Identity, Belonging & Citizenship in Urban Britain

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January, 2018
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Foreword

This report emerged from work undertaken for the Foresight Future of Cities programme, as members of a team put together by COMPAS at the University of Oxford. The brief of that research project, to risk being reductive, was to examine the last fifty years of urban patterns of identity, belonging and citizenship, before trying to project those patterns forward across the next fifty years. The Foresight Future of Cities programme focused on urban renewal, but specifically on the risk factors these processes may face, from flooding to riots.

However, after the project was completed, it struck the authors that their work on identity, belonging and citizenship - undertaken before the general election of 2015, before the referendum on UK European Union membership went to 'leave' and the whole subject became a white hot cipher in 'Brexit', and before the general election of June, 2017 - had a much wider use on a changing British landscape.

It strikes us that precisely because of what came after the Foresight Future of Cities programme, identity, belonging and citizenship is going to be one of the key intellectual sites for British researchers of all kinds in the next five to ten years. The work on Englishness now seems almost prophetic.

We have therefore taken steps to have this work updated and then to have it published in the hope that it might inaugurate necessary ongoing debates about identity, belonging and citizenship in Britain, as the island morphs into new subjective shapes.

There is no better place for this work to emerge at the start of 2018 than the Centre for Urban and Community Research (CUCR) at Goldsmiths. To connect this work to their roots, emerging somewhere between the Chicago and Frankfurt School, via crucial figures such as Paul Gilroy and Michael Keith, is to give the research a much needed politics. Many thanks are due to Les Back, Director of the CUCR, for considering the report and providing a home for it.

- Ali, Gidley and Hanson, January, 2018
**Introduction**

This paper explores how identity, belonging and citizenship might change in the cities of the future.

It starts by setting out how we are using our key terms. As a baseline, it traces the tectonic shifts that have structured these terms in the period from 1965 to the present. As part of this, we present new original analysis of Census data to explore how national identity is patterned geographically across the UK’s system of cities.

The paper then briefly sets out some of the “known unknowns” that will affect their future unfolding, before tracking what we know about trends that are likely to shape future urban forms of citizenship, belonging and identity. Drawing on an inventory of key future threats and opportunities, we set out a series of scenarios for future cities in relation to our three key terms. In thinking this through, we have foregrounded the role that citizenship, belonging and especially identity might have in rethinking notions of resilience in both imagining and planning for cities of the future.

For the sake of coherence, we focus in this paper on trends which relate to the ongoing massive migration-driven demographic transformation of the UK. As we will note in the paper, these changes intersect with changes in several different domains of life – such as gender, age, lifestyle, sexuality, constitutional change and cultures of consumption.

International migration is the main driver of demographic change in the UK today. Thus this paper specifically addresses how migration has fundamentally changed identity, belonging and citizenship in Britain, especially urban Britain. This transformation is not unique to the UK. As we will show, it is part of the larger turbulence of globalisation that has put more people on the move on the planet than ever before, hastening a final global shift from the countryside to the city – but an understanding of Britain’s near future is impossible without it.

At the start of our baseline period, 1965, there were a little over 2 million foreign-born people in the UK; now there are close to 8 million. The period between the 2001 and 2011 Censuses saw the biggest population growth in the UK since the Census began in 1801: a growth of 3.7 million or 7.1%, of which 55% was directly due to international migration rather than natural growth (births over deaths). As the demographic changes caused by this period ripple down the generations in the coming decades, the ethnic make-up of the UK and the prevalent forms of identification, belonging and citizenship will be transformed. There are now a growing number of “majority minority” cities, and the transnational connections of the residents of these cities will be among the most significant drivers of change in this domain.
1. Conceptual framing

All three of the keywords in our paper title – identity, belonging and citizenship – are contentious terms on which social scientists and others find definitions hard to agree.

Identity

Brubaker and Cooper (2000: 1) argue that identity “tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)”, concluding that it “is too ambiguous... to serve well the demands of social analysis” (ibid).

Nonetheless, as we will argue throughout this paper, used carefully the term offers rich insight into social processes. We tend to talk of “identities” rather than “identity”; it is a fallacy to think of identities as singular affiliations (Sen 2006). We follow that work, seeing identities as socially constructed and highly complex; it is important to see them in an intersectional perspective. However, we have taken the term to mean the range of group identities to which individuals in the UK belong – including how others see us and how we relate to others. The late Stuart Hall suggested that “identification” might be more useful analytically than “identity”, the former naming an active, unfinished process, rather than a finished state of being (Hall and du Gay 1996). While theorists understand identities as always “in process” (as Hall put it), most understand them as more fixed, residing deep within us, or assigned to us by obdurate social structures such as “race”.

It is also worth noting that city identities are included in the many sub-national identities that have become more prominent in the context of the pluralisation of identities in the UK, alongside national, religious, ethnic, sexual, subcultural and other paradigms. Finally, it is important to note that while identities are the effects of social patterns, they also actively contribute to re-shaping social patterns by constituting collectivities and grounding social action. We use the term identitarian to refer to those forms of politics for which a strong sense of deeply held essential identity is absolutely central.

Belonging

The term belonging has become popular with social scientists in the context of the difficulty of the term “identity”, as much less subject to identity’s ontological drift. Belonging includes an affective, emotional dimension – not just being but also longing, as Elspeth Probyn (1996) puts it. It often includes a performative, ritual aspect (as Anne-Marie Fortier 2000 and Vikki Bell 2001, for example, have discussed). It also has an association with place, the sense of belonging to a neighbourhood, city or region is one important form of belonging, often related to a sense that these territories belong to us.
Citizenship

Our third keyword is generally understood as having two dimensions: passive membership in a polity, and active participation in a polis. Both of these can be thought of in terms of membership in a community of value (Anderson, 2013), and both are bound up with the political and social rights of members of that community. As with identity, both senses of the word should be thought of as socially constructed and highly complex; as Anderson (2013) shows, it is only relatively recently and for a fairly short period that these two dimensions have coincided in the UK. There is a rich body of recent literature on citizenship (both empirical, e.g. Bloemraad 2006, Calder et al 2010, French and Hinze 2010, Hampshire 2005, Hansen 2000, and philosophical, e.g. Carens 2000, Crick 2000, Joppke and Morawska 2003, Kiwan 2008, Kymlicka 2003), exploring, for instance the extent to which citizenship concerns political rights and/or social rights and its relationship to the national and other scales. This literature has increasingly pointed to a pluralisation of the forms of citizenship available to us. But for the sake of coherence, this paper will focus on citizenship as identity and belonging rather than on citizenship as rights or civic participation.

2. Baseline: From 1965 to 2015

2.1 After empire: Britain’s postcolonial melancholy

A number of tectonic shifts have driven the transformation of identity, belonging and citizenship in Britain’s cities in the last half century. The first is our postcolonial condition: the loss of empire. This has forced an incomplete reconfiguring of British identity and citizenship, as Britain’s place in the world has shrunk from imperial metropolis to small island; Paul Gilroy (2005a, 2005b) has used the term “postcolonial melancholy” to name this shift. Thus Robin Cohen (1995) describes a series of transformations that occurred in this period in what he calls “the frontiers of identity” in Britain, both internal and external: the changing relations between Britishness at home and the Empire, Dominions and British diaspora abroad, as well as the trans-Atlantic relationship and the return of what is now known as the “Anglosphere”; but also the fuzzy internal frontiers that mark the shifting extent of association or distanciation between the Scots, Welsh and Irish (the “Celtic fringe”) on the one hand and the English on the other.

More concretely, the presence of postcolonial citizen-migrants in the mother country – the Windrush legacy – has changed the demographic profile of Britain’s citizens. By 1965, Britain was near the end of the period of mass migration from Britain’s colonies and former colonies to the metropolitan “Mother Country”, inaugurated by the 1948 docking of the iconic HMT Empire Windrush from Jamaica and concluding with the final arrival of “East African Asians” displaced from postcolonial Kenya in 1968 and Uganda in 1972. The Jamaican-born population of the UK increased from 6,000 to 100,000 between 1951 and 1961, a more than sixteen-fold increase.
VOTE
BRITISH
NATIONAL
PARTY
These events irretrievably changed Britain’s demography and its politics of identity, citizenship and belonging. The Windrush settlers were “citizen-migrants”, already subjects of the Crown and schooled in an Anglocentric tradition; as Hall (1996: 491-492) writes of his arrival in the West Country from the Caribbean, “it was like finding again, in one’s dream, an already familiar idealised landscape”.

This tectonic shift opened up a gap between ethnic and civic forms of Britishness. While civic Britishness – a mongrel, multi-ethnic, multi-faith Britishness – has been resisted by a revanchist political tradition (epitomised by Enoch Powell and the slogan “there ain’t no black in the Union Jack”), by the 1990s the concept of “black British” had been mainstreamed; for instance, the spectacle of non-white athletes draped in the Union Jack had become a staple of popular discourse. The tectonic shifts associated with “postmodernism” have also re-shaped forms of identity and belonging. Some of the widely recognised features of this include the weakening of some sources of identity, the blurring of private and public identities, and an increasingly consumerist and “mix-and-match” approach to identity. Theorists of the postmodern (or “liquid modern”, as Zygmunt Bauman (2000) names it) since the 1980s have - prematurely - claimed the coming death of class and national identities.

Cultural theorists have spoken of the rise of club-cultures (Thornton 1995), neo-tribes (Bennett 1999) and scenes (Kahn-Harris 2007), or of thrown-together “bricolage” identities (Hebdige 1987). The postmodern turn and the postcolonial moment come together in the emphasis by many scholars on forms of “hybridity” (Pieterse 1995), or in Hall’s analysis (1992) of the emergence of “new ethnicities” in the wake of the “death of the innocent black subject” and the uncertainty of any idea of “authentic” identities (see Back 1996, Keith 2005).

The “crafting” of identities by postmodern individuals and groups out of multiple sources, in ways that that render redundant older identitarian and communitarian models, was already foreshadowed in earlier discussions of diversity. In the 1910s, responding to the rise of hyphenated categories such as “Italian-American”, intellectuals such as Israel Zangwill, Horace Kallen and Randolph Bourne began developing notions of hyphenated belonging. (Kallen 1915). The human heart, Zangwill wrote, “is large enough to hold many loyalties” (quoted Leftwich 1957: 147). Bourne (1916) argued that this kind of multiple identity characterised what he called “transnational America”. By the 1960s, the concept of “hyphenated identity” was deeply embedded in the American social science repertoire (Glazer and Moynihan 1964). In the 1980s, Hammar powerfully argued that identity is “not a zero sum game”, that it is not a finite resource (1985).

In the 1990s, the concept of “hybrid identities” – implying something more complex, more irrevocably intermixed than mere hyphenation – was widely used (Faist 2000),
opening up a research agenda around transnationalism. Such “remixed” identities are especially notable among urban young people (Gidley 2007, Keith 2007a) and are likely to become increasingly common as dual citizenship proliferates. (For ethnographic studies on mixed identities, see e.g. McKenzie 2012b, Twine 2000, Tyler 2005.)

2.2 The turbulence of globalisation and the rise of diasporas
The period has clearly also witnessed the turbulence of globalisation, with the attendant rise of connectivities and mobilities, unleashing what Castles and Miller (2003) have named the age of migration. This has fuelled the pluralisation of identity, belonging and citizenship. The rise of connectivities and mobilities also facilitates transnational practices and the formation of diasporas, which enable residents of one place to maintain meaningful belongings and civic action in various elsewheres (Castells 2000a, Vertovec 2001, Keith 2005, Berg and Eckstein 2015). Castles and Miller’s formulation of the age of migration (2003) highlights the extent to which new technologies of transport and communication, the globalisation and deregulation of markets, and manifold human and natural disasters unleashed across the global South have triggered an unprecedented number of people to seek a more liveable life elsewhere, whether within their countries of birth, in other countries of the region, or in the wealthier countries of the world.

We need to qualify this view. Leslie Page Moch (1992) showed that migration, connected with urbanisation and other phenomena, has always been a structural aspect of human life. Dirk Hoerder (2002) has revolutionised our understanding of modern migration by placing it in a millennium-long history, revealing that contemporary mobility is less novel than we imagine. Even within the recent past, Hein De Haas (2005) has shown that the same proportion (a little less than 3%) of the world’s population were international migrants a century ago as today. Nonetheless, it is clear that the absolute number of people on the move is now higher than it ever has been, and the distances travelled and the speed of movement has increased. Empirical research, using both ethnographic and quantitative approaches, has produced a rich body of evidence about the diasporic and transnational forms of urban life that emerge from this conjuncture (Basch et al 1994, Levitt and Jaworsky, 2007, Keith 2005, Portes 2003, Vertovec 2007).

The embedding of migration routes and transnational connections has a circular effect, making future migration more imaginable for those left behind (Hemmerechts et al 2013) – a process Paul Collier (2013) has recently named the “rise of diasporas”. Structured by relative exclusion from receiving societies, some migrants and subsequent generations are active in diaspora networks. At the same time, “others may seek social attachment and associated social action and identity through other transnational networks, some of which may have wider geographical scope or be
associated with a particular form of identity politics or set of ideologies” (Collinson 2011: 28), which interact in a range of ways with diaspora social networks (Vertovec, 2001). As Vertovec (1999: 450) writes of contemporary migrants, they “maintain several identities that link simultaneously to more than one nation”.

Of course, as Portes (2003) has argued, not all immigrants are transnationals in this sense. However, it is the case that all migrants dwell within a transnational social field, as Faist (2000: 191) argues when he notes that “transnational webs include relatively immobile persons and collectives”. Faist posits a range of types of transnational social space at play: kinship groups operating on the principle of reciprocity, transnational circuits based on exchange; and transnational communities acting out of solidarity.

At the same time, the sheer number of people on the move, as well as the toxicity of the politics around the figure of the migrant, makes the question of citizenship increasingly urgent for many. This is especially so given the rise in the number of nation-less people, lacking, in Hannah Arendt’s phrase, “the right to have rights” (Arendt 1951, Anderson 2013). Migration, then, has politicised citizenship: dual nationality is rising globally, encouraged by many governments; rates of naturalisation are rising (including in the UK); but states (including the UK) are also increasingly imposing more stringent citizenship tests.

The turbulence of globalisation has diversified the migrant population. At the start of our baseline period, international migration followed imperial routes: Ireland, India and, by 1971, Jamaica and Pakistan were the main countries of origin. Conflicts and other factors have meant that there is a bigger range of sending countries: since 2001, less than half of migrants came from the top 10 sending countries. After 2004, the expansion of the EU meant that countries such as Poland featured more prominently (see Figure 1 below).
2.3 The age of migration and super-diversity

Globally, processes of migration and processes of urbanisation are interconnected, as migration is typically into cities (Saunders 2010). At a local level, in the UK’s cities, the turbulence of globalisation and the age of migration have created a changing geography of diversity. It is in cities where those people (mobile or not) with the densest connections to non-proximate elsewheres are most likely to live.

Since the emergence of urban sociology in the nineteenth century, the city’s defining characteristic has been understood as the proximity of strangers and the concentration of difference. However, since 1965, and accelerating since the 1990s, the question of living with (2000) difference has become increasingly key to thinking about what makes a resilient city. Alain Touraine has suggested that how we can live with difference is the defining question of our new century. Stuart Hall spelled this out:
“What are the terms for the different groups of people from different cultural, religious, linguistic, historical backgrounds, who have applied to occupy the same social spaces, whether it is a city or a nation or a region, to live with one another without either group (the less powerful group) having to become the imitative version of the dominant one – i.e. an assimilationism – or, on the other hand, the two groups hating one another...?” (Hall with Yuval-Davis 2004, quoted in Yuval-Davis 2011: 26)

In public discourse, this question has been associated with the contested notion of “multiculturalism”; as Hall commented, “The multicultural question is... the question that globalization has unconsciously produced” (Hall with Yuval-Davis 2004, quoted Yuval-Davis 2011: 26). While multiculturalism” as an “ism”, an ideology or a way of managing difference has been especially controversial, in British cities the fact of people of multiple cultures living side by side has become a commonplace norm, a reality which Hall captured in the term “multicultural drift” and which Doreen Massey (2007) has named "the thrown-together-ness of place".

And these questions are always played out locally, typically in cities. We know that migration, and in particular the mass migration of the last decade or so, has changed the cartography of diversity in the UK. Its features include the intensification of what Vertovec (2007) called “super-diversity” (the multiplication of the axes of difference) in inner city areas, as well as what David Robinson (2010) calls “new contact zones” in the suburbs, provincial towns and even rural areas.

This must change the way we think of diversity, in two ways. First, it calls us to shift away from the multicultural mosaic model which was dominant previously. Instead, we need to foreground intersecting and multiple axes of difference (Vertovec 2007, Berg and Sigona 2013). Second, it means we need to shift attention away from the iconic inner city sites, in which our previous thinking about identity and belonging has been grounded, to account for diversity in “new city spaces” and “ordinary towns” (Kesten et al 2011).

These shifts create challenges for cohesion and conviviality, which we could argue are key competencies in a resilient city in the context of demographic change. As superdiversity becomes less and less exceptional, several ethnographic researchers have noted the rise of forms of “prosaic multiculture” (Amin 2002: 959), “banal intercultural interaction” (Sandercock 2003: 89), “commonplace diversity” (Wessendorf 2013) and “civil-integration” (Vertovec 2007). However, as Vertovec (2006) and Wessendorf (2010) among others have observed, public interculturalism is often accompanied by private segregation.

But these challenges are not the same everywhere. For example, Kesten et al (2011) suggest that “new city spaces” (such as relatively prosperous Milton Keynes) might
offer greater possibilities for what Ash Amin (2002: 970) has called “sites of prosaic interaction” where cultural transgression becomes possible. Different demographic profiles, governance structures, local and regional political leadership, local and regional narratives of identity and belonging, and aspects of spatial environment all structure the specific playing out of this challenge.

Several “ideal types” of modes of living together (mapped on to different sorts of urban locales) seem to be present in the literature (e.g. Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007, Hickman et al 2012, Jensen and Gidley 2015, Robinson 2010, Wallman 2003), ranging from cohesive but exclusive closed and brittle modes of community to less cohesive but more open and flexible modes of community characterised by commonplace diversity. Key questions for further research, then, include the extent to which forms of cohesion and conviviality are shaped by place, and the extent to which they might interact with dimensions of urban resilience.

Of particular relevance to the future of cities is the rise of conflicts over the allocation of resources, including urban social goods, given that ethnicised competition for such resources has been identified as central to the challenge of cohesion (Cantle 2001, Commission on Integration and Cohesion 2007). Housing is one such example: should it be allocated by belonging or need? Both what some commentators call “welfare chauvinism” and new forms of political mobilisation claim such goods have been growing features of urban politics, especially in the context of austerity and the rationing of such resources. For example, several influential centre-left commentators have predicted that growing diversity will lead to a reduction in social solidarity (Freeman 1986, Goodhart 2004, Putnam 2007), although the empirical evidence from the UK and Europe does not support this (Bailey 2013, Blomberg 2008, Hooghe et al 2009, Kymlicka and Banting 2006, Parsons and Smeeding 2006, van Oorschot 2006).

2.4 Resurgent Englishness

Despite the stronger articulation of an inclusive, civic British identity in the 1990s, the current century has seen a resurgence of the identities associated with the countries that make up the United Kingdom, e.g. Englishness in England, Scottishness in Scotland, and Welshness in Wales. The 2011 Census included a national identity question, allowing systematic national comparison for the first time. These more static and closed categories of identity do not capture the intersectional and dynamic dimensions of identification described elsewhere in this paper. Nevertheless, it showed that in England, Englishness remains the predominant national identity, expressed by two thirds of the population (with 58% choosing only English identity), while 29% identify with Britishness (19% choosing only British identity).

We have used the geographical scale of the Primary Urban Area (PUA) alongside the UK Census urban-rural classification to identify the core cities of the UK’s system
of cities, as well as how cities compare with non-urban localities, to map national identities in the PUAs in England. Our analysis shows that there are striking variations across England’s cities and regions.

In terms of Englishness, using the UK Census urban-rural classification, our analysis finds that an English-only identity is more prevalent in rural areas (e.g. 64% across rural towns) than in urban areas (e.g. 51% across major conurbations). Behind this headline, however, as Figure 2 shows, looking at England’s PUAs reveals even more variation, with a number of particularly English-identifying cities with over 75% English-only and over 80% English-plus-other identification. These are often ageing, post-industrial cities, such as Wigan, associated with the demographic Goodwin and Ford (2014) identify as the “left behind”: older, whiter, less educated and more working class than the population as a whole.

Across major conurbations, our analysis finds that the rate of Englishness is much lower (52% English-only) and a heterogeneous group of cities has low levels of English identification (the university cities of Cambridge and Oxford, London, Luton but also Hull, all with around 40% English only identification). But we also find a range of levels of Englishness within the major conurbations: English-only identities are even more prominent in outer London boroughs such as Havering (up to 70%) than in rural towns, but rare in super-diverse inner London boroughs (as low as 21% in Newham). But not identifying as English is not only more prevalent in major conurbations (40%); it is also far more common in those cities, towns, villages and hamlets in sparse settings (reaching 48% in sparse-set rural villages).

In contrast, we find that British-only identification is more prevalent in urban areas, especially major conurbations (24%, compared to 15% in rural towns), with a third of people in major conurbations choosing British as one of their identities (compared to 25% in sparse-set rural towns). Among England’s PUAs, as shown in Figure 2, the majority of the most British-identified cities are places with long-settled migrant background populations, often with larger South Asian Muslim communities: Blackburn, Bradford, Leicester, London and Luton, which are cities with around 30% British-only, up to 40% including British plus other identification. Within London, boroughs with long-settled minorities – Brent, Tower Hamlets and Harrow – have British-only identification of up to 41%. The least British PUAs are Barnsley, Doncaster, Mansfield, Middlesbrough and Wigan, although outer London boroughs Bromley and Havering have similarly low levels. People in sparse settings (including in cities in sparse settings, 74%) are also more likely than elsewhere to not identify as British at all.

Finally, other identities only, unsurprisingly, are urban phenomena: 13% of people in major conurbations compared to 8% nationally or just 2% in hamlets in sparse
settings. Among the PUAs, the cities with high numbers of other identities are the university towns of Cambridge and Oxford, as well as London, Luton and Hull, all with around a fifth of the population identifying with other identities. Cities with very few other identities are mainly smaller low-migration Northern cities, such as Birkenhead, Sunderland and Wigan (around 2% other identities).

![Belonging to Britain (London vs. Non-London)](image)

**Figure 2: English and British identification in England’s Primary Urban Areas**

Looking at Englishness and Britishness in England’s system of cities – the falling arc from Luton and London to Barnsley and Mansfield – we can see several interlocking patterns. Typically (although there are some outliers, such as Hull), Britishness is stronger in cities which are more economically vibrant, more ethnically and religiously diverse, have higher minority ethnic populations and are better linked to London.

A cluster of what we might call “ordinary cities”, exemplified by Crawley, where Englishness and Britishness are close to the national average, tend to be moderately prosperous. But the “English cities” are most striking: predominantly in the North but all outside the Southeast, typically falling behind economically, with ageing and lower educated populations. Whether Englishness is seen as an obdurate residual identity, in contrast to a progressive civic Britishness, or rather as a resurgent form of belonging, it is clear that policy-makers focusing on reconnecting the most marginal nodes in the UK’s system of cities need to focus on these “English cities”.

In the Census, presented with a list of possible national identities, most respondents ticked a single box, and so English identity and British identity are negatively correlated, hence the falling arc in Figure 2. However, this does not mean that those
identifying as English do not also identify as British. The Citizenship Survey, and British Social Attitudes (BSA) Survey, with a smaller but nationally representative sample, asked questions around national identity that reveal high levels of British identification in exactly the same regions where the Census revealed high levels of Englishness.

The national identity question has been posed in the annual BSA as “nationality” rather than national identity, which probably explains why British was a more popular answer (around 40% across the UK since the start of the century). However, Englishness remains as common as Britishness in some regions, especially in the North of England and Midlands. In contrast to the Census, in the BSA, with the question is in terms of nationality, Britishness is slightly lower in London than elsewhere (under 40% in most years), perhaps reflecting higher numbers of migrants – but surprisingly usually lowest in outer London. However, as in the Census, English identity has been significantly lower in London and especially inner London (often dipping below a fifth).

From 2007 to 2011, Citizenship Survey (CS) respondents were asked if they had a British identity or not, without any alternative (e.g. English) options. Between 2007 and 2009, just over half answered positively, with similar rates in London and outside London. Between 2009 and 2011, the proportion increased, to just over 60% in London and just under outside London. In 2003 to 2011, CS respondents were also asked how strongly they felt they belonged to Britain and from 2007 to 2011 they were asked how strongly they felt part of British society. Throughout this period, the majority responded positively to both questions: just under 90% to the first question and just over 90% to the second with no clear upward or downward trend over time. The higher rates of positive answers to these questions suggest that a sense of British belonging is more accessible and inclusive than a sense of British identity.

With the belonging to Britain question, the CS also asked about the intensity of the feeling. Here an interesting gap appeared between respondents in London and elsewhere, as shown in Figure 3.

Although there was a slight increase in the proportion of Londoners feeling they belong through the period, in London “fairly strongly” was more popular than “very strongly”, whereas outside London the reverse was true.
The post-secular city, religious identities, spaces of spirituality

The return of religion in some ways parallels the resurgence of Englishness. For many decades, social scientists observed declining religiosity in Britain, a trend associated with cities. However, the current century has seen the flooring out of this trend, due to drivers most intensely concentrated in cities: “the higher religiosity of immigrants, the rates of religious retention amongst immigrant groups, and differential fertility rates amongst the religious and non-religious populations” (Grasso 2013: 4; see discussion by Platt 2013: 14-15).

We can see the impact of this, for example, in the growth of the UK Muslim population, which increased by 75% between the 2001 and 2011 Censuses, which is likely to continue due to the age structure of the Muslim population (Ali 2015). This Muslim population is predominantly urban, with concentrations in four large cities: London, Birmingham, Bradford and Manchester (ibid).

Similarly, African migration, also concentrated in urban England, has helped reduce the long-term decline in the Christian population, as has the more geographically dispersed Polish migration. Thus, while the number of people declaring “no religion” rose between the 2001 and 2011 Censuses, this was less true in urban areas, and especially in the biggest cities. But the trend doesn’t just affect the demographics: it affects the urban landscape. Some commentators (e.g. Eade 2011, 2012, Molendijk et al 2010, Beaumont and Baker 2011) now talk about the emergence of “the post-secular city”. They argue that religion, faith communities and spiritual values have returned to the centre of public life, especially public policy, governance, and social identity.
They state that this in turn is exemplified by the rising number of religious spaces in our urban landscapes. Beaumont and Baker (2011: 46) identify such spaces as both “spaces of belonging” and “spaces of becoming”, where, for example, young Muslims develop practices of citizenship and secular citizens learn to understand diversity (see Garnett and Harris 2013 for some sophisticated analyses of how this plays out in different urban contexts). This trend affects the dynamics of identity and belonging as well. Since the 1990s, sociologists such as Phillips et al (2010), Eade (1997), Glynn (2002, 2009) and Jacobson (1997) have described a shift from ethnic to religious identities, for instance to specifically Islamic identities among younger generations of Muslims, no longer describing themselves as British Asians or British Bangladeshis etc.

The rise in Islamic identities has in turn led to the rise of Islamic identity politics, shaped by “Islam’s potential to provide a coalescing identity for those who feel that they are unjustly discriminated [against] and victimised…, and evidence that second generation Muslim immigrants are choosing specific elements of Islam and Muslim practices to signal their ‘otherness’ and resentment towards a mainstream society which they feel has failed them” (Grasso 2013: 4).

In fact, resurgent religious identities may respond to some of the same factors – rapid forms of change and globalisation – that drive the rise of obdurate and identitarian politics more generally, or what Castells (2004) calls “defensive identity politics”, which provide a sense of community and security in a risk society.

2.6 The decline of class or the return of whiteness?

For some decades, commentators have pointed to the decline of class identities – particularly working class identities – in the post-modern, post-industrial period, a claim echoed by politicians who have been keen to portray an emerging classless society. However, working class identification remains stubbornly persistent in the UK, according to large-scale social survey data; for example, in the British Election Survey (BES), while those identifying as working class unprompted went down from 34% in 1964 to 25% in 2005, when given a list of prompts those identifying as working class went from 31% to 32% over the same period (Heath et al 2009), while the BSA Survey shows 60% still identifying as working class in 2013 (Park et al 2013).

In fact, the last decade has seen something of a resurgence in public commentary about class. A key moment was the 2008 publication of a report published by the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (Broecke and Hamed 2008), which identified that white working class boys had significantly lower educational achievement than their peers. In particular, elite commentators in the media and politics increasingly talk about this white working class, generally represented as a homogenous ethnic category – typically framed, as Rogaly and Taylor (2011: 2) put it,
as either feral “chavs” or noble “beleaguered natives”, both set in opposition to “the multiculturally sophisticated middle classes or to (often implicitly black) immigrants.” As observed, in neither narrative are they “seen as having their own connections to minority and immigrant populations”.

There is some ethnographic research in white working class communities which reveals how narratives of resentment, and of “fairness” and “unfairness”, in the context of competition for the scarce resources of the local state, can drive a backlash against multiculturalism and sometimes find expression in far right politics (Evans 2012, Hewitt 2005, Jensen and Gidley 2015, Hanson 2014, Koch 2014, Rhodes 2011). This echoes Castells’ (2004) “defensive identity politics” discussed in the previous section.

Rogaly and Taylor’s fieldwork (2009), however, shows that many white working class people themselves have more complex and migratory personal and family histories than is suggested in mainstream discourse. There is also ethnographic and other evidence that white working class populations are characterised by less obdurate and defensive identity politics than public discourse suggests, and less hostile to difference (Back 1996, Hewitt 2005, Jensen and Gidley 2015, Twine 2000, Tyler 2004).

3. 2015–2065 Known unknowns, wicked problems and future challenges

It is clear that environmental and technological change affect identities. Previous research has identified changing age structure as helping to transform identities. Devolution is another major challenge. But what is equally interesting is how forms of identity and belonging might impact on our ability to adapt to such challenges. For example, personal and collective identities make a difference to the resilience and adaptiveness of cities by making certain forms of behaviour change more or less possible. For instance, evidence shows that identity, e.g. “green” self-identity, might enable the behaviour change necessary to adapt to changing climates (Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010), but also that identity, e.g. the fear of lifestyle changes threatening personal identities, can have the opposite effect (Kahan, 2010).

The key known unknowns faced by future cities are the role of technology, demographic challenges and devolution. All of these raise questions of how we maintain identities, sense of place and sense of belonging in the context of rapid and profound change. The centrality of these known unknowns to policy debate has been a driver of liquid modernity’s “risk culture” and sense of insecurity (Bauman 2000). Where industrial society was concerned with the distribution of “goods” (wealth, health and welfare), for Ulrich Beck our risk society is concerned with the distribution of “bads” (risk, infection, disease); the dominant problem of risk society is insecurity, the proliferation of these bads (Beck 1992: 20). Some research suggests a risk society engenders a culture of blame: the “not me – other” phenomenon (Mythen 2004: 112).
Jane Franklin (1998: 2-4) argues that there are two political responses to the proliferation of insecurity. One, “the politics of nostalgic community”, is defensive: seeking to preserve that which once provided a secure backdrop to life. “This politics appears to be a resistance to change. It builds on an idealised notion of community and encourages efforts to bring back the traditional family, reconstruct strong neighbourhoods and reassert a kind of commonsense morality to hold it all together. It offers a way of imagining a secure society.” The second path recognises insecurity and seeks to construct a new politics to deal with it – venturing into the unknown, living creatively with risk, creating a shared recognition of the risks we face (ibid.).

This section is not intended as a comprehensive review of the literature and evidence, as each bullet point here signals an enormous field of inquiry, but rather sets out some of the contours of the context in which the trends discussed in the remainder of this report will unfold.

• The role of technology

Changing patterns of technology will affect how trends in identity, belonging and citizenship play out in the coming decades. As Penny Harvey (2013) has suggested, drawing on Zygmunt Bauman (1996), preoccupations with “identity” are not only relatively recent, but emerged as a way of addressing the uncertainties of modern life and its drive to change. Our concern with identity emerged in response to the unsettling effects of technological failings or limits.

Manuel Castells’ (2000b) describes the complexity of technological, social, economic, political and cultural dimensions of societal change emerging in the 2000s, leading to the “network society”. Castells saw between the industrial era and an ‘information age’ (described in terms of both new communication technologies and new biotechnologies) the emergence of a “space of flows”. This work runs parallel to David Harvey’s (1990, 2010), when he describes how space is rendered less important through new technologies, but also new relationships with information itself. Harvey (1990) writes of the “flattening” and “compression” of space and time, globally something that can be traced back through to The Enlightenment, but intensifying in the information age.

Also relating to this body of work is that of theorists such as Virilio (1998), Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 1988) and Bauman (1998), who, in different ways, emphasise the importance of speed in an era of time-space compression. The effects of speed create an uneven geography in the networked society: globalisation for some, localisation for others. The geographer Doreen Massey (2005) has thus described people stranded in a bad “eternal present”, as others literally fly around the earth in an exciting one – the former economically necessary for the latter. Thus Bauman (1998) argues that the rich have time whilst the poor have space: globalisation sorts the weightlessness of an
overclass and the gravity of the class of insecure class known as the precariat (Savage et al 2013, Standing 2011).

Although there are important critiques of this binary thinking, showing that the precariat also includes many who are highly networked and technologically native (Hanson 2014, Candeias 2008); it is clearly the case that some sections of society are more spatially constrained than others, and thus more likely to develop place-based, territorial identities. These include the gang-like “postcode” loyalties of many young people, which it is argued (e.g. Lewis 2011) played a part in the 2011 urban riots, as we explore further later in this paper. However, as with the “cybertariat” (Candeias 2008), these postcode-affiliated youth are highly networked native users of new mobile technologies, and their hyper-localism is perhaps better thought of as a “hyperlinked localism”.

How can we understand the implications of these on-going changes on identities, belonging and citizenship? The line of thinking, following from Castells’ work (2000a, 2000b), emphasises the emergence of online identities (Ellison 2013, Miller 2013), in complex relationships with offline identities, including place-based ones. Cultural theorists (e.g. Bennett 1999) have argued that this has accompanied a shift from subcultural and countercultural identities to “tribes” to “neo-tribes”, understood as effectively the consumerist “bricoleurs” of previous countercultures described above. Again, some of the more simplistic accounts of the 2011 urban riots framed the disturbances through this kind of lens, seeing them as the revolt of “nihilistic” consumerism inverted (see Valluvan et al 2013).

However, as Miller (2013) has shown, online identities are not necessarily in opposition to offline ones, particularly as the anonymity favoured in the earlier internet has given way to stronger personal identities in the social media period. Thus local social media – often described as “hyperlocal” (e.g. Hess 2008, 2009) – such as local blogs, local online forums, and local residents networked through Twitter, have augmented and empowered local forms of civic action and placebased identities (Pé 2012, Bingham-Hall 2014): another example of “hyperlinked localism”.

There is also a growing literature on ethnic and other identities mobilising online, including both local and trans-local levels. This suggests that even as opting in and out of identities becomes easier, the possibilities for maintaining multiple identities are strengthened by online platforms. Therefore, smaller and more dispersed group identifications are increasingly able to sustain stronger forms of identity and belonging (Alonso and Oiarzabal 2010, Bernal 2006, Brinkerhoff 2009, Diminescu 2008, 2010, Franklin 2001, see Grubmüller et al 2013 for discussion of social media analytics for future oriented policy-making and Wetzstein and Leitner 2013 on this issue specifically in relation to migrant and minority communities).
In this sense, online identities open up the possibility of more flexible identifications—but also the maintenance of more closed defensive and obdurate identities that might not be sustainable offline.

• The demographic challenge
A second set of known unknowns is how the changing age structure of the UK will play into the trends associated with identity, belonging and citizenship: Considerable evidence (Harper 2013, Grasso 2013) shows that our society is witnessing the strengthening of age-based or generational identities: relatively newly recognised childhood identities, long-recognised distinct adolescent and young adult identities, increasingly fractured adult identities, and growingly important older and old age adult identities. Mimicking earlier discussions of the rise of the teenager and its associated subcultures, we are now seeing the proliferation of categories such as “silver surfers” and other “third age” and “fourth age” identifications. At present, the older population is less ethnically and religiously diverse than younger populations, but this will change as migration-driven demographic dynamics unfold (Simpson 2013).

The UK’s changing age profile and family structures (both affected by migration patterns) are the topic of other papers, so we will just note that these shifts will in turn re-shape the dynamics of identity, belonging and citizenship. Understanding these dynamics is complicated both by the difficulty of disentangling age, cohort and period effects, and by uncertainties about future population change. Demographic changes of this sort open up possibilities for new generational inequities and conflicts (Berg and Eckstein 2015), which might intersect with some of the forms of competition for urban social goods discussed elsewhere in this report, e.g. home ownership. Crucially, we know that demographic trends unfold at different rates across the UK’s regions: for example cities, while ageing, have younger populations than non-urban areas. In framing identities in terms of resilience, as we do in this paper, it is significant that more obdurate and defensive identities map on to those locations within the UK’s system of cities with the larger ageing and with less mobile populations. Thus, the “English cities” emerging in our analysis (see Section 2.4) are structured by patterns of ageing which give weight to “left behind” groups of older and immobile residents, while the “British cities” have more dynamic and younger populations.

• Devolution
A third known unknown to signal is devolution. We know that constitutional change impacts on identity (Curtice 2013). However, there is very little literature on how devolution might affect urban identities. Nonetheless, there are clues. Gillian Allard’s (2007:71) analysis of Welsh cultural policy documents from the last two decades finds that: “the endorsement of an eclectic cultural style as a collective identity for a diverse citizenry is compromised by the implication that it is the Welsh language, rather than diversity itself, that signifies diversity. Scrutiny of proposals for, or assertions about,
a “branded” cultural identity reveals inconsistencies between the cultural practices of place-based communities and the opportunistic affiliations that are deployed in the interests of social and economic development in a “new” information economy.”

Advocates of devolution have attempted in the devolved nations to harness the kinds of open, civic, mongrel identities described elsewhere in this paper. For instance, a cross-party pro-migration consensus among the political classes in Scotland has developed both as a result of perceived demographic need to renew Scotland’s population, and also as a way of developing a civic Scottishness which escapes obdurate older sectarian Catholic and Protestant identities (Jones 2012).

There is some evidence of success, in that 25% of Scottish residents born outside Scotland identify as Scottish, whether they come from South and East Asia, Africa and the Middle East or from England, and many migrant groups in Scotland (including Pakistanis and Bangladeshis) are nearly as likely to give a Scottish-only identity as a British-only. Most strikingly, almost all minority groups are more likely to claim a Scottish identity in Scotland than an English identity in England. However, there is a sharp difference in the likelihood of Christian residents of Scotland identifying as Scottish than of minority religion residents, which is not the case with Britishness in England (Simpson and Smith 2013).

4. Trends

Having set out a baseline covering the period from 1965 to 2015, and identified key known unknowns, we turn to some of the key trends which are likely to shape citizenship, belonging and identity in the UK’s cities of the future, focusing on those trends related to the on-going migration driven demographic transformation of the UK. Clearly the devolution narrative above - particularly in relation to what has become known as “Brexit” - needs to be subject to further intense study across the next 5-10 years.

4.1 Stratified forms of citizenship

Belonging to the British polity was traditionally conceived in terms of being the monarch’s subject rather than a citizen of the UK. Only with the 1981 British Nationality Act did nationality and citizenship legally coincide, as various categories of colonial and Commonwealth identity were formally excluded from nationality (although Commonwealth citizens retain the right to vote).

However, the constitutional changes brought about through the construction of European Union citizenship opened new gaps between nationality and social and political rights. This has been identified in the literature as part of a global trend from stable national forms of citizenship to more stratified and multi-scalar forms.
While twentieth century theories of citizenship (e.g. Marshall 1950), identified the rights and responsibilities as universal but bounded by the nation-state, since the 1990s some scholars have identified ways in which citizenship has become unbounded from national borders through the emergence of supra-national spaces of citizenship (Soysal 1994) or through the granting of “denizenship”, near-citizenship conditions to long-term regular migrants (Hammar 1990).

On the one hand, we have seen a multicultural “revaluation” of citizenship by scholars such as Kymlicka (2003) and on the other a post-national “de-emphasis” of national citizenship by scholars such as Soysal (2004). Whereas multiculturalists point to new forms of national citizenship more accommodating of differences, post-nationalists point to the granting of citizenship rights to non-nationals. However, these observed trends towards multicultural, post-national and cosmopolitan forms of citizenship have been belied by increasing restrictions on citizenship rights internally. Lydia Morris (2003), using Lockwood’s (1996) concept of “civic stratification” has shown how various forms of partial membership (Brubaker 1989) in citizenship are emerging – described by Schuster (2003) as a way of filtering welcome from unwelcome strangers – an insight documented across Europe by Kraler (2010) and Kofman (2002).

Anderson (2013) has argued that the workings of these internal and external frontiers to citizenship’s moral community have increasingly cramped the space of civic rights by defining a putative “good citizen” against the “non-citizen” abroad (Hoenig 2001) and the “failed citizen” domestically. Empirically, even as the rates of naturalisation and dual nationality rises, many European countries are taking increasingly conditional and restrictive approaches to the naturalisation process.

Some scholars have argued that these processes are encouraging the growth of class of “deportable” and right-less “new helots”, whose precarious status is exploited in serving the denizens of global cities (Anderson 2013, Cohen 2006, De Genova 2002, Sigona 2012). These kinds of shifts have important implications for the practice of citizenship, but also for citizenship as a form of identity and belonging, as national space and the space of citizenship become ever less coterminous, encouraging the formation of new forms of identity and belonging. We might call these identifications “multiplex” (Rosaldo 1989): comprised of multiple, overlapping and intersecting trajectories.

### 4.2 Multiplex forms of identity and belonging

Studies from a transnational perspective have found that multiple identities need not conflict and can often in fact enhance each other (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). In the UK, the evidence is clear that minority ethnic citizens - especially naturalised migrants and including majority Muslim ethnicities - have high levels of identification with and belonging to Britishness – typically much higher than in majority ethnic populations.
There are significantly different trends around identity and belonging in different ethnic and religious groups and in different generations. Ethnic minorities tend to report increasing levels of British identity following both length of stay and naturalisation among migrants, as well as rising levels generation-to-generation among those of migrant background. Muslim and South Asian groups tend to have especially high levels of British identification, again increasing in the second generation; Black Caribbean groups tend to have lower rates of British identification as well as lower rates of minority identification (Platt 2014).

The on-going trend towards greater identification with Britain among minority ethnic populations is also geographically uneven: most pronounced in London, less pronounced in many of the least urban regions (East of England, South East, South West and Scotland). While this trend towards multiplex, hyphenated identities can be seen as a symptom of the postmodern turbulence that fuels anxiety and social insecurity, it is also clear that open, multiplex identities can be features of an adaptive and resilient population in the face of rapid change.

As Pelling (2010: 6) argues: “adaptive capacity should take note of the extent to which politically and economically ambiguous social networks cut across… societies. It may well be that this mess of interactions forms the social raw material that shapes capacity to identify new information, learn and cope with change, and is as important for long-term adaptive capacity as the more easily observable formal organisational structures that are predominantly used to indicate adaptive capacity”. In this “mess of interactions”, he suggests, forms of bonding capital within communities can be transferred into forms of bridging capital between communities, and vice versa (ibid).

Such messy interactions and multiplex identities render mosaic multiculturalist models of municipal governance, such as developed in Britain from the 1970s onwards, increasingly anachronistic, as distinct, discrete and homogenous ethnic “communities” give way to “a space within which difference can be negotiated and argued over” (Kesten et al 2011).

Nonetheless, the growth of mixing and of multiplex civic Britishness can be seen alongside evidence for other identity dynamics, summarised by Platt (2013), such as “reactive ethnicity” (responding to a perceived hostile environment through stronger minority ethnic identification) and alienation (withdrawal from mainstream identities). And the generation of confident, adaptive multiplex identities should not blind us to the persistence of identities which reject or position themselves outside of shared civic identities: “when these overlapping connections fail... the fractionalisation
of communities and organisations into isolated sub-communities takes place” (Pelling 2010: 6).

Experience of racial harassment is a strong predictor of lower attachment to Britishness among minority ethnic populations (Platt 2013: 13). On the one hand, the psychological consequences of personal identification with a “devalued” identity can have negative consequences for self-esteem; on the other hand experience of discrimination can result in politicised assertions of identity that aim to mobilise common experiences across those discriminated against (Platt 2013: 16). While minority ethnic groups tend to have higher levels of identification with Britishness than the White British majority, among the latter there has been a growth in last decade of identification with the countries of the UK, particularly Englishness, Scottishness and Welshness (Platt 2014).

This identification has been mobilised politically, for instance in Scotland in the Yes campaign in the 2014 referendum (and the subsequent movement of “the 45 percent” after its defeat) and in England by the UK Independence Party or more explicitly far right groups such as the English Defence League (EDL). Thus Gilroy argues that the choice for the future is between “a melancholic longing for a return to the relative cultural homogeneity of old” or an appreciation of mundane “conviviality” (2005). That melancholic longing is most often expressed, in both majority ethnic and minority ethnic populations, in terms of the ideal of community. This idea, as the political philosopher Iris Marion Young wrote: “privileges unity over difference, immediacy over mediation, sympathy over the limits of one’s understanding of others from their point of view. Community is an understandable dream, expressing a desire for selves that are transparent to one another, relationships of mutual identification, social closeness and comfort. The dream is understandable, but politically problematic... because those motivated by it will tend to suppress differences amongst themselves or implicitly to exclude from their political groups persons with whom they do not identify.” (2005: 1).

At the most extreme, the ideal of community in a context of rapid change drives Castells’ “defensive identity movements” (2004), including the forms of fundamentalist belonging associated with Islamism or the EDL. Thus scenarios for future cities need to attend to the obdurate presence of attachment to exclusive group-based identities and the resurgence of divisive, identitarian politics. Again, the need to examine these dimensions in more detail as Britain attempts to exit the European Union should be obvious.

### 4.3 City identities

However, it is important not to overplay local identities, compared to regional and especially national identities, which remain more salient for more of us most of the
time. As John Curtice (2013: 12-13) found, BSA data from England in the 2000s showed that around a quarter of us were “very proud” of our region compared to half of us who are either not at all proud or don’t think of ourselves in that way. In the same period Citizenship Survey data revealed that around a quarter of us feel we belong very strongly in our local area and a third of us feel we belong very strongly to our neighbourhoods. These figures contrast with the nearly a half who feel “very proud” of or a very strong sense of belonging to England and/or Britain. Nonetheless, sub-national and city identities appear to be gaining ground (ibid). This and the following sections identify a number of ways in which city and other place-based identities are emerging as important, leading to more multi-layered identifications for urban residents.

There is some evidence that younger people and minority ethnic residents identify more strongly with city identities: such identities tend to be relatively inclusive in the sense that they are less marked by ethnicity than national identities and are therefore more open to diversity. Drawing on the detailed analysis of different localities developed by Hickman et al (2012), Reicher and Hopkins (2013: 6) suggest that: “where a place is defined in terms of a successive history of migrations and in terms of a developing mixture of populations and cultures, then new migrants are accepted more easily and cohesion (understood not as bland uniformity but as an accommodation of differences) is maintained. Conversely, where local identity is defined in terms of a settled ‘indigenous’ population (and where the reality of previous migrations and cultural variety is suppressed) then new migrants are seen as more problematic and the potential for conflict is heightened.”

This has a crucial policy implication, for how local authorities and others can use place making and place branding strategies to make more resilient places: “it is crucial to start by creating a context which minimises the purchase of versions of identity that problematise migrants and that allow them to be represented as the source of difficulties for existing members of the community. This means ensuring that questions of poverty and social inequality are addressed in areas of settlement and of ensuring that any increase of population is matched by increased social provision. At the same time, however, such economic policies must be matched by leadership in the social and cultural domain so as to promote a notion of community as a developing relationship between diverse streams of people (Reicher and Hopkins 2013: 6).”

We can point to several examples from the UK (Jones 2012) and across Europe (Collett and Gidley 2012) of local and regional authorities acting to promote such open forms of identity, confirming the role political leadership in shaping belonging. Examples include campaigns such as “I Love Hackney”, “One Oldham”, “We Are Walsall” or “One Tower Hamlets”.

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Linked to this, we can see the proliferation of forms of municipal citizenship, including a directly elected mayors (and in some cities parallel Young Mayors, elected by young people), alongside participatory forms of governance such as citizen’s panels and youth parliaments, and at sub-city level in neighbourhood forum approaches.

4.4 City identity and local inflections of national and global events
A range of literature identifies the significance of major events such as major sporting events in shaping identity, with evidence for heightened national identity and civic pride in hosting cities, but also for sense of symbolic “displacement” and exclusion in hosting localities. The 2012 Olympics, as well as previous sporting competitions hosted in UK cities, provides important evidence for this. What became known as “London 2012” was held mainly in East London, with some elements in sporting venues across Britain such as the Millennium Stadium in Cardiff. Former Olympic medallist Sebastian Coe and London’s Mayor, Ken Livingstone, fronted the winning bid for the games, awarded in 2005.

At the centre of the successful bid was the ambition to use the Olympics to invest in East London, seen as a stigmatised zone in contrast to London’s West (Harvie 2013). Executing the event involved considerable redevelopment in London, centring on a former industrial site at Stratford in East London. Analysis has shown both economic benefits and costs to local areas hosting the events, for instance through new development and real estate inflation, as well as the political contestation (by resident groups and others) of regeneration efforts (e.g. Kontokosta 2012, Wolff and Gibbons 2012, Raco 2012).

The regeneration of East London through the Olympics has been seen to have generated some forms of exclusion from emerging place-based identities and disruption of some forms of local belonging. Watt (2013), in studies of social housing residents and young people in temporary accommodation living close to the Olympic site’s ground zero, found such residents to be affected by a rapidly changing sense of place and space (e.g. the emergence of a “new Stratford”), generating “displacement” (Davidson 2009: 226): a sense that changes had little to do with them, that legacy “is for others, not for them” that displacement “is taking place directly and indirectly as the local area changes so that existing residents no longer feel it is ‘their place’” (Watt 2013: 118).

Just as the Olympic 2012 event was structured through a narrative of contrasts between East and West London, the 2014 Commonwealth Games in Glasgow uses a similar story. Gray and Mooney (2011: 4) describe how: “narratives of decline, ‘blight’ and decay play a central role in stigmatising the local population. ‘Glasgow East’ represents the new urban frontier in a city that has been heralded in recent decades as a model of successful post-industrial transformation... To this end, the media and
politicians have played a particularly important role in constructing Glasgow East as a marker of a ‘broken Britain’.

However, as well as the narrative of regeneration, the successful Olympic bid also drew on a discourse of London as a diverse, global city, celebrating the kind of inclusive, mongrel civic identity described in previous sections. The slogan of “the world in one city”, amplified in Mayor Livingstone’s responses to the 7/7 bombings which occurred immediately after London won its Olympic bid, signalled a confident multicultural Britishness (Vertovec 2007).

However, London 2012 as cultural event and national conversation – staging both an imagined national past and an imagined national future – has received critical attention too. Andrew Kötting and Iain Sinclair described the zone around the Olympic Park as a “cloud of 21st-century consciousness” (Kötting and Sinclair in Hanson, 2014). The opening ceremony was choreographed by the British film director Danny Boyle. He attempted a representation of Britain from the industrial revolution on, via a romanticised, feudal, pastoral scene. Chimneys began to split the ground, replacing the maypoles and giant oak tree with the “dark satanic mills” of William Blake, whose Jerusalem was performed. A particular, civic kind of nationalism was being broadcast, with two mourning pauses, one for the World Wars and one for the 7/7 terrorist attacks on London, while a section involving NHS workers incubated some criticism of changing government policies (Hanson 2014).

4.5 Placebranding at city and sub-city level

Sporting events are among the many examples of different symbolic values being applied to urban identity in Britain’s cities through processes of city-branding. While much of the literature on city branding rightly stresses the role of municipal authorities, we can see how place making is both a top-down and ground-up process, actively engaged in by residents, by local authorities, and by a range of other actors such as estate agents and property developers. Thus for example Paganoni (2012: 13, cf Keith 2005) describes the ways in which various actors “attempt to present their cities as diasporic, cosmopolitan and ‘glocalized’ spaces” In this sense, we need to look at both the physical and symbolic landscapes of city terrain in order to track both identity formation and place-branding. So far in this section, we have focused on emerging city-level identities, citizenships and forms of belonging. It is also important to foreground sub-city level dynamics too, including neighbourhood processes, which play a constitutive role in how we see the city itself. Ethnographic accounts foreground examples of bottom-up neighbourhood identities, which sometimes draw on but sometimes cut across class or ethnic identities (e.g. Tyler 2007).

Equally, other literatures point to how bottom-up sub-local identities can come together with policy discourses and state narratives. Two key examples are the
“cultural quarter” and the “urban village”. An enormous literature has built up around the former, both promotional and critical, with analysis from several UK cities including London (Keith 2004a,b, 2005), Sheffield (Moss 2002), Manchester (Brown et al 2000), Wolverhampton (McCarthy 2005a) and Dundee (McCarthy 2005b), showing how place-based identities can both feed into and emerge from the efforts of local state and non-state actors. The rural was traditionally associated with the white middle classes, as Tyler (2003: 392) points out, which has a long history stretching back to a post-WW2 cultural bracketing against a racialised immigrant urban setting. But in Tyler’s study of Leicester, “the rural” is a multiple but loaded signifier, declared in various ways in city spaces, by different groups.

Tyler identifies that “villages” can be declared within urban sprawl to symbolically resist suburbanisation, and in her example to bracket away certain Asian families, who are themselves moving away from inner city areas. Similarly, Butler and Robson (2001) describe the formation of imagined “urban villages” by middle class Londoners, calibrated with patterns of gentrification in inner city areas. Contrasting with these forms of urban pastoralism, but working in similar ways, more selfconsciously metropolitan and cosmopolitan forms of sub-city identity can be seen in the shift towards high-rise waterside living in several UK cities. Hills (2002), for example, has pointed out how the urban middle classes bracket themselves away from the “suburban” through their patterns of consumption in Manchester.

Similarly, the large commercial zones omnipresent in contemporary cities have been key sites of topdown and bottom-up place-branding efforts. Warnaby (2013) argues that the city square, “through its role as an urban node” can form “an urban place ‘product’”: “the creation of a genius loci (or ‘spirit of the place’), which can be capitalised on for place marketing purposes.” The example he deploys is St Ann’s Square in Manchester, where regular events incorporate spectacles to draw in consumers, jazz bands, French and German Markets; symbolising middle class taste and cosmopolitanism. We can add to this “spectacular” place-branding the series of millennium wheels in British Cities, which Overy (2003) described as retaining the aesthetics of nineteenth century “vertigo machines”, while incorporating the health and safety conscious dimensions of the twentyfirst century.

The development of these older squares and sites in cities have been accompanied by the construction of massive retail centres, often off motorways at the edges of cities. Jewell (2001) charts “The fall and rise of the British mall”, examining iconic urban sites such as The Trafford Centre in Manchester, Meadowhall in Sheffield, and the “mega-mall” Bluewater. These postmodern sites, embodiments of Venturi’s *Learning From Las Vegas* architectural manifesto (Venturi, et al, 1972) are mirrors of the ways in which everyday multiculture is both provided for and cheapened by consumer capitalism.
In all these examples, the symbols of urban landscapes are crucial to urban identity formation and place-branding. But an overemphasis on the emergence of spectacular place branding strategies and on the citadels of high consumption can obscure the fact that the consumption of place is always multifaceted and complex: Harvey’s (1988) image of the flattening of space can’t be taken too literally.

Thus beyond Warnaby’s (2013) St Ann’s Square or the Trafford Centre described by Jewell (2001), Manchester also contains a rich system of distinct locales. Its “ordinary” neighbourhoods are now sites for Polish delicatessens (which don’t signal the same cosmopolitanism as St Ann’s Square’s German markets), which are similarly connected to multiple elsewheres, and connected to multiple systems of time and place, with just-in-time ordering vastly increasing consumer choice via containerisation and air freight.

The German and French Market, the Polish delicatessen, are all in a sense “neither here nor there”, spliced into symbolic and physical global networks. Similarly, Manchester’s more affluent southern suburbs, close to the airport, contain residents and corporations directly connected to global economies; edge zones contain sharp juxtapositions between deprived and wealthy areas; and super-diverse neighbourhoods such as Levenshulme have been colonised in recent years by a moustachioed pseudo-bohemian middle class, playing ukuleles and appearing, in retro clothing, like ghosts from previous eras. Such “hipster gentrification” is an increasingly important feature of many UK cities, in which arguably the aesthetics and some of the strategies of bohemian countercultural activities have been co-opted by cultural policy and place-making social entrepreneurs.

Buser et al (2013: 606) argue that creative practice, activism and urban place making play a significant role in the construction of meaning in urban spaces. Through an analysis of two activist groups in Stokes Croft, Bristol, they argue that: “cultural activism provides new political prospects within the wider context of global capitalism through the cultivation of a shared aesthetics of protest. By cultivating aspects of shared history and a mutual enthusiasm for creative practice as a form of resistance, Stokes Croft has emerged as a ‘space of nurturance’ for creative sensibilities. However, we note how Stokes Croft as an autonomous space remains open-ended and multiple for activists interested in promoting different visions of social justice.”

The development of certain quarters of London’s East End has been well-covered, as have the links between fine art markets and regeneration here (Stallabrass, 2006). But rural equivalents to Stokes Croft can be found too, in places such as Hebden Bridge. What characterises all these places is a complex mesh of gentrification and declared “down at heelness”, increased house prices coupled with symbolic declarations of various kinds of ‘radicalism’, whether this comes in the form of green growing groups
or other collective activities (see Hanson, 2014). In such areas, urban diversity has been realised as a financial asset (Mirza 2009). And of course, all of these forms of change are contested and resisted, often in the name of “authentic” or “indigenous” place-based identities, by anti-gentrification voices, although these are often articulated most powerfully by earlier waves of gentrifiers now priced out.

4.6 Urban youth territorialities

If cosmopolitan high-rise living, urban pastoralism, hipster gentrification and indigenist anti-gentrification discourses are expressions of the tense intersection of new place-based identities with new consumerist personal identities; an even more spectacular instance of this is the rise of youth territorialism (Keith 2007a). We can explore this through two case studies, both instances of unrest in Britain’s cities in 2010-11 (see Keith 1993 for a critical genealogy of some of these debates). What became known as the “Millbank riot” began on the afternoon of 11th November 2010 after a central London student protest against education fees. Students gathered outside and then forced entry into Millbank Tower, location of Conservative Party office space, by smashing a plate glass window and then attacking the offices inside; seen in some commentary as inaugurating a cycle of unrest that continued into 2011, in the wake of the crash of 2008.

Media attention focused on the class identities thought to be at play in the Millbank riot, with a Daily Mail front page (Gill, S, 2010) describing the event as the “hijacking of a very middle class protest”. While the Mail reportage stressed the “mindlessness” of the violence, some accounts described Millbank, and subsequent clashes with police at later student protests, as the return of earlier forms of politicised protest (Bauman, 2012, McDonald, 2012) or as a UK instance of the revolts of the “indignant” in southern Europe in the context of austerity and economic crisis (Caroll, 2014, Sutterlüty, 2014 and Tester, 2014). Similarly, the urban unrest across Britain’s cities in the summer of 2011 was often seen by commentators as variously “meaningless” and “apolitical”, or “engaged” and “re-politicised” (ibid). These discussions often took their cue from Zizek’s (2008) analysis of the French suburban riots of 2005, claiming that there were no demands there, no utopian narratives, and that the protesters only wanted to be recognised, in light of a vague sense of stigma: “the 2005 revolt was an outburst with no pretence to vision.”

If the much repeated commonplace that we live in a post-ideological era has any sense, it is here. Thus the very language to be used to describe the 2011 unrest was an unsettled question, leading many commentators to adopt an ironic, distancing use of quotation marks, as with Andrew Wallace, who wrote: “Whether we accept that ‘riots’ (and urban unrest generally) require a coherent ‘message’ and ‘target’ or not, it is clear that the 2011 riots did not display much coherence. However,... they challenged not only the structural conditions, but the moral imaginaries which are brought to bear in
the convening of neoliberal urban space. The ‘rioters’ succeeded (for a short period) in challenging, subverting and caricaturing these imaginaries. In seeming to turn against their ‘own’, they unsettled the geographies and practices of responsible ‘community’ by engaging in behaviour directly contrary to that expected of ‘empowered’ local actors inhabiting particular social and moral formations and defending/promoting place.” The 2011 riots, like Millbank, began with an enraged expression of community politics, in protests over the shooting of Mark Duggan by police in Tottenham (BBC, 2011) before turning into something else.

These events then tipped, via social media networking, into a series of nationwide incidents, often characterised by looting and the destruction of commercial retail spaces. Much centre-right media coverage focused on the family businesses destroyed, while centre-left commentary narrated a series of discontinuous, unfocused attacks on commercial city architecture across Britain. A *New Statesman* leader captured this tendency well: “The riots were not, as some have claimed, an uprising or insurrection against the coalition’s spending cuts. Many of the cuts deemed responsible for the violence have not even taken effect. This is not to say that the cuts will not make matters worse. Rather, it is to say that placing an undue and politically convenient emphasis on their role risks masking the social and economic deformities that lie beneath the violence... The looting was, on one level, pure nihilism; on another, it was a crude attempt by rioters to mimic the conspicuous consumption exercised by the affluent and credit-rich. It was an expression of the values of a society in which we have been taught that, in the words of the former Labour minister Alan Milburn, to lead a good life is to ‘earn and to own.’”

Moving beyond the riots, this line of analysis can be traced in Gilroy’s (2001: 242) critiques of marketised “urban culture” emerging in the 1990s: “the culture industry is prepared to make substantial investments in blackness providing it yields a user-friendly, house-trained and marketable ‘reading’ or translation of the stubborn vernacular that can no longer be called a counterculture.” But Gilroy also notes that this corporate urban culture facilitates a range of intercultural exchanges, opening up a space for conviviality, dialogue and identity formation across racialised boundaries. Urban youth are most intensely subjected to the pull of corporate global culture yet also produce stubbornly local identities, often circumscribed by the most microscopic of geographies; emphatically local cultural forms – grime (Gidley 2007), the “Bristol sound” (Webb 2007) – emerge from confrontation with global cultural forms such as US hip hop.

Back (1996) has shown how such forms of cultural exchange in highly localised youth cultures generate forms of “neighbourhood nationalism”, in which older differences of race and ethnicity are erased or suspended as new loyalties emerge.
But mapped on to these spaces of interculture, mediated by consumption, are intense and sometimes violent proprietary affects of micro-local territoriality, often described in terms of “postcode” loyalties. Arguably, then, we can see these strong forms of place-based identity as another face of obdurate defensive identity politics.

4.7 The role of place in shaping identity and belonging

Previous sections have outlined a series of trending forms of place-based identity, citizenship and belonging in the UK’s cities. In this section, we briefly explore how aspects of the space – of urban form, spatial planning and urban landscapes – might shape these. The Concordia Discors research project, comparing eleven neighbourhoods across five European cities, came to a number of findings about this (Pastore and Ponzo 2013, Jensen and Gidley 2015). Among the locales researched, the level of connectivity of the area to the rest of the city made a difference. “Island” or “village” quarters, closed off to the rest of the city (such as inner or outer city housing estates), more typically developing “closed” social systems Wallman (2003): densely cohesive with strong bonding capital but brittle in the context of change and lacking bridging capital.

In contrast, neighbourhoods characterised by multiple flows are often more “open”: linked externally but less cohesive internally, generating forms of living with difference that could be characterised as “separate together”. Similarly, types and uses of space made a difference, with possibilities for interaction shaped by the availability of accessible public space such as markets or parks – the absence of such sites of interaction limits cohesion; consumption-oriented sites of interaction promote superficial mixing for some groups; while a wealth of meeting places creates greater possibility of meaningful interaction. These kinds of findings clearly have implications for planning and urban design, and a rich tradition of urbanism has sought to develop principles and practices for addressing such issues, from Richard Sennett’s Uses of Disorder (1970) to the work of Leonie Sandercock (e.g. 2003) and of the Comedia group (e.g. Wood and Landry 2008). 24

5. Future threats

In this and the following section, we outline key future threats and opportunities for the UK’s cities, based on the presentation of evidence above. From these threats and opportunities, we identify four city scenarios.

These four scenarios draw on the work of Dominic Abrams and Milica Vasiljevic (2013) for the Foresight Future Identities programme, which outlined four ideal types of identity-based interaction based on the presence or absence of what Berry (2001) calls “contact participation” (good relations between individuals and within groups) and, on a second axis, high or low levels of prejudice. This model recognises (as also shown in the Concordia Discors research, Pastore and Ponzo 2013) that positive relations do not
map on to positive representations of other identities. Abrams and Vasiljevic’s (2013) four ideal types are:

- “Rivalrous cohesion”, communities living parallel lives, underlying an urban scenario we call here the sectarian city;
- “Big Society” or “harmonious cohesion”, typical of what we call the intercultural city;
- “Broken Britain” or “malign antipathy”, driving what we call the revanchist city;
- “Benign indifference” or what we call “Together apart”, predominant in the ordinary city.

As Abrams and Vasiljevic (2013) summarise, there is some economic and social psychological evidence that people retreat from multiple and tolerant modes of belonging into exclusive and divisive modes in times of economic crisis and austerity and in the wake of certain types of negative large scale events. For example, there is evidence that xenophobia and isolationism (e.g. Euroscepticism) tend to rise at such times. However, it is also clear that these relationships are not straightforward, and are mediated by political opportunity structures; thus, for instance, the post-2008 economic crisis was followed by rising anti-migrant sentiment in Scandinavian countries relatively unaffected by the economic crisis, but far less so in Italy and Spain which were among the most gravely affected countries. In this section, we explore two key areas of threat to future cities: identity-based division and social segregation, threats likely to be intensified in conditions of long-term economic suffering but which can be mediated by appropriate policy responses.

### 5.1 Urban politics of identity-based division

In previous sections, we have reviewed the ways in which times of rapid flux create a thirst for obdurate and divisive identities, including fundamentalist forms of belonging. The starkest example is probably jihadi Islamism, which often (as with...
the “Sharia patrols” which have appeared in East London or flag-burning incidents in Westminster, as well as in terrorist attacks such as 7/7) takes urban space as its spectacular stage.

The CONTEST strategy, published by the government in the wake of the 7/7 bombings, identified a series of “risk factors” driving this. Identity featured among these: “Radicalisation seems to be related directly to a crisis in identity and, specifically, to a feeling of not being accepted or not belonging” (HM Government 2009: 5.23). The parliamentary Communities and Local Government Committee (2010: 26) reviewed this strategy in 2009-10, and its report emphasised the role of identity as a risk factor, summarising evidence that attributes radicalisation to a failure to “address the complex identity issues stemming from a failure to access a shared British identity”.

However, the CLG Select Committee report on CONTEST, drawing on evidence from grassroots South Asian community practitioners and from Ted Cantle of the Institute of Community Cohesion, noted that efforts at countering Islamist extremism had had the perverse effect of contributing to divisive identities by addressing British Muslims solely in terms of the singular identity “Muslim”, denying their range of other identities, i.e. denying the multiplicity and complexity of their identities. The Committee concluded: “We believe that support for individuals in helping them reconcile ‘multiple identities’ is key... Only if such concerns are not addressed properly, or ignored, will they develop into a sense of alienation from British society” (2010: 27). We can see this dynamic at play too in the mirroring of Islamist identitarianism in right-wing mobilisations around singular identities, such as the EDL, the explicit goal of which has been to “defend” an exclusive Englishness seen as under threat from Islam and immigration.

This is the extreme form of “the politics of nostalgic community” Franklin (1998) describes. Electoral analysis and survey research (Ford and Goodwin 2014, British Future 2012, Searchlight 2011) have identified a significant constituency – between a fifth and quarter of the population, predominantly white British, older, both working class and middle class, less educated – supporting xenophobic politics, described by Ford and Goodwin as “the left behind”. The term “left behind” conjures up the complex of cultural anxiety (Goodwin 2013) and socio-economic grievance (Feldman and Gidley 2014) that can drive far right mobilisation.

Islamism, in contrast, is associated with the young, and can be linked to what Anthony Heath (2014) calls “the integration paradox”: while second generation Muslims of minority background are more integrated than their parents by almost any objective index – in terms of feeling British or socioeconomic outcomes – they are more likely to perceive the gap, driving a sense of grievance among the more rather than the less integrated (Feldman and Gidley 2014).
**Scenario 1: The sectarian city**
This scenario is premised on the continued obduracy of absolutist forms of identity, and brittle, closed systems of civic life. The trend towards residential segregation among those of white British ethnicity, as well as the “balkanisation” of the school system and increasing stratification by migration status of both the welfare state and workplaces creates a “parallel lives” scenario. Some groups are internally cohesive, with strong bonding capital and strong sense of identity to anchor a sense of self in a changing world. Some migrant and minority groups benefit from maintained transnational links.

But there is a lack of bridging and linking capital in communities. Identity-based grievances drive a politics of division and the growing appeal of populist xenophobia and of extremist ideologies. Both Islamism and the right-wing populism of the “left behind” can be seen as brittle, obdurate identities, which, while providing a sense of security, are less resilient at times of rapid change. This has been described as “too much bonding capital” or as “destructive gemeinschaft”. This points us to a key policy implication of the understanding of identity developed in this paper: that community resilience in turbulent times is best served by developing narratives of identity and belonging that recognise multiplicity – through flexible, open and inclusive civic, regional and national identities.

As social psychologists Crisp and Hewstone (2007) have shown, interventions which reinforce factors that raise people’s sense of membership of multiple, cross-cutting identity categorisations shared with other individuals (rather than dwelling on single group memberships) are effective in moderating tendencies towards conflict. The principles of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (2007) are helpful here in thinking through what this might mean, in particular their emphases on “visible social justice” and “an ethics of hospitality” (see Keith 2007b).

**5.2 Social inequality and segregation as threat to shared urban identities**
Richard Sennett argues that the global order and its insecurities leaves many of us pining for security and retreating to the apparent safety of the suburbs and gated communities – a flight expressed architecturally in the New Urbanism (1970, 1991). Similarly, Bauman has spoken of the rise of “mixophobia” in this age of insecurity, while Neil Smith used the term “revanchist urbanism” to talk about middle class anti-urbanism and retreat from the disorder of the city. While evidence from the 2011 Census shows that most ethnic and religious groups are trending away from segregation (Simpson and Jivraj 2013), it is striking that the main ethnic group to buck this trend is the white British majority, and evidence from many UK cities suggests that socio-economic segregation is becoming more ingrained than ethnic segregation (Jensen and Gidley 2015, Kaufman 2014).
There is a vicious circle between patterns of social exclusion and patterns of divisive identity formation. Gating drives resentment among those outside the gates; evidence shows that “the experience of exclusion may translate into attachments to radicalised networks and ideologies that are defined in terms of opposition or hostility towards the majority society” (Collinson 2011:28).

This in turn heightens the urban risks to which gating responds. Such forms of social segregation and visible injustice are driven by socio-economic processes which occur in the absence of regulation, for instance in the housing market, or as the unintended consequences of social policies such as welfare reform or urban development. Returning to the example discussed above of the displacement from new city spaces in the wake of the Olympics, Watt (2013: 119) argues that: “The restructuring of urban space that Harvey (2008) identifies as accumulation by dispossession is producing increasingly antagonistic class relations that are in turn making such relations and their accompanying social injustices more apparent to those who’s right to the city is being threatened.” Similarly, Gray and Mooney’s (2011: 4) analysis of Glasgow 2014 describes Glasgow East as among the many “stigmatised locales of relegation” across the UK. Many geographers and social scientists have explored the malign effects of such a cartography of relegation in generating negative place-based identities:

**Scenario 2: The revanchist city**
This scenario is premised on the deepening of trends towards socioeconomic segregation in a context of a rolled back welfare state safety net and thinning of social solidarity. Individualist, lifestyle-based consumer identities, including those lived out on-line, predominate; place-based belonging is weak; civic culture is minimal and bonding capital is reduced. Urban unrest - the revolt of frustrated consumers - occurs periodically. Those that can afford to will invest in privatised security, retreating from a broken society into gated communities.

• Atkinson and Kintrea (cited by Lupton 2003) found that the perceived “reputation” of an area was important in structuring residents’ assessment of opportunities in the wider community;
• McKenzie (2012a, b) shows the psychological damage done to working class women living in a stigmatised social housing estate in the East Midlands;
• Gidley and Rooke (2010) have explored the damaged place-based identities associated with living in a locale designated a “chav town”.

And, as Watt (2013: 119) concludes his Olympic example, the results are potentially dramatic: “In turn this is leading to greater class resentment and in some cases anger against ‘them’ - corporate wealth and power - a resentment and anger whose political consequences are as yet unforeseen, but which will no doubt be played out on the streets and estates of East London.”
In his analysis of the 2011 riots as the revolt of frustrated consumers in the context of an increasingly socially segregated urban landscape, Zygmunt Bauman posed the question of whether the unrest curtails the possibility of conviviality in British cities: The point, therefore - and a point to which we don’t have as yet a convincing and empirically grounded answer, is whether the joys of conviviality are capable to replace the... enjoyment of market-supplied consumables... Can our desire for the pleasures of conviviality... be pursued inside the currently prevailing kind of society...? Well, if we don’t choose it by our own will, we may well be forced to accept it by the consequences of our refusal. (Bauman, 2011).

Other writers have suggested that the negative working of social segregation can be reduced through interventions which build shared, inclusive identities, including at a local level. As Reicher and Hopkins (2013: 11) put it: “To create inclusive identities that bring people together rather than set them at odds with each other it is necessary to deploy a range of economic, social and cultural policies which both shape the context in which we live our lives and also provide the resources by which we make sense of our world. Good leadership at every level – national government, local government and institutional management – is about combining the practical and the rhetorical to create a coherent and cohesive notion of who ‘we’ are.” These challenges point us towards more optimistic scenarios, which we turn to in the next and final section of this paper.

6. Future opportunities
6.1 Mundane cosmopolitanism, realising the diversity advantage
Previous sections have introduced ideas of “prosaic interaction”, “banal interculturalism”, “everyday integration” and “mundane conviviality”. Evidence from a range of “new contact zones” and “new city spaces” (e.g. Kesten et al 2011) as well as from long-established zones of encounter suggest that sites for mundane interaction are becoming more common in the UK’s towns and cities. The “commonplace diversity” Wessendorf (2013) observes in Hackney, whereby residents see identity-based differences as an unremarkable feature of daily life, is becoming less and less of an exception.

Scenario 3: The ordinary city
This scenario is based on the assumption of continued trends towards relaxed attitudes towards identity and difference, as well as the on-going transformation of our urban landscape by consumer capitalism. It is marked by the absence of identity-based conflict, but also reduced sense of placebased belonging and both low bridging and low bonding capital.

Residents respond to difference through benign indifference, living apart together. Commonplace diversity is most characteristic of areas with what Wallman calls “open
systems”: urban areas with dense connectivities and a high volume of flows in, out and through (Wallman 2003, Pastore and Ponzo 2012, Jensen and Gidley 2015).

The massive generational shift in attitudes towards difference – including towards migrants, minorities and homosexuality – signalled in the BSA and other survey data (Ford 2012) – shows that there are grounds for the optimism about the future of identity-based conflict. The “left behind” demographic is distinguished above all by age, and therefore the constituency for “the politics of nostalgic community” will inevitably shrink, despite an ageing population. Meanwhile, the “integration paradox” of disengagement noted above is largely a second generation phenomenon, equally likely to wither as cohort dynamics play out over time.

However, with the weakening of face-to-face communal identities, the growth of individualist consumerist identities and the blasé attitude (Simmel 2005) accompanying these, and in the absence of institutions providing opportunities for high levels of sustained and meaningful interaction, mundane interaction is most likely to take the form of “together apart” (Jensen and Gidley 2014). This sort of benign indifference to difference is the predominant mode of interaction in the scenario we call “the ordinary city”. Cochrane et al (2014), in a multi-sited study of “living multiculture” in libraries, parks, cafes and other spaces across a range of types of urban form, identify practices of blasé indifference to difference which they describe using Goffman’s (1959) phrase “civil inattention”: groups comfortably sharing space without necessarily connecting. They describe “comfort spaces” in the city, including chain cafes such as McDonald’s, Nando’s and Costa, whose neutrality allows use by different groups across multiple axes of difference and identity.

In this sense, the ordinary city is a safe city, characterised by spaces of familiarity, with the risks of unexpected encounter and conflict designed out. The “Clonetown UK” phenomenon – the sameification of our urban landscapes of leisure and consumption, as chain retail crowds out local distinctiveness – promises the spread of such comfort spaces. The loss of local distinctiveness may ground comfortable multiculture, but it cannot sustain place-based identities. Thus the identities associated with the ordinary city may prove too flexible (rather than too brittle) to be resilient: floppy identities perhaps, carrying the converse risks of the obdurate identities of the sectarian city. The key risk then, for policy-makers, of the ordinary city scenario, is not division, but lack of belonging. Urban strategies for place making that grounds belonging and for stimulating meaningful encounter through investment in public space therefore become central.

### 6.2 Interculturalism

The final opportunity we explore in this paper is the extent to which urban identities and belonging themselves can act as drivers for economic growth, wellbeing, equity and social inclusion. An enormous literature, in particular from economics, has shown
“the diversity advantage”, the forms of innovation, flexibility and resilience which flourish under certain conditions of diversity (Khovanova- Rubicondo and Pinelli 2012). As well as the superficial connections we might associate with the ordinary city, there is much of evidence of more meaningful intercultural interactions, not least the striking rise of mixed relationships and mixed families in the last decade (Ford 2012, Simpson and Jivraj 2013).

**Scenario 4: The intercultural city**

This scenario is premised on the deepening of trends towards forms of mixing and lower prejudice, and the on-going hybridisation and internal diversification of minority identities. With weaker and more fluid group identities and the survival of local distinctiveness, inclusive place-based identities can flourish, allowing richer but riskier forms of civic engagement. Richard Sennett (1991: xiii) argues that “difference is a positive human value” and that we need “to see differences on the streets or in other people neither as threats nor as sentimental invitations but rather as necessary visions” (ibid).

Political scientist Iris Marion Young (1990: 239) also wrote on this facet of city life: “attraction to the other, the pleasure and excitement of being drawn out of one’s secure routine to encounter the novel, the strange, and surprising. The erotic dimension of the city has always been an aspect of its fearfulness, for it holds out the possibility that one will lose one’s identity, will fall”. Similarly, Sennett (1991: xiii) links this orientation to disorder, to “discontinuity, and disorientation” as “ethical forces which connect people to each other”; “a disorganised city could encourage [residents] to become more sensitive to each other”, generating multiple points of contact with difference, and this diffusing hostility (Sennett 1970).

If the intercultural city is a disorderly city, then, it is a city of risks, in contrast to the ordinary city as a safe city. Where the ordinary city is a scenario in which the urban landscape is homogenised, flattening regional and local differences, the intercultural city is one in which distinctiveness is heightened and the unexpected thrives. Can a disorderly city be a policy goal? (see Philips et al 2014). The policy implications of the intercultural model are set out clearly by the Council of Europe’s Intercultural Cities programme, drawing on a body of analysis developed by urban scholars such as Phil Wood, Charles Landry and Ricard Zapata Barrero: “In relations with civil society the centre of gravity is not with ethnic community ‘representatives’ who are often advocates of cultural ‘purity’, but with the expression of plural voices in each community.

Public funding gives priority to cross-cultural activities of non-for profit organisations that emphasise common principles and objectives rather than sectarian interests… In the public realm, cities identify key public spaces (formal and informal) and invest in
the redesign, animation and maintenance to raise levels of usage and interaction by all ethnic groups as well as across ages and social strata.

Those involved in urban planning have a strong cultural awareness which helps them develop a better understanding of how different groups use space and incorporate into planning and design guidelines. In housing programmes intercultural cities seek to promote mixing, de-segregation, intercultural contacts and interaction through special activities and events. They also give ethnic groups confidence and information enabling them to consider taking housing opportunities outside traditional enclaves. An [effective] urban intercultural strategy requires a committed leadership, but also an intimate understanding of the complexities of diversity which can be found only in culturally diverse political and administrative structures.

Opening up of the political system and public service for minorities and empowering intercultural innovators and bridge-builders, is a fundamental condition for a genuine intercultural approach (Council of Europe 2012:3).” The intercultural city scenario is a potential constrained by many of the trends described in this paper – towards certain kinds of ethnic and socio-economic segregation, towards retail homogenisation and consumer identities – and by the obdurate presence of singular identities.

**Conclusion**

The four scenarios presented in the previous section – the sectarian city, the revanchist city, the ordinary city and the intercultural city – are not mutually exclusive; all are likely to provide ingredients for the varied cities of a future UK. It is unlikely that any one of them defines all UK cities in the coming decades. Rather, we can predict elements of all developing in the UK system of cities: cities will realise different aspects of the scenarios simultaneously in different neighbourhoods of the metropolis and at different moments in time.

The risks and opportunities identified above will be primary factors in which will predominate. Personal and collective identities make a difference to the resilience and adaptability of cities, making certain forms of behaviour change more or less possible. This can be especially the case when behaviour change relates to consumption patterns, due to the role of consumption practices in expressing and sustaining social identities (Crompton 2008).

Christie, et al (2010: 28) give examples in relation to climate change, noting that “studies suggest that there is an important connection between worldviews, sense of personal identity and core values, and sense of willingness and capacity to change behaviour and accept evidence that challenges cherished values and views”. For example, “green” self-identity might make behaviour change likely (Whitmarsh and O’Neill, 2010), but the sense that necessary changes to lifestyle might threaten
personal identities can have the opposite effect (Kahan, 2010:5); “it seems likely that those with worldviews disposed against the perceived implications of climate policy will remain resistant to the weight of evidence” on climate change.

Thus, as Christie, et al (2010) note, initiatives aimed at changing behaviour must go beyond information campaigns and incentives to focus on deeper values relating to personal and group identities (Crompton 2008, Crompton and Kasser 2009), a point paralleling that made in the literature around attitude change in the context of migration (Crawley 2005).

In turn processes of identity formation are affected by local and global events such as those related to environmental change, for instance by reinforcing diasporic solidarity: “High-profile natural disasters, heavily reported in the global media, have the potential to mobilise network-based reactions among a variety of migrant and other social groups dispersed across different societies or locations which may have political dimensions. This might be most likely where the particular event or responses to it are perceived in such a way that they become linked into pre-existing grievance or politicised identity agendas...” (Collinson 2011: 28).

In this sense, the resilience of specific urban sites and of the urban system itself is intimately bound up with features of identity, belonging and citizenship. These features, then, should be on the policy agenda in attempting to support such resilience. Social segregation and narratives of grievance breed obdurate forms of belonging that will not be able to face future challenges; the patterns of fragmentation that come with privatised identities and thinned citizenship are also barriers to the solidarity that is essential to resilience.

Learning the mundane art of living together is one of the essential challenges of creating cities able to adapt to the changes they will face in the coming decades.
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