Justice and Apology in the Aftermath of War and Mass Crime: 
Contemporary Serbia and the German Model

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Abstract

West Germany’s record of dealing with National Socialism is often held up as a model to be emulated by states emerging out of war and mass crimes. This article traces the external application of the German model to contemporary Serbia, as represented by the two tropes of “Nuremberg” (justice) and “Willy Brandt’s Kniefall” (apology). It argues that both events were divorced from their own historical circumstances and presented as co-temporaneous elements of a model that set unrealistic normative benchmarks when applied to the Serbian national context, resulting in public resistance, official “transactional compliance,” and mimicry devoid of substance. The article advances instead a comparative history approach to the two cases, adopting an equivalent periodization focused on the first two postwar decades in both countries (post-1945 in West Germany and post-2000 in Serbia). Placing Germany’s process of postwar memory construction in a historical and comparative light, rather than viewing it as an ideal-typical model to be emulated, provides a more productive way of analyzing the complexities of national memory processes in post-conflict states.

Keywords: Germany, Serbia, justice, apology, Nuremberg, Willy Brandt, ICTY

Introduction: the German model as a hegemonic narrative and the Serbian case

The German model of “coming to terms with the past” has, since the 1990s, been a key signifier in discourses and debates about memorialization and transitional justice around the world. Analysts and activists have held up the German experience as a “gold standard for dealing with a difficult past,” and protagonists of various democratic revolutions from South Africa and Eastern Europe to the Arab Spring have invoked the German experience or been told to learn from it. Narratives of the German model are often infused with a normative—even quasi-religious—quality and Germany has been characterized as a “model penitent” or “master atoner,” while other countries have been held up to the German standard in dealing with their own wartime legacies and found wanting. As Mischa Gabowitsch notes: “Today, from Australia to Canada and from Russia to Rwanda, there is hardly a single debate about present-day attitudes toward past atrocities that will not
sooner or later be punctuated by a reference to the German experience of post-war atonement—just as the atrocities themselves are often viewed through the lens of the Holocaust.”

In a number of respects, the German model can be seen as representing a global hegemonic memory narrative, defined as a set of “experiences and memories transformed into a knowledge system, as a filtered and normalized canon.” Since the 1990s, it has become operationalized by international organizations, human rights activists and Western donors through practices broadly subsumed under the field of transitional justice, defined as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation.” The concept of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“coming to terms with the past”), which has been used as a shorthand reference to the German model, initially emerged in the West German public sphere in the late 1950s as a critical and even ironic term. However, by the 21st century, it came to denote Germany’s perceived success in dealing with its Nazi past through legal prosecution, apology, reparations, educational reform and cultural memorialization—all of which have since become elements of a UN-endorsed “tool kit” for dealing with the past. As some scholars have noted, the narrative of the German model is inherently oversimplified and ahistorical, not doing justice to Germany’s continuing and complex history of memory, which remains subject to multiple interpretations, contestations and re-evaluations, not least in Germany itself. Nevertheless, it remains a powerful reference point for human rights and memory activists, liberal states and international institutions.

Hegemonic narratives are rooted in power relations, and the German model is no exception. In the liberal internationalist post-Cold War era, a public commitment to “coming to terms with the past,” became a prerequisite for a country’s membership of international institutions, such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN), and thus “a key to participation in the global political arena.” All states are expected to comply with international human rights norms, cooperate with international criminal tribunals and, where appropriate, adopt the tools and commemorative practices along the lines prescribed. While no sanctions are proposed for non-adherence to the prescribed practices, other forms of pressure aimed at ensuring compliance, notably “conditionality”
for membership of international organizations (the EU or the UN) or for much needed financial aid packages for economic reconstruction. Such tangible incentives are often accompanied by moral pressure, for example, by the adoption of resolutions on the appropriate memorialization of mass crimes by international bodies and wealthy donor states. Small, weak states emerging from periods of authoritarianism or conflict—which are usually in grave need of access to Western aid and markets, as well as international legitimation—are particularly susceptible to such pressures. Yet it is precisely these states that also have the greatest trouble adopting the required measures because conflicts do not just end when armed violence ceases and the structures of authoritarianism do not just disappear when regime change takes place.

Global hegemonic narratives, like that of the German model, inevitably “travel” to specific national contexts—where local narratives concerning crimes, victimhood and responsibility predominate—and become caught up in domestic political struggles over memory. As Aleida Assmann notes, even in the age of globalization and transcultural memory, the national frame remains salient and needs to be taken seriously. This article examines the “travel” of the hegemonic narrative of the German model and its adaptation to a specific national context—that of Serbia. Serbia is a particularly appropriate case study for this analysis. The emergence of the Holocaust as a floating signifier and a focal point on the global memory landscape in the 1990s coincided with the unfolding of the Yugoslav wars, in which Serb atrocities recalled in some ways those of the Nazis and were also portrayed as such by the international media, human rights organizations and Western governments. As Daniel Levy and Natan Szaider note, the link created in the media between the horrifying crimes of the Bosnian war and the Holocaust resulted in the forging of a broad perception in which “the Serbs became the Nazis, and the Muslims were the Jews.” These depictions were given additional authority by the activism of some American Jewish organizations and well-known public intellectuals in the United States and Western Europe, who repeatedly referred to the Holocaust while calling for military intervention against the Serbs. By the time of the Kosovo War in 1999, the image of Serbia’s President Slobodan Milošević as a new Adolf Hitler was cemented in the West. In Germany itself, the year 1999 marked an important ideological transformation of a segment of the
left-wing ’68 generation of political leaders, such as Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer and Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping, who pursued German participation in NATO’s military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) despite the history of German atrocities in Serbia during the Second World War. Meanwhile, some public intellectuals, such as the American historian Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, whose widely discussed book *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* had equated the Germans with the Nazis, now depicted the Serbs as “ Milošević’s Willing Executioners” and called for Serbia’s leader to be removed and “the large percentage of the Serbian people” who had supported him to be subjected to a program of re-education and rehabilitation, as had been done by the Allies in post-1945 Germany. By October 2000, when Milošević was ousted from power by an opposition-led popular uprising, the German model had achieved hegemonic status of how to deal with the past, and Serbia was viewed as the prime candidate for its application.

Drawing on a wide secondary literature on Germany and Serbia, and a range of primary sources—including speeches, memoirs, interviews, public opinion surveys and official documents, such as parliamentary declarations—this article will first highlight the ways in which external actors referred to the German model in their relations with Serbia, before turning, in the second section, to the Serbian reactions to this hegemonic narrative. It will argue that, in the Serbian case, the application of the German model was focused on two key tropes: Nuremberg and Willy Brandt’s iconic *Kniefall* at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial, broadly representing “justice” and “apology.” It will show how these tropes were divorced from their own historical circumstances and presented as co-temporaneous elements of a model that set unrealistic normative benchmarks when applied to the Serbian national context. It will then argue that external pressures to adopt the German model have not produced any genuine reckoning with the wars of the 1990s in Serbia. In contrast to the ahistorical German model, it will focus on how both Serbia’s context—defined by the prevalence of a well-established victimhood narrative and a precarious political transition—and the official reactions by successive governments to external imperatives to “come to terms with the past” recalled in some important ways those of West Germany in its own first two postwar decades. Finally, the article
highlights that, despite the various official references to—and even mimicry of—German atonement in Serbia, by the end of their initial post-conflict periods, it is possible to discern a clear divergence in the trajectory of the two countries. Whereas the mid-1960s represented a first important turning point in the Federal Republic’s history of memory regarding its Nazi past, Serbia at the end of its second post-Milošević decade has sunk into even deeper oblivion about its own role in the post-Yugoslav wars. The reasons for this divergence, it will be argued at the end, can also be illuminated by casting the two countries in a comparative historical perspective.

Traveling memory: external applications of the German model to Serbia

While the contours of hegemonic narratives—such as that of the German model—broadly remain stable, their evocations vary depending on both the historical moment and the specific circumstances of each case. Even within the post-Yugoslav region, Western interlocutors referred to different aspects of the German model in different local settings and with varying intensity. In contrast, for example, with Bosnia—where the German model has usually been associated with the trope of reconciliation (referencing postwar Franco-German reconciliation)—and with Croatia—where it has been referenced more sporadically—in Serbia, evocations of the German model have been ubiquitous and the emphasis has, above all, been on justice (referencing Nuremberg) and apology (referencing Willy Brandt’s iconic 1970 genuflection at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial). While other aspects of the German model have also been invoked (denazification, reconciliation, reparations), these have not been as long-lived or as intensely debated over time.

The first important external application of the German model to Serbia has been that of “Nuremberg,” which was the mnemonic signifier underlying the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. The ICTY was self-consciously created in 1993 as an “echo” of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) and its protagonists often invoked the Nuremberg legacy as the seminal reference for their work. Louise Arbour, the ICTY’s second Chief Prosecutor, thus noted: “Collectively […] we’re linked to Nuremberg. We mention its name every
When discussing the purpose and the remit of the new Tribunal, policymakers and lawyers often referred to the “lessons” of Nuremberg. For example, Madeleine Albright, the US Ambassador to the UN, evoked the problem of retroactivity (trying crimes that had not previously been codified in international law) which had “encumbered the Nuremberg trials” and affirmed that “unlike the world of the 1940s, international humanitarian law today is impressively codified, well understood, agreed upon and enforceable.” She also argued that “this will be no victor’s tribunal”—a point that was also reinforced by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who stated that, in contrast to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY “is not the organ of a group of States; it is an organ of the whole international community.” Meanwhile, the Nuremberg principle of “individual guilt” was maintained, in the hope that, faced with the criminal responsibility of their leaders, Serbs and other post-Yugoslavs would disown their former regimes—much as the Germans had rejected Hitler and the Nazi leadership during the Nuremberg trial.

As the prominent transitional justice scholar Diane Orentlicher notes, the hope of the ICTY’s supporters rested “in part on a notion to which international lawyers have long been attracted—that Germany’s ‘impressive achievements in facing its own past’ are due in meaningful part to the Allied nations’ prosecution of Nazi war criminals in Nuremberg.” Like the IMT, which was conceived by the Allies as part of “a broader project to ‘reorient’ German society away from authoritarianism, militarism and Nazism,” the ICTY’s mission was not only to render justice but also to “educate” societies in the post-Yugoslav space about their recent past and create a basis for inter-ethnic reconciliation and long-term peace; this, the ICTY claimed it was doing, by “combating denial and preventing attempts at revisionism.” However—for all its important contributions to the subsequent development of international law and historiography of the Second World War, the removal of the Nazi leadership from Germany’s political scene and, most importantly, of justice served for some of the most heinous crimes known to humankind—the “pedagogical” impact of Nuremberg and other Allied trials on German society during the initial decades of Germany’s postwar history has been overstated. International tribunals had little impact on either the national hegemonic narrative of German victimhood or the public’s willingness to consider any political responsibility for the crimes
committed by their former regime.\textsuperscript{35} Indeed, in the proclamation of the lofty aims of the “new Nuremberg,” it often went unmentioned that subsequent Allied war crimes trials and denazification policies had been quickly abandoned and that, by 1955, the majority of imprisoned German war criminals had been freed and were even able to rise to high office in the Federal Republic.\textsuperscript{36} More important for onset of the country’s later reckoning with the Nazi past were the creation in 1958 of a central investigative bureau for Nazi crimes, which was followed over several decades by a few large public trials, the most important being the 1963-5 Frankfurt Auschwitz trial.\textsuperscript{37} Bearing that history in mind, more nuanced expectations for the ICTY would have been appropriate, particularly in regard to its “pedagogic” mission in Serbia and the broader post-Yugoslav region.

The second main application of the German model is found in the calls for a Serbian apology, which surfaced on numerous occasions even before the fall of Milošević in October 2000. As described by Drinka Gojković, a Serbian anti-war activist and the editor of the five-volume oral history of the Yugoslav conflicts, \textit{People in War}:\textsuperscript{38}

On a visit to Kosovo in late February [2000], the German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer, informed the Serbs... that a condition for dialogue, in addition to a political denouement in Belgrade, is also “an apology of the Serbian side for what happened to the Albanians in Kosovo.” He cited “the experience of Germany, who apologized to the Jews” and “accepted the guilt for a crime against humanity committed under the Nazi regime” as an example. Dialogue, the Minister added, must be based on truth.

In the last couple of years, a call for apology has been sent to the Serbian side on many occasions, especially from the German side. It was repeated […] during the whole course of the Bosnian war, and it was continued with particular intensity last summer, after the end of the NATO intervention on the territory of the current Yugoslavia. At the many press conferences which were held in Germany during the summer with the representatives of the Serbian alternative, not a single occasion was missed to send a message to the Serbs to apologize.\textsuperscript{39}
Such requests for a Serbian apology continued throughout the post-Milošević period. In April 2002, the then US Senator Joseph Biden outlined several conditions that, in his view, Serbia needed to fulfil in order for US financial aid to the country be restored, including that “[President Vojislav] Koštunica and [Prime Minister Zoran] Djindjić must publicly own up to Serbia’s behavior in the 1990s by apologizing for its genocidal campaign in Kosova, as well as in Croatia and Bosnia.” 40 The media commentary on Biden’s speech included the inevitable references to the German model, often asking why Serbia had not yet produced its own Willy Brandt. 41 Similar requests came from political figures in Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, although these were sometimes qualified to include statements to the effect that “wholesale atonement in the style of Willy Brandt” was not yet expected. 42 Apologies and appropriate commemorations were also expected for specific crimes, notably the Srebrenica genocide; three European Parliament resolutions of 2005, 2009 and 2015 thus called for all European states to create a Srebrenica memorial day on 11 July. 43 Informally, too, calls for a Serbian apology and invocations of Brandt’s iconic Kniefall surfaced periodically over the course of the 2000s. 44

Whereas in the case of the “Nuremberg” trope considerable thought and effort had been put into adopting the legal—if not always the historical—lessons of the IMT for the ICTY, external invocations of “Brandt’s Kniefall” in the calls for a Serbian apology were made as normative standpoints at best, and as ultimatums at worst. 45 As Valentin Rauer notes, “thirty years later, the kneefall became an object of iteration and mythification in its own right,” applied in various contexts including the post-Yugoslav region, “as a symbol which one should take as a model to be followed while performing public acts of reconciliation.” 46 In the creation of the iconic symbol of “Brandt’s Kniefall,” the historical and biographical context of the act—which gave it such weight at the time—was inevitably lost. No consideration was paid to Brandt’s past as a member of the wartime anti-Nazi resistance and his consistent rhetoric, including as Mayor of Berlin and Chancellor of the Federal Republic, about German responsibility, which differed from that of his predecessors in the chancellery. Brandt’s genuflection at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial in 1970 also represented—not just a spontaneous, emotionally resonant gesture of atonement for the past—but a new direction in West German policy towards the past and an acceptance of the postwar settlement, despite being deeply
unpopular with the FRG’s citizens at the time. In sum, the various external calls for gestures of atonement resembling Brandt’s Kniefall did not arise out of cognizance of the historical circumstances of the act, nor did they reflect any understanding of what might be possible or meaningful in the contemporary Serbian context.

As the next section will show, external invocations of the inherently ahistorical German model failed to elicit adequate policy responses in Serbia to the wars and crimes of the 1990s. Stripped of historical specificity and eschewing a nuanced approach to West Germany’s own postwar trajectory, these have primarily acted as a “yardstick” or a “foil” (to use Mischa Gabowitsch’s characterization)—serving to expose Serbia’s inadequacies rather than explain them. As the next section will show, applying alternatively a comparative history approach that looks at the equivalent period in the Federal Republic’s trajectory yields greater insight into the limitations of public memory in states that, like Serbia, have recently emerged from authoritarianism and conflict.

**Reception of the German model in Serbia: external hegemonic narrative meets the national context**

External invocations of the German model in demands for justice and apology for the war crimes of the 1990s led neither to the adoption of an official memory policy nor to a sustained public debate about the recent past in Serbia. Instead, Serbia’s mnemonic landscape in the post-Milošević period resembled in some important ways that of West Germany during its own first two postwar decades. Stating this is not to equate Serbia’s experience with the magnitude of the crimes perpetrated under National Socialism, nor the extensive destruction and occupation of Germany, nor the influx of millions of ethnic Germans from the east—clearly, the differences are vast. The parallels that can be drawn relate rather to some aspects of West Germany’s early history of memory: the presence of a national victimhood discourse that eclipsed notions of responsibility for crimes; a broad perception of the international prosecution of war crimes as “victors’ justice;” and a “transactional” official approach to questions of justice and apology, aimed primarily at securing the country’s international
rehabilitation. In addition to these parallels, a comparative approach between the two countries’ first post-conflict decades also highlights the glaring differences apparent at the endpoint of those periods. Whereas, in the Federal Republic, the latter half of the 1960s marked the start of a period of greater public reckoning with the Nazi past, Serbia, at the end of its own twenty-year postwar period, seems further than ever from such an evolution. Pending a more sustained comparative history, some initial reflections for this divergence will be offered at the end of this article.

In stark contrast to external perceptions of the post-Yugoslav wars, post-Milošević Serbia’s dominant national narrative has been one of Serb victimhood. This narrative emerged in the 1970s, initially in intellectual circles and the Serbian Orthodox Church, then more widely, adopting by the late 1980s elements of an extreme nationalism that was harnessed by Milošević and Serb political leaders in Bosnia and Croatia in their policy of war in the 1990s. It contained tropes of betrayal and a “stab in the back” by the other Yugoslav nations—supported by hostile external powers—who had always pursued their own independence at the expense of the common Yugoslav state, and who had not shirked from resorting to violence and even genocide against the Serbs in the service of their nationalist goals. This narrative was propagated by the state-controlled media throughout the 1990s, providing a cognitive framework for interpreting the wars. Recalling the memory of the Second World War and the mass killings of Serbs in Axis-controlled Kosovo and the fascist-led Independent State of Croatia (which encompassed most of Bosnia), it cast Serb actions as defensive and motivated by legitimate existential fears and contrasted them with those of other Yugoslav nations and their Western “sponsors.” It also remained pervasive in the post-Milošević period, as was reflected in opinion polls undertaken throughout the first decade. The first of these polls, carried out in April 2001, showed that the crimes most frequently recalled by the respondents were those perpetrated against Serbs—especially the mass expulsion of Serbs from Croatia in 1995 and the NATO bombing campaign in 1999 (itself viewed as a crime); only about a quarter of those polled could name more than one crime that was perpetrated by Serbs against others. This poll also showed that the vast majority believed that the primary responsibility for the “disasters” of the 1990s lay with the other Yugoslav nations, the United States and NATO. Such perceptions have lingered over time, as
subsequent surveys show: a substantial majority of respondents continued to believe that Serbs had suffered the most casualties in the wars (although this number declined from 84 percent to 69 percent between 2004 and 2011), while the number who believed that Serbs committed the most crimes remained very low (between 5 percent and 13 percent). In addition to the pre-existing nationalist narrative of Serb victimhood, which was stoked by the tabloid press, the Orthodox Church, and some intellectuals and politicians, ethnographic research undertaken at the end of the first post-Milošević decade showed that “the presence of victimhood motifs in narratives about the past may [also] be considered as the result of the difficult personal experiences of the 1990s,” As the political scientist Jelena Obradović-Wochnik notes, people felt particularly resentful about narratives where “only the Serbs are presented as the guilty ones” and believed that the story of Serb victims and of their own living memory had been rendered invisible by the discourse of “confronting the past” derived from the German model.

The focus on Serbian victimhood particularly colored attitudes toward the ICTY. As in the case of the IMT—where there was a considerable mismatch between the views of commentators outside Germany, who “agreed with the Tribunal’s own view that it was international in nature,” and those within Germany, where the Court was classified as “an occupational court”—a similar mismatch in perceptions of the ICTY was present in Serbia. Whereas for much of the outside world, the ICTY was a UN court, with judges and prosecutors carefully drawn from different, mainly non-NATO, countries, in Serbia the Tribunal was viewed overwhelmingly as a “NATO court” and an example of “victors’ justice.” This was due to the preponderance of Serbs indicted by the court—viewed by Serbs as the main indicator of bias—but it also represented a byproduct of the coercive international intervention against Serbia and ethnic Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia in the 1990s. As the political scientist and diplomat Marlene Spoerri notes, the decade of UN sanctions against Serbia, spearheaded by the United States and West European powers, “fueled the worst hyperinflation witnessed in Europe since Weimar Germany, making everyday goods—like bread, milk, and fuel for cars—harrowingly difficult to come by” and enabled the Milošević regime to blame the West for all of Serbia’s problems. Unemployment levels reached 50 percent during this period and per capita
income dropped by more than two-thirds. In 1995, US training and air support given to the Croatian and Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) forces against Serb positions brought an end to the Bosnian war and the destruction of the Serbian para-state in Croatia, resulting in the mass expulsion of more than 200,000 Serbs from Croatian territory. Finally, the 1999 NATO air war against FRY and support for Kosovo’s independence—which led to a further mass exodus of Serbs (as well as Roma and other minorities) from what was formally still Serbia’s province—cemented the vision that the Western powers were themselves belligerents in the wars, and not neutral arbiters. NATO’s extensive destruction of Serbia’s infrastructure and economy and its direct responsibility for several hundred deaths were also widely reported in the Serbian press, which defined the campaign as “NATO aggression.”

Some of the Tribunal’s actions contributed to the perception in Serbia that the ICTY was an “extended arm of NATO,” such as the indictment of Milošević at the height of the NATO bombing campaign in June 1999, and the Chief Prosecutor’s rapid dismissal, a year later, of allegations of war crimes against NATO because of the Tribunal’s dependence on the Western alliance for logistical and financial support. By the early 2000s, even long-standing opponents of the Milošević regime thus characterized the Tribunal acerbically as “an instrument of those same powers that dropped humanitarian bombs here.” Subsequent Western policies of conditionality—which made economic aid and progress on accession negotiations with the EU contingent on the capture and transfer of indicted war crimes suspects to the ICTY—were viewed in Serbia as a continuation of the coercive measures of the 1990s. Their temporal longevity also played a role; as Goran Svilanović, Serbia’s first post-Milošević Foreign Minister, noted, Nuremberg had only lasted eleven months, whereas ICTY conditionality went on for ten years. While there was no significant public opposition to the transfer of war crime suspects to The Hague, many in Serbia felt that the country was held hostage by the Tribunal, with only 8 percent to 14 percent of Serbs polled expressing a positive view of it. The ICTY’s defenders in Serbia represented a small minority of human rights activists and anti-nationalist intellectuals, who embraced the discourse of Serb responsibility—often looking towards German thinkers, such as Jaspers, Arendt and Adorno, for inspiration.
The dominant narrative of Serb victimhood and its impact on public perceptions of responsibility for war crimes recalls the prevalence of the dominant discourse of German victimhood after 1945 and German attitudes towards Nuremberg and other Allied trials. As the historian Robert Moeller argues, despite Nuremberg and the early Allied efforts at denazification and re-education—and despite the Federal Republic’s considerable successes in rebuilding the country, its democratic political system and economy—“one of the most powerful integrative myths of the 1950s emphasized not German well-being but German suffering.” Focused on the twelve million expellees from the East and the fate of the more than three million POWs held by the Red Army, “it stressed that Germany was a nation of victims, an imagined community defined by the experience of loss and displacement during the Second World War.” Notions of collective political responsibility for the Holocaust and other Nazi crimes were vehemently rejected by the citizens of the Federal Republic in the first postwar decades, while anti-Semitic views continued to be reported in high numbers in opinion polls. Nuremberg enabled ordinary Germans to distance themselves from the Nazi leadership, who were presented as “demonic monsters” and “a few bad apples,” but the trial itself was rarely discussed in conversation. The charge of tu quoque was a popular refrain, “with people asking why Germans were being brought before courts while crimes committed by Allies themselves went unpunished.” The narrative of German victimhood was also echoed by Konrad Adenauer, West Germany’s first chancellor, who placed the plight of expellees and POWs high on his agenda, while the alternative discourse of confronting German responsibility—as articulated by politicians such as the first postwar Social Democratic Party (SPD) leader Kurt Schumacher—remained deeply unpopular and unable to win elections.

Like Adenauer, Serbia’s political leaders in the 2000s navigated external pressures to “reckon” with the recent past while facing a public that overwhelmingly adhered to a narrative of national victimhood—in both cases adopting a type of “transactional compliance” in their dealings with the international community. They did what was necessary to enable their countries’ access to Western financial aid and integration into global and European institutions, but without grappling with the question of war crimes or articulating a discourse that challenged dominant views of national
victimhood. Like Adenauer, Serbia’s reformist Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić feared a resurgence of the extreme nationalist right and a destabilization of the country’s fragile democracy—a fear that was not unfounded, as was demonstrated in 2003, when Djindjić was assassinated by a criminal group that included members of the unreformed state security apparatus, who believed they were under threat of extradition to the ICTY.77 Like Adenauer, whose approach relied on the notion that West Germany could foster “either memory and justice or democracy, but not both,”78 some in Serbia’s post-Milošević governments believed that a trade-off existed “between justice and stability.”79 Others endorsed the dominant victimhood narrative and did not believe that Serb crimes deserved to be singled out in the broader array of violent acts committed during the wars of the 1990s.80 In the face of external pressures and EU conditionality, by 2011 Serbia finally captured and transferred all indicted war crimes suspects to the ICTY (including the former political and military leaders of Serbia itself and of the two Serb wartime entities in Croatia and Bosnia), thus completing its cooperation with its own “Nuremberg.” However, the succession of political leaders who led these efforts never sought to counteract prevailing negative perceptions of the ICTY, justifying their actions only by reference to the national interest.81 Meanwhile, domestic prosecutions of war crimes—as in the case of the paramilitary group the Scorpions, which had taken part in the Srebrenica genocide and committed extensive crimes in Kosovo—often ended in mistrials or overly lenient sentences issued by an unreformed judiciary, without examining the involvement of the Serbian state in the crimes committed.82

Responses to external calls for an official Serbian apology ranged from initial resistance to becoming part of the Serbian government’s “transactional compliance” approach to the past, and eventually descending into outright mimicry—using language and gestures that referenced Willy Brandt’s Kniefall, but without accompanying such apologies with actions to make them meaningful. Post-Milošević Serbia’s first political leaders, FRY President Vojislav Koštunica, and Serbia’s Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić both rejected calls for an apology, despite their divergence on cooperation with the ICTY.83 Both envisioned apologies only as reciprocal among the post-Yugoslav state leaders, in mutual recognition of all the victims of the wars of the 1990s.84 In a televised discussion in
Sarajevo, Djindjić even warned that “waiting for Willy Brandt” would be akin to waiting for Godot; in his view, rather than dwelling on the past, which was unchangeable, all the former Yugoslavs needed to turn towards the future and focus on the things they could change. In stark contrast to Brandt’s Kniefall, which saw a Chancellor untainted by his own past make a moral gesture of atonement to the Jewish victims on behalf of the democratic West German state, Djindjić responded to Biden’s call for an apology to Croats, Bosniaks and Albanians in May 2002 by stating that, since “there is no one from the Milošević regime in power in Belgrade now, there is no reason for the present government to apologize for what that regime did.”

A more compliant approach was taken by Boris Tadić, Serbia’s President from 2004 to 2012, who issued several official apologies. However, rather than resembling Willy Brandt’s Kniefall, these apologies remained closer to the rhetoric of Adenauer, who in his 1951 speech to the German Bundestag advocated reparations to Israel by referring to the “unspeakable crimes [that had] been committed in the name of the German people,” while also noting that “the overwhelming majority of the German people abominated the crimes committed against the Jews, and did not participate in them.” Tadić adopted a similar passive construction in his first official apology in Sarajevo in 2004, to “all against whom crimes were committed in the name of the Serbian people,” emphasizing that these crimes “were not committed by the Serbian people but by individual criminals.” Tadić became the first Serbian president to attend the anniversary commemorations in Srebrenica, and apologies to Croatia followed in 2007 and in 2010. Yet, like West Germany’s reparations to Israel, which Adenauer argued were necessary to send the “right signal to the world” and particularly the “economically powerful” Jewish constituency in the United States, Tadić’s apologies too had a transactional quality to them. In 2005, as he prepared to attend the tenth anniversary commemoration in Srebrenica, he explained in the Serbian media that it was necessary to demonstrate that Serbs did not condone the massacre and needed to distance themselves from the perpetrators and, “in that way, defend Serbia’s national interest.” An important aim of these apologies was to support Serbia’s accession negotiations with the EU while not alienating Serbian voters, who remained largely hostile to such gestures. This was shown in the case of the Serbian Parliament’s adoption of a “Declaration
on Srebrenica” in March 2010, when a mere fifth of those polled could envisage such a declaration, and even then only if accompanied by a simultaneous condemnation of crimes against Serbs.92 Similarly to the Bundestag’s ratification of the agreement on reparations to Israel, which passed in 1953 with a slim majority that included the opposition SPD, the Serbian Parliament’s Srebrenica Declaration was adopted by a majority of only two votes, following extensive compromise with the nationalist right that included an addition to the draft calling for a “reciprocal” apology by other post-Yugoslav states for crimes committed against Serbs.93 Nevertheless, Tadić seized the occasion to signal to the Western powers the “historical” gesture that Serbia had made in an editorial in The Wall Street Journal.94

Official apologies descended into outright mimicry of Brandt’s Kniefall following the ascendance to power of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which had emerged from a split in the extreme right-wing Serbian Radical Party (SRS) over its approach towards EU accession. The SNS’s successive leaders—Tomislav Nikolić, who was elected president in 2012, and Aleksandar Vučić, who became Prime Minister in 2014 and then succeeded Nikolić to the presidency in 2017—tempered their rhetoric in response to European expectations. In April 2013, when pressed about Srebrenica by a Bosnian journalist in a television interview, Nikolić declared:

I kneel because of that. Here, I am kneeling. And I am asking for forgiveness for Serbia for the crime committed in Srebrenica…[and] apologizing for crimes committed in the name of our country and our people by any individual belonging to our nation.95

Nikolić’s obvious reference to Brandt’s Kniefall was highlighted by commentators in the media, some of whom saw it as a positive sign that Serbia’s reformed nationalists had genuinely come to embrace a policy of atonement.96 Others argued that it was “not genuine kneeling” but rather a way of appeasing the EU, with whom Serbia was about to embark on a new round of accession negotiations.97 However, as the Serbian human rights NGO Humanitarian Law Center noted at the time, Nikolić’s apology needed to be followed by concrete actions to be credible—such as stepping up domestic war crimes trials, offering material and symbolic reparations to victims, revising history textbooks to provide a more truthful narrative about the crimes of the 1990s, and supporting a civil society-led initiative for a
regional truth commission. None of these materialized. Lip service to regional reconciliation continued to be paid by various representatives of the SNS-led Serbian government and more gestures of atonement were made—including an aborted attempt by Vučić to join the twentieth commemoration ceremony in Srebrenica in 2015, when he was pelted with debris by angry Bosniaks, and a direct replica of Brandt’s Kniefall by his Special Envoy at the memorial to Croat victims near Vukovar in November 2020.

Notwithstanding such gestures, in the years of SNS rule, Serbia’s official approach to the legacy of the 1990s became defined by democratic backsliding and worsening denial and relativization of crimes, reinforced by growing links with Russia. In July 2015, when Russia vetoed a UN Resolution designating Srebrenica as genocide on Serbia’s behest, President Nikolić—whose own “kneefall” for Srebrenica had made headlines two years before—declared that he was relieved, “not only because it prevented a stain being put on the whole Serbian nation in an attempt to declare a genocide, but because today Russia has shown and proved that it is a true and honest friend.” Serbian generals, who had completed their sentences after conviction for war crimes by the ICTY, returned home to a hero’s welcome and assumed positions of responsibility—one even being hailed as a “role model” by Serbia’s Defense Minister and appointed to teach at the Military Academy. The upsurge of government pressure on the media resulted in a sharp rise of conspiracy theories and the glorification of nationalist figures and war criminals. Critics of the regime, who often hailed from the same circles that advocated a reckoning with the Milošević era, were targets of hate speech and even physical abuse. Meanwhile, public awareness of the Yugoslav wars consistently regressed, as indicated by opinion polls showing a substantial rise in the numbers of “don’t know” responses to questions relating to the 1990s and the crimes committed. In contrast to West Germany in the mid-1960s, Serbia’s initial postwar period has given way to a time of organized forgetfulness, punctured by moments of inconsequential performativity aimed to satisfy Western interlocutors holding up the German model as a standard to be replicated.
Conclusion: recovering history—Germany, Serbia and remembrance in the aftermath of conflict

By the time Willy Brandt famously fell on his knees at the Warsaw Ghetto memorial in 1970, he represented the face of a new Germany in the making—at peace with its neighbors, secure in its democracy, a beacon of economic prosperity and seeking to make amends for its past. Although West Germany’s history of memory since then has been a complex process, defined by alternating narratives of the period of Nationalist Socialism and emotionally charged moments of public debate about questions of German political and social responsibility, the end of the Adenauer era in 1963, followed by the rise of a new generation demanding a reckoning with the Nazi past, marked a first stepping stone in that history. This stands in stark contrast to the Serbia in the 2020s, despite the “kneefalls”—symbolic and literal—of different representatives of the Serbian state of the last several years. Understanding this divergence in the two countries’ trajectories, despite some of the striking similarities in their national memory and official policy during their respective first postwar decades, would require careful comparative analysis. As the German historian Fritz Stern noted, “how Germans dealt with the legal and political legacies of the Nazi past remains an important and instructive issue.” However, little instruction can be gained from an ahistorical hegemonic narrative of the German model that conflates the various strands and moments of this process and provides unreachable benchmarks for other post-conflict societies. Instead, the question that needs to be posed is which forces drove change in Germany over time and what contextual and structural frameworks enabled and supported them.

While this question calls for a more sustained comparative history, it is nevertheless possible to discern several key factors that played an important role in Germany’s initial postwar decades, and that have been conspicuously absent in the equivalent period in post-Milošević Serbia. It is the absence of these factors, rather than the presence of a German model to emulate, that conditions what may and may not be possible in a post-conflict society at a given time. These include, first of all, a propitious international context which supported the Federal Republic’s integration into the international community and contributed to its remarkable economic recovery and democratic
consolidation. Crucially, one of the important lessons of the West German case, missing from the ahistorical German model, is that Vergangenheitsbewältigung “was launched from a secure political and economic position at a point in time when the West German experiment had succeeded beyond anybody’s expectation.”109 As the historian Wulf Kansteiner notes, the onset of the Cold War meant that Allied pressure on Germany to deal with its recent past, both politically and legally, ended quite suddenly and was replaced by subsidies and indifference to the reversal of denazification.110 This stands in marked contrast to Serbia in its first post-Milošević decades, when reintegration into international institutions, aid for its economic recovery and progress on accession to the EU were continuously subject to ICTY conditionality. While these pressures eventually led to the capture and transfer of the last war crimes suspects to the Hague in 2011, they nevertheless did not give way to any qualitative change in Serbia’s EU prospects. Like most of the post-Yugoslav states emerging from the wars of the 1990s, Serbia remains an impoverished, weak country whose accession to the EU remains elusive—a situation that has contributed, in Serbia’s case, to the suspicion felt by many Serbs towards the West and to reorienting Serbia’s policy towards rapprochement with Russia and China.111

A second key difference between the two cases relates to the problem of agency during the compared time periods. The presence in the Federal Republic of a strong political left, with some influential voices from across the political spectrum, was decisive in not allowing the Nazi past to slip into oblivion during the Adenauer era.112 The SPD’s actions at important junctures, such as on the adoption of reparations to Israel in 1953 or the several extensions to the Statute of Limitations for crimes of the Nazi era from the mid-1960s, were crucial in keeping the war crimes issue alive and enabling some legal reckoning.113 In contrast, Serbia’s most influential opposition in the post-Milošević period came from the nationalist right, which had no interest in pursuing any investigation into the period of the 1990s, when its politicians collaborated with the Milošević regime and aided and abetted the Serbian war effort.114 With the consolidation of power of the Serbian Progressive Party after 2012, this problem became even more acute as the political opposition fractured into an array of small, inconsequential parties with little electoral weight.115 Another key difference is that West German memory activists in legal, media and intellectual spheres—such as the Hessian attorney
general Fritz Bauer, the news weekly Der Spiegel and the two main West German television channels, or the historians gathered around the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich—had much greater scope for action, including within state institutions, than their Serbian counterparts, gathered around human rights NGOs, international foundations and a falling number of media outlets dependent on a shrinking supply of external funding. Finally, standing in stark contrast also, is Serbia’s demographic decline and continued “brain drain” since the 1990s of university students and recent graduates, which represents the loss of precisely the new generation that had been the motor of West Germany’s reckoning with the past—in the legal, educational and cultural sphere, as well as in civil society initiatives. The work of Serbia’s new generation of scholars, grappling with various aspects of the country’s history, its role in the wars of the 1990s and its subsequent politics of memory—written and published mainly in Western Europe and North America—rarely reaches audiences beyond Serbia’s NGO and activist sphere, which is itself already marginalized and often vilified. Meanwhile, the growing importance of right-wing organizations within the university and in civil society, built on an extreme nationalist discourse about the past and hero worship of war criminals sentenced by the ICTY, continues to present a potent alternative for disaffected youth.

These contrasting circumstances in West Germany and Serbia over their respective early post-conflict periods indicate the futility of external invocations of the ahistorical German model as a beacon to be followed. As has been shown, this model neither matches West Germany’s own postwar experience, nor does it lead in “recipient” countries, such as Serbia, to any genuine reckoning with a difficult past. To the contrary, the focus on the ahistorical German model has tended to obscure those aspects of West Germany’s postwar experience that played a particularly important role in fostering its long and complex process of reckoning with the legacy of National Socialism. Relinquishing external models of atonement and invocations of “appropriate” ways of confronting the past, in favor of a more nuanced comparative history, would certainly produce, at the very least, a better guide to the experiences of post-conflict countries in addressing the criminal and morally reprehensible legacy of their recently deposed regimes. At best, such an understanding could also inform the crafting of a
more careful, context-specific, international policy and manage expectations for those institutions that are created to address human rights abuses and war crimes.

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2 Timothy Garton Ash, “Germany can show reborn Arab nations the art of overcoming a difficult past,” The Guardian, March 16, 2011.


12 This is well explained by David, The Past.


15 Aleida Assmann, “Transnational Memory and the Construction of History through Mass Media” in Memory Unbound, 65-82.


19 Novick, *The Holocaust*.


23 The malleability of mnemonic narratives has been highlighted above all in studies of Holocaust memory. See notably Michael Rothberg, *Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Huyssen, *Present Pasts*; and Levy and Sznaider, “Memory Unbound.”

24 Neither Russia nor China endorsed the hegemonic narrative of the German model, nor have they considered memory policy towards the wars of the 1990s important in their relations with the region. For an overview of Russia’s policy in the region, see Dimitar Bechev, *Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).


34 Devin Pendas, *Democracy, Nazi Trials and Transitional Justice in Germany, 1945-50* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020). As Pendas notes, in agonistic trials, the audience always has a choice of
narratives to learn from, and “there is good reason to think that many Germans preferred to listen to the defense at Nuremberg, rather than the prosecution.” Pendas, Democracy, 20.


41 Ibid.


50 David MacDonald, Balkan Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian Victim-Centred Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). Indeed, it was not uncommon for Serbs to demand an apology from Croats and the Catholic Church for the atrocities committed in the Second World War Axis puppet state of the Independent State of Croatia.

51 Svetlana Logar and Srdjan Bogosavljević, “Vidjenje istine u Srbiji,” [Visions of the Truth in Serbia] Reč no. 62.8 (2001): 7-34. The expulsion of Serbs from Croatia was cited by 49.1 percent and the NATO bombing by 35.4 percent of respondents.

52 These polls by the Belgrade Center for Human Rights are illustrated in Table 7.11 in Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice, 208. For a comprehensive overview, see Milanović, “The Impact.”


54 Obradović-Wochnich, Ethnic Conflict, 184-85. Comparisons of Serb crimes to the Holocaust were perceived as particularly problematic, even among individuals who had been opposed to the former regime and the wars of the 1990s. See Jasna Dragović-Soso, “The Parting of Ways: Public Reckoning with the Recent Past in Post-
_polls from 1945 to 1947 also showed that some 47 to 55 percent Germans believed that. 

According to ICTY prosecutor Louise Arbour, the indictment was made without NATO’s blessing and was

_best known for his efforts to criminalize Nazi war criminals, and his work in the Nuremberg Trials, especially as prosecutor. Arbour is a strong advocate for international justice and has been involved in many high-profile cases._

_estimates of the number of FRY citizens killed by NATO bombs vary between five hundred and 1500. The joint investigation by the Humanitarian Law Centers in Belgrade and Pristina has put the count at 754 people. (http://www.hl-cdc.org/?p=34890&lang=de)

According to ICTY prosecutor Louise Arbour, the indictment was made without NATO’s blessing and was ever viewed as counterproductive for the ongoing negotiations with Milošević. (Truehart, Charles, “A New Kind of Justice,” _The Atlantic_, April 2000, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/04/a-new-kind-of-justice/305709/)


68 Ibid., 9. This stands in contrast to the 78 percent of the Germans polled in 1946 who viewed the IMT proceedings as fair. However, temporal longevity mattered here too; with the Allied successor trials, support for a legal reckoning with the Nazi past fell off drastically by 1949. See Jeffrey Herf, _Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germans_ (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 206-7.

69 Gordy, _Guilt_, 21; Dragović-Soso, “The Parting of Ways;” Jacqueline Niefé, “Which Commemorative Models Help? A Case Study from Post-Yugoslavia,” in Gabowitsch, Replicating Atonement, 131-61. Examples of such reflections can be found in the publications of the Belgrade Circle, the Serbian Helsinki Committee, or the journals _Republika, Peščanik_ and _Reč_.


72 Ibid., 6.

73 Ibid., 24. A 1952 poll saw nearly two-fifths of respondents state that Germany was better off without Jews. (Judit, _Postwar_, 809) Polls from 1945 to 1947 also showed that some 47 to 55 percent Germans believed that National Socialism had been a good idea badly carried out. (Herf, _Divided Memory_, 205)

74 Sharples, _Postwar Germany_, 19-20.

75 Ibid., 21. See also, Bloxham, _Genocide on Trial_.

76 Frei, _Adenauer’s Germany_, Herf, _Divided Memory_, Moeller _War Stories_, Shapes, _Postwar Germany_, Fulbrook, _German National Identity_.

77 They dubbed their action “Stop The Hague.” (Ostojić, _Between Justice and Stability_, 78)

78 Herf, _Divided Memory_, 7.

79 The title of Ostojić’s excellent study. (Ostojić, _Between Justice and Stability_) For an insider’s perspective, see Vesna Pešić, “Antecedents to a Debate: Conflicts over the Transfer of Milošević,” in Waters, _The Milošević Trial_, 409-418.
For example, Vojislav Koštunica, the opposition candidate who defeated Milošević in the October 2000 election and who served as both president and prime minister in several Serbian governments in the 2000s. As Audrey Budding notes, “had Koštunica so chosen, he could have used his presidential pulpit to advance the process of confronting the realities of Serbs’ and Serbia’s roles in the wars. Instead, he continued to display the same preoccupation with the suffering of Serbs (only) that had been evident in his opposition years.” Audrey Budding, “From Dissidents to Presidents: Dobrica Ćosić and Vojislav Koštunica Compared,” Contemporary European History, 13, no. 2 (2004): 198-199.


Gordy, Guilt, 124-144.

Economic aspects of the process of confronting the realities of Serbs’ and Serbia’s roles in the wars. Instead, he continued to display the same preoccupation with the suffering of Serbs (only) that had been evident in his opposition years.” Audrey Budding, “From Dissidents to Presidents: Dobrica Ćosić and Vojislav Koštunica Compared,” Contemporary European History, 13, no. 2 (2004): 198-199.

Koštunica vehemently opposed to extraditing Milošević and the DOS coalition that had toppled the former regime disintegrated over this issue.


87 Quoted in Moeller, War Stories, 25. Emphasis added. See also Herf’s analysis of the speech in Divided Memory, 245.


90 Herf, Divided Memory, 286.


92 Most people polled preferred a single parliamentary declaration condemning all crimes perpetrated in the wars (46.2 percent) or no declaration at all (20.8 percent). See Jasna Dragović-Sos, “Apologising for Srebrenica: The Declaration of the Serbian Parliament, the European Union and the Politics of Compromise”, East European Politics, 28, no. 2 (2012): 170.

93 Ibid.


96 For example, Nataša Kandić, Director of the human rights NGO Humanitarian Law Center and one of the foremost defenders of the ICTY. “Izvinjenje koje je podelio Srbiju,” [An Apology That Divided Serbia] Deutsche Welle, 26 Apr. 2013 (https://www.dw.com/sr/izvinjenje-koe-je-podelilo-srbiju/a-16773599). For more positive assessments of Nikolić’s apology see Orentlicher, Some Kind of Justice, 251-3.


Vučić’s Envoy Kneeled at the Ovčara Monument: “I am Keen for Every Missing Person to be Found”, Jutarnji list, Nov. 17, 2020, (https://www.jutarnji.hr/viesti/hrvatska/vucevic-izaslanik-kleknuo-ispred-spomenika-na-ovcari-stalo-mi-jeda-se-pronade-svaka-nestala-osoba-15004964) Matić stated that he hoped that his gesture would be a reference “that people could recognize without a lot of words, because words of apology have


104. Florian Bieber and Marko Knežić, *Media Freedom in the Western Balkans*, BiEPAG Background Paper, August 2015. For some journalists, the situation under the SNS is worse than under Milošević. “Šta je gore - Vučićev ili Miloševićev medijski mrak?” [What is Worse – Vučić’s or Milošević’s Media Darkness?] Most, Radio Slobodna Evropa, Oct. 8, 2017. (https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/most-vucic-milosевич-medijski-mrak/2879566.html)


106. In 2017, although most respondents still believed that Serbs had been the greatest victims (42 percent) and only a small minority (5 percent) that they had committed the most crimes, the most striking result was the large percentage of “don’t know” responses: 41 percent for the nation with the greatest number of victims and 52 percent for the nation that had committed the most crimes. (Srečko Mihalić et al, *Serbian Citizens’ Awareness of Wars in ’90s, War Crimes and War Crimes Trials*, DEMOSTAT Research and Media Center, August 2017: 32.)

107. For an excellent discussion, see Jenny Wüstenberg, *Civil Society and Memory in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 32-75.


110. Ibid., 108.


112. Herf, *Divided Memory*; Frei, *Adenauer’s Germany*.


114. The SRS topped the polls in the elections of 2003 and 2007 and came second in 2008. Serbia’s current president Aleksandar Vučić, who was an SRS parliamentary deputy during that period before defecting to the SNS, previously served as Minister of Information under Milošević in 1998-9, when media control by the state was at its worst, and is on record for his intervention at the Serbian parliament on 20 July 1995, days after the fall of Srebrenica, warning the international community that if they killed one Serb, “we will kill 100 Muslims.” (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UGqv9CJbd3U)


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