THOUGHT AT ITS LIMITS:
IMMANENCE AND PHILOSOPHY IN FOUCAULT
AND DELEUZE

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in Philosophy

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I hereby declare that all the work contained in this volume is my own.

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This thesis argues that immanence should be understood as the key problem of modern philosophy, by virtue of giving a philosophical form to the rise of a critical attitude in regards to claims to truth and authority. If the space defined this question is where all thought since the early Enlightenment is deployed, it is nevertheless the case that it receives its most important inflection when, with Kant, critique is brought to bear on philosophy itself, which is questioned as to its own authority and truth. This entails a redoubling of the problem of immanence, which must now be understood as being separated into a material (immanence of thought to Being) and formal (immanence of Being to thought) side. Bringing the two together becomes the greatest challenge for all subsequent philosophy, and the way in which each philosophy attempts to do it is determinant for the future of the political and cultural question of critique. Deleuze and Foucault are both critical of the two main cases of solution to this problem – the transcendental (Kant and phenomenology) and the historical (Hegel and Marx). It is in Nietzsche that they find the inspiration for a kind of critique that will avoid closure, and therefore escape from being made relative to its own present; that can affirm at once the two determinations of immanence that are most important for the two – univocity and perspectivism –; and that can provide a new solution to the challenge of making formal and material immanence coincide. I thus propose that we can find in the two a third alternative to this central problem of all philosophical modernity, which I call a performative solution.

Many complain that the words of the wise are always merely parables and of no use in daily life, which is the only life we have. When the sage says: 'Go over', he does not mean that we should cross over to some actual place, which we could do anyhow if the labour were worth it; he means some fabulous yonder, something unknown to us, something too that he cannot designate more precisely, and therefore cannot help us here in the very least. All these parables really set out to say merely that the incomprehensible is incomprehensible, and we know that already. But the cares we have to struggle with every day: that is a different matter.

Concerning this a man once said: Why such reluctance? If you only followed the parables you yourselves would become parables and with that rid yourself of all your daily cares.

Another said: I bet that is also a parable.

The first said: You have won.

The second said: But unfortunately only in parable.

The first said: No, in reality: in parable you have lost.

Franz Kafka, 'On parables'

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Introduction

Foucault and Deleuze: hardly ever in the history of philosophy does one find two great thinkers so close to each other, as living individuals and individual thinkers, friends in personal and philosophical life – sharing, 'more than a goal, a common cause', as much as 'the same enemies'.[1] Yet, as much as the personal was not, neither is their philosophical relation free of complications, confusions, misunderstandings.[2] Both had the opportunity to

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[1] DELEUZE, G. Fendre les choses, fendre les mots. *In: Pourparlers. 1972-1990.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, pp. 117-9. The phrase on sharing the same enemies is taken from François Châtelet's *Chronique des idées perdues,* where it refers to the author and Deleuze, Guattari, Lyotard and René Schérer; it is then used, by Deleuze, to include Foucault, and later, by Derrida, in relation to Deleuze. *Cf.* DERRIDA, J. Il me faudrait errer tout seul. *Libération,* 7/9, 1995. It is not insignificant to this study that these thinkers should express themselves in such terms.

[2] The two met in 1962, in Clermont-Ferrand, at the house of Jules Vuillemin, the scholar whose interpretation of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy was undoubtedly important for both, and who played a key role in getting Foucault his positions at Clermont-Ferrand and, later, the Collège de France, where he gave the latter's *in memoriam* lecture. They fell out, or perhaps rather ceased to communicate, in 1977; according to Deleuze, Foucault 'went through a crisis of every order, political, vital, of thought. (...) I felt he wanted to be alone, to go where no-one could follow, apart from the few most intimate.' According to Éribon, what precipitated their estrangement was the polemic around the extradition of Klaus Croissant, the lawyer who represented the Red Army Faction. (The different positions can be seen *In:*

express their views on each other, but the exchange (not unlike the more discussed one between Foucault and Habermas) is not symmetrical; the weight of engagement, in extent as well as in consistence and depth, is certainly heavier on Deleuze's side.[3] Pointing that out, however, does not suffice to clear the field. Partly owing to this original imbalance, there seems to be among readers and interpreters two basic ways of relating the two, none of which are particularly satisfactory. If one considers Foucault

FOUCAULT, M. Va-t-on extrader Klaus Croissant?; Michel Foucault: 'Désormais, la sécurité est au-dessus des lois'. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 361-8; DELEUZE, G; GUATTARI, F. Le pire moyen de faire l'Europe. *In: Deux régimes de fous*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, pp. 135-7.) The divergence, always following Éribon, was due to Foucault's perception that Deleuze and Guattari had failed to distance themselves from urban guerrilla groups such as the RAF. *Cf.* ERIBON, D. *Michel Foucault*. Trans. Wing, B. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991, p. 259-62. They would only meet again *in extremis*: one of Foucault's last wishes was to see Deleuze, and their ultimate reconciliation would be marked by the latter reading extracts from *L'Usage des plaisirs* at the former's funeral. Together, the two signed, apart from a number of manifestos on various issues, the influential 'Les intellectuels et le pouvoir', and co-edited the French publication of the Colli-Montinari edition of the complete works of Nietzsche. With Félix Guattari (and François Fourquet), Foucault wrote 'Premières discussions, premiers balbutiements: la ville est-elle une force productive ou d'anti-production?'; with Deleuze and Guattari, 'Arrachés par d'énergiques interventions à notre euphorique séjour dans l'histoire, nous mettons laborieusement en chantier des "catégories logiques"'.

Curiously, perhaps the greatest misunderstanding in their mutual relation could concern the quote that usually defines it – the famous sentence in which Foucault proclaims that *'un jour, peut-être, le siècle sera deleuzien'* (FOUCAULT, M. Theatrum philosophicum. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 944.) In a 1978 interview, Foucault explains: 'One must imagine the polemical environment one inhabits in Paris. I remember well the sense in which I used this sentence. But the sentence is like this: at present – it was 1970 – very few people know Deleuze, a few initiated understand his importance, but maybe the day will come when *"le siècle sera deleuzien"*, that is, *"siècle"* in the Christian sense of the word, common opinion against the elite's, which does not prevent Deleuze from being an important philosopher. It was in its pejorative sense that I employed the word *"siècle"*. Yes, Deleuze is very important for me.' *Idem*. La scène de la philosophie. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 589.

[3] Foucault wrote reviews of *Différence et répétition* and *Logique du sens*, and engaged to some extent with Deleuze's thought post-*L'Anti-Oedipe* (to whose American edition he contributed the preface) in three main occasions (the first lecture of the 1976 Collège de France course, the debate in 'La verité et les formes juridiques', and a short, cryptic passage of 'Structuralisme et post-structuralisme'). Deleuze wrote reviews of *Raymond Roussel*, *Les mots et les choses*, *L'Archéologie du savoir* and *Surveiller et punir*, all later revised and included in his book-length study of his friend, to whom he also exclusively dedicated three interviews and his 1984-5 course at the Université de Paris VIII. He also commented on Foucault in 'Sur les principaux concepts de Michel Foucault' (parts of which were used in the book), 'Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle' and 'Qu'est-ce qu'un dispositf?' (an extract of which also appeared as 'Foucalt, historien du présent'). Notoriously, he also wrote in 1977 a series of notes on *La volonté de savoir*, relating convergences, divergences and doubts – in the wish to open a discussion and rekindle the friendship. To the best of everyone's knowledge, Foucault did not reply, at the time or when the two became reconciled. This text was published in 1994 – hence after the death of Deleuze – by François Ewald, to whom it had been originally trusted, under the title 'Désir et plaisir'.

scholarship, it is easy to draw two neat camps in which the relation to Deleuze divides it. At the time when Deleuze's *Foucault* was published in 1986, its author was a relatively marginal figure outside France in comparison to the then much more relevant figures of Derrida, Lyotard and Foucault himself. By then, the book that is arguably the most influential in Foucault's international reception had already come out[4], setting the tone for much of the scholarship that would follow; and so had (or were on the verge of being) other important and influential texts by authors such as Fraser, Gutting, Habermas, Honneth, Rajchman, Rorty, Taylor, Walzer.[5] These factors, combined with a relative decrease of philosophical interest in Foucault at around the same time when Deleuze was coming to prominence, has meant that a great amount of commentary on the first has entirely ignored not only the second's book, but also his thought altogether; and that, on the other hand, much commentary that considers Deleuze's *Foucault* tends to be primarily interested in the first rather than the second – with the not entirely rare consequence that Foucault can end up being almost exclusively considered in the terms set by Deleuze, appearing as all but a 'case' of his thought.[6]

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[4] DREYFUS, H.; RABINOW, P. *Michel Foucault. Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics.* Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982. It is not only the fact that this is the first book-length study of Foucault to encompass almost the whole length of his work that makes it important, but also that he is seen as stamping it with a seal of approval, not only according to what the authors say in the introduction, but also by contributing an important essay ('Le sujet et le pouvoir') and an interview as afterwords.

[5] *Cf.* FRASER, N. *Unruly practices: power, discourse and gender in contemporary social theory.* Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, 1989, ch. 2; GUTTING, G. *Michel Foucault's archaeology of human sciences.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989; HABERMAS, J. *The philosophical discourse of modernity. Twelve lectures.* Trans. Lawrence, F. G. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992, ch. 9, 10; HONNETH, A. *The critique of power. Reflective stages in a critical social theory.* Trans. Baynes, K. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993, ch. 5, 6; RAJCHMAN, J. *Michel Foucault: the freedom of philosophy.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1985; RORTY, R. Foucault and epistemology; TAYLOR, Ch. Foucault on freedom and truth; WALZER, M. The politics of Michel Foucault. The last three can be found *In:* HOY, D. C. (ed.) *Foucault: a critical reader.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.

[6] Examples here would include: BADIOU, A. *Deleuze. 'La clameur de l'Etre'.* Paris: Hachette, 1998; GUALANDI, A. *La rupture et l'évenement. La question de la verité scientifique dans la philosophie française contemporaine.* Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998; HARDT, M.; NEGRI, A. *Empire.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001; LAZZARATO, M. From biopower to biopolitics. Trans. Ramirez, I. [www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/csisp/papers/lazzarato_biopolitics.pdf]; NEGRI, A. Foucault between

I have, as a consequence, tried to keep a balance between the two that prevented one from blurring into the other.[7] Where there seemed to be important points of convergence, I have strained to make the surface of contact visible, which entails precisely presenting both sides as different rather than as one and the same thing; and in general I worked towards the lines of divergence, in the belief that it is in the places where different philosophical trajectories choose different paths that there is most to be learnt. This is because the specific nature of philosophical decisions must be a key point in an enquiry into the relations between philosophy and immanence, which is also an enquiry into thought and Being, which is also an enquiry into the possibility of philosophy itself. The stakes in this enquiry – understood as the general exercise of philosophising of which this study is nothing but a necessarily limited, *necessarily partial* individuation – are, as I try to argue here, the highest not only for philosophy as a separate, constituted discipline, but – being philosophy the discipline in which the essential concern is always inevitably its own status – to the relation between whatever this discipline may be considered as and the world in which it takes place.

The approximation between the two, however, carries other difficulties. The first concerns how to read them. While Deleuze is widely recognised as being a philosopher in a very traditional sense of the word – systematic, 'classical',

past and present. Trans. Toscano, A. *ephemera: theory and poltics in organisation*, 6(1), pp. 75-82 [www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/6-1/6-1negri.pdf]. Notable exceptions would be: HALLWARD, P. The limits of individuation, or how to distinguish Deleuze and Foucault. *Angelaki: Journal for the theoretical humanities*. 5 (2), 2000, pp. 93-103; PRADO JR, B. The plane of immanence and life. *In:* KHALFA, J. (ed.) *An introduction to the thought of Gilles Deleuze*. London: Continuum, 2004, pp. 9-25. As a middle-term: AGAMBEN, G. Absolute immanence. *In:* KHALFA, J. (ed.) *Op. cit.*, pp. 151-69; COLWELL, C. Deleuze and Foucault: series, event, genealogy. *Theory & Event*. 1 (2), 1997.
[7] In this sense I have been inspired by Lawlor's idea of an analysis geared at identifying 'points of diffraction', i.e., those points where the proximity between different systems of thought are at its closest, which is also where they are the farthest from each other, since that is where the decisions that structure them and render them incommensurable are made. *Cf.* LAWLOR, L. *Thinking through French philosophy: the being of the question*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.

some would suggest even pre-Kantian[8] –, the same can hardly be said about Foucault. At the same time, given some of the contingencies of their reception (which to a great extent took place initially in academic fields outside philosophy, in areas such as anthropology, literature, sociology) and the impact of their very uniqueness, there is a tendency to, even in Deleuze's case, play down the structural, architectonic features that would point to a certain unity of vision and systematicity, and often celebrate them as philosophers of an entirely distinct kind, whose work can be appropriated in a relatively mix-and-match fashion, who are entirely beyond the totalising ambitions and overall preoccupations of a certain 'traditional' philosophy.

There certainly is some truth in this; in a way this whole study is about what exactly this truth should, or can, be interpreted as. Nevertheless, this is a study which is concerned with Deleuze and Foucault *as philosophers*, in a way that may be more 'traditional' than some readers would like. Following the thread of immanence as both historical and philosophical problem, it examines the relation of philosophy to time as a nodal point of its relation to transcendence and immanence, and identifies Kant as the key point of inflection in this field. It is thus also centrally concerned with Foucault and Deleuze's rapport with the Copernican turn and the impasses legated by it in what concerns the problem of, at once, thinking thought as immanent to Being, and Being as immanent to thought.

This choice of stressing Deleuze and Foucault the philosophers essentially boils down to one idea: that all thought tends towards a system. This does not necessarily entail that all thought has the condition, or even the intention, to constitute a closed, complete edifice capable of encompassing the whole of reality and justifying itself metatheoretically; in a weaker sense of 'system', we

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[8] *Cf.* BADIOU A.; *Op. cit.*, p. 69; DERRIDA, J. *Op. cit.*; and Deleuze himself, in a characteristic statement: 'I belive in philosophy as system. (...) In this sense, I feel I am very classical.' DELEUZE, G. Lettre préface a Jean-Clet Martin. *In: Deux régimes de fous.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 338.

can say that all thought strives towards a point, and thus has an inbuilt tendency towards coherence, being capable of structuring itself internally so as to produce meaning, even if it is never fully capable of complete self-mastery. This could perhaps be taken as a hermeneutic principle which is a very specifically philosophical form of *in dubio pro reo*: whenever two or more alternatives in interpretation are possible, the one to be chosen should be the one that yields the most results. To 'search for the whole (*l'ensemble*)', where the "whole" means: what forces [thought] to go from one level to another'.[9] This is not a way of being charitable to a philosopher, but rather to ourselves: of not spoiling too soon the pleasure of the game that a thinker can offer us. It is true that, apart from the adventure of L'*Archéologie du savoir*, Foucault was a thinker who showed little concern with erecting systems – which could be attributed less to a incapacity than, as I shall argue, a peculiar kind of ethics that was a necessary derivation of his own thought; and that he enjoyed actively engaging in cat-and-mouse games with his critics, reclaiming with proud insistence the right not to be pinned down.[10] But precisely one of the reasons why Deleuze's book on him stands out is the fact that he emphatically sets out to take his friend seriously as a philosopher – certainly in a more traditional sense than Foucault saw himself –, as someone with a coherent and defensible programme in its own right. The continuity he speaks of is neither merely formal, as in the continued use of certain terms or

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[9] DELEUZE, G. Fendre les choses, fendre les mots. *In: Pourparlers. 1972-1990*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, pp. 116. (Modified; the passage originally concerned Foucault.)

[10] The most famous of such statements being: '"What, do you imagine that I would take so much trouble and so much pleasure in writing, do you think that I would keep so persistently to my task, my head down low, if I were not preparing - with a rather feverish hand - the labyrinth where to venture, (...) in which I can lose myself and appear at last to eyes that I will never have to meet again. I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: this is a moral of the civil state that concerns only our papers. May it spare us when we write."' FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 28. *Cf.* also: 'It is true that I prefer not to identify myself, and that I am amused by the diversity of ways in which I have been judged and classified.' *Idem*. Polémique, politique et problématisation. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1412. This is taken to its ultimate conclusion in the anonymous interview published as: *Idem*. Le philosophe masqué. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 923-9.

methods, nor circumscribed to the recurrence of certain themes and preoccupations at different levels; his reading faithfully follows the idea that

> As in all great thinkers, his thought has always proceeded by means of crises and quakes as an ultimate condition of creation, as condition of an ultimate coherence.[11]

This has the concrete consequence of, where most commentators look at the changes in direction in a relatively negative sense[12], as the ultimate exhaustion of a point or thread and the departure towards a next one, Deleuze gives them a positive one: as the internal movement of a set of questions towards their ultimate completion. Not for a moment does he seem to doubt that the project of archaeology 'made sense' and, while sustainable in the first place, required the move towards genealogy; and again in the 'return of the subject', a point where some would see a near denial of earlier work, he sees the logical consequence of previous research.

This way of reading, to which I fully subscribe, is not only valid in its own right, but also finds just as much support in Foucault's writings as the opposite alternative. If, on the one hand, he never ceased to stress the experimental quality of his researches, he also repeatedly seemed to look back and take stock of the different concepts, methods and results thrown up along the way, and rework them into new meanings and ensembles. These two relationships towards his work do not show a vacillation or inconsistency, since what unites them is the selective, recursive character of each return – L'Archéologie du savoir does not attempt to tease out the methodological framework of the books that precede it without exposing their flaws; the 1970s find him asking what else he could have been speaking about before if not power,[13] while

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[11] DELEUZE, G. Fendre les choses, fendre les mots. In: Pourparlers. 1972-1990. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 115.
[12] I could refer to the Dreyfus and Rabinow book here, if only for its influence; this is one of the most recurrent topoi of Foucault scholarship.
[13] Idem. Entretien avec Michel Foucault. In: Op. cit., p. 146.

condemning his previous work for posing questions in inadequate ways;[14] and in the last years of his life both archaeological and genealogical periods are reconfigured into an overall preoccupation with the constitution of the subject.[15] 'Larger ensembles' should be understood then as 'larger' only by virtue of the accretion of subsequent work; every new reconfiguration requires exclusions and transformations, and Foucault seems less interested in rewriting his trajectory as a coherent whole than in identifying degrees of consistency, a range of variations:

> These researches were very closely related to each other, without actually developing into any continuous or coherent whole (...); at once dispersed and very repetitive, they have continually re-trod the same ground, invoked the same themes, the same concepts, etc. (...)

> It is, at the end of the day, up to you or me to see what we can make of these fragments. I have felt somewhat like a whale that leaps to the surface of the water disturbing it momentarily with a tiny jet of spray and lets it be believed, or pretends to believe, or wants to believe, or in fact does himself indeed believe, that down in the depths where no one sees it any more, where it is no longer perceived or controlled by anyone, he follows a more profound, coherent and reasoned trajectory.[16]

These exclusions and transformations are, in my opinion, not only inevitable, but essential in philosophical scholarship. As much as Deleuze's book on Foucault is full of choices – and, as those familiar with his work on other philosophers will know, these can be idiosyncratic – the way in which I attempt to read both also includes choices, simply because an element of choice is always at work when one reads. I make no claims to producing a

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[14] *Cf.* for instance his critique of *L'Ordre du discours* for its reliance on a model of power as negative *In: Idem*. Le rapports de pouvoir passent a l'intérieur des corps. *In: Op. cit.*, pp. 228-9.

[15] *Cf.* for instance: *Le sujet et le pouvoir. In: Op. cit.*, pp. 1041-2.

[16] *Idem. 'Il faut défendre la société'. Cours au Collège de France (1975 - 1976)*. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1997, p. 5-6. It is interesting to compare this to the end of *L'Archeologie du savoir* in order to see how, while saying very similar things, one points in the opposite direction to the other.

'truer' Foucault or Deleuze, and yet I do not think any of my conclusions misrepresent their thought in any way. Reading and writing about philosophy should include both a rigorous exam of the texts and an appropriation that changes them by, consciously but not arbitrarily, reconfiguring their elements and their connections; it should, finally, be coupled with an ethics that does not exclude other interpretive paths in useless scholarly polemics, but opens up to them in order to identify what exactly are the ways in which they differ, and what consequences these can have. It may seem, for example, that more attention is given here to texts which are not ascribed much value elsewhere; it is up to the reader to judge whether the research justifies such choices or not. Finally, it must be said that, in thinking of the work of philosophy as more than the neurotic search for an elusive textual truth, I am perfectly justified by what both Deleuze and Foucault have to say on the subject.[17]

A third question of interpretation, before we begin; and again one finds it more on one side than the other. The problem that this study works towards, as well as the guiding thread it tries to follow, is that of immanence. 'Immanence' is a word usually associated with Gilles Deleuze, solo or in tandem with Félix Guattari; one could say it is the central concept of his philosophy by virtue of being the concept, or rather the *problem*, he elects as central to philosophy as a whole; to the point where, in his last work with Guattari, the two things – immanence, philosophy – almost blur into each other. It is a fact that the term does not have much weight in Foucault, even if he shares some of the 'enemies' that Deleuze's quest for immanence sets up: Platonism, phenomenology, the subject. And again, it is not unfair to see that

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[17] Foucault's critique of 'commentary' is notorious: *Idem. Naissance de la clinique.* Paris: PUF, 2003, pp. xii-xiii; in an interview, he states: 'As for me, I use the authors I like. The only acknowledgment one could give a work such as Nietzsche's is to use it, deform it, make it squeal, scream.' *Idem.* Entretien sur la prison: le livre et sa méthode. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1621. Deleuze, on the other hand, argues for a history of philosophy that doubles it with 'maximum modification', and describes his way of reading other philosophers as 'taking them from behind' to produce 'monstrous children'. *Cf.* DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 4; Lèttre à un critique sevère. *In: Pourparlers. 1972-1990.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 15.

much of the work being done today in which Foucault is made to side with Deleuze as a philosopher of immanence often falls into the category described above, viz., the scholarship that sees the first primarily through the eyes of the second.[18]

Would this research then, by the very choice of theme, not betray at the outset the intention to keep the two apart, and not subsume one under the other? Here we start touching upon the content of these pages. And the answer is no.

The starting point here, examined in the first chapter, is the idea that the problem of immanence, or of philosophical immanence, is the specifically philosophical form of a much wider cultural phenomenon in the West, whose emergence can be made to roughly coincide with the Enlightenment and the period that saw important transformations in economic and political structures which for the first time gave shape to this modernity which, as Foucault insists, is still ours. This historical moment, which is a recurrent element in many of his historical analyses (the appearance of 'man', the rise of governmentality, new modes of relation to madness, punishment and sexuality), is what he will try to capture one more time, under another aspect, in his late lectures on Kant's 'An answer to the question: "What is Enlightenment?"'. It is not only the site of changes whose consequences we live out today, but the point of emergence of a certain critical attitude concerned with the nexus of truth (hence knowledge), authority (hence power) and their effects in producing the subject. This critical *ethos*, which is

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[18] *Cf.* LAZZARATO, M. *Op. cit.*; NEGRI, A. *Op. cit.* The same could be said, to some extent, of Agamben, even if he does observe more differences between the two than the others. AGAMBEN, G. *Op. cit.*, pp. 151-69. An alternative view of Foucault in relation to transcendence and immanence, from a phenomenological perspective, can be found *In:* VISKER, R. *Truth and singularity. Taking Foucault into phenomenology.* New York: Springer, 1999.

also an 'attitude of modernity'[19], certainly manifests itself in philosophy, but essentially takes place in struggles around ecclesiastical and political authority where it is the power associated to claims to truth, and the truth associated to claims to power, that is at stake. These are problems neither created by philosophy, nor those it gathers when it flies at dusk. These are *the key problems of modernity* as a whole: the critique of truth and power; its relationship to autonomy, heteronomy, the constitution of the subject. My starting point is therefore that the problem of immanence is only the specifically philosophical form of a general social and political *drive towards immanentisation*, which is determined by material struggles and processes (such as the rise of a new property-owning class, the progressive extension of suffrage, the relative expansion of access to education, the appearance of a public arena of debate through, for instance, the printed press etc.). The death of the God of philosophers is not simply *concomitant* with the separation of State and church, for example, but part of one and the same phenomenon.

This amounts to saying that, since then, every philosophy has had to deal, in a way or another, with the problem of immanence – in other words, with the problem of grounding claims to truth concerning objects and moral principles on the world we experience rather than a supra-worldly realm; the effects of power inherent in truth claims, and the effect that struggles around power have on truth. The question that guides me then is: what, if anything, constitutes Deleuze and Foucault's specific contributions to this problem that has at once moved and haunted philosophy since then? What are the choices they imply, and the consequences they entail? Thus the question that this study would seem to beg from the start can be dismissed straight away: if immanence is the central problem of modernity and of modern philosophy,

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[19] FOUCAULT, M. What is Enlightenment?. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1387.

Foucault, insofar as he is inscribed within the space defined by this modernity, must necessarily be engaged with it.

After having started *in media res*, reading Foucault's texts on Kant, the second chapter turns to Kant himself. This is because, with the first *Critique*, the problem of immanence is turned upon philosophy itself: now, instead of being a tool of critique that is called into the fray of the critique of claims to truth – of religious, scientific, political and legal discourse –, philosophy will have to answer the question of the provenance and legitimacy of its own truth. If modernity, following Habermas' famous sentence, *'has to create its normativity out of itself*[20], from Kant on philosophy must fashion its own truth out of the materials it gives itself. The question of philosophical immanence is thus doubled, folded upon itself, but also split into two divergent paths. On the one hand, to think of Being as immanent is to conceive it without any recourse to transcendence, to a supplementary dimension that bestows intelligible and moral order upon from the outside – extra-temporal, self-identical forms, a transitive or emanative cause, a principle of harmony that enables intelligibility. On the other, if Being is to be thought in such a way, it is necessary that the act of conceiving too must happen 'from the inside', from 'the middle' of Being. It is in distinguishing logic from transcendental logic, logical possibility from transcendental condition, that Kant effectively marks this turning point: while Spinoza could argue for an infinite, eternal Substance that was perfectly conceivable from the logical point of view (because non-contradictory), he could not demonstrate its existence, or how the knowledge of this existence could occur to a finite intellect existing in time. This splitting of immanence into a material – the affirmation of a this-worldliness free from any 'outside' that conditions it – and a formal side – the requirement that affirmation be capable of fashioning itself out of this-worldly materials – is the legacy of the critical system, and the point where the connection between

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[20] HABERMAS, J. *The philosophical discourse of modernity. Twelve lectures.* Trans. Lawrence, F. G. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992, p. 7. The quote continues: 'Modernity sees itself cast back upon itself without any possibility of escape.'

immanence and immanentisation is clear: the critique of *vana religio* and *potestas* must be able to withstand the same test it subjects others to, and free itself from extra-worldliness also at the level of its justification.

These two lines define the coordinates of philosophical immanence since the late 18th century; that they can, or should, be folded back upon each other defines its challenge: to make material and formal sides coincide, to realise immanence. Even if the question of material immanence at best does not apply to Kant himself (and at worst, as shall be seen, must be answered negatively), it persists in almost the whole of philosophy that comes in his wake, as a (philosophical) consequence of the blow he applies to deism, and a (historical) consequence of the progressive secularisation of Western thought; but, after him, there can be no philosophy of immanence that is not a philosophy of realised immanence. From this point, I trace two general forms of solutions to the challenge of realising immanence that follow from the Copernican turn. The first I name 'transcendental'; it is concerned with an explication of the subjective structures that enable knowledge, and thus looks for its realisation in the form of a limit which is also what grounds the empirical. The second I call 'historical'; it searches for its realisation in a moment in empirical time when its enunciation and its truth coincide, and therefore points to an end, even if it is also a re-beginning – Absolute Knowledge, communism, or the end of metaphysics. From this analysis, it becomes clear that the relation between philosophy and immanence has time as a central axis: the infinite, eternal time of transcendence, or the finite time of the subject, in its different forms (*a priori*, originary, empirical, historical), or a time beyond the human condition.

But in becoming its own lawgiver, philosophy also becomes arbiter and peacemaker. The tension at the heart of modernity as immanentisation, as can be seen by the way in which it is taken inside philosophy and how it forces the latter to fold upon itself, is: where, if anywhere, must critique stop?

One finds this in the opposition between a 'radical' and a 'conservative' Enlightenment;[21] in the German dispute between Enlightenment and Romanticism, and within Romanticism itself;[22] one finds it in Nietzsche; one finds it everywhere to this day, in the debates concerning the limits of parliamentary democracy, or the relations between faith and politics, or between the West and Islam. The aim of Kant's project is precisely to set a mechanism through which claims can be judged, so that somewhere there will be an unmoving something – a tribunal of reason, where the form of the reasonable can be legislated upon once and for all – from which everything else can be measured; if that can be done, then morality will be possible.

As Nietzscheans, each one in their own way, Foucault and Deleuze cannot be happy with Kant's solution. The latter's draft of a constitution of reason is in fact a political contract that tries to set the limits of critique in order to save some things from it – ultimately, a compromise between immanence and transcendence. Neither can they be satisfied with Hegel's. If the latter, for managing to bring together Spinozian Substance and Kantian subject, appears as the biggest rival in the quest for an accomplished system of philosophical immanence, it is still necessary to decry him both for achieving immanence only for representation, and positing an absolute closure of critique.

The third chapter thus focuses on the possibility of constructing a critique predicated on material immanence that can at once attain formal immanence and refuse closure, affirm the univocity of Being and equivocity of thought. It builds upon Foucault's and Deleuze's critiques of Kant and Hegel, and the impasses between the two, in order to resituate the problem of modernity in a

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[21] ISRAEL, J. I. *Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 11.
[22] *Cf.* BEISER, F. Early Romanticism and the Aufklärung. *In:* SCHMIDT, J. (ed.) *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century answers and Twentieth-Century questions.* Berkeley: University of California Press: 1996, pp. 317-29.

way that opens onto their embracing of Nietzsche. It then undertakes a more detailed examination of their respective projects in search for the relation between philosophy, immanence and time that the two establish; both effectively invert, following Nietzsche, the Hegelian relation between time and logos. Each, however, does it in a particular way: Foucault, whose rejection of metaphysics is premised on an attack on philosophy's pretensions to an a-temporal perspective, tends towards empirical time, and a variation on the historical solution; Deleuze, on the other hand, being concerned with the problem of a metacritical account of the genesis of thought, searches for a logical, transcendental time, and tends towards the transcendental solution. Reading one with and against the other, I attempt to reconstruct the ways in which these solutions (and their problems) function in their work, and it is from this point that an answer to the question concerning the specificity of their participation in this history of immanence that is the one of Western modernity can begin to be answered.

This answer has to work through and position itself in relation to the two most general lines of criticism directed at them – both of which, unsurprisingly, point us back to the challenge of realising immanence, and the fold of matter and form that defines it. For reasons of poetic economy one could distribute the charges under the proper name of the highest philosophical reference they share, and whose project it was to take immanentisation beyond Kantian critique and towards its most radical consequences. Foucault, the philosopher of knowledge and power, would end up with Nietzsche the genealogist in the same self-referential position to which one is condemned by attempting to treat truth as historical contingence; to borrow the term Habermas borrows from Austin, a performative contradiction. Deleuze, the philosopher of desire and the virtual, would represent the other, pre-critical, metaphysical side of Nietzsche, the thinker of the will to power and the eternal return.

But if we understand that the whole of modern philosophy has been immanentist, or always necessarily dealt with the problem of immanence, and if the tension at the heart of this problem has always been where critique must stop – what can these 'failures', if that really is what they are, say about modernity and philosophy? And what if they point towards a new away of understanding the solution to the problem of realised immanence, one that moves beyond the transcendental and historical options – a solution which is at once a limit, and perhaps a limit of philosophy itself, and which raises the question of what it means to be making philosophy today?

My contention is that, contrary to what some commentators would seem to think, neither Foucault nor Deleuze are oblivious to the question of formal immanence, but that this question undergoes with them important transformations, which have a bearing on the way philosophy itself is conceived. In the conclusion, I try to provide a preliminary definition of what could unite and define their respective projects around a third kind of solution to the problems inherited by Kant. I name this a performative solution, which has in relation to the others the disadvantage that it can assert itself neither as necessary by right (as the transcendental) or as necessary in fact (as the Hegelian and Marxist historical alternative), but only as a possibility. What would appear as a drawback, however, can just as well be conceived as a quality; for there is something specific in the way that this possibility can be established that allows this solution to affirm in one movement the univocity of Being and the equivocity of thought.

I vaguely recollect being told at least three times that this work could not be done. I could not thank enough those close to me who believed otherwise and, perhaps against my best judgment, convinced me to go on. A list would be too long, but a special mention must be made of Sian Sullivan, Steffen Böhm, Massimo De Angelis and, above all, Emma Dowling, Amália de Medeiros Cunha and Fábio Barboza. Near the closing stages of the writing, the presence of the Kermetic Institute has been invaluable. I also thank David McNeill, the timing of whose sympathy was perfect; Nuno Nabais, who, having never met me, intervened at a crucial moment; and Howard Caygill, whose support and insightful observations gave me time to breathe and find my own direction, and often made me think retrospectively that he always had a much better idea of where I was heading than I did. I dedicate these pages to him.

Chapter I

Modernity, immanentisation, immanence

Introduction

This chapter argues, starting from a reading of Michel Foucault's texts on Kant's 'An answer to the question: "What is Enlightenment?"', how immanence as a philosophical problem is indeed the philosophical translation of the central problem of modernity: what is identified by Foucault as the rise of a critical attitude and ethos that confronts all claims to truth based on authority and tradition, and what is identified in the Kantian text as a question of autonomy – reason's famous 'passage to maturity' of. It is this relationship with a significant cultural transformation in the West that makes immanence,

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as it appears in the discourse of philosophy, into much more than a mere conceptual problem; in fact, it is only a problem for philosophy insofar as it is necessitated by the historical, practico-political imperative that Kant captured in the motto 'Sapere Aude!'.

But the constitution of this problem in modernity shows only that it is internalised by philosophy in the question of its immanence to non-philosophy, to its time, and the need to find in its time, in its non- or pre-philosophical conditions, its ground. It shows that the problem is and must necessarily be posed, but does not say anything about how it should be. Therefore, the second part of this chapter turns to Deleuze, in order to trace a history of this problem which is at once external and internal to philosophy: the history of its posing, as well as the history of the forms in which it is posed up to the philosopher who made the most systematic, most rigorous attempt to give it a philosophical form: Spinoza.

1.1 – Back to modernity: Foucault's Enlightenment

1.1.1 – Foucault's modernity

It is not easy to observe in most of Foucault's historical researches the recurrence of a tripartite scheme of periodicisation establishing discontinuities between Renaissance, Classical Age and modernity around which are organised phenomena such as the West's relation to madnes, punishment, government, sexuality, or its knowledge, or the modes of its production of subjectivity and the relations of the self to itself these enable. Despite the parallelisms never yielding any straightforward isomorphisms, instead tending

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towards an overlapping of different historical series, strategies and rationalities of different duration (compounded by the addition, in the late years, of Antiquity as a more recondite dimension), the works in all these different areas share the thrust of questioning the teleological assumptions of a modernity and a humanism too easily satisfied with their historical superiority over previous periods. This has entailed that Foucault's studies have sometimes been hurriedly misread as simply a narrative of how Western societies tend towards an intensification of power relations, like a teleology with a dystopian vector – for instance, in a generalised practice of confinement and surveillance culminating in a generalised 'carceral society'.[1] Admittedly, this is warranted by some architectonic, substantive and rhetorical elements in these writings. The Great Confinement in *Histoire de la Folie*; the end of the 'dogmatic slumber' that only leads to the 'anthropological slumber' of the modern *épistémè* in *Les mots et les choses*; the appearance of the prison and the dissemination of discipline in *Surveiller et punir*; the rise of biopolitics and governmentality in *La volonté de savoir* and the courses at the Collège de France in the late 1970s; the promise of liberation through a stronger attachment to an 'inner truth' of the subject throughout *Histoire de la sexualité* – it looks as if every time Foucault is behaving like the child who pointed out the king was naked, discerning a dark lining in every moment of the constitution of Western modernity that would characterise its qualitative superiority in relation to previous epochs: science and medicine, the universal subject, the nation state and the subject of rights, rationalisation and the modern state, the free subject. That would seem to justify the idea that, if there is a single vision organising the whole of Foucault's work – even if as a

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[1] *Cf.* Deleuze's discussion of Virilio's interpretation of Foucault. DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 49-50; this interpretation is generally characteristic of the criticism Foucault has received from thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School, such as Habermas, Honneth and Bernstein, who will be dealt with in the next pages.

diffuse sensibility rather than a systematic principle or a metanarrative –, it is to be found in a perception of modernity as being the opposite of what it claims to be: the intensification of power relations instead of progressive emancipation, the increase in domination rather than reciprocity, even (particularly when it concerns the complex relations between knowledge, science relations of government and the subject) a 'destiny of Being' not unlike Heidegger's Technology.[2] It can thus be eventually described as a 'critique of contemporary culture that purports to be postmodern, [but] is at best modern and at worst antimodern'[3], or even a 'systems-theoretic dissolution of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*[4] where 'societal evolution is conceived only as a process of the augmentation of social power carried out according to the logic of periodic adaptations to the environment'.[5]

As Foucault's late return to Kant makes perfectly clear, but more importantly for reasons that can be found in the structure of his thought as whole, Foucault's position is far more nuanced than that; and if there is an ambivalence (rather than outright rejection) in his relation to modernity, it is less to do with the fact that he cannot make his mind about it, or that his hermeneutic situatedness prevents the leap that his rhetoric seems to long for, but down to the very way in which he understands modernity. For Foucault, and for a good reason, modernity is necessarily double. Such readings, while no doubt warranted by textual elements, can only be arrived at through

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[2] The parallels with Heidegger are argued for *In:* DREYFUS, H. 'Being and power' revisited. *In:* MILCHMAN, A.; ROSENBERG, A. *Foucault and Heidegger: critical encounters.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, pp. 30-54.
[3] FRASER, N. Michel Foucault: A 'young conservative'?. *In:* KELLY, M. (ed.) *Critique and power. Recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998, p. 185.
[4] HONNETH, A. *The critique of power. Reflective stages in a critical social theory.* Trans. Baynes, K. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993, p. 176.
[5] *Ibid.,* p. 195.

systematically overlooking certain other elements whose relevance to the whole runs much deeper. These can be condensed into three general points which are insistently highlighted in books, shorter texts and interviews, particularly in the latter years of his life. They are: the function and the functioning of his historical analyses, and their constitutive relation to the historical method; the conception of history that underlies them; and the double meaning and role that the present (and hence modernity) is ascribed in them.

1.1.1.1 – On the uses of history

The name Foucault proposed for his chair at the Collège de France was 'history of the systems of thought'; in an entry on himself written under a pseudonym for a philosophical encyclopaedia published in the year of his death, he seems to rectify that into 'critical history of thought'.[6] The change in accentuation marks adequately the transformations that his thinking underwent between 1970 and the early 1980s – the stress on systems of rules of the period around *L'Archéologie du savoir* giving way to the open-endedness of power relations understood as games of freedom and the constitution of the self in the last years. The connection between 'history' and 'thought' stays, however, unchanged; as for the late Heidegger, thinking itself is for Foucault what remains to be thought,[7] and the way to do that is historical. Foucault's body of work is generally (and roughly) divided into three periods: archaeological (from *Histoire de la folie* to *L'Archéologie du savoir*), genealogical (from *L'Ordre du discours* until the first tome of *Histoire de la*

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[6] FOUCAULT, M. Foucault. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p 1450. (In italics in the original.)
[7] *Cf.* DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 124.

sexualité) and those concerning subjectivity and the self (the last two); and it is evident that the different 'uses of history' in different texts (and the concepts that accompany them: historical *a priori*, *épistémè*, *dispositif*...) have a bearing on the principle behind this division. It can nevertheless be said that both the role history is invited to play and the ways in which it can perform that role remain sufficiently consistent throughout for it to be possible to speak of an overall philosophical rationale that justifies and necessitates its use.

L'Archéologie du savoir finds Foucault trying to apply on the history of knowledge itself an 'autochthonous transformation'[8] in the field of historiography that communicates with similar developments in other areas. These are taken very much as given, presented rather than questioned; the fact that they are the form of practice currently taking shape in these fields (the historiography of the *Annales* school, literature, history of sciences etc.) suffices to exempt him from any need to justify any further his endorsement of them. It nevertheless is also clear that this endorsement stems from the fact that they share with Foucault's researches an enemy, or in any case a foil, and offer him tools to find a way out of the impasses of the philosophy of the subject that enveloped the three main forms of philosophising which had presided over the intellectual formation of his generation: phenomenology and Hegelianism, and the 'middle-term' constructed between them in Marxism.[9] This chasing away of the constituting subject in its various forms takes place here by rejecting the notions that had served, in history, as its last

[8] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 25.
[9] *Cf. Idem*. Entretien avec Michel Foucault. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 144-5; Structuralisme et poststructuralisme. *Op. cit.*, pp. 1252-3; Une interview avec Michel Foucault par Stephen Riggins. *Op. cit.*, p. 1348. On the same subject, *Cf.* DELEUZE, G. 'Il a eté mon maître'. *In: L'Île déserte*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 109-13; DESCOMBES, V. *Modern French philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, ch. 1.

'refuge'[10]: totalisation (and its correlate, teleology), continuity, meaning. Instead of being assumed from the start, unities and cultural totalities become the problem: under what conditions, through what systems of relations, at what levels, can a series be given? What are its thresholds and the ruptures that signal new beginnings? It is a forgetfulness of forgetfulness that overcomes a history that would by right be memory and exposes the artifice in the act of amassing, isolating, grouping its materials. What occupies the space left void by notions of continuity and totality is a dispersion of events of different ranges, chronological amplitudes and capacity to produce effects, which must be differentiated in their levels and relations. As Foucault would later put:

> Hence the rejection of an analysis that refers to the symbolic field or that of signifying structures; and the recourse to analyses done in terms of a genealogy of relations of force, of strategic developments, tactics. (...) Relations of power, not of meaning. History has no sense, which does not mean it is absurd or incoherent. It is on the contrary intelligible and can be analysed down to its minutest detail: but following the intelligibility of struggles, strategies, tactics.[11]

Neither dialectics (which inscribes difference in the logic of contradiction, paving the way for its pacifying synthesis), nor semiotics (which anthropologises history by giving it the structure of sense), both of which are yet two other avatars of the constituting subject, can serve as explanatory principles. 'Eventalisation' (événementalisation) has a multiplying effect, replacing vague ideas such as 'influence' or 'tradition' with a plurality of discursive and non-discursive practices treated as events; these can be

[10] Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 22.
[11] Idem. Entretien avec Michel Foucault. In: Dits et écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 145.

organised in fields and levels where their relations can be described, but never captured in any linear scheme leading from an 'origin' to an 'end'.

'Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire', which marks the first big turning point in Foucault's trajectory, extends the scope of these transformations: more than just the philosophy of the subject, it is metaphysics that is to (and can) be escaped through this renewed historical practice.

> If historical sense allows itself to pass to the side of the supra-historical point of view, metaphysics can take it up in its own terms and, fixing it under the forms of an objective science, impose its own 'Egyptianism' on it. In contrast, historical sense will escape metaphysics to become the privileged instrument of genealogy if it does not situate itself in any absolute. (...) Historical sense, and this is where it practices *wirkliche Historie*, reintroduces everything that one thought was immortal in man into becoming.[12]

The possibility of this oscillation lies in the fact that both genealogy and metaphysics (given here the guises of 'Egyptianism', Plato and the 'history of historians') concern themselves with the search for origins. For metaphysics, origins are the essence of things, their original self-identity underneath all that is accidental, their primitive state of perfection and purity, and therefore the site of a truth prior to any positive knowledge (*connaissance*). Its invocation of 'truth, the law of essences and eternal necessity' is doubled in the historical triad of 'objectivity, exactitude of facts, unmoveable past'; in both, we find the hypocritical movement that hides its own 'rancorous singularity under the mask of the universal'.[13] Their attempt to eliminate all traces of will in their

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[12] *Idem.* Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 1014-5.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 1019.

knowledge only leads to finding will on the side of the object of knowledge, and therefore the belief in 'Providence, final causes and teleology'.[14]

The ultimate identification of metaphysics with Platonism as the *delenda Carthago* of contemporary philosophy not only follows Nietzsche, but also places this 1971 essay alongside two other key texts of the period, Deleuze's 'Platon et le simulacre' (the first version of which appeared in 1966), and Derrida's 'La pharmacie de Platon' (1968).[15] The way in which Platonism is characterised, however, finds Foucault farther from Derrida, and very close to Deleuze's condemnation of transcendence through a exaltation of the material; where the Foucauldian text stands out is in the 'remedy' for metaphysics that it finds in the Nietzschean texts on history.[16] Genealogy's search for origins differs from a metaphysical one because, behind the original essence, it finds a contingent constitution; under purity and perfection, it uncovers the humble, low historical beginning; and beneath a *priori* truth, it encounters truth as having a history of its own. It follows a hereditary trace back to a proliferation of events that, instead of a continuity or progressive accumulation, dissolves what we believed was unitary in front of our very eyes; it finds the inscription of these events on the body, and discovers how even in the body forces still struggle against each other. It identifies points of

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[14] *Ibid.*

[15] DELEUZE, G. Platon et le simulacre. *In: Logique du sens*. Paris: Minuit, 2002, pp. 292-306; DERRIDA, J. La pharmacie de Platon. *In: La dissémination*. Paris: Seuil, 1972, pp. 77-214. For a comparison between the Deleuzian and Derridean texts, as well as between Foucault's and Derrida's 'Le puits et la pyramide', *Cf.* LAWLOR, L. *Thinking through French philosophy: the being of the question*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, chapters 1 and 8. It is possible that this highlighting of Platonism by Foucault also had a Deleuzian inflection; it appears right at the start of his review of his friend's work. *Cf.* Theatrum philosophicum. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 944.

[16] 'History has more useful things to do than being a servant to philosophy and recounting the necessary birth of truth and value; it is meant to be the differential knowledge of energies and weakenings, of altitudes and collapses, of poisons and antidotes. It is meant to be the science of remedies.' *Idem.* Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire. *Op. cit.*, p. 1017.

emergence, but not as the original sense that becomes retrospectively clear. It seeks to avoid the metaphysical presentism that projects the present onto the origin to find a destiny that manifests itself today; instead, it only finds the aleatory play of forces behind contingent events. The emergence is never anyone's responsibility: it marks the 'non-place', the 'interstice'[17] where opposed forces enter in relations of relative strength or weakness.

> The forces at play in history obey neither destiny nor mechanics, but only the contingency of struggle. They do not manifest themselves as the successive forms of a primordial intention; they do not have the airs of a result either. They always appear under the singular *alea* of the event.(...) [T]he world of effective history knows only one kingdom, where there is no providence or final cause, but only 'the iron hand of necessity that shakes the cup of chance'[18]

Finally, genealogy does not pretend to cover up its situatedness; it is fully aware that it is not free from interests and has a perspective nature instead of value-free objectivity. It is value-oriented, in the sense that its position is one of interested evaluation rather than universal normativity.

At the time of acute European nihilism that was his, Nietzsche, according to Foucault, sees the task of philosophy as freeing history from its metaphysical origins, not so as to found it in a philosophy of history, but 'to master it in order to make a genealogical, that is, a *rigorously anti-Platonic* use of it.'[19] There are, in fact, three uses of historical sense that correspond to the three Platonic modalities of history; if nihilism looks for assurance in facile continuities and self-negating asceticism, parodic, dissociative and sacrificial

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[17] *Ibid.*, p. 1012.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 1016.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 1020, my italics.

histories are unsettling, closing the door on any metaphysical 'sense', 'truth' or 'origin' that might try to stand in the vacuum left by the death of God. The parodic (destructive of reality) use is the reverse of history as reminiscence or recognition (monumental history); whereas the latter wishes to keep the monuments of the past – great figures, deeds, civilisations – permanently present for veneration, genealogy responds with a carnivalisation that renders the past laughable, unreal. The dissociative (destructive of identity) use opposes history as continuity or tradition (antiquarian history); it does not search for the originary point where our identity is condensed, but creates dispersion by showing the heterogeneous elements that constitute us. The sacrificial (destructive of truth) use goes against history as knowledge; instead of assuming the neutrality that it would possess today as the viewpoint from which past injustices can be judged, it uncovers its own implication in a will to knowledge that is neither neutral nor just, but indeed dangerous, perhaps even lethal as it demands from the subject of knowledge the ultimate sacrifice of putting its own life, and life itself, at risk. Together, what they allow is 'a use of history that once and for all surpasses the model, at once metaphysical and anthropological, of memory. It is a matter of turning history into a counter-memory – and thus to deploy (*déployer*) a different form of time into it.'[20]

Even if the text is ostensibly an essay on Nietzsche, it is hard not to read it as a programmatic statement on Foucault's part. To do philosophy through history is, for Foucault, a way of upsetting narratives of origin, continuity and totalisation that place themselves outside of history. The belief in constants and absolutes, linear progression and final causes is shared by metaphysics

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[20] *Ibid.*, p. 1021. Lawlor translates *déployer* as unbending, a translation whose additional meanings he makes some extensive use of. *Cf.* LAWLOR, L. *Op. cit.*, 18-9.

and religious eschatology alike; it is thus not enough that Western philosophy may have eliminated God as the external cause of history, since it has only succeeded in putting man in his place; humanism still offers the same reassurance in the form of a subject that realises its inbuilt essence and arrives at the end only to find itself, or uncovers the origin that can finally deliver reconciliation with Being. To do philosophy through history is a matter of eliminating beginning and end as what makes possible extra-temporal guarantees of harmony and pacification; taking history, and philosophy, from the middle.

1.1.1.2 – The history of the present and the role of philosophy

What is essential about Foucault's use of history is therefore its emphasis on the present. To eliminate the end and the beginning of history is to accord the present its full importance – not the endpoint on a straight line, but a thin layer of 'non-place' between the past and the future – without imposing its form on the past or the future – turning it into what retrospectively justifies or makes sense of what came before, or the moment in time from which constants and absolutes can be deduced. It is to multiply causes and effects, levels and fields, dissolving identities and continuities into the events that produced them, and reducing these to the 'non-places' where the play of opposition and composition of forces is open to the future, to contingence. These encounters in turn will create the new fields of subdetermination where new encounters will happen; which means that contingency never returns in full, but always under the conditions created by previous events: 'always a mixture of aleatory and dependent, as in a Markov chain'.[21] The entire thrust of this way of

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[21] DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 92.

philosophising is to dissolve the solidity of the present and open it up as yet another 'non-place' where the dice is being rolled again. It works in three stages: *analysis* (or narration) – where the historical raw material is organised in ways that point to the fundamental contingence that produced the present; *estrangement* – where the effect of making the present appears to our eyes as this combination of 'aleatory and dependent', instead of the evident or the necessary, is produced;[22] and *production* – where, once accepted identities and natural limits have been exposed as contingent effects, once analysis has decomposed today into the field of forces that constitute(d) it, action can take place as an experiment on the *possible*. The present appears as a Janus-faced entity; at once the contingent process of its own individuation into *this particular present*, that which we are; and that which we are in the process of ceasing to be, the open field of possibilities of new becomings that our past and present becomings open up.[23]

This commitment to the present underlies Foucault's thinking throughout. In the period that goes from *Les mots et les choses* to *L'Archéologie du savoir*, where he returns many times to the contentious claim (made at the end of *Les mots et les choses*) of the 'death of man' and the dissolution of the modern *épistémè*, the role of philosophy is repeatedly described as 'diagnostic'. In a 1968 interview he says:

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[22] *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, vol. I, p. 626: 'If history has any privilege it would be rather insofar as it could play the role of an internal ethnology of our culture and our rationality (...)'.
[23] Deleuze and Guattari speak of a distinction between the present, as what we are and cease to be, and the actual (*actuel*), as what we are in the course of becoming. *Cf.* DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. Paris, Minuit, 1991, pp. 107-8. The passage refers to page 172 of *L'Archéologie du Savoir*, which does not speak of a present/actual distinction, but of a 'gap' (*l'écart*).

Philosophy from Hegel to Sartre was essentially an enterprise of totalisation, if not of the world or of knowledge, at least of human experience; and I would say that if there is today an autonomous philosophical activity (...) we could describe it as an activity of diagnostic. To diagnose the present, to say what our present is, to say in what our present is different and absolutely different from what it is not, i.e., our past'.[24]

The famous last pages of *Les mots et les choses* express this diagnostic way of philosophising. An archaeological study, Foucault contends there, can show how that which appears to us as the most natural and necessary figure of thought is a relatively recent mirage that occupies the space between two 'modes of being of language'[25]; man is an episode between the dispersion of language that marks the end of the Classical Age (the disappearance of Discourse) and its reassembling in a new, dense unity in which it is language in its very being that is questioned. Prefigured at a distance by Mallarmé and Nietzsche, and expressed in literature such as Blanchot's and Bataille's, as well as in the (then) recent inroads made by structuralism in psychoanalysis, ethnology and linguistics, this reoccurrence of language in the form of a 'one speaks' that dissolves the thinking, speaking, conscious subject in a *'positive unconscious'*[26] it cannot be the master of would be what announces the end of the modern *épistémè* and its replacement by a new form of knowledge. The latter can be felt in its possibility and promise, but not described or brought to light, as it is the unconscious of what we already are in the course

[24] FOUCAULT, M. Foucault répond a Satre. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, vol. I, p. 693. *Cf.* also: *Idem.* Qu'est-ce qu'un philosophe?. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 581; 'Qui êtes-vous, professeur Foucault?'. *Op. cit.*, pp. 640-1.
[25] *Idem. Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 397.
[26] *Idem.* Préface a l'édition anglaise. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 877. (Foucault's italics.)

of saying, and as such the way in which it is structured must by definition remain unknown to us.[27]

In the third chapter I shall examine the important differences that obtain between this earlier position and the ones Foucault will later hold. Right now, it is enough to point out that already at this stage Foucault's 'use of history' is essentially the same as the one sketched out in 'Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire'. *Histoire de la folie* already proceeded by taking an object like the scientific knowledge of 'madness' and, instead of assuming it as given from the start, attempted to show how it could be constituted across history. It is therefore a narrative that

> frees us from our continuities; it dissolves these temporal identities in which
> we look at our own face to conjure the breaks of history; it breaks the thread
> of transcendental teleologies; and where anthropological thought
> interrogated man or his subjectivity, it introduces the other and the outside.[28]

Its success in doing so lies exactly in being able to suspend the reliance on the permanence of the past – or on the present as the point that progresses linearly from a distant point in the past – and 'deploying a different form of time' into history: becoming a counter-memory. Its parodic, dissociative, sacrificial effects produce a estrangement that equals a forgetting of memory

[27] In what is probably the interview where Foucault sides with structuralism most clearly – even if with the proviso that his position is one of 'distance, because I speak of it instead of practicing it directly, and redoubling, because I do not want to speak about it without speaking its language' – it is actually 'some sort of structuralist philosophy' which is assigned the role of diagnosing the present. *Idem.* La philosophie structuraliste permet de diagnostiquer ce qu'est 'aujord'hui'. *In: Op. cit.*, pp. 609-11.

[28] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, pp. 172. This does not, of course, stop Foucault from recriminating (and rightly so) his first book with investing too much in some sort of mysterious 'experience of madness' that would be the counterpart of the knowledges constituted around it, 'showing by that token how I remained close to admitting an anonymous and general subject of history'. *Cf. Ibid.*, pp. 26-7.

(dissolving the heroic, bastardised solidity of the past) and of forgetfulness (so that the present possibilities can appear, so that the dice can be thrown once again): a feeling of estrangement in relation to one's past that returns to the present its full being.

In the next section we will see how these final definitions of the role of philosophy and his theoretical enterprise itself happen in a reiterated relation to Kant's essay on *Aufklärung* spanning the last six years of his life. We will also see the dimension and form that the present takes in these formulations, and how intimately linked its Janus-faced character becomes to the question of philosophy itself – the moment of writing as a combination of 'product-ness' and production, passivity and activity, that is both the situatedness of a philosophy in its present and the place where a philosophy can ask itself the question of its own being. Before moving there, however, it must have become clear why critiques such as Honneth's or Fraser's (or even Habermas' praise that Foucault would have aptly identified a historical 'bifurcation of reason'[29]) are off the mark. What they miss is precisely that the aim of Foucault's critique is directed to the present as what must be thought – in the sense that it is what determines the conditions for our thinking, that it is where new ways of thinking may appear, and that it places our thinking right in the middle of the two, the gap (*l'écart*) between what is and what is not (or not yet), what could cease to be and what may become. Modernity, therefore, is not, for Foucault – as opposed to Hegel and (via a generalisation of Kohlberg's insights to species-being) the Habermasian strain of the Frankfurt School – the teleological culmination of a process of human realisation, or at least the moment where the conditions for such realisation are made

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[29] *Cf. Idem.* Structuralisme et poststructuralisme. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1258-60.

conscious. But neither is it (as in Heidegger) the final destiny in a slow descent into the forgetfulness of Being that awaits for a conclusion whose coming is uncertain. It is 'a day like every other' and yet 'a day like no other'[30], as it still is – and that is its utmost importance – to a great extent 'our' day, that in which we think, speak, relate to others and to ourselves.[31] It is therefore neither to be fully rejected or uncritically (which would mean: a way that fails to see what is contingent in it) accepted: *it is*, like the *il y a* of language, and if it matters to us it is because that is where we also are. And that is where we may also cease to be what we are, if we can deploy a counter-memory into history that opens up what is contingent in our Being. Because this play of contingence and necessity itself responds to no other necessity than that imposed by the *alea* of the events that made the present what it is, introducing a 'dialectical nuance' in the form of a bifurcation of reason will dissolve the materiality of events in yet another idealist linearity where the shadow of man (and thus God) lurks.[32]

> The task of thought is not to denounce the evil that secretly inhabits everything there is, but to sense the danger that threatens us within everything that is usual, and to render problematic everything that is solid. The 'optimism' of thought, if one wishes to use that word, is to know there is no golden age.[33]

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[30] *Ibid.*, p. 1267.

[31] In 1971, Foucault presents his work and its relation to modernity in very much the same way as he would towards the end of his life: 'I try to expose, grounding myself on their constitution and historical formation, systems which are still ours today, and inside which we are trapped. It is, in the end, about presenting a critique of our times based in retrospective analyses.' *In:* Conversation avec Michel Foucault. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 1051.

[32] *Cf. Idem.* 'Omnes et singulatim': vers une critique de la raison politique. *In: Op. cit.*, pp. 954-5.

[33] *Idem.* A propos de la généalogie de l'éthique: un aperçu du travail en cours. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1429.

Which, finally, explains why, for him, the Enlightenment 'is not absolute evil, far from that; but neither is it the absolute good, and certainly not the definitive good'.[34] It *is* and that is all, and it is *all* for us, as it is where we are.

1.2 – 'What is Enlightenment?'

1.2.1 – 'An ontology of the present'

Among the many retrospective examinations undertaken by Foucault upon his own work, the late texts on Kant stand out for four reasons. First, on a symbolic level, as a return to a philosopher who had served him as starting point (the translation of and commentary on the *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* which accompanied *Histoire de la folie* as his *thèse complémentaire*). Second, because they do not so much identify or retrospectively ascribe thematic, conceptual or methodological resonances than point to an overall *sens* ('direction' more than 'meaning') that, in its generality, is applicable to the whole of Foucault's work from the very start. Third, because this *sens* lies precisely in the 'commitment to the present' of which I spoke above, where a philosophy is *of* its present both in the sense of a subjective and objective genitive; and fourth, because this is the same *sens* that he finds in the Kantian text as its foremost originality – a novel and crucial way of posing the question of the relation of philosophy to its time and to itself.

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[34] FOUCAULT, M. Interview de Michel Foucault. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1511. (My italics.)

What is this relation? Foucault opposes it to previous philosophical (Plato, Augustine, Vico) and cultural (the Classical Age) ways of dealing with the present, and even with Kant's own approach in his other historical and political texts (the problem of finality); it is the relation of the philosopher as belonging to a certain actuality, rather than a doctrine, tradition or universal humanity – 'a certain "we"'[35] – that he finds problematised in Kant's 'An answer to the question: "What is Enlightenment?"'.[36] This problematisation is unique to modernity in the sense that it does not place itself in a 'longitudinal' relation to what comes before it, but 'sagitally' in a relation to itself, in the 'actuality that it interrogates as an event of which it says the sense, value, philosophical singularity, and in which it must find at once its own reason for being and the grounding of what it says.'[37]

This actuality is then the same that Kant speaks of when he describes his as the 'age of criticism'[38]. More than a philosophical acknowledgment of the impasses of the metaphysical tradition, the recognition of a transformation in political institutions (with demands for individual liberties and a growing discussion on the limits of sovereignty which erupted in the French Revolution), scientific knowledge (with its promise of an exhaustive understanding of the physical realm based on a discussion of method and the limits of certainty), and social life (the role of tradition and religion, the expansion of education and the 'learned public', and the transformations in the balance of power between bourgeoisie and aristocracy) that generates a situation where knowledge is required to provide the grounds for its own

[35] *Idem.* Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1499.
[36] *In:* KANT, I. *Political writings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 54-60.
[37] FOUCAULT, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 1499.
[38] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason,* Aix. The edition used throughout is the 2003 Palgrave Mcmillan revised Norman Kemp Smith translation with an introduction by Howard Caygill.

existence; where the claims to authority of tradition have to be suspended and criticised so as to separate the legitimate use of reason – the autonomous use that is at once a right and a duty for all – from its illegitimate uses – which lead back into illusion, dogmatism and heteronomy. When Kant speaks of *Aufklärung* he is not speaking of a moment in the history of philosophy, but a social and political event that founds the need for critique as a public practice, as a tool to which political institutions, scientific knowledge (or knowledge in general, or rather any knowledge that bears a claim to truth, particularly in that most modern understanding of it, *scientificity*), and social forms have to be submitted. This is what strikes Foucault as unique and innovative in Kant's text: the way in which it connects

> internally and tightly the significance of his work in relation to knowledge, a reflection on history and a particular analysis of the singular moment where he writes and because of which he writes. The reflection on today as difference in history and as the motive for a particular philosophical task seems to me to be the novelty of this text.[39]

In the first of the texts dedicated to Kant, separated from the others by almost five years (hence situated in the context of the researches around biopower and governmentality of the late 1970s), Foucault traces a longer genealogy of what he deems 'the critical attitude', which finds its beginnings in the 15th and

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[39] FOUCAULT, M. What is Enlightenment?. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1387. This is the third and last text that Foucault dedicated to Kant's essay; it bears the same title as the second one, published in the same 1984, a few months later, but which had been presented in January 5th the year before at the Collège de France as part of the lectures that Foucault was expected to give every year. Both are quite similar but differ significantly from the first one, from 1978, not included in the *Dits et écrits* as it appeared posthumously and without authorisation from Foucault or the editors of the collection. I have chosen to present the last one under the English title it was originally published in, so as to differentiate it from the second. This is the only case where I present a text from the *Dits et écrits* with the title in the original language in which it was published.

16th centuries before emerging in Kant's text on *Aufklärung* and the project of the three *Critiques*.[40]

The unique thing about the period is its being a moment where the idea, until then confined to very specific areas under the direct influence of the Christian Church, of a government of individuals towards their salvation under the guidance of a spiritual leader to whom they are bound by total obedience (pastoral power) extrapolates what had been its confines and becomes at once laicised (by virtue of its introduction in the sphere of civil society and political life) and broken down into a variety of domains (the government of the family, of children, of the body etc.).[41] This is the process that Foucault names 'governmentalisation'; the question 'how to govern?', and its infinite practical applications, becomes generalised.

As one would expect from Foucault's accounts of the mutual immanence of power and resistance, this question is not asked without finding a counterpart, which springs not from a elementary anarchism, but precisely from the resistance to particular solutions, potentials, dangers of the original question: '"How not to be governed *like that*, by that, in the name of these principles, in the view of such objectives and by the means of such methods, not like that,

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[40] Here we clearly see the idea of Foucault's consistency as a 'range of variations', where the same material and ideas are given successive treatments in which some elements remain the same while others vary and change around it. The period between the first and the last two tomes of *Histoire de la sexualité*, if one follows the paths explored in the courses at the Collège de France and shorter texts and interviews, exemplifies this very well, in the continuum traced through the 'discourse on the war of the races', biopower, governmentality, pastoral power and the 'government of the living' finally opening itself onto the ethical questions of the last years of Foucault's life.

[41] To speak of laicisation here does not mean that the 16th century marks 'the beginning of de-christianisation', but 'the beginning of a christianisation in depth' – that is, the moment where Christian practices spread across different fields and, by the same token, are transformed. *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. *Les anormaux. Cours au Collège de France(1974-1975).* Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 1999, p. 67.

not for that, not by them?'".[42] This is the critical attitude he refers to, which will find its 'historical anchoring points'[43] in the enquiries into the limits of ecclesiastical power and the authority of Scripture; the challenges to civil authority in all its instruments and its legitimacy, whose correlate is the use of natural law, itself an older question, as a critical tool (as well as, one could add following the 1976 course at the College de France, the 'discourse on the war of the races'); and, finally, the general questioning of authority in its claims to truth. In Foucault's summary:

> critique is the movement through which the subject gives itself the right to question truth concerning its power effects and to question power about its discourses of truth. Critique will be the art of involuntary servitude, of reflective indocility. The essential function of critique would be that of desubjetification in the game of what one could call, in a word, the politics of truth.[44]

These are of course the same areas defined by Kant when he says:

> Our age is, in special degree, the age of criticism, and to criticism everything must submit. *Religion* through its sanctity, and *law giving* through its majesty, may seek to exempt themselves from it. But they then awaken just suspicion, and cannot claim the sincere respect which reason accords only to *that which has been able to sustain the test of free and open examination.*[45]

The focus of the later texts is not so much a genealogy of the 'critical attitude' as the defence of a philosophy as 'ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the

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[42] *Ibid.*, p. 384.
[43] *Ibid.*, p. 385.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 386.
[45] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason.* A xi. (My italics.)

present'[46] by which Foucault characterises his own project and stakes a claim to a Kantian and modern legacy. Between the text on the Enlightenment and the *Critique*, he draws a distinction between two traditions founded by the German philosopher: one concerning itself with the (universal) conditions under which true knowledge is possible ('analytics of truth'), the other with questioning the present and its 'field of possible experiences', under which sign Foucault places himself. The emphasis here is on playing Kant against himself, or against the other tradition descending from him: this is why the novelty of the enquiry into the present where the very discourse that enquires must be grounded is extolled, since 'it is the question itself of this event and its sense (*the question of the historicity of the thought of the universal*) that one must keep present and bear in mind as what must be thought.'[47] In other words, it is both the search for ultimate universal grounds and the 'question of the historicity of the thought of the universal' that can find an opening gesture in Kant; and the latter is destined to constantly overturn the first's authority, by reintroducing the question of the present – and therefore time: the present's load of past and its openness to the future – into the search for limits. This insight is constitutive of Foucault's entire philosophy, and is what allows him to mock the 'piety' – which is also 'the most touching of treasons' – 'of those who wish to retain living and intact the legacy of *Aufklärung*.'[48]

It is then the legacy of Kant's 'novelty', rather than any substantive content inherited from *Aufklärung*, that Foucault reclaims. It is probably the case that when writing these texts he had in mind the lecture given by Habermas in acceptance of the Theodor Adorno Prize in September 1980, with the title

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[46] FOUCAULT, M. Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1506-7.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 1506. (My italics.)
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 1506.

'Modernity versus Postmodernity', in which Foucault had been bundled with Bataille and Derrida in a Nietzschean lineage of antimodernity disguised as postmodernity.[49] It is in any case precisely what Habermas fails to understand in the eulogy he wrote after Foucault's death.[50] And it is nothing more than an echo of the approach advocated by Kant in relation to the French Revolution (and of Foucault himself towards the *sens* of Kant's work) in *The conflict of the faculties*: not so much a question of choosing what to retain and what to discard, but of bearing the 'enthusiasm' in mind.[51]

The *Aufklärung* is thus not a set of normative principles or of unfulfilled promises that come from the past as given achievements of human reason and require only their completion (even if under new conditions) in the present; for Foucault, we live in modernity not only because so many of the solutions to the political, social, theoretical and institutional impasses lived then are still ours, but because what Kant presents as that unique conjuncture of practical imperatives (or problems) and philosophy (or thought) still obtains; what the text submitted to the *Berliner Monatschrift* in 1784 describes is an 'attitude of modernity':

> a mode of relation to actuality; a voluntary choice made by some; finally, a
> way of thinking and feeling, a way of acting and conducting oneself that at

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[49] The lecture called them 'young conservatives' in what Nancy Fraser has pointed out as an allusion to the 'conservative revolutionaries' of the Weimar Republic such as Heidegger, Jünger, Freyer and Schmitt. *Cf.* SCHMIDT, J.; WARTENBERG, T. Foucault's Enlightenment: critique, revolution and the fashioning of the self. *In:* KELLY, M. (ed.) *Critique and power: recasting the Foucault/Habermas debate.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998, p. 300. The first four lectures (hence not the ones that deal with Foucault) of what would become *The Philosophical discourse of modernity* were presented by Habermas at the Collège de France in March 1983, where he had come under an invitation from Paul Veyne.

[50] HABERMAS, J. Taking aim at the heart of the present. On Foucault's reading of Kant's *What is Enlightenment?. In: Ibid.,* pp. 149-154.

[51] KANT, I. The contest of the faculties. *In: Political writings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 182-3.

once marks a belonging and presents itself as task. A bit, no doubt, like what the Greeks called *ethos*. Consequently, rather than distinguishing the 'modern period' from 'pre-' or 'postmodern' epochs, I think it is more valuable to investigate how the attitude of modernity, since it was formed, has been in struggle with attitudes of 'counter-modernity'.[52]

'*Attitude de modernité*' (a 'modernity attitude', an attitude of being or acting as modern), rather than '*attitude de* la *modernité*' (an attitude that would be characteristic of modernity as a defined historical period); modernity for Foucault is doubled because the present is always double, and those who fail to see this do not understand that 'the modern' does not have a fixed referent, but is deictic.[53] This is why Foucault insists in 'refusing the *Aufklärung* "blackmail"'[54]: not placing oneself in the position of judging for or against modernity, reason etc. – and thus being faced with the choice of either being 'for' it and reason, or being antimodern and irrational – but asking what in our present condition as (partially) constituted by *Aufklärung* is not (anymore) necessary for our constitution as subjects. It is an orientation towards the 'present limits of the necessary' rather than an original 'kernel of rationality'.[55] He will then go on to characterise this *ethos* of modernity and his own project in relation to it; the two most important features of this characterisation are the adoption of a limit attitude, and the translation of the latter into an experimental, as well as a historico-critical, attitude.

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[52] FOUCAULT, M. What is Enlightenment?. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1387.
[53] This is very acutely remarked *In:* RAJCHMAN, J. *Michel Foucault. The freedom of philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 25.
[54] FOUCAULT, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 1390.
[55] *Cf. Ibid.*, pp. 1391; *Cf.* also: *Idem*. 'Omnes et singulatim': vers une critique de la raison politique. *In: Op. cit.*, pp. 954-5.

This entails exactly the commitment to the present outlined above. The limit attitude is a transformation of Kant's critical question — in the same way, perhaps, that the questions on the negative limits of freedom (where do the rights of the sovereign stop? where do individual rights stop in relation to the individual rights of others?) have been historically followed by positive ones (what is every person entitled to in order to be free?) — from negative into positive. It is not about taking human reason as a given and asking about the boundary between its legitimate and illegitimate use, but standing at the borders of rationalities and practice and asking what is contingent about the existing limits, what their possible transgression might be. It moves from 'necessary limitation' to 'possible transgression'; away from 'universal formal structures' towards a 'historical investigation into the events that have led us to recognise ourselves as subjects of what we do, think, say'.[56] It is 'genealogical in its finality' ('it will not deduce from the form of what we are what is impossible for us to do or know', but the contingence in what has made us what we are) and 'archeological in its method' (not universal structures of knowledge or moral action, but the discourses that articulate what we do and think as historical events).[57]

This means that the *ethos* of modernity cannot confuse *Aufklärung* as the moment in which it finds its own beginning, not as an intellectual invention but as a practical imperative born out of complex historical problems, with the humanism that, while historically entangled with it, is too inconsistent and vague to guide reflection. This *ethos* does not take as its frame of reference a universal human subject whose limits are givens to be defined once and for all; it is based on a principle of permanent critique as a means to reinvention.

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[56] *Idem*. What is Enlightenment?. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1393.
[57] *Ibid.*

This principle is not just theoretical, but practical; it does not emptily affirm a human freedom, but, in enquiring into the limits of possible transgression, both results from and looks into practical situations where these limits can and are being tested: it is experimental as much as it is historico-critical, i.e., it requires 'a work of ourselves on ourselves'[58] If the present is always caught up between ceasing to be and becoming, the *ethos* of modernity, in its critique of what we think, say and do, requires permanent reactivation.

Once *Aufklärung* as a historical moment is over, what happens? Foucault argues that is precisely the gap that opens up in the 19th century between what he there calls 'critical attitude' and '*Aufklärung*' – or what could be rephrased in the terms of the subsequent texts as 'modernity as *ethos*' and 'modernity as event' – that will provide substance to the attitude of critique. What took place was the development of positivist, 'self-confident' science; the state as what presented itself as, on the one hand, the ultimate reason or deep underlying rationality of human history and, on the other, functioned by means of rationalising procedures; both of which overlapped in a 'fabric of tight relations'[59] where science plays a more and more important role in the development of the state, society and economy, and is at the same time dependent on the state for much of its development. The question will then be: 'for what excess of power, for what governmentalisation (all the more ineluctable as it is justified in reason)' is the very reason whose limits Kant sought to determine historically responsible?[60] In a genealogy that he will later revise, Foucault finds here the central point around which the tradition in

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 1394.
[59] FOUCAULT, M. What is critique?. *In:* SCHMIDT, J. (ed.) *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century answers and Twentieth-Century questions.* Berkeley: University of California Press: 1996, p. 388.
[60] *Ibid.*

which he inscribes himself diverges – going from the Young Hegelians via Weber to the Frankfurt School in Germany, and through the philosophy and history of science in France.[61] And so it is that

> Two centuries after its advent, the *Aufklärung* returns: at once as a way for the West to become aware of its present possibilities and the liberties it can have access to, and as a way of interrogating itself on its limits and the powers it has used.[62]

1.2.2 – Immanence

What the first of Foucault's three texts highlights, in establishing a connection between the rise of governmentality, the correspondent appearance of a critical attitude, its expression in different areas where power and authority was resisted, its emergence in a philosophical system such as Kant's, and the ways in which it is transformed within different lines of enquiry and in relation to different problems which are both practical and theoretical, is the constitutive relation between an internal and an external history of philosophy, or between philosophy and non-philosophy. This relation is one of the problems inherited by the generation of those whose formative years took place under the guidance of Jean Hyppolite[63]; and to phrase it in such terms should not obscure the fact that this inheritance did not exist in a

[61] *Cf. Idem*. Structuralisme et poststructuralisme. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 1256-9. The important difference between the two accounts is that in the earlier one – that of 'What is critique?' – Foucault credits phenomenology for reintroducing the question of Aufklärung in France via the question of 'meaning' (*sens*). In the 1983 interview, phenomenology appears as a parallel tradition to the one he aligns with.

[62] *Idem*. La vie: l'expérience et la science. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1587.

[63] *Cf. Idem*. Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 808-13; DERRIDA, J. Le puits et la pyramide: introduction à la sémiologie de Hegel. *In: Marges de la philosophie*. Paris: Minuit, 1972, pp. 79-128. On the relation of both thinkers to Hyppolite, *Cf.*: LAWLOR, L.. *Thinking through French philosophy: the being of the question*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, pp. 11-23.

philosophical vacuum devoid of an external world. These formative years took place in a period where it was imperative to reflect on science and technology, political authority and social transformation, war and revolution, and their relations to philosophy (exemplified by Heidegger's rapprochement with Nazism and the Nazi's appropriation of Nietzsche, as well as by the support for the Soviet Union by thinkers such as Sartre, and the pervasive Marxist notion of an overcoming of philosophy in practice).

Philosophy has an internal history: it has its problems (the one and the multiple, free will, the rapport between mind and body), its concepts (*energeia*, substance, Spirit), its procedures (phenomenological reduction, logical analysis, structural analysis), its schools, traditions and factions (Thomism, Existentialism, ordinary language analysis), even its political tendencies which rely on incommensurable sets of assumptions (liberalism, Marxism), and divisions perhaps traceable to irreconcilable dichotomies (materialism, idealism). It is possible to trace this internal story in itself, observing how problems reoccur in explicit or implicit forms, how concepts are implicitly assumed, explicitly taken up, transformed, put into new relations, discarded; how procedures are employed, varied, moved to new contexts, universalised, taken to their ultimate consequences; how lines of enquiry and sets of pre-, non- or properly philosophical assumptions, problems and concepts define lines of descent, zones of dialogue, ranges of variation, polemics. In this space, even false or badly posed problems are real: it may be said that not all of Plato's texts correspond to what is called Platonism, or it may be shown that Kant's critical and post-critical endeavours subvert the solid systematic architecture that years of pious commentary have built out of Kantianism; phantoms such as 'Platonism' and 'Kantianism' still possess an effectiveness that allows them to be taken as starting points, be used as foils, to act and be

acted upon.[64] Philosophy does not reflect on its history without immediately rewriting it, and, as with Borges' Pierre Menard, its rewriting always adds to its Being.[65] (Or perhaps, as in the nightmare of 'Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius', one cannot write about the malign plan of the secret society without, by lending it reality, participating in it.[66])

Foucault's initial researches were, to a large extent, into the possibilities of writing this kind of history − not only of philosophy, but of knowledge in general − in a more rigorous way, one that would avoid fuzzy concepts such as 'influence' and any of the substitutes for the founding subject that traditional historiography employed. In doing so, he found the object of his enquiry to be that a 'positive unconscious of knowledge', that is, a level beneath the conscious ('process and products of scientific consciousness') and the 'negative' unconscious ('what escapes this consciousness', the negativity that 'resists it, makes it deviate, troubles it') of knowledge, which the history of science deals with.[67] In applying this to the history of philosophy, of course, one operates a first 'expansion' of whatever could be the field traditionally delimited under the name 'philosophy' − by identifying rules of formation that are common to different objects, theories, concepts, enunciative modalities and strategies, and therefore traverse the boundaries

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[64] A good example would be that the 'methodical doubt', universally spoken of as the starting point of Descartes' thought, is not referred to a single time in the Cartesian opus... Cf. PHILONENKO, A. Une lecture fichtéenne du cartésianisme n'est-elle pas necéssaire?. In: Le transcendantal et la pensée moderne. Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie. Paris: PUF, 1990, pp. 30-46.

[65] BORGES, J. L.. Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote. In: Ficciones. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1998, p. 41-56. This Menardian impulse is, naturally, just the kind of history of philosophy that Deleuze wishes for. Cf.: DELEUZE, G. Différence et répétition. Paris: PUF, 2003, pp. 4-5. One often wonders if Borges did not invent Deleuze.

[66] BORGES, J. L. Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius. In: Op. cit., pp. 13-40.

[67] FOUCAULT, M. Préface a l'édition anglaise. In: Dits et écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 877. (Foucault's italics.)

of any more or less arbitrarily constructed discipline, school or tradition. This amounts to opening up the internal history of philosophy towards that which it is not – science, religion, opinions, practices, and is indeed one of the effects of the archaeological interest in intradiscursive, interdiscursive and extradiscursive relations of dependence: the blurring of familiar disciplinary classifications and other accepted unities.[68] Thus one can understand, for example, that the introduction of the dimension of time, or indeterminacy, in modern physics and chemistry should spark new philosophical problems in a way in which philosophy is not invited to either provide foundations nor to reflect on limits or underlying meanings, but simply places itself in the same space of knowledge.

But the way the question is posed in 'What is critique?' is broader than that in which it appears in archaeology, corresponding to his subsequent shift in emphasis towards what at first appeared only as 'non-discursive practices'.[69] It is in fact posed as precisely the same question that, according to Foucault, haunts the thought of Hyppolite: the problem of philosophical finitude – the way in which the absolute philosophy strives towards is always denied, the way in which it is condemned to transgress the limits it sets itself, the internal relation in which it silently inhabits that which is not while at once remaining

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[68] *Ibid.*, p. 708. Also: Préface a l'édition anglaise. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 876-7; *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, pp. 31-43.

[69] The project of *Les mots et les choses*, where non-discursive practices play no role whatsoever, is, accordingly, explicitly criticised: 'the theme of man, across the human sciences that analyse it as living being, labouring individual, speaking subject must be understood from the point of view of the emergence of the population as the correlative of power and as object of knowledge. Man (...) as it was thought and defined in the so-called human sciences of the 19th century and reflected in the humanism of the 19th century, is in the end nothing but a figure of the population.' *Securité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France (1977-1978)*. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2004, p. 81.

external, not implied by any particular practice.[70] Foucault's interest, however, is in identifying material points of relay, mutual dependence and co-implication between philosophy and its other, i.e., that which makes up the 'external' history of philosophy. These relations should not be understood under the sign of dubious unities such as *Zeitgeist*. There is nothing of the order of totalisation in them; they are better understood as belonging the order of events – their necessity is that of fields of subdetermination opened up by the *alea* of what makes it possible, and perhaps necessary, that certain things be thought or said. Thus one can see how philosophical discourses may find their support, starting point or end in political incidents such as the French Revolution; how they can instead be invoked in certain practices as grounds for justification or tools of analysis; how they can be appropriated as mechanisms of legitimation or delegitimation, and how – according to a rule of 'tactical polyvalence of discourses'[71] – sometimes the same discourse can be used for both purposes; how – following a rule of 'double conditioning'[72] – they cannot have any practical purpose, that is, produce practical relays, without being inscribed in larger strategies that, in turn, cannot function without having such relays as their points of support; how, as an extension, these strategies and their tactical moves force new 'dice throws' in knowledge, or thought (and therefore philosophy), itself; how their relation with power – following a rule of 'continuous variations' – is not translatable into abstract forms that would mark the place of the 'Prince' and the 'oppressed', the

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[70] *Idem*. Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968. *In: Dits et écrits*. Gallimard, 2001, pp. 809-11; Foucault defines this as a 'philosophical question posed to/at (*aux*) the limits of philosophy' (p. 809). The polisemy allowed by the French 'aux' is significant: it is at once a matter or questioning the limits of philosophical knowledge and a questioning that pushes one towards the limits of what can be given to philosophy, or what philosophy can give itself.
[71] *Idem. Histoire de la sexualité I. La volonté de savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, pp. 132-5; for an example of this rule at work, Cf.: *'Il faut défendre la societé'. Cours au Collège de France (1975-1976)*. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1997, particularly the fifth, sixth and seventh lectures.
[72] *Ibid.*, pp. 131-2.

'dominators' and the 'dominated', but open '"matrixes of transformation"' for the endless play of '"distributions of power"' and '"appropriations of knowledge"'.[73] This is made clear in the identification Foucault observes between the areas of confrontation with power from the 16th century on and the points in which a critical attitude first manifests itself, as well as how this attitude is transformed and taken to different areas after the 19th century.

These rules can be analytically derived from a first one, simply called 'of immanence'. It is defined thus:

> Between techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, no exteriority, even if they have their specific roles and articulate themselves on each other, on the grounds of their difference.[74]

And what could Foucault have been talking about, what could the problem of 'philosophical finitude' be, if not the problem of immanence? By which is meant, the problem of philosophy's belonging to an ensemble of relations larger than those which are internal to its development, larger than any tradition or problem, concept or theory; that surpasses it in all directions, leading it back into the permanence of a total past, the full immanence of its present, and the open-endedness of the future. Is the formulation of this problem not what strikes him as the great innovation of Kant's text on *Aufklärung* – the way in which the question of its present becomes the question of the grounds of the questioning itself, which ultimately provides a philosophical sense to the present which simultaneously justifies Kant's own critical enterprise?

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[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 130-1.
[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 129-30.

(...) it seems to me that with this text on the *Aufklärung* we see philosophy –
and I do not think it is pushing things to say that it is the first time –
problematise its own discursive actuality: actuality that it interrogates as an
event of which it says the sense, value, philosophical singularity, and in
which it must find at once its own reason for being and the grounding of what
it says. And in this we see that, for the philosopher, the question of his
belonging to this present will not at all be the question of his belonging to
doctrine or tradition; it will not be the question of his belonging to a human
community in general, but his belonging to a certain "we", a we that refers to
a cultural ensemble characteristic of his own actuality.[75]

Thus it is not only the problem that fascinated Hyppolite or that exercised
Foucault – it is the problem of Kant's text itself. Or one could say: of Kant
himself; of *Aufklärung* itself. If the problem of *Aufklärung* is that of defining
itself, supplying its own value in relation to its belonging to itself, and
therefore bracketing any belonging to tradition or received authority, is it not
again the problem of immanence that we find there? Even if one makes a
distinction between a 'moderate mainstream' and a 'Radical Enlightenment',
their common underlying trace remains that of a rejection of superstition and
ignorance and a renovation of ideas and institutions that necessarily includes
the idea that all areas of activity are in principle liable to the scrutiny of reason,
that is, to critique – even if, in some cases, only to find firmer grounds on
which to 'safeguard what were judged essential elements of the older
structures, effecting a viable synthesis of old and new'.[76] Different tendencies
within *Aufklärung* can be said to be more or less radical according essentially
to two axes – the universalisation, or universalisability, of critique; the extent
of the break with the past that is called for –, yet their initial thrust remains the

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[75] FOUCAULT, M. Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?'. In: *Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol.
II, p. 1499.
[76] ISRAEL, J. I. *Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750*.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 11.

same. And so do, necessarily, their original practical relays and 'doubly-conditioned' relations with the world around them; it is at a moment of governmentalisation and intensification of power relations that the 'critical attitude' – or 'attitude of modernity', as he will later say – appears, and it is no coincidence then that it should emerge in those three areas: religious, civil and scientific (or, more generally, apodictic) authority.

1.2.3 – Autonomy, heteronomy, activity, passivity

In Kant's text, the overlap between Enlightenment and this critical attitude is made clear in its political, historical and social implications. Kant famously describes the Enlightenment as humanity's passage into maturity after the immaturity it had imposed on itself 'not by a lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use [reason] without the guidance of another'.[77] A return to those same areas – religion, law, conscience – is the means by which he enquires into the growing possibility of (and need for) resistance to guidance by authority. Moreover, a relation is established between an excess of authority and the 'laziness and cowardice'[78] of allowing oneself to be guided by an authority which does not justify itself before the tribunal of reason: the enlightenment of the entire public is almost inevitable provided the public is allowed freedom. This freedom is not unqualified; it is the site of the (famous, if counter-intuitive) distinction between public – the one that anyone can make as a learned person addressing the learned public – and private use of reason – the one made in the exercise of a civil office or position. This is the ground on which the unstable balance expressed in the

[77] *Idem*. An answer to the question 'What is Enlightenment?'. *In: Political writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 54.
[78] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

maxim 'argue as much as you like (as a public individual), but obey (as a private person)!' is struck.

The solution for the 'exit' that *Aufklärung* is identified as thus seems to reproduce the structure of the situation from which it exits – there is authority and guardianship in maturity as much as in self-incurred minority, contradicting the juridical sense of the metaphor that speaks of the passage between the two states as one from heteronomy to a state of autonomy.[79] This autonomy is, of course, none other than that of reason, the free use of which singles the enlightened individual out from the crowd; not its givenness, which is universal and inheres in all, but the courage to refuse the heteronomy of the intervention of a 'guardian' to determine matters of conscience, conduct, religion. Now, if all had the same courage and resolution to freely employ reason, it would not make sense to have had most still subjected to the yoke of guardians; this must mean that immaturity is not only imposed on passive subjects, but that the latter actively desire, or at least prefer to accept, this passivity. It is a process that feeds back into itself: the more it is imposed, the less courage individuals will have to use their reason. As a result, it becomes even more difficult for individuals to free themselves, and only a few effectively do; which prompts Kant to conclude that '[t]here is more of a chance of an entire public enlightening itself'.[80] This is not at all an unattainable goal; it is 'indeed almost inevitable, if only the public concerned is left in freedom' – the freedom to make free public use of

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[79] For an analysis of the juridical sense of the metaphor, which tends to get lost in English, as well as the etymology of *Mündigkeit* and *Unmündigkeit*, *Cf*.: GREEN, G. Modern culture comes of age: Hamann versus Kant on the root metaphor of Enlightenment. *In:* SCHMIDT, J. (ed.) *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-century answers and twentieth-century questions.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p. 292.

[80] KANT, I. An answer to the question: 'What is Enlightenment?'. *In: Political writings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 55.

one's reason.[81] There is again, then, one last moment of passivity in the passage to autonomy: if people are *allowed* to be free, they will be; if the guardians retreat and let them act free, they will. A heteronomous (at least for those under guardianship) decision is the key to autonomy.

These slippages did not escape the very first critic of the text, Johann Georg Hamann; they are in fact right at the centre of the disparaging commentary he wrote in the form of a letter to Christian Jakob Kraus within a week of the publication of the original essay in the *Berlinische Monatschrift*. It is the play of autonomy and heteronomy between 'public' and 'guardians', 'minors' (*Unmündinge*) and 'guardians' (*Vormünde*) in the legal sense, and the way in which the picture is a lot less straightforward than Kant would probably have liked to paint, that lead to Hamann's ironic conclusion:

> My transfiguration [*Verklärung*] of Kant's definition [*Erklärung*], therefore, comes to this: true *enlightenment [Aufklärung]* consists in an emergence of the immature person from a supremely *self-incurred guardianship*.[82]

In other words, Hamann sees Kant placing himself among the 'guardians', and implicitly arguing *for* tutelage, not against it. [83] By shifting blame from 'guardians' to a 'public' that actively wills its own 'minority' – by sharing the responsibility of subjection between subjected and subjector –, Kant in fact keeps the door open for the role of the 'guardian'. If the problem is that some 'guardians' want to keep people under the yoke, setting a movement through

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 55.
[82] HAMANN, J. G. Letter to Christian Jakob Kraus. *In:* SCHMIDT, J. (ed.) *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century answers and Twentieth-Century questions.* Berkeley: University of California Press: 1996, pp. 147-8. (All italics are Hamann's.)
[83] 'But who is the indeterminate *other [to which the unenlightened public trusts its guidance]*, who twice appears anonymously? Observe, *Domine Politice*, how metaphysicians hate to call their persons by their right names, and prowl like cats around the hot broth.' *Ibid.* p. 146.

which some 'minors' desire the yoke they are put under, it takes the intervention of an enlightened 'guardian' to start the movement that will take people out of this predicament. It is no coincidence that one of the epithets Hamann uses to refer to Kant is 'Plato'.[84] He looks suspiciously at the 'fraternity' among enlightened 'guardians' and how it ends up serving to justify a defence of Frederick the Great's role as an emancipator of the public; the kind of critique and enlightenment that Kant speaks of, he implies, will always stop short of really attacking the ultimate 'guardians' and the means through which their powers are exercised.

> With what kind of conscience can a reasoner [*Raisonneur*] & speculator by the stove and in a nightcap accuse the immature ones of *cowardice*, when their blind guardian has a large, well-disciplined army to guarantee his infallibility and orthodoxy?[85]

For at the end of the day it is perfectly conceivable that enlightened individuals can be allowed to chatter away provided they never question the one who gives them the permission to do just that; despite the fact that his opposition to the *Aufklärung* was essentially founded on religious belief, Hamann here is pointing out that, once the process of critique is started, there should be in principle no way to determine where it should end – and one can always claim to detect the foul smell of conciliation in any attempt to declare an area out of bounds. Is this not precisely what the distinction between public and private use of reason sets out to do – save from critical activity an area of obedience to authority, perhaps in the hope that in the long term free

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[84] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[85] *Ibid.*, p. 147. The reference to the 'large, well-disciplined army' is of course directly lifted from the Kantian text.

public debate will necessarily have to transform this area as well? If that is the wager, it does not appear to stir much enthusiasm in Hamann:

> What good to me is the *festive garment* of freedom when I am in a slave's smock at home? (...) Thus the public use of reason & freedom is nothing but a dessert, a sumptuous dessert. The private use is the *daily bread* that we should give up for its sake.[86]

The attack could, as a matter of fact, have been even more *ad hominem*: Kant's own life and work, in which the two poles of his distinction collapse into each other in the person of the university lecturer (*both* learned man addressing the public *and* civil servant), illustrates very well how the slippage between public and private uses of reason is inevitable and constantly threatens any steadfast separation.[87] This is transparent in the episode where Kant, following the publication of *Religion within the limits of reason alone*, submitted to a Cabinet Order from Frederick William II (successor to the enlightened monarch whose praise is sung in 'An answer to the question...') by promising to refrain from speaking or writing publicly on matters of religion. Kant's line of defence consisted in arguing that his book could not harm the larger public's attitude towards religion since it was not written with an average readership in mind, and could only be appreciated by a small readership composed of scholars – thus making the public use of reason refer back to the 'private', small sphere of 'a scholarly public authorised by the state to make judgments'[88], and confirming Hamann's suspicion of an ultimate complicity among 'guardians' that, when tested, would always work

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[86] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[87] A point very well made *In:* CAYGILL, H. Kant and the 'age of criticism'. *In: A Kant dictionary.* Oxford: Blackwell, 2004, pp. 7-34.
[88] *Ibid.*, p. 10

to the detriment of the 'immature'. The incident prompted from the editor of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, who had eagerly published the debate on *Aufklärung* to which Kant and Mendelssohn had contributed, the harsh rebuke that such behaviour amounted to deserting the struggle and 'leaving it to others to "continue the work on the great philosophical and religious enlightenment that you have so happily begun"'.[89]

In the end, the issue here comes down to the mobilisation of the subject's relation to truth that Foucault speaks of: in a new political field which opened up by the constitution of a learned public – itself a consequence of material variables such as a (comparatively) increasing generalisation of the access to education, the expansion of networks of production and circulation of texts, the growing participation and influence of the bourgeoisie in political affairs etc. – a growing area of political debate, which expands both in terms of the numbers of participants and the areas of debate that are open to it, creates the 'indocile servitude' in which, suddenly, the role of advising or criticising the prince ceases to be restricted to its immediate counselors, and becomes open to the circulation of new subject positions; the secularisation of a debate that does not fully accept the limits of might and divine right opens up a field of criticism of the secular power of the church, and the scriptural authority on which it is based; individuals tear themselves away from areas where until then tradition ruled, opening up a field of 'desubjectification' as a concrete experimentalism on how not to be governed in this or that way, how not to become this or that subject. This is a process that, once started, cannot be limited without the claims on which any limitation might be based being themselves put under scrutiny and questioned. The whole of the

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[89] Letter from J. E. Biester dated 17th December 1794, quoted *In: Ibid.*, p. 11.

Enlightenment, in its 'radical' and 'moderate' facets, its 'advances' and 'retreats', is nothing but the history of this; once the critical attitude is let out of Pandora's box, where must it stop? When one says 'must', does that imply a limit by right or an external imposition in the name of some authority that is best 'left alone' for the sake of social cohesion?

In 'What is critique?' Foucault dwells more than in the subsequent texts on this tension between critical attitude and Kantian *Aufklärung* whose practical expression is the 'argue, but obey!' formula. Whereas the last two commend the way in which the question of the present provokes and founds Kant's philosophical project as a whole as a work of intervention, the first one echoes Deleuze in pointing out that, by reducing the critical attitude to the task of defining the limits of reason, Kant reconciles 'argue' and 'obey' in making autonomy the ground of obedience, so that 'you will be in charge to the extent that you submit yourself to an order, which you are not subject to without also being the legislator of'.[90] The tension, however, reappears in a different form, around the split Foucault operates in Kant between an 'enthusiasm' to be pursued and a finished project to be left behind, and around the present – as non-space between past and future, passivity and activity, necessity and freedom, heteronomy and autonomy. There is something 'ambiguous' in Kant's definition of *Aufklärung*:

> He characterises it as a fact, a process in the making; but he also presents it as a task and an obligation. From the first paragraph, one must note that it is man

[90] DELEUZE, G. Cours Vincennes: Monisme, dualisme, multiplicités. 26/03/1973. [http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=166&groupe=Anti%20Oedipe%20et%20Mill e%20Plateaux&langue=1]. *Cf.* also: *Idem. Nietzsche et la philosophie.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 106: 'Kant's dream: not to suppress the distinction between two worlds, sensible and suprasensible, but to ensure *the unity of the personal* across the two. The same person as legislator and subject, noumenon and phenomenon, priest and faithful.' (Deleuze's italics.)

himself who is responsible for his state of minority. One must then think that he will not manage to exit it if not by a transformation he will operate on himself [and] consider that *Aufklärung* is at once a process that men collectively belong to, and an act of courage to be personally exercised. They are at once elements and agents of this process. They can be its actors to the extent that they are a part of it; and it is produced to the extent that they decide to be its voluntary actors.[91]

It is significant that Foucault is satisfied with this solution, which is not a solution so much as an affirmation of the necessity of the ambiguity; in the last chapter we will see to what extent this is a constitutive trait of his thought as a whole. If to think is always to think the present, in the present, in the non-space between ceasing to be and becoming, the present is the site of an ultimate indiscernibility between the passivity in which one acts and one's activity, between the receptivity of a capacity to be affected and the spontaneity of a capacity to affect, between the heteronomy that determines us as living, speaking, acting individuals and the autonomy by which how we live, what we say, what we do can lead us into becoming other and act upon the conditions that determine us; between Being (which, for him, can only ever happen to us as Being-something) and thought. There are, in fact, two distinct ways in which Foucault uses the word 'thought':

I have tried to write, in a style evidently unusual, the history not of thought in general, but of everything which 'contains thought' in a culture, of everything in which there is thought. Because there is thought in philosophy, but also in a novel, in jurisprudence, in law, even in an administrative system, in a prison.[92]

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[91] FOUCAULT, M. What is Enlightenment?. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 1383-4. (Slightly modified.)
[92] *Idem*. Michel Foucault, *Les mots et les choses*. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 531-2. In the same passage, he claims that he found shocking the separation between 'a history of philosophy

> Thought is not what inhabits a conduct and gives it meaning; it is rather what allows us to step back from this way of acting and reacting, to pose it as an object of thought and to question its sense, its conditions and its ends. Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the movement by which one detaches oneself from it, constitutes it as an object and reflects on it as a problem.[93]

The fact that the two statements have almost twenty years between them does not mean that there is a contradiction between them, with the second supplanting the first; again, what would appear as contradiction, or an ambiguity at the very least, is in fact a necessary tension to be kept.[94] That the two meanings necessarily imply each other is clear in the fact that the second speaks of questioning the *conditions* of a way of acting and reacting,

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that had as privileged object the philosophical edifices that tradition signalled as important' and a 'history of ideas, that is, sub-philosophies'.

[93] *Idem*. Polémique, politique et problématisations. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, vol. II, p. 1416.

[94] In 1981, hence three years before the second quote, Foucault says: 'Thought exists beyond, or underneath, systems and edifices of discourse. It is something that is often hidden, but always animates daily behaviours. There is always some thought in the most stupid institutions, there is always some thought even in silent habits.' *Idem*. Est-il donc important de penser?. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 999. More importantly, in the same interview in which he reconfigures his project as a 'history of problematisations' that concerns primarily the second meaning of the word, he states that 'for a domain of action, for a behaviour to enter the domain of thought, it is necessary for a certain number of factors to have rendered it uncertain, to have made it unfamiliar, or to have created around it a certain number of difficulties. These elements arise from social, economic or political processes'. (*Idem*. Polémique, politique et problématisations. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1416.) In other words, thought in the second sense is a consquence of something in the present exceeding thought in the first sense.

Béatrice Han has interpreted these two senses against each other, and while in general giving more importance to the second, in line with her project of tracking down the permanence of the transcendental in Foucault's project, she stops at the level of contradiction. Peter Hallward highlights the second at the expense of the first, playing it against Deleuze. While I have great sympathy for his overall argument in what concerns Foucault, I find the singular/specific distinction with which he wishes to oppose the two too equivocal for the task, and am inclined to take a more charitable stance towards Deleuze. *Cf.* HAN, B. *Foucault's critical project. Between the transcendental and the historical*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, Conclusion; HALLWARD, P. The limits of individuation, or how to distinguish Deleuze and Foucault. *Angelaki. Journal of the theoretical humanities*. 5 (2), 2000, pp. 93-103.

which are to be found precisely on what the first refers as the whole of thought that inhabits everything in a culture. In turn, as we have seen, the project described in the first (which specifically concerns *Les mots et les choses* but could just as well apply to any other work) is one that enacts, and seeks to produce, precisely what the second defines as a stepping back, an estrangement that makes thought in the first sense appear as a problem, as a contingent product to be acted upon anew. It would not be an exaggeration to say Foucault's thought takes place between these two senses of 'thought'; in any case, this is exactly what he finds in the Kantian text – not only as lesson on what to do with philosophy, but already enacted in the ambiguity with which it defines *Aufklärung*, with which it sets a task that is already a process. And the reason for this is that what takes place between the two senses of 'thought', or rather what constitutes the passage between them, is precisely the present.

And if we have seen that the present, as it expressly appears in the late essays on Kant, but also as it is silently presupposed in all of Foucault's writings, marks the spot of the problem between the relation of philosophy to non-philosophy which signals the privileged site of the problem of immanence in his work; and if we now find it as, more generally, the passage between the two meanings of thought; and if we can call Being what he, in non-intellectualist fashion, defines as the relations between discursive and non-discursive practices that constitute and determine thought in the first sense – then the present is, for Foucault, what marks the point of contact between Being and thought: the immanence of thought to Being. That the limits it can reveal are only ever the present limits of historical Being whose transgression is to be experimented with means that critique can never be closed, but is an *ethos* that demands permanent reactivation. Finally, that it calls for practical

experimentation means that there is a necessary and ultimate indiscernibility between what, at its most general, could be called passion and action; at the practical level, passivity and activity; at the transcendental, receptivity and spontaneity; at the political, heteronomy and autonomy; and ultimately, Being and thought themselves.

1.3 – A brief history of immanence

Let us stop for a moment to take stock of the determinations of immanence we have found so far. In Foucault's work from *Histoire de la folie* on, we find the problem of identifying the relays and defining the terms in which to describe thought's relation to Being; it is the problem of thought belonging within a larger ensemble of discursive and extradiscursive relations, its 'this-worldliness', its historicity: its immanence *to* Being. Given what has already been seen concerning the way in which Foucault understands history, this immanence is what is at stake in what he sees as the philosophical question *par excellence* since Nietzsche: "'what has been the aleatory path of truth?'".[95]

But it is already in Kant, according to him, that the problem of this immanence is twisted *into* philosophy, which cannot happen without producing a transformation in the way philosophy itself is practiced. More than a matter of grasping the history of philosophy in its relation to non-philosophy, the *very matter* of philosophy becomes that of grasping its own actuality: producing a diagnosis of its present, which necessarily includes identifying its own roots

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[95] *Idem.* Questions à Michel Foucault sur la géographie. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 50-1.

within it, and posing the problem of the role it can and is invited to play, as well as the effects it can produce, *in* it.

These two figures of immanence are indeed the same, but with a signficant change in stress from one to the other that is brought to bear by the fact that the gaze that in one case is turned towards the past, is made in the other to extend towards the present. To ask the question of the historicity of thought, and hence the immanence of philosophy to history, thought to Being, can appear as a philosophical question among others only up to the moment that the question catches up with its own present, the present in which it says itself. When it does, the question of its immanence becomes the question of its present, and hence that which it must above all think:

> this torsion and redoubling, this exit from and reapprehension of itself, by which philosophical discourse says what it is, pronounces its justification and, taking distance from its immediate form, manifests that which can found it and fix its own limits.[96]

A question that cannot be asked without implicating the questioning itself: 'what is this "now" in which we all are and within which I write?'[97]. 'What is the sense of this actuality? And what am I doing when I ask the sense of this actuality?'.[98]

Read in the terms of his late work, Foucault's enterprise from the start appears as given in the space opened by the Kantian question; its commitment to the present is a commitment to the reactivation of that attitude

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[96] *Idem*. Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 808.
[97] *Idem*. Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 1498.
[98] *Ibid.*, p. 1500.

that Kant reflected upon as the intersection between the practice of philosophy and the problem of its own present, which is also the question of the immanence of thought to history – to time –, and hence of the sense of the practice of thought itself. This problem, in turn, is the internalisation, by philosophy, of the critical attitude of modernity in questioning the claims to truth of all authority and demanding that such claims find a ground in this world, in the present, in time. We thus find in Foucault a perfect solidarity with Habermas' *dictum* that modernity 'can and will no longer borrow the criteria by which it takes its orientation from the models supplied by another epoch; it has to create its normativity out of itself.'[99] It is around modernity that pivot the first two determinations we have found so far: immanence as the immanence of thought to Being; which in itself is a problem opened by the necessity that thought refuse any transcendent grounds, that it make itself immanent.

But, even if it is perfectly possible to show as above that the problem is present and active at the very centre of his thought, it is just as perfectly well-known that Foucault did not directly thematise immanence as such; and even if we have found in him elements that point to why it should have become the central problem for philosophy since the beginning of modernity, so far there are little indications as to how to think it, or how it has been thought. Immanence, of course, has a history as a philosophical concept that reaches much farther back then the historical moment in which it comes centre-stage; and it is to Deleuze that we must turn in order to identify this trajectory, and the stakes that it involves.

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[99] HABERMAS, J. *The philosophical discourse of modernity: twelve lectures.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987, p. 7.

1.3.1 – The 'Greek miracle'

Deleuze and Guattari go much further back than Foucault in order to find the emergence of this problem. They find it, in fact, in the emergence of philosophy itself: for them, the 'Greek miracle' can only be grasped in its relation to a plane of immanence. Not that the relation itself translates into a necessary, analytic link between the Greeks and philosophy: they agree with Foucault that 'there is no good reason but a contingent one, and there is no universal history except that of contingence'.[100] If Heidegger and Hegel are historicists, 'it is to the extent that they pose history as a form of interiority in which the concept develops or unveils progressively its destiny'[101], and thus find in Greek thought – in the posing, by the free subject, of its relation to the object; or by the 'autochthone', the inhabitant of the world, of the question of the Being of beings – the beginning of a trajectory traversed by a collective subject, the first opening of the history, and destiny, of the West. The non-philosophical conditions that make the birth of philosophy possible should, then, be taken as contingent: it is the appearance, in the Greek city-states, of a '*millieu* of immanence'[102] – a democratic society of free men (as opposed to imperial sovereignity), which opens the space for open exchange of opinions (as opposed to the external, transcendent authority of the sovereign/God) that constitutes this space as one of free association, friendship but also rivalry (shaped from the inside by the immanent play of its forces, rather than from the outside by an externally given model or form). And this appearance in

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[100] DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 90.
[101] *Ibid.*, p. 91.
[102] *Ibid.*, p. 84. (Translation modified; italics in the original.)

itself is related to the constitution of the Greek territory in what would distinguish it from its theocratic Eastern counterparts: it has the form of a market rather than an empire, in the sense that it is founded on no other unity then the (always absent, always not-yet-given) one of the connections that relate its elements to each other (the city-states and their relations of exchange) and to its outside (maritime commerce, foreigners who come to seek refuge), whereas the empire is an original unity that reproduces itself by extending itself over the territories it conquers.

What distinguishes this 'milieu of immanence' from its neighbours is therefore not dissimilar to the transformations that take place between the appearance of a critical attitude in the 15th and 16th centuries and the form it is given in the 18th century by Kant's text on Aufklärung: the emergence of a public sphere, the posing of the problem of the limits of sovereign power, the demand that truth be grounded in the world rather than in authority or tradition.[103]

> If philosophy has a Greek origin (...), it is because the city (...) creates the *agon* as the rule of society of 'friends', the community of free men as rivals (citizens). It is the situation that Plato constantly describes: if each citizen has a pretension, he necessarily finds rivals, so that it must be necessary to judge the grounds [*juger du bien-fondé*] of pretensions.[104]

And as much as Foucault sees an intimate relation between this immanentisation of social life and its being given a specific philosophical form, so too do Deleuze and Guattari identify a correspondent relation among the

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[103] On the importance of cosmopolitan, trading cities and the levelling power of the rising public sphere that brought together bourgeoisie and the lower echelons of aristocracy for the intellectual development of early modernity, Cf. ISRAEL, J. I. *Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 59-66.

[104] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Greeks. What they call the 'immanent reterritorialisation'[105] that constitutes the Greek territory is given its philosophical dimension in the founding of philosophy upon a plane of immanence which is specific to Greek philosophy – but also, in a sense, *the* plane of immanence of philosophy as a whole. This is a 'thought-Being, a thought-Nature'[106]: '*un plan d'immanence absolu*'[107], at once an absolute plane of immanence and a plane of absolute immanence.

> The originality of the Greeks is to be found, however, in the relation between the relative and the absolute. When relative deterritorialisation is itself horizontal, immanent, *it conjugates itself* [*elle se conjugue*] with the absolute deterritorialisation of the plane of immanence that carries towards the infinite, that pushes to the absolute the movements of the first by transforming them (the *milieu*, the friend, opinion). *Immanence is redoubled.*[108]

> For philosophy to be born, it was necessary that there be an *encounter* between the Greek *milieu* and plane of immanence of thought. It was necessary that there be a conjugation of two very different movements of deterritorialisation, the relative and the absolute, the first operating already in immanence. It was necessary that the absolute deterritorialisation of the plane of thought be directly connected to the relative deterritorialisation of Greek society. It was necessary that there be the encounter of the friend and thought.[109]

Physis – a thought-Being or thought-Nature – is the plane of immanence that the first philosophers create for themselves for thinking Being rather than God, an internal *nomos* of the cosmos rather than an *arché* external to it, matter rather than religion, univocity rather than equivocity: immanence over

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[105] *Ibid.*, p. 83.
[106] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[107] *Ibid.*, p. 86. (First italics the authors', second mine.)
[108] *Ibid.*
[109] *Ibid.*, p. 90. (Deleuze and Guattari's italics.)

transcendence. The immanentisation of Greek society (its 'relative deterritorialisation') opens onto a thought of the immanence of Being (its 'absolute deterritorialisation'); but – such is the argument of *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* – this immanentisation is itself only the resultant of a movement of Being, is nothing but immanent to the contingence of an absolute plane of immanence. The superiority of the 'Greek miracle', what makes it into the foundation of philosophy, is that they give themselves the means through which to think this immanence of thought to Being *immanently*, that is, with no other reference except the internal movements of a *physis*: they redouble the immanence of thought into a thought of immanence. The Greek plane of thought is the foundation of philosophy by virtue of making philosophy into something distinct from religion, by making it into the thought of Being as immanent, where it implicates itself in the question of the immanence of thought and Being; if Deleuze and Guattari insist on the contingence of the Greeks, they nevertheless believe that it is in Greece that what it means to philosophise is established once and for all: to think immanence. A thought of immanence, where the genitive is both subjective and objective.

> There is religion every time there is transcendence, vertical Being, imperial State in heaven or on earth, and there is Philosophy every time there is immanence, even if it serves as the arena of *agon* and rivalry.[110]

Greece is thus not, as in Hegel, the beginning of a process to be completed (one could say: to be completed *by us, moderns*); but is it not then a source to be returned to, to be rediscovered from under its coveredness, as in Heidegger? What Deleuze and Guattari fault Heidegger for is relying too much on the necessity of the 'history of metaphysicians'; he abstracts the

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[110] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

'historical element'[111] – contingence, *alea* – so as to find, in the whole history of the West, a necessary line that goes all the way back, beyond the pre-Socratics, to the structure of Being itself as named by them for the first time: if Being only shows by concealing itself, the history of *alethea* is the history of its concealment, and the task of philosophy is to read it against the grain in order to find what it hides, in order to return to that first opening when Being gave itself to us, revealed itself in its structure of concealment and unconcealment. The French thinkers, in turn, insist it is not an origin they are speaking of, let alone a 're-beginning repetition'[112] they are advocating. To capture the divergence, it is worth to consider the Heideggerean notion of the 'gift'. In stressing contingence against necessity, Deleuze and Guattari are precisely following the Nietzschean intuition (which Foucault develops in his text on genealogy) that truth is of the order of the *event*, an *encounter*, the resultant of a relation of human and non-human forces, an emergence or invention. In doing so, they are going against what already at the time of *Différence et répétition* Deleuze called the 'good sense' of the 'dogmatic image' of thought: the unspoken assumption that there is a necessary predisposition or affinity between thought and Being, a good will in humans towards 'discovering' truth.[113] The causes that come together to enable the

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[111] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[112] *Ibid.*

[113] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, pp. 171-3. In one of his few extensive engagements with Nietzsche outside 'Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire', Foucault insists in a strict oppostion between *Ursprung* (origin) and *Erfindung* (invention), where the latter reveals that 'knowledge [*connaissance*] is absolutely not inscribed in human nature'. FOCAULT, M. La verité et les formes juridiques. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1412-3. *Cf.* also: 'The thematic of the gift, which binds the human and [B]eing together in the singular event of [*Ereignis*], reinscribes at the other end of the relation what was assumed by philosophical doxa as the fundamental trait of the faculty of thought, that is, its natural orientation towards truth. (...) Everything happens as if [B]eing itself were animated with a certain good will, a certain disposition toward thought.' DE BEISTEGUI, M. *Truth and genesis. Philosophy as differential ontology*. Bloomingtion: Indiana University Press, 2004, p. 282. (Slightly modified.)

birth of philosophy are themselves contingent, and not a gift in which Being reveals its structure for the first time; the question of immanence itself, therefore, would return only because of a new aleatory combination of factors that make it what is necessary to think.

It remains a fact, however, that Deleuze and Guattari see the requirement to think immanence as what constitutes philosophy in its difference from religion; and they do define the plane of immanence that philosophy must think in perfectly Greek terms as 'having two faces, as Thought and Nature, as *Physis* and *Noûs*'.[114] How not to think of it as the call for a return? The key lies, again, in the crucial relation of absolute and relative:

> absolute deterritorialisation *can only be thought* according to some relations to be determined with relative deterritorialisations, not only cosmic, but geographic, historical and psycho-social. There is always a way in which the absolute deterritorialisation on the plane of immanence finds a relay in a relative deterritorialisation in a given field.[115]

The plane of immanence – absolute immanence, absolute movement, infinite speed, *as what philosophy must think* – appears as what must be thought *only* through a combination of human and non-human causes – a relative deterritorialisation, an event – that provokes thought to think what it is that provokes thought; the absolute horizon of thought and Being, *the* plane of immanence, is only ever thought within a relative horizon that poses itself the problem of that absolute as the question of the conditions of what, and in which, it thinks. Thinking immanence is always directly connected to being made to think anew. This is why Deleuze and Guattari lament that

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[114] DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 41.
[115] *Ibid.*, p. 85. (My italics.)

Heidegger, however strongly he approached it, betrayed the movement of deterritorialisation by congealing it once and for all between Being and being, between the territory of the Greeks and the Western Earth they would have named Being.[116]

It is not the structure of Being that unconcealed itself in the Greeks, but it was Greece that for the first time assembled the conditions that made it possible for them, from within the relative horizon offered by the deterritorialisation that constituted their territory, to ask the question of the absolute horizon of immanence: to found philosophy. *Mutatis mutandis*, we find between Heidegger and Deleuze and Guattari the same opposition we found between Habermas and Foucault (and it is no surprise, then, that Deleuze and Guattari return to Kant's reflection on revolution in *The conflict of the faculties* a few pages on[117]): it is the fact that the Enlightenment asked the question of its present, posed itself the problem of its immanence, that is relevant for us; what is needed is a reactivation of the *question*, rather than a faithfulness to how it was posed or to whatever answers it may have found. What moves us to ask the question, and the conditions in which we ask it today, is not the same; it is the *form* of the question, and of the problem it poses, that matters. 'The plane is certainly not the same among the Greeks, in the 18th century, today (...): it is neither the same image of thought, nor the same matter of Being.'[118]

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[116] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 96. In a note, they suggest a comparison between Foucault's, Lyotard's and Habermas' different readings of that text.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 41. Those familiar with Foucault's work will no doubt find a resonance here with the theme of the 'return to the Greeks' in his late work: 'To try to rethink the Greeks today consists not in making Greek morality into the domain of morality *par excellence* which one would need in order to think oneself, but to make it possible for European thought to take Greek thought up again as an experience that was once given and in relation to which we

1.3.2 – Absolute immanence...

Despite their condemnation of a history of philosophy that confounds itself with a philosophy of history, the reader used to Foucault's historical analyses cannot help but feel that *Qu'est-ce que c'est la philosophie?* remains, in its treatment of history, extremely philosophical: lacking detail, full of generalisations. At the same time, and given some (unfortunately not rare) misreadings such as I have tried to dispel above, it may seem that there would be an incompatibility between many of Foucault's studies and the Deleuze and Guattari's conclusion that the link between modern philosophy and capitalism 'is of the same kind that the one between ancient philosophy and Greece: *the connection of an absolute plane of immanence with a relative social* milieu *that also proceeds by immanence*'.[119] How could the author of *Surveiller et punir* agree that modern democracies are the equivalent of the Greek 'society of friends'? The problem is purely superficial: firstly, because the transformations that he repeatedly attempted to capture, and whose moments of precipitation often return in his historical divisions, correspond precisely to the formation of modern nation states and the changes in the relations between governors and governed they involved; secondly, because if he develops an analysis of diffuse forms of micro-power, it is not because he excludes the juridical and public spheres that involve some degree of formal symmetry and reciprocity, but to show how they are insufficient to account for the nature of those transformations. To deny that there is a significant change that takes place between the *Ancien Régime* and

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can be totally free.' FOUCAULT, M. Le retour de la morale. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1521.
[119] DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Op. cit.*, p. 94. (Italics in the original.)

modernity concerning a new level of public debate would not only be insane, it would also leave Foucault with the problem of explaining how it was possible that so much of the material he draws upon (debates on penal reform or on governmentality, for instance) could have existed and circulated in the first place. What he sets out to do in 'What is critique?' is precisely to show how such transformations have a correlate in the development of a critical attitude concerning the question of 'how not to be governed', which progressively opens up authority and tradition to the scrutiny that, centuries later, Kant will give the name of 'age of criticism' and will place in a relation that ties from the inside philosophy and its social and political present. And so here we find the point where the history that the Deleuze and Guattari start with the Greeks catches up with that moment that Foucault finds expressed in the Kantian text; immanence finds its modern reterritorialisation in the Enlightenment.

Yet so far we have only expanded the history of the relation between philosophy and immanence into the past, without advancing much in finding a definition for it; it is perhaps in another history – an 'internal' history of philosophy – that we should look. And again one must start from non-philosophy, from religion; or rather, from the grey zone between the birth of metaphysics and Christianity.[120]

This time, Deleuze finds it necessary to return to Plato's doctrine of participation. In it, the participated always requires that the relation of participation be found on the side of the participant: an external power

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[120] As Phillip Goodchild points out, the Latin *immanere* becomes philosophical currency with St. Augustine, and shares the same etymology as the Hebrew name for the messiah, 'Immanuel' or 'God with us'. *Cf.* GOODCHILD, P. Why is philosophy so compromised with religion?. *In:* BRYDEN, M. (ed.) *Deleuze and religion*. London: Routledge, 2001, p. 157.

intervenes to force the participated by dividing it, imitating it, acting as a *daemon*. Ironically, then, neo-Platonics such as Plotinus are the first to have 'inverted Platonism', looking for the genetic, productive principle of participation on the side of the participated. Such is the role of the concept of 'emanation': 'at once cause and gift; but also productive giving.'[121] This in turn means that the principle in itself is what cannot be participated; the participated is beyond what it gives, 'superior to its gifts as well as its products, participable according to what it gives, imparticipable as it is in itself or according to itself; and, by the same token, founding participation.'[122]

The God of creationism is a transitive cause, which goes out of itself to create the world as something exterior to it. The Neo-Platonic One is the exterior cause of all there is, *while remaining in itself*. This difference is at the root of Nicolaus de Cusa's heterodoxy and Giordano Bruno's heresy, with their notions of 'complication' and 'explication': 'all things are present to God, which complicates them, God is present to all things, which explicate and implicate Him'.[123] Here, the hierarchy of the One (which reproduced itself in the hierarchy of the hypostases) is replaced by a flat Being in which all inheres in God's infinity. All these terms – complication, explication, implication, inherence – are contained in the concept of 'expression', which Deleuze sees as the hidden possibility of Neo-Platonism and the internal potential that the philosophy of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance could not develop; a fire that burns too strong, as Bruno himself could tell us. That it cannot do so is because of its compromise with transcendence, in the need to affirm the hierarchy between God and creature: what Heidegger named 'onto-

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[121] DELEUZE, G. *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*. Paris: PUF, 2002, p. 154.
[122] *Ibid.*
[123] *Ibid.*, p. 159.

theology', the transformation of Being into a being above or beyond all other beings. The historical erasure of the ontological difference is one and the same with the instauration of transcendence in the West: the same movement that makes Being into an entity places it in a hierarchical position in relation to all other entities, and its reduction to ontic sameness is also the opening of a chasm between God and creatures. Still, Christian theology would always rekindle that expressionism even while resisting it; creationism requires a compromise with emanation, in Bonaventure for instance, where God expresses himself in the Verb (exemplary Idea) which in turn expresses all things, created or not. All sorts of compromises between transitive, emanative and immanent cause are necessary to stave off the risk of pantheism – of atheism – that the concept of expression tends towards; and it will only be with Spinoza that this tendency will be given free reign to go until its limit: immanence,

> the vertigo of philosophy, inseparable from the concept of expression (the double immanence of the expression in what expresses, and of the expressed in the expression).[124]

Its double *immanence* allows Spinoza to solve the problem of developing an immanent ontology in the most elegant way. God's essence is to exist necessarily; this essence is expressed in different ways in infinite attributes; these attributes express God's essence in producing its finite modes. God expresses its essence as infinite power to produce effects (the attributes, *natura naturans*), and in effects themselves (the modes, *natura naturata*). The immanent cause is said of God in the same way as it is said of creatures: *God is the cause of all things in the same sense that he is the cause of himself.*

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[124] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

God's attributes express his necessary essence, and contain in themselves the essences of all the modes that explicate God; *the attributes are said of God in the same way as they are of modes*. Effects remain within the immanent cause in the same way as the cause remains in itself, insofar as their existence implicates God's essence, and necessarily follow from its necessity; *modes are in God necessarily in the same sense that God is necessary*. Deleuze here borrows from Duns Scotus the concept of 'univocity' – largely absent from Spinoza's work – in order to explain the full impact of the latter's achievement. Whether from the point of view of cause, attributes, or modality, all Being is said in the same way; whereas Scotus neutralised Being into a purely formal *ens communis* that could be said of both creature and creator, thus still leaving room for the eminence of a first cause, Spinoza expands univocity into the realm of causality, making God the immanent cause of modes in the same sense that it is the cause of itself. This does not mean, however, that modes and Substance are comparable in essence or perfection; attributes are the essence of Substance but not that of modes, which only imply them. At the same time, it is necessary to show that the distinction between attributes does not threaten the indivisibility of Substance. Here Deleuze again imports Scotus into Spinoza's system: the distinction between attributes is real, that is, purely qualitative, quidditative, formal, without implying any division, and so they infinitely express God's necessity; modes are numerically, quantitatively distinct, and their individual essences inhere in the attributes as God's finite affections.[125]

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[125] Pierre Macherey suggests that the risk of borrowing the problem of real/numerical distinctions is setting up a strict opposition between quality (attributes, *natura naturans*) and quantity (modes, *natura naturata*) in a way that is redolent of Deleuze's early Bergsonism. As we shall see, this is a constant tension in Deleuze's thought, which always flirts with a dualism that threatens his univocal aims. *Cf.* MACHEREY, P. The encounter with Spinoza. *In:* PATTON, P. (ed.) *Deleuze: a critical reader.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 148-52.

Expression, Deleuze argues, cannot be the object of a demonstration in the *Ethics* because it is what makes demonstration into the *'immediate manifestation* of the absolutely infinite substance.'[126] Its double *direction* – the mode expresses the Substance in the same movement that the Substance expresses itself in the mode – is what allows Spinoza to give a new answer to the question that the transcendent Being of religion begged: how can Being be said of God and creature, Being and beings? One alternative would be to say that, while we can have affirmative knowledge of God as cause, his essence, being beyond all essence, cannot be said in the same way as that of creatures ('God is good, but He is not good in the same way as men'); the Being of God *is not* said in the same way as the Being of men, and one must pass through negation to arrive at its *eminence: negative theology.*[127] Another, to say that God's Being is to the Being of creatures in a relation of proportionality or proportion; it remains eminent, but can be captured through *affirmative analogy.* By eliminating any trace of emanation or imitation from (and thus freeing up the element of expression in) the immanent cause, Spinoza, in the same movement that makes attributes univocal, entitles thought to the infinite. If attributes are real distinctions in God's Being that engender numerical distinctions through differentiation (modes), this means that the distinction between the two attributes that the finite mode can know – thought and extension – is purely formal, two 'points of view' in which the Substance expresses itself *in the same way.* Ideas in the attribute of thought express the Substance in the same way that bodies in the attribute of extension; there is a perfect parallelism between the two, so that expressive

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[126] DELEUZE, G. *Op. cit.*, p. 18. (Deleuze's italics.)
[127] *Ibid.*, p. 155. Dan Smith suggests that, for Deleuze, Heidegger would fail to move beyond a notion of Being as emanative cause only describable eminently, and, on the other hand, Badiou sees Deleuze's immanentism as, in fact, a theory of emanation. *Cf.* SMITH, D. The doctrine of univocity. *In:* BRYDEN, M. (ed.) *Deleuze and religion.* London: Routledge, 2001, p. 174; p. 181, n. 19.

knowledge, insofar as it is the expression in ideas of the infinite, necessary power of the Substance to affect itself (*potentia*), is the knowledge of God in his essence. Here we have a thought *of* immanence, where the genitive is both subjective and objective: the circle is complete.

This is why Deleuze will never cease to celebrate Spinoza: the 'prince'[128] and 'Christ of philosophers', 'the one who showed, constructed, thought the "best" plane of immanence, the purest, the one that does not give in to the transcendent and does not give out any transcendent.'[129] It is also why the heretic Jew who was expelled from the synagogue, whose name travelled Europe as a synonym for atheism and immoralism, a label with which any association brought risks – was at the same time and by the same token the source from which drank the underground current of radical Enlightenment across Europe in the 17th and 18th century, and the precursor whose heritage the likes of Hegel, Schelling, Heine, Feuerbach, Marx, and Nietzsche would reclaim at some point.[130]

1.3.3 – ... And beyond

Yet there still is transcendence in Spinoza's ontology, to the extent that the totality of modes exists within a single Substance: a transcendence of the whole over its parts, or a transcendence of the identity of the One over the equivocity of the Multiple. In this sense, he did not manage to fully escape the space of onto-theology, that is, of the thought of Being as a being, even if this

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[128] DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 49.
[129] *Ibid.*, p. 59.
[130] *Cf.*: BEISER, F. *The Fate of Reason. German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1987; ISRAEL, J. I. *Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002; YOVEL, Y. *Spinoza and other heretics. The adventures of immanence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

is the infinite *Deus sive natura*. Deleuze takes Heidegger's ontological difference seriously enough to introduce a displacement in Spinoza. Identity (like analogy, resemblance and opposition) must be thought as a secondary effect rather than primary; 'following Heidegger's ontological intuition', difference must be thought 'as what relates the different to different without any mediation by the identical or the similar, the analogue or the opposed'.[131] There are two sources of Deleuze's 'conversion according to which univocal Being is said only of difference and, in this sense, revolves around the being'[132]. The first is Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return, which makes each being insofar as it repeats and differs into the object of an affirmation of the return of difference, rather than, like Heidegger, taking Being as the point of departure for thought. Since Being, for the latter, is the unconcealing that gives us beings while in itself remaining concealed, the presenting through which the present is given but which in itself remains absent, the only path of access to it has to be, in the manner of negative theology, identifying it as what it is not (not a being) – placing negation at the beginning of thought. Again, while Heidegger wishes to go back towards the origin of a first presentation, a primordial disclosure, Deleuze starts from the middle. Here, then, is the 'great identity Spinoza-Nietzsche'[133] that Deleuze claims to have worked towards since his early writings: to eliminate both identity and negativity, discounted as purely subjective effects of representation, from Being; and thus to make ontology into the pure affirmation of Being as infinite power – but the infinite power of difference, rather than of the one Substance.

> That identity is not first, that it exists as principle, but second principle, principle
> *become*: that it revolves around the Different, such is the nature of a

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[131] *Idem. Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 154.
[132] *Ibid.*, p. 91.
[133] *Idem.* Sur la philosophie. *Pourparlers. 1972-1990.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 185.

Copernican revolution that opens to difference the possibility of attaining its own concept, instead of posing it under the domination of a concept in general, posed already as identical.[134]

So that this turn can be completed, he requires a second support, found in Bergson's theory of multiplicities, which was already the motor behind his introduction of Scotist real and numerical distinctions into Spinoza's ontology. As much as attributes become distinct from modes as quality from quantity, Bergson allows Deleuze to distinguish two kinds of multiplicities, where one is quantitative, numerical, discontinuous and actual, susceptible to infinite subjective manipulation by having division and order imposed on it; and the other qualitative, continuous, virtual and cannot be divided without changing in kind.[135] It is in the second type that he finds the conditions upon which to develop a 'transcendental empiricism' whereby they function as the ideal, problematic, transcendental side of Being which is the condition of existence for the actual exactly by dint of the fact that, through its being divided, it gives rise to multiplicities of the other kind.[136] Of all the dualities that run through

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[134] [134] *Idem. Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 59.

[135] Crucially, Deleuze does not follow Bergson is distributing the two kinds on either side of the time (continuous) and space (discontinuous) divide; hence the intensive, topological *spatium* of *Différence et répétition*, and the opposition between smooth (continuous and intensive) and striated (discontinuous and extensive) space in *Mille Plateaux. Cf.* also the critique of Bergson's critique of intensity (which is down to his partition of time and space) *In: Ibid.*, pp. 308-9.

[136] As is well-known, this double turn is not enough to convince Badiou that Deleuze effectively escapes a dialectics of the One and the Multiple, or that his thought does not amount to a 'mystic of the One'; and 'it serves no purpose to argue against whomever that the opposition between One and Multiple is 'congealed' and to oppose it, as if it were the ultimate invention of Life, a third concept such as multiplicities, which supposedly bears the unconceivable "wealth" of the movement of thought, the experimentation of immanence, the quality of the virtual, or the infinite speed of intuition. We find this vitalist terrorism, of which Nietzsche gives the sanctifiable version, and (...) Bergson the polite bourgeouis variant, rather puerile.' BADIOU, A. Un, multiple, multiplicité(s). *Multitudes*, 1 (1), 2000, p. 197. Whatever one makes of his critique, the most important thing about it is how he promptly recognises the point at which his own and Deleuze's project meet and diverge as central for a thought of absolute immanence: precisely the problem of multiplicities, be they conceived

Deleuze's thought (and perhaps even more markedly his collaboration with Guattari), this is the most fundamental one, and will be examined at greater length in the last chapter. For the time being, it should suffice to say this duality is charged precisely with the overcoming of the opposition between One and Multiple which he sees as the source of all dualisms[137], and so is clearly expected to be understood not as 'a veritable dualism that signals an irreducible difference', not even 'a provisional stage that is surpassed in the direction of a monism, as in Spinoza or Bergson', but 'a preparatory division that takes place within a pluralism'.[138] Or, as he writes with Guattari:

> We make use of a dualism of models only so as to arrive at a process that
> would refuse every model. (...) To arrive at the magical formula that we all
> search for: PLURALISM = MONISM, going through all the dualisms that are the

as purely quantitative (Badiou) or through an opposition between qualitative and quantitative that places the stress on the former (Deleuze).

[137] *Cf.* DELEUZE, G. Cours Vincennes: Monisme, dualisme, multiplicités. 26/03/1973. [http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=166&groupe=Anti%20Oedipe%20et%20Mill e%20Plateaux&langue=1]. These dualisms constitute the main line of attack for recent critiques of Deleuze, be it as an opposition between the equivocity of the Multiple and the univocity of the One (Badiou) or the sterile Sense-Event and the machinism of bodies (Zizek), or a unilateral separation between infinite creating power and finite creature (Hallward). Any evaluation of these positions has necessarily to start from the fact that they are correct and can find extensive textual evidence to support their claims, even if the first two rely on forcing a discontinuity between the Deleuze of the late 1960s and his work with Guattari (a break that, I shall argue in the third chapter, does exist, but marks a change in emphasis rather than a contradiction), and mostly ignoring the latter; besides, they all tend to eliminate the middle term of the triadic structure found in Spinoza, which is precisely what operates the passage between the two poles (in two words, intensity, and individuation). I believe that the tensions created by such dualisms in the Deleuzian *oeuvre* – including the ultimate tension that obtains in a thought that of immanence requiring so many of them – must be maintained as such, rather than calling for a choice that would determine the 'real' Deleuze on either side. John Mullarkey has recently provided an analysis going in this same direction that is at once rigorous in upholding this tense 'unity', and in counteracting tendencies in more sympathetic commentators to place too much emphasis on the virtual. *Cf.* BADIOU, A. *Deleuze. 'La clameur de l'Etre'.* Paris: Hachette, 1998; ZIZEK, S. *Organs without bodies: Deleuze and consequences.* New York: Routledge, 2003; HALLWARD, P. *Out of this world: Deleuze and the philosophy of creation.* London: Verso, 2006; MULLARKEY, J. *Post-continental philosophy: an outline.* London: Continuum, 2006.
[138] *Idem. Foucault.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 89.

enemy, but the absolutely necessary enemy, the furniture we are constantly moving around.[139]

There is, however, a more important problem here, which takes us back to where it started and already inflects the passage to the second part of this study. The vertigo that pulls philosophy 'to the ground' is, as seen, at once external and internal to it. If this internal drive consists in an affirmation of univocity, the elimination of a hierarchy or eminence in Being which finds its most consummate expression in the system of the *Ethics*, externally it responds to an increasing social and political demand for finding – and founding – all source of authority in 'the powers of this world'.[140] Philosophy becomes mobilised as a tool to question and discredit authority, be it religious, politico-juridical, or just generally one that lays claims to truth whose grounds cannot be found on 'this worldly'; this cannot happen without it, in turn, becoming an object of immanentisation, and having its own claims subjected to the scrutiny of reason that demands of authority that it justify its own claims to truth, and, by the same token, questions the authority that is granted to such claims. The operator of this transformation is the Kantian discovery of a different kind of logic – transcendental logic – which concerns itself not with the conditions according to which something can be non-contradictorily said to be thinkable, but with the conditions according to which an object can be given to experience, determined as an object. This move is what allows Kant to declare the claims of rational theology, while perfectly legitimate and necessary projections of reason, as null and void insofar as they fall under the illusion of being able to determine God as an object, i.e., as existing in correspondence to the concepts they make of it. In this light, how to sustain

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[139] *Idem*; GUATTARI, F. *Mille plateaux*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 31.
[140] HARDT, M.; NEGRI, A. *Empire*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 71.

the necessity of Spinoza's ontology – how to grant it the right to determine God as infinite, necessary, *existing* Substance?

Of the arguments that Kant dismisses, it is the first two (ontological and cosmological) that are of interest here, as the latter (by design), which he in fact deems 'the most accordant with the common reason of mankind'[141], amounts to just the kind of anthropomorphising, spurious use of the idea of final causality that Spinoza wishes to eliminate. At least one of the proofs of Proposition 11 (the third) is clearly a cosmological argument: an infinite Substance must exist, or nothing at all, since the existence of only finite entities would imply their having more power than an infinite one; since we can know that we exist, we know that God exists.[142] However, as Kant points out, cosmological arguments still rely on ontological ones, and would indeed be unnecessary were the latter sound (as, were an *a priori* deduction possible, there would be no need for an appeal to experience); they are therefore susceptible to his critique of the latter. This consists in saying that an ontological argument – i.e., one which deduces from the concept of an *ens perfectissimum* that it must exist, as not existing would amount to being lacking in perfection – mistakes the copula 'is' for a predicate, when what it only 'serves to posit the predicate *in its relation* to the subject': to posit a thing 'as being an object that stands in relation to my concept.'[143]

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[141] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*, A623/B651.

[142] Don Garrett argues that the proofs should, in their whole, be read as cosmological ones, unless the principle of sufficient reason can be directly derived from the concept of God itself (working from the concept alone being what defines an ontological argument); they can nevertheless do away with an empirical premise by virtue of the strength of the principle of sufficient reason employed by Spinoza. *Cf.* GARRETT, D. Spinoza's 'ontological' argument. *The Philosophical Review*, 88 (2), pp. 198-223.

[143] KANT, I. *Op. cit.*, A599/B627.

Deleuze insists that, unlike Descartes, Spinoza does not start from a clear and distinct idea of an *ens perfectissimum*, and while his proofs rely on the argument of perfection, they cannot be considered in abstraction from the previous definitions and propositions in which he sets their condition in an *ens absolutum*. To start with perfection is to mistake one of God's *propria* for its essence, as it refers only to the mode of each attribute that constitutes it; it provides only a nominal definition that cannot demonstrate that God's essence does not involve contradiction (as the perfection of two or more attributes could contradict each other), and thus fails to provide the sufficient reason for the idea we have of it; furthermore, it relies on eminence and analogy, setting up a separate order of Being that can be said to be more perfect than the other. In an absolute, univocal Being, there is no imperfection, no lack of any kind. So, again, Deleuze relies heavily on his Scotist reading to identify the workings of Spinoza's argument: if numerical distinction is not real, each really distinct substance is infinite, and there must be an infinite plurality of substances conceived each conceived through itself; if an eminent unity were introduced behind them, this would entail that their distinction would be numerical rather than real; therefore, it is the infinite plurality that must be thought as Substance, composed by what are now its infinite, really distinct attributes; hence to say God is 'a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence'[144] is to provide a real definition that shows the concept of *ens absolutum* to be non-contradictory; and Proposition 11 states that the absolutely infinite exists necessarily, or it could not be an infinitely perfect substance: the absolutely infinite is the sufficient reason or nature of the infinitely perfect.[145] This amounts to saying

[144] SPINOZA, B. *Ethics*. Trans. Shirley, S. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1992, Def. 6, I. I use this edition throughout, following its abbreviations.
[145] *Cf.* DELEUZE, G. *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*. Paris: PUF, 2002, pp. 60-71.

that Spinoza's God, rather than the *ens perfectissimum* of the ontological and cosmological arguments, is more like the *omnitudo realitatis* that Kant calls 'the ideal of pure reason'[146], to which every extended being and thought stands in relation to. The difference between the two lies, of course, in the idea of expression. For Kant, the concept of a totality of the real is the regulative idea that reason produces in its search for ever-expanding conditions and, therefore, the unconditioned itself; a guide in the application of concepts, it is a necessary object for thought, but not an object of experience. For Spinoza, prior to having an idea of God, we are already part of God's infinite intellect; in knowing God, we express infinite Substance through the infinite power to think (the attribute of thought), and our intellect is not a limitation, but only an affection of the absolutely infinite. To accept this, however, would require us to concede Spinoza's proof of God in the first place; and to the extent that knowledge will come to be, from modernity on, tied to what can be given to a finite intellect living in finite time, this is precisely the kind of *sub specie aeternitatis* claim that will lose credence once the process immanentisation is turned into philosophy itself, and the problem of immanence is doubled.

We thus find ourselves again back at the start: the moment where immanence becomes political and cultural problem and, at the same time, receives its fullest philosophical determination. As we have seen, this moment does not turn philosophy into tool and object of critique without passing through a questioning of its relation to its own present; and it is the relation to the present, or rather the relation that philosophy establishes to time, that is

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[146] KANT, I. *Op. cit.*, A574/B602.

central to understanding how it moves between the poles of immanence and transcendence. It is to the question of these relations that one must turn next.

Chapter II

Immanence, transcendence and time

Introduction

The first chapter attempted, following Foucault's reading of modernity, to give the process of immanentisation of truth its own time, that is, the time of its historical occurrence. Yet that truth should have its history, should have its place in the flux of time, is of course not a timeless question itself; it is, on the contrary, inscribed in the fabric of immanentisation, and the transformations in knowledge (*savoir*) that Foucault sees, in *Les mots et les choses*, taking place in the passage from the *épistémè* of representation to that of man.

The apparent self-referentiality at work here – that the question of truth and thought being made immanent to history and to time should itself be historical and temporal, that is, immanent to time – is, as shall be seen later, the very

problem that this study tries to deal with. At this point, what is necessary is determining the relations between immanence, philosophy and time. This is what this chapter sets out to do, at first by mapping the relation between time and transcendent metaphysics, and then the changes in the relation between time and philosophy brought about by immanentisation. In the passage from the Classical age – which finds its ultimate guarantee in the presence of an eternal, extra-temporal God – to the *épistémè* of man, and the movement whereby 'immanence becomes immanent "to" a transcendental subjectivity'[1], we find a transformation in the relation of time and thought that is also a transformation in the relation of transcendence to immanence. This transformation is described here as a passage from the time of infinity to that of finitude. It is then against the backdrop of finitude that philosophy will be made accountable for, and to, the legitimacy of its own truth claims – ushering in a redoubling of the problem of immanence. As *Les mots et les choses* points out, this will find its solution (or the general form of its various solutions) in the theoretical move that makes finitude constitutive, and it is the structural instability of this general form that will haunt all future philosophy.

Even if both can be said to pertain to the same epistemic space of modernity, I will argue draw a formal distinction between two kinds of such solutions in the ways in which they relate to their own capacity to justify their truth claims: the first, transcendental, finds its ultimate ground in a static or originary transcendental subjectivity, the explication of which becomes the task of philosophy; the second, historical, projects itself onto empirical time and searches for the vindication of its original claims in a point in time where, verified by history, philosophy is reconciled with its truth. I then look at the way in which Foucault and Deleuze pose the problem of the relation of time and thought and how they describe the limits of the turn towards finitude considered as constitutive.

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[1] DELEUZE, G; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. Paris: Minuit, 1991, p. 48.

2.1 – In the time of immanentisation

As Foucault often points out in late texts, it is part of the process of critique and immanentisation that philosophy should start to ask the question of its own present and its relation to it; it is thus that the problem that Kant sets for himself in his *Aufklärung* essay will be taken up and radicalised by Hegel and Nietzsche as an enquiry into the historicity of philosophy, and thought itself. It is not that earlier philosophers did not relate to the succession of systems that had preceded them – since Plato and, above all, Aristotle, much of what counts as the practice of philosophy is this dialogue with the past --, but the relation to this succession *as history* is a more recent event. In the latter case, it is not a question of returning to the past so as to order it in terms of the greater or lesser validity of the insights that have been proffered by other thinkers, but of considering these insights in their relation to each other and the time in which they were produced, to treat the appearance of concepts, themes and systems as events whose historical conditions of production must be accounted for in a way or another.

It will later become evident how this radicalisation differs in Hegel and Nietzsche. What matters now is to find in the work of the latter a moment that will be a common point of departure for much of posterior philosophy that in some way deals with critique, immanence and transcendence; one around which the thoughts of Foucault, Deleuze, Heidegger, Derrida cohere.[2] This moment is that of the naming of an 'effective beginning' of philosophy that is

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[2] The remarkable dissident in this regard is obviously Alain Badiou, who highlights the artifice of the moment in which this beginning of philosophy is named and thoroughly questions 'this Nietzschean construct called "Platonism"'. BADIOU, A. *Deleuze. La clameur de l'Etre.* Paris: Hachette, 1998, p. 149. Derrida's position, on the other hand, is more ambivalent, consisting in showing already in Plato not only the conditions of his overturning, but the work of a prior 'overturning' that escapes any attempt – by Plato as well as any anti-Platonist – to reduce it to a self-identity; an ambivalence that does exist in Deleuze as well, to the extent that the overturning he preaches 'conserves many Platonist characteristics', which is 'not only inevitable, but desirable'. DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 1968, p. 82.

also its *détournement*; an inflection that will come to characterise both its most defining features, and that which must be overturned, escaped, destroyed or deconstructed; that is at once what Western thought will come to be recognised for, and the crucial moment of transformation, forgetfulness, treason imposed on the thought that had come before. So if it is beginnings we are talking about here, there are three altogether: Nietzsche, the first to ascribe this point in history the value that subsequent thinkers will refer to; a first, 'real' beginning in the Pre-Socratics; and a second, 'effective' beginning, to which Nietzsche gave a proper name: 'Let us not be ungrateful and fail to recognise that the gravest, most persistant and dangerous of all errors was that of a dogmatist, Plato, the inventor of the pure spirit and the Good in itself.'[3]

Despite their individual variations, it is not only the point of origin, but the general traces of Nietzsche's sketch that will be followed by Foucault and Deleuze (as well as Heidegger and Derrida): the overlap of the lines of Platonism, Christianity ('Platonism for "the masses"'[4]) and metaphysics in the perpetuation of the original 'error' that, since Nietzsche, represents what there is to overcome.

What is this error? What is this Platonism that it is the task of modern philosophy to overturn?[5] Deleuze and Foucault will approach the Nietzschean theme from different aspects. For Deleuze, one misses what is important in the term, and therefore what must be overcome, if one fails to appreciate the motivation behind Plato's philosophical method and choices: to allow for selection, to establish a criterion according to which selection can take place. The role of criterion is occupied by the Idea as the dominant element in the

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[3] NIETZSCHE, F. *Par-delà le bien et le mal. In: Oeuvres*, Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1993, vol. II, p. 560.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Cf.* DELEUZE, G. Simulacre et philosophie antique. *In: Logique du sens.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 292; *Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 1968, p. 82.

triad unparticipated, participated and participant. What is to be selected, beyond a mere distinction between essence and appearance, is good and bad appearances, which go by the name of copies and simulacra. The copy resembles not the thing that it is a copy of, but the Idea in which the thing participates; its resemblance is internal, intrinsic to the Idea. The simulacrum is a 'copy without resemblance'[6], that is, what differs in itself, what differs without the mediation of the Same or the Similar. Therefore, Platonism 'founds the entire domain that philosophy will recognise as its own: the domain of representation populated by icon-copies, and defined (...) in an intrinsic relation to a model or foundation.'[7] It works in this way by setting the Same as the transcendent model from which everything that differs is produced and according to which all beings are measured, and excludes what escapes representation, what cannot be brought back to an internal relation with the Same. Difference exists only between particulars under the concept, subsumed under the intelligible. This is a move that Aristotle, even while he disputes the doctrine of Ideas, will conserve, giving it the form that will have the most lasting influence over Western thought. For Aristotle, the greatest difference is the one found among individuals of the same genus or species; things differ not through themselves, but through something they have in common. From this, various consequences follow: the concept is what remains identical to itself, while being progressively specified by the opposition of predicates of the particulars that fall under it; above the highest concepts (genera or, more properly, categories), there is no difference, but only otherness – no common Being among them, meaning that they can only be related through analogy; at the bottom of what would be given systematic form in the Middle Ages as 'Porphyry's Tree', the *infima species*, the most specifically determined concepts, meaning that there is no concept for individuals themselves, which can only be determined in their resemblance through perception. The subordination of difference to representation is thus

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[6] *Ibid.*, p. 297.
[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 298-9.

coextensive with its subordination to identity in the concept and to the opposition of predicates (specific difference); resemblance in perception (individual difference); and analogy in judgment (generic, or categorical, difference). Thought is then ascribed the role of distributing the different into given sets (the principle of recognition that underlies common sense) and judging true and false distributions, or true and false hierarchies and relations among concepts (good sense).

Unsurprisingly, Deleuze is here setting the enemy that must be overturned by the project of thinking singular difference, difference in itself, without mediation, which runs through his entire work. In doing so, he provides a first determination of philosophical transcendence: that it sets up a supplementary dimension to worldly reality – in the form of a creating God, Ideas, moral order, form, concept, category, as many avatars of a Same that appear as a stable, atemporal identity that is not the object of a differential genesis –, making it dependent on the second for its intelligibility, essence and/or existence, and therefore possessing Being to a lesser degree. In other words, the tradition of Western thought that followed on the heels of Plato's original error is condemned to think of Being in terms of representation and analogy, where immanence and difference can only be thought through the mediation provided by their subordination to a transcendent. Therefore, Deleuze will conclude, with Duns Scotus, that one of the criteria that a philosophy of immanence has to fulfill is to affirm univocity: 'There has only ever been one ontological proposition: Being is univocal'.[8]

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[8] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: 1968, p. 52. Scotus serves for Deleuze the double role of a weapon against Plato but, even more, against Aristotle; the former, because the doctrine of univocity eliminates the extra-worldly realm of Ideas; the latter, because it makes Being into the concept that stands above categories, and because *hacceitas* makes the individual knowable as individual, i.e., cognisable in its individuating difference, given its own concept; both the top and the bottom ends of Porphyry's Tree thus achieve conceptual status. Cf. DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 1968, pp. 52-61 (the three moments of univocity: Scotus, Spinoza, Nietzsche); on the stakes of the 'Scotist revolution' for the ontology of individuation that will find its highest expression in Deleuze, Cf.: TOSCANO, A. *The theatre of production: philosophy and individuation between Kant and Deleuze*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, Introduction.

Unsurprisingly given its overt concerns, Foucault's 'Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire' regards Platonism in a different light. Here the equation of Plato and metaphysics takes place under the mediation of Socrates, the missing link between the 'Egyptianism' of the belief in the immortality of the soul and the systematic 'foundation' of this belief by the hand of his disciple, Plato – '[t]he site of emergence of metaphysics'.[9] And what is then this metaphysics that Plato founded and Nietzsche's genealogy opposes? It is concerned with the search for the origin, understood in three senses and their variations, which genealogy will oppose point by point: as the site of a thing's essence ('its purest possibility, its identity meticulously folded over itself, its immobile form prior to everything that is external, accidental and successive'[10]); as external to finite and worldy existence ('before the fall, before the body, before the world and time: on the side of the gods'[11]); as the site of truth. Whereas Deleuze was concerned with how Plato set the limits of representation by expelling difference from its city, Foucault provides a further determination of transcendence in the association of essence, extra-worldliness, time and truth.[12] Transcendent metaphysics is then what can be identified by its resorting to an extra-worldly, extra-temporal truth as the ultimate object of thought, the knowledge of which is not only the ground of any knowledge of empirical and moral order, but also the very ground of the agreement between Being and thought that renders any knowledge as such possible. All diversity and change is related back to one permanent, immutable principle that remains identical throughout, and functions as the yardstick through

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[9] FOUCAULT, M. Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire. In: Dits et écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1020. Cf. Nietzsche: 'We paid dearly for the fact that this Athenian was educated by the Egyptians (or was it the Jews in Egypt?...)'. NIETZSCHE, F. Le Crépuscule des idoles. In: Oeuvres. Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1993, vol. II, p. 1025.

[10] FOUCAULT, M. Op. cit., p. 1006.

[11] Ibid., p. 1007.

[12] In his one other extensive treatment of Nietzsche, Plato's role appears as the point where philosophy becomes characterised by 'logocentrism, resemblance, adequation, beatitude, unity', all of which are themes 'that are now put into question'. Cf. FOUCAULT, M. La verité et les formes juridiques. In: Dits et ecrits. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1417.

which diversity and transience in themselves can be apprehended and measured. If the original and persistent problems of philosophy have been the relation between the One and the Multiple, Permanence and Change, it can be easily said that the dominant solution to them – at least in the brute, absolute number of centuries throughout which it continued, under new guises, to constitute what it would have wanted to be the neutral background of philosophy – has always involved in a way or another the relation that sets the permanent One outside of the flux of time and thus renders it the condition for thinking the changing Multiple. Whether it is called the Good, the Supreme Being, the Idea, the concept, category, it is an object external to time that must be thought. It is in this sense, then, that we can describe the relation between transcendence and time as finding its ground in the time of the eternal: an eternal, self-identical creating God that stands outside the time of His creation; or an eternal, unmoved prime mover that sets the 'stuff' of the physical universe in motion; or Plato's eternal, self-identical Ideas; Aristotle's categories. Time appears doubled, in the form of a time of finitude, transience and change, on the one hand, and eternity, on the other, and it in the latter that the grounds for the former's essence, existence, intelligibility must be found.

As a consequence, a further determination of immanence takes shape here. One can see it in the contrast to the demagogue or historian who '[h]aving set out to eliminate from his own knowledge all traces of will, shall find, on the side of the object of knowledge, the form of an eternal will'.[13] What is demagogic or hypocritical about this asceticism is that it inverts the relation between knowledge and will, and aspires for a universal truth that can only be

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[13] *Idem*. Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1019.

the extra-worldly mask of a perspective – a will – that is very much of this world. A philosophy of immanence must, therefore, embrace perspectivism.[14]

Here, again, the time of immanentisation must be turned back upon itself, and the act of Nietzsche's naming of Platonism has to be called an 'emergence' (*Entstehung*), not an 'origin' in the metaphysical sense (*Ursprung*): that is, it does not identify an actual origin as the site of the essence and truth of metaphysics, but it is itself the expression of a will to name an enemy, the resultant of forces that question the metaphysical privilege over the access to truth. The way in which it does so is by showing Platonism to be the 'emergence' of a will to knowledge that masks a will to power under the guise of objectivity, neutrality – but is in fact guided by a motivation to select, to exclude. This is the point where Foucault and Deleuze part ways with Heidegger (and, in a different way, with Derrida): for the German philosopher, Platonism is indeed an 'origin', or the 'destining' of a forgetfulness that conceals the 'true' origin that is the opening by the Pre-Socratics of the question of Being, and which determines the destinal history of the West. In this sense, for Foucalt (and Deleuze), Heidegger (and Derrida) would remain metaphysicians, Egyptianists. This important distinction in their respective definitions of what counts as metaphysics and transcendence will be of vital importance to their respective definitions of what counts as the end of metaphysics – and the elimination of transcendence.[15]

These are questions, however, that take on a greater importance at an intermediary stage in Foucault's trajectory, where his main concern moves

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[14] 'Historical sense, such as Nietzsche understands it [i.e., as opposed to the metaphysical search for origins], knows itself to be perspective, and does not refuse the system of its own injustice.' *Ibid.*, p. 1018.
[15] In 1967, Foucault comments on *Les mots et les choses*: 'If I were to recommence this book finished two years ago, I would try not to give Nietzsche this ambiguous, absolutely privileged, meta-historical status that I had the weakness to accord him.' *Cf.* Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 627. I shall return to this in the third chapter and the conclusion; for the time being, it should suffice to say that this disagreement on the nature of what constitutes metaphysics/transcendence is at the heart the polemic between Foucault and Derrida, and Foucault's and Deleuze's critique of Heidegger.

from an archaeology of knowledge to genealogical analyses of power in Western societies. They play a secondary role in *Les mots et les choses*, where, instead of his later analyses of modernity as the moment of the establishment of a practico-political critical attitude that I have related to the process of immanentisation, the level of analysis deployed is strictly concerned with regularities, relations and transformations internal to scientific and philosophical discourse. Both levels can be brought together in a way that is coherent, even if not co-extensive, as well as taken back to the original impulse behind Kant's critical project.

Famously, Foucault describes the Classical age in terms of an *épistémè* where representation and language, as perfectly transparent and isomorphic media, warranted the possibility of a complete and exhaustive representation of all entities, the perfection of which would be a *mathesis universalis*. That there could be such a goal – of, as long as the correct method were followed, a perfect ordering of representations that would correspond to the order of the world itself – was made possible by the fact that it was Order itself that opened up the epistemic space where everything could appear as by right orderable. For classical thought, Order 'was not the visible harmony of things, their observed arrangement, regularity or symmetry, but the space proper to their being and that which, prior to any knowledge [*connaissance*], established them in knowledge [*savoir*]'.[16] In keeping with the manifest intention of archaeology to treat the a-subjective, unconscious soil of *savoir* that organises the space where empirical *connaissances* can inscribe themselves, it is not a matter here of looking for ostensive affirmations of Order, or of the representability of the world, or of and the transparency of representation and language, but how the knowledge produced in different fields in the period was structured by the background of this *ça va sans dire*. But if one is to take the unconscious metaphor further, it is not difficult to find in the philosophy of the period what would amount to its rationalisations, its

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[16] FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 231.

conscious and explicit justifications.[17] One can see why it would not be difficult for the inheritors of Plato and Christianity to accommodate in their systems the idea of an ordered, harmonious universe, the privileged place of humans as those creatures endowed by God with the capacity to represent the whole of creation, and the guarantor of the representability of the world through its transparence to mind and language, God the creator. And it is true that, of all philosophical systems of the Classical age, it is only Spinoza's – deeply embedded, through its *more geometrico*, in an *épistémè* defined by Order – which leaves no space for God at the top of creation, while allowing the question of the rightful representability of the world to go unperturbed. Even Descartes, who sets out to establish an entirely presuppositionless philosophy, must eventually arrive at God as what, from the end of a chain of reasoning that moves from certainty to certainty, guarantees the possibility of certainty from the start.[18]

It is here that we again find Kant, the figure that Foucault will place in the centre of the transition between the Classical age and the *épistémè* that comes to be once it has dissipated. Despite all the anecdotal aspect of his private, tranquil life in Königsberg, Kant was not only perfectly aware of the public debates of his time, but also an eager participant in them, even if his engagement was not necessarily direct. The author of the essay on *Aufklärung* was a man who realised the question of critique was of much wider range to his time than a merely philosophical issue, and that his

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[17] The preface of *Les mots et les choses*, when defining the level of archaeological enquiry, says it asks 'on the ground of what historical *a priori* and in the element of which positivity could ideas appear, sciences become constituted, experiences be reflected in philosophies...'. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

[18] 'The continuum of representation and being, an ontology negatively defined as the absence of nothingness, a general representability of being, and being manifested through the presence of representation – all of this is part of the total configuration of the classical *épistémè*. (...) The ordering of empiricity is thus connected to the ontology that characterises classical thought; the latter is indeed right from the start inside an ontology made transparent by the fact that being is given without rupture to representation; and inside a representation illuminated by the fact that it conveys the continuousness of being.' *Ibid.*, p. 219.

theoretical work was a part of it, perhaps its 'final judgment'[19] rather than its motor. Metaphysics not only had to deal with the weight of centuries where it had been impossible to stop the proliferation of competing systems with their incompatible dogmatisms, which contributed to discrediting the possibility of it ever instituting itself on *a priori* grounds, it now had also come under the heaviest attack it had ever received, that of Hume and scepticism, which threatened to deny the possibility of *a priori* knowledge altogether. But these are only the ways these things expressed itself within the discipline of philosophy, and it is telling that Kant should choose to speak of it in terms of despotic rulers, anarchy and nomadic invaders.[20] For the Enlightenment, stretching across Foucault's epistemic divide, had already set in motion the process of social, political and cultural critique that saw not only a gap grow between religion and the physical sciences – a gap that philosophers like Leibniz would try to close precisely with the notion of a harmonious, ordered universe whose order included our capacity to know it –, but a process through which the claims of authority over truth, or of truth through authority, could be criticised. More than setting up a tribunal, Kant is then acting as a political operator who draws the Magna Carta through which the despotic rule of the dogmatists can be limited – through the end of the unaccountable use of reason by transcendent metaphysics –, so that the anarchy from which the nomadic invasion of the sceptics had profited could be reigned in, and a new, limited authority be restored while the nomads were expelled from the city. Metaphysics was not, for him, a neutral question, but one on which the foundation of morality lay; and the question of founding morality is, especially in the context of the Enlightenment, not neutral, but a politically charged one.

The nature of the pact that Kant has to propose is then to secure *a priori* knowledge while giving up for good the claims of transcendent metaphysics, which must always rely on either an '*influxum hyperphysycum*' (anamnesis or

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[19] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*, Aix.
[20] *Ibid.*

revelation, some kind of direct intuitive knowledge of a supreme being) or a *'harmonium praestabilitam intellectualem'* (the mysterious agreement between the subject and the object) – exorcising the *'deus ex machina'* that made metaphysics go round in endless circles, both encouraging wild speculation and opening the gates to scepticism.[21] The task transcendental philosophy takes upon itself is then to eliminate transcendence; following the Enlightenment's tendency towards immanentisation, what Kant sets out to achieve is to establish the rights of immanence:

> We shall entitle the principles whose application is confined entirely within the limits of possible experience, *immanent*; and those, on the other hand, which profess to pass beyond these limits, *transcendent*.[22]

By making thought immanent to experience, Kant displaces the question of the relation between thought and Being, which had until then had the time of eternity as its ultimate object and/or guarantor, to finite time: the time of human finitude. The transcendental is different from the transcendent because, rather than presuppose the agreement of the subject with the world, it makes the world agree with the way in which it is represented by the subject, as there is no way in which the world could be at all represented, if not in the way it is represented by the subject. If it makes no sense to speak of a knowledge that is outside the framework that determines the conditions of all possible knowledge, then anything that can count as an object of knowledge is, as an object of knowledge, necessarily in agreement with those conditions. It is this subtle juridical argument – the move from *quid facti* to *quid juris* questions, from the question of fact to the question of right[23] – that allows Kant's tribunal of reason to draft what would be the Magna Carta of all future philosophy. Making a distinction between objects as they appear to us as objects, and objects as they are in themselves, allows him to exclude the

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[21] KANT, I. Letter to Marcus Herz, February 21, 1772. *In: Correspondence.* Trans. and ed. Zweig, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 134.

[22] *Idem. Critique of pure reason.* A296/B352-3.

[23] *Ibid.*, A84-5/B116-7.

second from the realm of the intelligible, and therefore from philosophy; while transcendent metaphysics separated objecthood and knowability, transcendental idealism brings them together, making the concept of an object of knowledge, insofar as it can have reference, to include the conditions through which it can be known to us – with the pacifying effect of showing the sceptics that, if we can know objects at all, it is because we actively constitute them as such, and therefore knowledge in the strict sense of empirical reality is not an impossibility after all. And since the 'possibility of experience is (...) what gives objective reality to all our a priori modes', and 'experience depends (...) upon a priori principles of its form, that is, upon universal rules of unity in the synthesis of appearances', it turns out that a priori synthetic judgments 'relate, though only mediately, to the possibility of experience; and upon that alone is founded the objective validity of their synthesis'.[24] Thus once the problem of how objects are possible is solved, the possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge can be safely founded, and with it a space where science and (a new, re-founded) metaphysics become entitled to certitude once again.

From Kant on, then, the time of finitude comes to replace the eternal by virtue of the transcendental subject being made constituent of the object of experience; truth ceases to be grounded in some eternal Being and becomes grounded in the finite subject. This introduces a new element whereby time ceases to be divided on the one hand by eternity and on the other by the empirical time of succession – finite, transcendental time is the source of empirical succession itself, and the objective reality of the eternal is out of its bounds. Yet this is not without a consequence, that, as shall be seen, will be central to the original impetus of Foucault's and Deleuze's projects: if the eternity of the supreme Being or of the rational laws of the universe is eclipsed by the subject's finitude, this is at the cost of re-instituting an a-temporal universal at the heart of immanence, in the form of the immutable,

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[24] *Ibid.*, A156-7/B195-6.

self-identical transcendental framework through which Being can be thought by the subject: the subjects presence to itself, and the categories that we have already found in Aristotle. For both French thinkers this is a move that will determine the whole of post-Kantian philosophy, and will make it both self-defeating and structurally unstable (in the form of the doubles of man), and attached to a new transcendence (the constituent subject) it cannot shake away. For them, as for Nietzsche, the question will then be: how much of a revolution does Kant's Copernican turn really amount to?

Foucault seems to identify, however, another transformation in the relation between time and immanence taking place before the new epistemic figure of man becomes consolidated and is made explicit through the development of Kant's project. This transformation is marked by the dissolution of the epistemic space opened up by Order in the Classical age, and its replacement by History. As with Order, then, the emergence of History must be understood as a transformation happening at the archaeological level; History here is then neither historiography nor the succession of events, but 'what defines the site of birth of what is empirical, that in which, before any established chronology, it [the empirical] acquires its own particular being.'[25]

So it is in fact *before* the moment of the writing of the first *Critique* that finite time starts seeping into the eternal time of Order, with the ultimate effect of cancelling its hold over Western knowledge.[26] Given the level at which *Les mots et les choses* is pitched, there is very little Foucault can tell us about if and how this sudden transformation in different fields of knowledge relates to non-discursive practices[27]; as *per* Deleuze's gloss, it appears only as a

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[25] FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Galiimard, 2001, p. 231.

[26] 'European culture thus invents for itself a depth where the question will cease to be that of identities, distinctive characters, permanent tables with all their possible circuits and trajectories, but that of great hidden forces developing themselves from their primitive, inaccessible core, but that of origin, causality and history.' *Ibid.*, p. 263.

[27] There are 'two perpendicular axes of description: that of theoretical models common to various discourses, that of the relations between the discursive and the non-discursive

passage from a moment where knowledge was in relation to forces of the infinite (God, a timeless mechanical universe etc.) to a moment where it came in touch with forces of finitude (the new positivities of work, life and language).[28] In any case, this cannot fail to have an important consequence that transforms in another way the mode of relation between philosophy and time: if truth, and empirical time itself, must find their ground in the time of the subject's finitude, thought discovers itself as given in a history that it must account for; philosophy becomes 'entitled to the problem of its own beginning and end'.[29] The relation of philosophy to its own history ceases to be external – a matter of simply gathering and ordering, seconding or discarding, previous philosophical insights – and becomes immanent to itself in the mode of history.

> [Philosophy] will then only still be Metaphysics insofar as it is Memory, and it will necessary lead thought back to the question of knowing what it can mean for thought to have a history. This question will press upon philosophy from Hegel to Nietzsche and beyond.[30]

> Philosophy would then be either an element that reveals to a greater or lesser degree the signification of an epoch, or on the contrary the general law that fixed for each time the figure it should have. The reading of philosophy within the framework of a general history and its interpretation as the key through which to understand all historical succession become simultaneously possible.[31]

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domain. In *Les mots et les choses*, I have followed the horizontal axis; in *Histoire de la folie* and *Naissance de la clinique*, the vertical dimension of the figure.' *Idem*. Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 618.

[28] DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 132-4. Deleuze highlights in this text how Foucault explicitly divides in two moments the appearance of the epistemic figure of Man – the first corresponding to the entry of 'these new forces of the outside, which are forces of finitude' (p. 134), the second one corresponding to these forces producing the 'fold' that is Man.

[29] FOUCAULT, M. Jean Hyppolite. 1907 -1968. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 812,

[30] *Idem. Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Galiimard, 2001, p. 231-2.

[31] Firmly set in the framework of the late return to Kant, the passage continues: 'And, by the same token, the question of the present becomes for philosophy one from which it cannot distance itself: in which measure does this "moment" derive from a general historical process, and to what extent is philosophy the point where history must decipher itself in its own

So here we find ourselves back at the starting point – the problem of what it means for thought to have a history, 'from Hegel to Nietzsche and beyond'. As seen above, the transformation of the relation of truth to time hits philosophy in two complementary, but different ways, of which it could be said that one is internal – the move from the eternal time of transcendence to the time of finitude as the source and guarantee of truth – and the other external – the immersion of philosophy itself in finite time, which generates the problem of the historicity of thought. It is important to retain, however, that both transformations are, in a different way, external: they happen *to* thought, rather than take place as its 'creations'. Be it in the form of the appearance of a critical attitude, as seen in the first chapter, or in the form of a wide-ranging transformation in various disciplinary fields, things take place here in the same way as we saw them take place with the rationalisations of Order in the classical age: philosophy arrives once the transformation has happened so as to fix it in a form. Which amounts to saying that, at the moment when Kant sets out to write the *Critique*, immanentisation has already taken a hold in Western thought; the problem for philosophy will be, from then on, to give immanence an adequate form. Which finally amounts to saying that, from this point on, what the whole of philosophy is dealing with is the problem of immanence – all philosophy from Kant on is immanentist, or attempts to provide immanence with a philosophical form. Therefore, the whole of philosophy since then can be judged according to the different strategies it employs to achieve this goal, and their relative success or failure.

One cannot separate, in the move towards finitude, the moment that amounts to a fatal blow to the full transcendence of transcendent metaphysics and the moment that establishes the central criterion through which all subsequent philosophy can be measured – through the twisting of immanence upon itself, the capacity for a philosophical system to be formally immanent, that is,

conditions?'. *Idem*. La vie: l'expérience et la science. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1585.

capable of accounting for all the elements it employs without resorting to any form of covert transcendence: realised immanence. The jurisprudence produced by Kant's tribunal of reason rules over the claims that any future suitor can have to realise immanence in a philosophical system.

Once we project this criterion onto the two modes of relation between philosophical immanence and (finite) time – the internal and external – we find two general cases of solutions to the problem of realised immanence. The two are, of course, united in the sense that both are derivations of the general epistemic figure of man; they can, however, be formally distinguished precisely because of the respective accents they place on either transcendental subjectivty (subjective finitude) or history (historical finitude).

In the first case, which we could call transcendental solution, philosophical truth becomes justified by its own self-limitation, through the kind of circularity that allows for everything that falls within the constitutive limits of the subject to be, by right, his own, while excluding any right over whatever falls outside. In this case, philosophy becomes the explication of the subject's constitutive finitude, transcendental subjectivity. This is the path set by Kant, and it is possible to show how it is followed by Husserl, the Heidegger of the analytic of *Dasein*, and Merleau-Ponty. In the second case, which could be named historical solution, this justification is doubled in the form of a historical movement whose development, endowed with at least some transcendental features of a subject, culminates in a point where philosophy can find its own justification – in the mature development of Spirit (Hegel), but also communism (Marx), and a time when it is possible to think Being (Heidegger).

It is to these two, and the way in which Foucault and Deleuze criticise and try to find alternatives to them, that I will turn next.

2.2 – The transcendental solution: Kant

At once lawyer, head of the tribunal and interested part (since he holds the salvaging of metaphysics as necessarily entwined with the fate of morality), Kant's opening gambit is to recognise that, in the situation as it appears then, sceptics could be seen as having a valid claim against the pretensions of transcendent metaphysics; as long as the rationalist is allowed to carry on mistakenly assuming the difference in nature between sensory and intellectual representation – a difference of 'origin and content'[32] – to be a mere difference in degree between the clear and the confused, metaphysics can spin around its own axis endlessly while failing to provide solid foundations for itself. By introducing this unbridgeable difference between the two, Kant can break away from the 'naïve' idea that can only construe the finite by limitation of the infinite[33] – that is, as that which grasps only in a partial and confused manner what is fully given to God's understanding – and give philosophical consistency to a new image of the finite. For a being endowed with intellectual intuition, there would be no distinction between knowing an object and being presented with it, and there would be no need for concepts, since each object would be immediately given in its individuality. For those beings with intellects such as ours, however, in whom and for whom the separation between sensibility and understanding appears as an opaque fact that we can only speculate upon (they 'perhaps spring from a common, but to us unknown, root'[34]), the mark of finitude imposes itself in that

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[32] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*. A44/B62.

[33] *Cf.* DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 131-4. '[T]he God-form (...) is composed of all the forces [in man] that can be directly elevated to the infinite (be they understanding and will, thought and extension etc.). (...) Thus in the classical historical formation the forces of men enter in relation with forces of the outside in such a way that what is composed is a God-form, not at all a Man-form. Thus is the world of infinite representation.' (p. 132-3)

[34] KANT, I. *Op. cit.*, A15/ B29.

> [w]ithout sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object can be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concept are blind. (...) The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can knowledge arise.[35]

Thus it is that only under the pure, *a priori* intuitions of time and space, the forms of inner and outer sense, can objects appear to us and be brought under concepts by the judging capacity of the understanding. This is what allows Kant to say that the objects of our cognition are at once empirically real − because considered from the 'human standpoint'[36] that determines spatio-temporality as a condition of all appearances, all spatio-temporal appearances are real, i.e., possess objectivity *for us* − and transcendentally ideal − because when considered from the transcendental point of view that sees objects in relation to our mode of cognition, they appear as determined by such a mode of cognition, and therefore not transcendentally real (as things-in-themselves would be, by virtue of being independent from our transcendental constitution). Empirical reality can be maintained, and the common sense, 'human standpoint' be affirmed because transcendental enquiry once and for all closes the door on the transcendent knowledge of things-in-themselves:

> What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us. (...) Even if we could bring our intuition to the highest degree of clearness, we should not thereby come any nearer to the constitution of objects in themselves.[37]

The sceptic is thus entitled to question claims concerning non spatio-temporal beings such as God and the soul; empirical objects are rescued from the same fate.

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[35] *Ibid.*, A51/B75.
[36] *Ibid.*, A26/B42.
[37] *Ibid.*, A42-3/B59-60.

Now, in refusing the logicism that allows the rationalist to treat the relations between concepts as relations between objects, and thus to postulate the existence of that which can only have subjective validity (since it can non-contradictorily thought), Kant is careful to avoid another elimination of the difference between sensibility and understanding – that of the empiricist, for whom the objects of the latter are merely derived from sensory data. It would not be enough to assume that the unity of sensory data we have of an object corresponds in some way to that object as it is in itself, since (even if that were possible) it would still be necessary for there to be a recognition, on the part of the subject, of this unity as corresponding to an object. In other words, there must be an active intervention of the subject that produces this unity in the apprehension of whatever distinct elements are provided by the senses and synthesised (determined in space and time) by the imagination. As it is not provided by the senses, and is not given in sensibility, the production of this unity must be *a priori* and pertain to the active faculty of the understanding; 'it is owing to this spontaneity that I entitle myself an *intelligence*.'[38]

This is what Kant names 'transcendental unity of apperception', the non-empirical, purely intellectual consciousness of thinking, which makes me 'conscious of myself, not as I appear, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am'[39], which allows him to steer a course between the Humean negation of the self and the Cartesian certainty of the self as an existing, thinking *substance*. The analytic principle that to all my representations there must correspond one and only self-consciousness reveals an *a priori*, synthetic activity that brings representations together.[40] To this function of unity on the part of the subject there must, in turn, correspond a function of unity on the part of the object: something that I represent as what my representations

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[38] *Ibid.*, B158n.
[39] *Ibid.*, B157.
[40] On the analytic quality of the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception, *Cf.* B135.

relate to, the object that my sensible intuition pertains to. It must of course not be intuited, since that would create an infinite regression where that intuition would itself have to be related to something else as providing it with a ground, and must therefore be an *a priori* concept of an object=x; a transcendental object entirely devoid of any empirical determination, and completely distinct from the thing-in-itself. It is 'the completely indeterminate thought of *something* in general'[41], which 'cannot be separated from the sensible data, for nothing is then left through which it might be thought'; 'a concept which is determinable' only through the manifold of appearances.[42]

For Kant, to know is to judge: to relate a subject to a predicate, to recognise and subsume an object under a concept. The two *a priori* conditions of the transcendental unity of apperception and the transcendental object thus provide the two poles, subjective and objective, substantial and predicative, in a judgment. More than that, they are constitutive of each other. The unity of representations is necessary for there to be a relation between representation and object, and therefore the transcendental unity of apperception is the condition for the transcendental object. It is only through the consciousness of my *a priori* synthetic activities that I can be conscious of myself as an 'I', and this spontaneity must involve the synthesis of representations into unities through the use of the concept of an object=x, and thus the transcendental object is a condition for transcendental apperception. Now, if my consciousness of myself as an 'I' is transcendentally dependent on synthetic *a priori* activity, that is, conceptual synthesis, then the categories supplied by the understanding – concepts of an object in general, such as causality, substance etc. – have a transcendental role in providing the rules through which the spontaneity of the understanding, under the concept of transcendental object, produces such syntheses. Kant can then conclude that 'the highest principle of all synthetic judgments is this: every object stands

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[41] *Ibid.*, A253.
[42] *Ibid.*, A250-1.

under the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold in a possible experience[43] – the pure intuitions of time and space, transcendental apperception, the transcendental object, and the categories of the understanding. Any claims to knowledge outside these conditions are, as far as pure reason is concerned at least, ruled out; the case against transcendent metaphysics is therefore closed, without having required an acceptance of empiricism.

Kant's target, it must be noted, is transcendent metaphysics as both transcendental realism, the pre-Copernican assumption that our knowledge of objects is determined by their constitution rather than our own, and Berkeley's empirical or material idealism[44], which would have the content (and not just the form) of appearances determined by subjects, as well as problematic or sceptical idealism[45] of the Cartesian kind, for which the existence of outer objects is doubtful and cannot be demonstrated. Against the latter, Kant argues that, for there to be an empirical consciousness of my own existence (i.e., a determination of myself as empirical object in time, rather than the mere consciousness of the spontaneous 'I' that accompanies all my representations, transcendental apperception), there must be something permanent in perception. This is because time as such cannot be perceived, as its intuition gives me only a unitary time within which appearances occur; there must then be something underlying transformations in appearances that allows me to grasp them as occurring in time – which is the vindication of the category of substance. This something cannot be Descartes' *res cogitans* since any determination of myself in time is a representation, and since representations require something external to them that provide them with permanence, an intuition in me cannot fulfil this role; 'consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence

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[43] *Ibid.*, A158/B197.

[44] The two terms are employed, respectively, in A369 and B274.

[45] The terms are employed, respectively, in B274 and A377.

of actual things which I perceive outside me'.[46] As a consequence, the problematic idealist assumption that outer objects can only be (doubtfully) inferred from the certainty of self-consciousness is turned against itself; the Cartesian is forced to accept that this certainty itself presupposes the existence of outer objects.

From the Aesthetic to the Analytic it has then been shown that all appearances appear in space and time, forms of our receptivity; imagination acts upon time and space *a priori* in order to determine them; it does so under the condition of the spontaneity of the understanding, which provides unity to the manifold of representations (transcendental apperception, transcendental object); and the way in which the latter does so is through its conceptual activity, the employment of the categories, which are at once *a priori* representations of the unity of consciousness, and predicates of the object=x. This movement, which has managed to undermine the claims of empiricism concerning self-consciousness, Cartesianism concerning the existence of outer objects, and rescue a sense of objectivity from the doubts of the skeptic, has only been possible due to an overturning of the basic assumption of transcendental realism which underlay all previous philosophical enterprises, viz., that our knowledge of objects is determined by their constitution. This reversal – Kant's celebrated Copernican turn – starts in the Aesthetic, when it is shown that time and space can be empirically real without needing to be transcendentally real: they are real *for us*, that is, in the perspective of the human, finite intellect, because they are transcendentally ideal, that is, a necessary part of how objects can be at all given to us. They are thus infinite, but only in how they are intuited by us – as an unlimited magnitude, a single time for all changes in time, a single space for all coexistence in space – and not how in they are in themselves. (It is in fact the object of the Antinomy of Pure Reason to show how futile, because necessarily contradictory, are cosmological speculations into the being of time

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[46] *Ibid.*, B275-6.

and space in themselves.) This is what allows Kant to find an alternative to the Newtonian conception of time and space as absolutely real, the Leibinizian conception of time and space as a relational concept, and Berkeleyan denial of any reality to time and space by virtue of failing to make the empirical/transcendental distinction.

This move is continued in the Analytic through the demonstration that temporality, as the form of inner sense, is the condition under which the imagination schematises the categories (that is, determines them in time), and thus *a priori* conceptuality entails transcendental ideality. *A priori* synthesis is the process through which the categories guide the formation of intuitions that agree with them: again, if objects are to be subsumed under concepts at all, it is due to the subject's activity in providing them with a conceptual form. Here it becomes clear that Kant's Copernican turn is in fact an internalisation of the problem of the adequation between thought and Being, subject and object, that transcendent metaphysics sought to solve by resorting to a mysterious agreement supplied by an external teleogical principle, God: 'the problem of the relation between subject and object thus becomes internalised: it is the problem of the relation between subjective faculties that are different in nature (receptive sensibility and active understanding).'[47] Providing this adequation and closing this gap is, of course, precisely the mediating role played by the imagination in producing schemata – ambiguous intermediaries between the sensible and intellectual, neither passive nor active, a middle term between 'thoughts without concept' and 'intuitions without concepts'. The weight of the failures of previous metaphysics seems heavy on Kant's shoulders when he has to present schematism as a raw fact of whose nature and origin the most that can be

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[47] DELEUZE, G. *La philosophie critique de Kant*. Paris: PUF, 1998, pp. 23-4.

said is that it is 'an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover.'[48]

Since categories cannot be employed in unschematised form (transcendentally), it follows that there is no knowledge they can offer of what lies outside possible experience. This does not, however, render them entirely useless when directed to the sphere beyond phenomena, and this is where a central Kantian distinction comes into play in a tone of worried preemption:

> Lest my readers should stumble at the alarming evil consequences which may over-hastily be inferred from this statement, I may remind them that *for thought* the categories are not limited by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unlimited field. It is only the *knowledge* of that which we think, the determining of the object, that requires intuition.[49]

It is perfectly reasonable to postulate the existence of noumena (things in themselves as they could be given to an intellectual intuition), given that the concept is not contradictory, and appearances should be assumed to be appearances of something. So even though we are bound to the frontiers of the 'land of truth'[50] (and the tribunal has shifted shape once more to become a border dispute), we are not only allowed to believe in something beyond it, but are also naturally drawn towards it by reason.[51] The latter is a syllogistic faculty that works by 'descending' from premises to conclusions, in which case it lies safely within experience, but also 'ascending' from conditioned objects to their conditions, in which case it produces its own concepts

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[48] KANT, I. *Op. cit.*, A141/B180-1. The role of imagination and its 'concealed art' constitutes the most important thread that leads out of the Kantian edifice, and will be of paramount importance to the post-Kantians, as well as Heidegger's and Deleuze's readings of critical idealism.

[49] *Ibid.*, B167n.

[50] *Ibid.*, A235/B294.

[51] Kant must be committed not only to the thinkability of noumena, but to their existence – had he failed to affirm it, he would have fallen short of the original goal of whole critical enterprise, namely, that of providing a safe ground for morality.

independently – 'transcendental ideas' that translate the inevitable search for always further determination of conditions into unconditioned totalities: God, world, immortal soul. Again, the nature of the break has to be emphasised: against rationalism, the ideas of reason are not innate, but constructed out of the *a priori* concepts of the understanding[52]; they transform the meaning of error, from the failure to grasp an external object into the internal illusion caused by the illegitimate (yet necessary) employment of reason;[53] and these illusions, as projected ideals, have their positive function in pushing empirical knowledge towards ever greater unity, simplicity and systematicity through the unification concepts.[54] Ideas do possess objective validity – they do have objects, even if these are not determined, but problematic.

> Indeterminate in its object, determinable by analogy with the objects of experience, bearing an ideal of infinite determination in relation to the concepts of the understanding: these are the three aspects of the Idea.[55]

The illusion consists, then, in mistaking the regulative role they play in the expansion and coordination of empirical knowledge for the constitutive role in determining its objects by employing the categories outside the limits of sensible experience that is the prerogative of the legislating understanding. Herein lies the mistake of all pre-Kantian transcedent metaphysics. And yet one cannot fail to notice also a condemnation *avant la lettre* of the post-Kantian search for Absolute Knowledge, as well as positivism: the ideal of ultimate unity is just a *'focus imaginarius'* outside the field of possible experience, its realisation always deferred. The ideal of a *mathesis universalis* is retained: the attainment of the highest degree of knowledge is

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[52] As such, whereas the categories precede all experience by providing them with form, the concepts of the understanding can only be extrapolated through inference, and therefore presuppose the prior existence of experience.

[53] This particular transformation introduced by Kant is repeatedly celebrated by Deleuze. *Cf. La philosophie pratique de Kant*. Paris: PUF, 1998, p. 38; *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 1968, p. 178.

[54] They have another role in projecting a teleological unity of nature, a very relevant point in Deleuze's interpretation of Kant.

[55] DELEUZE, G. *La philosophie critique de Kant*. Paris: PUF, 1998, p. 32.

not, *contra* mysticism, a single moment of revelation, or, *contra* spirituality, a process of self-transformation; absolute knowledge is identified with the slow, cumulative progress of empirical knowledge in ways that the science of Kant's time (Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics above all) seemed to promise. While the progress is possible and necessary, its final point of arrival disappears beyond the 'land of truth': the final unification of the knowledge of nature (as the realm of necessity) and the final unification of it with the moral subject (as the kingdom of freedom) – the pretension to exhaustive philosophical or scientific knowledge is, to the finite intellect, forever denied. More than the impossibility of total empirical knowledge, it is the difficulty of closing the gap between nature and man and accounting for the *imperium in imperio*[56] of freedom in necessity that will push post-Kantianism towards a rediscovery of Spinozist immanence.

With Kant, not only does the problem of the relation between thought and Being become internalised (as the relation between sensibility and understanding), so do time and space (as *a priori* forms of inner and outer space): infinite empty forms, but only for us. Human finitude not only finds its own philosophical consistency, becoming more than a mere limitation of the infinite, it is also made constitutive. No more 'this is how we can know, we who are finite', but 'we can only know (as such) *because* we are finite'. Metaphysics is made immanent to (finite) experience: a crucial turning point in the history of philosophy. Until then, philosophical systems could relate to each other according to different material and formal criteria. Materially, they could differ and criticise each other in relation to the their capacity to provide solutions to problems, the amount of new problems they raised without being capable of solving, their practical implications (for example, in yielding 'unacceptable' claims about freedom or morality), even, in more specific cases, their difficulties in relating to Scripture. Formally, they could point out each other's internal contradictions, the lack of economy and elegance in

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[56] SPINOZA, B. *Ethics*, Preface, III.

their proliferation of entities, their incapacity to consistently obey to their own rules of production. With Kant, a new formal criterion is introduced that has at its base a material import. One can refer to formal immanence, in a weaker sense, as the rule whereby philosophical systems cannot lay claim to any principles or concepts that cannot be accounted for by the laws of their construction, or that cannot be consistently deployed within their own conceptual structure. In other words, every philosophical system must be capable of providing and abiding by the laws of its construction. This sense is, however, too weak to grasp the transformation brought about Kant, and applies just as well to the great edifices of transcendent metaphysics.[57] In the stronger sense that it acquires with the Copernican turn, formal immanence entails that, at the bottom of the laws of its construction, a philosophical system must be able to demonstrate the validity of said laws as a possibility available to a finite intellect, so to speak, *existing in immanence*. This is one of the two of the initial determinations of immanence found in the first chapter: that it directs thought to think its immanence to Being, but also that it requires the thought that thinks this immanence to be immanent itself — a political demand prior to being a philosophical one. It remains to be seen whether it is possible to do so without having to refer, in a way or another, immanence *to* a subject; in any case, the passage is clear: from transcendent metaphysics to an immanent critique of reason.

2.2.1 – Reform or revolution?

Yet could this criterion not be used against Kant himself? If the motivation of the critical project is to find safe grounds for knowledge, is it not the highest

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[57] If I understand correctly, this is the sense of 'formal immanence' employed by Christian Kerslake in an essay with which this study shares much common ground, while coming to different conclusions. *Cf.* KERSLAKE, C. The vertigo of philosophy. Deleuze and the problem of immanence. *Radical Philosophy*, 113, pp. 10-23. *Cf.* also: HALLWARD, P. Justification or affirmation? To have done with justification: a reply to Christian Kerslake. *Radical Philosophy*, 114, pp. 29-31; KERSLAKE, C. Copernican Deleuzianism. *Radical Philosophy*, 114, pp. 32-3.

indictment against that it has to assume certain 'facts of reason' as 'already there', that it cannot explain? This is what Deleuze refers to in saying

> The post-Kantians, Maïmon and Fichte in particular, made a fundamental objection to Kant: he would have ignored the demands of a genetic method. This objection has two senses, one objective, the other subjective: Kant relies on facts for which he only searches for conditions; but also, he invokes ready-made faculties, of which he determines that they can have this relation or that proportion, already assuming they are capable of some kind of harmony. If one considers Maïmon's *Transcendental philosophy* is from 1790, we must note Kant already in part anticipated his disciples' objection.[58]

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[58] DELEUZE, G. L'Idée de genèse dans l'esthétique de Kant. *In: L'Île déserte*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 86.The passage is differently phrased elsewhere: 'Now, we know that the post-Kantians reproached Kant for having compromised this discovery [of the concept of synthesis]: from the point of view of the principle that governed synthesis, from the point of view of objects in the synthesis itself. One demanded a principle that were not only determinant in relation to objects, but truly genetic and productive (principle of difference or internal determination); one denounced, in Kant, the survival of miraculous harmonies between objects that remained external. From a principle of difference or internal determination, one demanded a reason not only for the synthesis, but for the reproduction of the manifold in the synthesis as such.' *Nietzsche et la philosophie*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 58. Or, finally: 'Kant does not realise his project of immanent critique. Transcendental philosophy discovers conditions that remain exterior to the conditioned. Transcendental principles are principles of conditioning, not of internal genesis.' *Ibid.*, p. 104.
Kant did have a very thorough knowledge of Maïmon's *Essay on transcendental philosophy* at the time of writing the third *Critique*, and recognised not only its 'excellence' and the quality of a critic who had 'understood [him] and the main questions' better than any other, but how powerful his criticism was – declining to write a recommendation for its publication 'since it is after all largely directed *against me*'. He insists on the futility of searching for a genetic principle for sensibility and understanding, and restates the argument that it is only if our limitation is accepted as constitutive that we can account for our representations at all. 'If we wanted to make judgments about their origin – an investigation that of course lies wholly beyond the limits of human reason – we could name nothing beyond our divine creator; once they are given, however, we can fully explain their power to make a priori judgments (that is, to answer the question, *quid juris*?)'. While praising his critic for agreeing 'that reform must be undertaken, if the principles of metaphysics are to be made firm', he also concludes that, to the extent that he makes the difference between intuition and understanding one of degree, and both different in degree to the divine intellect, 'Herr Maïmon's way of representing *is* Spinozism.' (Kant's italics.) KANT, I. Letter to Marcus Herz, May 26, 1789. *In: Correspondence*. Trans. and ed. Zweig, A. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 311-6. In the light of the *Pantheismusstreit* of a few years earlier, it could even be that associating the book with Spinoza was an underhand way of discouraging its publication; in any case, shortly before the publication of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant denies having read it at all, but says of its author: 'Self-educated minds commonly possess a certain originality which one can use to sharpen one's ways of conceiving things (which are usually due more to one's teachers than one's own thinking) and often such people can give us a whole new perspective for assessing things.' Letter to Johann Gottfried Carl Christian Kiesewetter, February 9, 1790. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 336.

Both elements hinted at here – the post-Kantian's critique and Kant's own answer to the problem of providing a genetic account – will be central to Deleuze's reading and transformation of transcendental criticism. In them, he will find the point of leverage that allows him at once to attack the self-imposed limits of Kantian critique, and thus point to an originary failure in its scope, and to find at its heart a possibility of a groundless ground that is not only the unmaking of Kant's project, but also the fulcrum of his own. The first, destructive moment is dealt with here, while the constructive one is included in the next chapter.

It is by pitting Kant against Nietzsche – and one cannot underestimate the importance for him of these *Auseinandersetzungen,* and the role Nietzsche in particular plays in many of them – that Deleuze first hits upon the tone of his attack on the scope of criticism. Here he lists five differences between the two concerning the internal economy of critique and the kind of consequences it can produce. Whereas Kant looks for transcendental principles, 'mere conditions of alleged facts'[59], Nietzsche's are plastic and genetic; which means that if, for both, thinking is judging, in the second case the judgement concerns the sense and value of interpretation, rather than a recognition, distribution and validation of the already known; as a result, the legislating role is not that of a reason that limits the rights of thought, but of thought that creates new values, pushes reason towards the new;[60] therefore, instead of the pacifying legislator that settles the score on the legitimate and illegitimate uses of reason once and for all, one finds the genealogist who upsets tranquil

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[59] DELEUZE, G. *Nietzsche et la philosophie.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 107.

[60] 'In irrationalism what is at stake is nothing else but thought, nothing else but thinking. What one opposes to reason, is thought itself; what one opposes to the reasonable being is the thinker himself. Because reason on its own account gathers and expresses the rights of what subjects thought, thought reconquers its rights and becomes legislative against reason: *the dice-throw,* that was the meaning of the dice-throw.' *Ibid.* It is particularly important to notice the causal link established here: the moment of finding the limits of what can be thought is a necessary step towards opening up new possibilities of thought; critique as identifying blockages precedes critique as production. This parallels the analysis made in the first chapter concerning Foucault's use of history, and is a crucial theme in Deleuze's *Foucault.*

certainties and announces transformation; the protagonist of critique is then not the reasonable being, priest/faithful, legislator/subject, 'bureaucrat of current values (...), reactive man in his own service'[61], but 'man *insofar as he desires his overcoming, his surpassing*[62]; which finally means that the goal of critique is not that of safely determining the ends of reason and of man, but the overcoming of man. 'The question in critique is not that of justifying, but of sensing differently: a new sensibility.'[63]

There would be, then, two critiques. One would presuppose a given image of what it means to think, and proceed to criticise the false and illegitimate uses of that whose legitimacy is not questioned – the fact that thought, in its natural exercise, in its good sense that is universally shared, is entitled to truth, and that it suffices to have an adequate method to reconduct it to its rightful condition. The other, which pushes against these presupposed limits, which questions the desire for universality and truth in morality, faith, religion, knowledge, by enquiring into the forces that guide the alleged 'natural' exercise of these faculties by forcing thought to think. For one, conditions of possibility, rightful exercise of a faculty, the determination of legitimate claims to truth; for the other, conditions of existence, a genesis of thought in its contingent conditions, the reversal of what is accepted as true in favour of a new sensibility, of a new dice-throw, a new image of thought. [64] That a

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[61] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 108. (Italics in the original.)

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 108.

[64] 'Well, philosophy must create new ways of thinking, a whole new conception of thought, of "what it means to think", that are adequate to what is going on. It must make on its own account revolutions that are taking place elsewhere, on other planes, or that are being prepared. Philosophy cannot be separated from a 'critique'. Except that there are two ways of practicing critique. Either one critiques "false applications"': false morality, false knowledges, false religions etc., it is in this way that Kant for instance conceives the famous *Critique*: the ideal of knowledge, true morality, faith, come out unscathed at the end. On the other hand, there is another family of philosophers, the one that thoroughly critiques true morality, true faith, ideal knowledge, in favour of something else, in function of a new image of thought. As long as one is happy to criticise the "'false", one does not harm anybody (true critique is the critique of true forms and not false contents. One does not criticise capitalism or imperialism by denouncing its "mistakes".) DELEUZE, G. Sur Nietzsche et l'image de la pensée. *In: L'île déserte*. Paris: Minuit, 2002, p. 191.

philosopher in the 20th century should raise this distinction, or that Nietzsche himself should have done it, only shows that the inner tension of the drive for immanentisation at the heart of Enlightenment that Kant wanted to settle and pacify once and for all – by denying 'knowledge, in order to make room for faith' so as to combat the 'unbelief (...) that wars against morality'[65] – has, beyond all discussion of rights, in fact remained. Deleuze's critique (and Nietzsche's as viewed by Deleuze) is a denunciation of the Kantian enterprise as just an attempt at reconciliation, the Copernican revolution little more than an enlightened reform, more Frederick the Great than Robespierre; echoes of Hamann's reading of 'What is Enlightenment?' resound. He recognises Kant's originality and importance in recognising that critique must be immanent (reason cannot be criticised by a principle external to itself, like faith), total (nothing must escape it) and positive (the act of criticising opens new possibilities)[66], but cannot but decry its failure in that it starts by believing in what it sets out to criticise, so that in the end 'one has never seen so reconciling a total critique, so respectful a critique'[67]. 'From Kant to Hegel', the philosopher remains 'a very civil and pious character, who loves to mistake the ends of culture with the good of religion, morality, the State.'[68]

Besides allying with Nietzsche, Deleuze is the inheritor of a line of critical reaction to Kant that includes Maïmon and Bergson, as well as following a particularly French tradition that includes Brunschvicg and Bachelard.[69] For

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[65] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*. Bxxx. I use 'deny' here following Kemp Smith's translation, even though the original reads 'aufheben', and so would be best translated as 'sublate'.

[66] DELEUZE. *Nietzsche et la philosophie*. Paris: PUF, 2003, pp. 102-4.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

[68] *Ibid.*, p. 119.

[69] Dan Smith argues that in opposition to a post-Kantian tradition largely concerned with the synthetic identity of the self – Fichte, Schelling, Hegel –, Deleuze constructs his own tradition, focusing on difference as a genetic principle: Maïmon, Nietzsche, Bergson. SMITH, D. Deleuze, Kant and the post-Kantian tradition. Text sent by the author. On the French tradition of Kantian critique, and the importance this critique has for the development of French philosophy (ranging from Meyerson, Brunschvicg, Bachelard through to Deleuze, Foucault, Lyotard, Serres), *Cf.*: GUALANDI, A. *La rupture et l'évenement. La question de la verité scientifique dans la philosophie française contemporaine*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1998.

the last two, it was clear that the scientific revolutions in physics and mathematics in the 20th century – which turned the models of Kant's time, Newton and Euclides, into limited cases of larger theories – were the main motor behind the need to re-evaluate Kant's enterprise. It is not the case, however, that Kant's reliance on these two models and their subsequent overcoming should be read as an invalidation of the critical project as such; they provide a *posteriori* material that complicates Kant's philosophy, without tackling it from the inside, in its a *priori* bases. In a parallel way, Deleuze's favouring of Nietzsche could be accused so far of remaining exterior and failing to confront Kant on his own grounds, motivated by sentiment rather than accomplished through an immanent critique.

The next step would then have to include a demonstration of how the internal mechanism of Kant's thought undermines its original critical thrust, making the critique less than total; and at the same time find in it the possibility of a new beginning for critique. This is what Deleuze's book on Kant – 'a book on an enemy of whom I wanted to show the functioning, his cogs'[70] – purports to do.

The strategy here is to consider Kant's total system rather than reducing transcendental idealism, as is often done, to the first *Critique*. What results is a vision that places the whole within the framework of the finalism advanced in the Canon of Pure Reason and ultimately redeemed in the *Critique of Judgment*; in this way, Deleuze can accumulate 'facts' along the way – the ready-made faculties, the duality between understanding and sensibility and the 'hidden art' of schematism bringing them together, the moral law – so as to show how all the elements that appear as unexplainable givens in the course of the critical enterprise are part of a larger structure coordinated towards the realisation of certain ends of reason and culture which are those

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[70] DELEUZE, G. Lettre a un critique sevère. *In: Pourparlers. 1972-1990.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, pp. 14-5.

that Kant had set out to defend from the public, widespread use of critique in his time. In that sense, the conditions that Kant finds are merely derived from what they are supposed to condition; Kant's question would then be not 'how can the given be given at all?', but 'how can *these givens* be given?'.

Already in the first *Critique* the elements that will determine the closure of the system are in place. On the one hand, the problematic gap in the relation between thought and Being always risks to open up again, despite its internalisation as a matter of the relation between different faculties, understanding and sensibility: there is the mysterious schematising power of the imagination to explain how the two can be brought together, but then how does one explain that the imagination can work alongside the understanding, and so on?[71] Affirming the sheer fact of the accord of faculties under the interest of one of them (*sensus communis*) will satisfy Deleuze as much as it satisfied Maïmon; there must be a principle to explain the genesis of this common sense, and going beyond its insurmountable facticity will be the ultimate task deferred until the last *Critique*. On the other hand, Deleuze points out how the objective role of regulative ideas exposes the analogical function of reason. When Kant imagines the possibility that the content of appearances may be of such diversity that the concept of genera, or indeed any universal concepts, and thus understanding as such, would be impossible, it is reason that intervenes by postulating that phenomena can conform to the the ideals of systematicity and unity, regulating all its internal movement as if this harmony were the case: 'Reason is thus the faculty that says: everything is as if...'.[72] Thus, after the destructive work done by the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant proceeds to show that we can view God,

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[71] Deleuze at this point highlights, referring to the Letter to Herz of May 26th 1789, the centrality that this relation, and its solution through internalisation, has for Kant, and how he admits that a ultimate solution would have to be looked for in the intervention of a divine creator, even though the object of research lies beyond 'the land of truth'. *Cf.* DELEUZE, G. *La philosophie critique de Kant.* Paris: PUF, 1998, p. 35.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

freedom and soul *as if* they existed – effectively opening the way for the second *Critique*.

The genetic principle finally appears in the *Critique of judgment*. The Analytic of Beauty shows that the *sensus communis aestheticus* is what makes the determinant accords of the faculties under the speculative and practical interests possible: it is a free, indeterminate, subjective, heautonomous agreement that allows imagination to 'schematise without concept'[73], spontaneously producing forms for possible intuitions. But to simply assume that such an accord can be given, taking it as fact, would entail building the whole critical edifice on grounds too susceptible to scepticism; it is necessary to show how this common sense can be engendered, and that is the role of the judgment of the sublime. In facing the immensity or might of nature, we feel 'an outrage to the imagination'[74] that shows that its powers are insufficient to reproduce to itself the successive parts of the measureless or beyond measure, and thus exposes the limits of our power to judge. But what pushes us towards the unification of the dynamic and material infinity of nature, if not the idea of a sensible totality? It is not nature, then, but reason that exposes imagination to its limits; and this original painful disagreement is transmuted into pleasurable agreement when, in the greater powers of reason, imagination is presented with the overcoming of its limits in 'the presentation of the infinite, which [because imagination cannot go beyond the sensible] can only be negative, but which enlarges the soul all the same'.[75] This excess that cannot be brought into representation is the transcendental genesis of all other possible agreements of faculties; and while the

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[73] KANT, I. *Critique of the power of judgment.* Trans. Guyer, P. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, §35. (This is the edition used throughout, referred to as *Critique of Judgment* from here on.) Deleuze observes that the formula is 'more brilliant than it is exact', which is fair considering that, in the picture of the functioning of the faculties painted by the Analytic, it does not seem to make much sense to speak of schema without concept. DELEUZE, G. L'idée de genèse dans l'esthètique de Kant. *In: L'île déserte.* Paris: Minuit, 2002, p. 83.

[74] KANT, I. *Critique of judgment*, §23.

[75] *Ibid.*, §29.

mathematical sublime appeals to our speculative interest, the dynamic, as it concerns the power of the suprasensible, appeals to our practical interest, and thus prepares us for our destiny as moral beings. The judgment of the sublime offers the model for the other geneses: in it, the ideas of reason intervene directly and negatively; positively and indirectly, through reflection, in the interest that enables the sense of beauty (enlarging the concepts of the understanding and liberating imagination to reflect on how the materials of nature symbolise the ideas of reason); positively and secondarily, through the creation of a second nature, in genius (again enlarging understanding and freeing imagination to reflect on how aesthetic ideas express the ideas of reason).[76]

It then becomes apparent that reflective judgments – those where the particular is given for which a universal must be found, that do not correspond to an interest of reason where an object is determined by the agreement of faculties presided by one of them[77] – expose the 'living background'[78] against which determinant judgments take place. Both require an art, but whereas in schematisation, for instance, this art is 'hidden', here it is brought to light by the fact that, in reflective judgment, rather than being ruled over by one of them, all faculties cooperate freely. It is only through this possibility of free, indeterminate accord that determinant agreements can be understood – not as facts always already there, but as engendered. It is here that one hits the bottom of the critical system. But reflective judgements are 'in search of a principle'[79] as they ascend from particular to universal. If this principle cannot be a universal itself – for the obvious reason that in the case the judgment would be determinant –, what can it be?

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[76] Deleuze highlights how in the last two Kant adds a material meta-aesthetic to the formal aesthetic of the judgment of taste: 'the accomplished (achevée) classicism and the rising (naissant) Romanticism find a complex balance.' DELEUZE, G. La philosophie critique de Kant. Paris: PUF, 1998, p. 83.

[77] KANT, I. Op. cit., §IV.

[78] DELEUZE, G. Op. cit., p. 87.

[79] KANT, I. Op. cit., §IV.

In the interest of beauty the free agreement of faculties finds pleasure in a contingent harmony between nature and the ideas of reason it symbolises; something appeals to it from the limits of our reason, the intimation of a finality that guarantees the ultimate harmony between the freedom of our speculative and practical interests and nature itself. The teleological judgment is prepared by the aesthetic. The interest of beauty provides us with the opportunity to grasp 'the *internal* finality of our subjective faculties'[80], which is the principle that guides the aesthetic judgement of beauty, offering a formal finality ('a finality without an end'[81]) that prepares us for a concept of finality which, applied to nature, will be not only formal, but concern its content: it is 'reflection without concept itself that prepares us for a concept of reflection'.[82] Teleological judgment therefore is not determined by an *a priori* condition, but rather the principle for all reflective judgments. We derive the concept of a natural finality from the ideas of reason, subsuming nature under a totality (that of a final unity or final cause of phenomena) that can only be thought, but it differs from them in that its object, although not determined by it, is given – since we cannot push our concepts to a maximum of unity and sytematicity without lending the same qualities to empirical phenomena. Now, knowledge of this final cause would only be possible for a being endowed with intellectual intuition, for whom there is no difference between intuiting and creating an object. Therefore, it makes the object of an idea of reason determinable, if only by analogy: from the ends of nature we must proceed *as if* there were a divine, creating intellect behind them – from natural teleology to physical theology. The aesthetic reflective judgment thus finds its principle in the teleological judgment, a free accord of faculties under the interest of knowing in which the understanding, enlarged by the syntheses of concepts produced by the concept of natural finality, renounces to its legislative power and allows imagination to reflect freely.

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[80] *Ibid.*, §58.
[81] *Ibid.*, §24.
[82] DELEUZE, G. *Op. cit.*, p. 95.

Thus the bottom of reason – the possibility of a free agreement of the faculties in the reflective judgment, under the aesthetic interest or (in the case of teleological judgment) the interest of knowledge – is what enables and prepares the submission of all faculties to the legislation of reason: the highest interest, practical reason. Since it works under the speculative interest, the determination of the idea of God offered by the concept of finality of reason is only capable of justifying the existence of a divine creator regarding the possibility of what exists; it must be superseded in the question of a final goal capable of explaining *why* things exist. This final goal must be found in a being that is the reason for its own existence, and it is only of '*man considered as a moral being one cannot ask the reason of his existence*; his existence contains in itself the supreme end'[83] – namely, that of realising the supreme good. This realisation, in turn, can only be thought if one postulates the existence of a moral creator responsible for making the sensible world susceptible to its transformation guided by suprasensible ends. So here the chain comes to its conclusion, from the formal finality in aesthetic judgment, to the concept of finality of nature, from natural teleology to physical theology, and, finally, from practical teleology to moral theology.

In the end, one notes that the reflective judgment that makes determinant judgments possible finds its principle in the concept of natural finality, an analogical use of reason that in turn necessitates the postulation of a divine cause for the sensible world and finally ascends towards a moral God. One could argue that the analogical role of ideas in practical reason remains somewhat facultative, and the return of the soul, God and freedom as postulates of reason can as such be discarded without much damage to the picture of knowledge painted by the first *Critique*;[84] it is sufficient that the link

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[83] KANT, I. *Op. cit.*, §84.

[84] The 'option' to accept or not the idea of soul, for instance, seems to be suggested when Kant says: 'Why do we have resort to a doctrine of the soul founded exclusively on pure principles of reason? Beyond all doubt, chiefly in order to secure our thinking self against the

exist in fact for Deleuze to object that there is a much more serious compromise with transcendence that contaminates the whole of Kantian criticism, namely, that of the reintroduction of the *as if there were a God* at the bottom of the system in the form of the principle of causal finality. Through this analogy, the instauration of immanence that Kant sought to carry out is halted by the appearance of transcendence at its very heart. The explicit Kantian doctrine is that God can be said only through analogy from the constituent limits of finitude (and as such ceases to be the infinite from which the finite is derived from as limitation, and becomes the negative image of what is outside finitude: noumena are things-in-themselves *as they would* be given to a being with intellectual intuition). Behind the curtains, in the internal workings of the system, one finds it is nevertheless the opposite movement that grounds the whole mechanism: knowledge is founded in the belief that nature is *as if* there were a divine creator. It is said by analogy with God: the univocity of Being is broken, onto-theology surreptitiously smuggled back in: the being of the world is subjected to the Being of God, immanence subjected to transcendence.

One can, not without irony, describe Kant's transcendental reasoning as that which to the question 'how is this possible?' (for example, for concepts to legislate over intuitions given the difference in nature between understanding and sensibility) always replies 'because it is necessary' (concepts must have an a priori, transcendental role so that knowledge is possible at all).[85] In this, it is open to the critique of the concept of possibility that Deleuze picks up from Bergson: if the real is supposed to be the image of the possible it realises, the possible is considered as the real minus existence, and one

danger of materialsm.' KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*, A383. That is, if one is not inclined to avert what B421 calls 'throwing ourselves into the arms of a soulless materialism'...

[85] 'And is it not the most general character of the foundation (*fondement*), that this circle it organises is also the vicious circle of the philosophical "proof", where representation must prove that which it proves, like again in Kant, where the possibility of experience is the proof of its own proof?'. DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 351. Or, in parallel terms: 'the operation of [self-] limitation becomes the very act of reason.' PHILONENKO, A. *L'Oeuvre de Kant*. Paris: Vrin, 1983, vol. I, p. 131.

projects backwards in time a set of possibles that, by limitation and elimination, would have yielded the real in front of us. The possible is therefore copied from the real, and its very becoming real appears as a mystery, a mere addition of existence.[86] Conditions of possible experience are then always general and formal affairs that assume the real in advance and then proceed to justify it; they do not explain the conditions of real experience, which for Deleuze can only be the object of a determining transcendental genesis (taking place, as we shall in the last chapter, in the passage from virtual to actual).

Not little, in the Enlightenment, was at stake when discussing the legitimacy and function of the claims concerning God and morality. The worldly weight of such questions, Heine captured them adroitly in an elegant elipsis, which made evident the relation between political and theoretical immanentisation and critique in that

> [a]s here, in France, every privilege, so there, in Germany, every thought, must justify itself; as here, the monarchy the keystone of the old social edifice, so [in Germany] deism, the keystone of the old *regime*, falls from its place.'[87]

Who would be the leader of the revolution that finally, after Spinoza's first attempt, managed to slay God, if not Kant, who Heine praises as 'the arch-destroyer in the realm of thought' who 'far surpassed in terrorism Maximilien Robespierre?'.[88] If the problem for Leibniz had presented itself as limiting the

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[86] DELEUZE, G. *Le Bergsonisme*. Paris: PUF, 2004, pp. 99-100. In a passage in which much of *Différence et répétition*, published two years later, is already contained, he adds: 'To become actual, the virtual cannot proceed through elimination or limitation, but must *create* its own lines of actualisation in positive acts. The reason is simple: while the real is in the image and resemblance of the possible it realises, the actual instead *does not* resemble the virtuality it embodies. What is primary in the process of actualisation is difference – the difference between the virtual and where one departs from, and the actuals where one arrives, and also the difference between the complementary lines along which actualisation takes place (*se fait*).' (Deleuze's italics.)

[87] HEINE, H. *Religion and philosophy in Germany*. Trans. Snodgrass, J. Boston: Beacon Press, 1959, p. 102.

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 109.

claims of Newtonian mechanicism in order to show the need for its metaphysical and theological foundation, staving off the encroachment on the authority of the church by the pretensions of science, for Kant it is the other way round: the final balance between the two is not objectively founded by the understanding but only postulated by reason, so that it is the finitude of our cognitive practices (where science is included) that provides the basis on which a finality of nature can be said by analogy. So even if one may be repelled by the return of God as moral religion, the revolution remains radical in that it is humans who are now endowed with the power to constitute (empirical knowledge, the idea of a natural finality, the idea of a moral creator). Perhaps a few revolutionaries would complain that the post-revolutionary morality remains the same, except now inscribed in a human constitution. This is where we can appreciate Kant's consummate skill as a political operator: he drafts a Magna Carta for reason that lays safe grounds for empirical knowledge in settling the disputes between dogmatists and sceptics; and it can, at the same time, serve as a constitution for the civil state in which the claims to truth of science, religion, moral and poltics can be accomodated with relatively very little damage.[89] Things can stay as they are, except they are now on a different basis. Some could say: the essence of a conservative revolution. It is nevertheless the high watermark in all attempts at reconciling all the different claims to truth and authority at stake in the Enlightenment with the drive towards immanentisation – to the point that one could find all future philosophy concentrated in this single point.

Yet what Deleuze's reading suggests is that the whole revolution had only been possible through a back door compromise that allowed transcendence to return within immanence itself. The same thing that troubled the post-Kantians is what is raised here, even if in vastly different terms: maybe the revolution of critique had betrayed its principles from the start.

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[89] Cf. KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason.* A751-2/B779-80.

The possibility of the other critique Deleuze invokes when speaking of Nietzsche, then, opens up when one considers that, even beyond the practical postulates of reason, it may be the whole critical edifice that brings Kant

> back to 'God', 'soul', 'freedom' and 'immortality', like a fox that, believing it escapes, strays back into its cage – and it had been *his* strength and *his* wisdom which had *broken* the bars of this cage![90]

Rather than Robespierre, Kant returns in the character of Danton – condemned to death in the process of a revolution he led, not because of uncompromising radicality, but cautious moderation.

2.2.2 – From this slumber to the next

Foucault's trajectory is, in a way, bookended by Kant. We have already seen how the return to Kant and the question of the Enlightenment sparked in him a late summation of his work, and drew him to place himself as inheritor of the critical legacy. It is only fitting, then, that we should find Kant's presence already in the beginning: in the translation, historical note and introduction to Kant's *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*[91] submitted by Foucault as the secondary thesis for his *doctorat*, alongside *Histoire de la folie*.

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[90] NIETZSCHE, F. *Le gai savoir. In: Oeuvres*. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1993, vol. II, §335.

[91] Only the historical note providing a look into the long period where Kant's text was in production appeared along with the translation in Vrin's 1964 *Anthropologie du point de vue pragmatique*; it was later reprinted in *Dits et écrits*. Foucault's introduction, which at the time of writing is given by Semitoext(e)/MIT Press as scheduled to appear in August 2008 (delayed from September 2007), was for a long time available only in its original typewritten form at the Archive Michel Foucault at the Institute de Mémoires de l'Edition Contemporaine (IMEC), Paris. It was first made widely available by Brazilian researcher Márcio Miotto, who posted the full text online, sparking speculation on its accuracy and authenticity, subsequently attested by Foucault scholar Colin Gordon. It was then posted, with a partial English translation, by England-based Italian researcher and translator Arianna Bové, on her website www.generation-online.org. She was then approached by Semiotext(e) with a project for publication, of which she subsequently pulled out for various reasons reported at http://www.generation-online.org/p/psylverelotringer.htm. Given one particular point she raises – the lack of publishing rights over the original – it could be that the tortuous history of this text will not find a happy end so soon. The French original remains, lawfully and freely,

This special relation is further demonstrated by the fact that Kant is, alongside Nietzsche, the modern thinker whose position in *Les mots et les choses* is the most interesting. While the latter appears as a somewhat diagonal presence in relation to the knowledge of his time, Kant's position is pivotal, in the most literal sense: at once central and neutral, playing the role of a hinge between two *épistémès*. While he certainly does not belong anymore to an *épistémè* marked by the continuity between representation and Being, his presence in the modernity seems to be at once definitive, in the way it helps sketch the blueprint for the ulterior development of philosophy, and yet, precisely by virtue of its formal character, somewhat less tainted by the more critical conclusions that the modern age of man elicits from Foucault. This had already been the case in the introduction to Kant's *Anthropology.* Much of the overall sense of the last chapters of *Les mots et les choses*, as well as the future demarche of Foucault's own project, is already contained in this text.

It follows a similar approach to Deleuze's in that it takes Kant seriously in his attempt not only to critique transcendence and lay safe grounds for the future of metaphysics, but actually develop a complete system of transcendental metaphysics in its own right. The way Foucault tackles this ambition, however, is not by analysing this project as a whole, but by looking at some of what are regularly considered marginal texts in order to shed light on their relation to the overall architectonic, and especially the first *Critique;* the chief

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available at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault8.htm; a good example of the excellent and valuable work done by the two people behind this website.

Interest in the 'Introduction' has grown in recent years, when some have pointed out the important place it occupies in prefiguring some of the most important features of the work Foucault would go on to do. *Cf.*, for instance: BOVE, A. Foucault's 1961 Introduction to Kant's *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view.* [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault2.htm]; HAN, B. *Foucault's critical project. Between the transcendental and the historical.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, ch. 1; LAWLOR, L. *Thinking through French philosophy: the being of the question.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, ch. 2.

I use my own translation, but have profited from the comparison with Bové's throughout.

interest is evidently the *Anthropology*, but he also considers the *Opus Postumum* and the *Logic* to a lesser extent.

The essential difference between the scope of the *Anthropology* and that of the three *Critiques* lies in two interconnected points. The latter provide a formal description of what *a priori* constitution the subject must have so that there can be knowledge, moral action, universally communicable aesthetic judgment at all; the former is concerned with a being whose connection to the world it finds always given in already-operated syntheses. And this is because man, as it appears in the *Anthropology*, is considered neither as necessity (as natural being) nor as pure spontaneity and freedom (moral being), but as *Weltbürger*, in and of the world. It becomes clear from the start that the central question in the relation between the two texts will move around the issues of time and, in time, the 'co-belonging' (Foucault speaks of *s'appartenir*) of 'can' and 'ought', passivity and spontaneity, freedom and necessity, freedom and truth. Man not as what it is, but as what it makes of itself.

Yet despite this explicit concern, the *Anthropology* is not, for the most part, dealing with the relation to the world directly. Rather, it is overtly concerned with a study of *Gemüt*; and in this study, the presence of *Geist*, a principle that 'vivifies (*belebende Prinzip*) *Gemüt* by means of ideas'[92], draws Foucault's attention. Firstly, because it would seem to add a new element to *Gemüt*, showing that its prior division into three faculties had not been exhaustive.[93] Secondly, because this life-giving principle is neither

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[92] FOUCAULT, M. Introduction à l'Anthropologie de Kant. Thèse complementaire pour le doctorat ès lettres. [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault8.htm]. *Cf.* KANT, I. *Anthropology from the pragmatic point of view.* Trans. Lyle Dowell, V. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996, p. 124.

[93] Knowing, desire, pleasure and displeasure, as per the *Critique of Judgment*; that is, the three faculties of *Gemüt*, as opposed to the cognitive faculties of sensibility, understanding, judgment and reason. *Cf.* KANT, I. *Critique of judgment*, §3. *Cf.* also: DELEUZE, G. *La philosophie critique de Kant.* Paris: PUF, 1998, pp. 8-17; the 'system of permutations' (p. 97) created by the relation between the two meanings of 'faculty' is very important to the

determinant nor regulative. If it were the latter, it would be the unachievable promise of a final unification and systematicity (in Foucault's gloss, 'totalisation'), and hence be undistinguishable from the ideas of reason; *Geist* would then be the active principle that shakes *Gemüt* off its originary passivity (in empirical determination) and breathes life into it in the form of the ideas of reason which, while firmly establishing the infinite as out of bounds, are nevertheless what spurs empirical reason into the endless task of truth. It is the movement of *Geist* that makes *Gemüt* 'not what it is, but what it makes of itself'. The *Anthropology* would then reveal a self-affection at the root of both a transcendental and a non-transcendental dialectics: the source of illusion, but also the movement that 'opens *Gemüt* to the freedom of the possible, wrests him from its determinations, and gives it a future it owes to no-one but itself.'[94] It is here that Foucault finds the first key to establish the connection between the *Anthropology* and the critical texts:

> *Geist* would be this originary fact which, in its transcendental version, implies that the infinite is never given, but is always in an essential retreat – and, in its empirical version, that the infinite nevertheless animates the movement towards truth and the inexhaustible succession of its forms. (...)
>
> Originary fact which, in its unique and sovereign structure, hangs over the *necessity* of the *Critique* and the *possibility* of the *Anthropology*.[95]

A game of inversions ensues: to the *a priori* of knowledge in the *Critique* (the sovereignty of the 'I think') corresponds an 'originary' in the *Anthropology*, whose occurrence reveals it as an already there; to the inert given that the subject operates upon, a given that is always already the result of prior operations in unconscious syntheses; to the cognitive faculties considered in

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organisation of his finalist interpretation of Kant, as well as providing a heuristic 'combinatory' of great didactic value.

[94] FOUCAULT, M. *Op. cit.*

[95] *Ibid.* In the version of the text I have had access to, only 'necessity' and '*Anthropology*', in the last sentence, appear in italics. Since 'Critique' appears capitalised, it seems quite clear that the reference here is to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (something the context confirms), hence my italics; and I also italicise 'possibility', for reasons of symmetry.

their positive domain (the '*conditioning* in *founding* activity'[96]), an emphasis on the permanent risk of error that runs through every one of them ('the *unfounded* in *the conditioned*[97]); to the beginning in an analysis of the powers of the faculties leading to a canon of how to produce correct judgments, the order of the *Anthropology* covers a Didactic (which discovers the possibility of truth and untruth, prescribing the avoidance of the latter) and a Characteristic (which takes us back from phenomena to the powers that constitute them, thus showing the possibility that they may never be given once and for all).

The *Anthropology* never attempts to provide a direct answer to the question 'what is man?' that Kant adds to the three other questions that had guided the critical enterprise: 'what can I know?', 'what must I do?', 'what can I expect?'. The question is chronologically posterior to it, present as it is in the *Logic* and the *Opus Postumum*. In the former, it is immediately followed by three further questions that break it down into another tripartite division concerning the sources and domain of knowledge, and the limits of reason. The anthropological question therefore repeats and unifies the critical ones, neither invalidating nor substituting them. In the *Opus Postumum*, in turn, man appears as a member of another tripartite division, in a system of transcendental philosophy – God, the World, Man – where it is the middle term through which the other two are connected; the most fundamental, as the element in which any enquiry of such sort can take place; but also given in the world, where it becomes an object for itself. The three sets of three questions, projected onto each other, reveal the obstinacy in which a single set of critical problems was repeated from the three *Critiques* as propaedeutic to the *Opus Postumum* as (attempted) completion of the transcendental system; yet they arrive at the other end transformed by the way in which, in the *Opus Postumum*, the world appears not as the open possibility of the *All*, but the givenness of the *Ganz* that is constituted in the process through which

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[96] *Ibid.* The original reads '*le conditionnant dans l'activité fondatrice*', which can only be rendered with some ambiguity in English. The italics are Foucault's.

[97] *Ibid.* (Foucault's italics.)

the self-affection of the subject constitutes a self that is an object of knowledge for it. Not a system of possible relations, but of real ones. This world answers the three questions in that it is *at once* the *source* of what is given to the passivity of sensibility, and what is constituted by the subject, 'unsurpassable correlation of passivity and activity'[98]; as *domain*, it is a space that is limited in its determination through synthetic activity, but precisely for that reason open to freedom; as *limit*, it is both the promise of a final term that animates all search, and the reminder of its unattainability. This transformation is what Foucault calls the level of the *fundamental*, where what was elsewhere given as a division of faculties (sensibility, understanding, reason) or the internal organisation of the system (the three *Critiques*) appears as a set of 'transcendental correlates'[99] – passivity and spontaneity; necessity and freedom; reason and *Geist* – that finds its ultimate foundation in the co-belonging and 'reciprocal transcendence'[100] of truth and freedom. The anthropological question duly appears as what, in opening the *Philosophieren*[101] onto the fundamental correlates that envelop the relations between man and world, operates the passage from the propaedeutic moment to the accomplishment of transcendental philosophy.

Many of the themes of the last Foucault can already be glimpsed here: the question of self-affection, the self-relation of subjectivation ('making something out of what one is made of'). This theme runs right through the early text on Kant: the formula that dominates the text is the 'at once' – 'at once' this *and* that, the '*co*-belonging' and *co*-relation that unravels the distinctions the first *Critique* had so meticulously raised, as it had to, in order to avoid the Scylla of dogmatism and the Charybdis of empiricism. The repetition of this 'at once' represents the blurring into each other of passivity

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[98] *Ibid.*

[99] *Ibid.*

[100] *Ibid.*

[101] The exercise of 'the talent of reason, in accordance with its universal principles, on certain actually existing at attempts at philosophy', where the latter is 'a mere idea of a possible science, which nowhere exists *in concreto.*' KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*, A838/B866.

and spontaneity, necessity and freedom, and takes place under the aegis of time.[102]

The time of the *Anthropology* is not the time of the first *Critique*. There, inner sense was where the given appeared only already under the spontaneity of transcendental apperception. Here, it is a time already operated upon, 'an "already there"' of syntheses in which the spontaneity of synthetic activity succeeds and is in permanent danger of losing itself. 'Time is not that *in* which, and *through* which, and *by means of* which synthesis is made; it is what gnaws at synthetic activity itself.[103] Differently from the certitude that the first *Critique* sought to establish and legitimate, thought is here haunted by the permanent risk of untruth, and the distinction between the power of possible conditions and the passivity of the real (the necessary subjugation of appearances by the transcendental subject) becomes blurred in a continuous movement establishing a direct connection between the appearance and disappearance of transcendental illusions and the concrete, worldly development of the *Gemüt*.

Two other future Foucauldian themes are foreshadowed here. For this worldly development has the form of a game (*Spiel*): the object of the *Anthropology* is precisely the subject's 'acquisition' of the world as practice[104], and the rules and prescriptions the world imposes on it. This is also why 'the the relation between time and the subject, fundamental in the *Critique*, is responded in

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[102] In this sense, this would be the text where Foucault comes closest to Derrida in his methodology, first establishing a set of oppositions, and then showing how these oppostions contaminate each other without respite. At the bottom of this procedure lies a question whose decision is not given by the 'Introduction': is this a pure choice of method, or is it determined by the nature of Kant's text itself? This is a point that will be broached in the last chapter, and which I believe to be central in discerning Foucault's relation to Derrida.

[103] FOUCAULT, M. *Op. cit.* All italics are his.

[104] By 'practice' I am translating Kant's *Gebrauch'*, which Foucault gives as '*usage*', not without remarking it covers only 'some' of the meanings the word has in German. I believe 'practice' is the word that can best cover the various meanings of 'custom', 'use', 'handling', 'exercise', as it is the most general of them, and because it emphasises the character of construction and openness to change which I believe is essential to the overall sense of the text.

the *Anthropology* by the relation between time and *Kunst*[105]: an '*art*' that reveals the fact that the given being given always depends on 'an enterprise that at once founds it in construction, and eschews it in the arbitrary.'[106] As such, it negates the originary passivity opened by time in the self, which appears only as a determination in time that depends on the existence of the outside world to take place, and opens onto a 'dangerous freedom that links the labour of truth to the possibility of error, but frees the rapport to truth from the sphere of determinations'[107] – once more the co-belonging of truth and freedom.

The summary that follows is worth quoting at length, for what it says about Foucault in what he has to say about Kant; it would not be exaggerated to say that the most important and constant problems of his subsequent development are already given here:

> The *Anthropology* is systematic. Systematic due to a structure which is that of the *Critique* and which repeats it. Yet what the *Critique* enunciates as determination, in the relation between passivity and spontaneity, the *Anthropology* describes in the course of a temporal dispersion which never ends and has never begun; what the *Anthropology* deals with is always already there, and never entirely given; what is prior for it is devoted to a time that envelops it through and through, from far and above. Not that the origin is unfamiliar to it: on the contrary, it restitutes the correct sense of the problem, which lies not in isolating and illuminating, in the moment, the initial; but in regaining a temporal density which is none the less radical for having already begun. The originary is not the *really* primitive, but the *truly* temporal. Which means it is there where, in time, truth and freedom belong to each other. There would be a false anthropology – and we know it only too well: it is the one that would try to move back towards a beginning, an archaism of fact or right, the structures of the *a priori*. Kant's *Anthropology* gives us a different lesson: to

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[105] *Ibid*. Foucault leaves the German untranslated, as he thinks no word could adequately render its meaning.
[106] *Ibid*.
[107] *Ibid*.

repeat the *a priori* of the *Critique* in the originary, that is, in a truly temporal dimension.[108]

But the originary time which is the element of the *Anthropology* is, as said above, only the point where the critical questions become projected onto the questions of the philosophising that animates the system of transcendental philosophy; the three moments of start, passage, and conclusion thus correspond to three levels of a threefold repetition. The enquiry into the relation between passivity and spontaneity at the *a priori* level of the *Critique* is oriented towards the question of *source*; the temporal dispersion and universality of language at the originary level of the *Anthropology* is immersed in the problematic of the world as already there, *domain;* a transcendental philosophy deployed at the level of the *fundamental,* the correlation between truth and freedom, is given to the problematic of finitude and *limits*. God as absolute source; the world as the inescapable domain, site and system of all truth; man as their synthesis, but not without being at the same time defined in relation to them as an object in the world, and a finite being. For Foucault at this point, the distinction of these three levels – *a priori*, originary, fundamental – is the most essential legacy bequeathed to us by Kant. And yet it is precisely what all post-Kantian philosophy will not cease to try to overcome, or dissolve.

This would explain the peculiar position Kant occupies in *Les mots et les choses*. His name marks the point where the 'conceptual destiny, that is, the problematic of contemporary philosophy'[109] is defined, as well as where are given the first lines along which it can and will lose itself and unravel; in this sense, he would be 'responsible' for what follows, the difficulties and failures of philosophical exercise in the modern *épistémè*. But for exactly the same reason, he appears as the point where these difficulties and failure are

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[108] *Ibid.* The italics are Foucault's
[109] *Ibid.*

contained in potential rather than in act – and thus it will be only in his successors that the problems whose entry into the scene he signals will become developed.

Let us return then to those three positivities – work, language, life – that mark the break between the *épistémès* of representation and of man. The transformation they cause is, first of all, a redefinition of the relation between infinite and finite, whose form we have already seen above. The finite understood negatively as limitation put a metaphysics of the infinite before any empirical knowledge of man, and was the explanation for its limits. The positivity of work, language and life found the outline of the limits of man's knowledge, not without establishing this finitude at the same time as the possibility of empirical knowledge (including that of man), and the impossibility of knowledge of the infinite. A metaphysics of the infinite and an analysis of *empiria* gives way to an analytic of finitude and the temptations of establishing metaphysics of work, language and life – the full and uncontaminated empirical knowledge of which the analytic of finitude will always frustrate. The death of the *épistémè* of representation, transcendent metaphysics, infinity – God; the negative moment of what appears, in its positive aspect, as the birth of man.

The unraveling of the dogmatism that found itself assured by the certitude of representation and the transparency of discourse is thus the point in which become possible both the question of man as representation – the visibility of what would be this object's unity, but which is at the same time the retreat of this unity in the flux of the historicity of work, language and knowledge – and the question of man as subject – the *a priori* synthetic unity as possibility of representations in general. Kant is the one who cut the tie that, for classical thought, made possible and evident the passage from 'I think' to 'I am'. The transformation of infinite into finite time through its introduction into the subject is at the same time what fractures the subject in two: transcendental

apperception, the pure formality of a spontaneous 'I think'; and the empirical self, as a determination in time. This separation is what that defines the analytic of finitude: '[f]rom one end of experience to the other, finitude responds to itself: it is, in the figure of the *Same,* the identity and difference of positivities [as object] and their foundation [as subject].'[110] This structure, which is at once separation in different spheres and relation of mutual enabling – positivities being the (empirical) condition for knowledge of man's finitude, the subject's finitude being the (transcendental) condition of positivities – is what is repeated in the well-known doubles of man. I will look at the first two here, while the third will return in the next section of this chapter.

As an empirico-transcendental double, man is 'a being such as that it is in him that one can have knowledge of what makes all knowledge possible'[111]; it is where the modern age will, starting from the empirical contents of finitude, attempt to expose the conditions of such knowledge. The whole problem is that of keeping the two poles of such a reciprocally dependent structure separated, the collapse of the two being immediately the reduction of one to the other, in either direction. Evidence of this reductionism can be found in the twin examples of positivism (where the truth of the object is what determines the truth of discourse on it) and eschatology (where the discourse of truth promises the future coincidence of its truth with the object). It is through this very fine analytic point between the two that phenomenology will try to establish itself as the only sound philosophical alternative in the form of the analysis of lived experience, the thin layer where the givenness of all empirical contents connects with the ground that makes them possible and founds them, nature touches history, the space of the body and the time of

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[110] FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 326.

[111] *Ibid.,* p. 329. 'Knowledge' here translates '*connaissance*', which corresponds to Kant's empirical knowledge, and must not be confused with the specifically archaeological level of '*savoir*', which corresponds to the condition of existence of the discourse of a particular historical formation.

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culture come together. Now, it would not be surprising to see Foucault recognise in this limited space precisely that thin level of the originary that took shape in Kant's *Anthropology* at least for the moment in which it was needed to preside the transition from the *a priori* to the fundamental. The arguments of the 'Introduction' and of *Les mots et les choses* complement each other: in the latter, it is keeping empirical and transcendental levels in man separated which is the problem for all post-Kantian philosophy; in the former, this problem appears in the moment when post-Kantian thought tries to overcome the distinction between *a priori*, originary and fundamental. The 'Introduction' signals the spot where, in the forgetfulness of the Kantian tripartite distinction, philosophy takes the anthropological turn in which it will keep on posing itself the problem of establishing a discourse in which man can have at once the value of object and subject, empirical and transcendental:

> The intermediary character of the originary, and with it of anthropological analysis, between *a priori* and fundamental, is what will authorise it to function as an impure and unreflected mixture within the internal economy of philosophy: it will be given at once the privileges of the *a priori* and the sense of the fundamental, the preliminary character of the critique and the accomplished form of transcendental philosophy; it will be deployed undistinguishably from the problematic of the necessary to that of existence; it will confuse the analysis of conditions and the interrogation on finitude.[112]

It is again the same repetition and confusion that we find in the redoubling of cogito and unthought: split into subject and object, man is at once the subjective transparency of thought that constitutes, and the objective, constituted opacity of what cannot become a self-consciousness. Kantian critique is thus displaced from a question on the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments into an interrogation on man, that is, from nature to man, from the possibility of knowledge in general to the impossibility of a knowledge of man,

[112] FOUCAULT, M. Introduction à *l'Anthropologie* de Kant. [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault8.htm]

from the 'groundless' condition of philosophy in comparison to the exact sciences to the attempt to develop a clear philosophical consciousness of what necessarily escapes thought, from truth to being. 'The modern cogito' is the always recommenced attempt to cover 'the distance that once separates and connects thought's presence to itself and what, in thought, is rooted in the non-thought'.[113] Whereas the first double showed the source of eschatological and positivist deviations, as well as the structural impossibility for a phenomenological solution to stabilise itself, the epistemic fraternity of the cogito and the unthought provides evidence of the inescapable necessity of the analytic of finitude for modern philosophy: in Husserl, in Schopenhauer, in every dialectic of in-itself and for-itself since Hegel. '[T]he whole of modern thought is traversed by the law of thinking the unthought.'[114] Moreover, this co-belonging in the same epistemic space is what provides all such different philosophical choices with a deeper affinity that makes all possible combinations explainable (the approximation of phenomenology and Marxism, for example); while, on the other hand, what appears here is also the divergence that sets post-Kantian in the path of either a desire for formalisation which would bring the pure forms of thought to rule over empirical knowledge (starting from Fichte, but extending to the drive for mathematisation in the social sciences), or the tying of empirical domains to a philosophy become reflection on man and finitude (from Hegel's phenomenology on).

Deleuze's and Foucault's interpretations of Kant overlap, and unsurprisingly under the common sign of Nietzsche: for Foucault, the theme of the possibility and necessity of a 'second critique' insinuates itself there where the analytic of finitude exhausts all its possible strategies in the repetition of a self-referential movement. Kant may well have awaken us from the dogmatic slumber, but it was only to put us to an anthropological sleep where

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[113] FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 335.
[114] *Ibid.*, p. 338.

dogmatism is unfolded in two separate levels – 'the pre-critical analysis of what man is in his essence repeated in the analytic of what can be given in general to man's experience'[115] – and forms the fold of man in the middle. Unlike in Deleuze, however, it is not – yet, or not exactly – at this stage Nietzsche as the philosopher of forces (let alone of the eternal return) that points a possible way out; and another parallel between *Les mots et les choses* and the 'Introduction' comes to the fore.

We have seen above how, for Foucault, the first moment of the epistemic shift between Classic and modern age is that when History comes to replace Order as the mode of being in which beings are given in knowledge; and also how the movement going from the purely formal, a-temporal *a priori* level to the originary, 'truly temporal' time of the *Anthropology* is the moment where anthropological enquiry, failing to follow Kant to next level of the fundamental, installs and deploys itself. The passage to the originary and into anthropology is then shown as more than a movement internal to the structure of Kant's thought; it is in fact a necessity directed by the *épistémè* in which this thought is inscribed, and it follows and draws the consequences of History becoming the element in which and through which beings are given and organised. The last moment in the rupture that goes from representation to man is that when language folds over itself and loses the transparency in whose surface Being and thought were allowed to unproblematically connect; when language makes an object of itself in history, escaping itself in the direction of a past development with its transformations and sedimentations of meaning, and in the direction of the future with the living practice of its use; as formal system; and as autonomous literary discourse.[116] In the 'Introduction', Foucault points out how Kant's attention to concrete anthropological experience is more linguistic than psychological, and marks a moment where the atemporality of Latin is abandoned in favour of the possibility of founding a philosophical

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[115] *Ibid.*, p. 352.

[116] Foucault highlights that the last moment corresponds to the 'first', most fundamental, element. *Cf. Ibid.*, p. 315.

discourse on a living language and its practice[117]: like originary time, language figures in the *Anthropology* as an already there, the necessary background against which daily practice develops and in which philosophy and non-philosophy find their common root. Again one can see how the internal movement of Kant's thought would in fact be following the direction of the epistemic changes underway.

Such is the heaviness of the anthropological slumber, says Foucault, that it often passes for a vigilant rigour; and still it sleepwalks blindly between the four corners of the space which it defines and is defined by – analytic of finitude, the repetion of the empirical in the transcendental, the doubling of the cogito in the unthought, and the retreat and return of the origin. In man, both philosophy and human sciences – and given the particular configuration of the epistemic field, the latter can never fully distinguish themselves from the former – expand indefinitely across a space that is, by right, given to the privileges of the Same to find itself everywhere, and still escape itself all the time. Both of these early Foucauldian texts on Kant point to a way out in the strangely extra-temporal place which is, in *Les mot et les choses,* the one occupied by Nietzsche. Both essentially agree on the point that the gesture that kills God is at once the gesture that kills man, so that the 'trajectory of the question "*Was ist der Mensch?*" in the field of philosophy comes to an end in the answer that refuses and disarms it: der *Übermensch.*'[118] Both demonstrate that it is the attempt to place a questioning of finitude on the

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[117] The more materialistic strain of argument considering the definitive end of Latin as the universal language of the *savants,* on the one hand, and the transformations in the production and circulation of Western knowledge that would be more or less contemporaneous with it, on the other, unfortunately disappears between the 'Introduction' and *Les mots et les choses.* Israel observes that in general the two main languages in libraries across Europe during the early modernity would be Latin and French, with a tendency from the beginning of the 18th century on to find the latter eclipse the former. ISRAEL, J. I. *Radical Enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 137.

[118] FOUCAULT, M. Introduction à l'Anthropologie de Kant. [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault8.htm]

same level of empiricity – to found an empirical discourse on finitude – that is the source of the quagmire in which philosophy has, since Kant, been stuck.

In the 'Introduction', this is the consequence of a misunderstanding of the stakes of the *Anthropology;* and while Nietzsche appears as the first model of what the exit from this confinement could be, Foucault clearly states that the form of the answer is to be found already in Kant. There are two moments in the text when Foucault speaks of the 'lesson' of the Kantian text; in the first, it consists in repeating 'the *a priori* of the *Critique* in the originary, that is, in a truly temporal dimension'[119]; in the second, it is that

> finitude, in the general organisation of Kantian thought, can never reflect on itself at its very same level; it only offers itself to consciousness and discourse in a secondary manner; but what it is bound to refer to is not an ontology of the infinite; it is, in their collective (*d'ensemble*) organisation, the *a priori* conditions of knowledge. That is, the *Anthropology* is doubly subject to the *Critique*: as knowledge, to the conditions fixed by and the domain of experience determined by the latter; as exploration of finitude, to the prior and insurmountable forms that the *Critique* manifests.[120]

Their juxtaposition shows that for Foucault the important thing is that the truly temporal, originary time must function only as the passage towards an interrogation of the fundamental, that is, of the transcendental correlation between truth and freedom. That would be the only type of interrogation that could offer a demonstrative answer to a question whose obstinacy in reoccurring 'is tied to the very structure of the Kantian problem: how to think,

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[119] *Ibid.*

[120] *Ibid.* This finds an echo in *Les mots et les choses*, where Foucault speaks of modern philosophy as operating in the confustion 'between empirical and transcendental of which Kant had nevertheless already shown the division. FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 352.

analyse, justify and ground finitude'[121] in a reflection that resorts to neither an ontology of the infinite nor a philosophy of the absolute.

An important difference between the 'Introduction' and *Les mots et les choses* on this point derives from their methodological distinctness; while the earlier is a relatively traditional philosophical exercise and concerns itself exclusively with Kant's development, in the later one we find the attempt at establishing an archaeological method in full swing. The analysis is therefore concerned with a surface of discourse that spans across such 'unities' as an *oeuvre* or disciplines, and aims at providing a description of the rules that determine its internal arrangement; we have just seen, for example, that what appears in the early text as an internal development of Kant's thought (and its subsequent deviation) can appear in the later one as fulfilling the lines of development traced by the break between Classical and modern *épistémès*. The empty space of a future philosophy that the 'Introduction' had outlined – a questioning of the fundamental – is thus filled in a different way in *Les mots et les choses*, where Foucault is looking for signs of wider transformations that would herald the dissolution of man.

The difference in approach, as well as the external weight of, and Foucault's sympathy for, the relative success of structuralist analysis at the time, indicate the fields of psychoanalysis and ethnology (and literature) as the sites where the first lights of a new configuration of knowledge may be emerging.[122] What

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[121] *Idem.* Introduction à l'Anthropologie de Kant. [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault8.htm]

[122] Foucault's relation to structuralism at this time is a rather confusing affair, and one can find just as many shows of sympathy as of distantiation in his interviews. He claims that what he has tried to do 'is to introduce analysis of a structural style into domains where they had not until then penetrated', but also describes his position as one of 'distance, because I speak of it instead of practicing it directly, and redoubling, because I do not want to speak about it without speaking its language'. *Idem.* Le structuralisme nous permet de diagnostiquer ce qu'est 'aujourd'hui'. *In: Idem. Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 609-11. From *L'Archéologie du savoir* on, he will become more adamant that neither he nor his methods are structuralist. The most accurate thing is probably to describe him as identifying in the rise of structuralism the possibility of a 'tactical alliance' against the

gives them this special importance is, first of all, the fact that they are concerned with what is 'outside' man, that is, outside consciousness; they found a positive knowledge of two different forms of unconscious in which both what is given and what escapes human consciousness can be thought. And, secondly, the condition under which they can do so is that they find in a third science – linguistics, which is purely positive and at the same time addresses the medium through which any reflection of finitude can take place – the model through which they can speak of an individual or social unconscious as a formal system that is structured like a language (and here it becomes clear that Foucault has in mind above all the work of Lévi-Strauss and Lacan). These two features make way for the opening up of new relations between human and *a priori* sciences – mathematics in particular – and the attendant possibility of formalisation. Following the logic of the method employed throughout the book, the new centrality of language – where linguistics comes to be the middle term between psychoanalysis, ethnology and mathematics, and literature takes language itself as its object – is what leads Foucault to conclude that, like every time when language's place and role had changed before, it is both the fulfilment of an internal epistemic logic that is taking place, and the likely imminent arrival of a new *épistémè* that is being announced.[123] With it, Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God can finally arrive at its necessary conclusion, and be consummated in the death of man.

I will come back to this moment (in time, and in Foucault's trajectory) in the next chapter. For now, it is enough to wonder if the twin transformations embodied by linguistics and literature respond to the need of a return to Kant – that is, to an interrogation of the fundamental correlation between truth and

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philosophy of the subject, while at the same time a historical event whose immediate and farther historical conditions he tried to describe in Les mots et les choses.

[123] We have seen above the same movement take place in the moment where the appearance of an empirical knowledge of language precipitates the end of the Classic *épistémè*; this internal economy of the book is any case made perfectly clear *In:* FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 397.

freedom – that Foucault seemed to be advancing in the 'Introduction' when opposing transcendental and anthropological illusions:

> The former consists in applying the principles of the understanding outside the limits of experience, and therefore to admit an actual infinite in the field of possible knowledge, through a kind of spontaneous transgression. Now, the anthropological illusion resides in a reflexive regression that must account for this transgression. Finitude is only surpassed insofar as it is something other than itself or rests on something underneath it where it finds its source; this underneath is nothing but itself, but refolded from the field of experience where it is experienced onto the originary region where it is founded. The problem of finitude has gone from an interrogation on limit and transgression to an interrogation on its return to itself; from a problematic of truth to a problematic of the same and the other.[124]

2.2.3 – One or several revolutions?

Apart from the three already noted – a concern with the system that extends beyond the *Critique of pure reason*; the use of Nietzsche as critical foil; the indication of a failure in carrying out the critical project to is ultimate consequences – can another convergence between Deleuze's and Foucault's readings of Kant be found? And how do the two, and any possible convergence between them, relate to the questions set out at the start – the relation between time and immanence, and the specificity of what I have called the transcendental solution?

The answer to both questions can be found in the formula of the 'at once' that populates the discussion in the 'Introduction'; in the game of repetitions in *Les mots et les choses*; and in Deleuze's critique of the concept of possibility. For it will not be difficult to notice now that in the whole structure of anthropological thought presented by Foucault in the form of a series of

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[124] *Idem*. Introduction à l'Anthropologie de Kant. [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault8.htm]

repetitions that are also the creation of a figure that is at once spontaneity and passivity, subject and object, condition and conditioned, it is also that problem that is at stake. When Foucault speaks of a form of enquiry that goes from empirical contents to the question into what founds them, and tries to produce a knowledge of finitude that is given at the same level as what finitude is supposed to found, he is describing the movement that departs from the empirical as given, abstracts a set of possibles from it, and turns the real into the model of the possible that is supposed to ground it. Anthropology is 'a mode of thought in which the limits of knowledge by right (and consequently of all empirical knowledge) are at the same time the concrete forms of existence as they are given in this very same empirical knowledge.'[125] It is no surprise that Foucault should describe this as thought of the return to the Same, which 'responds to itself' from both sides of its interrogation: in fashioning conditions in the image of the conditioned, thought is permanently caught in a reflexive regression that always finds the founded included in the foundation.

Now, the Same is the figure of transcendence understood, in the broad Nietzschean sense, as Platonism: the eternal, the a- or extra-temporal, immutable permanence, self-identical principles that is ontologically prior to the diverse, the multiple, the temporal. It is then legitimate to ask again of post-Kantian thought what sort of relation it establishes with time, in order to answer the question that was set at the start.

At first it would seem that, since Kant, philosophy has been entirely innocent of such a thing as transcendence. The transcendence of Being to thought implies precisely that we know objects on the basis of *their* constitution rather than ours; for the dogmatist, reality is not a problem, as reality is what we know. In the great debate between physics and metaphysics in the 18th century, Leibniz does in fact affirm, *contra* Newton, that time does not

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[125] FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 261.

possess a transcendent, absolute reality, but is only a concept abstracted from the relations among objects; yet these objects themselves are just assumed to be transcendentally real. In the same way does 'problematic idealist' Descartes, while bracketing the existence of a world of outer objects, posit the existence of a thinking substance as the certain evidence of a direct intuition, whose source in us is ultimately the divine intellect. Even the empiricist, for whom for the first time the claims of metaphysics appear as groundless flights of fancy, does not dispute that what is given to our senses possesses a reality that we can apprehend as it is in itself. The important thing here, Kant reminds us, is a failure to adequately distinguish between sensibility and understanding, seeing the two within a continuum in which they only differ in degree: for the dogmatist, intuitions are confused ideas; for the empiricist, our concepts are abstractions from sensory data. The break that separates sensibility and understanding, intuition and concept, is the point through which time flows into the subject. Our knowledge is only possible as long as we can relate a concept to an object that is given to us in intuition, and the idea of a being capable of non-temporal sensibility, an intellectual intuition, is only the negative image of what lies beyond our limits – an inversion of the analogical relation between an *ens realissimum* and finite subjects where, at least at this level, it is God which is said in analogy to us. We can only know objects, including ourselves, as they are given in time. These are two evidences of our finitude, but also an evidence of our power: if we can have intuition at all, it is because it has a form we give to it, i.e., time and space; if intuitions can become knowledge it is only because of our spontaneous synthetic capacity to employ the concepts of our understanding. Double internalisation: the external problem of an agreement between subject and object, whose resolution required the intervention of God, is turned into the internal problem of the relation between our spontaneity and our passivity; and the condition for knowledge of objects, ourselves included, is that they be given in time, the flux that runs through us and in which we determine being;

and even if we can postulate an eternal being, and postulate as the creator of all nature, there is nothing that we can actually know about it.

We saw how Deleuze would argue that, despite the ostensive refusal of any substantial ontological status to God, there is a holy ghost in the machine of Kant's thought: determinant judgments are only possible on the background of the free, subjective arrangements that our faculties find when they have to proceed without a concept for a given intuition; and the ultimate principle that guides these reflexive movements is the idea of a natural causality, which leads necessarily to the postulation of a creator as unconditioned condition according to highest end of reason. But the question is that, even if one might take issue with his particular interpretation of the last *Critique* (of which the picture in the existing scholarship is anyway much less focused then that of the first), there is still, right at the centre of the transformation of eternal or infinite into finite time, the germ of a new compromise with transcendence. Or rather, there are in fact two ways in which this compromise takes place, and again, with Foucault, we can draw the line that separates the two right across the progress of Kant's own thought.

The 'Introduction' distinguishes between the *a priori* time of the first *Critique* and the originary time of the *Anthropology;* since the latter is the one in which the development of the whole analytic of finitude takes shape, it is given a lot more attention then the former. At one point in the text, however, Foucault does have something to say about it:

> In the *Critique*, time made itself transparent to a synthetic activity *which was not in itself temporal*, since it was constituent; in the *Anthropology*, time, mercilessly dispersed, makes synthetic acts impenetrable and obscures them (...)[126]

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[126] FOUCAULT, m. Introduction à l'Anthropologie de Kant.. [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault8.htm]

We will remember that the 'I think' is a purely intellectual representation that accompanies all our syntheses – pure conscience of our spontaneity. It is not an intuition, and as such not given in time; it is a purely formal representation that, although part of the Table of Categories, enjoys a special status in it; it does not even count as a condition for experience in general as such, as it 'belongs to and precedes every experience'.[127] It clearly cannot itself be temporal, since temporality is the form of every possible experience. Not only is it, along with the concept of a general object, one of the two most crucial elements in the account of the Analytic, it is also the moment where transcendental enquiry, deploying itself outside of time and experience, comes the closest to unraveling. (An uncharitable reading of the A Deduction could accuse Kant of incurring in the same kind of paralogism as Descartes when he affirms that transcendental apperception entails not only unity, but also identity[128], not a small problem as it would amount to having a noumenon as a part of the a priori structure of experience. The account is refined in the B Deduction, stressing that the knowledge offered by apperception does not determine any object – with the consequence that it would therefore be possible to imagine that there may be no coincidence between the I that thinks and the self that is given to inner sense. Kant is explicitly committed to affirm that this coincidence can at least be postulated, given that it is essential for morality; but, as in different moments throughout the Critique, he cannot foreclose here an exploration in a different direction.) The conclusion is clear: the time of the a priori, constitutive of all determination in time, is itself extra- or a-temporal.

On the other hand, the problem with originary time is trying to hold in the same level the a priori and positive, conscious contents, inserting itself in the gap between 'I' and 'self', with the inevitable consequence that it will oscillate endlessly between the two poles. The unmaking of the transcendental

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[127] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*, A354.
[128] *Ibid.*, A113.

solution to the problem of grounding an immanent philosophical discourse in itself appears as double, expressing itself in the two modes of relation to time that this solution can resort to. At the *a priori* level, it refers knowledge back to a spontaneous synthetic activity that resides outside of time, and thus enjoys the same status as a creating God, Plato's Ideas or, indeed, the Aristotelian Table of Categories that Kant appropriates: all knowledge is founded upon an empty formal structure that, from a distance that cannot be covered, is its self-identical and permanent source. It is true that, unlike its counterpart in transcendent metaphysics, it is not conceived as a being, but only a form; its right to inherit the same powers as its predecessors remains untouched.[129] At the originary level, it searches for the conditions of the given in the given in a way in which the regressive interrogation (*Zurückfragen*) works by projecting the given onto its conditions of possibility, and making the conditions out of the conditioned. Whereas in the first case it is the pure formality of the subject as an 'I', here it is the subject *qua* living, concrete subject that takes over as the ground of knowledge; with the consequence that the *form of the present* becomes the *de facto* condition of possibility of all knowledge: the extra- or atemporal gold standard of identity from which all positive knowledge, all history, all that is given and all that escapes us (unthought, 'primitive' cultures etc.) can be thought. Such are the powers of the Same: regardless how far and alien to itself its objects might be, they are always made thinkable by right on its grounds. Or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it, specifically in regard to phenomenology:

> Phenomenology wanted to renew our concepts, giving us perceptions and

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[129] 'Kant will call this subject transcendental, and not transcendent, as it is the subject of the field of immanence of all possible experience, of which nothing, external or internal, escapes. Kant refuses any transcendent use of synthesis, but relates immanence to the subject of synthesis as the new unity, subjective unity. He can even go as far as denouncing transcendental illusions, making them into the "horizon" of the field immanent to the subject. in doing so, however, Kant finds the modern way of saving transcendence: it is not the transcendence of a Something, or of a One above everything (contemplation), but that of a Subject *to which* the field of immanence is not attributed without belonging to a self that necessarily represents such a subject to itself (reflection). The Greek world which belonged to no-one becomes more and more the property of a Christian consciousness.' DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 48.

affections that would makes us be born to the world (...) But one does not fight perceptive and affective clichés without also fighting the machine that produces them. In invoking the primordial lived experience, making immanence immanent to a subject, phenomenology could not prevent the subject from forming opinions that would simply extract the cliché from new perceptions and affections.[130]

Either way, the conclusion for Foucault and Deleuze is unequivocal: the attempts to ground a thought of immanence in the subject have become stuck in a constantly unstable ground that only manages to resurrect the God of transcendent metaphysics in the transcendental subject. And this of course applies not only to Kant (and Foucault, as we have seen, is a lot more nuanced in his critique of him), but the whole of post-Kantian philosophy. The model of the doubles of man developed in the final chapters of *Les mots et les choses* applies indistinctly to phenomenology (from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, via Heidegger), Hegel, Marx, positivism. And no different is Deleuze's position when, with Guattari, he attacks any philosophy of the subject for making immanence immanent *to* a subject, and thus reintroducing an analogical element that is a break between two different 'orders' of Being covered in a reflection of the subject upon itself (Descartes and Kant are the two explicit targets here); or when, on top of the dative relation, transcendence is reintroduced in all that escapes consciousness and points towards a communication with other selves (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Lévinas are referred to).[131] Be it by adhering to the pure extra-temporal formality of a constituent subject, or by deploying in lived time transcendental invariants whose analysis would expose the originary structures of our mode of relation to a world that predates and escapes us in otherness (Ego, Dasein, Flesh) – the kind of thought that seeks a transcendental solution to the problem of realised immanence will necessarily entail the explication of something which is either outside time or projected from the present (*to*

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[130] *Ibid.*, p. 142.
[131] *Ibid.*, pp. 47-9.

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consciousness and *in* time) over that which is supposed to explain it. Pure extra-temporal formality or the form of the present: the transcendental solution is condemned to reintroducing transcendence right at the point in which it was supposed to have been dissolved.

Sad destiny of betrayal for Kant's revolution: just when it seemed that immanence could be given its adequate philosophical form in a discourse that would at once eliminate the illusions of transcendence of God, soul, world, thus eliminating the analogical relation from where they could, from a distance outside the flux of time, provide the measure and sense of what is given in time; and in that very movement realise its own immanence in a discourse that would be able to provide its own grounds, determine its limits and demonstrate itself as true by right; just then, philosophy found a new compromise with transcendence: a new form of atemporality or the form of the present. 'One is not content anymore to relate immanence back to transcendence, one wants to return immanence to it, to reproduce it, to fabricate it in itself. In fact, it is not difficult, all it takes is to *stop movement*.'[132]

At this point, Foucault's two questions are: can there be a knowledge of finitude at the empirical level? And can there be a thought of finitude that does not find its ground in an ontology of the infinite, where it is just the negative image of what grounds it? The answer to the first is a resounding 'no'; the answer to the second, as suggested in the 'Introduction', must include both a rejection of anthropology and a displacement towards the level of the fundamental correlation between truth and freedom. Deleuze's two questions are: can there be a thought of univocity that manages to avoid every compromise with analogy, be it God or subject? Can there be a transcendental method that renders possible a thought of conditions of existence rather than possibility, and does not have to assume a self-identical subject as given from the start, but can provide an account of its genesis

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[132] *Ibid.*, p. 49. (Italics in the original).

along with that of objects? Providing an answer to the second is the line of development through which he attempts to answer the first. Both sets of questions open onto a single, common one: how is another form of critique possible, which will not fall back within the limits where critique has been trapped almost ever since the moment when it was first unleashed in its most radical form – the cage to which it returned, believing itself to be breaking free? Thus far, what we see is that both indicate a direction in which their respective researches will move: Nietzsche. Genealogy, eternal return: the names of two attempts at establishing a new relation between time and immanence. These will be the two points to turn to, after a detour through Hegel's specific contribution to the problem of realised immanence.

2.3 – The historical solution: Hegel

It could seem strange that Hegel should warrant a separate discussion; his thought is, after all, as strongly embedded in the subject-form as any of those discussed above, and he is clearly implicated by Foucault in the critique of the *épistémè* of man that stretches from the last chapters of *Les mots et les choses* to *L'Archeologie du savoir*, where the author of *Science of Logic* is, alongside phenomenology, the main polemical foil. One would expect that it would not escape the same critiques outlined above – of re-encountering transcendence either in the form of an atemporality of the subject, or by giving the form of the present an atemporal status. And it is of course not innocent of either, as one can see in Deleuze's and Foucault's responses (not to mention Heidegger's). However, the specific way in which the subject-form is deployed in his work, and with it the weight taken by the question of immanence, amounts to the introduction of certain elements whose importance, negative and/or positive, to the development of Foucault's and Deleuze's own philosophical projects should not be underestimated.

For anyone chasing the red thread of immanence throughout the history of modernity, Hegel has a presence that is at once towering and somewhat embarrassing: a point of completion which is, at the same time (and perhaps by the same token) too difficult to accept. His is certainly the most radical attempt at producing a philosophy of immanence after Spinoza, with the added advantage of its chronological position after Kant, another great philosopher of immanence (even if in a very different way). As a matter of fact, Hegel's overall goal could be summarised as trying to bring together Spinoza's immanent substance, which cannot accept in its one-sided objectivity, and Kant's constituent subject, whose experience immanence is immanent to. In its intention to promote a higher unity between the two highest systems of immanence – one objective, the other subjective –, Hegel's is therefore no less than the most ambitious project of finally establishing a philosophical discourse of immanence. Which is also to say that what Hegel is effectively doing is, as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* very bluntly suggests, drawing a line under the whole of Enlightenment and establishing its aftermath: the process of critique and immanentisation sweeping both philosophy and society since the early hours of modernity (and, in its most radical form, since Spinoza), which had found its paroxysm in France's revolutionary Terror, would come to its conclusion in the moment when the word of the *Logic* can finally be spoken. Conclusion, rather than end: Kant's problem was to put an end to reason's state of nature by creating a mechanism of adjudication capable of excluding the most extreme claims (dogmatism, empiricism, scepticism), after which metaphysics could finally begin on safe grounds – in a straight line rather than endless circles, as Kant himself tried to do in the (ultimately aborted) development of the system of transcendental philosophy.

In a very particular way, Hegel did accept that Kant had managed to bring philosophy to its civil state – but had also failed to draw all the consequences from his own revolution. In moving one step further, Hegel is radicalising the

end of transcendent metaphysics announced by the *Critique*, and doing so by eliminating what he saw as the last remnant of dogmatism that had survived in the Kantian system itself: the thing-in-itself. 'That which, prior to this period, was called metaphysics has been, so to speak, extirpated root and branch and has vanished from the ranks of the sciences' – this is how the *Science of Logic* announces itself.[133] The sentence already offers a glimpse of the full implications of what this step sets out to do. The elimination of any form of transcendence – any 'something' which would subsist outside time and outside the subject, as either what is way below it (an 'ineffable' of sensible experience that cannot be made conceptual) or high above it, be it as an actual being or substance (a divine creator) or merely a negative figure (a thing in itself of which we can only know that it exists) – which opens onto the discovery of a logicity of Being goes hand in hand with the most drastic radicalisation of the effect of the Copernican revolution on philosophy itself: what we can call the *realisation* of immanence. This means two things; one, moving from a purely formal (i.e., logically possible) construction of an immanent philosophy to the demonstration of its correspondence with the real – that is, at once its *objective validity* and its *necessity*; two, providing an immanent account of its construction, that is, the *real genesis* of the system *in Being*. If Kant redoubles the problem of immanence into two divergent paths that are also two sides of a fold, material and a formal sides, to realise immanence corresponds to folding the two back together. With Hegel, 'philosophical discourse itself [poses], within itself, the problem of its beginning and its end'[134]. It is not only a discourse on immanence, but one which is entirely immanent to itself, whose enunciation provides and finds in itself the foundation of its own truth; in it, philosophy is made immanent not to the experience of an *a priori* subject, but to the whole of human experience in

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[133] HEGEL, G.W.F. *Science of Logic*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International, 1989, § 2. This is the edition referred to throughout.

[134] FOUCAULT, M. Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968. *In: Dits et ecrits*. Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 811. (Slightly changed.) The quote continues: 'the moment where philosophical thought gives itself the inexhaustible task of saying the total field of non-philosophy, and tries to arrive, in all its sovereignty, at the enunciation of its own end.'

its development, and therefore also the development of philosophy which, from the vantage point offered by the moment when the logic of Being can be exposed for the first time, appears as the necessary process that had never led anywhere else but there. In Hegel, the culmination of human experience and the culmination of philosophy are one and the same thing: and when thought overcomes all its partial, one-sided previous moments, it is Being itself which achieves its culmination and becomes fully entitled to the total knowledge of itself; if such a system can be articulated at all, it is because the whole of history, the whole of thought as embodied throughout history had always been marching towards the moment of its articulation. Nothing had ever been 'external', transcendent to this process; and when the process has reached its completion, it becomes clear that everything that had ever seemed to escape it had been nothing but a moment where Logos had failed to fully capture its own sense and, by the very same token, been led to find itself again in a higher stage: *'there is no second world, and there is nevertheless a Logos and an absolute speculative life'*[135], summarises Hyppolite. It is this unique solution to the problem of realising immanence that is hereby called 'historical', and it is its specificity – its startling match of total negation of transcendence and pure affirmation of the rights of the finite subject to transcend its finitude in the direction of an absolute knowledge – which warrants its special treatment here.

The first consequence of the absolute immanence of thought to its own history that is at the basis of Hegel's system can be seen in the way in which Hegel himself relates to the history of philosophy. His system occupies the privileged point in historical becoming where Logos comes to know itself in Absolute Knowledge; to its elaboration, therefore, no previous philosophical intuition or finalised system can be external, and every single moment must necessarily fit into it – not through accretion, but through the dialectical process in which all systems, overcome in their limits, become subsumed

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[135] HYPPOLITE, J. *Logique et existence.* Paris: PUF, 2002, p. 71. (Hyppolite's italics.)

under his, just as all such moments were, in the very limits that necessitated their overcoming, necessary stages in the march of Logos.[136] The place occupied by Spinoza in this process is a privileged one: in the *Logic* (which is not an exposition of formal logic, but the self-explication of Logos) his immanent substance is the point where Objective Logic, Hegel's name for transcendent metaphysics, achieves its completion and leads onto Subjective Logic.[137] It represents both a major step, and a limit necessarily overcome: 'to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of all philosophy'[138]; and yet 'everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as *Substance*, but equally as *Subject*'[139]. The last statement already clarifies how Spinoza and Kant are held together at the heart of Hegel's system: in Kant, Subjective Logic finds a decisive affirmation, opening the path for the synthesis with Objective Logic – the synthesis of Being as Substance and as Subject in the Concept (*Begriff*) – which will be Hegel's work to achieve.

It is ironic, though not surprising, that for Hegel the problem with the *Ethics* is that it remains a transcendent philosophy: in it, thought (that of the finite mode) encounters the totality of Being as a Substance which precedes it eternally and is indifferent to it; the immanence explicitly affirmed in the letter of the text is denied by the structure of the system.[140] The Absolute is thus misconceived as the pure presence of a thing-like substance; an inert, self-

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[136] *Cf.* HEGEL, G. W. F. *Lectures on the history of philosophy.* Trans. Haldane, E. S. and F. H. Simson. New York: Humanities Press, 1974, vol. I, pp. 36-9.

[137] The distinction consisting in that Objective Logic is 'the logic of the Concept as being', and Subjective Logic 'of the Concept as Concept'. HEGEL, G.W.F. *Science of Logic*, § 79. This is the edition referred to throughout; I have preferred to render *Begriff* as 'Concept' rather than 'Notion'.

[138] HEGEL, G. W. F. *Lectures on the history of philosophy.* Trans. Haldane, E. S. and F. H. Simson. New York: Humanities Press, 1974, vol. III, p. 257.

[139] *Idem. Phenomenology of Spirit.* Trans. Miller, A. V.. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, §17. (Hegel's italics.) This is the edition I refer to throughout.

[140] 'Spinozism is a defective philosophy because in it reflection and its manifold determining is an external thinking. The substance of this system is one substance, one indivisible totality; there is no determinateness that is not contained and dissolved in this absolute; and it is sufficiently important that in this necessary notion, everything which to natural picture thinking or to the understanding with its fixed distinctions, appears and is vaguely present as something self-subsistent, is *completely reduced to a mere positedness.*' HEGEL, G. W. F. *Science of Logic*, §1179. (My italics)

identical thing given from the outset, in an entirely unilateral relation to the modes whose cause it is – and who must, consequently, be said only by analogy with it. Given the lack of reciprocal determination between mode and substance, the latter lacks any internal development – which in turn means that the principle of its becoming, *natura naturans*, can be said only in a contingent analogy to the permanence of an eternal *natura naturata*. The same fate befalls the divine attributes and modes: they are not real as such, but only subjective reflections that determine the Substance by limiting it in thought. A faultline opens up that runs right through Spinoza's monistic Substance. And for this, says Hegel, is that Spinoza conceives substance as pure, positive, self-identical being, and thus lacks a principle of dialectical negation.

It is thanks to negation that Hegel can conceive of the Absolute as what contains in it all differences; its only identity is that of being the mediation of all oppositions. This entails that it cannot be given at the outset, but can only be arrived at after the ascending work of Logos that advances from contradiction to contradiction towards ever greater unity. 'The true is the whole', which is 'nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute it must be said that it is essentially a *result*, that only in the *end* is it what it truly is.'[141] In envisaging the Absolute as mediation and process, Hegel moves beyond the transcendent idea of a first substratum to which all predicates would inhere. The motor of this dialectical process is to be found in the movement of negation and sublation (*Aufhebung*); its absence in Spinoza is what makes modes and attributes seem entirely contingent: without a principle of internal differentiation, the question of why they should exist at all is a mystery.[142] For Hegel the problem

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[141] HEGEL, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §20. (Hegel's italics.)

[142] This ultimate contingence is a point which Yovel believes can be accepted without necessarily leading to Hegel's conclusion that modes and attributes are just products of imagination. *Cf.* YOVEL, Y. *Spinoza and other heretics. The adventures of immanence.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 37.

of conceiving of difference and identity at the same time is senseless: all 'difference is already implicitly contradiction'[143], because when one side posits itself against another (as what it is not), it negates that through which it can posit itself, and therefore contains in itself its own negation and sublation, which is the key concept (symptomatically introduced in the *Science of Logic* immediately after Being, Nothing, and Becoming) that operates the movement of contradiction. At once preservation and cessation, it is a non-being, but not nothing (which, like Being, is immediate); what is sublated is the result of a mediation, but preserving '*in itself* the *determinate* [being] *from which it originates*.'[144] Identity that becomes difference and is overcome, yet preserved in its overcoming at a higher stage: the fractal structure of Hegel's system is given in this movement and its triadic form, at once the general arc of the trajectory in which the Absolute externalises itself as Nature and returns to itself as self-conscious Spirit, and that of every single moment in which this narrative unfolds.

Still, Hegel accepts the monism of the *Ethics* as indeed the only basis on which the Absolute can be thought, even though in Spinoza it is captured only in its abstract, given form, not in the vitality of its movement.[145] This is indeed what is also at stake in the critique of the *more geometrico*: it offers proofs of objects not as they are conceived, but as they would be in themselves independently of the subject; it thus fails to grasp the object in its essence: the Concept in which it coincides with the subject's being-for-self (that is, the realm of reason where the subject is conscious that the object as it appears is the subject's own work). It remains purely external, at the level of mere

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[143] HEGEL, G. W. F. *Science of Logic*, §934.

[144] *Ibid.*, §184.

[145] 'This Idea of Spinoza's we must allow to be in the main true and well-grounded; absolute substance is the truth, but it is not the whole truth; in order to be this it must also be thought of as in itself active and living, and by that very means it must determine itself as Spirit (*Geist*).' HEGEL, G. W. F. *Lectures on the history of philosophy*. Translated by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson. New York: Humanities Press, 1974, vol. III, p. 257. (Giving, for reasons of consistency, 'Spirit' for 'mind'.)

understanding.[146] It is only with Kant that the problem of philosophical methodology – one adequate not to the object's external form, but to the movement in which it is internalised by the subject in a progressive engendering of truth – will be first posed in adequate terms: any truth must be reason's own production, and therefore it is only in a process of self-explication of truth that such process can be presented in the unfolding that finds the true *at the end*, as *result*. This does not, however, imply that Hegel is satisfied with the way in which this self-explication takes place in Kant.

How can Kant's contribution then be used in order to grasp the Absolute in its internal movement, that is, in its essence? Hegel's critique of Kant remains, in part at least, very close to that of other post-Kantians such as Maïmon, Fichte and Schelling, hence also Deleuze: its essential problem is that of the incapacity of the critical system to go beyond what in finds in the analysis of the transcendental framework as pure facticity: the irreducible separation between sensibility and understanding, the source of the categories – in short, the problem of genesis. The way in which these (for Kant, at least) insurmountable limits represented a serious source of embarrassment for the first generation to come after the Copernican turn repeats the pattern of the motivation behind the turn itself: for Kant, it was a matter of putting an end to (transcendent) metaphysics so that metaphysics could be put out of the reach of the sceptic's attack and, as such, serve as the ground for morality; for those who followed in his wake, the necessity to go beyond Kant came out of the need to defend idealism's revolutionary implications. As long as the understanding allows the most fundamental elements in the subject's constitution to go unexplained, the assertion that truth must be seen as dependent on the subject rather than on the object, as immanent rather than

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[146] It is here again a question of the system's architectonic reintroducing that which on the surface is argued against: 'philosophical truth is subordinated to a guarantee of formal evidence, an abstract and external rule. Thus, even if [Spinoza] declares himself a monist by affirming the absolute unity of substance, he establishes again a sort of dualism through the separation in knowledge itself between form and content..' MACHEREY, P. *Hegel ou Spinoza*. Paris: La Découverte, 1990, p. 43.

transcendent, will not be safe – it will still be possible to view such limits as the revelation of a transcendence at work behind them, which gives them a form adequate to their ends (and none other, in fact, as seen above, would have been Kant's own hidden ontology).[147] Critique demands a metacritique that can ultimately ground it.

Hegel's solution (just as, in a different way, Fichte's) will, unsurprisingly, be that the subject itself has to be the source of its genesis. 'Reason is the certainty that it is all reality; thus does idealism express its Concept'.[148] With Kant, truth is made dependent on the subject, not the object: all reality is of the subject's own making. If the *Phenomenology* is not the history of empirical totality, but of a totality of signification constituting itself, the Copernican turn figures in it as the point where Being and self-consciousness are recognised to have the same essence. Nevertheless, idealism remains the affirmation of the empty form of the constituent subject, opaque to itself – incapable of finding in itself the genesis of its own form[149] – and thus self-contradicting in that 'reality directly comes to be for it a reality that is just as much *not* that of Reason, while Reason is at the same time supposed to be all reality.'[150] It remains in thrall to a limit that at once restricts it to empirical knowledge (immanence to experience), and thus denies it the knowledge of infinity, and yet points towards what is beyond this limit as its unknowable source (transcendence). Reason becomes an in-itself for reason itself. The same problem is repeated at the level of the separation between sensibility and understanding: while as spontaneity it is the subject that constitutes reality, as

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[147] Philonenko goes as far as raising the hypothesis that, for Kant, these limits have the added function of working as indirect proof of a divine creator's existence. *Cf.* PHILONENKO, A. L'Emergence de l'idéalisme transcendental dans la *Phénomenologie de l"Esprit* de Hegel et sa critique. *In: Le transcendantal et la pensée moderne. Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie.* Paris: PUF, 1990, p. 201.

[148] HEGEL, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §233.

[149] 'But to pick up the plurality of categories again in some way or other as a welcome find, taking them, e.g., from the various judgments, and complacently so, is in fact to be regarded as an outrage to Science. Where else should the Understanding be able to demonstrate a necessity, if it is unable to do so in its own self, which is pure necessity?'. *Ibid.*, §235.

[150] *Ibid.*, §239.

long as this activity is regarded in purely formal terms it remains the case that such spontaneity (exercised, as we know, through the categories) is empty without something external being given to it in intuition, that is, in passivity.

The oppositions between intuition and concept, content and form, passivity and activity fall away once the opposition of subjective ideality and objective reality are overcome, and this is the synthesis between Kant and Spinoza: 'substantiality embraces the universal, or the *immediacy of knowledge* itself, as well as that which is *being* or immediacy *for* knowledge'[151].

> [T]he living Substance is being which is in truth *Subject*, or, what is the same, is in truth actual only in so far as it is the movement of positing itself, or is the mediation of its self-othering with itself.[152]

It is through the Concept that the synthesis between Substance and Subject is operated, or rather, and that the Absolute, as Spirit, knows itself in its determinations; and these determinations, once shorn of all that is empirical and partial in them and grasped in their pure universality, *are* what the Concept *is*: the 'absolute unity of being and reflection in which being is in and for itself only in so far as it is no less reflection or positedness, and positedness is no less being that is in and for itself.'[153] In the Concept the finite subject can go beyond the 'spurious infinity' of the understanding, which, in positing the finite and the infinite as external to each other, remained trapped in an infinite progression that always raised a new limit to knowledge and ultimately placed its point of arrival, Absolute Knowledge, outside its reach (that, of course, being precisely the point of Kant's ideas of reason). But it can only do so because, in doing it, it is in fact participating in the realisation of the Absolute's (as Substance and Subject) movement of self-positing. What appears as the disparity between subject and object is in

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[151] *Ibid.*, §17.
[152] *Ibid.*, §18.
[153] *Idem. Science of Logic*, §1282.

fact the internal difference in the Substance/Subject itself: the negativity that moves all movement. Neither *adequatio intellectus ad rem* nor *adequatio rei ad intellectum*, truth is the progressive mutual *adequatio* of subject and object, or better still, the *adequatio* to itself of what is at once subject and object, Subject and Substance. The spontaneity of the Subject is then no less than the freedom to realise itself through its progressive determination. It is no coincidence that the discussion in the *Science of Logic* uses the State as example: its universal essence underlies any historically given instantiation of a civil constitution as 'an urge so powerful that [humans] are impelled to translate it into reality'[154], and at the same time it is only under a State that corresponds to the Concept that Spirit can achieve full self-consciousness,– a process realised in history, a history which is none other than the one followed by the *Phenomenology of Spirit*.[155]

The *Phenomenology of Spirit* is a unique mixture of propaedeutic work and retrospective, theory of knowledge and world history: a *Bildungsroman* of reason. Its object is precisely the phenomenal movement of the externalisation of the Absolute in the world, as seen from a point in which it has ceased to be mere phenomenon and become immediate and reflexive consciousness of itself, that is, Absolute Knowledge. This process of self-alienation through determination is not, unlike the relation between *natura*

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[154] *Ibid.*, §1637.

[155] Philonenko highlights how Kant and Hegel stand in total mutual exteriority here: for Kant, reason in history can only be apprehended subjectively (*Cf.*, for example, the question of the French Revolution *In:* KANT, I. The contest of the faculties. *In: Political writings.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 177-200); for Hegel, the objective development of history shows that it is subjective self-comprehension; 'Kant denounces history as science – Hegel affirms it as philosophy'. This, he highlights, has its background in an important difference between the two in what regards the 'sense' of Being, that is, ontology: for Kant, it is a formal explication of the structure of experience as it is given to us, and hence on the side of mathematics; for Hegel, it is the content of experience itself, and hence on the side of history. *Cf.* PHILONENKO, A. *Op. cit.*, p. 189. Hegel, of course, does not think that mathematical knowledge, for him merely a product of the reductionist tendency of the understanding, is adequate to the task of disclosing the logicity of Being that only speculative reason is capable of (*Cf.* HEGEL, G.W.F. *Science of Logic*, §8; Phenomenology of Spirit, §§43-5; HYPPOLITE, J. *Logique et existence.* Paris: PUF, 2002, p. 63-6.); we would, however, find a number of French thinkers – from Brunschvicg down to Badiou, through Bachelard and, in his way, Deleuze – siding with Kant on this issue.

naturans and *natura naturata* as Hegel interprets it, a contingent one, but necessitated by the Absolute's dialectical logical structure: it is necessary for it to go from undifferentiated infinity to various forms of determined finitude in order to progress to an ever greater degree of actuality, as much as it is necessary that this ascension necessary leads back to itself as self-knowledge, the highest degree of actuality. It is in 'the universal individual'[156], Spirit, that the journey is finalised, and singular, historical individuals are themselves no more than partial moments in it; and yet only path that could lead to the conclusion is that of the negative determinations in which the journey manifests itself. The negative being the motor of all Being means that the false is necessarily part of true, the finite necessarily part of the infinite; and that the true can only come to be through the false, the infinite only be actualised through the finite. As Hegel announces in the Preface (which is a preface not to the book, but to the entire system of Science, i.e., speculative philosophy), it is only at the point in time in which Absolute Knowledge appears *to itself* (i.e., becomes *self-consciousness* or *being-for-self*) that it can see the way in which it historically *appeared* in the world (i.e., as *phenomenon* or *being-in-itself*). The text is as such split into two layers; as it follows Spirit's historical development, it narrates it as it appeared to those historical men who were its past instruments (*Wekzeuge*)[157], but also, and more importantly, as it appears to those who already inhabit the time when this development is complete. Retrospective, yet also propaedeutic: it is when it arrives at its end – the end where the reader, as historical being, has been since the start of the book – that the process it describes comes to an end for a second time – once as history (empiria, in-itself), and twice as its retelling (self-consciousness, for-itself) – and philosophy can finally acquire a discourse perfectly adequate to itself. The Absolute/Being in the form of Spirit

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[156] HEGEL, G. W. F. Phenomenology of Spirit, §28.

[157] [T]he means which the World-Spirit uses for realising its Idea' is the mediation that 'involves the activity of personal existences in whom Reason is present as their absolute, substantial being; but a basis, in the first instance, still obscure and unknown to them.' *Idem. The philosophy of history.* Trans. Sibree, J. New York: Dover, 1956, p. 37.

is finally entitled to immediate knowledge of itself and to a language in which the movement of its Logos can be captured reflexively, its sense, spoken: the *Logic*.

Thus it is that at the end of Hegel's critique of Kant we find ourselves facing the most puzzling divarication: to go back in the direction of transcendental philosophy is to reconcile ourselves with our finitude, but not without giving ourselves up to a transcendence that may hide behind a veil of unknowability, but is undiminished in its presumptive power by our ignorance; we must therefore move forward, but to do so is to erase the limits Kant had so painstakingly fixed for the finite intellect, and move towards Absolute Knowledge. That Absolute Knowledge is necessary if we are to save immanence from any compromise with the transcendent: such is Hegel's most daring synthesis.

It is this coincidence of objective and subjective genitives – which makes the thought of Being the same thing as Being's thought of itself, and hence suppresses any distinction in the last instance between thought and Being – that constitutes Hegel's highest contribution to the problem of immanence. One could say that if the dative, as Deleuze and Guattari show, is the marker of transcendence – a relation of one thing *to* another it immediately produces a split in two in which one has to be said by analogy of the other –, then the coincidence of genitives is the marker of immanence. In it, Hegel manages to operate the synthesis of what transcendent metaphysics held in total opposition: reason and history, logic and existence, permanence and becoming. The atemporal becomes historical time in the same movement in which the Verb of the Absolute becomes flesh in Nature and, through the rise of empirical man from natural being to universal, supra-subjective self-consciousness, returns to itself as Spirit: Being that knows itself.

The logic of the Concept corresponds to the great turn in the history of philosophy that transcendental logic represents. Kant called it in a letter his ontology, and it is indeed a new ontology, since it substitutes the logicity of Being for a world of essence, to the being of logic. Hegel's speculative logic, pushing the anthropological reduction set in motion with the transcendental to its conclusion, is the deepening of this dimension of sense. It is Being which is its own self-comprehension, its own sense, and the Logos is Being positing itself as sense; but it is Being which poses itself as sense, which means that sense is not alien to Being, outside or beyond it. This is why sense also includes non-sense, the anti-Logos, its in- as much as for-itself, but its in-itself is for-itself, and its for-itself is in-itself. The dimension of sense is not only sense, it is the genesis of sense in general, and it suffices for itself. Immanence is complete.[158]

2.3.1 – The ends of history

The supreme discomfort of such a system without an outside is that, once accepted in its own terms, it renders senseless any criticism that would have Hegel falling back into transcendent metaphysics in the same movement in which he tries to overcome the limits of transcendental philosophy: what may appear as an absurdly illegitimate flight of fancy is, as Absolute Knowledge, entirely justified in its progressive actualisation. The entire system is made true in the process of its very writing, since the moment of its writing is that when this truth has finally been achieved; and it is only when this truth has been achieved that this process can appear for what it is, viz., the self-development of truth itself: 'the way to Science is itself already *Science*'.[159] This makes an internal critique practically impossible. Perhaps some of the dialectical transformations, particularly in the *Phenomenology*, may appear contrived; the speculative system nevertheless demands wholesale adoption. The very form in which it does so, however – by placing the burden of its validation on history –, makes the weight of *a posteriori* falsification much

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[158] HYPPOLITE, J. *Logique et existence*. Paris: PUF, 2002, p. 230.
[159] *Idem. Phenomenology of Spirit*, §88.

stronger than it is in Kant's case: depending on how one reads history (and how one reads Hegel's emphasis on it) – and probably very few today would want to follow Hegel that closely here – the announcement of its imminent culmination, in its combination of politics and philosophy, can be little more than a relic of its time.[160] And considering how all pieces of the system hold together, dismissing one without the others demands much contortion – the alternative thus being to severely reduce the breadth of Hegel's claims.[161] In any case, all critique of speculative philosophy must remain, for the most part, external.

One of the main lines of such critique directly concerns the question of immanence: it basically consists in pointing out how Hegel's extreme monism of an internally differentiating Substance/Subject, in its necessary movement of self-alienation and reconciliation through self-consciousness, effectively reintroduces the Christian notion of a Divine Providence guiding history through the necessary vicissitudes that deliver redemption at the end – tantamount, in fact, to a sophisticated secularisation of trinitarian theology, with the Absolute as God, Nature as Christ, and Spirit, the Holy Ghost binding the two.[162] What is more, the separation between Nature and Spirit, in-itself and for-itself, maintains the dogma of the separation of matter and soul (as

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[160] This would seem to be the fate of much contemporary attempts at reviving Hegel's teleologism – notably Francis Fukuyama's *The end of history and the last man.* Never has a book had the end of its own history announced so often, and so quickly following its publication.

[161] Philonenko makes the point about this systematicity requiring complete rejection on the grounds of the rejection of one part into a cry of exasperation at those who can cling on to Hegel while deriding his philosophy of Nature. *Cf.* PHILONENKO, A. L'Emergence de l'idéalisme transcendantal dans la *Phénomenologie de l''Esprit* de Hegel et sa critique. *In: Le transcendental et la pensée moderne. Etudes d'histoire de la philosophie.* Paris: PUF, 1990, p. 204.

[162] 'The insight then to which — in contradistinction from those ideals — philosophy is to lead us, is, that the real [actual] world is as it ought to be — that the truly good — the universal divine reason — is not a mere abstraction, but a vital principle capable of realising itself. This *Good*, this *Reason*, in its most concrete form, is God. God governs the world; the actual working of his government — the carrying out of his plan — is the History of the World.' HEGEL, G.W.F. *The philosophy of history.* New York: Dover, 1956, p. 36. (Hegel's italics.) The *Logic*, in turn, is famously described as 'the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.' *Idem. Science of Logic,* §53.

well as Aristotle's hylemorphic scheme); the movement through which *Wirklichkeit* affirms itself in its progressive detachment from the base empiria of *Realität* mirrors the negation of the flesh and the sensual in favour of that, in the real, that belongs to the soul/Spirit – the truly rational highest end that reason strives towards. A Spinozist corollary would be that, in giving the Substance the form and powers of a Subject, Hegel remains squarely within the realm of superstitious, anthropomorphising *vana religio*; and so prisoner to imaginary knowledge and sad passions. Both the notion of progress and its correlate, a meta-historical subject, will, as we have seen, number among Foucault's primary targets, and be thoroughly dismissed by Deleuze in the name of immanence; in both, even if in different ways (that go by the respective names of pleasure and desire), ethics will be the affirmation of this-worldliness and joy.

The other broad line of critique is that established by Marx. While accepting the basic tenets of the system, above all the triadic structure of dialectics, he attacks it for 'standing on its head', and sentences it to 'be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell'[163] – so goes that most hackneyed of quotes. The mystic mystification in question lies in the fact that the self-consciousness of Spirit takes the place of concrete human existence, thus allowing every concrete limit to be dialectically overcome in the pure thought of the Absolute: Hegel 'stands the world *on its head* and can therefore dissolve *in the head* all limitations, which naturally remain in existence *for evil sensuousness*, for *real* man.'[164] 'Evil' here alludes to the fact that, in absolute idealism, the material world is only a limitation of the Absolute, the external, phenomenal form it must take in order

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[163] MARX, K. Afterword to the second German edition. *In: Capital. A critique of political economy.* Translated by S. Moore and E. Aveling. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 2003, vol. I, p. 29

[164] MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. *The holy family, or critique of critical critique: against Bruno Bauer and consorts, 1845.* Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956, p. 254. The two sound quite like Deleuze here in saying that 'the whole destructive work results in the *most conservative philosophy* because it thinks it has overcome the *objective world*, the sensuously real world by merely transforming it into a "thing of thought" (...).' (p. 253)

to achieve its highest degree of actuality in self-knowledge. With Hegel, real movement always happens in the logic of the world rather than the world itself; and thus to turn dialectics the right way up means to make the ideal into the reflection of the material world. If Hegel's immanence is Spinoza's Substance spiritualised, what Marx wants to do is a return to Spinoza, in that immanence is again made to correspond to nature; but it is again a departure, in that nature is humanised. The problem of bringing the subjective and the objective together, which had in Hegel been solved through the gradual work of the Concept, as long as it is considered apart from human activity, can be dismissed outright as a purely scholastic problem: idealism abstractly considers reality as an object of contemplation; the problem for dialectical materialism is to grasp it subjectively, that is, as human praxis that transforms the world.[165]

In this inversion, Marx also reverts the move that had allowed the dismissal of the limits of the finite intellect as set by Kant. Nature here ceases to be the external expression of an absolute subjectivity and is returned to its more modest status of a totality organised according to mechanical laws. But Marx too wishes to push Kantian immanence forward, which he does by eliminating the chasm between nature and man at the bottom of which God could still be at least presumed. The separation between the realms of necessity and freedom – which made morality possible at the cost of erecting the subject as an *imperium in imperio* – becomes internal to nature. Whereas Kant found himself obliged to postulate a transcendence in the form of the noumenal agent, man is for Marx strictly a natural being; but it is also nature's active, for-itself, subjective element, pushed to practically transform precisely by virtue of being finite, that is, of having needs (and thus also being natural in-

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[165] MARX, K. Theses on Feuerbach. *In: Selected writings.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 156.

itself).[166] In Kant, teleology was the movement through which humans, having already cognitively imposed a goal on nature in reflexive judgment, progressively attempted to bridge the gap between the two worlds by acting out a moral end on it; here, nature is dialectically enriched by human praxis through sensuous, material activity. Like Hegel before him, Marx has to find his own course between Spinoza (mechanical necessitarianism and rejection of teleology as anthropomorphism) and Kant (moral teleology as *a priori* activity). At the same time, he sides with Kant and Hegel against Spinoza in continuing to affirm the privileged role that the metaphysical and Christian traditions always ascribed to man – but as real, historically determined species-being, rather than as pure freedom and morality, or as Spirit.

On the other hand, the practical transformation of nature in which humans are involved is, similarly to Spinoza, determined by laws, which are, however, dialectical rather than mechanical; this not only means they are propelled by the work of the negative and have the same triadic structure found in Hegel, but also that they encompass a dynamic of in-itself and for-itself where man (as species-being) is historically determined by the world it produces. From the dawn of their existence, humans have faced nature as external being-in-itself, externalised themselves through praxis, and recognised themselves in the results of their work. In this, there would seem to be no great difference to Hegel. But in the latter's system it is the element of recognition and self-consciousness that matters in subjective activity – understood at once as that of the singular (finite man) or of the universal individual (Spirit). Three consequences of this idealism follow: that the sensuous world of production is always secondary to the ideal, and only its limitation; that Science is the systematic expression of the highest stage of self-consciousness, that of the Absolute; and that the culmination of human history in which this Science is possible takes place under a State that guarantees civil liberties and

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[166] '[Men] begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation.' MARX, K. The German ideology. *In: Op. cit.*, 1997, p. 160.

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reciprocity. For Marx, this fails to grasp that the dialectical work of man upon matter is always a social one and cannot be abstracted from the context in which it takes place: as soon as humans engage in it, they also produce the determinate social formations in which their relations to material production and to each other are organised. If one accordingly places the sensuous, socially conditioned element of human activity as the most important, Science will then come to be the name of the systematic exposition of the laws under which the historical progress of relations of production takes place, and the *telos* towards which such progress tends is not a matter of civil liberties only, but of the very way in which society organises (and is organised by) its collective productive capacity – the overcoming of the contradiction between ever greater mastery of nature and alienation from the products of work, as well as of the mastery of one class over the other.

Apart from the explicit differences, there is a number of displacements operated by Marx on Hegelian philosophy that are of particular importance for the discussion here. In Hegel, the system comes to a close when Spirit recognises itself as Absolute or, put the other way round, when the Absolute achieves self-consciousness and recognises itself in the forms of its alienation (Nature and the phenomenal existence of Spirit); thus, to recognise alienation is automatically to negate it. In Marx, there is a gap where the moment of recognition in alienation precedes that of its negation, since the latter can only be achieved in practice.[167] 'Proletarian Science' is hence at once the systematic exposition of the laws of historical development of the relations of production, which captures its internal logic in the same way as the *Science of Logic* had intended to do with the Absolute; the recognition of

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[167] It is this final twist that gives rise to many of the difficulties that Marxism has found itself in, as well as to all the attempts to solve these by turning consciousness into the key element to understand this passage, or why this passage does not happen, or why this passage happens in a certain way. I stay close to Foucault and Deleuze in downplaying its importance, and seeing it as a secondary discussion that obscures problems taking place elsewhere; to provide an account of power and production that does not have to go through it being precisely the main thrust of books such as *L'Anti-Oedipe* and *Surveiller et Punir*.

the alienation this development has brought about in separating humans from the products of their labour; the uncovering of the systematic functioning of the present stage of development, capitalism, as put forward by *Capital*; the announcement of its demise through the law of its internal contradictions; *and* the weapon in the hands of the proletariat – the universal class – with which it can bring about the end of alienation and reconcile man as species-being with itself.

The importance of this transformation to the question of immanence is huge. In Hegel, the privilege of philosophy is total: mathematics (which remains purely at the level of formal understanding), natural sciences (exclusively concerned with the external form of the Absolute), *Geistwissenchaften* (which only deal with Spirit as phenomenon), not to mention art and religion – all must yield before, and can only acquire their proper sense in, the pure Absolute Knowledge that only speculative philosophy – Science – can provide. Complete immanence is achieved at the end, once history has played itself out and become totalised (which also means: reduced to the rationality of its actual, *wirklich* form) in philosophy. For Marx, philosophy itself must be sublated, and this sublation takes place before history has come to a close – something that his own trajectory would seem to show, where the scientific economic content of *Capital* already appears as the step beyond the philosophical works of the previous decades –; and the form of this *Aufhebung* is practice. Whereas in Hegel there is a philosophy of immanence that justifies its absolute rights by following the progress that leads to itself, and thus constructs itself out of itself, here one finds a philosophy of immanence that indicates a point outside itself, in the future, as the moment where immanence can be realised – *both* in the sense of the final realisation of a historical logic that makes Being (here, the dialectical unity of man and nature) coincide with itself *and* that of a philosophical system finally capable of redeeming its truth claims by guiding the process of its own practical verification. In the first case, immanence goes through the progress of

historical time and acts by means of finite subjects in order to become complete; in the second, the movement is human finitude itself as praxis, and instead of an Absolute that knows itself, we find that the coincidence between objective reality and thought 'is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice.'[168]

This does not happen, however, without the absolute unity of subject and object brought about by Hegel being, to a certain extent, undone, or at least rolled back to a point where it ceases to be fully coincident and becomes permanently reversible in either direction; the return of finitude that is also the re-humanising of spiritualised Being reintroduces an ambiguous moment of contingent subjectivity in what was the fully objective (that is, necessary) development of the Subject/Substance. In Hegel, we have philosophy becoming capable of knowing the Absolute and speaking its sense in the moment where Being and Thought coincide, and this achievement is not, strictly speaking, philosophy's own, but Being's. In Marx, the *écart* between the enunciation of Science and the realisation of immanence requires the intervention of human praxis for Thought and Being to be *made* to coincide; and yet this achievement is supposed to be in itself objectively determined, since the laws of historical development allow the prediction, and production, of its end. Human activity is as world-historical in one as in the other thinker, but here the consciousness of this world-historicity (the self-consciousness of Being), instead of arriving only at the end, occurs one stage too soon. This tension – between the objective prediction of a necessary conclusion and the subjective intervention it requires for its realisation; between science as what

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[168] MARX, K. Theses on Feuerbach. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 156. Or, as stated elsewhere: 'It can be seen how subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and passivity lose their opposition and thus their existence as opposites only in a social situation; it can be seen how the solution of theoretical opposition is only possible in a practical way, only through the practical energy of man, and their solution is thus by no means an exercise in epistemology but a real problem of life that philosophy could not solve just because it conceived of it as a purely theoretical task.' *Idem.* Economic and philosophical manuscripts. *In: Op. cit.*, 1997, p. 93.

reveals the *telos* in history and hence yields the prediction of its conclusion, and as what, in unearthing its laws, is partially a condition for these predictions to be fulfilled – goes back to man's condition of in-itself and for-itself, *natura naturans* and (part of) *natura naturata,* and runs right through all thought that finds in Marx its point of support.[169] (A further conclusion here would be that, by virtue of the structure just described, the weight of *a posteriori* falsification on the whole of Marx's system is lighter: it is possible to hold on to the analysis of capitalism without having to subscribe to his underlying teleology.)

If this set of differences between these two thoughts can be summarised in short, well-known formulae, these would be:

> Philosophy, as the thought of the world, does not appear until reality has completed its formative process, and made itself ready. History thus corroborates the teaching of the conception that only in the maturity of reality does the ideal appear as counterpart to the real, apprehends the real world in its substance, and shapes it into an intellectual kingdom. When philosophy paints its grey in grey, one form of life has become old, and by means of grey it cannot be rejuvenated, but only known. The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering.[170]

> *The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it.*[171]

And, such differences notwithstanding, an important commonality appears in these:

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[169] I have explored this theme in relation to the Italian tradition of Autonomous Marxism, and to a fair extent Antonio Negri's position regarding the problem of immanence, *In:* NUNES, R. 'Forward where, forward how?': (Post-)operaismo beyond the immaterial labour thesis. *Ephemera,* 7 (1), pp. 178-202; Breeding mutants: subjectivism, post-subjective politics and organisation. Paper presented at *Historical Materialism,* London, November 9, 2007.

[170] HEGEL, G.W.F. *Philosophy of right.* Trans. Dyde, S. W. Kitchener: Batoche, 2001, p. 20.

[171] MARX, K. Theses on Feuerbach. *In: Op. cit.,* p. 158. (My italics.)

> As for the individual, every one is a son of his time; so also philosophy is its time apprehended in thoughts.[172]

> It is not the consciousness of men which determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.[173]

A key element of Hegel's system inherited by Marx, and arguably their most important contribution to the question of immanence, is this: that there is a relation between the contents of philosophy and the historical conditions in which it is produced. The nature of this relation, and the transformation this thought introduces in the tradition, will be something most subsequent philosophy will have to grapple with.

Its importance lies, first of all, in that it opens the question of what constitutes philosophical finitude[174], or, as Foucault says in relation to Kant's text on the Enlightenment, an enquiry into the present which at the same time attempts to grasp what it is in this present, in the part of non-philosophy, that makes a philosophy what it is; it 'marks the point of inflexion from which philosophy can and must seize again the shadow that outlines it (*qui la découpe*) at every moment, but at the same time attaches it to its invincible continuity.'[175] It is the very question of finitude, transferred onto the plane of that in which a discourse of finitude can take place; it does not, therefore, radicalise the refusal of transcendent knowledge without at the same time unsettling the space in which this refusal can appear. At this point one can see the persistence of the immanentising drive mobilised by critique. From the direct denial of a creating God and a moral order in Spinoza, to a denial of the possibility of claims that transcend spatio-temporal experience, including even the (non-) existence of God (all the objections already raised

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[172] HEGEL, G.W.F. *Op. cit.*, p. 19.

[173] MARX, K. Preface to *A critique of political economy. In: Op. cit.*, p. 389,

[174] FOUCAULT, M. Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 809.

[175] *Ibid.*, p. 810.

notwithstanding), in Kant; which in turn opens the question of how a philosophy can be constructed exclusively out of the materials that are accessible to the this-worldy limits of finite experience; to the problem of, once finite experience is deployed onto historical time, how a philosophy is at all possible within the limits of the experience of its time, and what kind of limit such limits are, and hence what kind of transgression they may or may not make room for. Again, immanence appears as founded on a relation to time; and again one finds a new inflection in this relation.

The inflection consists in the following: whereas Kant had promoted the passage from the eternal time of transcendence to the constitutive time of finitude, and the time of finitude had in the end constituted itself as a new extra-temporal point from which philosophy could flow (be it as the *a priori* or as the form of the present in the originary), immanence is now brought down to the empirical time of history, where it is supposed to find its ground. In other words, any enquiry into the limits of what can be known must now be able to account for the occurrence of philosophical knowledge in history, and must in turn find in history itself the transcendental grounds on which it can account for its occurrence, as well as the rights by which it can retrospectively comprehend its own, as well as any other philosophy's, existence.[176] We are both taken back to the essential question of genesis, and squarely placed in the middle of the slippage between *a priori* into originary time.

An analysis of how this historical solution to the problem of realised immanence works in Hegel and Marx respectively can illuminate what its problems are. In the first case, a philosophy is always 'the daughter of its

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[176] An imperative that evidently must be brought to be bear on Kant's thought as well, which, as seen above, is what Hegel does by including the transcendental turn as a partial moment in his system. Marx, given the direction taken by his trajectory, is less concerned in working through such problems; but he was certainly the forerunner in the line of critique that sees the rise of the subject in modern philosophy as paralleling and rationalising the rise of the *homo economicus* and the subject of rights of capitalist economy and the bourgeois State – a line that finds continuity in both Foucault and Deleuze.

time' in the sense that it manifests immediately the contemporary stage in the development of Spirit. It can therefore self-consciously comprehend what it has left behind, but not itself: it is only once it has been sublated into a new stage – which is at once a new moment of Being and a new moment of Thought, the *Aufhebung* being exactly what engenders both new social and subjective forms, such as for example in the passage from Greek to Roman spirituality in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*[177] – that this mediate, reflexive knowledge can take place. Of course, until here, there is nothing that justifies such an account: the comprehension afforded by every new moment is by definition partial and one-sided, that is, blind to itself; and therefore the consciousness of past stages must also be partial, by virtue of lacking the mediate consciousness of its standpoint. If such a system is to respond to the critical demand of clarifying its own conditions of possibility, it is therefore necessary that the progress of reason must come to an end – a moment where all previous stages can be fully grasped in what they actually are, and the movement itself appears as for-itself, self-consciousness: 'all it takes is to *stop movement.*'[178] Hegel's thought, if it is to be capable of legitimising its own claims at all, must posit an end of history and, furthermore, posit itself as the thought that is only possible when this end has been achieved. It would be an irony, given all he has to say on the question of beginnings, to call what we have here a *petitio principii;* it is rather *petitio principii* made system.

The same requirement is carried over into Marx's thought; even if the economic analysis of the capitalist mode of production can stand or fall depending on its capacity to yield accurate results, for the whole system to stand – obviously Marx's unambiguous wish – it must follow a similar structure. It is rather less straightforward, however. The thought of a time is always a one-sided apprehension of the truth of the social conditions in which it occurs; but its partiality reveals not only the lack of a world-historical self-

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[177] *Cf.* HEGEL, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit,* §§ 464-76.

[178] [178] DELEUZE, G; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?.* Paris: Minuit, p. 49. Deleuze's and Guattari's italics.

consciousness, but also the partiality of a society divided by class war. (Determining with exactitude the part of the 'unconscious' in the thought of a period, that is, the boundary between science and ideology, will always be one of the most difficult and important problems for Marxists.) When antagonism has been taken to its most extreme form and become reduced to only two classes, when the development of the relations of production has constituted the proletariat as universal class which 'can no longer lay claim to a historical status, but only to a human one'[179], configured itself into a system with an identifiable logic, and created (or started to create) the material conditions for a proletarian revolution and communism – only then can a Science appear that can be conscious of its own present and grasp the underlying historical logic that led to itself.[180] And only at this moment can it then both shine a light on the end-point this logic advances towards, and – in what is, in a way, a curious twist of the material-ideal relation – provide the self-consciousness required for this end-point to be arrived at: for philosophy

[179] MARX, K. Towards a critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: introduction. *In: Selected writings.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 73.

[180] The difference to Hegel here – viz., that self-consciousness appears in the 'penultimate' stage of the development of the historical logic – is of crucial importance to the political development of Marxism, as the time between one moment and the next unfolds in a kind of stasis where the chief question becomes one of evaluating the degree to which capitalist development itself has ripened the material conditions for communism, and the extent to which a revolution can be already organised through a subjective intervention in the given conditions. In his political trajectory, apart from a fleeting enthusiasm with the European uprisings of 1848, Marx always stuck to his own theory and repeatedly argued against the voluntarism of the likes of Blanqui and Bakunin. *Cf.* The class struggles in France. *In: Op. cit.,* pp. 286-97.

But this stasis can already be found in the way Marx locates his own writing – taking place, as it does, after the end of history announced by Hegel. In his commentary to the latter's *Philosophy of Right,* one of the main issues is the gap between the intellectual and political lives of the Germany of his time; philosophy has travelled far with Hegel's discovery of Being's logicity, and been taken forward in the Young Hegelians' critique of religion, but has still failed to grasp the truth contained in both moments, as much as political reality has failed to live up to them. The question of the exact location of the transcendental conditions of his own system is a lot less straightforward than in Hegel's case; and appropriately so, considering not only the structure we have been discussing, but also the fact that his attention is directed not at the great brushstrokes of the life of Spirit, but the concrete, material and social situation; and the fact that, as a keen political observer, he is capable of great nuances that always threaten to overflow the limits of the logic in which his thought is inscribed. While faithful to a sense of world-historicity, his political texts show great attention to the fluctuations of the present and always tend to complicate the general outline of the system.

to be sublated in its practical realisation. Only once it has ceased to be can Science be verified, its truth claims redeemed.

To say that both philosophies, in their attempt to ground philosophical immanence in the time of history, require that it have an 'end' evidently does not mean that either of them expects empirical time will come to an end. Both, however, ascribe to history an internal logic that plays itself out across time and includes the dynamic genesis of its own recognition, which occurs at the point where, as *logic*, it exhausts itself: the 'end of history' is nothing but (although that is not little) the (empirical) moment that corresponds to the final term of this logic, and the (transcendental) moment of the logic's discovery. The real (*das Reelle*) is progressively shorn of its purely phenomenal, accidental aspects and gradually becomes actual (*wirklich*), expressing in purer terms the universality that is the medium of philosophy.[181] Time is living self-differentiation[182], but the logicity underscoring it enables its apprehension not as dispersion, but according to a principle of selection that makes it possible to gather the essence of existence without it being neither obscured nor detracted from by an infinity of particular accidents; it is because the latter fall away and the former shines through that time can be totalised, that is, brought into a collective unity that coalesces around a principle. The difference, of course, lies in the principle: for Hegel, it is the stage of self-consciousness of a given epoch, while, for Marx, its relations of production.[183]

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[181] *Cf.*, for instance: '[T]he so-called Revolutions of 1848 were but *poor incidents* – small fractures and fissures in the dry crust of European society. (...) *Noisily and confusedly* they proclaimed the emancipation of the Proletarian, i.e., the *secret* of the nineteenth century, and of the revolution of that century.' MARX, K. Speech on the anniversary of the *People's Paper*. *In: Selected wiritings*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 338. (My italics.)

[182] HEGEL, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §46.

[183] I will not go here into the discussion of Althusser's and his followers' efforts to differentiate the simplicity of Hegel's logic (and hence its 'expressive' causality and concept of contradiction) to a 'structural' logic in Marx; suffice to say that, if it is the economic, and the contradiction between capital and labour, that play the role of determination in the last instance, the simplicity is maintained at least as a tendency. *Cf.* ALTHUSSER, L. Contradiction and overdetermination. *In: For Marx*. Trans. Brewster, B. London: Penguin Press, 1969, pp. 87-128. Maurizio Lazzarato explores the substitution of this 'monocentrism'

At this level it becomes clear why a critique of either system (to different degrees) has to remain external, and how transcendence is allowed back into both. Hegel tried to eliminate transcendence by obliterating the distance that forever separated the subject from the thing-in-itself, including the in-itself of his own reason: if thought has unlimited rights to what is thought because it is what is thought thinking itself, there is no outside in which the shadow of God can find refuge. This was not enough for Marx, who saw the supersession of the positive into the ideal as a 'reinstatement of religion and theology'[184]; Hegel's immanence still sided with religion and metaphysics in undervaluing the this-worldliness of concrete existence in favour of an ideal world, and had to be made complete through the upending of speculative thinking that placed the accent of transformation – the power to negate – in concrete human existence and praxis. What he conserves, however, is the same principle of selection through which, in one and the same movement, the real accedes to the actual and philosophy acquires its rights. In both thinkers, immanence is given at a point in historical, empirical time, where the universal, the necessary, always before active in the world but never given in its pure form, makes itself fully present.

Platonism, says Deleuze, must be grasped in its motivation to establish a criterion for selection: a selection that allows to distinguish between good and bad copy, ordered in terms of greater or smaller resemblance to the ideal, which stands outside of time and difference in self-identical, immutable permanence. While attempting to eliminate transcendence, the historical solution reinstates the essential, self-identical principle of transcendent metaphysics, which it places within immanence, deploying it in time and making it actual within history. This makes the implications of the way in

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(in Althusser's case, a monocentrism *malgré lui*) *In:* Lazzarato, M. Multiplicité, totalité et politique. [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fplazzarato3.htm]
[184] MARX, K. Economic and philosophical manuscripts. *In: Selected writings.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 98.

which it projects the form of its own present over the past, and so rediscovers itself as necessary, weightier than the way in which the transcendental solution incurs in the same hypostasis. If the political question of the immanentising drive of modernity is the relation between authority and truth, with critique as their active middle term, one can see how a philosophy that experiences the present as absolute limit differs from a philosophy that experiences the present as absolute knowledge. Often in the recriminations waged against Marxism (the polemics of the *nouveaux philosophes* being a classic example) what is at stake is nothing but the first case being brought to bear against the second (parliamentary democracy versus totalitarianism etc.) – and it is ironic to think that it was the former to come out victorious in the end. One could compare the two through an analogy with the separation Foucault sees as taking place between the times of Hesiodus and Plato.[185] The authority-effect of the hypostasis of the present as limit is an interdiction attached to what is said – 'its sense, its form, its object, its relation to its reference'[186] – and therefore establishes itself as measure of reasonableness, logicity, objectivity, meaning; it excludes its other as what fails to qualify to a standard of rationality, positivity and universality: as either irrational, or unreasonable, or contaminated by particularity. The authority-effect of the hypostasis of the present as absolute knowledge is parrhesiastic -- 'the discourse pronounced by someone entitled to it (...) which, prophesising the future, not only announced what was to come but contributed to its realisation, carried with it the adhesion of men and thus tangled itself with destiny'[187] – by virtue of what its content has to say regarding its enunciation; its parrhesia derives from the parousia of a Being which is its contemporary and speaks through it.[188]

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[185] FOUCAULT, M. *L'ordre du discours*. Paris: Gallimard, 2005, pp. 16-8. This is not only another moment where the theme of Platonism emerges, but also the introduction of a theme – parrhesia – to which Foucault will return in the last years of his life.
[186] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[187] *Ibid.*
[188] 'The science of the phenomenology of Spirit is the theology of the absolute as regards its parousia within a dialectical-speculative Good Friday. The absolute is here. God is dead.

It is curious that it is normally Marx who bears the brunt of accusations that could be made to both him and Hegel, but not at all surprising. For the former, the end of history, or the embodiment of reason in history, must take place in the organisation of social production rather than just in the legal framework of the modern State, which is supposed to offer the best conditions for the flourishing of ethical life; this commits Marxism to a degree of social transformation – some would say: engineering – that extends the scope of Science much beyond anything Hegel could think or wish, the sensuous sphere of the realisation of needs not being lofty enough for the heights of Spirit. The affinity between Hegel and the hypostasis of the present as limit, in the political field, is evident: for it is not necessary today to believe that formal, parliamentary democracy is the highest stage of Being in order to argue that, as the only possible rational structure, it is in fact the inevitable end of the West's political history.

Yet it is in those things that philosophy presupposes or posits as necessary that, as Nietzsche suspects, one can find the marks of non-philosophy; and a philosophy that produces its conditions in the image of the conditioned is thus condemned to reproduce its own moral prejudices in the guise of the *a priori*. The question that imposes itself now is: can a critique predicated on material immanence manage to both refuse its own closure, and attain formal immanence?

Which means everything except that there is no god. (...) The phenomenology of the Spirit is the parousia of the absolute. Parousia is the being of beings. (...) Provided that the "to be with us" of the Absolute prevails, we are already in the parousia.' HEIDEGGER, M. Hegel's concept of experience. *In: Off the beaten track.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 152; 154. (Translation slightly modified.) The idea of the historical solution bestowing a parrhesiastic value to the discourse of Science can also be used to understand why, in those organisations or States that claim or have claimed to 'embody' Marxism, true discourse so often tends to be circumscribed to the speech of one leader; that would serve to explain why so many variants of political applications of Marxism have become known by proper names – Leninism, Trotskyism, Maoism etc.

Chapter III

A time for immanence?

Introduction

Either as absolute limit or as absolute knowledge, the present dominates the alternatives to critique (and metacritique) that are opened by Kant's introduction of the problem of immanence into philosophy. This chapter returns to the site of this inflection in order to ask whether another path is possible that does not betray the critical, immanentising drive of modernity by making critique relative to the present. If such a possibility exists, it has to be established on two fronts: firstly, in relation to Kant, as being able to think material immanence while maintaining itself formally immanent – whether it can account for its own conditions of existence in ways that do not re-introduce transcendence; secondly, in direct competition with Hegel, whether it can demonstrate that his system falls short of attaining material immanence.

This creates the conditions for an exam of Foucault's and Deleuze's projects, and the way in which the problem of material and formal immanence is articulated in them. We see the first tending towards a variation of the historical solution, while the second tends towards the transcendental one. The most important questions, however, lie in how exactly they transform these alternatives so as to make them consistent with the refusal of giving critique a closure that both find in Nietzsche.

3.1 – Immanence as paradox

3.1.1 – The paradox of non-coincidence

Now, perhaps, the central problem behind this study can begin to appear. To put it simply: that to say that thought is immanent to Being, and Being is immanent to thought, is not exactly, or not necessarily, the same thing. In this apparent paradox, one would be tempted to find the opposition between those two tendencies that, according to Althusser, since the dawn of philosophy draw and redraw the battlefield in which they play themselves out.[1] On one side, the idea that thought must have a material and historical genesis that means it is secondary in logical, ontological and chronological order to the Being from which it arises; on the other, that there is Being to the extent that it appears to thought, that is, that thought constitutes it. By giving the problem of immanence its historical dimension, by tying it to the Enlightenment and what has been identified as a cultural-historical drive towards immanentisation, I hope to have sketched the way in which this opposition could appear to us as a problem today: on one side, the need to conceive of Being in a way that excludes any trace of divine transcendence from it, to exorcise it from the shadows of God, to think Being as immanent; on the other, the requirement that the critique of the claims of religious and

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[1] ALTHUSSER, L. Lenin and philosophy. *In: Lenin and philosophy and other texts.* New York: Monthly Review, s/d, pp. 61-3.

political authority be carried out in a way that is capable of providing its own grounds, free from any unwarranted claims that would make it fall back on the pure exercise of an authority immune from itself – that thought be accountable to the principles of its own construction. The requirement that Being be thought as immanent, and that it be thought immanently: that immanence be attained by an immanent thought. In both, the demand to affirm the 'powers of *this* world'.[2]

This tension could in effect be found in, or rather between, the two determinations of immanence that the previous chapter laid out: univocity, perspectivism. The first is, obviously, an ontological thesis – the only one, in fact, if we are to follow Deleuze. It concerns the nature of the Being of beings, and the principle according to which beings are distributed. It thus necessarily concerns the way in which thought, as something that occurs to beings, is immanent to Being and occupies a place in the distribution it operates. The second, on the other hand, refers primarily to the way in which Being is immanent to thought, or the principle of distribution according to which the thoughts of beings can apprehend Being. The univocity of Being and the equivocity of thought.[3] This is not to say that the two are necessarily opposed or contradictory – on the contrary –, rather that the gap between the two marks the exact spot of a question; or *the* question that a philosophy of immanence must address if it is to expel any form of transcendence from the relation of Being to thought *as well as* the relation of thought to Being. This is because such a philosophy, if it is to achieve the aim of realising immanence, must do more than demonstrate the logical possibility and compatibility of the

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[2] 'The origins of European modernity are often characterized as springing from a secularizing process that denied divine and transcendent authority over worldly affairs. That process was certainly important, but in our view it was really only a symptom of the primary event of modernity: the affirmation of the powers of *this* world, the discovery of the plane of immanence.' HARDT, M.; NEGRI, A. *Empire*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 71. (Italics in the original.) The logic of this passage, however, makes the two self-professed materialists come across as ironically idealistic.
[3] 'And it is not we who are univocal in a Being that is not; it is us, it is our individuality that is equivocal in a Being, for a Being that is univocal.' DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 57.

two. But this gap also returns us to the sketches of a preliminary determination of immanence found in the first chapter: to the extent that Being and thought can and must in principle be distinguished – a necessity that springs from the need of an account of the *construction* of thought as determined by the historico-cultural question of critique and modernity – the relation between the two also concerns the establishing of a certain relation between passivity and activity, or passion and action. The separation between this other pair, and the question of how to establish their relation, has logical and ontological precedence over that which is only one of its possible individuations, even if the one that has dominated Western thought almost since its recorded beginnings: that of subject and object.

The way in which to establish such a relation refers to the problem of thought in general, but above all to philosophical thought, or to that characteristically philosophical activity that consists in the building of systems. To ask the question of how Being affects thought or how thought constructs Being, if it may make more or less sense when considered from within this or that philosophical system, is nevertheless a necessary one once asked externally of all philosophical systems – in their co-existence as exteriorities, so to speak. The reason for this is that any system, however strong or weak the sense one may wish to attach to the word[4], still consists in an act, an internal movement of separation that defines its own distance from the everyday forms of thought whose conditions it must share (since the principle of its construction must by right be the same of thought in general), but that it must also distinguish itself from as the moment of self-reflexivity that grasps both those common conditions, and the form in which that separation is operated. To highlight this is of no small importance, as it introduces a distinction between formal immanence understood as concerning the capacity for a philosophy to account for and abide by the principles of its construction, and the level specific to the kind of action, or performance, it constitutes.

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[4] *Cf.* introduction.

Now, too, these two pairs – the immanence of thought to Being and of Being to thought, passion and action – can be brought to bear onto the immanence/transcendence pair as it is related through time. We have established transcendence initially, or at least from the perspective of material immanence, as the setting up of a measure that is external to the flux of time. This has shown how it both serves for the finite subject as the measure of action – in the moral as well as in the cognitive sense –, and how the attainment of a principle of intelligibility of the order of world (what underlies diversity and change) and of morality is the site of a passion – a direct intuition, revelation, *anamnesis*, an *influxum hyperphysycum* or an *harmonium praestabilitam intellectualem* that guarantees all knowledge, including that of the principle itself that secures this harmony. Kant correctly identifies in this passion the mark of transcendence, thus turning the problem of immanence and critique into philosophy itself, and effectively breaking it into the pair thought-Being/Being-thought; so that in just over sixty years one could go from 'Before we can understand what the soul is (...) we must first learn what the constitution of the world is'[5] to 'we can know a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them'[6]. The entire critical enterprise is built on an attempt to establish a firm division of action and passion: the spontaneity of the understanding and the autonomy of the moral law in the noumenal agent, on the one hand; the receptivity of sensibility and the affections of desire, on the other.

The whole point of this operation, however, is, through the spontaneity of transcendental subjectivity, to salvage measure – now made internal and formal in the form of a pure, active, moral subjectivity which, however defined, is the stable kernel back towards which everything must be led.

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[5] WOLFF, C. *Vernünftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt, und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt.*, §540. Quoted *In:* CAYGILL, H. Soul and cosmos in Kant: a commentary upon 'Two things fill the mind...'. Text sent by the author.

[6] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason.* Bxviii.

Foucault's critique, then, consists precisely in pointing how this careful separation is always at risk of becoming blurred again once man is made into its site: if, as empirical being, man is always passively determined rather than actively determining, that will mean that there will always be some degree of passion, of an unconscious in thought – be it in the form of language, work or life, those transcendentals that *Les mots et les choses* shows to chronologically precede the Copernican revolution – that will seep back into pure transcendental activity. And if he identifies the initial site of this blurring – which is by definition the foundering of the critical enterprise – in the *Anthropology*, one could in fact find it everywhere in Kant's work, as the problem that runs under and across the critical years, in which it finds a precarious balance, only for that balance to be upset again in the course of the *Philosophieren*. Such would be the case of the tortuous line that goes from pre-critical physics to the attempt to incorporate the physical, physiological, organic in the *Opus postumum*[7]; but one could also see it, as his contemporaries did, in those 'facts' he found himself obliged to appeal to without deduction – the 'hidden art' of imagination in bridging the gap between subject and object internalised as the difference between understanding and sensibility, which makes Kant assume what he had set out to prove; or the 'fact of reason' of the moral law, which enables Nietzsche to suspect that a Kant born in a different place and time could find something very different in his heart; or the readiness, equally susceptible to the suspicion of cultural and historical contingence, to accept the analogical postulation of God in natural finality, in exactly the point of the third *Critique* where the whole system would find its closure.

If on the one hand the separation is always threatened by its own collapse, it will be found, on the other, to be too abrupt to lend itself to the demands of an

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[7] *Cf.* CAYGILL, H. Op. cit; TOSCANO, A. *The theatre of production: individuation between Kant, Simondon and Deleuze*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, chapters 1, 2.

analysis beginning from the empirical being of man as embodied, conditioned, always already there; and much of the development of philosophy that follows, by variously transforming, the path opened by Kant will take the form of a 'passivisation'. Husserl's *Leib* and *Lebenswelt*, early Heidegger's Dasein (and its subsequent transformation into the 'shepherd of Being'), Merleau-Ponty's *corps propre* and the Flesh, Nietzsche's genealogies of moral feelings, pragmatism – much of what takes place from the late 19th century on is an attempt to either redistribute or upset the partition that transcendental philosophy produced; one could maybe see Hume's revenge against Kant in this.[8] In effect, the site where a separation between action and passion is operated is one that each philosophy has to return to in order to start anew; but the effects that Kant's intervention in it brought about in relation to the pair transcendence/immanence places him in the position of a rupture to be returned to, even if the question is always one of, in a way or another, leaving it behind. It in this sense, of the 'injunction to relive this rupture' which constitutes the paradox this study addresses – of the non-coincidence to be bridged between saying that thought is immanent to Being and Being immanent to thought – that 'we are all neo-Kantians'.[9]

3.1.2 – Time beyond measure

The previous chapter looked at this rupture from the perspective of the relation between philosophy and time; and it is in what the critical system does to time that Deleuze finds the germ of a true Copernican revolution which, if started by Kant, was just as quickly aborted by him; and again what

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[8] On what approximates (but also distinguishes) Deleuze and phenomenology around the theme of passivity, *Cf.*: BEAULIEU, A. *Gilles Deleuze et la phénoménologie.* Mons: Sils Maria, 2004, pp. 32-45.

[9] 'What one designates by this term is less a philosophical "movement" or "school" than the impossibility Western thought has found itself in of surmounting the rupture established by Kant: neo-Kantianism (in this sense, we are all neo-Kantians) is the ceaselessly repeated injunction to relive this rupture – at once to rediscover its necessity and to fully measure it.' FOUCAULT, M. Une histoire restée muette. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: 2001, vol. I, p. 574. *Cf.* also: Jean Hyppolite. 1907-1968. *In: Ibid.,* p. 807.

is at stake here is the separation between action and passion as time is brought into the subject, splitting it into a 'fractured I' and a 'passive self':

> A rift or fracture in the I, a passivity in the self, this is what time means; and the correlation of passive self and fractured I constitutes the discovery of the transcendental, or the element of the Copernican revolution. (...)

> Even in the speculative domain, the fracture is quickly covered up by a new form of identity, the synthetic active identity, while the passive self is solely defined through receptivity, being by that dispossessed of any power of synthesis (...). It is in a completely different evaluation of the passive self that the Kantian initiative can be taken up again, and that the form of time can keep God dead and the I fractured.[10]

Rather than respecting the separation that makes the transcendental I the source of time – which, as we have seen, marks the distinction between a *finite time* that runs between the I and the empirically determinable self, and the same time considered as the *time of finitude* generated by the extra-temporal self-identity of the I –, Deleuze sees in Kant's critique of the Cartesian *cogito* a more radical alternative. Up until the last years of his life, he would celebrate this alternative through the Danish prince's formula: 'time is out of joint'.[11] That it is out of joint means, precisely, that it is made free from measure, or no longer required to play the role of 'measure, interval or number'[12] of movement. Subordinated to movement, time is reduced to extensive measure; and movement, in order to be measured, obviously requires an external referent, something that stands outside it; hence something that stands outside time. What the Transcendental Dialectics accomplishes is precisely the jettisoning of these external referents which simultaneously were the attractors towards which time was pulled and in which it froze: 'the absoluteness of a divine origin, the ultimate intelligibility of

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[10] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, pp. 117-8.

[11] *Ibid*. Sur quatre formules poétiques qui pourraient résumer la philosophie kantienne. *In: Critique et clinique*. Paris: Minuit, 2006, p. 40.

[12] *Ibid*.

a cosmological principle, the crystalline intuition of the substantiality of an I'[13] – God, world, soul. Freed from the circular movement that fixed it around these axes, time becomes the straight line that imposes on movement, now become pure space, the succession of its determinations.

> Everything that moves and changes is in time, but time itself does not change, does not move, as much as it is not eternal. It is the form of everything that changes and moves, but it is a form that is unmoveable and does not change. Not an eternal form, but precisely the form of what is not eternal, the unmoveable form of change and movement.[14]

The Analogies of Experience are the moment in the first *Critique* where this transformation becomes clear: the dichotomy between the intraworldly movement of succession and change, and the a- or extratemporal stable foundation that plays the role of substantial measure – precisely what sets up the necessity of transcendence – is broken; eternity becomes internal to time and loses its substance, receiving the purely formal determination of permanence; simultaneity ceases to be spatial and is given the temporal form of a principle of community or reciprocal action; and the instantaneous coincidence between 'I think' and 'I am a thinking substance' is fissured by the introduction of the pure form of time between what will now be the two heterogenous halves between the active, spontaneous (but fractured) transcendental I, and the receptive, passive self. Whereas Descartes wanted to move from the indeterminacy of an 'I think' directly towards the determination of an 'I am', Kant interposes between an I that is indeterminate (since it is the spontaneous power of all determination) and a self that only exists as passive determination – self-affection in inner sense rather than substance – the *form of determination* whereby this self-affection takes place: time.

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[13] SIMONT, J. *Essai sur la quantité, la qualité, la relation chez Kant, Hegel, Deleuze. Les 'fleurs noires' de la logique philosophique.* Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997, p. 303.
[14] DELEUZE, G. *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

The revolution promised by the substitution of a trivalent logic for Descartes bivalent one – that the 'spontaneity of which I have consciousness in the I think' is only 'the affection of a passive self that senses that its own thought, its own intelligence, that by which it says I, is exercised in it and on it, not by it', leading to 'a long, inexhaustible story: I is an other, or the paradox of inner sense'[15] – is obviously aborted by Kant in the interest of securing the rights of spontaneity and, through that, the measure (now made formal and internal) in which and through which Being can appear as such. Instead of traversed and split by time, the 'I think' becomes the source whence it flows; the time of finitude, rather than finite time. Again we find ourselves at the starting point of Foucault's critique, where the separation in which spontaneity is made sovereign is shown to fall apart when one moves into the originary time of 'already operated' syntheses in the *Anthropology* – but what is important to highlight at this point, already beckoning towards Hegel, is the meaning that can be elicited from the 'repetition' that this work constitutes in the transition between the critical moment and the full-fledged system of transcendental philosophy that will occupy Kant in his last years. For would the slippage into originary time not be a necessity – as it certainly will become for subsequent thinkers –, in the sense that it is logically and chronologically anterior from the point of view of the empirical writing of a *Critique*? In other words, did not the empirical, historical Kant himself have to start *in media res*, from the middle of a time already operated upon, in order to write the work in which he achieves the *de jure* separation by which the transcendental unity of apperception is accorded the rights to an *a priori* spontaneity? If the *Critique* was written by a really existing man, did its genesis not take place in originary time?

3.1.3 – Dynamic genesis (and revelation)

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[15] *Idem. Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 116.

To point this out is already to move one step beyond Kant, and into the problematic that followed in his wake. Following Deleuze's assessment of the relation between the *Critique of Judgment* and the two works that preceded it, it was possible to see exactly through what door there is a risk of material immanence being reintroduced in the enterprise that would eliminate it; but it was above all the self-referential aspect of Kant's project, and thus a question primarily of formal immanence, that troubled those who came after him. 'That [transcendental apperception] is the absolute basic principle of all knowledge, was pointed out by *Kant*, in his deduction of the categories; but he never laid it down specifically *as* the basic principle'[16], says Fichte. 'Kant has provided the results. The premises are still missing. And who can understand results without premises?', laments Schelling.[17] Whether it was a vicious attack concerning the fact that for reason to be 'purified' it would have to divest itself from language (which is at once passivity and spontaneity, sensibility and understanding), as in Hamman; or an over-enthusiastic defence that strived to achieve the standard of systematicity that the *Critique* had fallen short of by (much to Kant's chagrin) giving it a first principle, as in Reinhold; down to the more adventurous and risky paths opened by Maïmon, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel – the problem of what it meant to think after Kant was built around the possibility (or impossibility) of providing the *Critique* with a metacritique. To purify it from what appeared in it as simply presupposed: to build a philosophy without presuppositions, from which any authority external to itself would be excised.[18] This presented itself as the search for a genetic principle from which the critical apparatus could be deduced, which would often mean three things in various degrees and combinations: a formal first principle capable of

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[16] FICHTE, J. G. *The Science of Knowledge, with the first and second introduction.* Trans. and ed. Heath, P. and J. Lachs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, § 1. (Italics in the original.)

[17] Schelling to Hegel, January 5th, 1795. *In: Hegel: the letters.* Trans. Butler, C. and C. Seller. Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1984, p. 29. I thank Christian Kerslake for drawing my attention to this text.

[18] The two strongest attacks received from the quarters of the counter-Enlightenment go by this name: Hamman's *Metacritique of the purism of reason*, and Herder's *Metacritique of the critique of pure reason. Cf.* BEISER, F. *The Fate of Reason. German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1987.

accounting for the logical possibility and internal concatenation of a system of transcendental philosophy; a dynamic principle capable of accounting for the genesis and development of the elements Kant was happy to inductively 'discover' in transcendental subjectivity; and, as a consequence, a principle capable of accounting for a proof and demonstration of 'how our representations obtain objective validity'.[19]

This quest, which Deleuze will renew in the 20th century, again hinges on the problem of operating a division between action and passion, since, on the one hand, it deals with the requirement of eliminating (or at least reducing to a single point) the unwarranted 'passions' that appear in Kant's work as so many 'facts' to be assumed rather than justified – and thus a tendency towards a purified philosophical act or positing that is up to the *a priori* spontaneity of a sovereign, pure subjectivity. But, on the other, also a coming to grips with the difficulty, of which Kant would become increasingly aware in his later years, of finding a resolution to the tension between the *imperium in imperio* of this cognitive spontaneity and moral autonomy and the nature enveloping it – and thus a tendency towards a monism that would explain how necessity and freedom, which intersect in the empirical/transcendental double of man, come to coexist; and hence also a tendency towards an interrogation of Being, in the shape of the absolute.

It is in his capacity to synthesise these two tendencies into a solution to the problems inherited from transcendental philosophy that lies Hegel's accomplishment; in one same movement, he carries the turn towards finitude to its most radical conclusion, and makes time return to thought the speculative rights to the absolute that had been denied by Kant. The mediating role of the transcendental imagination between the action of the understanding and the passion of sensibility is now elevated to the very

[19] FICHTE, J. G. First introduction. *In: Foundations of transcendental philosophy.* (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova methodo (1796/1799). Trans. and ed. Brazeale, D. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 80.

functioning of reason, in the dialectical self-relation of an active Concept always affected from the inside by its own non-Being; a virtuous circle of self-differentiation that discovers the outside only to rediscover it as part of the inside in a higher unity. To the question of demonstrating how representations attain objective validity rather than mere logical possibility – that is, the passage from the possible to the real – Hegel answers with a dynamic genesis that allows him to establish the necessity of the movement of construction of his own philosophy not once, but twice: as the world-historical development of Spirit in the *Phenomenology*, and as the dialectical progression of the categories towards the Concept, in the *Science of Logic*. The relation between the two is to be found in the movement of internal differentiation that, in the first, is the account of how Spirit is affected by its historical determinations only to rediscover them as his own in sublation, and, in the second, the affection of thought by itself that ascends towards the unity of the universal given in thought and the particular given in intuition, in the Concept. At their highest point, both accounts encounter, in self-differentiation, the coincidence between thought and Being: the movement of Being itself, as Substance, as it returns to itself as Subject; the Concept as the higher unity whose movement is directly expressive of Being, as it is the movement itself.

By transferring the question of justification from the timeless time of transcendental spontaneity to one of realisation in the finite time of history, captured as a unified process given the properties of a subject, Hegel radicalises the critical enterprise in placing the question of knowledge within history: how is the appearance of (Absolute) knowledge possible within history? In this, one finds not only the move from conditions of possibility to genetic conditions of existence, but one of the key problems of all subsequent philosophy – one whose original bifurcation can be given the proper names of Hegel and Nietzsche. In Hegel, philosophy does have to provide an account of its own possibility, to the point that it must question its own history, to ask

how it can be possible within the empirical time of history; but following the unfolding of this history is in fact enacting (in the *Logic*) or re-enacting (in the *Phenomenology*) the unfolding of thought itself, of Being thinking itself, towards the point where it recognises itself in all its previous moments and uncovers the necessary rules – the logicity – of its own operations. Hegel accepts the rules of the transcendental game, the turning of philosophical immanence upon itself, but overrules Kant's verdict against the possibility of taking this movement towards its term. Where reason is made into the site where, in man, Being thinks itself, material and formal immanence come together into a higher form of immanence that we could call *performative*: one that discovers itself in each step along its path, progressively constructs itself out of the movement of its own construction, and is therefore capable to present this movement as necessary. Thought is immanent to Being, and Being is immanent to thought: 'immanence', as Hyppolite peremptorily puts it, 'is complete'.[20]

Spinoza's system may well have established the possibility of a philosophy of immanence, it still could not move from logical consistency towards an affirmation of its reality through immanent means, and thus had to reintroduce transcendence at the point where it would close in upon itself in a perfect circle. 'The *Ethics* is made in accordance with a method of which an account *cannot* be given in *human* language. For the *Ethics* explains everything, except the possibility for a man living in time to write it'.[21] Kant's problem was the kind of knowledge available to a finite intellect, and hence determining the immanent (to experience) limits in which metaphysical speculation could be

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[20] HYPPOLITE, J. *Logique et existence*. Paris: PUF, p. 230.

[21] KOJÈVE, A. *Introduction to the reading of Hegel*. Trans. Nichols Jr., J. H. Basic Books: New York, 1969, p. 120. (Italics in the original.) The quote continues: 'And if the *Phenomenology* explains why the *Logic* appears at a certain moment in history and not at another, the *Ethics* proves the impossibility of its own appearance at *any* moment in time whatsoever. [It] could have been written, if it is true, only by God himself; and let us take care to note – by a non-incarnated God. Therefore, the difference between Spinoza and Hegel can be formulated in the following way: Hegel becomes God by thinking or writing the *Logic*; or, if you like, it is by becoming God that he writes or thinks it. Spinoza, on the other hand, must be God from all eternity in order to be able to write or think the *Ethics*.'

deemed legitimate, its claims fully grounded in 'this world', the world as it appears. His alternative had then been to displace metaphysics vertically, above the arena where transcendent philosophies confronted each other, in order to uncover the transcendental field from which their claims could be judged – much in the same way as Foucault (seemingly following Tarski) observed that Epimenide's 'I lie' could be judged provided one distinguished within discourse between an object- and a metalanguage.[22] Yet this displacement itself would require a further step by which it could be legitimated: 'Kant said, "I ask about the possibility of experience". To be sure, before I can ask about the possibility of something, I must be acquainted to it; but the basis for the possibility of the thing in question lies beyond the thing itself.'[23] So it is the same vertical move again that the post-Kantian generation felt was required, and that Hegel accomplished in his system: another level needed to be discerned on which the level at which Kant spoke could find its necessary ground and, in the same movement, be superseded. 'Hegel's whole effort consists in creating a Spinozist System which can be written by a *man* living in a *historical* World'[24] – which is to both accept and subvert Kant, since, that 'philosophy should raise itself above the level of experience is, therefore, something that has already been explicitly asserted by Kant himself'.[25]

3.1.4 – Immanence and transcendence between Kant and Hegel

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[22] FOUCAULT, M. La pensée du dehors. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 546.

[23] FICHTE, J. G. Second introduction. *In: Foundations of transcendental philosophy*. (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova methodo (1796/1799). Trans. and ed. Brazeale, D. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992, p. 90.

[24] KOJÈVE, A. *Op. cit.*, p. 122. (Italics in the original.)

[25] FICHTE, J. G. *Op. cit.*, p. 90.

The standard picture of the way in which Kant and Hegel oppose each other here would have it that the first remains on the side of (formal) immanence, while the second veers towards transcendence, or transcendent metaphysics, again. This does not, however, take us far enough; to pose the problem in this way is to already choose one side in the opposition set up at the beginning – between thought as immanent to Being, and Being as immanent to thought –, taking Kant's victory for granted, and failing to acknowledge that the problem for Hegel is precisely to bring both sides together. Finally, even the dichotomy proposed at the end of the second chapter, between the present as absolute limit and the present as Absolute Knowledge, cannot allow us to proceed without some qualification. As it becomes apparent when one follows the line of criticism started by Nietzsche and taken up by Foucault and Deleuze, both transcendental and historical solutions come under essentially the same attack. It is important, then, both to grasp what changes from Kant to Hegel, and what, for Deleuze and Foucault at least, does not change *enough*.

Kant poses the referents of transcendent metaphysics outside the realm of what can be known (that is, what can be given to the experience of a finite intellect), but still recognises their necessity as *foci imaginarii* that drive reason in its application of concepts towards the unachievable, but necessary, goals of unity in the field of the knowable and establishing on earth the 'kingdom of ends'. The unity of reason, as Deleuze correctly stresses in his reading of Kant, is the extreme virtual point of its teleology[26]; philosophy, which encompasses the metaphysics that the critical moment lays the groundwork for, 'is the science of the relation of all cognition to the essential ends of human reason'.[27] The traditional transcendent concepts of dogmatism find their legitimate employment in giving form to this teleology, and what is condemned is only the illusion that one is determining an object

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[26] DELEUZE, G. *La philosophie critique de Kant.* Paris: PUF, 1998, conclusion.
[27] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason.* A839/B867.

by employing them – by definition an impossibility, since they are concepts an intuition for which the finite intellect cannot provide. The revolutionary discovery of the transcendental field is thus coupled with a safeguarding of the transcendent, as at once necessary and out of bounds; as what guides the development of reason from a virtual point of convergence that lies permanently outside the field of possible determination but, while bracketed, loses none of its effectiveness. The upshot of this definition of immanence, as we have seen, is that reason remains in thrall to a limit that at once restricts it to empirical knowledge (immanence to experience), and thus denies it the knowledge of infinity, and yet points towards what is beyond this limit as its unknowable source and principle of organisation (transcendence). On the one hand, reason, restricted to a field of possibility defined once and for all according to the pure form of the subject, can expect nothing 'new', and forever fashions the conditions that limit it out of the conditioned it finds; on the other, it hankers for something which it is by definition impossible; such is the general form of the transcendental solution as it will be found from Kant to phenomenology.

Hegel finds Kant at fault on both counts. The vestigial transcendence of the Ideas is one and the same with the imposition of the limits of the understanding onto reason, which is thus condemned to grasp the universal only from the external point of view of the understanding. Given free reign to explore the medium of speculative thought that is by right its own, reason can arrive at the determination of the Ideas in the higher unity of the Concept, where the universal is grasped no longer as the universal-for-the-Subject, but as Being in its movement of self-positing and self-differentiation, both Subject as Substance. The virtual lines that Kant would have converge beyond the horizon of possible experience are bent into a circle where it is the Absolute that experiences itself within finite time, through the medium of finite subjects.

3.1.4.1 – Dialectics: the end and the beginning

We have already seen how the historical solution is not, in the end, free from the problems of the transcendental one, and presents further practical and political risks. In both, the impossibility of thinking the new and the different without reconducting it to a fixed unity or measure; a thought of the Same. Yet the picture of Hegel already presented, while perfectly coherent with the full scope of its intent, leaves the question open as to whether Foucault's and Deleuze's critique would still apply should one wish to do without the metaphysical mechanism through which it realises immanence, that is, legitimates its claims to expressing the internal movement of the Absolute by presenting itself as its endpoint – the 'parousia' that Heidegger speaks of. In other words, would their critique still hold if one wishes to hold on to the triadic structure of dialectics, but turn it into an open progression? In this case, of course, Hegel ceases to be the mighty rival who managed to arrive at a performative account of the immanence of thought to Being and Being to thought; but the question remains whether Deleuze and Foucault can retain their difference from the negative movement of dialectics.[28]

To try and locate this difference is also to start finding the differences between Deleuze and Foucault. At a first glance, Deleuze appears to be the

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[28] There is an unfortunate gap in Foucault scholarship in terms of more in-depth analysis of his relation to Hegel. (The most notable exception being the pages on the subject *in:* BUTLER, J. *Subjects of desire.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.) His often vociferous attacks should not obscure the fact that he wrote a dissertation (now lost) on him as a student ('The constitution of a historical transcendental in Hegel', written for his *Diplôme d'études avancés en philosophie,* now lost), and would at times acknowledge his Hegelian beginnings ('I can only tell you that I remained ideologically "historicist" and Hegelian until I read Nietzsche.' FOUCAULT, M. Qui êtes-vous, professeur Foucault?. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 641.)
On the Deleuzian front, Michael Hardt is certainly the one who has given most importance to the polemic with Hegel, and gone a long way in defending Deleuze's position. Juliette Simont and Catherine Malabou, on the other hand, have in different ways demonstrated how the distance Deleuze wishes to establish from the German philosopher can often close down more than would probably be to his liking – although in the first case it is Hegel who comes closer to him, and in the second the other way round. *Cf.* HARDT, M. *Gilles Deleuze. An apprenticeship in philosophy.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993; MALABOU, C. Who's afraid of Hegelian wolves?. *In:* PATTON, P. (ed.) *Deleuze: a critical reader.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1997, pp. 114-38; Simont, J. *Essai sur la quantité, la qualité, la relation chez Kant, Hegel, Deleuze. Les 'fleurs noires' de la logique philosophique.* Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997.

best equipped of the two to resist dialectics. His arguments, in fact, seem less concerned with the overall movement of totalisation that accompanies Spirit in each step of its way towards its final destination.[29] From his early work on Bergson, his concern is to develop a thought of pure difference that can confront Platonism, Aristotle, Hegel and Leibniz on the ontological terrain; it is on this level of the conception of difference that the bulk of his opposition to dialectics takes place. In 'La conception de la différence chez Bergson', this takes the form of something like a reversal of Hegel's indictment against Spinoza that a fully positive Being could not account for the necessary existence of the modes. For Hegel, this entails the necessity of introducing negation as the motor of determination whereby Being becomes actualised in determinate Being, i.e., finite modes; but the couple negation/determination, Deleuze's Bergson argues, makes difference dependent on a 'subsistent exteriority'[30] that undermines its ontological self-sufficiency: what dialectics does is to extend external difference to infinity, without arriving at a difference-in-itself, independent of the identity that fixes it to the movement of opposition between A and non-A. A true conception of difference, therefore, would have it as internal; and not only is internal difference 'not a determination, given the choice it would in fact be indeterminacy itself.'[31]

The respective positions, of course, derive from an irreconcilable difference of philosophical options; from the very start of the essay, Deleuze makes the stakes of his future philosophy clear: 'if the Being of things is in a certain way in their differences of nature, one could expect that difference itself is

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[29] 'Did [Hegel] believe in [the end of history]? He wished to say that history is over at each moment (even if he does not say it). History is made from the present. Its rule is in the movement and the suppression of present contradictions, and not in the thought of a future. Action takes place from the present and in the present, and from the contradictions to be suppressed. In this sense, history is well-defined at each moment. DELEUZE, G. Qu'est-ce que fonder?. [http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=218&groupe=Conf%E9rences&langue=1].
[30] DELEUZE, G. La conception de la différence chez Bergson. In: L'île déserte. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 55.
[31] Ibid.

something, that it has a nature, finally, that it will deliver us Being'.[32] Hence the overall arc of the argument: if Being is difference, and it is to be necessary, difference must be internal, in itself, independent from externality. The incommensurability is stated again further on, when Deleuze concludes: 'it is thus by ignoring the virtual that one believes in contradiction'[33] – an implicit recognition that, if he has no trump card against Hegel, neither can he be beaten; it is in fact different games they are playing. For him, dialectical difference must remain abstract, engendering abstract concepts out of one another – determinate Being from Being and Nothingness, quantity from quality and its absolute otherness –, without capturing the real movement of differentiation internal to Being. If contradiction is external, and premised on the absolute exteriority of a non-A, then the cause must remain entirely external to its effect; and here we find the ontological stakes behind Deleuze's critique of the concept of possibility: the goal of moving beyond retrospectively projecting the possible as merely a set of non-actualised present givens is to render the concept capable of grasping the singular movement of an individuation as differentiation, and to discern behind it 'the true reason of the thing in the process of its very making [en train de se faire], the philosophical reason which is not determination, but difference.'[34] In turn, the movement of the negative remains stuck in producing difference out of the opposite of identity, and hence out of identity itself. 'Hegel's circle (...) is only the infinite circulation of the identical through negativity. The Hegelian audacity is the last tribute, and the most powerful, to the old principle [of identity].'[35]

> Infinite representation thus suffers from the same problem as finite
> representation: that of mistaking the concept of difference with the inscription

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

[34] *Idem.* Bergson, 1859-1941. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 42. I have chosen 'in the process of its very making' rather than 'of making itself' to avoid the equivocity in the latter alternative which would obscure the stress on difference as sufficient reason.

[35] *Idem. Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 71.

of difference within the identity of the concept in general (even if it takes identity as a pure, infinite principle rather than genre, and extends to the whole the rights of the concept instead of fixing its boundaries).[36]

Foucault's position is, at least initially, less marked by an alternative project than by opposition – and he was not unaware of the attendant dialectical twists in such a situation.[37] One could assume that both Hegel and Marx are intended in *Les mots et les choses* in the discussion on how the three 'transcendentals' of work, life and language – which prenounce, or indeed constitute, the amphibious structure of man – give rise to 'metaphysics which, despite their post-Kantian chronology, appear in fact as pre-critical'[38]. Outside of knowledge by virtue of being its source, and therefore never fully available to objectivation and representation, they correspond to the transcendental field discovered by Kant, yet find themselves on the side of the object rather than the subject.[39] While their *a posteriority* explains the development of positivism (a philosophy that restricts its task to the observation and organisation of empirical knowledge), the metaphysical alternatives – 'the Word of God, the Will, Life'[40] –will develop their condition of objective transcendentals. Yet the passage remains underdeveloped, and the only proper name mentioned is Bergson's. While it would not be difficult to associate Marx with a metaphysics of Work, it remains doubtful which of the terms could correspond to Hegel, for if his thought does speak of the Absolute as living self-differentiation, it is not in the vitalistic sense but as a

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[36] *Ibid.*

[37] 'To truly escape Hegel requires appreciating what exactly is the cost of distancing oneself from him; it presupposes knowing to what extent he has not, insidiously perhaps, come close to us; it presupposes knowing, in what allows us to think against Hegel, what is still Hegelian; and to measure to what extent our opposition to him is not still maybe a ruse he confronts us with and at the end of which he awaits us, immobile and elsewhere.' FOUCAULT, M. *L'Ordre du discours*. Paris: Gallimard, 2005, pp. 74-5.

[38] *Idem. Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 257.

[39] '[L]ike the Idea in transcendental dialectics, they totalise phenomena and say the *a priori* coherence of positive multiplicities; but found it in a being whose enigmatic reality constitutes ahead of every knowledge (*connaissance*) the order and nexus of what there is to know; what is more, they concern the domain of *a posteriori* truths and the principle of their synthesis – and not the *a priori* synthesis of all possible knowledge.' *Ibid.*

[40] *Ibid.*

dialectical structure; and this structure makes the Logic 'the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind'[41], and therefore precisely not a formal language; its movement, a self-differentiation, rather than emanation.

A clear opposition between Comte and Marx is proposed later, this time concerning the twin options available to a thought that attempts to give the empirical a transcendental value: on the one hand, making the truth of discourse dependent on the truth of objects, and hence reducing the transcendental to the empirical (positivism); on the other, making the truth of discourse capable of outlining the truth of things and determining its history, hence reducing the positive to the transcendental (eschatology). Curiously, there is no reference here to Hegel.

Things are clearer in the discussion of the retreat/return of the origin double. Again, the substitution of History for Order at the most basic level of epistemic organisation is the key to understanding how the thought of man constitutes itself in this way. For Classical thought the origin was the ideal – and it did not really matter whether it would be taken as actual or hypothetical – point where the doubling of representation, the correspondence between things and words, was in its purest, simplest form. In the modern age, the origin ceases to be the condition of historicity, and instead historicity, in the weight of its always already there, always already commenced givenness, necessitates the thought of an origin

> like the virtual apex of a cone, where all differences, all dispersions, all discontinuities would converge (*seraient resserrées*) to form a single point of identity, the impalpable figure of the Same, with the power nevertheless to burst upon itself and become other.[42]

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[41] HEGEL, G.W.F. *Science of Logic*, §53.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp. 340-1.

As in the commentary to Kant's *Anthropology*, *Les mots et les choses* calls this time 'originary', but traces it back to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* instead of Kant himself. It is given as the paradox of an origin that is always in retreat in relation to man: surpassing him back towards a time he cannot know because it predates him and which, by the same token, makes man a being whose origin has never taken place, because he is the source of historicity, and it is only in him that the empirical time of succession can flow. As the 'Introduction' put it, as soon as he appears, he appears as already there. 'If in empirical order things appear to him in retreat, ungraspable at their point zero, man is fundamentally in retreat in relation to this retreat of things'[43]. And here again, the structure of the *épistémè* of man will give rise to a diffraction: on the one hand, a subordination of man's time to that of things (thus placing man's origin within the chronology of positivities); on the other, a subordination of the time of things to that of man (making positivities depend on the different psychological or historical experiences man may have had of them). For the second alternative, the paradoxical task is that of founding the originary in an origin that keeps on retreating as one tries to arrive at it, and which is given a foundational role exactly by virtue of its retreat, as what is beyond and yet enables experience. This is what will give rise to the theme of the return: in Hegel, Marx, and Spengler, thought comes to an end as it closes in on itself, 'illuminates its own plenitude, finishes its circle, recognises itself in all the foreign figures of its odyssey, and accepts to disapper in the same ocean whence it had surged.'[44] In Hölderlin, Nietzsche and Heidegger, on the other hand, reconciliation is the promise that appears at the moment where the retreat is the most extreme, where estrangement is the greatest: 'where the danger is, grows/ the saving power also...'[45]

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[43] Ibid, pp. 343.

[44] FOUCAULT, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 345.

[45] *Cf.* HEIDEGGER, M. The question concerning technology. *In: Basic writings*. Ed. Farell Krell, D. London: Routledge, 2004, p. 333. More that just a favourite quote (from the poem 'Patmos' by his dear Hölderlin), for Foucault this as an architectonic feature of Heidegger's thought, in the same way as 'the end of history' is for Hegel and Marx. This is also, of course, one of the points in Deleuze's mischievous rapprochement of Heidegger and Jarry: 'Being

The conclusion is that, in either case, what becomes the object of thought is

> something like the 'Same': across the domain of the originary which articulates human experience upon the time of nature and life, upon history, upon the sedimented past of cultures, modern thought applies itself to recover man in his identity – in this plenitude or this nothing which he is in himself (...).[46]

It seems that Deleuze and Foucault thus could arrive at a similar conclusion through different paths, and following different projects. The primacy of the Same, for the first, is the incapacity of dialectics to go beyond the identity principle, and in this case it does not matter whether one considers Hegel's thought as positing an end, since the principle is already given at the start; it is Hegel's indebtedness to the history of philosophy, and its failure to arrive at a concept of difference in itself, that is determinant. For the second, the positing of the end plays a much more important role; but it is only a sign of Hegel's historical occurrence within an epistemic field already overdetermined by the question of the subject and its self-identity, so that Hegel's transgression is not really transgression, but 'return to itself'[47]. One could say that Foucault's Hegel is primarily that of the *Phenomenology*, whereas Deleuze's is that of the *Logic*; but the point where the two converge is a critique of *interiority*: in Deleuze, the interiority of difference to the concept, rather than its self-sufficiency; in both, the interiority of any difference that can affect thought to a pure subjectivity whose transformation is always led back into recognition, which only goes out of itself – and never does it go farther than in Hegel – in order to reincorporate the other as other-for-itself.

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shows itself twice: once in relation to metaphysics, in an *past immemorial* because it is in retreat from all past history – the always already thought of the Greeks. The second time in relation to technology, in an unassignable future, pure imminence or possibility of a thought always to come.' DELEUZE, G. Un précurseur méconnu de Heidegger, Alfred Jarry. *In: Critique et clinique*. Paris: Minuit, 2006, pp. 118..

[46] FOUCAULT, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 345.

[47] *Idem*. Introduction a l'*Anthropologie* de Kant. Thèse complémentaire pour le doctorat ès lettres. [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault8.htm]

The prevalence of identity also means that, even if made into an infinite progression, dialectics maintains the movement of selection that allows for the distinction between the (accidental) real and the (essential) actual: a 'conservation of the whole' (...) 'in a gigantic Memory', whereby there is a selection, 'but always in favour of that which is conserved'.[48] This means more than just the refusal of the piety of a critique which, like Kant's, does not go far enough; if for Hegel thought and action always start from the present, the conserved is always the point of view from which history and the present will be judged – dialectics is a machine that always produces the apologia of the necessity of whatever has come to pass; it 'codifies struggle, war and confrontation in a logic' that recuperates them in a 'double process of totalisation and exposition of a rationality that is at once final, but fundamental, and in any case irreversible'.[49] The capacity to select the necessary from the contingent, the essential from the accidental always 'in favour of the conserved' also means dialectics, as much as making 'a mockery of pluralism'[50], cannot allow for perspectivism: 'infinite representation encompasses in fact an infinity of representations'[51], but always converging on the identity of the same one world or orbiting around the properties of the same self. If 'difference is the object of an affirmation', it is *because* 'this affirmation is multiple'[52], and cannot be subsumed under the identity of a concept. Hence, in fact, the inner necessity for an end of history in the historical solution: a thought that aspires to universality not only at the level of possibility, but of necessity, must affirm itself over all other in an absolute way: the one who enunciates it *must* be the vehicle through which Being speaks itself.

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[48] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 76.

[49] FOUCAULT, M. *'Il faut défendre la societé'. Cours au Collège de France (1975 - 1976)*. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1997, p. 50. Foucault continues by claiming that dialectics 'must be understood (...) as the colonisation and authoritarian pacification, by philosophy and law, of a historico-political discourse that was at once an observation, a proclamation and a practice of social war.'

[50] DELEUZE, G. *Nietzsche et la philosophie*. Paris: 2003, p. 4.

[51] *Idem. Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 79.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 78.

3.1.5 – Beyond closure

Reason, in its dialectical mastering of all that is other to it into the higher identity of the Concept, must pass through the end, through death itself. This appears at the moment in which the *Phenomenology* moves into the *Logic*: the enunciation of the latter by the philosopher is the cancellation of the philosopher himself as individual, his becoming the voice of Being that finally speaks itself. But it is also there at the beginning: in sense-consciousness, where the thisness, the 'here' and 'now' of intuition is negated into universality, and, self-reflexively, the subject negates its own thisness and finds itself subsumed under a universal[53]; and in the founding moment in which the slave averts the struggle to death ('the Absolute Master'), and, retreating from the possibility of its ultimate negation as finite being, accepts bondage but attains the essence of self-consciousness – pure being-for-self, negativity.[54] It is precisely this 'experience' of death that will be a key issue for the likes of Bataille and Blanchot, who mark the transition from the 'generalised Hegelianism' of the generation that preceded Foucault and Deleuze's to the 'generalised anti-Hegelianism'[55] of theirs; for the impossibility of such an experience is, in a way, Kant's revenge against Hegel. If the latter passes through death in order to return it to self-consciousness, it is precisely by not arriving at it as such; for the real experience of death, of the end, precludes any return, as it is the end of consciousness itself. What Hegel does is to accomplish, through theoretical means, the same thing that religion does through ritual and sacrifice: to bring man's absolute immanence to Being – death, the annulment of the individual in the face of Being – into conscious experience. But, precisely, if this experience remains conscious, if the point is to arrive at the self-consciousness of the end, it is because this immanence can only be represented, and not experienced as such: 'if man

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[53] HEGEL, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 129-30, 173-4.
[54] *Ibid.*, § 194.
[55] DELEUZE, G. *Op. cit.*, p. 1.

surrendered unreservedly to immanence, he would fall short of humanity; he would achieve it only to lose it and eventually life would return to the unconscious intimacy of animals.'[56] It is impossible to be at once 'the consciousness of disappearing' and a 'disappearing consciousness'; only the one who managed that would 'have entirely added to his consciousness its disappearing, [would] thus be realised totality, the realisation of the whole, the absolute.'[57] But even when death is the object of an attempt at mastery in the form of suicide, it remains a walkway that is interrupted just as one would arrive.[58] To say 'I kill myself' is as much of a paradox as Epimenides', for the activity affirmed by the subject is entirely contradicted by the passivity of the object.[59]

So even while making the movement of representation infinite – and even if this movement is construed as truly infinite, that is, where its end is nothing but the self-knowledge of its own pure *form* – Hegel remains trapped in representation; even if it this development does not arrive at an end, each one of its moments is always a reconciliation with otherness in (self-)recognition, maintaining a progress of ever greater actualisation where the essential is selected against the contingent[60]; even while the movement of negativity is a process of both action and passion that transforms the subject, the form of the subject remains the same, and only goes out of itself to come to rest again in the interiority of consciousness. Foucault and Deleuze inherit from Bataille and Blanchot the challenge of this problematic, impossible experience that Hegel always confronts, but always retreats from; the heart of

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[56] BATAILLE, G. Sacrifice, the sacred and the principles of the sacred world. *In:* BOTTING, F.; WILSON, F. (org.) *The Bataille reader.* Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p. 215.

[57] BLANCHOT, M. *L'espace littéraire.* Paris: Gallimard, 1991, p. 122.

[58] *Ibid.,* p. 132.

[59] *Ibid.,* p. 134.

[60] One could see this, for instance, in the way in which Habermas appropriates Kohlberg's insights into the ontogenetic development of morality into a metanarrative of the historical constitution of contemporary societies and combines it with a continuation of the theme of the dialectics of Enlightenment, normatively grounded on the presuppositions of communicative action.

Bataille's 'paradoxical philosophy'[61], and the starting point of Blanchot's reflection on the work (*l'Oeuvre*). To go beyond representation, to go beyond the subject, is to agree with Hegel that philosophy finds its true medium in a thought that is not reduced to the limits of experience; but it is also to oppose term by term the limits in which they still find Hegel trapped: to search for the difference that founds representation, to search for the unconscious that inhabits thought, to search for the exteriority in which a subject can appear.

It is here that Foucault and Deleuze encounter the problematic of the internal tension of modernity – the problem of the 'two critiques'. It is here that they recover the Nietzschean moment: how to hold on to the critical thrust of immanentisation and sustain it in both directions. How to provide a critique of claims to truth of authority without from the start restricting its rights by placing the subject in the role of extra-temporal measure through which the eternal values of truth, God, power end up being not only secured, but reinforced; while, at the same time, not reverting to a philosophy incapable of subjecting itself to critique, and falling back upon the unfettered claims of transcendent metaphysics? If to think immanence means to think what surpasses and conditions representation, how to achieve material immanence through formally immanent means? How can one see the emergence of truth within finite, empirical time of history (Hegel's starting point), without reinstating transcendence either as the movement by which the torsion that captures this emergence is accomplished in an interiority, or as the immutable, extra-temporal viewpoint from which the whole process can be measured?

> It is true that philosophy, since Descartes anyway, has always, in the West, been tied to the problem of knowledge. One cannot escape it. (...) For as much as I could say I am not a philosopher, insofar as it is truth I am concerned with, I cannot be anything but a philosopher. Since Nietzsche, this

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[61] BATAILLE, G. Autobiographical note. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 113.

question has changed. No longer: 'what is the safest way to Truth?', but 'what has been the aleatory path of truth?'[62]

At this point, the relation between material and formal immanence stands truly, and maybe in more senses than one, *entre chien et loup*. The question of whether Kant's philosophy is materially immanent at best does not apply (since a judgment of this kind would require a transcendent application of the categories of the understanding), or at worst, as *per* Deleuze's critique, it is analogy and transcendence that animate the entirety of Kant's critical edifice. Kant nevertheless establishes the criteria by which a system can be judged formally immanent (immanence to possible experience), but fails to bring it to its necessary conclusion in the providing the conditions of existence of his own discourse (performative immanence). Nietzsche's philosophy is materially immanent, insofar as it excludes any supplementary dimension to existence and, with it, any extra-temporal ground of judgments of truth or value. But in so doing, it also eliminates the transcendental subject as the (extra-temporal, by virtue of being the source of time) ground upon the knowledge of whom the rule of formal immanence could be established; it also refuses the occurrence of the Absolute Knowledge of the identity between subject and object, Subject and Substance, within empirical time. But a thought that thinks without the subject to whose experience thought must be immanent, how could it be formally immanent? Or, in other terms: how can one have the *experience* that the limits of the constituent subject are not given once and for all?

We have seen that Foucault's answer is precisely to invert the burden of proof: how *can* the experience of finitude be given? If the 'trajectory of the question "*Was ist der Mensch*?"' – a question that 'would bring upon the philosophy of our time the whole shadow of a classical philosophy now deprived of God: *can there be an empirical knowledge of finitude?*' – 'comes

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[62] FOUCAULT, M. Questions à Michel Foucault sur la géographie. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 50-1.

to an end in the answer that refuses and disarms it: *der Übermensch*'[63], it is because Kant's text already shows that

> the empiricity of the *Anthropology* cannot be founded on itself; it is possible only as a repetition of the *Critique*; (...) and if it presents itself as its empirical and external *analogon* it is to the extent that it finds support in the *a priori* structures already named and exposed. Finitude (...) can therefore never reflect on itself at its very same level; it only offers itself to consciousness and discourse in a secondary manner; but what it is bound to refer to is not an ontology of the infinite; it is, in their collective (*d'ensemble*) organisation, the *a priori* conditions of knowledge. That is, the *Antropology* is twice subordinated to the *Critique*: as knowledge, to the conditions that it fixes and to the domain of experience that it determines; as exploration of finitude, to the prior and unsurpassable forms of the latter that it manifests.[64]

Anthropological thought – 'a mode of thought in which the limits of knowledge by right (and consequently of all empirical knowledge) are at the same time the concrete forms of existence as they are given in this very same empirical knowledge'[65] – must always project the form of the given over that of the conditions, turning the present into the limit *de jure* of what can be thought. Even if the boundaries between empirical and transcendental, passion and action keep blurring into each other, they always rely on an original division that is itself not given to experience; and when philosophy

> finds its presupposition in an Image of thought whose pretension is to be valid by right, we hence cannot content ourselves with opposing it with contrary facts. One must take the question to the level of right itself, and know if this image does not betray the very essence of thought as pure thought. As long as it is valid by right, this image presupposes a certain partition of the empirical and the transcendental; and it is this partition that must be judged (...).[66]

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[63] *Idem*. Introduction a l'*Anthropologie* de Kant. Thèse complémentaire pour le doctorat ès lettres. [http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpfoucault8.htm]
[64] *Ibid.*
[65] *Idem. Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 261.
[66] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: Gallimard, 2003, p. 174.

3.1.6 – Beyond representation

The experience of limits is beyond the limits of experience. If Nietzsche disarms the question of man, it is insofar as he takes the problem of immanence to its limit – and its limit is only itself, or rather, is not a limit at all. Here Nietzsche speaks in the name of time as absolute genesis. Or, since it is impossible to experience time as absolute genesis as much as it is impossible to experience grounds, from the point of view of the finite subject, Nietzsche speaks in the name of the future, of a 'people to come', in the formula that Deleuze is so fond of. It is primarily in the name of the future that one can be committed to the present; to try and determine once and for all the limits of what can be thought or done is to recoil from death as the possibility of ceasing to be what one is: Nietzsche would almost certainly agree that all attempts at providing a halt to the movement of critique share with suicide that 'remarkable intention of abolishing the future as the mystery of death: in a way, one wishes to kill oneself so that the future would hold no secret, so that it stops being the obscure reserve of the undecipherable death.'[67] In Nietzsche, it is as if thought temporalises itself not against the horizon of death as the collapse of all possibilities, but beyond the death of the individual who thinks, against the horizon of the never finished Work to be accomplished.[68] As Blanchot says: 'Suicide is oriented towards the [reversal, in death, of power and powerlessness] as its end. The work (l'oeuvre) searches for it as its origin.'[69] To which Zarathustra can reply: 'I love the one who lives to know and who wants to know so that one day the overman will live. For it is thus that he wills his own decline.'[70]

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[67] BLANCHOT, M. L'espace littéraire. Paris: Gallimard, 1991, p. 130. This can be compared to Deleuze's remarks on Freud. Cf. DELEUZE, G. Op. cit., pp. 26-30.
[68] Cf. PÉLBART, P. P. O tempo não-reconciliado. São Paulo: Perspectiva, 2004, p. 129. Pélbart makes this point about Deleuze – but the relation here is obvious, considering the latter's reading of the eternal return.
[69] BLANCHOT, M. Op. cit., p. 133.
[70] NIETZSCHE, F. Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra. I, §4.

The stakes of both Deleuze's and Foucault's trajectories are, in different ways, connected to the overcoming that is involved in a surpassing of representation, and hence on a refusal of closure – in fact, on a refusal of the *possibility* of closure – of critique.

> From this world of representation, rigorous science can only deliver to a minimum extent – even if this is in any case nothing to be desired – because it cannot break radically with the force of the habits of sentiment: but it can very progressively and step by step clarify the history of this world as representation – and elevate us, at least for a few minutes, above the entire process.[71]

In the same book in which he announces for the first time the death of God and the eternal return, Nietzsche celebrates critique as the sign that 'something in us *wills* to live and affirm itself', even if it is something that is not yet visible: '*It is your new life*, not your reason, which has killed for you this [old] opinion: you need it no more, and now it sinks upon itself and unreason escapes it like vermin'.[72] Critique is then, as in Kant's *Aufklärung* essay, marked by a double tie to the present: as belonging to a moment in time (to Enlightenment, to a 'new life') and as an action upon its time (a project, the need to destroy in order to affirm). Again, the self-referentiality (he says 'ambiguity') that Foucault detects in the Kantian text; the game of action and passion, autonomy and heteronomy, whereby the exit from the state of minority is at once *a process that is happening* and a *task to be fulfilled*:

> we have to consider *Aufklärung* at once as a process that men are part of collectively and an act of courage to be practiced personally. They may be their actors insofar as they are part of it; and it takes place insofar as men decide to be its voluntary actors.[73]

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[71] *Idem. Humain, trop humain.* I, §16.
[72] *Idem. Le gai savoir.* IV, § 307. (Nietzsche's italics.)
[73] FOUCAULT, M. What is Enlightenment?. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1384.

The refusal of a closure for critique is then none other than the refusal of a point of view external to time. This is the project that Deleuze and Foucault unmistakably wish to carry further; and if the move from eternal to finite time in the end amounted only to a reinstatement of extra-temporality in the form of a self-identical transcendental subjectivity; or if time was made into the exterior form of negativity as it occurs to the finite mode; if

> [the] passage from history to Absolute Knowledge, from the temporal to the eternal, is Hegel's most obscure dialectical synthesis; history creates itself, like the Logos, but this creation is in the first case temporal, in the other eternal. The Logos is not an essence, it is the element where Being and sense reflect themselves on each other, where Being appears to itself as sense, and sense as Being; it is absolute genesis, and time is the image of this mediation, not the other way round.[74]

The problem then is to invert the terms of the relation, and make time into the absolute genesis in which reason, or thought, takes place.[75]

> I have always felt I was an empiricist, that is, a pluralist. But what does this empiricism-pluralism equivalence mean? It derives from two characteristics (...): that the abstract does not explain, but is itself what must be explained; that one does not search for the eternal or universal, but for the conditions under which something new is produced (*creativeness*).[76]

> [I]f the Kantian question was one of knowing which limits knowledge must renounce to transgress, it seems to me that the critical question today must be reversed into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what is the part of what is singular, contingent and due to arbitrary

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[74] HYPPOLITE, J. *Logique et existence*. Paris: PUF, p. 246.

[75] Leonard Lawlor generalises this move to include Derrida: 'All of the solutions developed in the Sixties to the problem of how to conceive difference consist in *reversing* this relation of the Logos and time. The different ways in which one can reverse the relation of Logos and time (the relation of logic and existence) define the diffraction of philosophical options that the name "Hyppolite" represents.' LAWLOR, L. *Thinking through French philosophy: the being of the question*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, p. 20.

[76] DELEUZE, G. Préface pour l'édition américaine de *Dialogues*. In: *Deux régimes de fous*. Paris: MInuit, 2003, p. 284. (Italics in the original.)

constraints. It is, in the end, a matter of transforming the critique exercised in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique in the form of possible transgression.[77]

Yet the terms in which these two relatively late, retrospective appreciations of their trajectories are couched also point to their differences. For Deleuze, philosophy is a matter of arriving at the conditions for the production of novelty, the impersonal transcendental field that accounts for all individuation into a singular thing. For Foucault, it is about putting oneself through the experience of becoming different, undergoing 'a historico-practical test (épreuve) of the limits we can transgress'[78]; showing 'that things are not as evident as one thinks, to make what is taken for granted not be taken for granted anymore'.[79] For the first, philosophy must fulfill the post-Kantian project – advanced by Maïmon, but aborted by Fichte's and Hegel's emphasis on identity – of finding a genetic principle that accounts for the genesis of the real (not possible experience) in difference. The 'truly sufficient reason' behind the experience of 'the new, that is, difference' in its power of 'calling, in thought, upon forces that are not those of recognition', but take it into 'an unrecognised and unrecognisable terra incognita'[80]; difference as the transcendental condition of the given. For the second, it must proceed by means of the grey meticulousness of the genealogist who reveals the will behind the universality of an extra-temporal point of view; who unsettles our continuities' and dissolves the 'temporal identities in which we look at our own face to conjure the breaks of history'[81], which obeys 'neither destiny nor

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[77] FOUCAULT, M. What is Enlightenment?. In: Dits et écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1393.

[78] FOUCAULT, M. Op. cit., p. 1394.

[79] Idem. Est-il donc important de penser?. In: Op. cit., p. 999.

[80] DELEUZE, G. Différence et répétition. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 177.

[81] FOUCAULT, M. L'Archéologie du savoir. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 172.

mechanics, but only the contingency of struggle'[82]. Difference, 'far from being a forgotten and recovered origin, is this dispersion that we are and make.'[83]

And in spite of the great affinity, no doubt behind the mutual respect and admiration between the two[84], in practical consequences – both in the sense of how the two conceive practice, and in that of the practice, or performance, of their own philosophies – and stakes – to open in thought a space for a 'time to come', to find in it 'an unfolding [*dépli*] where it is possible to think again'[85] –, these are nevertheless arrived at through similar, but not identical paths. It would be possible in very broad terms to distribute them on either side of the oppositions posed at the beginning of the chapter. These should be read, as argued above, as divergent tendencies rather than sedimented oppositions; they nonetheless allow us to say: Deleuze arrives at immanence primarily through univocity, while Foucault through perspectivism; Deleuze's main concern is with developing a way of thinking the immanence of Being to thought, while Foucault's is with 'what it means for thought to have a history'[86], and hence the immanence of thought to Being; when transposed to the problem of the relation between immanence and time, this means that Deleuze's interest is in time itself, whereas Foucault's is in history; which, finally, means that we will find Deleuze working through problems that are closer to a transcendental solution, while Foucault's lie on the side of a historical one.

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[82] *Idem*. Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1016.

[83] *Idem*. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 173.

[84] 'I believe nonetheless in the existence of many points of correspondence [between their respective works], yet as if kept at a distance by a huge difference of method, and even goal. These points are even more valuable, inestimable, for that reason: better than a goal, there was a common cause.' DELEUZE, G. Fendre les choses, fendre les mots. *In: Pourparlers. 1972-1990*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, pp. 117.

[85] FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 353.

[86] *Ibid.*, p. 220.

3.2 – Between time and history

3.2.1 – From archaeology to an 'ontology of the present'

To say that history was the most constant, and most profound, of Foucault's concerns throughout his work is not an overstatement: even if one discounts the texts overtly dedicated to historiography (which, although important, are relatively small in number) and his explicit reclaiming of a French lineage in the history of sciences (that of Bachelard, Cavaillès and Canguilhem[87]), it remains a fact that, for him, history is what is to be thought; not only at the methodological level of *how* to think it, but as providing the *what* of philosophy. In Deleuze's concise and on-target formula: 'Thought thinks its own history (past), but to free itself from what it thinks (present) in order to finally "think differently" (future).'[88]

Therefore, there would be at least three ways of writing about the intrinsic and necessary relationship between Foucault's thought and history: by considering the histories (or stories) that his books tell, how they relate to each other, and what they can reveal about a Foucauldian diagnosis of the present; by looking at his statements concerning his own methodology, and historiography in general; by examining the properly philosophical character of this relationship, and how it affects both methods and contents. From the point of view of a enquiry into immanence and philosophy, and the kind of solution to the specific problem of philosophical immanence that one finds in Foucault, the latter is the most important; which means that, while it must build upon the first two, it must also aim at the deeper, more elementary level where they are connected, and from where they are articulated. This level can be captured by looking at the overall philosophical goals and practices, as well as metaphilosophical considerations, that stretch between the earlier

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[87] FOUCAULT, M. La vie: l'expérience et la science. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1583.
[88] DELEUZE, G. *Foucault.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 127.

formulation of a project of an archaeology of knowledge, to the development of a 'history of the present'[89], followed by the late retrospective characterisation of his philosophy as an 'ontology of the present'[90], or 'historical ontology of ourselves'. One could say, in fact, that if the problem inherited from Hegel's historicisation of the question of immanence is to invert the relation between logic and existence, concept and time – turning the second terms in each pair into the genetic medium of the first –, then whatever ontology can be found in Foucault's work is to be sought at this level; something which is indeed suggested by the slippage between the two terms to be found in the way in which he refers to his project: from a 'history of present' in the mid-1970s to an 'ontology of the present' in the early 1980s.

3.2.1.1 – Exteriority, the outside

In the most elementary sense, we can define material immanence as an absence of outside. An immanentist philosophy is one that recognises only one dimension of Being (univocity) that nothing stands in an external relation to; absolute immanence, following the well-known formula, is immanent only to itself. So here, again, we can find the tension with formal immanence: for the latter works precisely by setting up an outside, defining a space beyond which no meaningful or legitimate claims can be made. If the first is wholly ocean or desert[91], the second is island.[92]

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[89] FOUCAULT, M. *Surveiller et punir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 40.

[90] *Idem*. 'Qu'est-ce que les Lumières?. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 1506-7.

[91] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 389; *Idem*; GUATTARI, F. *Mille plateaux*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 469-70; 598-9. Even if imagined as island, it is as *desert island*... Cf. *Idem*. Causes et raisons des îles désertes. *In: L'île déserte*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 11-7.

[92] 'We have now not only traversed the region of the pure understanding and carefully surveyed every part of it, but have also measured it, and assigned to everything in it its rightful place. This domain is an island, enclosed by nature herself within unchangeable limits. It is the land of truth – an enchanting name! – surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion...'. KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*. A236/B295.

Yet 'outside' is too unspecified a term to be of much use if one is going to judge the immanentist implications of a philosophy.[93] As seen above, the refusal of Hegel's solution to the problem of realising immanence is based upon both a critique of interiority, and a refocusing on what lies 'outside' representation, which should be enough of a sign that the term cannot be used without adequate qualification.

This outside of representation, and the critique of interiority it entails, has a prominent role in Deleuze's reading of Foucault, which stands out, among other reasons, for its emphasis on the importance and permanence of an 'appeal to an outside'. This is given three essential meanings: 'that to think is not the innate exercise of a faculty, but must happen to thought'[94]; this outside is thus the 'non-place' in which the exteriorities of seeing and saying enter different relations (or 'non-relations') 'that are as many solutions to the "problem" of truth'[95]; and, as a consequence, it is to be understood as the space of informal forces that compose and transform historical, stratified forms. Unsurprisingly perhaps, these are all points that Deleuze could be quite satisfied with if applied to his philosophy; but a few pages down he recognises that the convergence between the two may at least not have been complete from the start:

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[93] The relation between the absence of an outside and immanence has been a point of much discussion in recent years in the space opened up by Toni Negri's work with Michael Hardt. There is, however, a curious oscillation in their thought, which is of special interest given their appropriation of Foucault and Deleuze: while holding on to an immanentist ontology that is purportedly applicable to time in general, and hence to history as a whole, the two at the same time argue that the elimination of an outside is a mark of the passage from the formal to real subsumption of society under capital. In other words, their Spinozian ontology, while generally valid, is made formally immanent through a recourse to a historical solution that applies only to the present. This not only creates a difficult metatheoretical position, but also accounts for the Hegelian tone of passages where they argue, for example, that it is only today that the democratic *telos* of struggles for emancipation can be fully realised in networked forms of organisation, or that the multitude, which has always already existed *sub specie aeternitatis*, can exist as a historical political figure. *Cf.* HARDT, M.; NEGRI, T. *Multitude. War and democracy in the age of Empire*. London: Penguin, 2006, pp. 87-8; 221.
[94] DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 93.
[95] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

> For a long time Foucault had thought the outside as an ultimate spatiality deeper than time; it is the last works that provide the possibility of placing time in the outside, of thinking the outside as time, under the condition of the fold.[96]

The second part of the sentence, as will be shown next, somewhat overstates the significance of the late works in this area; the first, while certainly not exhausting the subject, does offer an accurate observation about the way in which Foucault conceived of his own project at the very first time in which it was formulated as such. The original preface of *Histoire de la folie* speaks of a 'confrontation between history's dialectics and the immobile structure of the tragic'[97]. The book, while mostly consisting of a history of the relation of mutual conditioning between reason and unreason, where the form imposed on the second has a foundational role in the historical transformations of the first, does also rely on flashes of lightning such as Nietzsche and Artaud to provide a glimpse of a 'madness' as such – the 'true', static other of reason – and not just the 'relative' other it needs to constitute in order to constitute itself.[98]

The resulting ontologisation of madness (a charge later brought against *L'Anti-Oedipe*) would be disowned by Foucault very explicitly from at least the mid-1970s on.[99] More importantly, by the end of the 1960s he would

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[96] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[97] FOUCAULT, M. Préface. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2005, vol. I, p. 190. This preface – where the idea of a history of sexuality is first hinted at, and where Foucault places his work 'under the sun of the great Nietzschean enquiry' – was only printed in full in the first edition; it appeared in an edited version between then and 1972, when it was excised altogether. It has been suggested that Derrida's critique of the book may have influenced this decision. *Cf.* CAMPILLO, A. Foucault and Derrida. The history of a debate on history. *Angelaki. Journal of the theoretical humanities,* 5 (2), pp. 113-34.

[98] It is in terms of a topology concerned with the situation of reason and unreason along a variable boundary that Michel Serres describes *Histoire de la folie. Cf.* SERRES, M. The geometry of the incommunicable: madness. *In:* DAVIDSON, A. I. (ed.) *Foucault and his interlocutors.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997, pp. 36-56.

[99] 'Nothing is more internal to our society, nothing is more internal to the effects of its power than the unhappiness of a madman or the violence of a criminal. In other words, we are always on the inside. The margin is a myth. The word of the outside is a dream that never ceases to be reconducted.' *Idem.* La extension sociale de la norme. *In: Op. cit.,* p. 77. *Cf.* Appendix.

recognise that the way in which each historical period constitutes itself in opposition to the way it constitutes madness is still heavily indebted to dialectical thinking, and that the idea of this fundamental 'experience' of madness necessarily invokes the interiority of a meta-historical subject as its correlate.[100] Yet, while the outside would cease to be treated in terms of the relation between reason and its non-historical, non-temporal other, it is true that throughout the 1960s it will tend to be thought in spatial terms. That is the case, for example, in the 'heterotopias' that, even while encompassing different forms of 'heterochronia' (the threshold of death and the length of decay in cemeteries, the conservation of the past in museums), are essentially determined by the processes of inclusion and exclusion that define them and the historically variable functions they have for a given society[101]; or in a text on Bataille, where it is said of transgression that *the gesture that crosses the limits touches absence itself*.[102] But already at the time of this text, and its more famous, later counterpart on Blanchot ('La pensée du dehors'), the space of this outside has already been ascribed a historical value, showing how important a role Foucault's early reflections on literature played in the thinking that resulted in *Les mots et les choses*.

Both texts are on an experience of limits, or of the outside, which is also a test (*épreuve*); but they are also concerned with the conditions in which such a 'thought of the outside' can appear, in its historical singularity that stands opposed to a thought that only executes a false movement of going out of itself to return to the interiority of a subject (dialectics, which is identified with the beginnings of Western thought) or the ordered cosmos organised by an emanative or transitive cause (negative theology). The relevance of literature is twofold, since in both Bataille and Blanchot Foucault finds the effort to develop a language appropriate to this experience, but also the self-reference

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[100] Cf. FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, pp. 26-7.

[101] Cf. *Idem*. Des espaces autres. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 1571-81. The text, written in 1967, was only published in 1984.

[102] *Idem*. Préface à la transgression. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 278. (Italics in the original.)

of language that reveals an exteriority where no autonomous subject can take root; a difficulty, perhaps impossibility, and a symptomatic presence that they share with others: 'Attraction is no doubt the same for Blanchot as desire for Sade, force for Nietzsche, the materiality of thought for Artaud, transgression for Bataille; the pure and most naked experience of the outside.'[103]

> To be attracted is not to be invited by the appeal of the outside, it is rather to experiment [éprouver], in the void and in destitution, the presence of the outside and, with this presence, the fact that one is irremediably outside of the outside. Far from calling interiority towards an other, attraction imperiously manifests that the outside is there, open, without intimacy, protection or reserve (how could it have any, if it has no interiority, but deploys itself infinitely outside any closure?); but that there is no access to this openness itself, as the outside never delivers its own essence; it cannot offer itself as a positive presence – as a thing illuminated from the inside by the certitude of its own existence –, but only as the absence that retreats into the farthest from itself and hollows itself out, beckoning us to advance towards it, as if it were possible to arrive at it.[104]

Transgression, in turn, does not triumph over the limits it crosses by internalising them. 'It affirms limited being, it affirms the unlimited into which it leaps, opening it for the first time to existence. But one could say there is nothing positive in this affirmation: no content can bind it since, by definition, no limit can contain it.'[105] The difficulty, therefore, consists in speaking of an outside which is precisely the cancellation of the possibility of speaking of it; at once origin and death, the place where the one who speaks either is not yet, or is no longer. Such is the *il y a* of language that appears behind and around the 'I speak'; whereas 'I think' once led to 'I am', 'I speak' reveals only the murmur of a language always already there, a surface of dispersion

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[103] *Idem*. La pensée du dehors. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 553.

[104] *Ibid.*, pp. 553-4.

[105] *Idem*. Préface à la transgression. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 266. He continues, in a way that brings him closer to Deleuze: 'It is perhaps only the affirmation of division, provided this word is divested of the sense of cut, the establishment of a separation or the measure of a gap, and refers only to the *being of difference*.' (My italics.)

where the thinking, speaking subject, as well as any object that is named, cannot take hold. The I is fractured by language, rather than time. This thought of transgression and limit rather than totality and contradiction runs up against the difficulty that made Bataille describe his own project as a 'paradoxical philosophy': bringing the outside into the inside, when the nature of this encounter can only be that of the fleeting instant when Orpheus sees Eurydice before she vanishes forever, or when Ulysses listens to the Sirens from the mast he is tied to.

But while this outside is pure void, absence, a smooth surface of inscription of exteriorities, its appearance as an object for thought is a phenomenon within history: it is intimately tied to the disappearance of God; and, while occupying the same epistemic space as the appearance of man, and thus sharing with it the same conditions of possibility, it represents something of a counter-tendency in modernity – going from Sade, Hölderlin, Mallarmé and Nietzsche to Artaud, Klossowski, Blanchot and Bataille. It grows out of the same soil, but takes it to the threshold of a thought beyond the subject. The common thread in this lineage that cuts through modernity, and which encounters in the 1960s the structuralist generalisation of the linguistic model to ethnology and psychoanalysis, is the preoccupation with the Being of language as what surpasses, precedes and fractures the I; 'we find ourselves in front of an opening that had for a long time remained invisible: the Being of language only appears in itself in the disappearance of the subject.'[106]

This is the historical perspective developed in *Les mots et les choses*, in which flow together the various tributaries of Foucault's work on literature, his interest in structuralism, and a mode of thinking with a high, if unavowed, indebtedness to Heidegger (possibly as much a matter of direct presence[107]

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[106] *Idem*. La pensée du dehors. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 549.

[107] It is interesting to notice that Foucault's saying that for him 'Heidegger was always the essential thinker', despite the fact that 'it was Nietzsche who won out', is often quoted without the following *caveat*: 'I do not know Heidegger sufficiently well, I practically do not know

as indirect, via Blanchot), placed within the framework of the history of science practiced by Bachelard and Canguilhem.

From the latter, he takes an approach which gives the book its overall narrative arc and structure, with a succession of *épistémès* separated by definitive breaks spanning Renaissance, Classical Age, and modernity, and ending in the present with the still uncertain promise of a new dawn, a thought freed from both God and the subject; but it is clear that, despite being based on a 'positivistic' analysis of the different forms taken by the study of language, life and work in the period covered by the book, the notion of the 'Being of language' that appears at the end underlies the whole enterprise.[108] If the appearance of man was a consequence of the dissociation of the tight solidity of Discourse that held representation and language together in the Classical age, the dispersion of a language no longer transparent medium and become object for different positive knowledges (*connaissances*); and if it is the passage from similitude to representation and then signification that was at the bottom of the epistemic transformations in Western knowledge (*savoir*)[109] – it would then seem that the newly acquired importance of the question of language, while itself the deployment of a possibility contained

Being and time, nor what has been recently published.' *Idem*. Le retour à la morale. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 1522.

[108] John Rajchman argues that the narrative of *Les mots et les choses* is, in fact, a teleology constructed *a posteriori* to find, at the end, the conclusions of Foucault's analysis of literature; and that the linguistic reductionism of the book, whose analysis is entirely free from non-discursive practices, is derived from early Foucault's subscription to a modernist, avantgardist conception of art as the space of transgression, precisely by virtue of its preoccupation with the Being of language – which, in turn, would explain the somewhat free-floating, 'meta-epistemic' presence of works of art such as *Don Quijote* and *Las Meninas* in the book. *Cf.* RAJCHMAN, J. *Michel Foucault: the freedom of philosophy*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, chapter 1. While I largely agree with his arguments, I hope the ways in which my conclusions differ from his will become apparent in the next section.

[109] *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, pp. 57-9. These pages provide the key to the whole book.

within the space of the modern *épistémè*[110], suggests that another transformation is on course.

Language returns *to us* (the readers of *Les mots et les choses*), but the appearance of its Being puts us in front of an opening 'for a long time invisible' that reveals the role it played throughout the history of Western thought as what, unconsciously to speaking subjects, organised each *épistémè* and their transformations; that it appears *to us* in its purely exterior, a-subjective Being shows us how it *is*, and has always been, the space of exteriority in which each different moment was inscribed. The 'thought of the outside' is what in the present promises the historical possibility of a thought beyond the subject, but does so by revealing language as the absolute, static 'outside' that precedes any statement or subject-position that can take place in it, where the interiority of consciousness is unmade. It would seem then that Foucault is following Heidegger in recasting the empirical/transcendental distinction (so central to the modern *épistémè)* in terms of the ontic-ontological difference – the book is described as an enquiry into the 'naked experience of order and its modes of Being'[111] 'prior to the words, perceptions and gestures that are supposed to translate it'[112]. And, in giving it a historical dimension, he does in fact come very close to a *Seinsgeschichte* –, placing, like the later Heidegger, the weight of a thought of this separation on language. At the same time, however, instead of making the possibility of a thought dependent on the recovering of the origin of a first disclosure of the concealing/unconcealing structure of Being, he is in effect dialectically recuperating it in a historical solution to the problem of realised immanence akin to the movement of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*: even if this *connaissance* does not ostensibly promise the end of any alienation of the

[110] *Ibid.*, pp. 395-6; and the references to Hölderlin, Sade, Nietzsche, Mallarmé, Artaud, Bataille, Blanchot and Klossowski *In: Idem.* La pensée du dehors. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, pp. 549-50.
[111] *Idem. Les mots et les choses.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 13.
[112] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

subject's powers – at least not in the sense of a final mastery of language – it still seems to deliver at least a retrospective recognition of the unconscious work of language in shaping *savoir*.[113]

Foucault's thought at the time of *Les mots et les choses* then seems trapped in the same predicament of the return/retreat of the origin double: the 'return of language' is the moment of a reconciliation where the underlying unconscious structure of knowledge becomes known, but also the historical appearance of a knowledge of what, by virtue of being transcendental, escapes and precedes the empirical succession in which it is given. And it is precisely around the notions of the outside and limit, and the extent to which it is possible to exit dialectics, that Derrida's perspicacious critique of Foucault, and the polemic between the two, takes place.

Against *Histoire de la folie*, Derrida argues that writing a history of unreason as the outside of reason is an impossibility, since the first can only ever be rendered from within the second – very much like Habermas later would, he argues that a history of reason and its other must always presuppose reason from the start.[114] Unlike the self-reflexivity shown in Bataille's analysis of how the expenditure of the potlatch becomes recuperated by a restricted economy of honour, or the transgressive power of the sacrifice instrumentalised by the good functioning of society – an awareness that eventually leads to the dissolution of the search for sovereignty in an 'unknowing' –, Foucault is

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[113] '[I]n the movement of consciousness there occurs a moment of *being-in-itself* or *being-for-us* which is not present to the consciousness comprehended in the experience itself. The *content*, however, of what presents itself to us does exist *for it*; we comprehend only the formal aspect of that content, or its pure origination. *For it*, what thus arises exists only as an object; *for us*, it appears at the same time as movement and a process of becoming.' HEGEL, G.W.F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 87.

[114] DERRIDA, J. *Cogito* et histoire de la folie. *In: L'Ecriture et la difference*. Paris: Seuil, 1967, p. 57. Foucault's response could apply just as well to Derrida or Habermas: there is never a single reason, either in the form of certain quasi-transcendental presuppositions or a unified tradition, but only rationalities which, considered in the mutual exteriority of their dispersion, can add up only to a distributed, never a collective, whole. *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. Omnes et singulatim. Vers une critique de la raison politique. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 953-5.

merely oblivious to his complicity in the metaphysical violence he decries: his project is only another chapter of reason's triumphant appropriation of madness; his attempt to make immanent the relation between the two elements by placing them alongside each other in the surface of exteriority of history only achieves 'this reduction to intraworldliness [that] is the origin and very meaning of what is called violence, making possible all straitjackets.'[115] For Derrida, the point zero of the separation and exclusion of unreason by reason can be neither a transcendental, nor a historical point, but the site of a quasi-transcendental, originary undecidability between the two, where the two are always already contaminated by each other, and the opposition that Foucault wishes to historicise is undermined. Derrida maintains the structure of a negative theology, but eliminates its point of arrival by keeping it void; *différance* is a formal structure of transcendence that inhabits every 'inside', but in itself is not, and can only be read by the traces it leaves in immanence. In his reduction to history, in turn, Foucault would be dealing with presence and not the always absent presencing that makes it possible – which, for Derrida, is exactly what counts as metaphysics.

We have seen, however, that the essential way in which Foucault defines metaphysics is by its hypocritical aspiration for a point of view outside the flux of time – and time, for Foucault, is essentially history. It comes as no surprise, then, that he should react by claiming that this quasi-transcendental formal structure of transcendence that precedes the difference between transcendental and empirical, Being and being, is nothing but metaphysical.[116] The very way in which Derrida reads – which is tantamount

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[115] DERRIDA, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 86.

[116] FOUCAULT, M. Mon corps, ce papier, ce feu. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 1113-36. Foucault's almost ten-year late reply attempts to outdo Derrida at both the other's and his own game, by pointing out a deficient reading of the Cartesian text both in its textual and contextual qualities (the extra-philosophical, historical and juridical meaning of the original Latin choice of the word *dementes*). This essay is also important for focusing on one element that would later acquire much importance in Foucault's work, and which, as we shall see, is essential to understanding his relation to immanence: the Cartesian meditation is read as a specific form

to saying Derrida's *philosophy*, since deconstruction, in its concern with traces, is nothing but a form of *reading* – is a pure continuation of the metaphysical tradition in its

> reduction of discursive practices to textual traces; elision of the events therein produced that leaves nothing but marks for a reading; invention of voices behind the text so as to avoid analysing the modes of implication of the subject in the discourses; assignation of the originary as what is said and not said in the text so as not to relocate discursive practices in the field of transformations where they take place.[117]

What is at stake here is, evidently, the outside: of metaphysics; of representation; of history; of the text; and the outside 'in itself' that both thinkers, perfectly aware of the impossibility of the task, wish to bring into thought.

> The stake of the debate is clearly indicated: can there be anything outside, anterior or exterior to philosophical discourse? Can it have its condition in an exclusion, a refusal, an eluded risk, and, why not, a fear? A suspicion passionately rejected by Derrida. *Pudenda origo*, said Nietzsche of religious people and their religion.[118]

For Foucault, Derrida's position, insofar as it involves a point of support that is outside of both transcendental and empirical time and endowed with universality and necessity (since *différance* underlies the text, and there is nothing outside the text, that is, the metaphysical tradition) – i.e., one that fits squarely in the very definition of *a priori* –, is still leaning on the transcendental side of the empirico-transcendental double despite itself. (The same, as a matter of fact, would apply to Heidegger's displacement of the empirico-transcendental into the ontic-ontological difference, at least as it is

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of practice, an ascetic exercise where a series of *épreuves* lead the one who meditates to a subjective transformation that is a precondition for the attainment of truth.

[117] *Ibid.*, p. 1135.

[118] *Ibid.*, p. 1115.

found in *Being and time*: while the repositioning in ontological terms of the problem allows to keep the two levels separate, and makes the *existentiell* describable in the terms of existentials, it remains a fact that the latter are assumed to be historical invariants of *Dasein*.) Of the two, Derrida is the most 'neo-Kantian': for Foucault, it is not Being that is immanent to the metaphysical tradition, but metaphysics which is the historical effect of certain non-textual procedures (exclusion, refusal etc.); its *pudenda origo* is to be found on the side of forces and material processes that can be made apparent through a historical examination of the field of discursive practices that they determine and that is determined by them, and the events that the interaction between the two produce.

3.2.1.2 – Beyond the *épistémè*

This, perhaps, turns out not to be such a damning criticism of Derrida after all; for it could serve as a confirmation of the impossibility of fully escaping the tradition that he sets out to deconstruct, avowedly from the inside. The specific form of immanence found in deconstruction – one that falls on the side of formal immanence, and thus reintroduces transcendence at the material level – plays exactly, and very openly, on this *aporia*. The bite of Derrida's criticism is overall stronger, considering it not only addresses the problems already pointed out in relation to *Les mots et les choses*, but also appears to strike at the heart of the Foucauldian project: it is history as such, then, that appears as the ultimate transcendental, one which – again as a repetition of the return/retreat of the origin double – is moreover given a historical orig*In:* it is the passage from Order to History as the fundamental principle of organisation that marks the dissolution of the classical and the inception of the modern *épistémè*.

It must be noted, however, that at the time of Foucault's reply to Derrida his thought had already moved on from the way in which it was presented in *Les*

mots et les choses; his response is coming from a different, and (I intend to argue) more defensible, position. The changes that take place between these moments can be summarised along three lines: a move from conditions of possibility to conditions of existence; the refinement of, and eventually refusal of an exclusive focus on language, and consequently the latter's loss of an ontological role; the end of the epochality still built into the concept of *épistémè*.

In *L'Archéologie du savoir*, Foucault regrets that this concept had suggested the reintroduction of a form of cultural totality[119]; we find him at pains to distinguish it from 'vague' notions such as 'epoch', 'mentality' or 'spirit of an age'; the archaeological enterprise is now very explicitly defined by the bracketing of any notions of continuity, totality and identity, which cease to have explanatory powers and instead become entities that themselves require explanation.[120] The chapter dedicated to the critique of accepted 'unities of discourse' is a clear evidence of the 'nominalism' that Foucault will profess from then on; his razor suspends faith in such familiar notions so as to 'restitute to the statement its singularity as an event', showing that discontinuity is not only in the great geological rifts of history, 'but already there in the simple fact of the statement' in its 'historical irruption'.[121] Yet this is exactly what would be impossible – for reasons by now well-known – if one were to accept that '[i]n a culture, at any given time, there can be only one *épistémè* which defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether

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[119] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, pp. 25-27. On this 'embarrassment', Daniel Defert writes in the chronology that opens the *Dits et écrits*: 'On [March17th,1967], [Foucalt] makes a presentation at Raymond Aron's seminar at the Sorbonne on the criteria according to which a cultural formation such as political economy can be historically identified across different *épistémès*. Raymond Aron is determined to assimilate *épistémè* and *Weltanschauung*. The debate contributes to the abandonment of the concept in *L'Archéologie du savoir*. (...) The arguments employed at the seminar will be developed in [Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire]. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, pp. 39-40.
[120] *Ibid.*, chapter 1; pp. 193-4.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 40.

it is manifested in a theory or silently invested in a practice'[122]: if all possible statements are already contained in an *épistémè*, there can be no historical singularity, no novelty as such, apart from the shift from one *épistémè* to the next which, in that case, becomes even more mysterious.

Rather than an internal contradiction of Foucault's archaeology, this shows that there is a move away from the epochal use of the concept in *Les mots et les choses*. Its similarities with the epochs of *Seinsgeschichte* – that the *épistémè* is not restricted to one or more fields of discursive practices, let alone to a conscious theoretical framework, but governs the conditions of all possible knowledge and practice at a given time; and the overlap between the ages identified by Foucault and Heidegger – should not obscure some important differences: that its general form is to be found in a certain arrangement between language and what language stands in relation to (similitude, representation, signfication), 'words' and 'things'; that, *contra* 'The origin of the work of art', it does not (at least explicitly) require an origin in which 'openness takes its stand and attains constancy'[123], let alone a first disclosure[124]; that, *contra* 'The age of the world picture', metaphysics has no special grounding role in relation to it[125]; and that it is only in modernity that poetic or literary language is ascribed an ontological power, which is not so much that of disclosing the world, but of serving as an index of an 'outside' that precedes any disclosure and unmakes any identity or interiority.[126] It

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[122] FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 179.

[123] HEIDEGGER, M. The origin of the work of art. *In: Basic writings*. Ed. and trans. Farrell Krell, D. London: Routledge, 2004., p. 186.

[124] Cf. *Idem*. On the essence of truth. *In: Op. cit.*, 2004, pp. 126-7.

[125] *Idem*. The age of the world picture. *In: Off the beaten track*. Trans. Young, J. and K. Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 57.

[126] Hubert Dreyfus attempts to bring Foucault and Heidegger together around a *Seinsgeschichte*, where power would play for the former the same role as Being for the later. Cf. DREYFUS, H. 'Being and power' revisited. MILCHMAN, A.; ROSENBERG, A. *Foucault and Heidegger: critical encounters*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003, pp. 30-54. (This is expanded by Michael Schwartz's 'Epistemes and the history of Being', *In: Op. cit.*, pp. 163-86.) His arguments are countered *In:* RABINOW, P. Modern and counter-modern: ethos and epochality. *In:* HACKING, I. (ed.) *The Cambridge companion to Foucault*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 197-214; and a warning against epochal

nonetheless remains the case that not only does *Les mots et les choses* express itself in epochal ways, it is hard to make sense of its structure and claims in any other way – down to the hubristic claim that the fields of literature, ethnology, psychoanalysis and linguistics addressed towards the end seem to point to an ongoing epistemic shift.

This leads Foucault to positions he will later explicitly dispute. He seems to accept, with Heidegger, that each epoch amounts to a shared world. In the latter, it is an origin (*Ursprung*), a 'gift' or 'sending' that safeguards the rights to a common world, a common truth. In providing reassurance that there is a natural, universal predisposition towards truth, it forecloses the terrain of its this-worldly invention (*Erfindung*) – the emergence (*Entstehung*) of truth as artifice, as the product of struggle, of the different. And this struggle – although this will only fully come into focus for Foucault after *L'Archéologie* – is to a great extent one that takes place between, on one side, relations of power in their exercise, in act; and, on the other, the statements that they give rise to, through which they are conserved, but which also have their own degree of internal consistency, and become the objects, tools and targets of their exercise. 'If [power and knowledge] were two identical things, I would not need to study their relations, and would save myself a lot of work. The very fact that I ask the question of their relations proves that they are not the same thing for me'.[127] It is nevertheless already present in *L'Archéologie,* if only negatively delineated, as the realm of 'non-discursive practices': in the

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readings also appears *In:* DONNELLY, M. On Foucault's uses of the notion 'biopower'. *In:* ARMSTRONG, T. J. (ed.) *Michel Foucault, philosopher.* New York: Routledge, 1992. Needless to say, I side with the latter two, while acknowledging that *Les mots et les choses* does rely on epochality, and that some of Foucault's later remarks can very easily be read in the same way – but (as they already suggest) this should be understood as a rhetorical device, since it sits uneasily alongside central tenets of his thought (such as his nominalism). Béatrice Han shows why the attempted approximation between the two thinkers cannot fully work, but tends to interpret this as Foucault's 'failure' to develop in a Heideggerian direction, rather than as a sign that his project is in fact distinct. *Cf.* HAN, B. *Foucault's critical project. Between the transcendental and the historical.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, conclusion.

[127] FOUCAULT, M. Structuralisme et poststructuralisme. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1247.

formation of objects (the rapport that relations in the social field have with discursive relations); of subject-positions (institutional location, position in the web of discourse production); of strategies (as the role discourse is called to play, or the regimes and processes of its appropriation, or the role desire plays in discourse). In the rarity of statements (their 'value', which is not an intrinsic truth-value, but what makes them a 'good' that poses from the start the question of power, and 'which is by nature the object of a struggle'[128]), as well as their relation to historical events (which do not externally 'translate' into discursive transformations, but relate in different ways to different series).[129] This space of relations, which is essential for so much of Foucault's thought even before it is clearly theorised, cannot appear for Heidegger: for the latter, practice and language relate in a way that is unproblematic, stemming as it does from the same root in a world that is at once practice and language, that is disclosed in both at the same time.[130]

It also takes Foucault close to Hegel, and not only in the way already suggested above. With the reduction of the conditions of possibility of all statements and practices at any given time to a relation to language (or between 'words' and the 'things' they resemble, represent or signify), one

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[128] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 158.

[129] 'Hence the French Revolution – since it is around it that until now have been centred all archaeological analyses – (...) functions as a complex, articulated, describable ensemble of transformations that left intact a certain number of positivities, that fixed for a certain number of other rules which are still ours, which also established positivities that have just dissolved, or are in the process of dissolving under our eyes'. *Ibid.,* p. 231.

[130] The very perceptive observation of this distance that separates Foucault from Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and phenomenology as a whole, is one of the high points in Deleuze's interpretation. *Cf.* DELEUZE, G. *Foucault.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 115-22. On pp. 118-9: '[T]he fold of Being, in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, surpasses intentionality only to ground [*fonder*] it on another dimension: it is why the Visible and the Open does not offer itself to vision without making speak [*ne se donne pas à voir sans donner aussi à parler*], since the fold will not constitute the seeing of vision [*le se-voyant de la vue*] without constituting at the same time the speaking of language [*le se-parlant du langage*], to the point that it is the same world that speaks [*se parle*] in language and is seen [*se voyait*] in vision.' On the relation between discursive and non-discursive practices, Deleuze highlights how Foucault avoids both a 'vertical parallelism' where one field would 'symbolise' the other, and a 'horizontal causality' where the latter would determine individuals as the authors of statements, and keeps the two separate in order to analyse their interplay (which he nevertheless seems to reduce to the formation of objects and subjects). *Cf. Ibid.,* p. 19.

cannot help thinking of Althusser's critique of the simplicity of the principle (of identity) behind dialectics.[131] Even if this is, for Foucault, precisely not a spiritual principle – and in that sense maybe closer to the crude orthodox Marxism that his former teacher at the École Normale criticised for the same reason –, it is as though in *Les mots et les choses* he is sifting through diverse discursive practices in order to arrive at the simply unifying principle that defines the field of their possibilities in each different period. Again, the rejection of this *modus operandi* will be entirely clear much later: it stands out in his analysis of power, where it is a matter of rejecting a 'juridical' scheme that puts the problem of power in terms of the couple contract (as the alienation of power) and oppression (as the abuse of the contractual relation) in favour of one that introduces the notions of relations of force (where power is not a thing that can be alienated, but a relation that is exercised and only exists in act) and war (as the ultimate reversibility into direct confrontation); from which follow a series of 'precautions of method'[132] that fulfil the general role of eliminating from the framework of analysis any reference to a centre, be that at the level of its source (capillarities instead of a single site of legal and political authority), function (how its effects, of which the subject is one, act upon each other, instead of being set in motion by the interiority of a decision or consciousness), or exercise (a web instead of an edifice). A metaphor for this passage can be created around two metaphors of 'the king'. Whereas a close reading of *Las Meninas* allowed the whole drama of the classical and modern *épistémès* to appear in the play around the vacant space of the king, now Foucault says one must start 'from infinitesimal

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[131] 'If it is possible, *in principle, to reduce the totality*, the infinite diversity, of a historically given society (...) *to a simple internal principle, this very simplicity* can be reflected in the contradiction to which it thereby acquires a right. (....) [T]he reduction of all the elements that make up the concrete life of a historical epoch (...) to one principle of internal unity, is itself only possible on the *absolute condition* of taking the whole concrete life of a people for the externalization-alienation (*Entäusserung-Entfremdung*) of an *internal spiritual principle, which can never definitely be anything but the most abstract form of that epoch's consciousness of itself: its religious or philosophical consciousness, that is, its own ideology.*' ALTHUSSER, L. Contradiction and overdetermination. *In: For Marx.* Trans. Brewster, B. London: Penguin Press, 1969, p. 103. (All italics Althusser's.)

[132] FOUCAULT, M. *'Il faut défendre la sociètè'. Cours au College de France (1975 - 1976.)* Paris: Gallimard, 1997, p. 25.

mechanisms, which have their own history, their own trajectory, their own technique and tactic' to then discover how they 'were and are still invested, colonised, utilised, inflected, transformed, displaced, extended etc. by more and more general mechanisms and forms of global domination.'[133] The vectors of the analysis have clearly changed, and now the point is to look for the concrete ways in which the diverse relates in order to constitute an emergent, stable but also constantly changing, whole: 'we must cut the king's head'.[134] But the change, which begins in the period immediately preceding *L'Archéologie*[135], is already visible in that book, where the *épistémè* is redefined as 'the ensemble of *relations* that one can discover, in a given time [*époque*], among the sciences when they are analysed at the level of

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[133] *Ibid.*, p. 27. Foucault adds a fifth precaution a few pages later, which is to understand the functioning of mechanisms of power as producing not ideologies, but technical dispositifs of production and circulation of knowledge.

[134] *Idem.* Entretien avec Michel Foucault. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 150.

[135] This transformation, evidenced in various texts and interviews, occurs under the sign of a new-found pluralism. '[*Les mots et les choses*] had the subtitle *An archaeology of human sciences*: this in itself supposes another one which would precisely be an analysis of the knowledge and consciousness of history in the West since the 16th century. And even before having advanced much in this direction, it seems to me that the epistemological break in this case must be at the level of Marx. (...) You find yourself in front of a kind of superposition in blocks, and what is interesting, strange, curious, would be to know precisely why it is that for the sciences of life, economy and language the epistemological break is situated in the beginning of the 19th century, and in the middle for the theory of history and politics.' *Idem.* Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 615. Further down (pp. 616-7), he says: 'It has been said for example that I admitted or invented an absolute break between the end of 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. In fact, when you look at the scientific discourses of the end of the 18th century, what you notice is a very quick change, rather enigmatic to the most alert gaze. I wanted precisely to describe this change, that is, to establish the ensemble of transformations that are necessary and sufficient to go from the initial form of scientific discourse, that of the 18th century, to its final one, that of the 19th. (...) It is thus exactly the opposite of a discontinuity that I have tried to establish, since I made manifest the very form of the passage from one state to the other.'
A year later, in a text that reads like the initial sketch of the 'Réponse au Cercle d'épistémologie', and hence of *L'Archéologie* itself, he transforms the question posed to him – on whether to introduce 'the constraint of the system and of discontinuity into the history of spirit' does not render progressive politics groundless by placing the event beyond thought and conscious action – into one on 'the diversity of systems and the play of discontinuities in the history of *discourse*', observing along the way: 'Well now, I am a pluralist'. *Idem.* Réponse à une question. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 701-11, *passim*. One cannot but think here of his later tribute to Deleuze: 'Deleuze's thought is profoundly pluralistic. He pursued his studies as the same time as I did, and he was preparing a dissertation on Hume. I was doing one on Hegel. I was on the other side because, at this point, I was a communist while he was already a pluralist.' *Idem.* La verité et les formes juridiques. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1495.

discursive regularities.'[136] Clearly, Foucault is not letting go of the idea that significant transformations took place between the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, or between the 15th and the 16th centuries. But these breaks can no longer be defined against the background of a seismic change in the relation to language; the erudite analysis of the archive of all statements effectively produced – an '*open and undoubtedly indefinitely describable field of relations*'[137] – reveals an accumulation of transformations around those points, at different levels, in different scales, belonging to different series and temporalities. It is the work of the archaeologist to provide as exhaustive as possible an analysis of this multiplicity of different discursive events in order to determine their reciprocal relations, and the different levels at which they take place, the 'various possible planes of events'[138] (of statements themselves; of the emergence of objects, subject-positions, concepts, strategic choices; of the emergence of new rules within the same discursive formation; of the substitution of one discursive formation by another). The archaeologist 'does not multiply differences (...), but refuses to

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[136] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, pp. 249-50. (My italics.) Admittedly, the use of the French *époque* does not make our life much easier here; but I believe the fact that he uses it throughout the passage, twice to describe what archaeological research *is* and twice to describe what it *is not,* provides enough evidence that it is employed in a loose, general sense (hence the neutral translation as 'time'). If that is not enough, here is what he says about a more precise use of the word (which I hence translate as 'epoch'): 'Archaeology disarticulates the synchrony of breaks [*coupures*], as it disjoints the abstract unity of change and event. The epoch is not its basic unity, nor its horizon, nor its object; if it speaks of such a thing, it is always in reference to determined discursive practices and as a result of its analyses. The classical age, often mentioned in archaeological analyses, is not a temporal figure *that imposes its unity and empty form* upon all discourses; it is the name that one can give to the entanglement [*enchevêtrement*] of continuities and discontinuities, of internal modifications to positivities, of discursive formations that appear and disappear.' *Ibid.*, pp. 230-1. (My italics.)
The concept – conspicuously absent from *L'ordre du discours* – shows up in only two texts between 1969 and 1972, and three between 1972 and 1977, in the last one to be repositioned in Foucault's ever-changing conceptual architecture as 'a specifically discursive *dispositif,* whereas the *dispositif* is itself discursive and non-discursive, its elements a lot more hetergeneous'. *Cf. Idem.* Le jeu de Michel Foucault. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 301.
[137] *Idem.* Réponse à une question. *In: Op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 704. (Foucault's italics).
[138] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 223.

reduce them'[139]; he brackets the theme of 'succession as an absolute: (...) that there is in discourse only one form and only one level of succession'.[140]

Whereas until then archaeology was concerned with establishing the historical *a priori*[141] defining the conditions of all possible knowledge at a given time, *L'Archéologie du savoir* redefines it as concerning 'the conditions of existence' of 'things said, insofar precisely as they have been said': 'what it means for them to have appeared, and nothing else in their place'.[142] This refers neither to an economic infrastructure which is expressed, nor to a translation into language of a shared background of practices or a mentality, nor to the acts of a transcendental subjectivity, nor to the empirical contents of a consciousness, nor to the immediate context of an utterance, nor to logic, nor grammar. The 'atom' is the statement, but there is never 'a statement that does not suppose others; it always has around it a field of coexistence, of series- and succession-effects, a distribution of functions and roles'[143]. In a clear demarcation against Derrida, Foucault stresses that the condition for its repeatability is the fact that it is material (a *presence*), but, unlike an iterable pure form, its repeatability remains tied to its conditions: an affirmation such as 'species evolve' is not necessarily the same statement across history.[144] A

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[139] *Ibid.*, p. 222.

[140] *Ibid.*, p. 220.

[141] This concept, although it is older than that of *épistémè*, dating back to *Naissance de la clinique*, is used interchangeably with the other in *Les mots et choses*. Given a new definition in *L'Archéologie* as 'condition of reality for statements' (p. 167) and 'the set of rules that characterise a discursive practice' (p. 168), it seems that it would be less general than the *épistémè*, which encompasses the overall relations among different discursive practices, the distribution and operation of thresholds of epistemologisation, scientificity and formalisation proper to them, and the lateral relations among different epistemological figures. However, like many of the definitions in that book, both remain frustratingly unclear.

[142] *Ibid.*, p. 143. 'Unlike so-called structuralists, I am not that interested in the formal possibilities of language. Personally, I am much rather haunted by the existence of discourses, by the fact that words [*paroles*] have taken place: these events functioned in relation to their original situation, they have left traces behind them, they subsist and exercise, in this very subsistence within history, a certain number of manifest or secret functions.' *Idem*. Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 615.

[143] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 131.

[144] *Cf. Ibid.*, pp. 137-8.

'function of existence'[145], the statement can be described according to the conditions of its exercise: a referential (neither state of affairs nor object, but a 'principle of differentiation'); a subject-position (rather than consciousness or author); an associated field (not the real context of a formulation, but a 'domain of coexistence for other statements'); a materiality ('not only a substance or medium of articulation, but a status, rules of transcription, possibilities of use and reuse')[146], in which statements are treated as material. That the form of analysis has changed, and is of the same kind as the one later employed in studying relations of power, is made abundantly clear when Foucault states that it is from these relations – to non-discursive practices, to events, to other statements – that one can arrive at the individualisation of a discursive formation (a field such as 'humans sciences'):

> the regularity of statements is defined by the discursive formation itself. Its belonging and its law are one and the same; which is not paradoxical, since the discursive formation is characterised not by principles of construction, but by a *real* [*de fait*] *dispersion*; it is for statements not a condition of possibility but a *law of coexistence*, and statements in turn are not interchangeable elements but ensembles characterised by their *modalities of existence*.[147]

Likewise, it is said that the rules of the historical *a priori*

> do not impose themselves from the outside on the elements they relate; they are engaged in what they connect; and if they do not change with the least of them, they modify them and transform themselves with them in certain decisive thresholds. The *a priori* of positivities is not only a temporal dispersion, it is itself a transformable ensemble.[148]

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[145] *Ibid.*, p. 115.

[146] *Ibid.*, pp. 150-1.

[147] *Ibid.*, pp. 152-3. (My italics.)

[148] *Ibid.*, p. 168. Deleuze glosses: 'the historical Being of language (...) constitutes a form of exteriority where the statements of the corpus in question disperse themselves and disseminate in order to appear. It is a distributive unity.' DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 63-4.

3.2.2 – Nominalism, singularity, the event

In the methodological depuration undertaken in *L'Archéologie du savoir*, Foucault for the first time explicitly stakes a claim for an intermediary zone that is also a *tertius* between empirical and transcendental: the systems of formation that archaeology studies are neither 'static forms imposed from the outside on discourse, [defining] once and for all its characteristics and possibilities' nor 'determinations which, formed at the level of institutions, or social or economic relations, would transcribe themselves by force on the surface of discourses'[149]. It is this same intermediary space that will be the concern of his work in the following decade (between bodies and institutional or social determinations) and in the last years of his life (between moral codes and practices of subjectivation).

This helps clarify the way in which Foucault understands the transcendental – if he says 'I try to historicise as much as I can to leave as little place as possible for the transcendental' (even while recognising he may find it one day in his researches as 'a non-negligeable residue'), it is because he refuses 'an identification at the transcendental level between subject and thinking I', in favour of 'rules of functioning of knowledge [*connaissance*] that have appeared in the course of history and within which different subjects are situated'[150]. For him, the term necessarily leads back to the a-historical, extra-temporal limits of a transcendental subjectivity. Obviously, archaeology starts from empirical givens – effectively uttered statements as they pass into the archive –, but the 'complex bundle of relations'[151] it uncovers is not that of *a priori* limits that are worked retrospectively from the conditioned as a loose set of possibilities, but the conditions of existence of a singularity. In that it

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[149] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 97-8.

[150] *Idem*. Les problèmes de la culture. Un débat Foucault-Preti. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1241.

[151] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 97-8.

searches for an intrinsic genesis over an extrinsic conditioning, so that conditions will be specific to and determined along with what they condition, and that there is an asymmetrical passage from condition to conditioned that is not of the order of a formal conditioning but of a material determination, *L'Archéologie du savoir* does indeed share much common ground with *Différence et répétition*. Yet here lies a difference that runs deeper than mere terminology: for this space of conditions is precisely what Deleuze calls 'transcendental' – in the renewed sense of a 'transcendental empiricism' –, with the no doubt doubly uncomfortable consequence for Foucault (given the disclaimers that abound in his work) that Deleuze, in his characteristically idiosyncratic interpretation of structuralism, can conclude that, by virtue of practicing a 'new transcendental philosophy'[152], Foucault classifies as a structuralist. It is in fact at the point of this difference that their two projects can and must be differentiated; but before we do so, it is necessary to examine whether Foucault can, as the task he sets himself in opposition to the strategies available to the anthropological *épistémè* of modernity, avoid collapsing or confusing the empirical and the transcendental on his own terms.

It would seem, in fact, that he cannot; but the most important thing is to grasp the point at which the separation falls apart. In *L'Archéologie du savoir*, this appears as the problem of the status of the rules that the archaeologist identifies: should they be understood as an *a posteriori* description, or as causally efficacious within the phenomena studied?[153] Although Foucault

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[152] *Idem*. A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?. *In: L'île déserte*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 244. Written in 1967, the text restricts its references to Foucault mostly to 1966's *Les mots et les choses*.

[153] This point is the object of a very acute analysis *In:* DREYFUS, H.; RABINOW, P. *Michel Foucault. Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982, ch. 4. In forcing the alternative between hermeneutics and structuralism (thus preparing the ground for a 'hermeneutic turn' in genealogy), however, it fails to address the overall tension between empirical and transcendental throughout Foucault's work – both in recognising how Foucault's project may have been altogether different, and how the difficulties he faces in dealing with this tension may have come from the way the opposition was set in the first place.

repeatedly (and certainly under the influence of the structuralist 'scientism' of the time) insists that his methodology is strictly descriptive, if the rules do not materially determine statements as they 'appeared, and nothing else in their place' – if they are not conditions *of existence* –, that means the space he discovers is one of conditions *of possibility*; and consequently he would have to either fall back on a strong structuralist account of a-historical formal laws (a 'Kantianism without the subject', as Ricoeur said of Lévi-Strauss), or return to the problematic epochality of *Les mots et les choses*. Three issues are condensed in this point: one concerns the possibility of such an entirely external description as he wishes to lay claim to; the other, the empirical/transcendental separation proper; but finally, and more importantly, the problem of transformation (already present, in a different way, in *Les mots et les choses*' abrupt epistemic shifts) at its most elementary level: the one that pitches regularities against change. On the one hand, the unities that archaeology deals with (discursive formations and practices, historical *a prioris*, *épistémès*) are individuated according to their regularities: the 'law of their coexistence', which is at once a 'law of rarity' that is 'the principle according to which only the signifying ensembles that appeared could have been enunciated'[154]; a 'principle of rarefaction'[155] and the distributive law of a dispersion. On the other, the 'entire enunciative field is both regular and alert' – 'the most discrete and banal' statement always putting to work the 'play of rules according to which are formed its object, modality, the concepts it employs and the strategies in which it is inserted'[156] –, and such rules do not exist independently of the statements that actualise them, but are 'engaged in [the very elements] they connect'. Thus, while 'they do not change with the least of them, [but] modify them and transform themselves with them in certain decisive thresholds'[157], what must account for the precipitation of such

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[154] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 156.
[155] *Ibid.*
[156] *Ibid.*, pp. 191-2.
[157] *Ibid.*, p. 168. This can be compared to the more famous statement: 'as far as there is a relation of power, there is a possibility of resistance. We are never trapped by power: we can

transformations is statements themselves, in their power to 'modify, unsettle, overturn and sometimes ruin' the 'thickness of the accumulation in which they are caught'.[158] Statements are, on the one hand, determined by rules, which define the regularities of their production; but, on the other, they can act back on their causes and transform them. It is this notion – of conditions that are not external and in excess to what they condition, or rules that are immanent in the elements whose dispersion they govern and in turn transformed by them –, which seems unsustainable to some commentators[159]; but it is no surprise that it is exactly what Deleuze celebrates in the book he calls 'the most decisive step in a theory-practice of multiplicities'.[160] For someone who had laboured at length on a concept of immanent cause, such ideas make perfect sense.

Still, it is undeniable that it represents a problem for the strict separation between transcendental and empirical that Foucault is striving to establish: not only is the conditioned domain found to act back on the domain of conditions, the whole attempt to find a mode of analysis that does not fall back on the doubles of man is in question: for if archaeology moves from the positivities of discourse to the rules that determine any one statement at any

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always modify its hold, under determined conditions and according to a precise strategy.' *Idem*. Non au sexe roi. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 267.

[158] *Idem*. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 164. Just before, Foucault speaks of the power of the statement to 'constitute its past, (...) redesign what makes it possible or necessary, exclude what is not compatible with it. And this enunciative past is posed as (...) an event that has been produced, a form that can be modified, a matter to be transformed, or yet an object that one can speak of etc.' (pp. 164-4).

[159] Famously, Dreyfus and Rabinow see this as leading Foucault to 'the strange notion of regularities which regulate themselves', and ascribe these problems to the a hypostasis of the autonomy of discourse in relation to non-discursive practices.. *Cf*. DREYFUS, H.; RABINOW, P. *Michel Foucault. Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics*. Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982, esp. p. 84.

[160] DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 23. He had already praised it for the same reason *In: Idem*. Cours Vincennes: Monisme, dualisme, multiplicités. 26/03/1973. [http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=166&groupe=Anti%20Oedipe%20et%20Mill e%20Plateaux&langue=1]; elsewhere, he invokes the concept of statement as implying a 'pragmatic of language capable of renewing the whole of linguistics.' Fendre les choses, fendre les mots. *In: Pourparlers. 1972-1990*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, pp. 123. The influence (in the particular way in which Deleuze reads Foucault) is evident in the 'postulates of linguistics' of *Mille Plateaux*.

time, does it not proceed by producing conditions in the image of the conditioned – as Foucault faulted the empirical/transcendental double? In consciously recuperating the unconscious rules necessarily implied by any statement, does it not incur in the cogito/unthought double – made worse by the fact that it stakes the autonomy of its field on regularities with a capacity for self-regulation? It does not suffice to reduce the problem to Foucault's emphasis on the autonomous power of discourse which would exclude the effect of non-discursive practices in transforming the discursive field, to be alleviated by a genealogical hermeneutics that recognises that statements share a common world with a background of non-discursive practices of which the genealogist himself is also part. First, because it is precisely the problem of how the two kinds of practices act on each other that will remain central; and if *L'Archéologie* has little to say about the crucial notion of 'articulation'[161] that is supposed to provide such an account, it is less because of an autonomisation of one of the spheres, and more because there can be no general theory of this articulation: it can only be revealed in a particular case. (It is, in fact, one of the central themes of *Surveiller et punir*, where even programmes and rules that were never implemented or followed as such nevertheless play an important role.[162]) Secondly, and more importantly, because it is a problem carried over into different moments of Foucault's research, and quite noticeably between the works of the 1970s and the 1980s, where a relatively autonomous work of subjectivation as self-relation is posited as the ground of resistance to the mechanisms of subjectification (*assujetissement*) described by genealogy.[163] Consider a characteristic mid-70s statement such as this:

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[161] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 164.

[162] On this subject, Cf.: *Idem*. La poussière et le nuage. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 834: 'A kind of rationality, a way of thinking, a programme, a technique (...) all of this is real, even if it does not intend to be "reality" itself, nor "the" society'; the history of the prison is nothing but 'exactly the history of something that has never "worked", at least if one considers its expressed goals'.

[163] Such is the overall thrust of: HAN, B. *Foucault's critical project. Between the transcendental and the historical*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. While I to a good extent share its premise, my conclusions differ from this book's in regards to the scope

I would say that power is nothing else but a certain modification, the often different form of a series of conflicts that constitute the social body, conflicts of an economic, political kind. Power is thus something like the stratification, the institutionalisation, the definition of techniques, of instruments and weapons that serve all these conflicts. This is what can in a given moment be understood as a certain power relation, a certain exercise of power. As long as it is clear that this exercise, to the extent that it is at the end only the snapshot of multiple struggles and in continuous transformation, that this power itself is in continuous transformation.[164]

In this rather muddled 'clarification', the problem reappears: power is the strafication that stabilises a certain situation of struggle into regularities that define a set of relations of power; these regularities, again, do not exist independently from the relations in which they are actualised; but power, as Foucault insistently reminds us, exists only in the act of its exercise; and this exercise is always open-ended, meaning that the stratification that regularities embody is in 'continuous transformation', and that the description of such regularities (which he confusingly calls here 'a certain power relation, a certain exercise') that genealogy offers can only grasp them in general terms, as a 'snapshot'. It is not just the terminological equivocations, but the very object of this passage that is confusing; again, the conditioned that acts back on conditions that do not exist outside it, the haziness of an account of transformation (we start with a relatively stable state, as if set by a rupture, but the stability of this picture is dissolved at the end, its conditions for transformation incorporated into the situations' inherent potential for variation), and the uncertainty as to the status of the genealogist's discourse.

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of the problem (it being less a question of whether Foucault can 'go beyond' the modern *épistémè* than one concerning the difficulties of an immanent philosophy), and thus to its meaning and consequences.

[164] FOUCAULT, M. Précisions sur le pouvoir. Réponses a certaines critiques. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 632,

The key to working through these problems can be found in the nominalism that Foucault invokes for the first time in *L'Archéologie du savoir*, and remains with him throughout his subsequent work. Too often, this position can be understood exclusively in the terms of its first occurrence, and thus circumscribed to the thesis that objects as well as concepts are constituted in discourse (' from an analysis such as the one I set out to do, *words* are as deliberately absent as *things*'[165]), so that it is reduced to a particular form of social constructivism[166]. It speaks of their intellectual affinity that the two commentators that seemed to grasp its importance and full scope to the greatest degree were Deleuze[167] and Paul Veyne.[168] The term is often used by Foucault in a rather loose, unqualified sense, and it would be wrong to see a full-fledged doctrine in it; perhaps the function it exercises in his thought can be described in the same terms in which Canguilhem speaks of vitalism, 'an imperative rather than a method, and more of an ethical system, perhaps,

[165] 'No doubt, discourses are made of signs; but what they do is more than to use signs in order to designate things. It is this *plus* that makes them irreducible to language and speech [*langue et parole*]. It is this "plus" that one must make visible and describe.' *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 66. (Foucault's italics.)

[166] Such would be the case with Ian Hacking's 'historical ontology' and 'dynamic nominalism'. *Cf.* HACKING, I. *Historical ontology.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004. The book that pays most attention to the implications of Foucault's position is: FLYNN, T. R. *Sartre, Foucault and history. A poststructuralist mapping of history.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997, esp. ch. 2. Calling it a '*methodological* individualism' (p. 32), as Flynn does, is unfortunate, since the Weberian overtones of the expression jars with such admonitions as that we should not 'conceive the individual as an elementary node, primitive atom, multiple and inert matter' on which power finds support, but as 'an effect, a relay: power circulates through the individual it has constituted'. FOUCAULT, M. : *Idem.* '*Il faut défendre la société'.* *Cours au Collège de France (1975 - 1976.)* Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 1997, p. 27. *Cf.* also: BALIBAR, E. Foucault and Marx: the question of nominalism. *In:* ARMSTRONG, T. J. (ed.) *Michel Foucault, philosopher.* New York: Routledge, 1992.

[167] Particularly in his take on power *In:* DELEUZE, G. *Foucault.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, ch. 2.

[168] '[F]or what it is worth, Foucault himself once told me that he found [Veyne's 'Foucault revolutionises history'] the single most penetrating essay on his work'. DAVIDSON, A. I. Structures and strategies of discourse. Remarks towards a history of Foucault's philosophy of language, *In:* DAVIDSON, A. I. (ed.) *Foucault and his interlocutors.* Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997, p. 15. Foucault refers to himself three times in terms directly taken from this the article, appeared in 1978, even if naming it only once. *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. *Securité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France, 1977-1978.* Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2004, pp. 121-2; *Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France, 1978-1979.* Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, pp. 4-5; Table ronde du 20 mai 1978. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 853;

than a theory'.[169] Still, if there is a set of tacit underlying ontological assumptions that remain constant in Foucault, at least from the late 1960s on, nominalism is the best window onto them.

In it, Veyne finds a Nietzschean renewal of both philosophy and history, and the rapport between the two, towards 'a philosophy of relation': instead of 'a world made up of subjects, or objects, or the dialectic between them, a world in which consciousness knows its objects in advance, targets them, or is itself what objects make of it, we have a world in which relation is primary.'[170] This entails a positivism that suspends any belief in a-historical natural objects (and so, he concludes following Foucault closely, eliminates 'the last traces of metaphysics'[171]) and a materialism that grants the existence of pre-discursive referents, but only as 'faceless potentialities'[172] that are selected and objectified by practices. Thus, in the example that Foucault would later claim for himself, to say 'madness does not exist' is not to say it is nothing: the material for madness (behaviour, neurobiology) really exists, but not as madness; 'to be mad only materially is precisely not to be mad. A man must be objectified as a *madman* for the prediscursive referent to appear retrospectively as material for madness; for why consider behaviour and nerve cells rather than fingerprints?'.[173] But the point at which the properly ontological stakes appear – and in an explicit parallel with Deleuze – is where Veyne concludes that this philosophy of relation substitutes the 'dualist' idea of efficient cause in favour of actualisation: this eliminates the problems of defining causality that appear in the positing of such external relations as individual-society ('the "objective reality" of society includes the fact that

[169] CANGUILHEM, G. Science and life. *In:* DELAPORTE, F. (ed.) *A vital rationalist: selected writings from Georges Canguilhem.* Trans. Goldhammer, A. New York: Zone Books, 1994, p. 288.

[170] VEYNE, P. Foucault revolutionises history. *In:* DAVIDSON, A. I. (ed.) *Op. cit.*, p. 177.

[171] *Ibid.*, p. 181.

[172] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

[173] *Ibid.*, p. 170. (Slightly modified.)

individuals are interested in it and make it function'[174]), and leads to the formula, which is repeated throughout the text, that the explanation of a historical singularity must always proceed by taking in the whole set of relations that can account for its actualisation.

> A practice gives rise to the objectifications that correspond to it, and it is anchored in the realities of the moment, that is, in the objectifications of neighbouring practices. Or, to be more precise, a practice actively fills the void left by neighbouring practices; it *actualises* the potentialities that these neighbouring practices prefigure in the hollow form.[175]

It was not Christianity that led to emperors to ban gladiators, but '*history as a whole* (the withering away of the senate, a new ethic according to which the body is not a toy, and so on) (...)'.[176] There is, however, a nominalist twist that Veyne turns a blind eye to, and that Foucault only indirectly thematises: in order to exhaustively explain the emergence of a practice which comes to occupy the 'hollow form' defined by those around it, it would be necessary to regress indefinitely towards the emergence of the other practices that interact to determine it. What is more, if practices are defined as relatively stable regularities which exist only in act, and these acts are in continuous variation, a non-selective, *truly descriptive* account would need to go all the way down to the infinitesimal variations whose 'singularity of event' defines the 'hollow form' of one another, thus leading to new actualisations, and eventually a

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[174] *Ibid.*, p. 163, note 5. The parallel with Deleuze is around the notion of desire, as what accounts in a non-teleological way for the actualising power of human practices: 'the most obvious thing in the world, so much so that it is virtually invisible', it is 'the fact that mechanisms function, that assemblages work, that potentialities, including that of sleeping, are actualised rather than not.' (p. 163) Later on, he dismisses the opposition between structure and genesis – the latter being only the actualisation of the former – with a direct reference to *Différence et répétition*.

[175] *Ibid.*, p. 162. (Slightly modified.)

[176] *Ibid.*, p. 153. (My italics.) At the point where he comes the closest to examining the disruptive event in *L'Archéologie* – the analysis of the formation of strategies -- he points out that the 'principle of determination that enables or excludes, in a given discourse, a certain number of statements' must be studied from the point of view of the overall '*economy of the discursive constellation*'. FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 88. (Foucault's italics.)

precipitation of reciprocal determinations that pushes one or more regularities beyond a threshold of transformation – a task and a model which, while perfectly thinkable in principle, is an obvious impossibility for a finite intellect: the full, consummate perfection of an *amor intellectualis dei*. While such a position is defensible from the ontological point of view – and Foucault never really does it in direct terms –, when it comes to providing the account of actual historical phenomena, the archaeologist/genealogist must, like the Leibnizian monad, build an ocean out of a multitude of small waves: each branch of a plant a garden full of plants – but only a branch if it is to be described.[177] The nominalist, while holding on to the idea that universals do not exist as such, cannot speak without their semantic generality; forced to agree with Hegel, but in inverse terms: it pertains to the *diabolic* nature of language to reverse every singular into a universal.[178] So that there can be any archaeological description or genealogical explanation, it is necessary to produce a snapshot that represents as fixed what is in fact being transformed in the very movement that fixes it.[179] A few problems can thus be solved. To the question of whether there can be an interpretation-free description, nominalism provides a negative answer: even at the time of *L'Archéologie* Foucault would have to accept that, to the extent that a selection must be made as to what counts as relevant relations in order to determine rules of

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[177] *Cf.* LEIBNIZ, G. W. The principles of philosophy or, the monadology. *In: Discourse on metaphysics and other essays.* Trans. Ariew, R and D. Garber. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991, § 67.

[178] *Cf.* HEGEL, G. W. F. *Phenomenology of Spirit*, § 110, where 'the divine nature' of language shows that 'what is called the unutterable is nothing else than the untrue, the irrational, what is merely meant [but is not actually expressed]' – a key passage in the subjection of difference to the concept, and the refusal of pluralism.

[179] Foucault's position can be compared to Deleuze's Leibniz: 'For the Nominalists, only individuals exist, concepts being only well regulated words; for the Universalists, the concept can be infinitely specified, the individual referring only to accidental or extra-conceptual determinations. But for Leibniz, at the same time, only the individual exists *and* this is so by the power of the concept: monad or soul. Thus this power of the concept (to become subject) does not consist in infinitely specifying a genus, but in condensing and prolonging singularities. These are not generalities, but events, drops of events.' DELEUZE, G. *Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque.* Paris: Minuit, 2005, p. 86. (And, as matter of fact, if not to William James, at least to his brother: 'Really, universally, relations stop nowhere, and the exquisite problem of the artist is eternally but to draw, by a geometry of his own, the circle within which they shall happily *appear* to do so.' James, H. From the preface to *Roderick Hudson. In: The portable Henry James.* Ed. Auchard, J. London: Penguin, 2004, p. 471.)

formation, an element of deliberate artifice on the part of the archaeologist will always have to be involved. This also addresses the second round of criticism he receives from Derrida when the latter revisits the site of their early polemic, this time to problematise the ambiguous place ascribed to Freud in *Histoire de la folie* and *La volonté de savoir*, showing how Foucault cannot ensure that the boundaries he sets between historical discontinuities will stop from blurring into each other, their self-identities always unsettled by 'decouplings and self-differences [that] no doubt introduce a good deal of disorder into the unity of any configuration, whole, epoch or historical age'.[180] Yet if there is an epochality in *Les mots et les choses*, it is precisely because this self-identity could be guaranteed by the simplicity of a single principle (the function which language is called to play in each *épistémè*); and if it is abandoned, it is because Foucault, in an unacknowledged *volte-face*, comes to include a self-critique in his dismissal of the 'global description [that] ties all phenomena around a single centre – principle, signification, mind, worldview, global form [*forme d'ensemble*]', in favour of a 'general history' deployed in a 'space of dispersion'.[181] From this point on, he will recognise such space as an '*open and undoubtedly indefinitely describable field of relations*'[182]; and that one must construct 'around the singular event analysed as a process, a (...) "polyhedron of intelligibility" whose number of faces is not given in advance and can never be considered finished by right', and thus 'proceed through a progressive saturation that is certainly endless.'[183] The nominalist Foucault necessarily recognises, as an internal limit set by his underlying ontology, that this must be the case: 'in a sense description is infinite, but, in another, it is also closed, since it tends to establish the theoretical model capable of accounting for the relations that exist (...).'[184] One could say of the rapport

[180] DERRIDA, J. 'To do justice to Freud': the history of madness in the age of psychonalysis. *In: In:* DAVIDSON, A. I. (ed.) *Op. cit.*, p. 89. (Slightly modified.)

[181] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 19. (Slighly modified.)

[182] *Idem*. Réponse à une question. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001., vol. I, p. 704. (Foucault's italics).

[183] *Idem*. Table ronde du 20 mai 1978. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 843.

[184] *Idem*. Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 617.

between statements, or power relations, and a given period a similar thing to what he says of the rapport between individuals and *Aufklärung* in Kant's essay: they belong it to the extent that they actualise it, and it exists to the extent that it is actualised by them.[185] So given the fact that regularities are conditions of existence that determine a distributive (rather than collective) unity, and are transformed in time through the singular acts that actualise them, he cannot but agree with Derrida that such disturbances as brought about by the self-difference of the actualisations that constitute each time what is (and must be) presented as regular and stable

> make the historians' work rather difficult (...) This self-difference, this difference to self and not simply with self, makes life hard if not impossible for historical science. But inversely, would there be any history, would anything ever happen, without this principle of disturbance? Would there ever be any event without this disturbance of the principality?[186]

For is it not in this very condensed point – where the question of the singular and the event, of transformation and regularity, of description and interpretation meet – that the whole of his philosophy – in the challenge to leave behind anthropology's doubles, to uncover a positive, intelligible space between empirical and transcendental, to account for discontinuities in a history conceived as exteriority, in its practical consequences and in the metaphilosophical question of the status of its own discourse – is played?

3.2.3 – Foucault's historical solution

Admittedly, this internal principle of self-problematisation – a recognition of necessary incompleteness, of the artifice and *alea* that goes into every thought, including his own – does not suffice to exhaust the question of the position from which Foucault thinks; which is to say, does not answer the

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[185] Cf. *Idem*. What is Enlightenment?. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 1384.
[186] DERRIDA, J. *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

question of whether and how he can provide a solution to the problem of realised immanence. Given that his work consists in an immanentisation of philosophy in relation to the whole field of historical *savoir*, and with it an immanentisation of thought to (historical) Being – from an inquiry into 'what made knowledges [*connaissances*] and theories possible; according to what space of order knowledge [*savoir*] was constituted'[187] to establishing '[b]etween techniques of knowledge and strategies of power, no exteriority, even if they have their specific roles and articulate themselves upon each other according to their difference'[188] – it is a crucial test for his philosophy that it can submit itself without rest to its own principles. The question, posed in such terms, already tells us something about the answer: we will find, in Foucault, a variation of the historical solution.

In the period following *Les mots et les choses*, which saw his exposé of humanism come under attack from various quarters, he readily recognises the difficult spot where his own work has put him; the question of the grounds of his own discourse

> embarrasses me. It does not surprise me at all; but I would like, for some time still, to keep it in suspense. For, at the moment, and for a time whose end I cannot predict, far from determining the place from where it speaks, my discourse avoids the soil on which it could find support.[189]

Since it has uncovered at once the necessary instability of the solutions available to anthropological thought which make signification dependent on man's sense-bestowing activity, and the primary passivity of a *'positive unconscious'*[190] of knowledge, that his work should encounter this difficulty is

[187] FOUCAULT, M. *Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 13.

[188] *Idem. La volonté de savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 130.

[189] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 267.

[190] *Idem*. Préface a l'édition anglaise. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I p. 877. (Foucault's italics.)

not surprising. Yet it is clear that the only possible answer comes from a variation on the historical solution rehearsed by Hegel and Marx:

> I cannot answer [to the question of the grounds of the archaeologist's discourse] if not by going back to [*Les mots et les choses*] itself. If the style of analysis that I have tried to formulate can be received, it should be possible to define the theoretical model to which belong not only my book, but all the other books that belong to the same configuration of knowledge. No doubt it is the latter that allows us today to treat history as the set of statements effectively articulated, language as the object of description and set of relations in what regards discourse and the statements which are the object to be interpreted.[191]

That this is the case is clear from both the general thrust of *L'Archéologie* and *Les mots et les choses* and the remarks made in both about their relations to contemporary researches. The former starts by describing an ongoing transformation in historiography (ranging from the *Annales* school to Canguilhem's history of science) and speaks of applying this 'autochthonous transformation'[192] to the field of history itself, so as to free it from the last vestiges of transcendental subjectivity. The latter – the subtitle of which would have originally been *Une archéologie du structuralisme*[193] – is built around a historical narrative of the discontinuities in Western knowledge that provides both an account of the possibility of the rise of structural linguistics, ethnology and psychoanalysis (as well as modern literature) and the polemical suggestion that these, in their 'excess' in regards to the space of human sciences, shows the *épistémè* of man may have come to an end. In this, one finds a feature of Foucault's version of the historical solution: as he says of

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[191] *Idem.* Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 619.
[192] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, p. 25.
[193] *Cf.* DREYFUS, H.; RABINOW, P. *Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and hermeneutics.* Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982, p. vii.

archaeology, [r]ather than *founding* by right a theory (...) the question is by now to establish a *possibility*.'[194]

It is necessary that this be so: the unconscious of representation that archaeology uncovers must be a *possibility* available to it from the same historical unconscious whence it speaks, a particular actualisation of its own epistemic field, and cannot be the necessary, universal reappropriation of such an unconscious: the latter would entail that the present be made into the moment when the estranged otherness of language is finally reconciled with the one who speaks, recuperated in the interiority of a historical subject who, even if not capable of mastering its own discourse, is capable of making the rules that govern discourse known to itself. As in Hegel, then, the present of the archaeologist would be the point of totalisation from which the past can be read from the privileged point of view of the return of a distant origin in the form of the general outlines of its logic. Foucault knows perfectly well that he cannot allow himself such a move, and his position cannot be defended beyond being a possibility. The present, therefore, does not enable the total view that would be able to discern the necessity in the path leading towards it from purely accidental phenomenality, as it does not posses the principle by which selection can be made in absolute terms; it cannot repeat the philosophical manoeuvre that allowed Hegel to exclude pluralism and nominalism in one fell swoop. The past, as seen from the present, can appear as necessary only to the present; the owl of Minerva flies at dusk, but has different eyes each time.

It is here that his proximity to Bachelard and Canguilhem can be seen in its clearest form.[195] It is a legacy he does not accept wholesale: it is clear he

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[194] FOUCAULT, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 150.

[195] Famously, Foucault draws a synchronic line in French intellectual history separating 'a philosophy of experience, sense, and the subject from a philosophy of knowledge, rationality, the concept'; the former being the lineage of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, dating back to Bergson, Lachélier and Maine de Biran; the latter going from Poincaré, Couturat, and Comte all the way to Cavaillès, Bachelard, Koyré, and Canguilhem. (*Idem*. La vie: l'experience et la

cannot follow the former in transferring the properties of the transcendental subject, even if one made dynamic, to an intersubjective 'scientific city' or 'mind'. Moreover, knowledge (*savoir*) erases a sharp distinction between science and non-science and replaces it with thresholds of positivity, epistemologisation, scientificity and formalisation, which mark the progressive individualisation of a discursive practice but do not extract it from the larger field of relations in which it is given. This is a crucial distinction, as the strong sense of Bachelard's epistemological break (as a break with sense-perception and empirical foundations) still allows him to maintain that there is progress in science, to the extent that mathematical construction does indeed produce truths. Still, it is clear that the particular form of historical solution to the problem of realised immanence that the archaeological works rehearse is one whose form Foucault borrows from the works of Bachelard and Canguilhem, so that in the last text he worked on in his life he could, speaking of the latter, express himself in terms very close to those of the introduction to *L'Archéologie*: 'the identification of discontinuities is (...) neither a postulate nor a result; it is rather a "way of doing", a procedure that is one with the history of sciences because it is required by the very object the latter must treat.'[196]

For Bachelard, the discontinuity in question was the break imposed by non-Euclidean geometry and non-Newtonian physics, which introduced even

science. *In: Dits et ecrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1583.) It is clear Foucault places himself in the second, raising an interesting question in his relation to Deleuze – who, by proxy, would belong alongside Bergson in the first. (For a problematisation of Foucault's distinction, and particularly Bergson's presence in it, which has its implications regarding Deleuze, *Cf.* DURING, E. 'A history of problems': Bergson and the French epistemological tradition. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 35 [1].) This separation is complicated by dint of Foucault's late turn towards the subject and experience, and the emphasis on the concept in *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. The term conspicuous by its absence in this division is 'life'; and it is what further complicates it, since the problem for Canguilhem is exactly the relation between life and concept, and finding – founding – the concept in the *vivant*, rather than the *vécu*.
[196] FOUCAULT, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 1588. In the same text, he observes that Canguilhem himself had remarked that one of the conditions of possibility for the formation of a history of sciences in the 18th century was the impact of the scientific revolutions brought about by algebraic geometry, infinitesimal calculus and Copernican and Newtonian cosmologies.

greater discontinuities at a metatheoretical level, in that they did not add to existing truth, but substantially modified it; they opposed sense-perception and everyday knowledge to mathematical, scientific construction; and put into question categories until then held as *a priori* truths of both philosophy and science (substance, time, space, simultaneity, and even continuity itself). The fact that (his) contemporary science overturned the *a priori* truths of previous science so as to make them into particular cases of an enlarged scientific framework led Bachelard to the conclusion – and here the comparison can be extended to Deleuze – that *a priori* principles themselves should be seen as *a posteriori* rationalisations of epistemological practices: Kant had started by assuming the unconditioned truth of Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics and worked backwards from there to show how they were possible. The history of science, instead of a linear progression towards an ever greater approximation to truth, thus appeared as recursive, constantly re-establishing its own foundations through breaks with the past; and normative, whereby new science always establishes the criteria for what can pass as scientific knowledge, judging what science is valid (*sanctionée*) and outdated (*perimée*).

Put in traditional metaphysical terms, new science does not provide a greater agreement between subject and object, but defines the boundaries between what counts as subject and object anew. Contemporary physics, for example, provides us with a concept of objectivity that goes beyond the strict notion of object as something given to intuition, by making it include mathematical constructs that cannot 'exist' as such for sensibility; in so doing, it reveals the restriction of possible experience to what can be given to intuition as 'subjective' (i.e., as corresponding to an earlier moment of the scientific mind), and calls forth a new scientific subjectivity that must recognise the objectivity of abstractions such as subatomic particles – which do not conform to any of the classical (scientific and metaphysical) determinations of an object: self-identity, permanence, extension, indivisibility. For Kant, mathematics and

physics could yield true knowledge because they were knowledge of the subject's forms of intuition; for Bachelard, scientific development shows that such forms are not given once and for all.

From this, two consequences follow: that philosophy, instead of being the field in which the *a priori* is discovered so as to provide the foundation for sciences, becomes the field in which the 'spontaneous philosophy' produced by science must be reflected *a posteriori* – philosophy must cease to be determinant, in order to become reflexive; and if the new scientific mind has taken the rational step of recognising its own intrinsic openness to future transformation, if the 'whole of the intellectual life of science plays dialectically on this differential of knowledge, at the frontier of the unknown' – then 'the very essence of reflection is to understand what one has not understood.'[197] At the same time, if it is philosophy's role to reflect upon the knowledge produced by the science of its time, if it is this knowledge that draws the new boundaries between what counts as 'subjective' and 'objective', than philosophy cannot but think from within the conditions established by science. In other words, it cannot but replace the metaphysical assumptions it derived from the *science perimée* with the new 'spontaneous' metaphysics of contemporary scientists. As Bachelard puts it: 'The mind can change its metaphysics; it cannot do without metaphysics'.[198]

The same movement is repeated in Canguilhem, even if in a different and less accentuated way. The difference of accent lies, partially, in the difference of object; whereas Bachelard focused on physics and mathematics (and mathematical physics above all), Canguilhem's field was the sciences of life (biology, medicine), which had never undergone a break of similar dimensions. So whereas Bachelard's work – moving past a first moment of polemics against methaphysical prejudices that prevent the recognition of the

[197] BACHELARD, G. *Le nouvel esprit scientifique*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 178.
[198] *Idem. La philosophie du non. Essai d'une philosophie du nouvel esprit scientifique*. Paris: PUF, 2005, p. 13.

new scientific spirit towards a mature affirmation of the later – will come to put more and more emphasis on the creative role of mathematical physics, the area in which Canguilhem moves has no direct equivalent in importance. Nevertheless, vitalism will play a similar role in his work. Not that he will attempt to develop a philosophy of life, or even that he attaches enough clarity to the concept; it is a question that insists in his writings by virtue of the power to insist it showed in the sciences of life themselves.[199] Its value, in other words, is largely derived from its capacity to work *positively* as an epistemological obstacle (an idea that Bachelard would not accept): to mark the spot of a resistance to any reduction of the living organism to mechanism (which places anatomy above physiology, making the organism into the sum of its parts), pre-formationism (which eliminates any specificity of development, making it into a linear progression from pre-formed elements), or its physico-chemical processes, by opposing them the question of what is significant about the fact that something has *life*. It is this question, in the end, that defines for Canguilhem the essential problem that biology and medicine must always pose and run up against; it is whence he concludes that the pathological has priority over the normal, since it is life's capacity to err that defines self-regulating ranges of variation concerning which one can speak of normality; and, finally, it is what he sees vindicated in the development of genetic biology, as it finds in the double helix a logos inscribed in life itself, a material rather than formal *a priori*: 'in a certain way, contemporary biology is, somehow, a philosophy of life.'[200]

Foucault explicitly distinguishes his own project from two previous forms of histories of sciences: the recursive type that is internal to a science already past the threshold of formalisation (the example is mathematics), and the

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[199] It is in this context that he writes the passage, paraphrased above to speak of Foucault's nominalism, on vitalism as 'an imperative rather than a method, and more of an ethical system, perhaps, than a theory'. CANGUILHEM, G. Science and life. *In:* DELAPORTE, F. (ed.) *A vital rationalist: selected writings from Georges Canguilhem.* Trans. Goldhammer, A. New York: Zone Books, 1994, p. 288.

[200] *Idem.* The concept of life. *In: Ibid.*, p. 319.

epistemological history that deals with the threshold of scientificity. While the first unreflectively assumes the point of view of the present in order to redistribute the past according to its formal criteria, the second, while external to the science in question, deliberately and self-reflectively takes the side of the fully constituted science in order to mark the distance that separates it from non-science.[201] Archaeology, on the other hand, works on the threshold of epistemologisation, the point where discursive practices give rise to positivities that may or may not arrive at the two higher thresholds of scientificity and formalisation, and describe the transformations that operate this passage and their relations across different practices; it has no normative implications to the extent that it 'only takes up the given of science in order to ask what it means for this science to be given'.[202] In regards to their respective angles of approach, the distinction is perfectly valid; but, from the metaphilosophical point of view, Foucault's position cannot be sustained unless (whether he would like to see it or not) it too is recognised as recursive. Obviously not in the sense that 'the history of science is entitled to expect from epistemology (...) a set of criteria for judging which moves within the vast expanse of the past are legitimate and which are not'[203], since the question is not to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate science; but if archaeology itself is a positivity whose possibility inscribes itself in certain historical conditions, it cannot but see the past in terms which are neither the past's, nor autonomous, but those of its own present. *Les mots et les choses* is 'a pure and simple fiction: it is a romance, but invented not by me, but by the relation of our age and its epistemological configuration to this entire

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[201] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, p. 248-50. As Christina Chimisso points out, this short history is in itself rather recursive. *Cf.* CHIMISSO, C. The tribunal of philosophy and its norms: history and philosophy in Georges Canguilhem's historical epistemology. *Studies in history and philosophy of biological and biomedical sciences.* 34 (2003), p. 300.

[202] FOUCAULT, M. *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

[203] CANGUILHEM, G. *Idéologie et rationalité dans l'histoire des sciences de la vie.* Paris: Vrin, 1993, p. 14.

mass of statements'.[204] the condemnation of the *épistémè* of man is hence one of the possibilities of this moment of which Foucault cannot say with certainty whether it is the last hours of night or the first hours of day.[205]

There is a good reason, too, why he would not be able to answer such a question, which again shows his closeness to Bachelard and Canguilhem. For if epistemology can offer criteria, these are not of its autonomous creation; one of the most influential tenets of Bachelard's thought (stretching a tortuous line which, via the likes of Althusser and Serres, arrives today at Badiou) is that properly philosophical reflection always comes second, always arrives late: it thinks in the space of the gap that separates it from it science, the *décalage* it tries to close. If it is the 'spontaneous philosophy' of scientific practice that redefines subjectivity and objectivity and their boundaries, philosophy always thinks against the background of a change that it does not control, nor direct. Obviously, the point for Bachelard is to, in quasi-psychoanalytic fashion, make this movement conscious, and to combat the hindrance of epistemological obstacles accordingly; it is nevertheless the case that, as Nietzsche would put it, (philosophical) consciousness is always reactive.[206] *Mutantis mutandis*, it is the same thing for Foucault: archaeology, as one possibility of the epistemic field from which it thinks, can expose the positive unconscious of past knowledge, but not its own:

> The description of the archive deploys its possibilities (and the mastery of these possibilities) from the starting point of the discourses which have just

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[204] FOUCAULT, M. Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 619.

[205] 'Our impression of a rupture, of a transformation, may well be an illusion. It is perhaps the last, or a new, manifestation of a system of which we are prisoners that appears to make us believe that very soon we will find ourselves in a different world. An illusion, perhaps? One always has the impression that the sun is rising for the first time.' FOUCAULT, M. Interview avec Michel Foucault. *In:, Op. cit.,* p. 690.

[206] *Cf.* NIETZSCHE, F. *La généalogie de la morale*, II. Veyne suggests that 'Foucault's method may well be derived from a meditation on section 12' of this second dissertation, in that 'the primacy of relation implies an ontology of the will to power'. VEYNE, P. Foucault revolutionises history. *In:* DAVIDSON, A. I. (ed.) *Foucault and his interlocutors.* Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997, p. 181, n. 15.

ceased to be ours; its threshold of existence is established by the rupture that separates us from what we cannot say anymore, and from what falls outside our discursive practice; it begins with the outside of our own language; its site is the gap [*l'écart*] of our own discursive practices.[207]

The present, then, is not only the layer between ceasing to be and becoming other, but also the site of a necessary indiscernibility between *ratio essendi* and *ratio cognoscendi*: what appears to us, appears to us in such a way that it is impossible to determine to what extent it is determined by the unconscious of our knowledge. As in Bachelard – where past *a priori* can retrospectively appear as contingent 'subjective' determinations, but (and precisely for that reason) the present boundary between subjectivity and objectivity cannot be asserted as given once and for all –, the estrangement that archaeology casts over the past makes it impossible to establish in any certain way the limits according to which the given is given to us. The lesson Foucault had found in Kant's *Anthropology*: the task of knowing the limits of our historical experience is inexhaustible, not because it requires a torsion of the ego towards a pre-discursive world that, while given once and for all must remain elusive, but because limits are never given once and for all; there can be no empirical knowledge of limits, and thought must free itself from the obsession of accomplishing an always deferred return to self, and turn instead to transgression. It is a circularity – but a perfectly coherent one – that appears in a passage such as:

> Paradoxical notion, that of discontinuity: for it is *at once* the *instrument* and the *object* of the research; for it *delimits the field* where it is *the effect*; for it allows to individualise domains, but one cannot establish the former if not by

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[207] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, p. 172. 'I can, in fact, define the classical age in its own configuration through the double difference that opposes it to the 16th century, on one side, and the 19th, on the other. On the other hand, I cannot define the modern age in its singularity if not by opposing it to 17th century, on one side, and us, on the other; it is necessary, then, in order to be able to operate the division ceaselessly, to make appear under each of our sentences the difference that separates us from it. From this modern age that begins around 1790-1810 and goes on until the 1950s, it is a matter of freeing ourselves while, for the classical age, it is just a matter of describing it.' *Idem. Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 627.

comparing the latter. And because in the end it is perhaps *not simply* a concept *present* in the discourse of the historian, but one that is *secretly presupposed* in it: where could he speak from, in fact, if not from this rupture that offers him history as an object – and his own history? One of the most essential traits of the new history is precisely this displacement of the discontinuous: its shift from obstacle to practice; its integration in the discourse of the historian where it no more plays the role of an exterior fatality to be reduced, but that of an operative concept to be employed; and thence the inversion of signs whereby it is no longer the negative of the reading of history (its opposite, its failure, the limit of its power), but the positive element that determines its object and validates its analysis.[208]

This is why the epochality of *Les mots et les choses* had to be abandoned: for reasons already seen, it kept Foucault's historical solution trapped within the retreat/return of the origin double. The nominalism and pluralism that replace it restrict the scope of his diagnoses; it will no longer be a matter of identifying the large scansions that mark the unconscious transformation of Western discourse in its entirety, but of focusing on specific historical processes on which the present affords a new perspective, and in which local transformations are possible. For a Foucault politicised by his experience with the students in Tunisia and May 68, this has the welcome effect of opening up the question of practice. Strictly speaking, there was nothing a book like *Les mots et les choses* could achieve in its polemics: since the level of transformations it describes is unconscious, its diagnosis – while by right universal, since it concerns the rules governing 'the conditions of possibility of all knowledge, whether it is manifested in a theory or silently invested in a practice' –, if it were to avoid reproducing Hegel's historical solution, could not

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[208] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 17. (My italics.) It must be noticed how the structure of the passage, built around the 'at once', resembles both the text on the *Anthropology* and the chapter on the doubles of man in *Les mots et les choses*. Jacques Le Goff faults Foucault for not being exempt from confusing 'the history of historians, (...) the methodological field of history' with the 'evolution of human societies that the historian attempts to master as the object of a discipline, an analysis.' This 'confusion', I would argue, is a necessary feature of his thought. *Cf.* LE GOFF, J. Foucault et la 'nouvelle histoire'. *In:* FRANCHE, D. et al. *Au risque de Foucault.* Paris: Centre Michel Foucault/ Centre Georges Pompidou, 1997, p. 129.

wish to address itself to a community of thinkers who could rationally decide to adopt a new way of thinking, as if finally conscious of the unconscious conditions which allow them to think. From now on, Foucault's critique will be partial, in the double sense that it does not encompass a totality, and that it involves taking a side in a present struggle that is open and can be acted upon.

This has the further consequence of lightening the burden of accounting for his own discourse. The claims of *Les mots et les choses* require for their possibility the assumption of a large-scale transformation, the final redeeming of which has to be permanently deferred; a question to be 'kept in suspense'. The mode of justification remains the same – Foucault's thought still presents itself as a possibility that is opened by a transformation in the present –, but this transformation is in itself part of the continuous variation to which power relations are always subjected, rather than an epoch-making tectonic shift.[209] The work on prisons is justified by the little attention given to this problem until then, the possibility of taking up again the project of a 'genealogy of morals' from the point of view of the technologies of punishment, and 'a present fact; prison, and various aspects of penal practice more generally, were being put

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[209] As he would put it in the years after his late return to Kant, in what is no doubt the strongest argument against reading Foucault epochally: it is 'one of the most harmful habits of contemporary, or maybe modern, in any case post-Hegelian thought: the analysis of the present moment as being precisely the one of rupture, or the culmination, or completion, or of the dawn that returns. (...) *It is only fair I should say that, as I have happened to do it.* FOUCAULT, M. Structuralisme et post-structuralisme. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1267. (My italics.) Undeniably, even after *Les mots et les choses* moments abound where Foucault's periodisations could be understood in an epochal sense; I entirely agree with Rabinow, however, that 'the link [between genealogical researches and notions such as the 'carceral society' in *Surveiller et punir*] (...) is a rhetorical one, seeking to exaggerate one group of practices as a means of moving an audience to vigilance.' RABINOW, P. Modern and counter-modern: ethos and epochality in Heidegger and Foucault. *In:* HACKING, I. (ed.) *The Cambridge companion to Foucault.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 203. This can serve as critical remedy to Deleuze's highly influential re-interpretation *In:* DELEUZE, G. Post-scriptum sur les sociétés de contrôle. *In: Pourparlers. 1972-1990.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, pp. 240-7. Having never really posited the existence of a 'disciplinary society' as such, it is highly unlikely Foucault would fully agree with the thesis of its replacement with a society of control.

into question again.'[210] If *'Il faut défendre la socièté'* is where the analytic of power underpinning the study of problems[211] (prison, sexuality, governmentalisation) is first given clear philosophical outlines, its replacement of the model of sovereignity and the contract with a model of 'politics [as] the continuation of war through other means'[212] and power as what circulates in a centreless web coextensive with the social body finds justification in 'the efficacy of dispersed and discontinuous offensives'[213] and 'an insurrection of "subjugated knowledges"'[214]. On the one hand, in areas such as psychiatry and sexuality, for the previous 'ten or fifteen years, the immense and proliferating criticability of things, institutions, practices and discourses'[215] – a multiplicity of lines of attack with different targets, procedures and angles of approach, with little ambition of constituting themselves into general theories; if anything, coming up against such general theories as obstacles, or only finding them useful by restricting their scope. On the other hand, the emergence of knowledges which had been either covered up and masked within putatively coherent systems, or discarded as insufficiently elaborated, hierarchically inferior in relation to the existing demands of what counted as 'serious' knowledge: the 'historical knowledge of struggles', which had, in order to establish themselves, to confront the 'tyranny of all-encompassing discourses, with their hierarchy and all the privileges of theoretical vanguards'.[216]

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[210] *Idem*. Table ronde du 20 mai 1978. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 840.

[211] As he had done in interviews and shorter texts after *Les mots et les choses*, Foucault affirms that his genealogies (*Surveiller et punir* in this case) are not studies of periods, but of problems, which give them different rules to go by: 'choice of material according to the givens of the problem; focusing of the analysis on the elements capable of solving it; establishment of relations that allow it to be solved.' La poussière et le nuage. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 832.

[212] *Idem*. *'Il faut défendre la socièté'. Cours au College de France (1975 - 1976.)* Paris: Gallimard, 1997, p. 16.

[213] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[214] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[215] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

[216] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

It is this context of historical transformation in certain fields that calls for an analytic of the phenomena of power that, like the analysis of statements, is ascending rather than descending, and searches for the laws of a distributive unity. Starting 'from infinitesimal mechanisms' with their own history, trajectory, technique and tactic, it moves on to examine how these mechanisms of power, with 'their own solidity and, in a certain way, their own technology, were and are still invested, colonised, utilised, inflected, transformed, displaced, extended etc. by more and more general mechanisms and forms of global domination'[217]; eliminating any reference to a centre, first principle, prime mover or transhistorical constant, at the level of source (capillarities instead of a site of legal and political authority), function (how power effects, of which the subject is one, act upon each other, instead of being set in motion by the interiority of a decision or consciousness), or exercise (a web instead of an edifice). Yet what was seen above as the ontological framework behind Foucault's work from the time of *L'Archéologie* until the end is never, and for good reason, presented as such. According to his very strict definition, to introduce a set of *a priori* ontological principles valid once and for all would amount to positioning himself outside time and history, and hence to incur in the metaphysics he wishes to vacate; his genealogy is necessarily tied to its own historical conditions, and while it can recursively criticise the juridical model according to which power had previously been studied, it cannot establish more than its competing possibility; it cannot exclude the other by right, but only by arguing for the comparative advantage of the results it can yield. This is why the basis that structures his entire work of the 1970s is never presented as more than 'propositions' or 'precautions of method'.[218] As it is at the bottom of what Veyne calls 'a little noticed (...) philosophically grounded elegance' that consists in not affirming the correctness of his position against the wrongness of others: 'his books imply rather the following: "The reason my adversaries

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[217] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[218] *Idem. La volonté de savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 123; *'Il faut défendre la socièté'.* Cours au College de France (1975 - 1976.) Paris: Gallimard, 1997, p. 25.

give for the claim that their preferences are the truth rest genealogically on nothing'".[219] Even the polemics against the 'anthropological slumber' of modernity, grounded as it was on the possibility of an imminent epistemic shift, was concerned not with proving it to be false, but demonstrating its historical contingence and hence the false necessity of its object; not 'the choices of others, but the rationalisation they added to their choices.'[220]

It is in this sense that one can understand a statement such as this:

> As for the problem of fiction, it is very important for me; I am fully aware that I have never written anything but fictions. I do not mean by that they are outside the truth. I believe that it is possible to make fiction work within truth, to induce effects of truth with a discourse of fiction, and to make the discourse of truth suscitate, fabricate something that does not exist yet, that is, to 'fiction'. One 'fictions' history from a political reality that makes it true, one 'fictions' a politics that still does not exist from a historical truth.[221]

On the one hand, the perspectivism that Foucault finds in Nietzsche's philosophy of immanence entails that 'there is nothing but interpretations'[222]; and if this is so, and the task of interpretation is therefore endless, it is 'simply because there is nothing to interpret (...), no interpretandum that is not already an interpretans'.[223] On the other, an interpretation is always partial – it 'does not illuminate a matter to be interpreted that would passively offer itself; it cannot but appropriate, and violently, an already given interpretation that it

[219] VEYNE, P. The final Foucault and his ethics. *In:* DAVIDSON, A. I. (ed.) *Foucault and his interlocutors.* Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1997, p. 229-30.

[220] *Ibid.,* pp. 230-1.

[221] *Idem.* Les rapports de pouvoir passent a l'intérieur des corps. *In: Op. cit.,* vol. II, p. 236. The statement resurfaces in other interviews of the period, but its first occurrence was, in fact, in 1967, in relation to *Les mots et les choses. Cf.: Idem.* Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Op. cit.,* vol. I, p. 619; Foucault étudie la raison d'état. *In: Op. cit.,* vol. II, 859; Entretien avec Michel Foucault. *In: Op. cit.,* p. 864; What is critique?. *In:* SCHMIDT, J. (ed.) *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-century answers and twentieth-century questions.* Berkeley: University of California Press: 1996, p. 391.

[222] *Idem.* Nietzsche, Freud, Marx. *In: In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 602.

[223] *Ibid.,* p. 599.

must overturn, revert, destroy with hammer blows'[224] –, moved by a new force, new needs, strategies. It is never either pure or autonomous, and this, as we have seen, applies to both archaeology and genealogy, even if more coherently and self-reflexively in the latter. There is, *contra* Habermas, no cryptonormativism here[225], for the 'crypto-' charge can only stand if one accepts that normative grounds can be established in absolute, a-historical terms, and that Foucault should provide those. That he does not accept that does not mean his philosophy is or purports to be value-free, but that it shares the values of the forces that condition it, be those relatively generalised (thus the impact that the regicide's execution that opens *Surveiller et punir* is clearly meant to cause relies on a modern moral sensibility) or circumscribed to narrower limits of those who share a stake in a local critique; and that it cannot, in the last instance, justify its values as superior to those it opposes or criticises.[226]

This is the point at which the procedure of Foucault's philosophy – its *how* – becomes indistinguishable from its performance – *what* it does –, and where the first outlines of a novel solution to the problem of realised immanence can

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[224] *Ibid.*

[225] *Cf.* HABERMAS, J. *The philosophical discourse of modernity. Twelve lectures.* Trans. Lawrence, F. G. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992, p. 282.

[226] '[T]hat imperative discourse which, in the realm of theory, consists in saying "love this, loathe that, this is good, this bad, be for this, distrust that", all of this sounds to me to be no more, in fact, than an aesthetic discourse that can only found itself upon aesthetic choices. (...) In any case, *the dimension of what is to be done can only appear, I think, within a field of real forces*, that is, a field of forces that a speaking subject can never create on his own and with the power of their word; a field of forces that one can in no way control or validate within this discourse. Consequently, I would like the imperative that underscores the analysis that is being made here – *because it is after all necessary that there should be one* – to be no more than a conditional imperative like: if you want to fight, here are some key points, here are some lines of force, here are some bolts and some blockages. In other words, I would not want these imperatives to be any more than tactical indications. It is up to me and those who work in the same direction, to us that is, to know what are the real fields of force in which we find our points of reference to produce an analysis that would be efficacious in tactical terms. But, after all, that is *the circle of struggle and truth, that is, of philosophical practice itself.'* FOUCAULT, M. *Securité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France (1977-1978).* Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2004, p. 5. (My italics.) We find here all the basic elements of this historical solution: its partiality; its necessary normativity; and its inseparability from a different sensibility (which it is both produced by and aims at producing) and from a certain practical involvement, which is restricted to a concrete field rather than universal.

be discerned. It is patent when he describes 'eventalisation' (*événementalisation*) as both a method and a goal:

> First of all, a rupture of evidence. Where one would be tempted to refer to an anthropological constant or an immediate anthropological trait, or to an evidence that imposes itself in the same way to all, the question is to make a 'singularity' appear. To show that it was not 'that evident' (...). A rupture of these evidences on which our knowledge, consents, practices find support.[227]

In taking a present complex practice as problematic and going back in history in order to reconstruct the conditions in which it was determined in such and such way ('the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, games of force, strategies that, at a given time, gave rise to what would subsequently function as evidence, universality, necessity'[228]) – its *how* –, *what* genealogy *does* is make this practice appear not as given within the internality of a historical subject, the line of descent of an origin, or even a tradition (*as per* his critique of Derrida), but in the pure exteriority of *alea*, which can only be reconstructed through the material traces left by statements, buildings, historical records etc.[229] Both genealogy and archaeology are concerned with 'positivities', to the extent that their respective objects are the discourse effectively uttered and the larger ensembles (*dispositifs*) of discursive and non-discursive elements that constitute both a field of knowledge (with its 'effects of "veridiction"'[230]) and a complex practice (with its 'effects of "jurisdiction"'[231]) such as imprisonment. That is, they not only work with materials acquired through archival or historiographical research – themselves already

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[227] *Idem.* Table ronde du 20 mai 1978. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 842.

[228] *Ibid.*

[229] 'Foucault's initial intuition is not structure, or break or discourse; it is exceptionality, *rarity* (...). Human phenomena are exceptional: they are not ensconced in the plenitude of reason; there is empty space around them for other phenomena we in our wisdom do not grasp; what is could be otherwise. Human phenomena are arbitrary, in Mauss' sense.' VEYNE, P. Foucault revolutionises history. *In:* DAVIDSON, A. I. (ed.) Foucault and his interlocutors. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997, p. 147.

[230] Defined as 'effects of codification in regards to what there is to know'. *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. Table ronde du 20 mai 1978. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 841.

[231] Defined as 'effects of prescription in regards to what is to be done'. *Ibid.*

'interpreted', operated upon by pre-existing practices of production and conservation[232] –, but also purport to read them in a way that does not take such materials as the manifestation of a hidden depth (historical or anthropological constants, transcendental or psychological subjectivity, economic infrastructure – or, in fact, a transcendental materialism like Deleuze's). The gaze of both archaeologist and genealogist remains on the surface[233], and constructs its object exclusively from the inexhaustible play of relations that can be grasped in and through the materials amassed. If he twice refers to his work as a 'happy positivism'[234], it is because his express intent is to treat these givens at the level of their giveness, rather than by relating them to an external level that would account for the intelligibility (transhistorical constants such as human nature or functions, infrastructure, ideology, transcendental or empirical consciousness, origin, a horizon of meaning etc.). His way of proceeding is always, given a certain positivity (discursive or non-discursive practice), to work back towards the play of relations with other positivities that act as the conditions that singularise it, 'the multiple processes that constitute it'[235]; and, *in doing so*, making it appear as a singular and contingent effect of a certain play of relations. In short, to provide or re-enact an *experience* – in the sense of an experimentation – of the outside that exposes the absolute exteriority in which these singular

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[232] 'Why not go listen to these lives there where they speak for themselves? But, first of all, would there be any trace whatsoever of what these lives were in their singular violence or unhappiness if they had not at a certain point come in contact with power and provoked its forces?'. *Idem*. La vie des hommes infâmes. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 241.

[233] 'The statement may well not be hidden, it is nonetheless not visible (...). It takes a certain conversion of the gaze and the attitude to recognise and envisage it in itself.' *Idem*. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 145. Elsewhere, Foucault opposes the gaze of metaphysics, 'towards the distant, the lofty', and that of 'effective history', which remains close and looks at what is at the bottom – where the bottom is the materiality of bodies and struggles. *Cf. Idem*. Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1017.

[234] Once to archaeology, once to genealogy. *Cf. Idem*. *L'Archéologie du savoir*. Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 145; *L'Ordre du discours*. Paris: Gallimard, 2005, p. 72. Elsewhere, he celebrates Nietzsche for 'his attempt to put into question the fundamental concepts of knowledge, morality and metaphysics through a historical analysis of a positivistic kind without referring to origins.' Les problèmes de la culture. Un débat Foucault-Preti. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1240.

[235] *Idem*. Table ronde du 20 mai 1978. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 841.

givens are lodged; from within the always changing, yet always binding, limits of historical Being, to undertake an exercise – an *épreuve* – of placing oneself outside those limits, so as to make them appear as contingent, hence historical, hence transformable. In what concerns its *function*, philosophy has become diagnostic, limited to an archaeological and genealogical enquiry into the present conditions of thought and life. Since it is impossible to arrive at a definitive, extra-temporal knowledge of the limits of what can be done and thought, philosophy must be, in what concerns its *scope*, divested of pretensions to totality; which entails giving up on its self-appointed role of being the discourse in which all knowledge, including its own, finds its grounds.[236] This finally means that, at the level of its *performance*, it must be radically transformed: as Foucault says in relation to the last two volumes of the *Histoire de la sexualité*, but could have said of his trajectory as a whole, what he sets out to do is an 'exercise' in finding out to what extent it is possible to 'think differently'.[237]

The outside is, for Foucault, the pure absence from which subjectivity and objectivity, Being and thought are excluded; we are always outside of the outside. In this, he is true to his word: 'we are all neo-Kantians'. If philosophy is diagnostic of its time, this genitive must be subjective and objective. The *épreuve* that philosophy can offer is not of the outside as such, but of the possibility of becoming other. The effort to grasp the present – not as 'unique, fundamental or eruptive moment of history where everything comes to an end and starts again', but with the 'modesty to say to oneself [that] the moment in which one lives (...) is a day like every other', and yet 'a day that is never

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[236] '[F]or a moment people did indeed believe that a method could only justify itself as far as it was capable of accounting for the 'totality'. (...) Since Saussure we have seen the rise of methodologies which are deliberately partial.' *Idem.* 'Qui êtes-vous, professeur Foucault?'. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 638. In the following pages, he goes on to describe philosophy as 'an activity internal to an objective domain' (p. 639) and, again, as 'diagnostic' (p. 640).
[237] *Idem. L'Usage des plaisirs.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 17. He does, in effect, call philosophy as a whole 'a critical work that thought brings to bear on itself', an '*askesis*, an exercise of oneself in thought' that has 'in the *épreuve* through which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes' its 'living substance'. (p. 16)

really like any other'[238] –, to grasp 'today as difference'[239], as Foucault finds it in Kant's essay, does not exhaust itself in speculation. If in that essay *Aufklärung* ambiguously figured as both ongoing process and task to be accomplished, Foucault self-reflexively poses the question: 'if we limit ourselves to enquiries and experiments that are always partial and local, do we not risk to let ourselves be determined by more general structures of which we have neither conscience nor control?'.[240] The answer is direct: there can never be a full knowledge of our historical limits; however much we try to dig into the conditions of our passivity, the very fact of our passivity guarantees that such a knowledge can never be exhausted – interpretation is always a violence, a partial appropriation, the affirmation of a force. '*So that it will not be the empty dream or affirmation of freedom*', critique, less than a defined practice or a method, is an *ethos* to be constantly reactivated, a '*limit-attitude'* which is experimental: not a speculative exercise in interpreting the world, but a practical experiment in exploring 'in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what is the part of the singular, contingent and arbitrary'[241]; the Baudelairian effort to capture the unique in the fleeting by transforming it, the analytic attempt to respond to a moment that 'demands to be analysed, decomposed'[242] into what constitutes it, and the experimental effort of a 'critical practice in the form of possible transgression.'[243] The commitment to the present is, therefore, a commitment to the future: to becoming other, to the new; thought temporalises itself against the possibility of the different. The outside – such is its last determination as Deleuze finds it in Foucault – is openness to the future, 'opening of a future'.[244]

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[238] *Idem*. Structuralisme et post-structuralisme. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1267.

[239] *Idem*. What is Enlightenment?. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1387.

[240] *Ibid.*, p. 1394.

[241] *Ibid.*, p. 1393. (First italics mine, second Foucault's.)

[242] *Idem*. Structuralisme et poststructuralisme. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1267.

[243] *Idem*. What is Enlightenment?. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1393.

[244] DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 95.

To think is to lodge oneself in the present stratum that serves as a limit: what can I see, what can I say today? (...) To think the past against the present, to resist the present, not for the sake of a return but 'in favour, I hope, of a time to come' (Nietzsche), that is, rendering the past active and present to the outside, so that thought, always, happens to thought. Thought thinks its own history (past), but to free itself from what it thinks (present) in order to finally 'think differently' (future).[245]

We are now in a position to begin to discern with more clarity how close and how far Foucault and Deleuze are to each other in this redefinition of philosophy. The latter has, in fact, already inhabited in diffracted form this exposition of Foucault's thought; which leaves us now with the work of seeing how these diffractions appear on the other side of the mirror.

3.2.4 – From difference in itself to the plane of immanence

Considering the declarations of philosophical affinity between the two, it is ironic that, while Foucault's verdict on the modern épistémè is that it is interminably stuck in the oscillations of an empirical-transcendental double, Deleuze names his project a 'transcendental empiricism'; and while Foucault, at least initially, sees the way out of the anthropological impasse as calling for a strict separation between empirical and transcendental, going as far as manifesting a wish to eliminate the transcendental by means of the historical, Deleuze unashamedly aligns himself with structuralism (including Foucault himself) under the banner of a new transcendental philosophy. The issue, of course, lies in the concept each one makes of the transcendental; and while we have seen that, for Foucault, it seems to be inextricably tied to the subject, this is exactly not the case for Deleuze. The latter celebrates Kant's great discovery of the transcendental field, but precisely not the fact that it was made immanent to a consciousness that appears already formed, and whose

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[245] *Ibid.*, p. 127.

genesis cannot be accounted for; as he puts it in his last published essay, but in a way that applies just as well to his entire work, the transcendental field

> is distinct from experience, in that it neither refers to an object nor belongs to a subject (empirical representation). It thus presents itself as a pure current of a-subjective consciousness, pre-reflexive, impersonal consciousness, qualitative duration of consciousness without self. It may seem curious that the transcendental be defined by such immediate data: one will speak of a transcendental empiricism. There is something wild and powerful in transcendental empiricism. It is certainly not the element of sensation (simple empiricism), since sensation is only a break in absolute consciousness. It is rather, however close to each other two sensations may be, the passage between them as becoming, as increase or decrease in power (virtual quantity).[246]

Pure movement without beginning or end, the transcendental field must be defined as 'a pure plane of immanence, as it escapes the transcendence of both subject and object'[247]. Subject and object are '"transcendents"' produced by the field, which, being the site of their genesis, is necessarily prior to empirical succession, in which the pair, and any experience that relates them, are caught; and it is only be assuming the triad formed by them as facts that the field can be reduced to the consciousness of a subject. This gives us, in a nutshell, the two sides of the Deleuzian project: on the one hand, a critical account of how the illusion of transcendence is produced by and within immanence itself, as a necessary part of its movement; on the other, a genetic account of the immanent production of subjects and objects by a plane of immanence. It is in this sense, then, that Deleuze's response to the problem of immanence involves a transcendental solution, and that its relation to time can be determined: as pure form that precedes succession.

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[246] *Idem.* L'immanence: une vie.... *In: Deux régimes de fous.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 359.
[247] *Ibid.,* p. 360.

3.2.4.1 – The three syntheses of time

The first half of the groundwork required by the project advanced in *Différence et répétition* consists in an *a priori* discussion of the possibility of giving difference its concept, as a difference in itself that is not defined in opposition to a logically and ontologically prior identity. This is where Deleuze confronts the main chapters of the debate on the relation between difference and Being, those that write the history of its repression (Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz and Hegel, and, to a lesser extent, Heidegger), and those that tell of its progressive emancipation (Scot, Spinoza, Nietzsche). From its submission to the Idea, to the concept, and, even while it was promised the infinite and the infinitesimal, representation, which always make it revolve around identity; to its liberation in univocity (which still neutralises it in the indifference of an *ens communis*), immanence (which still relates it to a single Substance) and the eternal return (which finally delivers on the promises of univocity and immanence by making difference to be said of all equivocal beings in a single voice). Up to this point, Deleuze's argument is classically rationalistic, and appears exposed to the simple objection that, even if one grants that is possible for to think of a difference in itself that precedes and permanently underlies all identities, these identities are *for* a self-identical consciousness that constitutes them by imposing a stable form on them (and so, in fact, is the concept of difference). That he moves next to a concept of repetition *for itself* thus shows what is at stake: to provide an account both of how things are spatio-temporally determined through repetition, and of how the illusion of a self-identical, spontaneous subject is produced in a process in relation to which it is passive. This is accomplished by means of a philosophy of time that provides the transcendental complement to the concept of difference.

To oppose representation and consciousness is to search for the unconscious that escapes it and precedes it; it is, therefore, to search for a passivity that envelops the active; repetition is thus identified with the passive

syntheses that are transcendental conditions for the active syntheses uncovered by Kant, and which produce the same and identical out of a background of sub-representative differences. The model for the first synthesis – of habit – can be found in Hume and Bergson: it is passively produced in the imagination through the contraction of past moments into a sense of expectation in regards to the future, synthesising the living present and giving time the asymmetrical form of an arrow that goes from past to future through the present, from the particularity of past moments to an expected future. Memory requires these qualitative impressions in order to mediately constitute, through the understanding, a reflexive past of representation and a reflexive future of prediction; 'the active syntheses of memory and understanding superpose themselves on the passive syntheses of imagination, in which they find support'.[248] Up to here, what Deleuze is saying could easily be accepted by Husserl or Merleau-Ponty; but his point in fact goes much farther, towards a transcendental materialism: the syntheses of perception refer back to organic syntheses of elements, hereditarity, evolution, a whole realm of passive contractions constituting various levels that condition each other, as well as the active syntheses. As in Plotinus, there is contemplation everywhere, everything contemplates Being in the form of a contraction, and the passive self is thus constituted by a myriad 'larval subjects': it exists 'as soon as a furtive contemplation is established somewhere, as soon as a contracting machine functions somewhere, capable of extracting a difference from repetition'; 'the self is a modification'.[249]

The first synthesis leads to a paradox: while originary, it is already within time, and so is empirical; it constitutes the present, but the present never stops moving, and so it must pass with it; it founds time, but is not its foundation, or ground.[250] The present is past when a new present replaces it, but for there to

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[248] *Idem. Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 98.

[249] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

[250] Deleuze plays here on *fondation*, the act of founding, and *fondement*, the foundation or ground.

be 'past' and 'new' presupposes a transcendental constitution of the past that the present passes into. This leads Deleuze to draw out a second synthesis, which is also passive as it is the condition for any experience of the past as a passing away of the present. This is a pure or *a priori* past; and if the living present is constituted out of contractions, what it contracts is the whole past, so that the pure past is contemporaneous with the present, and the element in and through which all past contractions are related – Bergson's cone: each present is the entire past in its most contracted state. 'This is why, far from being a dimension of time, [the past] is the synthesis of the whole of time of which the present and the future are only dimensions.'[251]

> It does not exist anymore, it does not exist, but it insists, it consists, it is. It insists with the old present, it consists with the actual or the new. It is the in-itself of time as the ultimate ground of passage.[252]

In the first synthesis, we have a contraction of successive elements that are not related, while, in the second, it is the 'coexisting totality'[253] of the past that is contracted. Yet since each present contracts the totality of the past in a different way, the past that conserves them all contains their variations in relaxation and contraction, making it independent from, and capable of acting on, the present; it is the highly contracted, virtual side to each relatively relaxed actual. Sub-representative, this virtual past cannot be accessed by active memory, but only through the involuntary memory of reminiscence, by which the insistent past irrupts into the present in a new form.

Yet even while the pure past or memory lies beyond representation as what grounds it, it remains relative to representation in the present in which it erupts; an in-itself that grounds a for-itself that constitutes it, making time into a circle. For time to be made into the pure form promised by Kant/Hamlet, a

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[251] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[252] *Ibid.*
[253] *Ibid.*, p. 112.

third syntheses is needed that will make it so that 'time itself unfolds'[254], rather than something unfolding *in* time. This is a caesura that distributes, by assigning a past and a future, an *a priori order* of time that frees it from the need to be related to something external as its measure and principle of intelligibility. Two halves that are unequal, a past and a future made entirely different from it by the break – yet the break is precisely what relates the two halves, and thus assembles time into a *whole* in which it is the mark of a before and an after; and it is the point where two *series* of time begin to diverge, one past, the other future. The third syntheses is itself tripartite, and the repetition is said of the event or caesura once in relation to the past repetitions it leaves behind and which are contracted into a present, into a subject that is passively *chosen by* an action; once in relation to its own present, to the metamorphosis that redoubles the subject in making it up to what the action demands; and, finally, in relation to the future, which makes the subject differ from itself. This third moment of repetition – of the completely new – is the selection of the eternal return that consigns one series of repetitions (of identities) to the past that will never return, and one to the future that will ceaselessly return as the different. The pure form of time unmakes the simple circle that related time to an identity in favour of another circle that intervenes in the pure form by breaking it, by introducing the new and the different in its linearity. 'The pure form of time is only there for the revelation of the informal in the eternal return', and the in-itself of the past is unmade by 'a groundless, universal *ungrounding* [*effondement*] that revolves in itself and makes only the to-come [*l'à-venir*] return.'[255]

'*Repetition is a condition of action before being a concept of reflection*'[256], is the general conclusion. It does not exist for a subject without first being what constitutes a subject, and at the same time what guarantees that the subject

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[254] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[255] *Ibid.*, pp. 122-3. (Deleuze's italics.)

[256] *Ibid.*, p. 121.

will always differ from itself, split between a fractured I whose spontaneity is through and through dependent on a primary passivity that it does not constitute, and a passive self that receives its determinations in the pure form of time. This primary passivity is deeper than the receptivity of sensibility or the 'already operated' syntheses of anthropology, pointing towards an affectivity of matter itself: more than the 'already there' of the originary, what escapes the unity and identity of the subject is its ontologically secondary position in relation to the infinite, infinitesimal larval subjects that contemplate the whole of Being in contraction, the whole virtual past that is contracted each time, and the untimely event that breaks into time and produces the completely new. Seen from the point of view of the event, again the subject appears as a final term (or the final term that will then become a term or element for something else): the vector goes 'from world to subject', which is thus, as in Whitehead, more properly a 'superject'[257]: an event is a determination that acquires extension in spatio-temporal coordinates, composing with what surrounds, precedes and follows it an infinite series of which the intensities that it contains constitute other series *ad infinitum*, and only then does an individual become determined at a point where series converge into a passive prehension of 'its precedents and concomitants and, by approximation [*de proche en proche*], a world'.[258] The three syntheses are Deleuze's inversion of the relation between Logos and time, where time is made into the pure 'form of the most radical change, but the form itself does not change'[259], complemented by the circularity of the eternal return of the different that intervenes in it to disrupt linearity; there is thus no Logos that underlies change, but the Logos itself appears as a contingent product of immanent change which, projected back onto what is by right its condition, poses itself as the unconditioned beyond every change. This is the point where Deleuze's transcendental empiricism can pass into its critical moment

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[257] *Idem. Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque*. Paris: Minuit, 2005, p. 105.

[258] *Ibid.*

[259] *Idem. Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 120.

of exposing the illusion, produced within immanence, of a transcendent Logos that provides with an origin, finality, form or intelligibility.

But this critical work itself is double – goes in two directions, or rather feeds back into itself. For if it largely consists in demystifying the 'dogmatic' image of thought that forecloses the questions of difference, singularity and immanence, and if this foreclosure is operated at once by consigning them to the sphere of the unthinkable and making their intelligibility possible only on the condition of their subsumption under an identity, then Deleuze's attack on this image is automatically a defence of his own philosophy. His thought's rights have to be wrenched from the ruin of a set of presuppositions concerning what it is to think that would exclude them from the outset: his (op)position to the dogmatic image of thought is one of absolute exteriority. This is the image that, since Plato, has dominated the whole of philosophy in a way or another; but it starts to receive its modern form when, for the first time, with Descartes, an attempt is made to build philosophy on the safe foundation of a first certitude to be found in an enquiry into the subject's powers of cognition, preceded by a deliberate work of doing away with all presuppositions. While striving to reject any objective presuppositions, Descartes, and Kant after him, nevertheless hold on to the unspoken postulates that thought is the natural exercise of a faculty (which on the one hand is innate and universal, on the other presupposes a moral disposition to search for the true, rather than the true's production in habit), that it is a common sense that unifies different selves and the different faculties of a same self, that it is the spontaneous act by which a subject subsumes an object under the identity of a concept (in the understanding), relates it to other objects through analogy (in judgment), opposition (in imagination) or resemblance (in perception).[260] It is not difficult to recognise here the features of the Copernican revolution that brought transcendent metaphysics to an

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[260] He credits this fourfold structure, which is central to defining what he opposes, to Foucault's characterisation of the classical *épistémè* in *Les mots et les choses. Cf. Ibid.*, p. 337.

end. Now, if Deleuze stands in total exteriority to this image, this means that the question of formal immanence that it opened – what we have now redefined as the immanence of Being to thought – cannot be posed to him in the same way; in other words, if the question is posed in Kant's terms, Deleuze's philosophy would appear to fail the test of formal immanence, and hence fall on the side of transcendence. These, then, are the very high stakes being played in a critique of the image of thought – it is a matter of developing the conditions in which a new criterion of formal immanence can be created. It is no wonder, then, that Deleuze will say of the part where most of this critical work is concentrated in *Différence et répétition* that it is 'the most necessary and the most concrete, and an introduction to the following books'[261]: 'it was impossible to attain the powers of difference and repetition without putting in question the image that was made of thought.'[262] To find Deleuze's answer to the problem of bringing together material and formal immanence, therefore, depends on determining exactly what the act of putting an image of thought into question consists in.

3.2.4.2 – Transcendental dialectics against representation

That the modern version of this image, as perfected by Kant, will eventually mark the end of transcendent metaphysics is precisely down to the fact that these postulates, while maintained, are made free from any determinate empirical content, a purely formal 'everyone knows = x' that concerns the *de jure* conditions of the 'everyone knows' rather than any object that occupies the 'x'. But this move, as we have seen, rests on a prior operation of separation between action and passion; 'a certain distribution of the empirical

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[261] He continues: 'up to my researches with Guattari, where we invoke for thought a vegetable model of the rhizome in opposition to the model of tree, a rhizome-thought instead of an arborescent one'. *Idem.* Préface a l'édition américaine de *Différence et répétition. Deux régimes de fous.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 283.
[262] *Ibid.*, p. 282.

and the transcendental'[263] that relates a pure transcendental self as the unity of all faculties to an object=x that reflects this unity by being recognised as the same across the different faculties. A common sense exists by right since it mediates the agreement of the faculties between two formal identities, providing the Same as the model that good sense applies to the relation of every empirical object to every determined object, ascribing the role of each faculty in the process. The upshot is clear: the presupposition of 'a thought that is naturally upright, a natural common sense by right, a recognition as the transcendental model cannot but constitute an ideal of orthodoxy'[264]. There is no attachment to any concrete, determined *doxa*, but it is the form of *doxa* that is extracted and held up as the image of what it is to correctly think – *ortho-doxa*: 'The image of thought is nothing but the figure by which *doxa* is universalised by being elevated to the rational level. But one remains a prisoner of *doxa* if all one does is to abstract its empirical content, while keeping the use of the faculties that corresponds to it, which retains the essential of its content.'[265] This, in its most abstract terms, is the way in which the form of the present is projected onto the past as condition and limit, which is what Deleuze condemns as not only philosophically, but politically conservative: what the dogmatic image does is to give a particular, empirical evaluation of life a formal, universal value; it is the critique that wishes to conserve, to place certain things beyond the drive towards immanentisation by making them into formal principles. True critique, for Deleuze, necessarily pits philosophy against all present *doxa*; it always resists the present in the name of a future.[266] Representation, on the other hand, only gives us the already-known.

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[263] *Idem. Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 174.

[264] *Ibid.*, p. 175.

[265] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

[266] Cf. *Idem;* GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. Paris, Minuit, 1991, p. 104.

But what, then, is a thought beyond representation – which, again, is not only the *what* of the Deleuzian project, but also its *how*; the something it seeks to determine but also the one it already purports to be? The solidarity between what and how, between Being and thought, entails that it is produced in exactly the same way in which the different irrupts in time and calls forth a subject: not an active recognition that subsumes under a model, but the passivity of an encounter that forces thought to think, that demands a truly new response. It is what can only be sensed, since it cannot be related to an object already known; it is the transcendent exercise of sensibility, beyond the empirical use under a common sense with the other faculties, which starts a chain reaction from the *sentiendum* (which can only be sensed but not empirically perceived) to the *cogitandum* (which can only be thought but not known as such), forcing each faculty into its limit and forcing a discord of the faculties for which the model was already suggested by the experience of the sublime in the *Critique of judgment*. To say that this is a transcendent exercise does not mean that it is an experience of another world, but of what is beyond common sense; this is not a return to transcendent metaphysics, neither in the sense of re-establishing a difference only in degree between sensibility and understanding (it presupposes independent faculties), nor in the sense of establishing an access to the thing in itself as such (as an Idea or the noumenal correlate of an object of experience), nor in the sense of a classical 'negative of limitation' (where the finite is only a limit of the infinite).[267] The *sentiendum* is an element of pure difference, an intensity: what creates a quality in the sensible, and therefore what in itself is not sensible for empirical sensibility (which can only grasp it as mediated by a quality), but is immediately given to transcendent sensibility. This is, then, how Deleuze can provide an account both of how the new can be given to thought *and* how the illusion of representation is immanently produced by it: the illusion consists in separating the empirical from the intensive that it envelops in extension, to abstract the produced from the real conditions of its

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[267] On the negative of limitation, Cf.: *Idem. Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 81.

production, and turn it into the object of a conditioning where its conditions are produced in its image by further abstracting from it (now mistaken for a finalised, self-identical, necessary object) a set of possibles. Transcendental criticism grasps, of the object, only its empirical side, but not the truly transcendental in it: the pure differences that produce and transform it (rather than conditions that presuppose its present form). Or, to couch in the opposition that determines the whole of Deleuze's philosophy, it addresses only the actual, and misses the virtual that underlies all actualisation.

> Difference in intensity, disparity in the phantasm, dissemblance in the form of time, the differential in thought. Opposition, resemblance, identity and even analogy are only the effects produced by these presentations of difference, rather than the conditions subordinate difference and make it into something representable.[268]

The idea of illusion, rather than error or misrecognition, originates, of course, in the Transcendental Dialectic; but Kant, in his attachment to the dogmatic image of thought, never took it to its ultimate consequence. This is what Deleuze wishes to do in his own dialectic, which opens with an attack on another dogmatic illusion: truth or falsity do not pertain to solutions, but to problems; and problems can, following Kant's lead, be identified with transcendental ideas.

For Kant, ideas are literally 'problematic concepts'[269] of a totality of conditions or unconditioned totality, which are necessarily produced by reason and, while not determining an object themselves, play the crucial role of projecting an ultimate systematic unity of empirical knowledge that guides the understanding by furnishing it with rules of application towards its ever greater expansion and unifying rules towards its ever greater coherence. Deleuze commends the definition of ideas as problematic, and one could say

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[268] *Ibid.*, p. 189.
[269] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*, A647/B675.

that generally for him everything revolves around the distinction established by Kant between thought and knowledge; but he agrees with Hegel that what Kant ultimately does is to subordinate thought to the demands of the understanding, so that even while it is reason/thought that gives the understanding both drive and direction, it allows itself to be defined in the other's terms.[270] For Kant, insofar as ideas take us beyond the empirical objects determined by the understanding (the recognised, the already known), they are at once necessary, and the source of transcendent illusions when we mistake their problematic objects for objects that can be given in experience. For Deleuze, the idea mirrors the fractured I-pure form of time-passive self triad in its three moments: indeterminate in its object (the problem), determinable in relation to empirical objects, and carrying the ideal of an infinite determination (in the concept). It is not, therefore, that it does not have an object, but that the problem is itself its object, and it is of problems themselves that truth or falsity (in the form of under- or overdetermination) must be said. 'The indeterminate is neither an imperfection in our knowledge,

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[270] I speak here both of 'reason' and 'thought' so as to refer at once to Hegel and Deleuze; for the first, speculative, i.e., dialectical reason corresponds to the superior exercise the second calls 'thought', even if what is meant by this word is both a dialectic of the idea/problem *and* an aesthetic of intensity, and is not defined by opposition, but by a differential relation. Deleuze generally prefers not to speak of 'reason' in this sense, tending to consider the latter term in the sense of the overall arrangement of Kant's system (that is, its role not only in relation to knowledge, but also practice and aesthetics, and as the faculty that corresponds to the highest interest), which is exactly what he wishes to overcome. It is thus that he can say that what 'one opposes to reason, is thought itself; what one opposes to the reasonable being is the thinker himself. Because reason on its own account gathers and expresses the rights of what subjects thought, thought re-conquers its rights and becomes legislative against reason: *the dice-throw*, that was the meaning of the dice-throw.' *Idem*. *Nietzsche et la philosophie*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 107.

Christian Kerslake points out how Deleuze can expand the Hegelian critique of the subsumption of reason under the requirements of the understanding to show that unity, being a criterion for the concept, does not have to be assumed as characterising the telos of reason – which entails a substitution of a collective horizon for a fragmented one whose distributive law is given by difference in itself. While I in principle agree with his defence of Deleuze's transformation of Kantianism, I disagree with his evaluation of the work that follows the properly 'transcendental' moment of the late 1960s. Not only do I think he undertakes operations that are unnecessary for this defence (to wit, the elision of the 'objective' structure of Ideas as pertaining to things as much as to thought), I believe (for reasons to be exposed later) that the preoccupation with formal immanence is a constant in Deleuze's thought, but undergoes an important shift in later writings that do not amount to an affirmation of an absolute, thetic power. *Cf.* KERSLAKE, C. The vertigo of philosophy. Deleuze and the problem of immanence. *Radical Philosophy*, 113 (2004), pp. 10-23.

rather than from actual to actual, it is also asymmetrical, since what it engenders is each time a new solution to its problematic structure: each solution finds in the problem the conditions of existence of its determination as this or that singular solution, rather than the realisation of one out of a set of possibilities. The idea is thus of the order of the event, the eruption of the new into time, and it is necessary to distinguish a series of actual events or solutions and a series of ideal events that are each time a new dice-throw reconfiguring the conditions of the problem; the two 'echo each other without resemblance', and the ideal one is at once immanent and transcendent to the other: 'the existence and distribution of singular points [belongs] exclusively to the idea, yet their specification [is] immanent to the curves-solutions of their neighbourhood, that is, the real relations in which the Idea becomes embodied'.[274]

So now the elements are in place for what counts as transcendental illusion in Deleuze's dialectics to appear, which also amounts to answering the question of how an illusion of transcendence can be produced within immanence:

> In short, representation and knowledge are modelled entirely on the propositions of consciousness that designate cases of solution; but these propositions themselves offer a completely inexact notion of the instance that they resolve or solve, and which engenders them as cases. The Idea and 'learning', on the other hand, express this problematic, extra-propositional or sub-representational instance: the presentation of the unconscious, not the representation of consciousness.[275]

To separate the object from its conditions of existence is to erase its problematic genesis, to treat it as an identity or essence and neglect the virtual aspect that it explicates but that is also implicated in it. As in Spinoza,

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[274] *Ibid.*, p. 244. It is again the same model (of an Spinozist parallelism) that Deleuze will develop into a theory of sense: a series of actual events (bodily encounters) and a series of ideal, sterile events between which sense is produced, with nonsense as the 'quasi-cause' that triggers them. Cf. *Idem. Logique du sens.* Paris: Minuit, 2002, esp. pp. 115-21.

[275] *Idem. Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 248.

to truly know a thing is to know its causes, except that here the causes do not refer to a mechanical, dynamic genesis, but to the network of conditions that reach into the virtual realm of pure differences, the continuous multiplicities that the thing actualises in a certain way but which remain nonetheless present as the potentials and variations enveloped by extension. It is from this position that Deleuze can, *contra* Descartes, say that a clear and distinct idea of a thing always amounts to obscuring the whole of ideas that are present in it in a confused state; *contra* Leibniz, say that the extended world is not the selection of the most perfect set of compossibles in the divine intellect, but the actual product of a realm of virtual potentials in which all incompossibles communicate[276]; *contra* Hegel, dismiss the critique of empiricism that argued no knowledge could be produced by sense-certainty without there being a sublation of the particular into the universal, as, in Deleuze, what one has is not a particular 'this' opposed or juxtaposed to another ('here a tree, there a tree'), but a singularity given determinate content by the asymmetrical conditions of its actualisation[277]. Finally, *contra* Kant, that to conceive of the object as formally determined by a subject is to abstract from an actual, extended world of spatio-temporally determined objects both a time and a space (made pure planes of the possibility of objects) and a conceptual identity (made the generality that any particular object specifies) and then turn these into *a priori* subjective conditions. The triple consequence is that the novelty of the singular individual can never be thought (as it is a limitation of conceptual possibility, rather than a creation of divergent lines of actualisation each time), that its virtual potential is neutralised (it becomes a stable identity that erases the pure differences that subsist in it and push it into new becomings), and that thought is reduced to a function of recognition and

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[276] It is in relation to this point that we find Deleuze's most spirited defence of perspectivism: 'Nietzsche's perspective – perspectivism – is a more profound art than Leibniz's point of view; for divergence ceases to be a principle of exclusion, disjunction ceases to be a means of separation, the incompossible is now a medium of communication.' *Idem. Logique du sens.* Paris: Minuit, 2002, p. 203.

[277] *Cf.* BAUGH, B. Deleuze and empiricism. *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 24 (2), p. 24.

separated from what it thinks by having denied its own ideal conditions (its virtual communication with the potentials and variations that are expressed in the actual object), crowning the subject-object polarity.

3.2.4.3 – An aesthetic of intensity

One can see then how the dogmatic image of thought perpetuated, in philosophy, the illusion that consists in reducing reality only to its actual aspect. Yet there is no denying that such an illusion, if that is what it is, has a perfectly good reason for being, considering we only perceive actual, extended objects, and science necessarily deals with the objects that can be identified, propositions that can be verified etc. Deleuze's dialectics, however strong a case it may build for the necessity of positing a virtual aspect to the real, requires an aesthetics to complement it in showing that pure difference, which by definition cannot be identified with a concept, a thing or an actual process, can nevertheless be sensed. Only then could the possibility of thinking the diverse without any mediation by the Same be established; only then could he redeem the claim that diversity is given, but 'difference is that by which the given is given (...) as diverse'[278], and that pure difference is the *sentiendum* that forces thought to break with representation: intensity, 'the form of difference as reason of the sensible. All intensity is differential, difference in itself.'[279]

For that end, he provides a transcendental deduction of intensity in the perception of space. Extensity is never perceived as indifferent or uniform, but always charged with individuating factors that define the axes of height, length, depth. This dissymmetry cannot be reduced to the relations in an extensity already developed, but attests to the necessity of depth – 'the matrix of the extended, including the third dimension considered as homogeneous

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[278] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 286.
[279] *Ibid.*, p. 287.

with the other two'[280] – as the background (which is also the groundless ground) against which extended space is constituted. If depth is implicated in the perception of extensity, it is obviously not as something that is in itself extended, but as the intensive space (*spatium*) that is the condition of the *extensum* that explicates it in distances and the sizes of *extensio*. This intensive quantity of space is related to intensity in sensation, since it is the differences in degree in sensation that provide the perception of depth, 'or rather, give perception depth'.[281]

> Intensity, which envelops distances, explicates itself in the extended, and the extended develops, exteriorises or homogenises these distances themselves. At the same time, a quality occupies this extended, be it as *qualitas* [matter occupying the extended] or as *quale* [what characterises an object]. Intensity is at once the insensible and what cannot but be sensed. How would it be sensed in itself, independently of the qualities that cover it up and the extended in which it distributes itself? But how would it be anything but 'sensed', if it is what gives something to the senses [*donne à sentir*] and defines the limit proper to the sensible?[282]

Kant mistook empirical (according to which intensity is insensible) and transcendent (according to which it is 'the Being of the sensible'[283]) exercises of sensibility, assigning intensive quantity only to the matter that comes to occupy a space that he conceives already as pure, uniform, indifferent extension; but the re-presentation of space as an unbounded, infinitely divisible 'given magnitude'[284] presupposes an intensive presentation of *spatium* which gives us extensity. Naturally, the transcendental condition for measure cannot itself be empirically approached: intensive quantity cannot be known or measured according to a principle since it is that by which the measure itself of extensive quantity is given. Yet, unlike quality, it can be

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[280] *Ibid.*, p. 296.
[281] *Ibid.*, p. 297.
[282] *Ibid.*
[283] *Ibid.*, p. 304.
[284] KANT, I. *Critique of pure reason*, A25/B39-40. (Kant's italics.)

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divided, but only by changing in nature: implicated in itself, it envelops all differences, but explicates these differences in a certain configuration (that is, asymmetrically) in the extended and in quality, in which it is then implicated: contrary to extensive quantities, intensive ones 'are defined by enveloping difference [*différence enveloppante*] – the enveloped distances – and the unequal in itself that attest to a natural "rest" as the matter of change in nature.'[285] The play on *ex-* and *implicare* that Deleuze finds in the Neoplatonics, the movement of *de-* and *envelopment*, are essential here: like two inverted cones joined at the apex, we can go from one base as a maximum of implication and envelopment in the virtual (pure intensive potentials not yet expressed in actuality); to the apex as the evental point where intensity is developed and explicated along divergent lines in which extension and quality are produced, leading to the other base as a maximum of explication, where potentials are cancelled and an identity given to representation. Yet potentials are only ever fully cancelled for representation, whose 'most intimate task' consists in 'relating difference to an identity'[286]; and so the 'most' actual (that is, the base of the actual cone) implicates and envelops differences (potentials contained in matter itself) that communicate with the enveloped whole in the 'most' virtual (the base of the virtual cone).

As much as a 'maximum' of extensity and actuality corresponds only to the limits of representation, a pure state of implicated intensity not expressed in any actuality is valid only as the idea of a primeval chaos where nothing takes hold. Human experience, even in its enlarged Deleuzian sense, only takes place because intensity explicates itself in extensity, only because each time there is a passage from virtual potentials to actual extended objects and qualities. We are, in this sense, always 'outside of the outside' of pure difference. Chaos 'does not exist, it is an abstraction, because it is inseparable from a sieve that draws something out of it (something rather

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[285] DELEUZE, G. *Op. cit.*, p. 306.

[286] *Ibid.*, p. 303. 'Not that [intensity] cancels itself in appearance. It cancels itself really, but outside itself [i.e., after changing in nature], in the extended and under quality.' *Ibid.*, p. 309.

than nothing)'; it would be 'a pure *Many*, pure disjunctive diversity, whereas the something is a *One*, not already a unity, but rather the indefinite article that designates a singularity whatever'[287], and so is a concept abstracted from the diversity that is given to experience. Yet this outside is 'not a fixed limit, but a moving matter animated by (...) folds and foldings that constitute an inside', 'exactly the inside *of* the outside'[288]; we are ourselves, as actual beings, enveloped by it, and follow its transformations as so many individuating events that happen to us: 'all space of the inside is topologically in contact with the space of the outside, independently of distances and on the boundaries of a "living being"'.[289]

Intensity/difference is thus 'not the phenomenon, but the closest noumenon of the phenomenon'[290]: not known in itself, but sensed in the movements of actualisation by which the diverse is given, precisely because it is the closest to us, precisely because it is that by which the diverse is given. It is the point where the ideal synthesis of difference (dialectics) and asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible (aesthetic) come together: 'the power of intensity (depth) is grounded in the potentiality of the idea'[291]. Pure variations or potentials are asymmetrically synthesised into lines of differenciation that guide the actualisation of ideas by bringing some of its differentiated elements into clarity while obscuring others, so that the virtual idea expresses itself in the actual, but each time as a novelty, as an asymmetric, static genesis of a singular being. At the same time, it is the new compositions that the actual enters into that bring about a reconfiguration of potentials and thus new relations of clarity/obscurity in the idea: two independent but related series of events, actual and virtual, that act upon each other without resemblance or causality, but only through the resonance that makes a reconfiguration in one

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[287] *Idem. Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque.* Paris: Minuit, 2005, p. 103-4. (Italics in the original, where 'One' and 'Many' appear in English.)

[288] *Idem. Foucault.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 103-4.

[289] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

[290] *Idem. Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 286.

[291] *Ibid.*, p. 315.

be expressed as a reconfiguration in the other. If this is Deleuze's take on Spinoza's parallelism, it is no surprise that the element that sets the whole system in motion, intensity, corresponds to the affections that are said at once of Substance and finite mode, and that determine the movements of actualisation of *natura naturans* into *natura naturata* as much as the passage into states of higher or lesser power to affect and be affected in the mode's duration.[292]

It is only natural, then, that the kind of illusion produced in the aesthetics also corresponds to that of the dialectics: if actual beings are conceived in separation from the intensive states that individuate them, the negative is produced as limitation (correlate of divisible extensity) and opposition (correlate of both quality and extensity), the 'reversed image of intensity' that is also the 'shadow of problems and their elements'[293]. Deleuze's critique of representation is obviously not that it is wrong as such – there is no doubt that 'resemblance is the law of quality, as equality is that of the extended (or invariance that of extensity)'[294] –, but that it is condemned to recognition by virtue of reducing thought to the empirical. In failing to grasp the virtual conditions of the actual, it also fails to grasp what it is that produces the new both in Being and in thought, and thus is blind to its own transcendental conditions: the new can only be thought through the transcendent exercise that intensity, as *sentiendum* that can only be sensed, forces the faculties into – so that thought attains a *cogitandum* that can only be thought, which expresses the intrinsic difference of the real 'in the making'. 'Only transcendental study can discover that intensity remains implicated in itself and continues to envelop difference, at the moment where it reflects itself in the extended and the quality that it creates'[295], which calls for a 'pedagogy of

[292] Cf. *Idem. Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*. Paris: PUF, 2002, pp. 198-9.
[293] *Idem. Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 315.
[294] *Ibid.*, p. 303.
[295] *Ibid.*, p. 309.

the senses (...) that is a part of "transcendentalism"[296] – the ambition is, no less, to provide Kant with his long overdue metacritique.

The whole point – and here we see why Deleuze would call himself an empiricist – is that good sense comes second, and its mediated distributions presuppose a prior 'nomadic distribution, immediate, crowned anarchy, difference'.[297] It is grounded in the syntheses of habit, and distributes probability from the past (the improbable) to the future (the probable, the entropy that cancels difference and the exclusion of the symmetry-breaking event), and encounters a common sense that presupposes the correlation of a self-identical self and a self-identical object as pure, universal forms, to which it adds an intuition deprived of intensive quantity. Rule of universal distribution and universally distributed rule, good sense and common sense thus fulfil the functions of prediction and recognition, and, of the real, give us only the actual half. That philosophy is concerned not with the given (actual) but that by which the given is given (difference, the virtual) is central to Deleuze's conception of philosophy and to how he defines the latter's relation to science; as he will later put it, science is concerned with actual states of affairs, and constructs a plane of reference, relative to a partial observer, that limits the chaotic movement of the virtual like a 'freeze frame' in order to describe it in functions and propositions.[298] Creation cuts across the two (and art), and can define new concepts and a new plane of immanence in

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[296] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

[297] *Ibid.*, p. 289.

[298] *Idem;* GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?.* Paris, Minuit, 1991, p. 111-3. Manuel DeLanda argues against a certain 'conservatism' *malgré eux* of Deleuze's and Guattari's picture of science, which ignores the ways in which those 'minor' fields of scientific enquiry that have the most in common with their philosophy work. *Cf.* DELANDA, M. *Intensive science and virtual philosophy.* London: Continuum, 2002, pp. 178-80. Miguel de Beistegui sees contemporary science's freeing itself from the last constraints of a metaphysics of essence as an opportunity for a programme that makes the phenomenological tradition (shaken from its anti-scientific, anti-naturalistic bent) converge with Deleuze around a differential ontology concerned with the (non-actual) event of Being, whether epiphanic, poematic, for us (Heidegger) or genetic, mathematical, in itself (Deleuze) – although, in the end (a conclusion I fully subscribe to), there can be no synthesis between the two. *Cf.* DE BEISTEGUI, M. *Truth and genesis. Philosophy as differential ontology.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

philosophy as much as new functions and new plane of reference in science; but it belongs to the nature of the latter to seek stabilisation, certainty, manipulability; whereas for philosophy it is a matter of exercising thought at its limit (of expressing the events that surround it), and so of working close to its absolute, deterritorialised limit (the absolute plane of immanence, chaos). To think philosophically is to think 'far from equilibrium'.

> The manifestation of philosophy is not good sense, but paradox. Paradox is the *pathos* or passion of philosophy.[299]

3.2.5 – 'Illusions surround the plane'

Qu'est-ce que la philosophie? provides the sketch of an avowedly 'infinite' list of illusions: that of universals (which make singularities into the limitation of a universal, rather than the lines of variation that become temporarily stabilised, but also always pervert, genera, species etc), leading to the further illusions of contemplation (the objective universals of transcendent metaphysics), reflection (the subjective universals of innate ideas or the categories of transcendental subjectivity) and communication (the universals of a shared background or world); that of eternity (which takes concepts for something already-there rather than created); that of discursivity (when the problematic power of concepts is reduced to propositions)... All derive from the illusion of transcendence that consists in making immanence immanent *to* something – an eternal *eidos* or *ousia*, an extra-temporal constituent subject, an other-I that shares my world but can never be present to me, a Being that is the source of all presencing but never present itself.[300]

Yet the paradoxical, ironic effect of Deleuze's quest for a philosophy of immanence is that the everyday world of actual objects becomes doubled by

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[299] *Idem. Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 293.
[300] *Cf.* DELEUZE; G. GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?.* Paris, Minuit, 1991, p. 104.

a virtual realm which is the alleged 'sufficient reason of the phenomenon, the condition of what appears'.[301] What is more, this sufficient reason, which is prior to any measurable, empirical time, intervenes in the world from a time that is '[a]lways already past and eternally still to come' – an Aion behind Chronos which is 'the eternal truth of time'[302], peopled by events that precede eternally the states of affairs in which they are incarnated, 'impersonal and pre-individual, neutre, neither general nor particular, eventum tantum...'.[303] It is the 'empty form of time' as the form of all change which, in itself, does not change; the time of the eternal return, 'itself the Identical, the similar, the equal' that is said of the different, the pure disparity, the unequal.[304] Throughout all of his work, entities pullulate that resemble Platonic Ideas in that they never correspond to anything that embodies them, but are always given in an impure form – de jure oppositions between rhizome and tree, schizophrenic and paranoid, nomadic and sedentary, molecular and molar, war machine and state, smooth and striated...[305] Of course, Deleuze would say that the whole point is that the virtual is immanent and transcendent to the actual, but the real includes the two. But even if he manages to steer clear from allowing a categorical distinction between them (thus reintroducing analogy and equivocity), does he really manage – with his insistence in one form of time, one Being for all beings – to escape the transcendence of the whole to its parts? Or – with his insistence that what sets differenciation in motion by making actual and virtual series communicate and diverge be thought as a 'differenciator of difference'[306], 'a Sich-unterscheidende'[307];

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[301] DELEUZE, G. Différence et répétition. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 286.

[302] Idem. Logique du sens. Paris: Minuit, 2002, p. 194.

[303] Ibid., p. 177.

[304] Idem. Différence et répétition. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 311.

[305] A typical statement, concerning the latter: 'Smooth and striated space – nomad and sedentary space – the space where the war machine develops and the space instituted by the state – are not of the same nature. (...) [W]e must remember that the two only exist in fact outside through their mixtures (...) [but] the actual [de fait] mixtures do not prevent the abstract, by right [de droit] distinction between the two spaces.' Idem; GUATTARI, F. Mille plateaux. Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 592-3. (Modified.)

[306] DELEUZE, G. Différence et répétition. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 48. (Italics in the original.)

[307] Ibid., p. 154.

disparate, dark precursor, object=x (*Différence et répétition*); aleatory point, quasi-cause or paradoxical element (*Logique du sens*) – does he not reintroduce a first principle, even if it is difference in-itself? Is the effectuation of an event ascribed less Being than its counter-effectuation, that is, its virtual, *eventum tantum* side – or actual, 'creatural', impure mixtures, less Being than their ideal, virtual, *de jure*, 'creational' counterparts? Can immanence really dissociate itself from its theological beginnings in emanation? All these questions are posed at the level of material immanence; but, even if we concede that he makes a strong case about the possibility of thinking the real in the enlarged sense that he proposes, what *a priori* arguments does he have to disprove other, perhaps more parsimonious, accounts? And, from the point of view of realised or performative immanence, can he provide an internal demonstration of the *necessity* of his own system – and, in that case, does that not contradict perspectivism; does it not amount to reclaiming a transcendent, metaphysical, extra-temporal point of view?

These are all questions for which the verdict is still out, and, for a very good reason, will always be – because they reach all the way to that most fundamental level of philosophical choices, the very point in which a material whatever 'becomes' or 'is made' philosophy; and at this level, as Badiou masterfully puts it, 'discussion is at once omnipresent and with no other effect than internal'.[308] What is more, none of them can be accused of being unfounded or external. Enough textual evidence can certainly be gathered *against* Deleuze regarding all; and they do not pose problems from perspectives that are completely incommensurable with Deleuze's (even if they may lead to those points where decisions have to be made that define whether a system will go in one or another direction), but, on the contrary, interpellate it in its highest philosophical preoccupations, and its ultimate ethical concerns. So what was said at the start, mostly concerning Foucault, must also be applied here to the way in which I choose to approach Deleuze:

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[308] BADIOU, A. *Deleuze. La clameur de l'Etre*. Paris: Hachette, 1998, p. 81.

between two or more possible interpretations, I opt for the one that seems to yield more consistency and more results. To say 'results', here, obviously implies that such a reading is informed by pre-philosophical choices of its own, from the wish to make something be said in someone else's voice. Every interpretation is a violence, in this sense, but at the same time it should involve a certain philosophical *ethos*: never to spoil an author's game before it has taken us as far as it can go, in the hope that it will be from the greatest sympathy that the most pertinent questions will come.

From the fact that the criticisms behind these questions are well-supported one finds something else about them: they normally involve an operation of using one 'half' of Deleuze's philosophy against the other, which at bottom consists in opening the rift between the virtual and actual sides of the real that he tries to keep together in their separation. This dualism then gives way to a monism where the virtual is ascribed a more 'real' reality, and the actual made into its 'fallen', epiphenomenal counterpart: 'we need two names for the One *in order to experience that it is from one of these names only that proceeds the ontological univocity designated by the nominal pair*'.[309] Deleuze is perfectly aware of the stakes here, and that in the end it comes down to a theory of multiplicities:

> [Monism and dualism are] only one way of thinking, it is all the same: one can only think as a monist or a pluralist. The only enemy is two. Monism and pluralism, it is the same thing (...). To suppress the opposition between one and multiple (...) starts from the moment where 'one' and 'multiple' cease to be adjectives and are replaced by the noun: there is only multiplicities. (...) This is the operation that gives an account of the identity of monism and pluralism, and which referred the true source of dualism to the duality established between the two adjectives: the one and the multiple. The ground of dualism has always been: there are things that are one. (...) [O]ne substitutes the one and the multiple as adjectives with the noun 'multiplicities', as *In:* there is

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[309] *Ibid.*, p. 65. (Badiou's italics.)

nothing that is one, there is nothing that is multiple, everything is multiplicities. At this moment, one sees the strict identity of monism and pluralism (...).[310]

But apart from the staggering proliferation of dualisms throughout his work, there is a less pronounced insistence on triads, which in particular provide the nervure and *leitmotif* of his first book on Spinoza. This is because the concept of expression, chosen as the thread with which to unravel the system of the *Ethics*, possesses a triadic structure that brings together what expresses itself (*ce qui s'exprime*), the expression, and the expressed (*l'exprimé*). This structure is paradoxical, in that 'the expressed at once *does not exist* outside its expression, and nevertheless does not resemble it, but is *essentially* related to what expresses itself, as well as distinct from the expression itself.'[311] This, as we have seen, is precisely why expression is so important for Deleuze, and 'inseparable'[312] from immanence, as it is what provides the model for the asymmetrical event of ontogenesis (and hence a way out of causality and mechanism) and the correlative 'noogenesis' that presents it in thought (and hence a way out of representation) – 'everywhere, the expressed intervenes as a third that dissolves dualisms'.[313] Yet it would seem at first that it brings more grist to the critics' mill: if we substitute virtual for

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[310] DELEUZE, G. Cours Vincennes: Monisme, dualisme, multiplicités. 26/03/1973. [http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=166&groupe=Anti%20Oedipe%20et%20Mill e%20Plateaux&langue=1]. The irony – but perhaps we are beyond irony here – is that, even at the moment of affirming pluralism, he seems to require the positing of a dualism, where one of the terms is the 'shadow' of the other; this lecture argues that the source of the one-multiple dyad is the result of a failure to grasp that there are no individual statements, but only collective assemblages of enunciation, and so the production of a split in the subject between subject of enunciation and subject of the statement (*énoncé*); this provides a new twist to the thesis of *Différence et répétition*, where it is the result of the illusion of reducing the real to discontinuous, divisible, numerical multiplicities.

[311] *Idem. Spinoza et le problème de l'expression.* Paris: PUF, 2002, 310.

[312] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

[313] *Ibid.*, p. 311. Curiously, after believing that I had coined the term 'noogenesis', I discovered it was in fact first used by one of the great *bêtes noires* of Foucault's and Deleuze's generation, Father Teilhard de Chardin... Needless to say, it had for him a much different meaning (as the evolutionary stage in which consciousness appears). It is, of course, an adequate term only to the extent that it allows to highlight the correspondent event in thought to actualisation; the whole question for Deleuze being precisely that there is one single event that happens at once in both directions/'attributes'. It is justified, however, as a way of giving sharper contours to the question that occupies us here – that of the immanence of thought to Being, and of Being to thought.

Substance, it appears to confirm the dependence of the actual/finite on an instance that is its true, yet indifferent cause (even if one it inheres in), from whose power it emanates. On the other hand, if there is a way out of the dualist/monist impasse, it is through the middle term of this structure, which is also the one that defines it; for what in this case is expression, in other Deleuzian triads will be actualisation, individuation, intensity, the event, the instant of the eternal return – in other words, precisely the common vertex of the two inverted cones, the point where virtual and actual meet, the *affectio* that ascends and descends, without ever leaving its place, between God and mode. 'Things do not begin to live except in the middle'[314]; this is a principle that should be applied to Deleuze's thought itself.

It is no surprise, then, that a reading that plays the virtual up at the expense of the actual will also tend to miss any notion of individuality (and indeed agency) in Deleuze's philosophy, with serious consequences regarding what the overall project purports to do – something that is explicitly warned against because 'every reduction of individuation to a limit [i.e., as a negative of limitation, as the finite that is said by limitation of the infinite] or complication of differenciation compromises the whole of the philosophy of difference'[315]; a philosophy whose 'total notion' is 'indi-drama-different/ciation'.[316] This

[314] DELEUZE, G. On the superiority of Anglo-American literature. *In: Idem*; PARNET, C. *Dialogues II*. Trans. Habberjam, B., E. R. Albert, H. Tomlinson. London: Continuum, 2006, p. 41.

[315] *Idem. Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 318. As Alberto Toscano indicates, Badiou's interpretation depends on an erasure of this element (and of the third syntheses of time that ungrounds the 'foundation' of the absolute past that Badiou makes so much of) in order to present a picture where sustaining the thesis of univocity not only ties Deleuze to a metaphysics of the One, but eventually 'induces the collapse of the cornerstone of any true ontology: the question of determination'. He nevertheless stresses that his strategy of defence necessarily involves reinforcing a tendency towards 'the *construction* of a transcendental materialism that aims to provide the sufficient reason of production', and is thus chrono- as well as ontogenetic, instead of 'an ethico-aesthetic *intuition* of Time as the Self-Differing'. *Cf.* TOSCANO, A. *The theatre of production: philosophy and individuation between Kant and Deleuze.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 188 et seq. Peter Hallward, whose interest is more overtly ethical and political, would serve as even stronger example of this 'erasing' tendency. *Cf.* HALLWARD, P. *Out of this world: Deleuze and the philosophy of creation.* London: Verso, 2006.

[316] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 317.

(admittedly rather cumbersome) concept is the expression of the total movement that Deleuze wishes to provide a philosophical system for; which is at the same time to say that, following the rule of formal immanence, it is also where we must enquire into the possibility of his own thought as part of such movement – whether it can live up to the challenge of being 'a *description in thought of the life of the world*, such that the life thus described might include, as one of its living gestures, the description itself.'[317]

Individuation is the 'essential' process or 'act of intensity that determines differential relations to be actualised, following lines of differenciation, in the qualities and extendeds that it creates'.[318] The intensive field is the middle term between virtual ideas and actual individuals, and it is through it that individuation has priority over differenciation. The passage from the 'ground' of the pure virtual past into the actual is mediated by intensive 'disparations' that, in setting up at least two heterogeneous orders along which potentials are distributed, define a problematic field for which the individual appears as a solution consisting 'not in eliminating the problem, but in integrating the elements of the disparation in a state of coupling that ensures their internal ressonance'.[319] This is why the eternal return is an 'ungrounding' that creates, each time, the new: a new solution to the idea as it is dramatised by an intensive field through spatio-temporal dynamisms.

It is clear that, in operative importance, intensity is the most crucial element, not only because it provides the key to understand how determination takes place at all and why it is always the determination of the new, but also because it does so by showing how exactly the two separate series of actual and causal events interact. The prowl of an animal across its territory

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[317] BADIOU, A. Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. In:* BOUNDAS, C.; OLKOWSKI, D. (eds.) *Gilles Deleuze and the theatre of philosophy.* New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 63. (Badiou's italics.)

[318] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 317.

[319] *Ibid.*

encompasses a series of actual movements – not only those of the animal itself, but the scents that it captures, the wind in the vegetation; as well as longer cycles of birth and decay in the territory and the animal, the rise or fall of certain chemicals in its body that, once beyond a certain threshold, will determine whether it is hungry, tired etc. – that synthesise intensities in new ways and make both animal and territory express their virtual conditions in new ways. If Deleuze always stresses that ontogenesis is a static movement from virtual to actual, it is in order to provide an account of its asymmetrical, novelty-producing character that necessarily falls away if one remains at the mechanistic level of dynamic, actual causes – not to eliminate them. The actual acts upon the virtual, both as what forces continuous multiplicities to differenciate into new individuals, and as what determines new relations of clarity and obscurity among ideas (such as when the lack of certain chemicals reaches the threshold that determines a peak in the sensation of hunger, making tiredness disappear in the background); the *saute sur place* of ontogenesis is never independent from a circular relation that goes from actual to virtual as much as the other way round, even if in one case it determines new individuals, and in the other only new relations.[320]

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[320] John Mullarkey is the commentator who has gone the farthest in contesting the primacy of the virtual in Bergson/Deleuze, and finds material in a reading of the former to counteract the latter's tendency of overstressing the virtual to the point of placing the processual character of his metaphysics at risk (evidenced in the fact that, despite its non-individual content, one finds a subject-predicate structure in a statement such as: 'The individual is thus placed alongside a pre-individual half, which is not the impersonal in it, but rather *the reservoir of its singularities'. In: Ibid.,* my italics.), To do so, he argues that the virtual should be understood as the infinite series of successive, actual *Chronos* indefinitely embedded in each other, eliminating the need for an eternal *Aion* of pure, virtual events. He concurs, nevertheless, that it is a matter of playing some tendencies in Deleuze's thought against others – and provides a very good discussion of why and how Deleuze requires all of them, and their tension, to be simultaneously maintained. *Cf.* MULLARKEY, J. *Post-continental philosophy. An outline.* London: Continuum, 2006, esp. Ch. 1.
One must note that it is a movement in this direction that takes place in Foucault's work after *Les mots et les choses,* which is reproduced at the metaphilosophical process: whereas the version of archaeology in that book staked its acceptability on a massive epistemic transformation, the later Foucault emphasises that his work constructs overlapping historical series which concern a particular problem whose occurrence as problem is owed to transformations in limited fields, and addresses primarily those concerned with those fields.

The philosophical importance of intensity – and here we recover the thread of formal immanence in Deleuze – doubles as a metaphilosophical one. The 'method' of dramatisation responds to the 'mystery of [the] hidden art' of Kantian schematism by proposing that it is the 'pure spatio-temporal dynamisms that have the power to dramatise *concepts* because they fist of all actualise, incarnate *ideas*'[321]. In keeping with Deleuze's parallelism, this entails that intensity operates at once in the genesis of the thing and of thought. *Différence et répétition* is the highest point in the development of a doctrine of difference in itself and intensities as the pure potentials whose reconfiguration causes the actual to express the virtual in new ways, as well as *sentiendum* that sets in motion a transcendent exercise of thought beyond representation and recognition. The whole of his philosophy depends, therefore, on an appeal to this *sentiendum* that can only be sensed, and is only given to perception in the forms in which it explicates itself in the actual; that underlies representation, and hence is necessarily sub-representational; that is that by which the given is given, but is never in itself given to us. It consists in a speculative effort to name and provide a description of the structure and functioning of something that can never be *known* in the empirical sense, not because it lies in the farthest reaches of knowledge, but because it is, so to speak, the closest to it – under the threshold that defines the limits of experience, what can only be sensed; but also what takes us to that which is closest to our own Being, the virtual ideas that can only be thought.

This is why the whole question for him is not to establish his own system as an alternative to other systems, but to criticise the image of thought that is presupposed by them – hence why years later he would single this element out as the most important in the book. In making true and false into a property of solutions rather than problems, the dogmatic image of thought is always involved in a movement from the hypothetic to the apodictic, which is exactly

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[321] DELEUZE, G. La méthode de dramatisation. *In: L'Île déserte*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 138.

what necessitates the identification of a fixed, a-temporal point as the firm ground from which hypotheses will be tested. To go from the multiple to the one, from accident to essence, from difference to identity, from becoming to Being, is at once a reduction of thought to the limits and requirements of the understanding and (present) science (a 'scientistic hypothetism') and the subordination of life to a measure that, as Nietzsche argued, always has a moral prejudice for origin (a 'rationalistic moralism').[322] What is at stake is then nothing else than the modern drive towards immanentisation, and how, if the immanentisation of philosophy started by Kant is to be made complete, it is necessary to abandon the doubly conservative form in which its early results have become congealed; not only is the motivation behind Deleuze's philosophy absolutely modern in its nature, nothing could be more inadequate than describing him as anti-Kantian.[323] He is perfectly Kantian in what concerns the most important legacy of the *Critique*: the distinction between logic and transcendental knowledge, *thinking* and *knowing*; and perfectly post-Kantian (in a broad sense that includes Nietzsche and Bergson) in seeing the mistaken conclusion of this separation as the subordination of thinking to knowing, of discounting the powers of the former even while giving it the function of driving and guiding the latter. Where he differs from, for instance, Hegel, is that reinstating the powers of thought does not mean going from the hypothetic to the thetic; to think of intensity or virtual ideas in the way that Deleuze proposes does not mean that we will ever *experience* (that is, know) them as such, in themselves and as they are, but only gives us the philosophical grounds on which to *experiment* with the actual in a way that is open to the new.

This brings out a crucial feature of his thought, whose style is not an accidental question but bears an intrinsic and necessary connection to its

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[322] *Idem. Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, pp. 254-5.

[323] It is thus not simply a matter of 'acting like the trial of metaphysics attempted by Kant was null and void', but using the distinction between knowing and thinking against Kant himself. *Cf.* BADIOU, A. *Deleuze. La clameur de l'Etre*. Paris: Hachette, 1998, p. 69.

content: in all talk of intensities, the words printed on paper are not intensity itself, and neither is what they designate; they only re-present something which, by definition, can only present itself. The role of all the lengthy discussions on drama, irony, literature, as well as the examples drawn from science, is not to demonstrate the truthfulness of the elements of his thought, but precisely to *dramatise* them: both to convey them as working on individual cases, and to extra-linguistically, extra-representationally convey the sensations and problems that they provide a re-presentation of. If the true movement of thought, in its transcendent, novelty-creating and novelty-grasping exercise, is from the problematic to the question, this is not something that Deleuze's philosophy can escape: it cannot provide its own apodictic grounds or provide *a priori* arguments establishing its necessity; it can in the last instance only 'argue' through its performance – which means at once what it dramatises and vice-dicts for us and in us, and what it invites us to experiment with in individuating ourselves anew. After a discussion on the question and its expressive, productive power, he admits:

> But how disappointing the answer seems. We ask for the origin of ideas, where problems come from; and we invoke the dice-throw, the imperatives and questions of chance, instead of an apodictic principle, an aleatory point where everything becomes ungrounded (*s'effonde*) instead of a solid foundation.[324]

For Deleuze as much as Foucault, there are two meanings of 'thought'. Deleuze does not dispute the rights of representation, or argue that it does not give us something true about the world, that it is a simulacrum or illusion that hides from us the true, virtual realm of Being. On the contrary, he would, like Bergson, happily acknowledge its practical utility, or that of science; the illusion is not in representation itself, but in its hypostasis as the totality of Being. It must be noted that when Badiou begins his exposition of the virtual's function as ground or foundation, he does it by listing the ways in which it is a ground *for thought*: as chaos, 'absolute ante-predicative donation non-

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[324] DELEUZE, G. *Op. cit.*, p. 258.

philosophical presupposition *of all philosophical thought*, for 'to the extent that one thinks *philosophically*, one extracts from every actual (states of affairs and the lived) its virtual part', 'giving consistence to the virtual'.[325] This explains why, for Deleuze, we can both say that at the ontological level every thought is always new, and that only its higher exercise is capable of the new: for every thought in the first sense appears as new, every repetition as productive of difference, only from the point of view of a higher, philosophical exercise that seeks for its conditions of existence in the virtual; and to think in this way is above all a practical matter, one of liberating the potentials given in the present, of seeing the given actual as not necessary, but open to transformation. As in Bergson, thinking beyond the human condition is, in the end, both a human possibility and in the human interest.[326] This is why the question involves an element of decision: not the autonomous act of an unfettered subjectivity, since the question is an imperative thrust upon us in conditions that we neither control nor can make exhaustively clear; but a choice nonetheless, demanded from the fractured I, of whether to repeat in a recognisable or a new way – where '"powerlessness" is transmuted into power'.[327]

> Fate is first and foremost the unity or the site of physical causes among them; incorporeal effects are evidently subjected to fate, insofar as they are the effects of these causes. But insofar as they differ in nature from these causes, they enter into relations of quasi-causality with one another, and all together with a quasi-cause itself incorporeal, which ensures them a *very special independence, not exactly in regards to fate, but to the necessity that should normally follow from fate.* The stoic paradox is to affirm fate, and deny necessity.[328]

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[325] BADIOU, A. *Op. cit.*, pp. 70-1. (First italics mine, second his).

[326] On how Deleuze both follows and departs from Bergson in the question of thinking (beyond) the human, *Cf.* ANSELL PEARSON, K. *Germinal life. The difference and repetition of Deleuze.* London: Routledge, 1999, esp. Ch. 3.

[327] DELEUZE, G. *Op. cit.*, p. 258.

[328] *Idem. Logique du sens.* Paris: Minuit, 2002, p. 198. (My italics.)

The transcendent exercise of the faculty of thought, of which Deleuze's own philosophy would be only one case, is a particular way of responding to the actual by affirming, at once, contingence and fate (that is, a primary passivity that cannot be erased), but denying necessity. That metaphysics is necessary for an ethics, and must be measured by the latter's effects: this, and not a direct intuition of the Whole, is Deleuze at his most Spinozist.[329] To discover the new under every repetition, so that 'everything is to be event'[330], in order to find the virtual conditions that allow us to locate, in the actual, the elements for transformation, of discovering what both body and the world can do – this is his response to the critical challenge of modernity.[331]

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[329] 'Spinoza does not call his book an Ontology, he is too clever for that, he calls it *Ethics*. Which is a way of saying that, whatever the importance of my speculative propositions, you can only judge them at the level of the ethics that they envelop or implicate.' *Idem*. Cours Vincennes, 25/11/1981. [http://www.webdeleuze.com/php/texte.php?cle=15&groupe=Spinoza&langue=1]; 'The great question about the finite, existing mode is: will it arrive at active affections, and how? This is properly speaking the "ethical" question.' *Idem. Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*. Paris: PUF, 2002, p. 199.

[330] DELEUZE, G. *Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque*. Paris: Minuit, 2005, p. 103. None of this could suffice for Badiou, in any case, since it is exactly here that the difference lies: for the latter, the problem is, '"What are the conditions of an event for *almost nothing* to be event?"'. (BADIOU, A. Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque. In: BOUNDAS, C.; OLKOWSKI, D. [eds.] *Gilles Deleuze and the theatre of philosophy*. New York: Routledge, 1994, p. 56.) In this sense, he is correct in pointing out that there is a continuity (time as the unchanging form of change) that runs under every singular discontinuity in Deleuze, which he opposes with the radical, rare singularity of the event that sets up a wholly new situation. The choice, however, is between two transcendences as well as two immanences; for if he can accuse Deleuze of reintroducing a transcendence of the One-All over multiplicities, the latter could just as well retort that, in ascribing such a status to the event, Badiou makes it transcendent in relation to every situation. If a metaphysics is to be judged by its practical implications, then one must point out what seems to be the biggest political difference between the two: one is a thinker of a very special kind of pluralism, and his emphasis on the virtual is counteracted by a certain humility of thought in relation to every given present, to finding its potentials however closed it may seem; while the other is a self-avowed enemy of pluralism, which is resisted as precisely what obscures the conditions of the new.

[331] In the Appendix, I show how Deleuze insists on the 'actual', 'finite' side of his philosophy when critically positioning himself in relation to Foucault. On the necessarily involved character of the politics that can be derived from Deleuze and Guattari, and a critique of Zizek's critique of the two, cf: NUNES, R. Learning from porcupines: the analytic war machine and an ethics of intervention. *Transform,* June 2008. [http://transform.eipcp.net/correspondence/1213798160]

3.2.6 – *On* the plane of immanence

In any case, the emphasis on the ideal structure of the virtual is dropped from Deleuze's later formulation of his philosophy, which also means that the principial status of difference in-itself – the 'incorporeal quasi-cause' that made all other incorporeal quasi-causes communicate – is lost. This corresponds to a shift in interest, in two senses. First, in the importance that practical, ethico-political questions acquire in the partnership with Guattari; second, in that the task, after the monumental work carried out by *Différence et répétition* and *Logique du sens*, seems no longer to be that of constructing and defending a system of pure difference, but in following it to its logical conclusion, and focusing on its pragmatic consequences. Once the 'transcendental' moment of showing how it was possible to think in such terms has been done, and since this moment can only be a re-presentation of what by definition is only presentation, it is a matter of concentrating on the experimentation of and with immanence itself. The two volumes of *Capitalisme et schizophrénie* in particular, but also the second book on Spinoza, are both a speculative extension of the some of the ideas already developed to new areas – linguistics, history, psychoanalysis, geophilosophy, biology – and an exploration of what it means to 'live in', or perhaps 'live out', immanence: an onto-ethology.[332]

There seems to be, in fact, an element of self-criticism in the passages on the 'two planes' in *Spinoza: philosophie pratique* and *Mille plateaux*, or rather a re-evaluation on the paradoxes that the earlier plane of immanence necessarily generated; it is not difficult to assume that these are the moments in which Deleuze theorises the displacement that has taken place in his own

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[332] ALLIEZ, E. *A assinatura do mundo. O quê é a filosofia de Deleuze e Guattari?*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora 34, 1995, Ch. 3.

thought in what regards the way in which immanence is to be approached. Now there are 'maybe two planes, or two ways of conceiving the plane.'[333] One is a plan(e) of organisation and development, 'structural or genetic, or both at once', that makes it that 'on each instant the given be given, in such a state, at such a moment', which means that in itself it is not given; it only exists 'as a supplementary dimension to what it gives (n+1)', and is therefore a plane of transcendence.[334] Not only does this definition bring together some of the most memorable statements that defined his earlier project (the virtual as the site of a structural genesis which makes it into that 'by which the given is given'), Deleuze immediately emphasises:

> It is a plane of analogy, be it because it assigns the eminent term of a development, or because it establishes the proportional relations of a structure. It can be in the mind of a God, or in the unconscious of life, the soul, or language: it is always inferred from its effects. *Even if one calls it immanent*, the plane is so only by absence, analogically (metaphorically, metonymically etc.). (...) One can always expose [it], but as a separate part, and not given in what it gives.[335]

This is now opposed to 'a wholly different plane', where there are no more forms or subjects, or their development, or structure or genesis: 'only relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness among non-formed elements, or at least relatively non-formed, molecules and parts of all sorts.' There are only 'hacceities, affects', 'longitudes and latitudes'; no longer developments, but events that take place in the compositions of elements of different speed that form assemblages; no longer subjectivations, but haecceities that appear through compositions of non-subjective powers or affects.[336]

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[333] DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Mille plateaux*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 325.

[334] *Ibid.*

[335] *Ibid.* (Deleuze's italics.)

[336] *Ibid.*, p. 326.

> We call this (...) plane of consistency or composition (in opposition to the plane of organisation or development). It is necessarily a plane of immanence and univocity. We therefore call it plane of Nature, even if nature has nothing to do with what is in it, for this plane makes no distinction between the natural and the artificial. It may grow in the number of its dimensions, there is never a supplementary dimension to what takes place in it. (...) [P]lane of proliferation, population [*peuplement*], contagion (...). It is a fixed plane [which does not mean] immobile: it is the absolute state of movement as well as rest, on which are traced all the relative speeds and slownesses and nothing else.[337]

In this second plane, or second way of thinking immanence, the careful separation of actual and virtual with which Deleuze had replaced the empirico-transcendental divide inherited from Kant is complicated. The privilege that the virtual had enjoyed now comes under attack for reintroducing equivocity and transcendence. Not that the virtual disappears from Deleuze's thought; but there is a clear recognition of the strain that a static, structural-genetic account of ontogenesis places on the intention to sustain the doctrine of univocity: how much it still smacks of a ground, a higher order of Being from which the actual passively receives its determinations. Here, in fact, we find Deleuze and Guattari to a large extent pre-empting the work of critics such as Badiou – and while one cannot forget that the latter largely ignores the collaborative works of the two, it is nonetheless clear that Deleuze 'relapses' into the virtualist stress in texts of the years after *Mille plateaux* (for instance, in the return to Bergson in the *Cinéma* volumes). It is very easy to allow the extraction or subtraction of the virtual from the actual to turn into a transcendent affirmation of the former, with consequences that are disastrous, above all, on the practical level – if the quest for immanence consisted first and foremost in a requirement to affirm of the potentials of this world, to affirm the potentials *at the expense* of this world sets us back into the path of the denial of the sensual, practical and material that it was supposed to combat. The new plane of immanence, with

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[337] *Ibid.*

its infinite and relative speeds, absolute and relative deterritorialisations, tries to counteract this tendency by emphasising no longer the transcendental, but the materialist moment; the transcendental is now placed in matter itself, in the ceaseless flux of anorganic life that is the sufficient reason of all production, destruction and decomposition. It must be noticed that the double name of this new plane – consistency and composition – points at once to what is more properly said of relations among virtual elements, or the virtual elements of bodies (consistency) and to what at first appears a relation among actual bodies (composition); and as the work on the latter concept in the second Spinoza book shows, here it is above all a matter of a pragmatics of immanence, of a living and lived experimentation with what our and other bodies can do.[338]

This change of direction is not simply a change of mind, but involves a new reflection on the relation between transcendence, immanence, and thought. While the distinction between the planes can and must be made as between 'two abstract poles'[339], the oscillation between them is an inevitable part of the challenge of thinking immanence; the plan(e) of organisation or development covers the stratified, *natura naturata* side of nature; the plane of consistency and composition refers to *natura naturans*, destratification and deterritorialisation. But this again cannot be the whole picture, since the problem in each is precisely to think both sides at once: the problem of expression, whereby the attributes express Substance, but Substance does not exist outside of its expression. So the oscillation between the two planes is, in the end, the difficulty of thinking each, that is, of maintaining univocity by

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[338] 'Every reader of Spinoza knows that for him bodies and minds are not substances or subjects, but modes. It is not enough, however, merely to think this theoretically. (...) Concretely, if you define bodies and thoughts as capacities for affecting and being affected, many things change. You will define an animal, or a human being, not by its form, its organs, and its functions, and not as a subject either; you will define it by the affects of which it is capable. Affective capacity, with a maximum threshold and a minimum threshold, is a constant notion in Spinoza.' DELEUZE, G. *Spinoza: practical philosophy*. Trans. Hurley, R. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988, pp. 123-4.

[339] *Idem*; GUATTARI, F. *Mille plateaux*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 330.

neither reducing the real to actual, nor making the actual into the impoverished result of an emanation of the virtual. This is why Deleuze's thought is permanently split into two directions, and it is possible to take it to perfectly legitimate, yet wildly different consequences depending on whether one chooses one direction, or decides to persist with 'allowing [immanence] to play freely on the surface'.[340] It is clear, however, that the latter is, in the end, not only the game – and challenge – that he proposes, but also the only way in which to make good of the practical implications that he unequivocally expects his philosophy to have. If univocity is to be maintained, if this continuation of the critical drive of modernity is to be productive in action and not only in contemplation, it is necessary to accept that actual and virtual are, after all, in the shortest circuit of the passage of time that places side by side *this* actual and *its* virtual (rather than the expanding cone of the past as a whole), indiscernible.[341] The present – the present in its passing, where time is split between the present that passes and the past that is conserved – is, as in Foucault, the site of an ultimate indiscernibility between empirical and transcendental.

But there are other important consequences of this displacement, and these can be easily misunderstood. The transcendental moment of the philosophy of difference, as put forward by *Différence et répétition*, seems, from the beginning of the work with Guattari, to be re-evaluated as necessarily involving a compromise with transcendence, to the extent that the plane of immanence that it sets up is said in analogy to what it is the condition of. From then on, immanence fully becomes the object of a materialistic and experimental affirmation that is by and large untempered by considerations on the conditions in which it can be thought. While this, especially at the time,

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[340] *Ibid.* Todd May makes the point that, in order both to be consistent and stave off a return to transcendence, Deleuze cannot affirm difference over unity or identity, but must both affirm and negate the two at once. *Cf.* MAY, T. Difference and unity in Gilles Deleuze. *In:* BOUNDAS, C.; OLKOWSKI, D. (eds.) *Gilles Deleuze and the theatre of philosophy.* New York: Routledge, 1994, pp. 33-50.

[341] DELEUZE, G. *Cinéma II. L'Image-temps.* Paris: Minuit, 1985, pp. 108-110.

could lead critics to interpret it as a turn towards an anachronistic, unfettered, pre-critical metaphysics, it seems clear from the discussion on the two planes that what is rejected from the earlier project is the dialectics of virtual ideas. There is, in principle, nothing in the aesthetics of intensity in and of itself that would render it incompatible with thinking the plane of consistency and composition. On the contrary, if it is clear that the return to Spinoza is part and parcel of the process that leads to the re-theorisation of *Mille plateaux*, it must be noticed that what is brought out now is precisely the intensive charge of the *Ethics*: over the 'systematic reading in pursuit of the general idea and the unity of the parts', what is celebrated is 'the affective reading, without an idea of the whole, where one is carried along or set down, put in motion or at rest'.[342]

> [W]hat an extraordinary composition this Part V has; how extraordinary is the way in which the meeting of concept and affect occurs there, and the way in which this meeting is prepared, made necessary by the celestial and subterranean movements that together compose the preceding parts.[343]

The less conventional style of the later works is thus a continuation of the method of dramatising the conceptual structure of the argument already found in the earlier ones; the stronger focus on experimentation is an extension and logical conclusion of the intensive structure of the experience of difference laid out before; the speculative exploration builds on the (obviously problematic, and not apodictic) basis of the aesthetic of the transcendental moment; and the importance of the element of performance in Deleuze's comes to the fore: to write about immanence is to write about not its experience (in the Kantian sense), but its *épreuve* – which entails at once provoking an *épreuve* (an affective or intensive charge) that communicates

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[342] DELEUZE, G. *Spinoza: practical philosophy.* Trans. Hurley, R. San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1988, p. 129.

[343] *Ibid.*, p. 130. This reading, in any case, was already prepared by the Appendix to *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression* and its study of the relations between the series of propositions, demonstrations and corollaries on the one hand, and the *scholia* on the other.

the conceptual content with which it is to be thought, and directing the reader to find new *épreuves* in the world.[344] *Différence et répétition* does not talk about the dramatisation of ideas as a condition for individuation without dramatising its own, without performing a production of the individual who thinks pure difference; *Mille plateaux* is not a book about rhizomes without being rhizomatic itself. But whereas the first grappled with the conditions in which to think 'the problem of expression', the second is, even in its most speculative moments, a 'practical philosophy'.

And if *L'Anti-Oedipe* in particular, in its moments of more enraptured rhetoric, can appear to posit the schizophrenic as the model of absolute deterritorialisation, of the true *experience* of immanence – in the same way that Foucault once saw in madness the deepest truth of reason –, the pragmatics of making oneself a Body without Organs will subsequently be very clearly posed as a matter of bringing the pure exteriority of this experience into an *épreuve*. It takes not wisdom – which would imply that what is by experimentation with limits could be encapsulated in a permanent formula –, but caution: 'the rule immanent to experimentation'[345], 'the art of doses, when overdose is the danger.'[346]

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[344] 'It is only at the cost of *postulating* such a plane, of understanding the real as a space in which are established the relations between non-formal elements of matter, in which concatenations take place as the result of various degrees of speed and slowness, that the perspective of analogy can be overcome, and univocity can be established once and for all. In other words, immanence can only be realised as materialism.' DE BEiSTEGUI, M. *L'immagine di quel pensiero. Deleuze filosofo dell'immanenza*. Milan: Mimesis, 2007, p. 101. (My italics.) Alain Beaulieu suggests a radical turn in Deleuzian thought, where the pre-Guattarian period is still attached to the ontological theme through the centrality of the doctrine of univocal Being, later to be replaced with the experimental, 'disjonctological' perspective of the disjunctive synthesis. I do not believe it is necessary (or even possible) to establish such a clean break, but perfectly possible to accept that the tension between the two tendencies is not only inevitable, but necessary for the functioning of Deleuze's philosophy. Beaulieu remains, nonetheless, one of the most sensitive commentators when it comes to evaluation the non-accidental, internally generated and necessary emphasis on performance taken by Deleuze after the 1960s. *Cf.* BEAULIEU, A. *Deleuze et la phénoménologie*. Mons: Sils Maria, 2006, pp. 114-24.

[345] *Idem*; GUATTARI, F. *Mille plateaux*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 187.

[346] *Ibid.*, p. 198.

One invents self-destructions that have nothing to do with the death drive. To unmake the organism was never to kill oneself, but to open the body to connections that presuppose a certain assemblage, circuits, conjunctions, stages and thresholds, transmissions and distributions of intensity, territories and deterritorialisations that one measures like a surveyor.[347]

And finally, in terms that are very similar to those Deleuze uses to describe Foucault's thought, and not at all unlike Foucault's own late self-description:

This is what should be done: to install oneself on a stratum, to experiment the chances it offers us, to search for a favourable place in it, eventual movements of deterritorialisation, possible lines of flight, to experiment with them [*les éprouver*], to ensure conjunctions of flows here and there, to try continua of intensities segment by segment, to always have a little plot of a new land.[348]

In this sense, then, even the plane of consistency and composition – that is, its re-presentation in Deleuze's philosophy – is said by analogy of the presentation of the plane itself; the presentation, the experience of immanence, is the complete dissolution of the I who can experience it. As Blanchot had already indicated, *contra* Hegel, it is death itself, not as it appears to consciousness, not as it is re-presented, but precisely as what annuls consciousness and makes impossible all representation. The *épreuve* of this impossible experience is always, as Bataille had pointed out, a matter of 'subterfuge'[349]; a self-affection of thought that represents to itself what can only be pure presentation, the unconscious that will always elude

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[347] *Ibid.*

[348] *Ibid.*, p. 199. Or, as Isabelle Stengers pithily puts it: "'do not proceed in the name of anyone", not even Artaud. Especially not Artaud!'. STENGERS, I. Gilles Deleuze's last message. [http://www.recalcitrance.com/deleuzelast.htm]

[349] 'In order for man to reveal himself ultimately to himself, he would have to die, but he would have to die while living – watching himself ceasing to be. In other words, death itself would have to become (self-) consciousness at the very moment that it annihilates the conscious being. In a way, this is what takes place (what at least is at the point of taking place, or which takes place in a fugitive, ungraspable manner) by means of a subterfuge. In the sacrifice, the sacrificer identifies himself with the animal that is struck down dead.' BATAILLE, G. Hegel, death and sacrifice. *In:* BOTTING, F.; WILSON, F. (org.) *The Bataille reader.* Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p. 286-7.

consciousness, the passivity that will never be actively captured, the outside that will never be brought into the interiority of a subject. To speak of the plane of immanence as 'pre-philosophical' and 'presupposition'[350] is thus precisely not to affirm a boundless positing, thetic power of philosophy, or a direct intuition of what is in fact the destruction of the intuiting individual – but to acknowledge that to attempt to think absolute immanence is always to find it already there, already presupposed, necessarily beyond the power of philosophy to grasp it, as the absolute horizon in which the relative horizon of any thought can establish itself.

> THE plane of immanence is at once what must be thought, and what cannot be thought. It is the unthought of thought. It is the support of every plane, immanent to each thinkable plane that does not manage to think it. It is the most intimate in thought, and nevertheless the absolute outside. (...) This may be the supreme gesture of philosophy: not so much to think THE plane of immanence, but to show that it is there, unthought in each plane.[351]

It is true that in these late reflections on what it is to make philosophy there seems to be an accent – undoubtedly surprising, given the overall passivisation of thought, the individual and the subject that precedes it – on the power to create. This is what gives *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* a certain tragic, heroic tone of affirmation against all odds, which very clearly comes from a sensation of closure, of how difficult it has become to resist the present. It is perhaps here, more than anywhere else, that one senses a hint of intellectualist retreat from the world; and so here, more than anywhere else, it might be necessary to read Deleuze and Guattari against themselves.

As usual, it is just a matter of bringing out some elements in the text against others. If philosophy is untimely, of the order of the event, it is not because it is completely free in its autopoiesis, but because it is not exhaustively

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[350] DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. Paris, Minuit, 1991, p. 43.
[351] *Ibid.*, p. 59. Symptomatically, the passage quotes from Blanchot.

determined by its historical conditions: the result of an asymmetrical genesis that introduces the new in necessity, a response to something in the present that forces thought to think. If they (like Foucault and Lyotard) return to the Kantian distinction between the revolution itself and the enthusiasm it raises, and extract from the latter the pure event that breaks into, but does not come from history, it must be clear that one poses revolution as 'the plane of immanence, infinite movement, absolute survey', *but only 'to the extent* that these traits connect to the here and now'.[352] In short, if philosophy is inhabited by the plane of immanence as its unthought, its relation to non-philosophy cannot be only that of the immediacy of this presence, or through the virtual communication of all becomings that places non-philosophy 'there where the plane of immanence confronts chaos'.[353] There must be at least a side to it that is mediated by the strata on which the thinker is placed and which already pre-selects something out of chaos (as the passage on the Body without Organs above recognises); the autopoiesis of the concept must be mediated by the individuation of the thinker, which is obviously not a matter of its empirical ego, but its position in a machinic assemblage of bodies and collective assemblage of enunciation with both its cutting edges of deterritorialisation and its territorialising sides.

The problem of formal immanence was never, as I hope to have shown, absent from the preoccupations of Deleuze and Foucault; and how could it have been? The philosophical problem for them always concerned philosophy itself, its relation to non-philosophy, its meaning and significance as a practice, as one of this world's expressions, possibilities, virtualities. One cannot avoid the question of where the philosopher speaks from, what does its power to speak entail, how the practice of philosophy communicates with those around it, how it feeds on and feeds back into them. It is, in fact, one that grows in importance for them with time. The problem of how resistance,

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[352] *Ibid.*, p. 96. (My italics.)
[353] *Ibid.*, p. 205.

and thought as a form of resistance, is possible at all if power is productive led Foucault to the last turn in his trajectory. In direct response to it, Deleuze also turned his attention to the subject, in a continuum that goes from the last pages in *Foucault* directly into *Le pli*, precisely around the concept that gives the latter book its name. And as much as the last two volumes of *Histoire de la sexualité* had found in a precarious power of self-constitution the ultimate condition for resistance and detached, critical thought, Deleuze's long trajectory (scattered across his works) of constructing a thought of the individual and the subject 'from the outside in' here arrives at its term: 'an Inside deeper than any interiority' as the result of a self-affection that folds an 'Outside farther than any exteriority'[354], which no folding can exhaust. One begins with the event of a singularity, which become actualised by series of ordinary points that cross other series dependent on other singularities, individuating different worlds; but if the world cannot be separated from the monads and series that actualise it, it must at the same time be included in the monad as 'incorporeal (=virtual) predicate [that is] in each subject as its ground, from where each extracts the manners that correspond to its perspective (aspects).'[355] It is then that self-affection can constitute a subject, 'a derived function (...) of the outside, under the condition of the fold.'[356]

It was never, as Deleuze says in his text on structuralism, a matter of eliminating the subject, but of contesting its rights to be posited as an absolute starting point, an *imperium in imperio* the knowledge of which would suffice to bestow sense on the world: one 'breaks it up and distributes it systematically, contests [its] identity, dissipates it and makes circulate from place to place, always nomadic, made of individuations, but impersonal ones,

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[354] DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 117.

[355] 'The world is predication itself, the manners are particular predicates, and the subject is what passes from one predicate to another as from one aspect of the world to another'. *Idem. Le pli. Leibniz et le baroque*. Paris: Minuit, 2005, p. 72.

[356] *Idem. Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 117.

and singularities, but pre-individual ones.'[357] If *L'Archéologie du savoir* can be considered Foucault's most structuralist book (in the same way that *Logique du sens* would be for Deleuze), it nonetheless finishes with the warning that the question is not the limits to the initiative of subjects, but 'the field in which they are articulated (without being its centre), the rules that it puts to work (without them being invented or formulated), the relations that serve as its support (without it being neither the ultimate result nor the point of convergence).'[358] And if the question for Foucault at that time was 'that to show that to speak is *to do* something' different from expressing one's thoughts or employing the structures of a language, 'a complicated and costly gesture that implies conditions'[359], Deleuze emphasises that to oppose to the ideal events of the structure an ideal event that transforms it is a matter of 'agility in following and safeguarding displacements', 'power to make relations vary and to redistribute singularities, always emitting a dice-throw. This point of mutation defines exactly a praxis, or rather the very place where praxis must be installed.'[360]

Strange point, this one, where action and passion are in some way inextricable, and where action can, in a certain way, only affirm itself through an affirmation of passion that transmutes '"powerlessness" into power'[361]; where, while inside, one enters in relation with an outside beyond all experience, which can only be the object of an experimentation, an *épreuve* requiring a practice of 'being at the borders'[362]; where also philosophy and non-philosophy are necessarily entwined, and the former can only define itself against the background of the latter through an act which it can only represent to itself as sovereign, but of whose conditions it can never have any

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[357] *Idem.* A quoi reconnaît-on le structuralisme?. *In: L'Île déserte.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 267.

[358] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 272. These are terms very similar to those in one of his last great texts, 'Le sujet et le pouvoir'.

[359] *Ibid.* (My italics.)

[360] DELEUZE, G. *Op. cit.*

[361] *Idem. Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 258.

[362] FOUCAULT, M. What is Enlightnment?. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, vol. II, p. 1393.

certainty; where actual and virtual, empirical and transcendental, are indiscernible, and can only be separated by the violence of an act, a new interpretation; where to say Being, even to say Being is univocal, is to say it equivocally, from a perspective, under the forming pressures of different forces that cause thought to think. Point of mutation, event, present: the place where the adventures of living and thinking *in* immanence coincide.

Conclusion

Thought at its limits

Chronos can only express the internal subversion of the present through the present, precisely because it is internal and profound. The revenge of the past and the future on the present must still be expressed by Chronos in terms of the present, the only terms that it comprehends and that affect it.[1]

To negate dialectically is to take what is negated into the mind's agitated interiority. To negate one's own discourse, as in Blanchot, is to endlessly take it outside itself, to divest it at every moment not only of what it has just said, but of the power to enunciate it; to leave it where it is, far behind itself, so as to be free for a beginning – which is a pure origin since it has only itself and the void as principle, but which is also a re-beginning since it is past language that, hollowing itself out, has liberated this void.[2]

Philosophy is invention beyond the limits of experience.[3]

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[1] DELEUZE, G. *Logique du sens.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 192.

[2] FOUCAULT, M. La pensée du dehors. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, vol. I, pp. 551.

[3] NIETZSCHE, F. The philosopher: reflections on the struggle between art and knowledge. *In: Truth and philosophy. Selections from the notebooks of the 1870s.* Trans. Brazeale, D. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1979, § 53.

The history of immanence that this study has drawn here is inextricably bound with the history of the Western modernity which, in so many ways, is still ours today. The social and cultural processes that have shaped the space in which we still live and speak today were, from their very start, characterised by an attitude of critique towards the claims to truth of authority – religious, political, cultural and scientific – as well as the authority necessarily involved in claims to truth. To the extent that it embodies the challenge of finding (or founding) the epistemological and normative grounds of this world in this world itself, *immanence* provides the philosophical name of what has been, more than a *telos*, a constantly reactivated question. One that could not find in philosophy a tool without also making it its object, imposing upon it not only the problem of providing a philosophical account of immanence as what excludes any transcendent authority over this world – in itself a philosophical question with a much longer lineage, that goes all the way back to philosophy's beginnings –, but of producing this account immanently, without an ultimate dependence upon a transcendent principle for its justification. To think the immanence of thought to Being, and of Being to thought, in one single movement.

The question concerning the beginning an end of critique is connected to the problem of immanence not only through this historical relation, but also by the middle term of time, or of how transcendence and immanence imply a certain mode of relation between philosophy and time. If this world is necessarily bound to the rhythms of creation, destruction and transformation, then transcendence implies the establishment of a fixed point outside the flux of time that serves as measure of intelligibility and normative yardstick. For transcendence to appear 'all it takes is to *stop movement*.'[4] But does this not impose a limit on philosophical critique, on philosophy itself? How can the rights of philosophy to practice critique be asserted, if it cannot provide once for all the grounds on which it is set, from which it separates itself from the

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[4] DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 49. (Italics in the original).

non-philosophy that surrounds it from all sides? If immanence is 'the vertigo of philosophy'[5], it is, among other things, because it places its privileges at risk.

It is their belonging to the space defined by these processes and questions – by a critical attitude and a drive towards immanentisation – that has allowed me to claim that the *problem* of immanence is of key importance for both Deleuze and Foucault, even if it is only in the work of the latter that it acquires (great) relevance as a *concept*. We have seen, both in the way in which they work through the problems inherited from modern philosophy, and in the way in which they relate to the site of the inflection where critique is brought to bear on philosophy – which can go by the proper name of Kant –, that for both projects the questions of critique, metacritique and the relation of philosophy to non-philosophy are central. And if that is the case, then the two must necessarily have confronted the nodal point defined by that inflection: bringing together material and formal immanence.

It is in their respective readings of the Kantian event that the two find the conditions for their respective projects – for a renewal of the critical project that at once refuses the closure of critique, and attempts to move beyond the impasses of anthropology and representation. In a way, we have in Deleuze and Foucault a Kantianism that is stricter than any Kantian's: if the limits of knowledge are not objects of knowledge themselves, 'limit' can only be properly used in a deictic sense, as the limits *of the present – l'actuel* refers at once to the actual as presence, and to the present itself. The two critiques – the path that, in various ways, follows Kant, and the other one that is opened by Nietzsche – thus oppose each other as two 'images of thought': closing the critical enquiry entails making critique relative to the present, while making it relative to the future allows it to be kept open. And if, as Nietzsche suspected, moral prejudices are always at work behind the aspirations of

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[5] DELEUZE, G. *Spinoza et le problème de l'expression*. Paris: PUF, 2002, p. 164.

knowledge, the second critique is perfectly happy to accept its partiality, its anti-conservatism, its commitment to the present to the extent that it opens onto a future.[6]

We have seen how they work through this other critical path by remaining on either side of the alternatives that open up with Kant: a transcendental solution, for Deleuze, and a historical solution, for Foucault. It is clear, however, that they depart from both in important respects, which begs the question: how are these departures to be read? Should they be viewed as failures; or can we find in them a novel form of solution? What follows are partial conclusions in this regard, which open the way for future research.

First of all, one can see from the two sides each falls under how their respective differences are organised. In Foucault, the fact that critique is necessarily related to the present leads into a radicalisation of the question of the historicity of thought, its silent inhabitation by Being, of philosophy by non-philosophy, the problem of its genesis in time, and a strong rejection of the privilege philosophy aspires to of standing outside the flux of empirical time. In Deleuze, a metacritical search for the conditions of existence opens onto a reflection on time as absolute genesis, of the genesis of space and time themselves, and thus onto a logical, non-empirical, transcendental time. From Foucault's Nietzschean perspective, Deleuze's thought is metaphysical; which of course is not a problem for the latter[7], and (at least for some time)

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[6] '[T]ruth be said, none of this would matter if it were not for the practical implications and the moral presuppositions of this distortion. We have seen all that this valorisation of the negative meant, the conservative spirit of such an enterprise, the platitude of the affirmations that one thus wishes to engender, the way in which we are thus turned away from the highest task – that of determining problems, to apply to them our decisive and creative power.' DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 344.

[7] 'I feel myself to be a pure metaphysician – Bergson says that modern science has not found its metaphysics, the metaphysics it would need. It is this metaphysics that interests me.' *In:* VILLANI, A. *La guêpe et l'orchidée. Essai sur Gilles Deleuze*. Paris: Belin, 1999, p. 130.

immanence is necessarily to leave metaphysics behind, not because it forgets Being, but because it disguises its own Being in the robes of universality, necessity and eternity.

With Foucault, all thought is brought down to the same plane, as a perspective determined by certain discursive and non-discursive practices that act as its conditions of existence; it is only through the experience of discontinuity that one can *postulate* history as the discontinuous, aleatory space in which thought appears, under new conditions each time. This experience of discontinuity is at once the condition for thought – in the sense of the critical detachment to what one does that arises out of the incongruity of something in the present that requires thinking – and what Foucault's philosophy aims to produce: a feeling of estrangement whereby the familiar appears as alien, the necessary as contingent, so that the practical experimentation with thinking differently can begin again. It is not, in fact, an experience in the Kantian sense (the bringing of an intuition under the identity of a concept), but precisely what undermines it: an *épreuve*, a test; the moment where one encounters the outside, while remaining 'irremediably outside of the outside.'[9] In this sense, one could say that Foucault is both the most Kantian of the two: the greatest transcendental illusion is to believe one thinks beyond the limits of finite time. The conditions that apply for thought in general apply to his philosophy as well, and he cannot affirm the necessity of his statements: he 'fictions', but this fiction itself is not the free creation of an individual, but one of the possibilities of the present in which he speaks, in which something calls for thought at the limits of what can be experienced.

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[8] '*Logique du sens* must above all be read as the most impertinent, the most insolent metaphysical treatise – with the simple condition that instead of denouncing one more metaphysics as the forgetfulness of Being, one puts it in charge of talking about extra-Being.' FOUCAULT, M. Theatrum philosophicum. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, p. 947.
[9] *Idem*. La pensée du dehors. *Op. cit.*, pp. 553.

does not seem a problem for the former either.[8] But for Foucault, to affirm

But despite his metaphysical bent, Deleuze is just as happy to admit that he 'fictions'; but whereas Foucault does so as history, he does it as metaphysics. Unlike Hegel, Deleuze's dialectics does not promise to deliver us empirical knowledge of the transcendental realm; and if the latter is defined by him as problematic rather than apodictic, then the same applies to the grounds of his own philosophy. In fact, what appears in Foucault as a historical experience of being confronted with something that beckons to us from the limits of what we can think, is in Deleuze always already there as the nature of thought itself, of which again there are two senses. On the one hand, representation and recognition, the thought of the empirical, the actual; on the other, the *épreuve* of the virtual; and the transcendental illusion lies in reducing the latter to the former, reducing difference to identity, and missing the onto-heterogenetic power of repetition.[10] Nevertheless, the fact that for Deleuze the affirmation of this world requires a metaphysics appears, in the direct comparison with Foucault, as responsible for those great paradoxes of his thought: that in order to *affirm* (and not postulate) each dice-throw one must to affirm chance as a whole, that in order to say the eternal return of beings

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[10] Comparing the *Les mots et les choses* and *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*, Bento Prado Jr concludes that both ask 'what is it to think?' and connect it to the '*radically unthinkable*', but whereas Foucault's thought is 'propaedeutic (it corresponds to a *Prologomena to All Future Thought which does not wish to retain the Onto-Theo-Anthropological Style*)', which 'suspends the truth-values of discourse, and confines itself to opening a space for thought which is "other" or future', 'Deleuze's analysis of the instauration of philosophy already understands itself as thought in action, and the question of the essence of philosophy is already its own answer (simultaneously compass and magnetic pole). In other words, a style which is critical and reflexive is contrasted with a style which wishes to be immediately metaphysical and dogmatic (without attributing any pejorative sense to these terms).' PRADO JR, B. The plane of immanence and life. *In:* KHALFA, J. (ed.) *An introduction to the thought of Gilles Deleuze.* London: Continuum, p. 13. Peter Hallward comes to similar conclusions; I believe, however, that the main opposition he wishes to establish – of Foucault as a thinker of specific difference, and Deleuze as a thinker of singular difference –, while no doubt important for his own project, is too equivocal to be operative: if there is 'more' specific difference in Foucault, it is impossible to say (as seen in the third chapter, and as witnessed, for instance, in his whole work on norms) that there is no singularity. The other opposition he proposes – between the outside as void and as plenitude – is more useful, provided this void be understood first and foremost a sign of Foucault's Kantian/Nietzschean refusal to determine a concept for the outside/the transcendental. On the other hand, my reading of Deleuze is certainly more sympathetic, and likely to make the differences between the two less acute. *Cf.* HALLWARD, P. The limits of individuation, or how to distinguish between Deleuze and Foucault. *Angelaki: Journal for the theoretical humanities.* 5 (2), 2000, pp. 93-103.

only we must affirm it as identical, that in order to speak of time as the absolute genesis of self-differentiation we must affirm it as a pure, immutable form.

Following the crucial moment defined by the discovery of the transcendental field and the distinction between thinking and knowing operated by the Copernican revolution, we can say that the transcendental solution (as found in Kant and phenomenology) can establish itself as necessary by right, whereas the historical solution (as found in Hegel and Marx) establishes itself as necessary in fact. In other words, the first arrives at invariant, a-temporal structures that serve as conditions, but these are posed as necessary *limits* of finitude without which knowledge would be impossible; the second engenders the *experience* of these a-temporal structures in empirical time in the movement of an absolute *knowledge*. But if for Deleuze and Foucault knowledge is of the order of the event – if truth is 'in every respect a matter of production, not adequation'[11], so that the question concerning it is no longer '"what is the safest way to Truth?', but "what has been the aleatory path of truth?"'[12] –, it is clear that they cannot assert the superiority of their own alternatives against the other two; they cannot establish them as necessary either by right or in fact, but only as possibilities.

This may, however, not be the failure it would at first seem. For if the two primary determinations of immanence we have found in their work were univocity and perspectivism – the univocity of Being and the equivocity of thought –, it is obvious that the only way in which both can be held at once is if the thought that affirms the first affirms itself only as a possibility. Hegel's performative immanence, which enacts the genesis of thought in Being down to the very act of its enunciation, so that it is the thought of Being thinking itself, can only be a (formally) necessary account of (material) immanence at

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[11] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 200.
[12] FOUCAULT, M. Questions à Michel Foucault sur la géographie. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 50-1.

the cost of sacrificing perspectivism: it exists to the exclusion of any other. One the other hand, Foucault's and Deuleze's can only affirm the possibility of their accounts (as true in regards to the thesis of perspectivism) at the cost of negating their necessity. It is literally the case that their possibility *depends* on their not being necessary.

What is the nature of this relation? One is often reminded of how an affirmation of perspectivism is necessarily self-contradicting; yet this is based on the assumption that philosophy, by nature, must assert itself universally and necessarily. A philosophy that denies every thought the possibility of *a priori*, apodictic grounds is thus incapable of *demonstrating* this impossibility (that is, establishing its necessity), if it is to avoid contradicting itself. This does not mean, however, that this impossibility cannot be the object of a *monstration*, a 'showing' or performance. Let us say that a philosophy that affirms the equivocity of thought must affirm as a universal, necessary and a-temporal truth something like, 'no universal, necessary and a-temporal truth can be known by an intellect living in time'. It thus contradicts itself; but in doing so, it monstrates the possibility of its being true: the fact that it cannot affirm as *necessary* the impossibility that it asserts *shows* (without proving), in the very act of its self-negation, the *possibility* of this impossibility, as well as the possibility of asserting it.

One of the most important *topoi* in criticisms of Foucault is what Habermas, in the terminology taken from Austin, calls a performative contradiction: a contradiction not between two propositions, but between an assertion and what the act of asserting it implicitly opposes or implies; between a locution and its illocutionary force, when what is asserted denies the very possibility of the assertion being made. What is most immediately striking about this charge is not how often it occurs in several variations – any attempt at a defence must start from a recognition that it may, at the very least, *appear* to be justified –, but the fact that it tends to come with no recognition that, at

least once in his work, the French philosopher did in fact face the problem head on.[13] 'La pensée du dehors' opens with the most classic such case in the philosophical tradition – the paradox of the Cretan liar – and it is clear he does not ascribe great importance to it. While 'Greek truth once trembled' with this paradox, 'one knows well that Epimenides' argument can be mastered by distinguishing, within a discourse skillfully turned upon itself, two propositions, where one is the object of the other'[14]; rather than a logical problem, it derives from 'a pure and simple fact: the speaking subject is the same as the one that is spoken of'.[15] As is well known, this problem is nowhere as important for Foucault at this point then the seemingly unproblematic 'I speak'. But in the course of the text he finds in Blanchot's work the possibility of a language that can remain faithful to the thought of the outside, that is, to the outside as outside, and not as it is given to the interiority of a subject. This requires a non-dialectical negation, whereby the subject who speaks and negates what it speaks does not find itself reconciled in a higher unity, but instead, faced with the exteriority of its discourse to itself, confronts the powerlessness in which the relation to the outside places it. A discourse that negates itself in order to affirm its dependence on an outside that serves as its origin and condition is not a saying, but a doing: it may be that in both affirming and negating nothing follows, but *something happens* – its words now exist outside it, it has confirmed itself in the very performance of its negation.[16] It is

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[13] To my knowledge, this occurs only *In:* JAY, M. The debate over performative contradiction: Habermas versus the poststructuralists. *In:* HONNETH, A. et al. (eds.). *Philosophical interventions in the unfinished project of Enlightenment.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992. Jay also highlights how the *topos* of performative contradiction plays, for Apel and Habermas, the double function of being the main argument with which to dismiss opponents (since it entails a denial of what is assumed to be a universal obligation immanent to communicative action, viz., justifying the validity of truth-claims) and of moving social contradictions away from ontology (as in the Hegelian-Marxist tradition) and into intersubjective communication – a pacification of the pacification, in a certain sense.

[14] FOUCAULT, M. La pensée du dehors. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 546.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 547.

[16] Is it not the same movement that one finds in that pivotal work of the analytic turn, the *Tractatus*? in order to affirm the impossibility of philosophical language (given that it does not represent the world), it must employ a language that does not represent the world (since it refers to language itself); so that at the end *the said* establishes its possibility (the possibility of the impossibility of philosophical language) through an act of *saying* that negates it (by

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no wonder that both Deleuze and Foucault return to Blanchot on this point: for does not he work (*l'oeuvre*) searches for the reversal of power and powerlessness as its origin?[17]

In the sense that it confirms itself through its performance, that it is the negation of its necessity that can affirm it as one of Being's possibilities, we could call this solution *performative*. It rises up to challenge laid down by Hegel, of making formal immanence go all the way up to the very act of enunciation of material immanence, but it does so only as possibility, and not necessity. In doing it, it manages to affirm the univocity of Being and its distributive unity (rather than a collective unity around a principle), and, with that, the equivocity of thought.

But could there be something else behind this movement of philosophy out of itself, by which it ceases to be a saying (a re-presentation of the world in thought) and becomes a doing, one practice among others that express, each in their way, a univocal Being; but does not express it without placing itself in the world, diagnosing, mapping, acting upon it – a 'rhetoricisation' of philosophy?[18] Let us remember Bataille's and Blanchot's critique of Hegel: to

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making use of philosophical language). Yet if the point was to demonstrate (the possibility of) the impossibility of philosophical language, the fact that *the saying* contradicts *the said* functions as a *performance* that confirms it. And again, in two examples that appealed to Foucault: when Magritte draws a pipe with a legend that affirms that what one sees in the drawing is not a pipe, he is *showing* that the image that one sees is not a pipe, and neither is the name by which it is designated – using language to *show* that there is no passage from similitude to affirmation; when Borges includes the classification itself as one of the items in the classification, he is *showing* that order is necessarily blind to the act of ordering that instates it. (And then, famously, he credits the 'malaise' and 'embarrassment' that is *provoked* by a text so neutral and unemotional as Borges' with giving him the idea for *Les mots et les choses*.) And does not the encounter with Blanchot and Magritte lead Deleuze to insist on the centrality of the disjunction between saying and seeing, which is just as important for him as it is for Foucault? Cf. *Idem*. Ceci n'est pas une pipe. *In: Op. cit.*, pp. 663-79; *Les mots et les choses*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, pp. 7-10; DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 68-9.

[17] BLANCHOT, M. *L'espace littéraire*. Paris: Gallimard, 1991, p. 133.

[18] 'The problem is to reintroduce rhetoric, the orator, the struggle of discourse into the field of analysis; not, as the linguists do, in order to make a systematic analysis of rhetorical procedures, but to study discourse, even the discourse of truth, as rhetorical procedure, as ways of winning, producing events, producing decisions, producing battles, producing

the extent that it brings immanence into the interiority of the subject, infinite representation can only attain Absolute Knowledge as re-presentation, self-consciousness can only reflect itself in the objects for which it provides the form, and therefore Hegel's immanence is not that of Being, but only of thought. Representation allows the world affirmed of difference to escape' because 'the prefix RE- in the word representation signifies the conceptual form of the identical that subordinates differences'.[19] But difference in itself (rather than as it is related to an identity), *immanence in itself* (rather than as it appears for thought) can only be the object of a presentation. In order to eliminate the transcendence of thought to Being – to think the immanence of thought to Being, to think the two in a single movement –, it is necessary to think what escapes thought: the outside of representation, but exactly not as an exteriority that can be sublated into an interiority; the unconscious of thought, but exactly not as it appears to consciousness; the presentation of Being, but exactly not as it is re-presented by a subject. In other words, the challenge is to represent what cannot be represented, to think what necessarily escapes thought.

In this sense, as Deleuze and Guattari will twice recognise by talking of two planes (of organization and development or of consistency and composition, in *Mille plateaux*; absolute and relative, in *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?*), there is always a necessary *décalage* between immanence and philosophy, as much as there is one between seeing and saying. To think or write about immanence is still to be one step removed from it. There are two other senses, then, in which the solution found in Deleuze and Foucault must be performative. The first is directly related to that *épreuve* by subterfuge, through the Work, transgression or sacrifice, that Bataille and Blanchot spoke of: Foucault's and Deleuze's philosophies depend on their performance –

victories. To "rhetoricise" philosophy.' FOUCAULT, M. La verité et les formes juridiques. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 1502. (A few pages earlier, he recognises in *L'Anti-Oedipe* this kind of approach to the psychoanalytical relation.)

[19] *Idem. Différence et répétition*. Paris: PUF, 2003, pp. 78-9.

which includes, but is not exhausted by, a certain philosophical style – in order to convey a presentation of what they can only re-present. If Foucault's researches are born out of a present *épreuve* that calls for thought, they depend on imparting a sense of estrangement in order to provoke a detachment from present ways of thinking.[20] Deleuze must rely on dramatisation and paradox in order to monstrate intensities and a plane of immanence that he can only re-present. Both require non-philosophy as a necessary part of their philosophies.

But also, in a second sense, these thoughts of immanence cannot be indifferent to their present, if the genitive 'of' is to be both subjective and object. They are, properly speaking, thoughts in immanence, of which they issue in order to return as practice, as experimentation: they are necessarily premised on a 'rupture of evidence'[21], a 'conversion of the gaze'[22], 'a new image of thought' that requires a 'pedagogy of the senses'[23] 'The goal of critique: not the ends of man or of reason, but finally the overman, man overcome, surpassed. In critique, it is not a matter of justifying, but of sensing differently: another sensibility.'[24]

The way in which a knowledge is taken up by a practice that verifies it by structuring itself in accordance to it is directly thematised by the late Foucault through the study of the ancient practices of *askesis*, *parrhesia*, spiritual exercises, and we can therefore interpret this interest as neither accidental, nor even a consequence of the way in which he sees his own thought, but as corresponding to the very problem of what it is to think in immanence. Through a genealogy of modes of subjectivation, a longer historical series

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[20] 'If history has any privilege it would be rather insofar as it could play the role of an internal ethnology of our culture and our rationality (...)'. FOUCAULT, M. Sur les façons d'écrire l'histoire. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 626.

[21] *Idem.* Table ronde du 20 mai 1978. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 842.

[22] *Idem. L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, 2004, p. 145.

[23] DELEUZE, G. *Différence et répétition.* Paris: PUF, 2003 p. 305.

[24] *Idem. Nietzsche et la philosophie.* Paris: PUF, 2003, p. 108.

appears that runs under the archaeological succession of *Les mots et les choses*, preparing the occurrence of the anthropological question through a progressive inversion of the relation between *epimeleia heautou* and *gnôthi seauton,* and the transformation of their meanings. With Descartes, *gnôthi seauton* takes over from the care of the self in the image of a universal subject immediately endowed with a tendency towards true knowledge, substituting the correctness of method for the practice of spirituality, and establishing the subject itself as the object of any enquiry into truth – the turn that will be completed by Kant. This self-referentiality, however, never really eliminates spiritual practices from the horizon of philosophy, not even in Descartes himself: the scission that excludes madness from *logos* in the *Meditations* takes place as an exercise organised around a series of *épreuves*[25]; as if the pure immediacy of the Cartesian subject could only affirm itself after the subject-Descartes (or the subject-reader) has undergone a transformation that prepares it. [26]

In fact, what Foucault seems to suggest is that as much as the *de jure* separation between empirical and transcendental never eliminates the risk of their blurring as soon as one places oneself again in the lived, empirical time of succession, the material or formal evidence of the subject depends, in lived time, on a transformation of thought through which it comes to be accepted and, retrospectively, illuminates the subject that is transformed by it. One could put into perspective the ethical, genealogical and archaeological moments of this history to see how, in the end, the constitution of the figure of a universal subject that stands outside cosmic *nomos*, that is 'naturally'

[25] *Idem*. A propos de la généalogie de l'éthique. Un aperçu du travail en cours. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1449. In the following page, he speaks of when 'Kant says: "I must recognise myself as universal subject, that is, to constitute myself in each of my actions as a universal subject in conformity with universal rules"'. Also: *Idem*. Mon papier, mon corps, ce feu. *In: Op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 1113-36.

[26] The other examples he gives of the persistence of this theme are examples Spinoza, Hegel, in Marxism, psychoanalysis, 'Schelling, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the Husserl of the *Krisis*, Heidegger. *Idem*. *L'Herméneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France (1981-1982)*. Paris: Gallimard/Seuil, 2001, p. 29.

endowed with a capacity for *a priori* truths, that appears to exclude spirituality in favour of a scientific access to truth based on a method – everything, in short, that characterises the passage from Antiquity to what Deleuze calls 'dogmatic image of thought' – is itself the result of a process of subjectivation/subjectification determined by various overlapping historical series.

This takes us to the last sense in which Foucault's and Deleuze's philosophies open onto a practice: if they differ from the ancient practices of *askesis* in that the latter were grounded on the access to a transcendent truth, they resemble them in posing a necessary link between an experimental practice of the self and a practice of the world. We could say, in Deleuze's terms, that both oppose a juridicist conception of power whereby forces have a private origin that requires the mediation of a unique centre of power for their socialisation; a thought of relation, composition and distributive unity in opposition to the contract and collective unity.[27] The possibility of action – of coming into possession of our powers of acting and knowing – is thus dependent on gaining understanding of the conditions that the web of relations in which one moves, and the historical series which circumscribe it, place upon us. If Deleuze and Foucault give continuity to the immanentising drive and the critical attitude of modernity, it is by strongly refusing any compromises that would bring critique to a halt. Their form of critique can only establish itself as possibility precisely because of this refusal: its resistance to the attraction of any fixed point that would provide time with a measure is also the reason why they cannot but pose their own position as partial, and itself subject to the passage of time. The *askesis* found in them is not a rejection of this world, but a detachment that searches for the conditions of action in it, while knowing that this search is inexhaustible, and must be interrupted by the violence of an interpretation. This is, however, not a problem – as they

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[27] DELEUZE, G. Préface a l'*Anomalie sauvage*. In: *Deux régimes de fous*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, pp. 175-6.

have from the start ruled out the possibility of any position that would not amount to an interpretation. If 'philosophy reterritorialises itself three times, once in the past on the Greeks, once in the present on the democratic state, and once in the future on the new people and the new land'[28] – if it 'lives to know' and 'wants to know so that one day the overman will live'[29] – it too must will its own decline.

Yet have we not found that it is exactly at what be the crucial point for such a philosophy – the point of mutation, the transformative event, the highest épreuve, the present –, where they encounter the transmutation of powerlessness into power, that they discover an insurmountable indiscernibility? Between passion and action, receptivity and spontaneity, heteronomy and autonomy, virtual and actual, empirical and transcendental? Was this not what Foucault had identified as the crucial impasse of the modern épistémè, the endless oscillation it found itself as it lay in thrall to the figure of man?

As both Deleuze and Derrida, with different evaluations, point out, Foucault cannot fulfil the wish he once expressed of historicising as much as possible in order to eliminate the transcendental. This problem (which may well have been determined by too reductionist an interpretation of the transcendental, which saw it as necessarily entwined with the subject) never existed as such for Deleuze, who celebrated the work of his friend, as well as indirectly his own, as a new transcendental philosophy. But could it be that in naming this inevitable blurring he was not correctly identifying a question, but mistaken in regard to its source?

For maybe it is not the anthropological problem per se that is bound to this oscillation, but the self-referentiality of critique. And perhaps it is not critique

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[28] Idem; GUATTARI, F. Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 106.
[29] NIETZSCHE, F. Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra. I, §4.

as such that is self-referential; it is so only to the extent that its *telos* is to think immanence immanently, to find its grounds in itself. And what is immanence, if not self-referentiality itself?

Perhaps this is the ultimate revenge of Chronos: that all philosophy, if it is to respond to the challenge of bringing together material and formal immanence, must start from and return to the lived, already operated upon finite time that Foucault deemed 'originary'. It is thus inhabited by an insurmountable passivity that it cannot master; yet, if it is to exist at all, it must tear itself away from non-philosophy, it must act, it must play itself in the dice-throw of the present. And once it does, it cannot erase the fact of this action, but must always encounter it as already there, as what already puts it at a remove from immanence. Philosophy is then this impossibility in which the voices of Beckett's novel – 'I can't go on, you must go on, I will go on'[30] – chase each other and themselves.

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[30] BECKETT, S. *The unnameable. In: Trilogy.* Trans. Beckett, S. London: Calder, 2003, p. 418. The passage is famously quoted at the beginning of Foucault's inaugural lecture at the Collège de France, in which he pays tribute to Jean Hyppolite, whose death vacated the chair he would occupy. *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. *L'Ordre du discours.* Paris: Gallimard, 2005, p. 8. The connection between the quote and the occasion is anything but arbitrary. On the philosophical level, because, for Foucault, Hyppolite's thought is essentially about the relation between philosophy and non-philosophy, where 'philosophy, instead of the totality finally capable of thinking itself and to grasp itself in the movement of the concept, [was] made against the background of an infinite horizon, a task without end: always up early, his philosophy was not ready to ever finish' (p. 77, modified). On the personal level, because Hyppolite's widow gave his collection of Beckett's works to Foucault as a token of the regard in which her husband had held his former student. (*Cf.* DEFERT, D. Chronologie. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. I, p. 44.)

Appendix

Nietzsche's mirror

The two directions. – If we try to contemplate the mirror in itself, we end up failing to find anything but the things that are reflected in it. If we want to grasp these things, we end up finding nothing but the mirror. – Such is the general history of knowledge.[1]

The text published under the title 'Désir et plaisir' is of great interest for two reasons. The first is of course biographical: it is a posthumous publication of notes that Deleuze had trusted François Ewald to hand to Foucault in a period when the two had drifted apart. It is touching to notice the affectionate tone in Deleuze's attempted communication with his one-time friend at what he saw as a difficult time for the latter, an invitation for an exchange in which he was obviously interested and that had been interrupted; even more touching when one is reminded that one of Foucault's final wishes when already in hospital was to see Deleuze one last time. The philosophical interest, however, is none the smaller, since these notes comprise comments

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[1] NIETZSCHE, F. *Aurore*, IV, 432.

on the latest developments in Foucault's work at the time (1977), highlighting the strengths, possible problems and ambiguities Deleuze saw in them, as well as points of contact and departure. It therefore finds Deleuze rehearsing ways of positioning himself in the face of his friend's work, providing an insight into a philosophical relationship that would eventually culminate, two years after the latter's death, in *Foucault*; but it also reveals how he understands the limits that would mark the last great internal shift in Foucault's work – which caused the substantial change of direction in the overall project of a 'history of sexuality' –, and poses (in more explicit ways than later) the problem of how their thoughts stood in relation to each other. From this point of view, it is as if the *Foucault* offers us a picture from which the edges have been polished in favour of a more systematic, pacified *vue d'ensemble*. It is these edges that make 'Désir et plaisir' revealing.

Throughout the text, the greatest point of contact is repeated in Deleuze's aphoristic formula: 'neither repression nor ideology'[2]. This is what he sees as the greatest triumph of *Surveiller et punir* and the first volume of *Histoire de la sexualité*: a novel concept of power that constituted an innovation in relation to political thought and 'leftism', since it did away with any reference to the State as unifying principle, and in relation to Foucault's work in itself, since it created the common medium of the relation between discursive and non-discursive practices that *L'Archéologie du savoir* could trace the contour of, but had excluded from its scope from the outset. This position will be one of the salient features of Deleuze's *Foucault,* where, as opposed to many commentators[3], he sees the 'passage' from archaeology to genealogy not as a break, but as a sort of *Aufhebung:* the new-found concept of power takes up the archaeological point of view from a more fundamental and encompassing level.

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[2] DELEUZE, G. Désir et plaisir. *In: Deux régimes de fous*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 112. Originally published, posthumously, in the *Magazine littéraire,* 325, October 1994, pp. 59-65.
[3] To take just a cross-section of Foucault's commentary that contemplates fairly distinct readings and evaluations, one could name Dreyfus and Rabinow, Habermas and Rajchman here.

It allows him to overcome the duality of discursive and non-discursive formations that subsisted in [*L'Archéologie*], and to explain how the two types of formations distributed or articulated themselves segment by segment (without being reducible to the other or resembling each other, etc.). It was not a matter of suppressing the distinction, but of finding a reason of their relations.[4]

Instead of repression or ideology, Foucault finds normalisation and disciplines, whose effects have as their object the body. This is something Deleuze immediately identifies with, 'to the extent that [*dispositifs*] impose an organisation on the body'.[5] He notices a new, important inflection in *La volonté de savoir*, where power ceases to be just normalising and becomes constitutive, of subjectivity and of truth (not just 'knowledge'), and refers to the 'positive' category of sexuality as opposed to the 'negative' ones of madness or delinquency. Yet it is at this point that the doubts start showing up – although his doubts, as he emphasises, are not the same as other critics'.[6]

Deleuze structures the problem around a handful of oppositions between pairs of their respective concepts, with a single line of fracture running along the centre. This is first clearly hit upon by Deleuze when considering the problem for Foucault to explain the status of the phenomena of resistance. If power is constitutive, how can they oppose it, how are they to be construed? He imagines three alternatives, none of which appeal to him: following different suggestions given by *La volonté de savoir*, resistance would be found in 'the body and its pleasures'; or it would have the same character as power, as its inverted image; or, against the 'truth of power' (that is, constituted by power) there would be a 'power of truth' that could work as a

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[4] DELEUZE, G. *Op. cit.*, p. 112.
[5] *Ibid.*, p. 120.
[6] '[D]oes Michel return to an analogue of the 'constitutent subject', and why does he feel the need to resurrect truth, even if he makes a new concept of it? These questions are not mine, but I think that these two false questions will be posed as long as Michel will not have explained further.' *Ibid.*, p. 113.

counter-strategy.[7] The last two are summarily dismissed by Deleuze; the first one poses to him the problem of understanding exactly what Foucault means by 'pleasures'.

The last time the two had met, he comments, they had confessed to each other their mutual dislike for concepts that had become central in their respective works: Deleuze's 'desire' displeased Foucault because the word reminded him of a Freudian/Lacanian 'lack'; Focault's 'pleasure' was what Deleuze could not bear. Deleuze seems perfectly aware that the reason for this, rather than a mere choice of words, is where the core of the problem lies. For him, pleasure is what interrupts desire, therefore belonging to the level of 'strata and organisation'.[8] Pleasure is 'the only means for a person or a subject to "find themselves again" in a process which overwhelms them. It is a reterritorialisation'[9], and hence can have no positive value. The dichotomy between 'desire' and 'pleasure' – which is the dichotomy between 'deterritorialisation' and 'reterritorialisation' – is the main tension between their respective ways of thinking, and the same that opposes 'lines of flight' and 'dispositifs'. Deleuze summarises it:

> The problem of the status of phenomena of resistance does not exist for me: since the lines of flight are the primary determinations, since desire produces [agence] the social field, it is rather the dispositifs which, at the same time, find themselves produced by these assemblages, and crush or plug them. (...) I thus have no need of a status of phenomena of resistance: if the first given of a society is that everything in it flees [s'y fuit], everything in it deterritorialises [s'y déterritorialise].[10]

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[7] Deleuze here quotes 'La fonction politique de l'intellectuel', a French language edit of the passage in the interview with Alessandro Fontana and Pasquale Pasquino where Foucault speaks of the distinction between specific and universal intellectuals. Cf. FOUCAULT, M. La fonction politique de l'intellectuel. In: Dits et écrits. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, pp. 109-14; Entretien avec Michel Foucault, pp. 140-60.
[8] Ibid., p. 119.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid., p. 118.

It is the same problem that reappears when Deleuze draws a necessary correlate of the 'neither repression nor ideology' formula: that there is no contradiction in a society, that a 'social field never contradicts itself (...), it strategises itself, it strategises'.[11] Whereas Foucault substitutes contradiction for strategy, Deleuze again sees a fault in it, since strategy is secondary to desire: the first belongs to the line of flight, the second to the systems of power. And it also shows up in his insightful (though eventually inconclusive) analysis of the theme of the 'macro' and 'micro' brought up by his Foucault's latest books. He immediately discards the possibility of the distinction being based either on a matter of scale (which would maintain a primacy of the 'macro', i.e., the State, in denying the 'small' its own specificity) or on a dualism (the two levels are immanent to each other). A suggestion that the distinction be thought in terms of strategy/tactics is discarded, as a phenomenon on the side of the 'micro', like the family, is also imbued with strategic relevance. Again, due to the differences exposed above, Deleuze will ask whether, given this as yet unexplained heterogeneity, one can speak of *dispositifs* at the level of the 'micro'; the answer for him must of course be no, since the 'micro' is the level of the lines of flight, whereas systems of power are 'macro' ('molar' as opposed to 'molecular') assemblages that capture and reconfigure these lines.

The underlying problem could thus be construed in two different ways. The first would be that Deleuze, *contra* Foucault, still understands power primarily as being on the side of repression (in fact, it would be fairer to simply use the neutral 'interruption'), and what Foucault calls 'power' encompasses both the positive and the negative senses that Deleuze finds in the series deterritorialisation/lines of flight/desire, on one side, and reterritorialisation/*dispositifs*/pleasure, on the other. The second, that Foucault indeed lacks the positive dimension that the first series provides Deleuze with. As a matter of fact, the latter does recognise there is still a

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[11] *Ibid.*

place for repression in his thought: given that *dispositifs* of power are secondary to assemblages of desire, they exercise upon the latter a repressive function. Again the same opposition, the same line of fracture between the two; Deleuze can toy with an approximation, but the overall tone belies a sense of impossibility.[12]

Deleuze's reading is, as always, extremely instructive in what it says about its object as much as what it says about himself, in what he makes explicit as much as what he leaves unsaid. It does aim at the heart of a problem that was obviously of great concern for Foucault at the time; and it says much about the way in which both practiced philosophy that the question is posed first and foremost as political, rather than strictly philosophical: how, within his theorising of relations of power, could Foucault provide an account of resistance?

That Foucault grappled with this question as a political one is made obvious in various interviews and texts from the same period. On the one hand, we find him distancing himself from a certain position he had flirted with in the past, now described as 'hurriedly leftist, lyrically anti-psychiatrical'[13]; on the other, he manifests a preoccupation with the political reception of his work:

> People will say: there you go again, always the same incapacity to cross the
> line, to go to the other side, to listen to and to make heard the language that

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[12] *Cf. Ibid.*, p. 120: 'Could I think of equivalences such as: what for me is 'body without organs-desires' corresponds to what is, for Michel, 'body-pleasures'? Can I relate the 'body-flesh' distinction of which Michel has spoken to me, to the 'body without organs-organisation' distinction? Page 190 [of *La volonté de savoir*] is very important, on life as giving a possible status to forces of resistance. This life, for me, the very same that Lawrence speaks of, is not Nature at all, it is exactly the variable plane of immanence of desire, across all determined assemblages. The conception of desire in Lawrence, in relation with positive ligns of flight. (Little detail: the way in which Michel uses Lawrence at the end [of that book] is opposed to the way in which I use him.)' Deleuze will emphasise this passage of *La volonté* in *Foucault*, in what comes across as one of the most forced moments in an analysis otherwise capable of great acuteness, as well as one of the points where the edges are smoothed out in favour of a unified interpretation.
[13] FOUCAULT, M. L'extension sociale de la norme. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 77.

comes from elsewhere, from below; always the same choice, on the side of power, of what it says and does.[14]

But mostly the philosophical decision to remain 'on this side' – which also means, on his side of the line of fracture between him and Deleuze – is maintained. Nowhere is this made more explicit than in an interview of March 1977:

> *I have noticed in* La volonté de savoir *this displacement, this essential slide: that you make a rather clean break this time with a diffuse naturalism that haunted your previous books...*
>
> By 'naturalism' I believe you mean two things. A certain theory, the idea that, beneath power, its violences and artifices, one can find things themselves in their primitive vivacity (...). And also a certain moral-aesthetic choice: power is bad, ugly, poor, sterile, monotonous, dead; and that over which power is exercised is alright, is good, is rich.
>
> *Yes, The theme which is ultimately common to the Marxist vulgata and to neoleftism: 'Under the cobblestones, the beach'.*
>
> If you wish. There are moments when these simplifications are necessary. To every once in a while revert the landscape and go from the 'for' to the 'against', this kind of dualism can be useful.[15]

This is where the Deleuzian text becomes most revealing in what it does not fully articulate: as recurrent as the explicit agreement on the formula 'neither repression nor ideology' is the insistence, every time he differentiates his (and Guattari's) position from Foucault's, that his conception of desire is neither '"natural" nor "spontaneous"'[16], 'not a "natural reality"'[17], 'not a return to

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[14] *Idem.* La vie des hommes infâmes. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 241. Deleuze makes a significant use of this passage in *Foucault* in order to signal the last transition in his friend's trajectory – from the problem of power to that of the self – as the final attempt to 'cross the line'.
[15] *Idem.* Non au sexe roi. *Op. cit.*, pp. 264-5.
[16] DELEUZE, G. Désir et plaisir. *In: Deux régimes de fous.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 114.
[17] Ibid, p. 115.

nature'[18], 'not a natural given'[19]. It is as if the whole time a silent debate is taking place where he defends himself from an indictment never openly made: that to affirm a 'positive other' of power must necessarily entail opening a dualism that falls back upon some sort of politically and philosophically naïve naturalism. In order to do so, Deleuze repeatedly highlights that desire does not exist separately from the assemblages that constitute it, which are its historical determinations. It is these assemblages then that are supposed to embody the double role that the concept of power has for Foucault:

> Following a first axis, we can distinguish in the assemblages of desire states of affairs and enunciations (which is in accordance with the distinction of two types of formation or multiplicities in Michel). Following another axis, one could distinguish between the territorialities or reterritorialisations, and the movements of reterritorialisation that pull an assemblage away (...). The *dispositifs* of power would appear everywhere where reterritorialisations, even abstract ones, take place; they would thus be a component of every assemblage. But assemblages would also include edges of deterritorialisation. In short, it would not be dispositifs of power the ones that produced assemblages [*agenceraient*], but assemblages of desire that would engender formations of power following one of their dimensions.[20]

If desire comes first, then, it is because the side of its assemblages that opens onto deterritorialisation always has precedence over the side that reterritorialises, not because desire would be ultimate ground of both. But how is one to understand this precedence without positing desire as an ultimate ground, as an outside? This is clearly the problem for the Foucault of the period, who reproaches those who 'go too quickly'[21], who look for reassurances where none can be guaranteed.

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[18] Ibid, p. 116.
[19] Ibid, p. 119.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 116-7.
[21] This is of course a *détournement* of the formula Deleuze uses in speaking of Foucault's relation to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty: 'Everything takes place as if Foucault were reproaching Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty for going too fast.'. *Idem. Foucault.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 119.

> I do not posit a substance of resistance in opposition to the substance of power. What I say is simply: as far as there is a relation of power, there is a possibility of resistance. We are never trapped by power: we can always modify its hold, under determined conditions and according to a precise strategy.[22]

It is as if Foucault and Deleuze appearead on either side of a mirror, reverse images of each other: posing the same philosophical and political problems, but coming at them from opposite directions, and hence finding, fairly or unfairly, each other at fault. Nowhere does the mutual misunderstanding seem greater than at the point where Deleuze asks whether Foucault has been able to find a solution to 'the problem that concerned us:

> to maintain the rights of a micro-analysis (diffusion, heterogeneity, partial character) and nevertheless to find some sort of principle of unification that is not like the "State", the "party", totalisation, representation?'[23]

Such a solution he seems to find in the concept of 'diagram' – which he equates to his own 'abstract machine' – that *Surveiller et punir* had put forward, but whose disappearance from *La volonté de savoir* confuses him.[24] It allows him in turn to draw an opposition between a diagram of *dispositifs*, which would function as their unifying principle by imposing a transcendent plan of organisation that effects them; and a diagram of lines of flight (his 'nomadic war machine') that provides them with the consistence of an immanent plan of composition. Again, therefore, a dualism; again the need to oppose the unification of strategies of power from 'above' to that of strategies of resistance from 'below'. It is not that Deleuze wants to restore the privileges that the figure of the State had lost in Foucault's analysis; but he finds the need to establish a difference in nature between a diagram of power

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[22] FOUCAULT, M. Non au sexe roi. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 267.

[23] DELEUZE, G. Désir et plaisir. *In: Deux régimes de fous*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 120-1.

[24] In 'Désir et plaisir' Deleuze wonders whether Foucault will find the concept again on the terrain of biopolitical processes; the fact that he never does is no deterrent to it playing a prominent role in *Foucault*.

and a diagram of lines of flight (even if one which does not exist in fact)[25], whereby one would correspond to a transcendent organisation (assigning points instead of following lines, concerned with reproduction rather than variation, representation rather than singularity, repetition rather than difference), the other to an immanent composition (preferring problems to theorems, metamorphosis over stable identities, consistence and resonance over organisation).[26] Without this opposition, he thinks, the status of resistance becomes a problem.

Deleuze poses a correct problem – that is, one which was also Foucault's –, but in a way and at a level where it fails to grasp precisely what is the difference between the two at this point. This problem of a non-totalising unification was no doubt important for Foucault. Archaeology – be it in the more strongly epochal version of *Les mots et les choses* or in *L'Archéologie du savoir* – focuses on the 'entanglement of continuities and discontinuities, of internal modifications of positivities, of discursive formations that appear and disappear'[27] and those moments where transformations in different fields seem to precipitate. Genealogy explores the relations between transformations of this kind and the region of non-discursive practices, where

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[25] 'Smooth and striated space, -- nomadic and sedentary space –, -- the space in which the war machine develops and the space instituted by the State apparatus, -- are not of the same nature. (...) That said, we must still remember that the two spaces do not exist in fact apart from their combinations [*mélanges*] with each other. (...) But the combinations in fact do not prevent the distinction by right, the abstract distinction between the two.' DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. Mille plateaux. Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 592-3.

[26] It is the same dualism that one finds in Toni Negri's work, where he draws an opposition between biopolitics and biopower in correlation to his concepts of constituent and constituted power. *Cf.* HARDT, M; NEGRI, A. *Empire*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 40-59. The same opposition can be found *In:* LAZZARATO, M. From biopower to biopolitics. Trans. Ramirez, I. [www.goldsmiths.ac.uk/csisp/papers/lazzarato_biopolitics.pdf]. In both cases, the first term would be 'positive' (productive), the second 'negative' (stratifying, controlling, repressive); it is not difficult to see how, in all cases, it is the Spinozian opposition between *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* that lies behind these operations.

Incidentally, there is one passage where Foucault gives a 'positive' meaning to biopolitics, opposing it to the (ultimately racist) search for biological identities and defined boundaries as one that 'would no longer be that of divisions, conservations and hierarchies, but that of communication and polymorphism'. *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. Bio-histoire et biopolitique. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 97.

[27] FOUCAULT, M. *L'Archéologie du savoir.* Paris: Gallimard, pp. 230-1.

the latter are not 'an event external to discourse'[28] that finds expression in it (as the object that is spoken of or the subject that speaks), but where the two constitute a describable field of mutual conditioning. Both share the pretension of constructing their objects (be it a discursive practice, or a complex practice such as imprisonment) from the interrelation of diverse elements, rather than tracing them back to a larger unity. But for the Foucault of the second half of the 1970s, there is no sense in opposing a plan of organisation on the part of power and a plan of composition on the part of forces. On the contrary, his point is precisely that, whatever strategies or elements operate unifications at any point, these operations can never be total, even if the form that effects them, like the state-form characteristic of Western societies, aspires at once to a maximum of individualisation and a maximum of totalisation.[29] There is always a 'rest' that is not free-floating (in the sense that it would be entirely alien to power, a 'natural given' that exists outside it), but a coefficient of variation that power, in its very exercise, must leave open, cannot but leave open.

Deleuze will later tacitly recognise that there was something at the time of 'Désir et plaisir' that 'escaped' him because it was still not there; it would have

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[28] 'Hence the French Revolution – since it is around it that until now have been centred all archaeological analyses – does not play the role of an event external to discourse whose effect of distribution in all discourses one should discover in order to think it appropriately; it functions as a complex, *articulated*, descriptible ensemble of transformations that left intact a certain number of positivities, that fixed for a certain number of other rules which are still ours, which also established positivities that have just dissolved, or are in the process of dissolving under our eyes'. *Ibid.*, p. 231. (My italics.) It is his extreme attention to the importance of this separation between discourse and practices, 'saying' and 'doing' that proves the advantage of Deleuze's interpretation of the passage from archaeology to genealogy, and the reason why his book on Foucault can ascribe to it the positive value of a development rather than the negative value of a change of direction after a *cul-de-sac*. This is obviously less an interpretive acuity than the sign of a philosophical commonality; it is the same *separation* and *articulation* that Deleuze and Guattari deal with in important passages of *Mille Plateaux. Cf.* DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. *Mille plateaux.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, esp. 'La géologie de la morale' and 'Postulats de linguistique'.

[29] Precisely, the object of Foucault's researches into governmentality, biopower and the *raison d'Etat* in the late 1970s – as witnessed by the Collège de France courses *Securité, territoire et population, Naissance de la biopolitique* and shorter texts such as 'Omnes et singulatim' – is the 'political "double bind" of simulataneous totalisation and individuation of the structures of modern power' that is characteristic of the State-form. FOUCAULT, M. Le sujet et le pouvoir. *In: Dits et écrits.* Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1051.

to wait until Foucault's final change in trajectory to fully appear.[30] Exactly what allows Foucault to posit a complete immanence between power and resistance that does not leave space for any dualism, however residual, is the fact that power only exists in the act of its exercise, as an 'action over action, over eventual, or actual, future or present actions', under two conditions: that the one over which it is exercised 'be fully recognised as a subject of action; and that ahead of the power relation be open an entire field of possible responses, reaction, effects, inventions'.[31]

> The exercise of power consists in 'conducting conducts' and managing probability. Power is, in the end, less of the order of the confrontation or engagement of two adversaries with each other than of the order of 'government'. (...) To govern, in this sense, is to structure the field of eventual actions of others. (...)
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> Power is exercised over 'free subjects' insofar as they are 'free' – meaning individual or collective subjects that have in front of them a field of possibility where various conducts, manifold reactions and diverse modes of comportment can take place. Where determinations are saturated, there is no power relation (...).[32]

And, where Deleuze had observed that the problem of how individuals can come to desire their capture and subjection by power was a question for him but not for Foucault, the latter will say:

> The central problem of power is not that of 'voluntary servitude' (how can we desire to be slaves?): at the heart of the power relation, 'provoking' it endlessly, there is the relativity of the will and the intransitivity of freedom. Rather than an essential 'antagonism', it would be better to speak of an 'agonism' – a relation which is at once one of reciprocal incitement and

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[30] DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 103-15. Then will Deleuze recognise that 'Foucault's fundamental idea is that of a dimension of subjectivity that derives from power and knowledge, but is not dependent on it' (p. 108-9).

[31] FOUCAULT, M. Le sujet et le pouvoir. *In: Dits et écrits*. Paris: Gallimard, 2001, vol. II, p. 1055.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 1056-7.

struggle;' less a binary opposition that places one in front of the other than a permanent provocation.[33]

Here, then, Foucault seems to have fully arrived at the way out of the impasse of the late 1970s; whereas at that point he already denounced the search for an 'other' of power, here he has managed to clarify a fully positive account of the immanence of power and resistance, to the point that the distinction between the two becomes blurred in favour of a generalised 'agonism' that eliminates a strict dualism between flight and repression.[34] Yet, in truth, already around the time of *La volonté de savoir*, there was no need for a 'status' of resistance as such, since it was for him a given – not of nature, but empirical and historical: people do resist; there is no need to wonder how it is possible once there is ample evidence that it does happen. 'People do revolt, it is a fact; and it is through there that subjectivity (not that of great men, but of anybody) enters history and breathes life into it.'[35] What is to be done is, given the historical fact of a revolt, to ask its conditions, its objects, the areas it transformed, the blockages it ran up against. Against the charge that he fails to explain why people should resist, he could simply reply: they do, and it is when they do that one must find the hows and whys. It is in these *empiria*, in fact, that he repeatedly inscribes the context, motivation and sense of his researches.[36] Except that these historical facts, especially once they have fallen into the historical archive of the past, can never be apprehended in a 'natural state'. They are what provokes thought, what makes a new diagnostic necessary, like a 'chemical catalyst that allows to make relations of power appear, to see where they are inscribed, to discover

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[33] *Ibid.*, p. 1057.
[34] That this position was already his in the earlier period is made clear in the same 1977 interview quoted above, where, asked whether to say 'where there is power, there is resistance' would not be a tautology, he replies: 'Absolutely.' *Cf. Idem*. Non au sexe roi. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 267.
[35] *Idem*. Inutile de se soulever?. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 793.
[36] *Cf.*, for instance: *Idem*. *'Il faut défendre la société'. Cours au Collège de France (1975 - 1976.)* Paris: Gallimard, 1997, pp. 6-9; Table ronde du 20 mai 1978. *In: Op. cit.*, pp. 840-1; Le sujet et le pouvoir. *In: Op. cit.*, pp. 1045-7.

their points of application and the methods they employ'[37]; but as he says of reading the 'lives of infamous men' from the point of view of their records by the State:

> Why not go listen to these lives there were they speak for themselves? But, first of all, would there be any trace whatsoever of what these lives were in their singular violence or unhappiness if they had not at a certain point come in contact with power and provoked its forces? Is it not, after all, one of the defining features of our society that, in them, fate has the form of a relation to power, the struggle with or against it? The most intense point of lives, where their energies are concentrated, is exactly there where they throw themselves against power, struggle with it, try to use or escape its forces.[38]

Yet this is more than a methodological question concerning how to study the revolts of the past; it also concerns the political problems of the present:

> Nothing is more internal to our society, nothing is more internal to the effects of its power than the unhappiness of a madman or the violence of a criminal. In other words, we are always on the inside. The margin is a myth. The word of the outside is a dream that never ceases to be reconducted.[39]

The point of greatest tension and misunderstanding, therefore, takes place where the proximity is the greatest. The double character that Deleuze gives to assemblages of desire, with their edges of deterritorialisation and reterritorialising *dispositifs*, is to be found in Foucault's mature conceptualisation of power; but whereas the first maintains a distinction *de jure*, the second works towards a blurring of the boundaries under the category of a 'government of conducts'. It is in the sense posed by 'Le sujet et le pouvoir' that we can agree with Deleuze that, for Foucault, *'resistance*

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[37] *Ibid.*, p. 1044.
[38] *Idem*. La vie des hommes infâmes, *In: Op. cit.*, p. 214.
[39] *Idem*. La extension sociale de la norme. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 77.

comes first[40]; with the proviso that it comes first precisely at that point where there is no more question of ontological or chronological precedence, but only the necessary openness of agonistic relations. To which Deleuze would seem to reply, from a distance:

> The most closed system always has a thread that ascends towards the virtual, and down which a spider descends.[41]

The two last volumes of *Histoire de la sexualité* will cause Deleuze to see some of the problems posed in 'Désir et plaisir' as inadequate.[42] Since any open dialogue between the two ceases to exist at this point, it is impossible to determine with certitude whether the muted reproaches that seem to resound in Foucault's interviews were kept, or if they were ever such a thing to begin with. In the year that preceded his death and the their final *rapprochement*, however, we find in an interview the following exchange:

> *It seems that you recognise a certain common heritage with Deleuze, up to a certain point. Does this heritage go as far as his conception of desire?*

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[40] DELEUZE, G. *Foucault.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, pp. 95-6. (Deleuze's italics.) Deleuze makes exactly that proviso, in terms of a relation to the 'Outside'. I will return to the figure of this Outside later on.

[41] *Idem*; GUATTARI, F. *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?.* Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 116. The passage concerns the different objects of philosophy and science – the virtual and the actual (states of affairs), respectively. It is nevertheless perfectly adequate to the discussion at hand: in writing about something like the panopticon or biopolitics, and power relations in general, Foucault is precisely not concerned with reducing them to *what they are* (as a closed system), but with the problem of *how they work* in selecting certain possibilities rather than others at their capillary, infinitesimal level. At this level, it becomes clear that a 'macroscopic' description can only be true by approximation, since it excludes the minute variations and transformations that take place within the range of variations allowed and always have the potential of accumulating so as to produce larger-scale changes in the system. Manuel DeLanda argues against a certain 'conservatism' *malgré eux* of Deleuze's and Guattari's picture of science (one that I in very broad strokes have just reproduced here) which ignores the ways in which those 'minor' fields of scientific enquiry that have the most in common with their philosophical work. *Cf.* DELANDA, M. *Intensive science and virtual philosophy.* London, Continuum, 2002, pp. 178-80.

[42] 'If, at the end of *La volonté de savoir*, Foucault finds an impasse, it is not because of his way of thinking power, but rather because he has discovered the impasse where power itself places us, we who throw ourselves against it in our smallest truths.' DELEUZE, G. *Foucault.* Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 103.

No, precisely not. (...)

I do not want to take a stand or say what Deleuze wanted to say. (...) Nevertheless, it seems to me that his problem has in fact been, at least for a long time, to pose this problem of desire; and it is true that it is in the theory of desire that one sees in him the effects of his relation to Nietzsche, whereas for me the problem has never ceased to be that of truth, of truth-saying, *Wahrsagen* – what it means to speak truth [*dire vrai*] – and the relation between speaking truth and forms of reflexivity, reflexivity of the self on itself [*de soi sur soi*].

Yes, but it seems to me that Nietzsche does not fundamentally distinguish between will to knowledge and will to power.

I think there is a very noticeable displacement in Nietzsche's texts between those that are by and large dominated by the question of the will to knowledge, and those that are dominated by the will to power.[43]

The point now is not to pronounce a judgment on which interpretations are justified or invalid, or which philosophical alternative is preferable in absolute terms; not even to try to argue that it is indeed Deleuze who is the target of Foucault's late 1970s interviews. What matters is, first, to highlight the distance Foucault places between him and his estranged friend; how, in the middle of this distance, the role of intermediary point is played by Nietzsche; and, finally, how, in the two negative extremes that can be filled with the reproaches extrapolated from the open and mute dialogues of that crucial passage of 1976-1977[44], the charges that each could be seen as directing

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[43] *Idem.* Structuralisme et poststructuralisme. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 1264.

[44] One could say that the period of greatest philosophical proximity between Foucault and Deleuze was in the years that go from 1968 to 1977, when the former's preface to the American edition of *L'Anti-Oedipe* is published, and the two fall out over the Croissant affair. The political significance of the two dates is hard to miss. The personal relationship of mutual admiration and recognition of an intellectual affinity is of course prior to that – the two meet in 1962, and Foucault tries to have Deleuze appointed a lectureship at Clermont-Ferrand; they work together on the French edition of Nietzsche's complete works in 1966; and before the 'events of May', Deleuze has already written reviews of *Raymond Roussel* and *Les mots et les choses*. Yet there seems to be an increased awareness of a shared trajectory afterwards, which can be detected even in the common change of direction that happens to both

against the other follow the same two general lines along which their works have, for the most part, met their critiical fate. On one side of the mirror, Deleuze the anachronistic vitalist, the pre-critical substantialist, the metaphysician of desire; on the other, Foucault the cryptonormativist, the skeptic who undermines his own grounds or the failed hermeneuticist who can never clarify his own position, forever caught up in a performative contradiction. Hence the importance of the intermediary point: the face that stands beside them on either side, facing itself in the mirror, is that of Nietzsche, or that of the critical fate dealt to Nietzsche by the hands of those who came after him. On one side of the mirror, Nietzsche the last

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between 1968/1969 and the early 1970s, from more speculative and abstract works such as *Différence et répétition* and *L'Archéologie du savoir* to ones with more explicit political concern (*L'Anti-Oedipe*, Foucault's early courses at the Collège de France and *Surveiller et punir*), and which is openly thematised in 1972, in the dialogue 'L'intellectuels et le pouvoir'. (Also, from 1971, there is their common involvement in the Groupe d'Information sur les Prisons.); Focault speaks in 1976 of a moment in which 'the incandescence of struggles is extinguished' (FOUCAULT, M. L'extension sociale de la norme. *Op. cit.*, p. 77), and Deleuze would describe the question of that period, following, for instance, the defeat of the struggles around the penitentiary system, as one of understanding 'what happens if the transversal relations of resistance do not cease to re-stratify themselves, to rediscover or even fabricate nodes of power?' (DELEUZE, G. *Foucault*. Paris: Minuit, 2004, p. 101). When Guattari circulates a petition in favour of the Italian extra-parliamentary left (DELEUZE, G.; GUATTARI, F. Nous croyons au caractère constructiviste de certaines agitations de gauche. *Recherches* 30: *Les untorelli*. Nov. 1977, pp.149-150), labelled by the leader of the Italian Communist Party as 'pestilent' (*untorelli*), Foucault will sign it; but a few months later he will feel that the other two have failed to sufficiently distance themselves from terrorism.

A large part of the questions here seems thus to lie on the problem of how to evaluate the closing of a political situation that had been opened by May 1968, and where to go from there. It is perhaps more than an irony, then, that some of Foucault's most cutting remarks are made in an interview given to a 'nouveau philosophe', Benny Henri-Lévy ('Non au sexe roi') in 1977. In the same year, Deleuze vociferously attacked the 'nouveaux philosophes' for having 'nothing to sell but a resentment for 68' (DELEUZE, G. À propos des nouveaux philosophes et d'un problème plus général. *In: Deux régimes de fous*. Paris: Minuit, 2003, p. 131). *L'Arc*, the same journal which had five years earlier published 'L'intellectuels et le pouvoir', a powerful document of their philosophical and political affinity, closed that year with an issue called 'La crise dans la tête', asking whether Foucault's analyses condoned the political condemnations written by the likes of Henry-Lévy and Glucksmann, of whose *Les maîtres penseurs* he had written a positive review saying that 'it did not invoke again Dyonisius above Apollo', and praising for being a book on 'how not to be Hegelian *at all*'. *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. La grande colère des faits. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 281; p. 278.

However Foucault felt about those that Deleuze detested so much, in the same interview with Henry-Lévy he stated he did not think it was the time for 'reflection and rebalancing', but for 'new mobility and new displacement' (*Idem*. Non au sexe roi. *Op. cit.*, pp. 264-5). And whatever the motors behind their estrangement, they did not stop Foucault from saying, in 1978, that he considered Deleuze 'the greatest French philosopher today'. *Cf.* FOUCAULT, M. La scène de la philosophie. *In: Op. cit.*, p. 589.

metaphysician, the one who takes Kant's critique as far as it can go by positing a cosmology of the will to power that marries, in the eternal return of the same, permanence and becoming; on the other, Nietzsche the destroyer of idols, the *savant* anti-*savant* who takes Kant's critique to its limit by attacking the will to knowledge, defeating himself along the way.

What is clear, then, is that what is at stake here is once more the relation of the three – Deleuze, Foucault, and Nietzsche – to the post-Kantian heritage; which is to say, to the fate of critique, or the critical attitude, after Kant; which is to say, to immanence.

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