Tomoff, Herrala and Mikkonen on the touring and recording of Soviet musicians, the musicological inquiries of Cook, Symes and Katz into the cultural product of the music recording, and the research into economic relations between the Cold War West and the USSR of Sanchez-Sibony and Hanson. On top of this, through the application of elements of ANT, I have brought to light the sophisticated interactions of state and private human and material actors in the global record industry between private Western record companies and the bureaucratic state organisations of the Soviet Union. I have provided explanations and motivations for the creation and exchange of recordings between the USSR and the West. Finally, I have demonstrated the important role of the material object of the Soviet music recording in Western society and the discourses it added to the classical music listening culture of the times, and to longer-term perceptions of Soviet music and musicians.

Given the diversity of Soviet recordings in the Cold War West, I necessarily had to decide which of them would serve as the subject of my case studies. Focusing on Richter as the most sought-after Soviet performer and Shostakovich as one of the most ambiguous, therefore widely debated, Soviet composers was a logical, but not the sole, option. There are other performers with a substantial Western discography, for example, David Oistrakh or Emil Gilels, who also merit investigation. With more space, I might have complemented my study of Shostakovich with another prominent Soviet composer who was and remains popular abroad: Prokofiev. Or, alternatively, I could have spent more time on the recordings of music by so-called unofficial composers, such as Gubaidulina, Schnittke and Denisov, though to do so who have entailed stretching my time period beyond the early 1980s.

In analysing the images of the Melodiya/HMV set, I did not have the capacity to do a textual analysis of all the sleeve notes. Further research of the textual components of the Shostakovich sleeve notes on Melodiya/HMV and their placement in context of other record labels’ Shostakovich sleeve notes, is likely to
generate fascinating insights into his positioning to the Western listener that would complement the visual analysis. Looking at a larger sample of Shostakovich recordings in the West pre- and post-1979, the year of the Rostropovich Lady Macbeth recording and the publication of Testimony, carries the potential to uncover more exactly what the impact of these events was on the presentation of Shostakovich in mass culture. Post-1991, it would be logical to inquire whether Russian stereotypes in discourses around Russian recordings in the West have persisted into the twenty-first century. An analysis of the visual presentation of contemporary recordings of Russian and Soviet orchestral works, those made by Western record companies and those exported by Melodiya, would provide valuable data to answer this question.
# Appendix A. Sviatoslav Richter Discography in the West (British Library Sound Archive, July 1983)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Orchestra</th>
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<th>Composers</th>
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Note: Includes only disks recorded in the West (not in the USSR).

*CDM is Le Chant du Monde, DG is Deutsche Grammophon.
### Appendix B. Full List of Melodiya/HMV Recordings

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Note: If a record has different composers on each side of the disk, these are usually indicated on different lines of the table but under the same EMI release number (the same ASD).
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