The Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) Scale: A Questionnaire Instrument for Measuring Antisemitism as Expressed in Relation Both to Jews and to Israel

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Abstract

This article explains the development and face validity of the Generalised Antisemitism (GeAs) scale, which provides an up-to-date measure of antisemitism consistent with the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism (generally known as the IHRA Definition). The GeAs scale is comprised of two six-item subscales, each containing a balance of reverse-coded items: the Judeophobic Antisemitism (JpAs) subscale, which tests for endorsement of “classic” prejudicial attitudes towards Jews, and the Antizionist Antisemitism (AzAs) subscale, which tests for endorsement of related attitudes expressed in relation to Israel and its supporters. Both subscales reflect the current state of historical and social scholarship on antisemitism and have already been employed in large-scale survey research with funding from Campaign Against Antisemitism. Findings of a validation study presented elsewhere are summarized, and the scale’s use in future scholarly and stakeholder research is recommended.

Keywords: antisemitism, antizionism, attitudes, IHRA Definition, Israel, Jews, measurement, prejudice

1. INTRODUCTION

According to the most recent FBI report on hate crime in the United States, a clear majority of victims of anti-religious hate crimes were targeted as a result of the offenders’ “anti-Jewish bias”.1 Equivalent public data do not exist for most countries, but in the European Union, official statistics suggest that such bias is “widespread and normalised.”2 This suggests an urgent need for social scientists to investigate the bases of antisemitism. However, there currently exists no validated questionnaire instrument for measuring antisemitism as it is manifested in the twenty-first century. As Kaufman and colleagues’ systematic literature review finds, published psychological studies of antisemitism in the United States have overwhelmingly used single-item measures of antisemitism or multi-item scales that, having been developed over forty-five years ago, can no longer be assumed to reflect contemporary forms of antisemitism.3 Kaufman and colleagues do not go into detail on how existing questionnaire instruments can be said to be—in their words—“dated.”4 However, we would argue that one of the principal shortcomings of such instruments has been in their lack of attention to what scholars working in the twenty-first century have referred to as a “new antisemitism” or “new Judeophobia”; that is, antisemitism as it has accommodated to a world in which Israel exists as the national home of the Jewish people.5

Medieval antisemitism was founded on European Christian superstitions, which held Jews to be guilty of usury, devil-worship, deicide, and the ritual murder of non-Jewish children.6 Although the religious culture within which such
superstitions flourished no longer exists, secularized forms of antisemitism have emerged since the beginning of the nineteenth century. These have tended to draw on older traditions whilst replacing the more supernatural allegations with conspiratorial myths and fantasies, especially the idea that “there exists a secret Jewish government which, through a world-wide network of camouflaged agencies and organisations, controls political parties and governments, the press and public opinion, banks and economic developments.” However, antisemitism has continued to develop since that time. The Nazis drew on a range of newer and older tropes in the construction of their own racialized and genocidal antisemitism. After the Holocaust, “secondary” antisemitisms developed around Holocaust denial and distortion. Following the break between the Soviet leadership and the State of Israel, Jews in the Soviet Union began to be targeted as “Zionists” even if they were not literally Zionists. Antizionism quickly became embedded in the thinking of Soviet elites, and has long been recognized as an ideological current both on the far right and on the far left. Indeed, Fine and Spencer have gone so far as to argue that “[t]he most significant expression of the reconfiguring of the Jewish question in the present period lies in the rise of negative representations of Israel and Zionism.”

Thus, the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948 has had profound consequences, not only for the Jewish people, but also for antisemitism. The International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance Working Definition of Antisemitism, henceforth referred to as the IHRA Definition, accordingly emphasizes that antisemitism may now be expressed through “targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectivity.” The position taken in this paper is that any attempt to measure antisemitism as it exists in the contemporary world must begin with acknowledgement of that basic point. However, existing measures of antisemitism have largely been defined by a conception of antisemitism that has not yet accommodated to the realities of the post-Holocaust era—among them, the existence of Israel as a Jewish state, the widespread tendency to understand that state within an antisemitic framework, and the practical consequences of extreme opposition to Israel, for Jews resident both in Israel and in the diaspora.

The idea of the “new” antisemitism has been critiqued on a theoretical level, most influentially in Klug’s elaborate philosophical argument to the effect that “we cannot always tell when a case of ‘anti-Semitism’ is in fact anti-Semitism”—an argument that would apply as much to the old antisemitism as to the new (indeed, Klug’s argument is by analogy with an imaginary scenario in which a rabbi is ejected from a London bus, with no mention of Israel being made by any of the parties concerned). However, multiple empirical studies have found a positive relationship between anti-Jewish and anti-Israeli attitudes, providing empirical support for the idea that the two are, at the least, related. And, given that “old” and “new” antisemitism alike have served to motivate attacks on Jewish individuals and institutions, it has also been argued that the contrast between them is in practice “a distinction without a difference.” There thus exists considerable support for the understanding of antisemitism on which the IHRA Definition rests.

A standard, validated antisemitism scale which builds on the IHRA Definition could be used to produce replicable findings with regard to contemporary manifestations of antisemitism across multiple studies. The current article, then, introduces a scale that follows the IHRA Definition in acknowledging that antisemitism can be expressed both in statements about Jews qua Jews and in statements about Israel and its supporters. That scale is termed the Generalised Antisemitism or GeAs scale, and it is composed of two subscales: the Judeophobic Antisemitism or JpAs scale, and the Antizionist Antisemitism or AzAs scale,
developed to measure attitudes characteristic of the “new” antisemitism. The GeAs scale was used for the first time in the 2020 Antisemitism Barometer survey conducted by YouGov for Campaign Against Antisemitism, although earlier versions of the scale have been used in earlier surveys. The scale has been empirically validated elsewhere, and a non-technical summary of findings is provided towards the end of this article. However, our primary purpose here is to explain the principles behind the development of the scale, and to establish the face validity of its items through reference both to scholarship and to real-world events.

2. SCALE DEVELOPMENT

Given the controversial nature of the trait to be measured, the decision was taken to prioritize face validity, that is, intuitive correspondence between scale items and socially and historically significant expressions of antisemitism, as well as completeness, that is, the measurement of a wide range of different antisemitic attitudes, while consulting with stakeholders and researchers throughout the process. In order to avoid needless proliferation of scales, the decision was taken to adapt an existing scale that had been developed by stakeholders. As a base, we chose the Antisemitism Barometer items that had been developed and refined over a period of several years by Campaign Against Antisemitism. This scale had the advantage that it was relatively short at seven items, and that it already included some negatively keyed items: by contrast, the classic ADL antisemitism index includes twelve items, all of them positively keyed. This was referred to as the JpAs subscale, and the GeAs scale was produced by combining it with further items developed for the measurement of “new” antisemitic attitudes in consultation with stakeholders and published in a scholarly venue, and termed the AzAs subscale. The closest equivalents of the latter are the anti-Israel opinion indices used by Kaplan and Small, Baum and Nakazawa, and Beattie, although these include no reverse-coded items, as well as that used by Staetsky, which includes some reverse-coded items.

Draft versions of the full scale were used in earlier studies, producing a combined measure referred to initially as Antisemitism, and subsequently as Generalised Antisemitism, and have since been modified following stakeholder consultation. In finalizing the GeAs scale, a further principle that was applied was insistence on a balance of positively and negatively keyed items. Ray argues that meaningless acquiescence may result in spurious correlations between scales without reverse-scoring, and occurs where respondents perceive scale items to be ambiguous. McClendon likewise emphasizes that such satisficing behaviours may account for a substantial component of the variance in questionnaire responses, but argues that engagement in them reflects lower topic-specific knowledge and interest on the part of respondents. Moreover, it has also been argued that respondents may interpret a questionnaire without a balance of reversed items as evidence of the researcher’s opinion, and that this in itself can influence their responses. The construction of “balanced” scales, with equal numbers of positively and negatively keyed items is controversial, as reversed items often correlate less strongly with others in the same scale. However, in their comprehensive review, Weijters and Baumgartner argue that, while scales that make use of reversed items typically exhibit lower scores for reliability and lead to poorer fit for factor models, the improved psychometric properties that result from removal of such items are likely to result purely from respondent satisficing, and therefore to come at the cost of confounding method variance with content variance, making the former impossible to detect. In adapting the scales on which the GeAs scale was based, the decision was therefore taken to create a balance of pro-trait and con-trait items, and to accept some potential trade-off in terms of internal consistency and model fit.
The AzAs scale already had a balance of positively keyed and reversed items that was maintained following modification of the scale after its previous outings, and a balance was achieved in the JpAs scale by removing the least correlated pro-trait item and reversing the meaning of one other pro-trait item. This was achieved by removal of a negative: the original item stated that British Jews are less loyal to Britain than other British people because of their connection to Israel, while the reversed item states that they are just as loyal to Britain as other British people, and makes no mention of Israel. The removal of the reference to Israel creates an equal balance between items that refer to Israel and items that did not, segregating all of the former into the AzAs subscale.

3. FACE VALIDITY

While measures of psychometric validity are important, face validity is key to the acceptance of any questionnaire instrument. Thus, it is necessary to explain why answers to each item in the GeAs scale can be assumed to reflect the presence or absence of potentially antisemitic attitudes. As the following discussion will show, the items in both subscales relate to the same group of traditional stereotypes about Jewishness: although we do not share Klug’s extreme scepticism with regard to the possibility of identifying antisemitism, we agree with his assertion that discourse is antisemitic to the extent to which it “projects the figure of the ‘Jew’”—that is, the Jew of antisemitic mythology—“directly or indirectly...onto Israel...or...onto Zionism...or...onto Jews, individually or collectively.”\textsuperscript{34} This is particularly important given Beattie’s finding that there is a much stronger relationship between “old” antisemitic attitudes and extreme anti-Israeli opinions than between “old” antisemitic attitudes and moderate anti-Israeli opinions.\textsuperscript{35}

Items to be reverse-coded are indicated with an R.

3.1. JpAs 1 “Jewish people can be trusted just as much as other [nationality] people in business” (R)

JpAs 1 invites respondents to deny the antisemitic trope that Jews are prone to dishonesty, exploitativeness, and excessive self-interest, particularly in business dealings with people who are not Jewish. This trope probably dates back to the medieval era, when Jews were commonly accused of usury,\textsuperscript{36} and was promoted in 19th century works such as the 1869 \textit{Book of the Kahal}, which fraudulently combined records kept by the kahals (or Jewish communal authorities) of various towns in the Russian Empire with “a commentary which made it look as if the kahal in each town aimed at enabling Jewish traders to oust their Christian competitors.”\textsuperscript{37} The casting of Jews as the face of “capitalism” resonated with this trope: note left wing terrorist Ulrike Meinhof’s argument that “[a]ntisemitism is really a hatred of capitalism.”\textsuperscript{38} Hamas publications take the same line in asserting that Jews cannot be trusted because “deceit and usury are stamped in their nature.”\textsuperscript{39} Today, the same essential idea can be seen not only in the revival of the accusation of usury on the part of some political leaders,\textsuperscript{40} but also in the casual use of the word “jew” as a verb meaning “to cheat someone” or “to get someone down on their price.”\textsuperscript{41}

3.2. JpAs 2 “Jewish people are just as loyal to [nation] as other [nationality] people” (R)

As the Anti-Defamation League emphasizes, “[a]ntisemites frequently suspect Jews of holding allegiance only to fellow Jews and to a uniquely Jewish agenda.”\textsuperscript{42} The view of Jews as “rootless cosmopolitans” implies that they have no loyalty to their (ostensible) nation, but only to others of their own kind around the world. In pre-revolutionary Russia, “everything that was classed as ‘alien’ and ‘hostile’ was automatically branded ‘Jewish’ and ‘cosmopolitan’”,\textsuperscript{43} later, in
the mid-twentieth century “anti-cosmopolitan” campaigns, “hundreds of Soviet intellectuals, mostly of Jewish origin, were removed from their posts in all areas of culture, science, economy and administration, and often imprisoned.” 44 The contemporary version of this accusation is the idea that Jews dwelling in the diaspora are more loyal to Israel than to the countries in which they live: an idea consistently finding agreement from around thirty percent of Americans from 1964 to 2016. 45 JpAs 2 invites respondents to deny this longstanding trope.

3.3. JpAs 3 “I am just as open to having Jewish friends as I am to having friends from other sections of [nationality] society” (R)

Not having Jewish friends cannot be considered antisemitic. But a desire to avoid associating with Jews can credibly be considered symptomatic of antisemitism, and may lead to social exclusion of Jews if widely felt. Historically, social segregation between Jews and non-Jews has in some cases been institutionally enforced: ninety-five percent of Jews living in the Russian Empire were confined to the Pale of Settlement and, even within that area, there was considerable segregation of Jews and non-Jews. 46 But more recently, it has been driven by informal factors. In the early twentieth century, the social exclusion that American Jews experienced among non-Jews was one of the factors that led to the formation of predominantly Jewish residential areas. 47

3.4. JpAs 4 “Compared to other groups, Jewish people have too much power in the media”

Just as medieval superstition held Jews to be masters of black magic, modern conspiracy theory accuses them of exercising “technological and economic mind control” through “banks, mass media, government, [and] education.” 48 The charge that Jews have disproportionate power in the media thus goes beyond the claim that they are over-represented in a particular economic sector. First there is an assumption that any Jew who is powerful in the media is an agent of the collective, is part of the secret conspiracy, and not just a powerful person. It is not possible reasonably to interpret the wording “Jewish people have too much power” as referring to diverse individuals having unrelated power; a fortiori because the question refers to “groups.” The force of the trope is that Jews attain disproportionate power in the media with the collective aim of spreading lies, of constructing narratives that fool people into agreeing to their own subordination to Jews, or of giving support to projects from which Jews profit.

3.5. JpAs 5 “Jewish people talk about the Holocaust just to further their political agenda”

Jews, like other people, have every reason to talk about the Holocaust; it was a huge event in Jewish history, it happened in living memory and it affected many Jewish families. It is also a significant event in Austro-German, European and human history. While it is true that every human collectivity constructs its identity through remembering and narrating their history, Jews are accused of special duplicity and effectiveness in this regard. This accusation began decades ago with the allegation that “Jews . . . use the moral advantages that are theirs as privileged ‘victims’ to advance parochial aims and partisan political agendas”, and developed into the characterisation of Jews as “a corrupt, ruthlessly exploitative bunch that has used the Holocaust to acquire personal wealth and political power:” a view that has been enthusiastically received among antisemites because it revives stereotypes of “the opportunistic, money-grubbing Jew” and appears to provide “confirmation of [the existence of] a Jewish conspiracy.” 49 The ways in which events are remembered and narrated are always partial, contested fluid and significant. But this question distils all that
complexity into two related charges. One, about “Jewish power” again, constructing the memory and narrative that the Jews create of the Holocaust, as a key source of power. And the other is about imputed Jewish cunning and conspiracy, alleging that Jews have succeeded in a unique way in making the narrative of their own suffering appear preeminent and universal. Antisemitism seeks to construct a hierarchy of suffering in which Jews are at the bottom; it does this by accusing Jews of placing themselves dishonestly at the top.

3.6. JpAs 6 “Jewish people chase money more than other people do”

In medieval Europe, Jews were not only accused of loving, and even worshipping money, but widely employed as a symbol for “usury, avarice, and the destructive effects of money capital as a whole.” Today, “[o]ne of the most prominent and persistent stereotypes about Jews is that they are greedy and avaricious, hoping to make themselves rich by any means.” A stereotype of the avaricious Jew is so widespread that in 2010, the then-director of the Anti-Defamation League published an entire book on the topic. JpAs 6 thus invites respondents to agree or to disagree with one of the simplest and most enduring antisemitic tropes.

3.7. AzAs 1 “I am comfortable spending time with people who openly support Israel” (R)

Although the nature and the strength of Jewish support for Israel is diverse, the overwhelming majority of Jews support Israel, in one way or another. Surveys carried out in 1986 and 2007 find that, while only 27–29% of American Jews define themselves as Zionists, 63–70% agree with the statement “Caring about Israel is a very important part of my being a Jew” and 61–64% agree with the statement “If Israel were destroyed, I would feel as if I had suffered one of the greatest personal tragedies of my life.” A survey carried out in 2015 found that 59% of British Jews define themselves as Zionists, while 90% agree with the statement “I support Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state” and 93% agree that Israel “plays some role in,” “is important to,” or “is central to” their identity as Jews. This means that a person who is not comfortable spending time with supporters of Israel is not comfortable spending time with the overwhelming majority of Jews, and the consequences of holding the sentiment expressed in AzAs 1 are likely to be very similar to those of holding the sentiment expressed in JpAs 3, that is, social exclusion of Jews. It has been argued that attitudes to Israel and to antisemitism are in danger of becoming symbolic markers of the boundaries of acceptable left and liberal opinion, with people who are supportive of Israel being defined as belonging outside the “community of the good.” AzAs 1 recognizes that this process of casting out happens not only in the political sphere but also in the personal.

3.8 AzAs 2 “Israel has a right to exist as a homeland for the Jewish people” (R)

The denial of Israel’s right to exist links to the practice of treating Israel as an unambiguous evil, and as uniquely so in relation to states whose rights to exist are generally not challenged in an analogous way. It is not true that Israel, in its essence, is uniquely racist, or that it was forged originally through a uniquely illegitimate process, nor that its existence violates the norms of international law or of politics or of morality in a way that is unusual. Somebody may deny the right of states in general to exist, but, in practice, the “no state solution” to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an extreme minority position even on the far left, and the material effect of removing Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state would be to put Israel’s majority Jewish population at serious risk. Although a number of states in the region have now normalized relations with Israel, the country has been under continuous
military threat since its foundation in 1948, and the local Jewish population was subjected to pogroms even before that date.\textsuperscript{57} Israel has found ways of addressing three arguably contradictory essential functions: it holds together a diverse citizenship in a national community; it functions as the means of self-defense for Israeli Jews; and it provides a guaranteed refuge for Jews worldwide, should they need it. One can reasonably argue about the balance it has achieved. But it is not plausible to support Israel’s right to exist in the abstract without supporting it as a means of Jewish self-defence or an expression of Jewish peoplehood.

Note that this item replaces “Israel makes a positive contribution to the world” in the original AzAs inventory,\textsuperscript{58} which was borrowed from an earlier inventory of statements.\textsuperscript{59} Although that item correlated strongly with the other items in the original AzAs inventory, and thus appears plausibly indicative of the same underlying trait or traits, the change was made due to concern from stakeholders that denial of a positive contribution made by Israel would not be viewed as antisemitic in its own right.\textsuperscript{60}

3.9. AzAs 3 “Israel is right to defend itself against those who want to destroy it” (R)

The right to self-defense is a straightforward right that any state asserts. For example, article 51 of the United Nations charter protects the rights of its members to defend themselves against attack.\textsuperscript{61} To deny this right to Israel is to deny it a fundamental right that is not denied to other states. A fortiori, there are a number of actors, including armed movements and states which they wish to destroy Israel, which attacked it militarily in the past, and which make the case for destroying it in explicitly antisemitic terms. A particularly clear example of this is provided in the following opinion from one of the founders of Hamas:

God has gathered the Jews in Palestine, Ibrahim Quqa says, “not in order that it would be a home and a land for them, but to serve as their graveyard so that he would free the whole world from this pest. Just as pilgrims atone for their sins by offering a sacrifice in Mecca, so would the Jews be sacrificed in al-Aqsa by hands as pure as those of the pilgrims”\textsuperscript{62}.

3.10. AzAs 4 “Israel and its supporters are a bad influence on our democracy”

Weil argues that “[t]he simplest and most direct expression of political anti-Semitism is the opinion that Jews or Jewish organizations exercise too great an influence on national politics.”\textsuperscript{63} AzAs 4 simply recasts this in terms of Israel and its supporters—much as in the “Zionist-Occupied Government” (ZOG) conspiracy theory, which is one of the core ideas underpinning the Pan-Aryanist ideology of the contemporary extreme right.\textsuperscript{64}

Antisemitism has always positioned the Jewish people as being central to what is wrong in the world: as Fine and Spencer put it, “the Jewish question” is the classic term for the representation of Jews as harmful to humanity as a whole,\textsuperscript{65} and AzAs 4 articulates a way in which Israel is constructed not only as a specific threat to people who may be in conflict with it, but also to the wider world. This statement constructs Israel as being universally corrosive of democracy in general. It is related to the claim (above) that Jews have too much power in “the media.” Israel is not only bad for the Palestinians, goes this claim, but it is also bad for “us” in ways that are unrelated to Israel’s actual conflicts. Because most Jews are (as noted above) in a general sense supportive of Israel, a belief such as the one captured by AzAs 4 can easily shade into the classically antisemitic understanding of Jews in the diaspora as an “enemy within” the nation states in which they reside, with the idea of general support for the Israeli state often blurring into that of acting as an agent of the Israeli government. A good example of this was provided by the British academic who responded
to Jewish students’ complaints about his lecture content by claiming “that there is an all-out onslaught by the Israeli government” to “impose their [sic] will all over the world”, and that all university Jewish societies . . . plus the Union of Jewish Students, are “directed by Israel” as part of this effort.”

3.11. AzAs 5 “Israel can get away with anything because its supporters control the media”

While this article was being drafted, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, the foreign minister of Pakistan, was asked on live television what he had meant by a remark about Israel’s “connections.” In explaining his intended meaning, he first referred to “deep pockets” (that is, financial power) and then made the allegation: “they control [the] media,” prompting his interviewer, CNN journalist Bianna Golodryga, to interject: “I would call that an antisemitic remark.”

The idea that Israel controls the media is simply an extension of the old idea of Jewish power over the media, here codified as JpAs 4. Replacing the idea of “Jewish” power with the idea of “Israeli” might seem to render the basic claim more plausible and less antisemitic. However, this claim closely mirrors an older antisemitic trope about Jews qua Jews, and thus serves as a clear example of the “reconfiguring” of antisemitism described by Fine and Spencer (see above). Lastly, a belief in the idea that Israel “can get away with anything” implies huge power—and indeed, huge misuse of power—and (like AzAs 4) will inevitably impact significantly against Jews even if only by setting up an assumption that people should be looking out for Jews working, or sympathetically represented, in the media, with the expectation that they may be acting on behalf of a foreign government.

3.12. AzAs 6 “Israel treats the Palestinians like the Nazis treated the Jews”

The Nazis occupied most of Europe, defining Jews as an enemy that needed to be destroyed, and setting up networks of surveillance and power that could pick Jews out and kill them across the continent. They had significant success in killing the Jews of Europe, reducing the European Jewish population by around six million. The Israelis have done none of this. The occupation of Palestine is of a different nature and it persists for different purposes and reasons. Nobody in Israel outside of a tiny extremist political fringe has ever even discussed, let alone attempted, murdering non-Jews in Israel or in the occupied territories. Nazis murdered Jewish children across Europe; Israel does not murder children. Nazis conducted mass organized killing; Israel has never done anything like that. Indeed, “the idea that the situation in Gaza . . . is in any way comparable to the Warsaw Ghetto or Auschwitz . . . does not stand up to a moment’s scrutiny,” and analogies between these situations can only be sustained “by erasing the determinate role of exterminatory antisemitism in the Holocaust.” As Johnson argues, the analogy of Jews with those who made a serious attempt to exterminate Jews is antisemitic because it is gratuitous, false, and calculated to humiliate and to hurt. Moreover, the effect is to “exploit the reality that Nazism in the postwar world has become the defining metaphor of absolute evil” in order to produce the appearance of “a moral obligation to wage war against Israel,” resulting in “the total demonisation of the ‘Jewish other,’” both inside and outside Israel, “as the ‘enemy of mankind’ . . . [and] as barbarian ‘Nazis.’” Thus it is for good reason that Example 10 of the IHRA working definition of antisemitism specifically highlights the Israel-Nazi analogy as potentially antisemitic.

4. SCORING

The GeAs scale and its subscales were designed to be used and scored as Likert scales. Thus, it is intended that they be scored by recoding responses on a five-point scale from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree” as numbers from one to five, reversing where appropriate, and
calculating the mean. Scores for the JpAs and AzAs subscales can be calculated in the same way, if desired. Missing or “Don’t know” responses to individual items can be ignored for the purposes of calculating the mean. This procedure will yield a score of 1–5 for each of GeAs, JpAs, and AzAs, where a score can be interpreted as representing a respondent’s overall response to a complete set of items.

Alternatively, the GeAs scale can be scored by counting up agreeing responses to positively keyed items and disagreeing responses to negatively keyed items, and ignoring other responses (that is, disagreeing responses to positively keyed items, agreeing responses to negatively keyed items, and neutral, missing, and “Don’t know” responses to both). This procedure will yield a score of 0–12 for GeAs and scores of 0–6 for JpAs and AzAs, where these numbers can be interpreted as representing total numbers of potentially antisemitic views. This approach to scoring is arguably more intuitive, and has been employed in a number of previous studies using related scales, but it has the disadvantage of ignoring degrees of agreement and disagreement.

5. SCALE VALIDATION

Scale validation is outside the scope of this article. However, the scale has been extensively validated in a separate article, which presents evidence (a) that responses to individual items are predictive of responses to other items (internal consistency), (b) that respondent scores are consistent over time (test-retest validity), (c) that JpAs scores are more closely related to attitudes to Jews than to attitudes to other religious groups while AzAs scores are more closely related to attitudes to Israel than to attitudes to other countries (convergent-discriminant validity), and (d) that a single latent trait underlies responses to JpAs and AzAs items, although there are also factors inclining individual respondents towards one or the other (that is, that the data are best explained by a bifactor model). Most importantly, the GeAs scale was found to achieve excellent internal consistency with a representative sample of 1853 UK-resident adults ($\lambda = .90$), and JpAs and AzAs subscale scores were found to be positively correlated, both in that same sample and in gender- and age-based subsamples thereof (overall: $r = .42$, $p < .001$; females: $r = .38$, $p < .001$; males: $r = .50$, $p < .001$; 18- to 25-year-olds: $r = .28$, $p = .001$; over 25-year-olds: $r = .43$, $p < .001$), with all of these correlations becoming stronger following removal of outliers (overall: $r = .47$, $p < .001$; females: $r = .45$, $p < .001$; males: $r = .53$, $p < .001$; 18- to 25-year-olds: $r = .38$, $p < .001$; over 25-year-olds: $r = .47$, $p < .001$).

6. CONCLUSION

The GeAs scale is the first published scale to build upon the scholarly understanding of antisemitism now codified in the IHRA Definition by drawing on social and historical research to measure attitudes expressive of both “old” and “new” antisemitism equally. Independently of the scale’s psychometric validity (which, as explained, has been established elsewhere), this article demonstrates how the elements of the GeAs scale draw upon social and historical scholarship in order to provide a balanced and complete measure of contemporary antisemitism. The GeAs scale may thus be used in order to ensure that scores measured in studies employing diverse methods are directly comparable. By employing the GeAs scale, both academic and stakeholder researchers may follow Kaufman and colleagues’ exhortation to “utilise updated and validated measures of antisemitism,” thus increasing the accuracy and replicability of antisemitism research.
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