Communication Breakdown? Reasoning about Language and Rational Agents

Kibble, Rodger. 2017. 'Communication Breakdown? Reasoning about Language and Rational Agents'. In: AISB 2017: Computing and Philosophy Symposium. University of Bath, United Kingdom 19-21 April 2017. [Conference or Workshop Item]

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Abstract or Description

This paper examines different approaches to rationality in analytic philosophy and AI, in the light of Berm´udez’s proposal that a full account of rationality must aim to explain how agents can both select and explain actions, as well as assessing them against some normative standard. We briefly survey instrumental, linguistic and discursive accounts of rationality, and conjecture that Habermas’s notion of the “three roots” of epistemic, teleological and communicative rationality comes closest to providing a satisfactory account, or at least the ingredients of such an account. This is contrasted with the widely-accepted BDI model of rational agency in AI, which we argue falls short of a full model of rationality and in particular, fails to provide a convincing model of linguistic communication.

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Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)

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16 February 2017Accepted
21 April 2017Published

Event Location:

University of Bath, United Kingdom

Date range:

19-21 April 2017

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Date Deposited:

31 Mar 2017 16:07

Last Modified:

16 Oct 2020 14:15


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