Velmans, Max. 2002. Could phenomenal consciousness function as a cognitive unconscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25(3), pp. 357-358. ISSN 0140-525X [Article]

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Abstract or Description

Evidence for unconscious semantic representation suggests that a cognitive unconscious exists. Phenomenal consciousness cannot easily be shown to deal with complex cognitive operations such as those involved in language translation and creativity. A self-organising phenomenal consciousness that controls brain functions also runs into mind/body problems (well recognised in the consciousness studies literature) that Perruchet & Vinter must address.

Item Type:	Article
Identification Number (DOI):	https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X02510062
Departments, Centres and Research Units:	Psychology
Dates:	Date Event June 2002 Published
Item ID:	26179
Date Deposited:	10 Apr 2019 13:29
Last Modified:	10 Apr 2019 13:29
Peer Reviewed:	Yes, this version has been peer-reviewed.
URI:	https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/26179

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