Is the mind conscious, functional, or both?

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Velmans, Max. 1990. Is the mind conscious, functional, or both? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13(4), pp. 629-630. ISSN 0140-525X [Article]

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00080626

Abstract or Description

This 1990 BBS commentary will be mainly of interest to those who are studying the work of John Searle. It critically examines three of Searle’s proposals: (a) that cognitive functioning is not a definitive criterion of a mental state, (b) that the only definitive criterion of a “mental” state is its potential connection to consciousness, and (c) that there are no “deep unconscious states” that lack such a connection. The commentary argues that mental processes do not only have a potential connection to consciousness (as Searle maintains) or only permit us to function in certain ways (as functionalists would claim), but under certain circumstances achieve both. A science of the mind, therefore, could never be complete without addressing this duality.

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Article

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https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00080626