Velmans, Max. 1999. Intersubjective science. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(2-3), pp. 299-306. ISSN 1355-8250 [Article]

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Abstract or Description

The study of consciousness in modern science is hampered by deeply ingrained, dualist presuppositions about the nature of consciousness. In particular, conscious experiences are thought to be private and subjective, contrasting with physical phenomena which are public and objective. In the present article, I argue that all observed phenomena are, in a sense, private to a given observer, although there are some events to which there is public access. Phenomena can be objective in the sense of intersubjective, investigators can be objective in the sense of truthful or dispassionate, and procedures can be objective in being well-specified, but observed phenomena cannot be objective in the sense of being observer-free. Phenomena are only repeatable in the sense that they are judged by a community of observers to be tokens of the same type. Stripped of its dualist trappings the empirical method becomes if you carry out these procedures you will observe or experience these results - which applies as much to a science of consciousness as it does to physics.

Item Type:	Article
Keywords:	consciousness, dualist, empirical method, intersubjective, objective, private, repeatability, science, subjective
Related URLs:	Author
Departments, Centres and Research Units:	Psychology
Dates:	Date Event February 1999 Published
Item ID:	26185
Date Deposited:	10 Apr 2019 13:45
Last Modified:	10 Apr 2019 13:45
Peer Reviewed:	Yes, this version has been peer-reviewed.
URI:	https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/26185

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