Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness

Velmans, Max. 1999. Neural activation, information, and phenomenal consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22(1), pp. 172-173. ISSN 0140-525X [Article]

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Abstract or Description

O'Brien & Opie defend a “vehicle” rather than a “process” theory of consciousness largely on the grounds that only conscious information is “explicit.” I argue that preconscious and unconscious representations can be functionally explicit (semantically well-formed and causally active). I also suggest that their analysis of how neural activation space mirrors the information structure of phenomenal experience fits more naturally into a dual-aspect theory of information than into their reductive physicalism.

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February 1999Published

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10 Apr 2019 13:25

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10 Apr 2019 13:25

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