Convergence and divergence in dynamic voting with inequality

Di Guilmi, Corrado and Galanis, Giorgos. 2021. Convergence and divergence in dynamic voting with inequality. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 187, pp. 137-158. ISSN 0167-2681 [Article]

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Abstract or Description

We test whether the original median voter theorem's result of political convergence in a two-party system holds when the control variables that influence voters' preferences endogenously evolve over time and parties are policy motivated. We present a dynamic voting model in which voters' heterogeneous preferences evolve over time depending on observable common factors and unobservable idiosyncratic characteristics. In such a setting, the convergence of parties' platforms to the centre is a special case within a range of results that include instability and extreme equilibria. In particular, convergence is achieved not as the result of electoral strategies, but when neither party has enough support to pursue its agenda.

Item Type:


Identification Number (DOI):

Additional Information:

JEL classification: C62; D72; E71


Median voter, Dynamic voting, Political preferences

Departments, Centres and Research Units:

Institute of Management Studies


9 April 2021Accepted
12 May 2021Published Online
July 2021Published

Item ID:


Date Deposited:

26 Jul 2021 10:28

Last Modified:

12 Nov 2022 02:26

Peer Reviewed:

Yes, this version has been peer-reviewed.


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