What and where are conscious experiences? Dualism, reductionism, and reflexive monism

Velmans, Max. 2017. What and where are conscious experiences? Dualism, reductionism, and reflexive monism. In: Kurt Almqvist and Anders Haag, eds. The Return of Consciousness: A New Science on Old Questions. Stockholm: Sweden: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson Foundation, pp. 127-144. ISBN 9789189672901 [Book Section]

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This is a pre-publication version of a paper given at an invitation-only International Symposium on The Return of Consciousness: A new science on old questions, on 14th-15th June, 2015 in Avesta Manor, Sweden, hosted by the Ax:son Johnson Foundation. The paper summarizes the basic differences between dualist, reductionist and reflexive models of perception, clarifies why these differences are important to an understanding of consciousness, and provides references to how these contrasts have entered into philosophical and scientific discussions over the 25 years since they were first introduced in Velmans (1990) ‘Consciousness, Brain and the Physical World’, Philosophical Psychology, 3, 77-99. The paper concludes that there never was an unbridgeable divide separating “physical phenomena” from the “contents of consciousness”. Physical objects and events as perceived are part of the contents of consciousness—which alters the nature of the “hard problem of consciousness” and provides the departure point for reflexive monism.

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28 Mar 2019 10:24

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13 Jun 2021 07:19



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